

**Dialectical materialism**  
**Collective of the Institute of Philosophy of the Communist Academy under the**  
**leadership of M. B. Mitin**  
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**Foreword**

The creation of a textbook on Marxist-Leninist philosophy for colleges and universities is one of the most important tasks that the Party has long put before the Communists working on the philosophical part of the theoretical front. For a number of reasons, however, this crucial task has not yet been resolved in any satisfactory manner.

The discussion on the philosophical front and the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on the magazine "Under the banner of Marxism" placed in the center of attention of the workers of the philosophical front the task of creating a party textbook on Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The task was to provide a textbook with an in-depth and at the same time quite popular systematic exposition of the foundations of dialectical and historical materialism, containing strong criticism of mechanistic and Menshevik-idealistic distortions of Marxism-Leninism; to give a comprehensive exposition of the social-fascist textbooks of Kautsky, Kunov, M. Adler, and others.

Two parts of this collective work is one of the first experiences in creating such a textbook. Authors and editors set as their goal:

1) coverage of the main issues of dialectical materialism and its application to the history of society and the world-historical practice of the proletariat, which received their development and classical expression from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin;

2) the elimination of the gap created by the mechanists and the Menshevik idealists, between theory and practice, between philosophy and the politics of the proletariat, between worldview and method, between materialism and dialectics;

3) coverage of issues of dialectical and historical materialism based on criticism of bourgeois philosophy and sociology, as well as modern social-fascist views,

4) highlighting the role of philosophy in the struggle for the general line of the party on two fronts - with right and "left" opportunism and counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, with mechanism and Menshevik idealism as the philosophical basis of deviations from the general line of the party;

5) the discovery and coverage of the new that brings Marxism-Leninism in the person of Lenin and Stalin to the common treasury of the philosophy of Marxism.

These are the goals that determine the content of the book and the nature of the layout of the material presented in it.

The book is far from free from a number of serious flaws. Only further work on this material, only the help and instructions of the entire reading mass, and first of all of all workers on the philosophical front, only an expanded Bolshevik self-criticism will make it possible to make all the necessary corrections and improvements to subsequent editions of the textbook.

In the work on the first part of the textbook took part TT. Basilevsky, Bobrovnikov, Vandek, Lipendin, Mayogov, Makarov, Mitin, Sitkovsky, Tashchilin, Shevkin, Shorin, Cheremnykh. General management, material processing and text editing belong to Comrade Mitinu.

**Chapter 1. Marxism-Leninism - the worldview of the proletariat**

**1.1. Three sources and three components of Marxism**

Marxism is a coherent coherent system of views - the ideology of the proletariat, which was developed by Marx and Engels and further developed in relation to the new historical era - the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution - Lenin and Stalin. This doctrine, distinguished by exceptional depth and integrity, is comprehensive: it covers the whole body of knowledge, starting with the problems of the philosophical world view and ending with the problems of strategy and tactics of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. Marxism indicates to the proletariat the path of liberation from the shackles of capitalist slavery, the path of revolutionary destruction of the capitalist system, the path of building a classless communist society.

*The main thing in Marxism is the doctrine of the world-historical role of the proletariat as the creator of a socialist society — the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marxism-Leninism is the only completely correct revolutionary doctrine. "In Marxism, there is nothing like" sectarianism "in the sense of some kind of closed, ossified doctrine that has arisen *aside* from the high road of the development of world civilization" <sup>[1]</sup>. Marxism is a brilliant continuation and completion of the three most important ideological currents of the beginning of the XIX century, which were developed in three main countries of Europe. Marxism gave a deeply scientific revolutionary answer to all the questions that advanced human thought has already raised. The doctrine of Marxism is "the legitimate*

successor of the best, which created mankind in the XIX century. in the face *German philosophy, English political economy, French socialism* " [2] .

Marxism as a sociopolitical trend arose and took shape at a time when the proletariat matured enough to set the task of liberation with all its intensity. Marxism arose in the period when the proletariat began to enter the world-historical arena, when the *contradiction between the social character of production and the private-property appropriation* characterizing the capitalist mode of production and serving as the source of all the antagonistic contradictions of bourgeois society , was sharply revealed .

In the three leading countries of Europe at that time - England, France and Germany, which stood at different levels of capitalist development, these antagonistic contradictions of capitalism protruded with different strength and from different sides. The three main trends of advanced human thought — classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, French socialism in connection with French revolutionary teachings in general — reflect the movement of these contradictions. In these contradictions of bourgeois society and in social theories reflecting them, one should look for the historical roots of Marxism.

The world outlook of Marx and Engels, first consistently set forth in "German Ideology", "Poverty of Philosophy" and "Communist Manifesto", stood the historical test of the revolutionary practice of 1848 and the revolution of 1871 represented by the Paris Commune. In the future, it began to seize with increasing speed more and more wide circles of followers in all countries, organizing them into the international party of communists. By the 1970s, Marxism conquered all other ideologies in the labor movement. But the trends expressed by these ideologies began to look for other ways and "resurrected" as revisionism.

Marxism leads a merciless criticism of old theoretical principles. At the beginning of the development of Marxism, this criticism mainly focuses on three sources of Marxism: *German classical philosophy, English classical political economy and French utopian socialism* in connection with French revolutionary teachings in general. At the same time, Marxism directs the fire of its theoretical criticism to the main contradictions of the capitalist world and mobilizes the revolutionary labor movement to change it. This two-sided process, which inextricably connects research and criticism, characterizes the content of Marxism in all its three most important components. Marxism arose as a *continuation and development* the three main directions of theoretical thought of the XIX century. However, at the same time, it means, as Lenin repeatedly pointed out, the *critical reworking* of these teachings from the point of view of the working class, its historical tasks, from the point of view of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for building a classless communist society. What are the constituent parts of Marxism?

Firstly, the *philosophical doctrine* is the newest materialism, consistent to the end. This materialism, which did not stop at the level of the XVIII century. and on the contemplative materialism of Feuerbach, and enriched by Hegel, freed from idealistic mysticism and critically revised dialectic of Hegel, extended to the knowledge of human society. This finished materialism, which is the scientific method of knowing and changing nature and society, is *dialectical materialism* .

Secondly, the *economic doctrine* is the disclosure of the laws of the origin, development and destruction of the capitalist social formation. Marxism revealed the dual nature of labor, revealed commodity fetishism as the materialization of social relations in a commodity, gave the key to a true understanding of social relations of capitalist production. The economic theory of Marx exposed the secret of the existence of capitalism, based on the exploitation of the proletarian class by the bourgeois class, appropriating the unpaid labor of the worker as surplus value. Historical materialism — Marx's ingenious discovery — by overcoming the antihistorical and idealistic theories of the classical economists, made political economics quite scientific. *The theory of surplus value is the cornerstone of Marx's economic theory.*

Third, *scientific communism* is the doctrine of class struggle, through the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat leading to the destruction of classes, the doctrine of the strategy and tactics of this struggle and the organization of the proletariat in the struggle for this dictatorship and the implementation of its tasks. Only dialectical and historical materialism, which made it possible to "objectively take into account the entire set of interrelationships of all classes of a given society, and, consequently, take into account the objective stage of development of this society and take into account the relationship between it and other societies" [3] only economic doctrine, which determined the nature of class exploitation in general and capitalist in particular, created scientific communism. Marxism merged the workers' movement with scientific communism, for the political movement of the proletariat necessarily leads it to the consciousness that it has no other way out than communism, and communism only becomes a material force when it is the goal of the proletarian

political struggle. Communism is not a state pre-established, as was the case with utopians, not an ideal with which reality should conform, but a real movement that destroys classes. *The main thing in scientific communism is the doctrine of the world-historic revolutionary role of the proletariat as the creator of a communist society.*

These three most important components of the Marxist understanding of the world are merged into organic unity. "The application of materialistic dialectics to the processing of all political economy, from its foundation, to history, to natural science, to philosophy, to the policy and tactics of the working class, is what interests Marx and Engels most of all," says Lenin make the most essential and newest, that is their ingenious step forward in the history of revolutionary thought " [4] .

From this unified, consistent system of views of Marxism, the truth of which is confirmed and hourly confirmed by historical practice, no part can be removed or ignored with impunity without falling into the bourgeois-reactionary swamp.

So, Marxism as a socio-political current emerged and took shape on the basis of the class struggle of the proletariat, taking into account the revolutionary experience and revolutionary thought of all countries of the world, in the conditions of the development of industrial capitalism. The story itself announced the trial of the old world, and the proletariat made it the grave digger as the accuser and the enforcer of his sentence. This death sentence in the economic, political and theoretical fields is Marxism, which has merged into revolutionary dialectical unity revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice.

Only dialectical materialism gave mankind, and the proletariat in particular, a great tool of knowledge and action and indicated "a way out of spiritual slavery, in which all oppressed classes have been living until now" [5] . Only the economic theory of Marxism explained the real position of the proletariat in the general structure of capitalism. Only scientific communism in the doctrine of class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat has indicated to the proletariat a path into a society in which "the free development of each will be a condition for the free development of all." The history of the second half of the XIX century, still in the depths of capitalist society — represented by Marx and Engels — laid the foundation for a new trend of theoretical thought — Marxism. And only "walking along the path Marx's theory, we will approach the objective truth more and more (never exhausting it); going in any other way , "writes Lenin, a brilliant pupil and successor of Marxism," we cannot come to anything except confusion and lies " [6] .

## 1.2. Historical roots of Marxism

Marxism arose and took shape when the proletariat entered the world-historical arena, when the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production became apparent with great urgency. What are these contradictions?

*The first contradiction* , common to the advanced capitalist countries, but manifested with particular force in England as a more developed capitalist country, is the *antagonism of wage labor and capital, the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie* .

The appropriation of the unpaid labor of the proletariat is the basis of the capitalist mode of production. Freedom of competition increasingly revealed itself as the freedom to exploit the wage worker. This caused and causes antagonism between the bourgeois class and the proletariat class. Within this antagonism, the bourgeoisie is a conservative side, the proletariat is destructive and revolutionary. From the first comes the action aimed at preserving the contradiction, from the second - the action aimed at its destruction, the destruction of the society that gave rise to this contradiction.

The industrial revolution through the development of the steam engine turned the old manufactory into an enterprise of modern large-scale industry. It gave it a wide scope for the development of capital, increasing capitalist exploitation, but it also created a force that could resist this exploitation — the factory-proletariat.

"Since in the living conditions of the proletariat," wrote Marx and Engels in one of his early works, "all the living conditions of modern society have reached the peak of inhumanity; because in the proletariat man has lost himself, but at the same time not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, directly still forced to revolt against this inhumanity dictates starkly, relentless, absolutely imperious needs , the practical expression of necessity , that is why the proletariat can and should free himself. But he cannot free himself without abolishing his own living conditions. He cannot abolish his own living conditions without abolishing all inhuman life conditions of modern society, concentrated in its own position. He is not in vain passes the harsh, hardening school of labor . The point is not what the individual proletariat or even the entire proletariat sees its goal at the moment . The fact of the matter is what the proletariat is and what it, in accordance with its existence , will historically have to do. His goal and his historical action are most clearly and indisputably indicated by his own life situation, as well as by the whole organization of modern bourgeois society. There is no need to dwell

on the fact that a considerable part of the English and French proletariat is now *conscious* their historical task and is constantly working on the further development and final clarification of their self-consciousness " [7] .

Gradually, the working class develops the consciousness of the need not only to limit competition among workers or partially destroy it, but also to destroy the *whole system* that generates competition. In 1831 and 1834 there are uprisings of the French workers in Lyon in response to the intensification of exploitation and the treachery of the bourgeoisie, manifested by it in the revolution of 1830. During the uprising of 1831, the workers hold the city in their hands for several days. They expose the famous slogan: "Toil or to die fighting". The rebellion of 1834 was even more important. These uprisings put the work question at the forefront. The demands of the workers, although not yet directed against the very foundations of capitalism, nevertheless, with all the urgency they raised the question of exploitation, the struggle against capitalism. In 1837–1840 the first *the British Chartist national labor movement* , the first mass revolutionary movement of the workers reaches its apogee. In 1844, the Silesian weavers revolted in Prussia. Finally, the events of 1848 "noisily and muddledly announced," says Marx, "the emancipation of the proletariat is this mystery of the XIX century and its revolutions." Thus, developing with the growth of large-scale industry and with the liberation from the influence of the surrounding petty-bourgeois environment, the *proletariat* begins to resist the bourgeoisie as an independent force. He " *abruptly, clearly, mercilessly and imperiously declares publicly his opposition to the society of private property* ."

*The second contradiction* , which characterizes bourgeois society and strenuously erodes it especially since the second quarter of the XIX century, is the *antagonism between the organization of production in individual enterprises and the anarchy of production in all bourgeois society* .

Bourgeois society has as its basis the production of goods. But "the peculiarity of every society based on the production of goods is that in it producers lose power over their own social relations" [8]. Production without a plan, to the market, without taking into account the real needs entails anarchy of social production. The laws of commodity production are manifested in the external public relations between commodity producers in exchange; they are revealed as the coercive laws of "free competition" that prevail between capitalists. Being forced to introduce new machines under the blows of free competition and expand production, capitalism creates an unheard of development of productive forces, growth in the unprecedented levels of social wealth. At the same time, the ruin of the urban craft and the peasantry and the crowding out of workers through the improvement and introduction of new machines create a surplus of labor, human resources without employment and livelihood. " *Anarchy of bourgeois society* forms the basis of the modern *social order* , as well as public order, for its part, is the guarantee of this anarchy, Marx and Engels wrote then. "Since and to what extent they contradict each other, to the extent and to the same strong degree they condition each other" [9] .

The disorderly nature of bourgeois production in its whole, violating the proportionality between different industries, creates an excess of the supply of goods over their demand. At one extreme are the accumulated means of production and wealth in general, on the other, need, poverty, exhaustion. All this finds its extreme expression in crises. They especially clearly manifest the domination of the product over the producer, the material forces seem to acquire spiritual life, and the people who created them descend to the degree of inert, dull material force. Crises characterize the aggravation of the contradictions of the bourgeois order. "Demanding the *denial of private property* , the proletariat," writes Marx in 1844, "merely elevates to the *principle of society* what society has erected in *it* the principle that is embodied in *it* , besides its assistance, as a negative result of society " [10] .

Crises, as a material protest of the productive forces against the relations of bourgeois property that constrain their development, lead to an extreme deterioration in the condition of the workers, making it highly fragile and unstable. But by doing so, they enormously revolutionize the consciousness of the proletariat and make it necessary to fight not only for temporary and partial improvements within capitalism, but also against the basis of these crises, that is, against the capitalist mode of production itself.

So private property in the movement and development of its internal contradictions itself pushes itself toward its own destruction. It comes to self-denial by giving birth to the proletariat, this "conscious of its spiritual and physical poverty, poverty, this conscious of its rejection, and thus itself the most abolishing rejection. The proletariat enforces a sentence that private property itself imposes upon the birth of the proletariat, just as it executes a sentence that itself renders hired labor by producing someone else's wealth and its own poverty. Having won the victory, the proletariat in no

way becomes the absolute side of society, for it triumphs only by abolishing itself and its opposite. With the victory of the proletariat disappear like the proletariat itself,<sup>[11]</sup> .

Such are the most important forms of manifestation of the main contradiction of capitalist society — the contradiction between the social character of production and private-ownership appropriation. But from this basic contradiction arise also other derivative contradictions, which, however, are of no small importance for characterizing the capitalist reality of the first half of the 19th century and for understanding the historical roots and causes of the emergence of Marxism.

One such contradiction, increasingly emerging in the process of the unfolding of the class struggle in capitalist countries, especially in France with its wealth of political upheavals, was the contradiction between the economic essence of bourgeois society and its external manifestation in its political superstructure - between "civil society" and a democratic state.

The more the bourgeoisie adapted the political superstructure to the needs of its economy and replaced the old feudal privileges with bourgeois law, the more pronounced the contradiction between the formal equality proclaimed by it in the form of "democracy" and the actual inequality existing in its economy. Political institutions were the most evil, most sobering caricature, says Engels, to the brilliant promises of the philosophers of the 18th century. "Eternal justice was realized in the face of bourgeois justice ... natural equality was limited to equality of citizens before the law, and the most important of human rights was the right of bourgeois property. The rational state and the "social contract" of Rousseau turned out to be and could be in practice only a bourgeois democratic republic.<sup>[12]</sup> .

"The contradiction between a *democratic representative state* and *bourgeois society* ," Marx and Engels should have noted early, "is a complete form of the classic contradiction of the public community and slavery . In the modern world, everyone at the same time is a member of the slave system and the human community. It is precisely slavery of bourgeois society that, apparently , is the greatest freedom , because it seems to be a complete form of independence. an individual who takes unbridled, not bound by any common bonds and no other person, the movement of his alienated vital elements, such as property, industry, religion, etc., for his own freedom, while, on the contrary, it represents his complete slavery and human rejection. To the place of privilege here became the right"<sup>[13]</sup> .

The development of political struggle in the 40s of the XIX century. increasingly revealed the class essence of bourgeois democracy. It turned out that from a political point of view, the state and social structure are not two different things. The government discovered itself as the official expression of class antagonism, the organization of the class of exploiters to protect "the general conditions of production, and therefore forcible retention of the exploited class at the degree of subordination required by this mode of production"<sup>[14]</sup> . This showed that evil is not only in one form or another of the state, but in its essence, that is, in the structure of a society of private property.

When the proletariat enters the historical arena, when its struggle against the bourgeoisie comes to the fore, the bourgeoisie finally throws itself into the arms of reaction and the proletariat acts as the true representative of genuine democracy. He is ever more decisive in the experience of his struggle comes to the conviction that real equality is primarily the destruction of the classes themselves. But this equality is unattainable without the revolutionary overthrow of the existing government, without the destruction of the bourgeois state. And that is why slogans emerge more and more on the banners of the proletariat: "Peace to the huts is war to the palaces", " *Political power is our means, social prosperity is our goal* " .

Another, more particular contradiction arising from the difference in the level of economic status of capitalist countries, is important because it makes it possible to break through the revolution in certain parts of the bourgeois organism. This contradiction at the beginning of the XIX century. found its expression in the Anglo-Russian domination over Europe and in the presence of a revolutionary situation in Germany.

The originality of the situation was that in such capitalist countries, which were a kind of "extremities" of the bourgeois organism — namely Germany of that time — only the tasks of assault on absolutism and remnants of feudalism still arose, while in England and partly in France the beginning of the end was played out of this assault, and against capitalism, the revolutionary proletariat began a systematic struggle.

On the one hand, tsarist feudal Russia, a stronghold of reaction and absolutism, hung over revolutionary Europe. On the other hand, England, the ruler of the world market at that time, who turned whole nations into her wage workers, stood firmly like a rock on which continental revolutionary waves broke. But at the same time, due to the difference in the level of the economy of capitalist countries, England, expanding its economic ties and exerting economic pressure on the

backward states of the continent, acted as one of the causes that generated economic crises and revolutionary waves in the continental countries of Europe. "The continent," wrote Marx, "exports to England incomparably more than to any other country. But export to England, in turn, depends on the position of England, especially in overseas markets. Then England exports to overseas countries far more than the entire continent, so the size of continental exports to these countries always depends on the overseas exports of England. If, therefore, crises primarily create a revolution on the continent, then their reason is still in England. In the limbs of a bourgeois organism, violent catastrophes should naturally occur rather than in his heart, where there are more opportunities to compensate." [15]. One of these limbs was Germany 40s.

Thus, if all of Europe felt Anglo-Russian domination, then this double oppression fell on Germany with particular force, because at that time the economic and political border that separated East from West lay through it. *But it was precisely its position as one of the limbs of the bourgeois organism that thickened the revolutionary atmosphere in it and created the possibility of the development of the bourgeois revolution as a direct prologue to the proletarian one.*

It is necessary to point out one more contradiction in the field of theoretical consciousness, which arises from the already mentioned above contradictions. This contradiction was revealed with particular force by the time of the emergence of Marxism also in Germany. This is the most characteristic moment of bourgeois ideology, which is based on the contradictions of classes and the contradiction between mental and physical labor - the *gap between theory and practice*.

The once bourgeois society, due to the internal needs of its development, as it was free from the fetters of the feudal system, necessarily pushed its representatives onto the path of the development of theoretical knowledge. The bourgeoisie sought with the help of scientific knowledge to destroy the dominance of the Roman Catholic Church as an international center, cementing the feudal system. On the other hand, through the knowledge of the properties of material bodies and the forms of manifestation of the forces of nature, she set herself the task of developing productive forces. The feudal society with its religion, theology and metaphysics was opposed by the bourgeoisie to the alliance of natural science with materialistic philosophy. XVIII century. - the century of the Great French Revolution and the industrial revolution in England - was a practical triumph of this theory.

By the beginning of the new century, antagonism between theory and practice is beginning to be revealed in bourgeois ideology. This was facilitated by the growing isolation of the propertied classes from the direct process of material production and their monopolization of theoretical work. Large-scale industry separates science from labor as an independent production potency and forces it to serve capital. Knowledge becomes an instrument capable of separating from labor and opposing it against hostility. Antagonism between bourgeois industry and bourgeois theory, on the one hand, and poverty created and ruin created by capital, on the other, is becoming increasingly apparent.

At the beginning of its development, the bourgeoisie, expressing objectively progressive tendencies of social development, could give its science the appearance of superclassiness, the form of universality and represented it as the only rational and generally significant one. But as the antagonistic nature of bourgeois society is revealed, the dual nature of bourgeois science is also revealed. By one side it is aimed at mastering and subjugating nature to human society, and the other toward subordinating society to the ruling class in order to exploit the oppressed classes. The whole exploiting character of bourgeois science and its separation of theory from practice, the gap between mental and physical labor are revealed.

In the interest of securing the economic slavery of the working class, the bourgeoisie has already betrayed the "anathema" of materialism. It appeals to religion in order to "curb" the godless aspirations of the exploited, directed against capitalist property. Bourgeois philosophy turns into a pillar of theology, idealism is strengthened in it. At the same time, philosophical materialism also finds in its development a different class orientation. In the form of natural scientific vulgar materialism, it dissolves in natural science and in this way is neutralized by the bourgeoisie, which drowns in revolutionary creeping theoretical conclusions and perspectives that are creeping in creeping empiricism. On the other hand, in the form of socialist and communist theories, materialism begins to denounce bourgeois society and its inherent antagonisms.

The theoretical struggle develops between the classical economists as the scientific representatives of the bourgeoisie and the communists — theorists of the working people.

Classical political economy is still engaged in the struggle against the remnants of feudalism. She sees her task in showing how wealth is acquired in relations of bourgeois production and how much it surpasses the production of wealth under feudalism. This pushes her to study the relations of bourgeois production, and here she makes her great discoveries, laying the foundation for the *labor* theory of value.

But it is increasingly becoming clear, especially in connection with the consequences of the industrial revolution, "that not only wealth is produced in the same relationship, but poverty, that in the relations in which the development of productive forces takes place, a certain *resistance force* also develops and these relations create the wealth of citizens, that is, the wealth of the bourgeois class, only under the condition of non-stop destruction of the wealth of individual members of this class and the creation of a non-stop growing *proletariat* ." Therefore, bourgeois economists delimit their theory from such revolutionary conclusions and gradually descend to the explicit defense and idealization of bourgeois society.

French revolutionary doctrines, especially socialist and communist, disillusioned with the results of the Great French Revolution, critically reveal the contradictions of bourgeois society, but they cannot understand their nature and find the strength to resolve these contradictions in practice. They are well *aware of the existence of opposites of classes* , as well as elements of decomposition within modern society, but they do not see any historical initiative on the part of the proletariat, they "do not head the political movement inherent to it". During the struggle, they create a *utopian* theory of the organization of the future society. This leads them to detach from the practice of the present, from the class struggle.

Exposing existing antagonisms, utopian socialists dreamed of reconciling them, developed plans for a socialist structure, hoping to realize the future without a struggle; they saw no other lever for the reorganization of the present, except for the goodwill and consciousness of the people. They failed to combine their theories with the social practice of the present, with the practice of the spontaneously developing labor movement.

Bourgeois economists reject the unity of theory and practice, oppose the theory of revolutionary practice. Utopian socialists have not yet come to the unity of theory and practice.

The former relate positively to the existing bourgeois world, regarding it as the best of all worlds; the latter are negative, considering its existence as a mistake of reason. Some are apologetic with respect to capitalism; others are critical. But both of them take an anti-historical point of view, and both of them carry out metaphysics and idealism in their views on the history of social development.

Classical German philosophy, under the influence of the Great French Revolution, breaks through the metaphysical stalemate of bourgeois theory. But it breaks through metaphysics on an *idealistic* basis, identifying the development of being with the development of thinking.

This phenomenon is largely explained by the social practice of semi-feudal Germany, where the bourgeois revolution was still brewing.

Kant was the first to begin the philosophical revolution of classical idealism. Hegel completed it in his system. "Ever since people think," writes Engels, "there has not been such a comprehensive system of philosophy as Hegel's. Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of nature, philosophy of spirit, philosophy of law, religion, history — everything was put together in *one* system, everything was reduced to one basic principle " <sup>[16]</sup> .

*This principle was development, understood as the struggle of opposites, which was conceived by the idealist Hegel as the development of world consciousness, reason, absolute spirit.*

The more bleak the German semi-feudal reality was, the more the philosophical thought strove to rise above it. But not finding historically valid support for the bourgeois ideals she advanced, enjoying her own independence and "creativity", philosophical thought lost the firm ground of actual practice and fell into the deadly embraces of abstraction.

German philosophical idealism, marking the disgusting separation of theory from practice and the powerlessness of theory in the matter of explaining and changing practice, is incessant flight, "progress to infinity" from actual practice, from the real world. Not "you can, because you should," but "you cannot, because you should" —this is the result of German classical idealism, as expressed in the words of its finisher, in the words of Hegel. But Hegel himself, on the basis of his dialectic, plans a way out of this impasse.

"In reality, rationality and the law are not at all in such a sad position that they *should* only be" <sup>[17]</sup> ,states Hegel. All that is rational is at the same time necessary; yet what is necessary, must be, or at least become, is the result of his idealistic dialectic.

The Hegelian dialectic returns to reality. But it does not find the objective reality of nature and society, but only the empty shell of thinking — the logical shadow of reality. Having identified being and thinking, Hegel inevitably comes to the identification of practice with theory. Idealistic dialectics, expressing the practical impotence of the German bourgeoisie, dissolved all the subject-practical human activity in mental categories, leading to a conservative philosophy.

The thunders of the July revolution of 1830 were the burial sounds of German classical idealism, which approached the understanding of the meaning of practical activity, but failed to master actual, material practice in order to change it.

The philosophy of Feuerbach, expressing the closeness of the bourgeois revolution, decisively breaks with Hegel's idealism and proclaims materialism: not thinking, but being of nature and man - the initial moment of knowledge. But man and nature are considered by Feuerbach "only in the form of an *object* or in the form of *contemplation* , and not as *human sensory activity, practice* " <sup>[18]</sup> .

Putting forward the need for a union of philosophy with natural science and natural science with philosophy, Feuerbach did not understand that the problem of the development of the theory rested not only on the need to overcome religion, theology, metaphysics in general, but also to criticize bourgeois politics.

By the 40th years of the XIX century. An encyclopedic task arose to investigate and summarize the mass of accumulated material both in the field of the history of nature — natural science, and in the field of the history of society — the history of people. The once revolutionary bourgeois theory, having become conservative, was unable to cope with this task: by conserving bourgeois society as eternal and "natural" and feeding this conservatism of spontaneously developing natural science, it rested on a metaphysical impasse.

In Germany, the bourgeoisie was not yet in power due to the fact that the capitalist mode of production matured only when its antagonistic nature was revealed in the acute conflicts of the historical struggle that boiled in England and France. However, this feature of the historical development of Germany not only did not exclude the possibility of criticism of bourgeois theory, but required this criticism from the side of the class whose historical task was to replace capitalism with a new mode of production and finally destroy the classes, ie, the proletariat. This criticism had to be associated with politics. The political struggle was the main link for which it was possible to pull the theory out of the swamp of feudal and bourgeois limitations on the path of objective and revolutionary knowledge and thereby eliminate the gap and antagonism between theory and practice.

So there was this problem by the time of Marxism. Such, in the most general terms, are the historical contradictions that prepared the rise of Marxism.

Marxism as a socio-political current did not arise aside from the high road of international civilization. Both in its material and practical as well as theoretical roots, it is a *product of international development* . Its emergence in Germany is explained, as we have seen, also by the international situation.

Germany of that time was an interweaving of the above described contradictions. The still unsolved contradictions of the new bourgeois economy and feudalism were replenished with internal antagonisms of bourgeois society. Just as in the Roman Pantheon it was possible to find the gods of all nations, in Germany it was possible to find the sins of various forms of economic and government.

In Germany, as already indicated, the capitalist mode of production matured after its antagonistic character was revealed in England and in France. This circumstance determined the political and theoretical impotence of the German bourgeoisie and the great political and theoretical consciousness of the German proletariat, which had already relied on the experience of the British and French labor movement. Comparing the "giant children's shoes of the proletariat" with the "dwarf worn-out political boots of the German bourgeoisie," Marx, in 1844, saw in the German proletariat a "figure of an athlete." Already "the Silesian uprising *begins* just as the French and British uprisings *end*,- by the consciousness of the essence of the proletariat". Germany, being on the eve of the bourgeois revolution under more progressive conditions of European civilization in general, with a much more developed proletariat than in England XVII and in France of the XVIII century, had the opportunity to make this bourgeois revolution a direct *prologue to the proletarian revolution*. *The center of the revolutionary movement moved from the West to the East, and Germany was its vanguard*. And therefore, as the Communist Manifesto points out, "Communists pay their main attention to Germany".

Finally, only the German conscious dialectic — the greatest acquisition of classical idealism — cleansed of the mystifying form, put on its feet by the greatest ideologue of the proletariat, made it possible to pull the theory out of the metaphysical impasse of feudal and bourgeois limitations.

All these circumstances combined and explain to us why Germany of the second half of the XIX century became the *birthplace of Marxism* , and the leaders of the German proletariat — Marx and Engels, armed with materialist dialectics, critical and revolutionary in their very essence, its creators.

Marx and Engels, having passed through the "fiery flow" of Feuerbach materialism, through this "purgatory" of that time, freeing from concepts and prejudices of idealistic philosophy, for the first time brought back into the world, as opposed to "grumbling, pretentious imitation", forgotten



dialectical method. They pointed out the connection of their method with the Hegelian dialectic, as well as the direct opposite of this latter, showed the application of this method to the facts of empirical science and to the conditions of the revolutionary struggle.

The bourgeoisie, as we saw above, at the time of its revolutionism in the person of its best representatives, "pushing on nature", concluded an alliance of natural science with philosophy, and was in a materialistic and atheistic position. Marx and Engels, expressing the interests of the proletariat, a class interested not only in changing nature, but also in a radical change in society, require for ideological philosophy not only an alliance with natural science, but also its connection with the history of mankind. "We know only one single science, the science of history. History can be viewed from two sides and divided into the history of nature and the history of people. *But both these sides cannot be separated from each other* , - Marx and Engels write in 1845, "as long as people exist, the history of nature and the *history of people determine each other* " <sup>[19]</sup>. The conscious attitude of people towards nature determines their conscious attitude towards each other, and, conversely, their conscious attitude towards each other determines their conscious attitude towards nature.

In a class society, people's relations with each other, their social relations are far from conscious. In bourgeois society, however, they represent "complete slavery and human rejection," and represent the main brake on conscious development in all respects. Therefore, Marx and Engels directed the main fire on the social relations of capitalism, which were concentrated in the politics of the bourgeoisie.

Criticism of Hegelian philosophy, miserable epigones of Hegelianism in the face of representatives of the "German ideology" and "true socialism", criticism of contemporary socio-economic doctrines led Marx "to the conclusion that legal relations, like the forms of the state, cannot be understood from themselves , nor from the so-called universal development of the human spirit; on the contrary, they are rooted in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of the English and French of the XVIII century, united under the name of "civil society", and the anatomy of civil society should be sought in political economy " <sup>[20]</sup> . "The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and spiritual processes of life in general" <sup>[21]</sup> .

From this conclusion Marx follows highly revolutionary conclusions, opening up the prospects for the greatest revolution of all times, not only for theory, but, what is especially important, for the practice of the proletariat. At a certain stage of development, further points out Marx's famous preface, "On the Critique of Political Economy", production relations of the "forms of development of productive forces" become their fetters. "Then comes the era of social revolution. With the change in the economic basis, a revolution takes place more or less quickly in the whole vast superstructure. " "Bourgeois production relations are the last antagonistic form of the social production process, antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but antagonism that springs from the social conditions of life of individuals,

Therefore, the prehistory of human society ends with this social formation " <sup>[22]</sup> .

### **1.3. Marxism-Leninism as a unity of theory and practice**

"It is not the consciousness of people that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness" <sup>[23]</sup> . This position, brilliant in its depth, sounding so simply and so clearly, was formulated by Marx and Engels and further developed by Lenin in a merciless struggle against idealism and against metaphysical, mechanical materialism.

Idealism is distracted from real life, identifies it with consciousness. According to Marx, he turns "real, objective chains into *extremely ideal* , extremely subjective, exclusively existing *in me* , and therefore turns *all* external sensory battles into battles of pure ideas."

Metaphysical materialism such as Feuerbach does not go beyond the framework of simplified "natural-scientific materialism." He views the existence of people chained by modern capitalist relations as being the "man in general". Therefore, he does not find in the very existence of a force capable of breaking these chains, and thus dooms people to the further wearing of these "sober hopeless chains".

From the point of view of idealism, the development of being is determined by the development of consciousness. Therefore, idealism considers the impact on people's minds, the propaganda of ideas a necessary and quite sufficient condition for the transformation of being. For metaphysical materialism, consciousness is determined by the development of being, but it understands being itself abstractly, "only in the form of an *object* or in the form of *contemplation* , and not *ashuman sensory activity, practice* , not subjectively" <sup>[24]</sup> . In so far as the metaphysical materialist remains in practice an idealist, it is precisely where the communist materialist, the Marxist sees the need and at the same time finds the conditions for the transformation of the world.

Consciousness is determined by social being, and in turn it contributes to the further development of being. However, people's consciousness can play such a role only *through the practice of man*. "Ideas can never be brought beyond the boundaries of the old order: they always only bring beyond the boundaries of the ideas of the old order. Ideas can *not do anything at all* . To fulfill ideas, Marxism formulates its position, it requires people who must use practical force " [25] . Marx and Engels beat their opponents both for their idealistic disregard for the practical material activity of man, and for the metaphysical opposition of being to consciousness, ignoring the change of nature and society by man himself.

They did away with the metaphysical, Feuerbach abstract cult of nature, but they also relied on natural science and its new discoveries: the discovery of the transformation of energy, which showed that the unity of all forms of movement in nature is no longer just a philosophical statement, but a natural science fact; the discovery of a cell that has thrown off the veil of secrecy that has enveloped the process of the emergence, growth and structure of organisms; Darwin's discovery of the law of evolution of the organic world. On the other hand, Marx and Engels, through criticism of politics, oriented philosophical thought to the study of the history of human society. Having opened the material content of political ideas, having summed up the scientific basis for his political ideology by opening *historical materialism*, Marx and Engels thus created the missing link for an all-inclusive, integral scientific materialistic worldview, from beginning to end. Relying on stubborn facts and at the same time revealing their dialectical-materialistic connection, this world outlook makes the *philosophy* that makes a *claim to be higher than other sciences* , a philosophy divorced from concrete knowledge, philosophy as "science of sciences", *unnecessary* .

Thus, the greatest merit of Marx and Engels and Lenin, who continued their work, is the creation and further development of *dialectical materialism* as an integral, consistently revolutionary worldview, encompassing dead nature, organic life, thought, and human society. In its development, Marxism is built as such a *holistic world view* , containing "consistent materialism covering the area of social life, dialectics as the most comprehensive and profound teaching on development, the theory of class struggle and the world historical revolutionary role of the proletariat, creator of the new communist society" [26] . Focusing on politics makes it possible for Marx and Engels to overcome the purely contemplative nature of previous materialism and to *unite philosophical materialism with scientific communism* . The realization of communism is the ultimate goal of the activities of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and the practical materialism party created by them, i.e. communism.

Marxism banishes idealism from its last refuge — from the knowledge of human society; he contrasts dialectical materialism with unilateral, half-hearted, deadly materialism of the past. Marxism sets itself the task of ripping off "imaginary flowers from chains" not for the fact that oppressed by class slavery, humanity carried "sober, hopeless chains" [27] , and then for it to shed these chains in a revolutionary struggle.

But material chains can be completely dropped by material force. Marxism, having discovered the laws of the development of human society and its class structure, having discovered the specific law of the capitalist mode of production, the law of the production of surplus value, finds such strength in the person of the proletarian class. This force, in contrast to all the historically preceding classes, striving under the influence of "unvarnished, inexorable, absolutely imperious *need* , this practical expression of *necessity* , " cannot be freed from its inhuman living conditions, can not free itself by abolishing its own living conditions, not abolishing " *all* inhuman life conditions of modern society, concentrated in its own position " [28] . Marxism reveals all the antagonisms of modern society, tracing their evolution, proving their transitory nature. While utopian socialists regarded the proletariat only as the most suffering class, Marxism directly sets the goal of the proletariat's class goals and the leadership of the proletariat in its struggle, since only the proletariat is the only completely revolutionary class of modern society. Marxism is the dialectical materialist result of the processing of the whole history of mankind and especially the historical practice of the development and struggle of the proletariat itself.

Marxism, as a theory in its very essence critical and revolutionary, unites in itself an internally and inseparably strict and supreme scientific nature with revolutionism. And this is because, first of all, it is the only and only world outlook of the proletariat - the class called upon by history to eliminate the separation of theory from practice and practice from theory in the process of revolutionary change in the world. Expressing this aspiration, Marxism from the very beginning acts not only as a critic of the world and its explanation, but also as a *theory and practice of its change* , including criticism and explanation as its subordinate moments.

"Not criticism, but revolution is the driving force of history, as well as religion, philosophy, and any other theory" [29] .

"Philosophers only *explained the world* in various ways , but the fact is, - Marx wrote in 1845," to *change it* " <sup>[30]</sup> . This in no way means that revolutionary change is possible without theoretical criticism and explanation of the world. It only means the requirement to *free the theory* from fetishistic covers, to save it, on the one hand, from subjectivist illusions that it "can do everything, that it doesn't care", on the other hand, from creeping empiricism, from "objectivism" that doomed the theory to "Tail" stumbling after the events and turned it into a tool to protect the existing old world. Thus, this "only" is a whole revolution, freeing the theory from illusions and giving it immeasurable power and strength.

Already at the beginning of its development, Marxism, defending a dialectical understanding of the unity of theory and practice, led a merciless struggle with both *subjectivist and objectivist* distortions of this view. He fought against the subjectivist "critical criticism" of the idealists of the Young Hegelians, the Bauer brothers and Co., who reduced history to imaginary activities of imaginary subjects who put these activities of individuals above the interests and movement of the masses. He led the struggle against empiricism and objectivism, etc., of "true socialists" and historians who viewed historical relations separately from activities that reduced history to a collection of dead facts that ignored political activity, which in their party "impartiality" were above any class struggle.

Against these alien teachings of the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism put forward a theory based on "*revolutionary, practically-critical activity* ." The theoretical criticism of Marx and the explanation of historical reality for them pose problems for the resolution of which there is only one means - revolutionary *practice* . "We see," Marx wrote, "that the solution of theoretical opposites is possible *only* through *practical* means, only thanks to the practical energy of man, and therefore, their solution is not at all just a task of knowledge, *but really* a task of life that *philosophy* could not solve precisely because she saw in her *only a* theoretical problem " <sup>[31]</sup> . True practice — and such is, first and foremost, a sensory-objective *activity* — forms the basis of a real and positive theory, it is its driving impulse and the criterion of truth. Marxism developed in constant ideological battles with "friends" and with open enemies, in a bitter struggle with all the remnants of "socializing" petty-bourgeois theories, defending in theory and practicing the dialectical unity of theory and practice based on objective activity. Marxism reveals the roots of modern practice in the economic conditions of a class society, and therefore mobilizes genuine theory and true revolutionary practice to overthrow bourgeois practice. In the masses, in the practice of the masses, Marxism is seeking a way to eliminate this disgusting gap.

*Theory, in order to become a force, must master the masses.* The masses, in order to become capable of correct revolutionary action, must master the true theory.

*But not every theory is capable of mastering the masses.* The theory can do this *only when* "*at the same time it includes in the positive understanding of its negation, its necessary destruction, every realized form is considered in motion, therefore also from its transitory side, since it does not bow down and by its very essence is critical and revolutionary* " <sup>[32]</sup> , i.e. when it brings objective knowledge to dialectical materialism, which cognizes things objectively and in essence, in their revolutionary change and development.

The conclusion that theory of oppressing classes, in particular bourgeois theory, essentially cannot be in unity with the practice of the oppressed masses follows from the same relationship between theory and practice. The reasons for this impossibility lie in the living conditions of the bourgeoisie and its exploiting essence. Deepening the antagonism between theory and practice, the class of exploiters tries to inculcate the surrogates of their theories into the oppressed masses. One of these forms of bourgeois influence is the theory of *superclass and non-partisanship* . Marxism-Leninism, who discovered that the class struggle permeates the whole social whole, economics, politics and theory, which exposed the lies of bourgeois theory, directly and openly declares itself to be the one and only proletarian party theory.

"Marxism differs from all other socialist theories," writes Lenin, "by the remarkable combination of complete scientific sobriety in analyzing the objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with the most resolute recognition of the significance of revolutionary energy, revolutionary creativity, revolutionary initiative of the masses, and groups, organizations, parties, able to grope and realize communication with certain classes " <sup>[33]</sup> .

Marx, Engels and Lenin pin all their hopes on the proletariat, because "the proletariat, the lowest layer of modern society, cannot rise, cannot straighten up without the entire superstructure of the layers forming the official society, not taking off" <sup>[34]</sup> . He cannot free himself ,without liberating at the same time the whole of humanity. Then the place of the old world with its classes and class antagonisms will be taken by the association, "in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all" <sup>[35]</sup> . To achieve this goal, Marxism-Leninism arms the proletariat with a

solid world outlook and method of changing the world. With the help of a truly proletarian party, the proletariat is organized into an independent force capable of not only throwing off chains, but also changing the world.

From the very beginning, Marxism as a sociopolitical trend is inextricably linked with the Communists, for "in the struggle of the proletarians of various nations they single out and defend the common interests of the entire proletariat, not depending on nationality" [36]. At various stages of development through which the struggle of the proletarians against the bourgeoisie passes, the Communists "are always representatives of the interests of the movement as a whole" [37].

"The Communists therefore," wrote Marx and Engels in the "Communist Manifesto", "are in fact the most decisive, always encouraging a part of the workers' parties of all countries to move forward, and theoretically they have an advantage in understanding the conditions, progress and general results of the proletarian movement" [38]. Their task is to lead the proletariat in its real revolutionary struggle. Under this condition, the *theoretical and practical work of Marxist communists merges into one work. The economic, political and theoretical struggle consists of three mutually connected fronts of the liberation class struggle of the proletariat.* Against the desire to turn Marxism into a dogma, a symbol of faith, into a "petrified orthodoxy", Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin repeatedly stressed: "Our teaching is not a dogma, *but a guide to action*". "Nothing prevents us," Marx wrote back in 1843, "to connect our criticism with criticism of politics, with the interests of a particular political party, and therefore to connect and identify our criticism with *real* struggle. In this case, we will not appear before the world as doctrinalists with a ready-made new principle: "here is the truth, kneel before it!" We develop the world new principles from its own principles. We do not tell the world: "stop fighting, your whole struggle is nothing", we give him the true slogan of struggle" [39]. Against dogmatism and sectarianism, Marx advanced *connection with a certain party and participation in real struggle*; only under this condition can the theory give a true slogan of struggle.

#### **1.4. Leninism - a new and higher stage in the development of Marxism**

The activity of Marx and Engels coincides with the period of preparation of the proletariat for the revolution, when the proletarian revolution was not yet a direct and immediate practical task. Their activities coincide with the era of *industrial capitalism*, spreading it in the backward countries, colonial seizure of agrarian backward areas by industrial capital. In the period of 1848, the center of the world revolutionary movement moved to Germany, in which, as Marx and Engels thought then, the bourgeois revolution could easily become the prologue to the proletarian revolution. This epoch advanced the brilliant theorists and leaders of the international proletariat — Marx and Engels; In this era, Marxism developed as a revolutionary theory of the proletarian struggle. She revealed the ways and methods of the proletarian struggle, she put forward with all clarity the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the main content of the Marxist doctrine.

By the end of the life of Marx and Engels, new phenomena in the economy and politics of world capitalism were discovered, which could not fail to attract their attention. So Engels, in his *Anti-Dühring*, notes the growing importance of joint-stock companies and their future role in creating capitalist monopolies. The center of the revolutionary movement is moving to the East: the attention of Marx and Engels is increasingly directed to Russia, to the eastern colonial countries, where the possibility of breaking through the chain of world capitalism becomes more and more likely.

The brilliant visions of Marx and Engels, as well as all aspects of their teachings, were further developed by Lenin in the new era, which replaced the period of industrial capital, in the era of *imperialism*.

In order to fully understand the socio-historical roots of Leninism and its international significance, it is necessary first to clarify the historical significance of the struggle of Leninism against the opportunism of the Second International and a whole strip of its undivided rule. An impassable gulf separates the revolutionary teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin from Social Democratic opportunism, which has now grown into social Fascism.

The teachings of Marx and Engels developed in a merciless struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories and views, which, being in reality "fundamentally hostile to Marxism", sought to exert their influence on the labor movement: with Lassallism, Proudhonism, Bakunism, Durginism, etc.

A distinctive feature of the teachings of Lassalle, Proudhon and other authors of theories, spread among the proletariat in the era of Marx and Engels, was the desire to go *to reconciliation* with bourgeois society and the state, to *reform* for the better existing social relations without class struggle, without a revolutionary change in the economic basis. Or, in these theories, an abstract, petty-bourgeois, "left", *anarchic denial of the modern social system and state* was manifested, without understanding, however, the real ways and means of replacing it with another social system (Bakunin).

Gradually, Marxism defeated these obviously hostile theories and ousted them from the ideology of the labor movement. However, as soon as the *theoretical victory of Marxism* was designated, the tendencies that found expression in the said teachings began to look for new ways for themselves.

The petty-bourgeois worldview began to dress up in "Marxist" vestments, began to emerge as socialist opportunism *within Marxism*, "on the common ground of Marxism".

The end of Engels's life was already marked by the growth and domination of opportunism in the social democratic movement and the Second International. Engels had to wage an open struggle with the opportunist leadership of German Social-Democracy, which, hiding behind Marxist phrases, in fact dissociated itself from the true spirit of the teachings of Marx and Engels; I had to lead the line to split with opportunism.

Between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, Comrade Stalin indicated, and Lenin, on the other, there is a whole band of undivided and actual domination of opportunism of the Second International, despite the fact that such "orthodox" as Kautsky and Other Opportunists seek to turn Marx and Engels into harmless "icons." They distort the revolutionary essence of their doctrine, replacing it with the theory of "civil peace" and setting on *reforms* through the medium of bourgeois democracy. Bernstein and Kautsky publish, with reductions and distortions, the works of Marx and Engels, or else they completely ignore and conceal their works and letters of crucial importance. Opportunists pervert the basic tenets of the revolutionary teachings of Marxism, relating to the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the theory of the state, to the strategy and tactics of the class struggle. The main theoretical line of opportunism was *revisionism*, that is, the desire to revise (revise) all the most important theoretical propositions of Marx and Engels. Opportunists declare a revisionist approach against the foundations of revolutionary theory, the philosophical foundations of Marxism, against materialism and dialectics, seeking to return to philosophical *idealism*, to the doctrine of a calm and slow "evolution" of society.

The period of imperialism leads to the further growth of opportunism: its social base is expanding along with the bourgeoisization of a part of the proletariat.

With the help of imperial superprofits derived from the robbery of colonies, capitalism is able to bribe the better paid layers of workers, creating a *working aristocracy*. Capitalism makes the top of the workers' professional movement obedient to themselves by bribing a professional bureaucracy. This leads to the further development of opportunism and revisionism.

The previous petty-bourgeois illusions about the possibility of "correcting" capitalism by the reformist "mending" of its contradictions are increasingly giving way to the openly bourgeois trend within social democracy, seeking to adapt the labor movement to the interests of capitalists, staking on the durable existence of capitalist relations. In England, this trend was expressed in English trade unionism, which sought to detach the economic struggle of the working class from its political struggle, in the policy of the British "workers" party. In Germany, it is expressed by the reformist elite of the trade unions, parliamentary and municipal figures of social democracy, theoretically represented years. Bernstein, Vollmar, David, Südekum, etc.

In Russia, the same trend is represented by the so-called "legal Marxists", who were direct apologists of capitalism in the ranks of social democracy (Struve et al.), And the Mensheviks, such frankly terry as its representatives, as "economists", "workers" and "liquidators" openly pursuing liberal-bourgeois tendencies in the labor movement, adapting it to the interests of the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, intermediate "centrist" groups are being created in international social democracy, trying to occupy an intermediate, vacillating position between revolutionary Marxism and opportunism. The social roots of centrism must be sought in a kind of division of labor among opportunists, some of whom, while continuing to sow petty-bourgeois illusions in the proletarian environment, clothe them in "Marxist", sometimes "left" and "revolutionary" phraseology. Thus, along with frankly terry opportunism, centrism arises (Kautsky in Germany, Trotsky in Russia), which is especially dangerous and harmful, since it covers up frank opportunism, and in the course of further development has revealed its entire counter-revolutionary Menshevik essence. Finally, a group of so-called "left" Social Democrats (R. Luxemburg and others. Along with a more correct understanding of the revolutionary perspectives, however, the roughest opportunist perversions of the theory and practice of Marxism allowed. The "left", "revolutionary" phraseology, petty-bourgeois in its content, often turned out to be the worst form of revisionism.

On all the decisive questions of the theory and practice of class struggle, opportunism turned out to be in glaring contradiction with Marxism. Kautsky and Hilferding's "Marxism", Russian Menshevik's "Marxism", Trotsky's "Marxism" has nothing in common with genuine revolutionary Marxism, despite the fact that, unlike Bernstein, this "Marxism" often hides behind "Marxist" and "left" phraseology. We shall further see what monstrous perversions of Marxism even such Menshevik theorists, such as Plekhanov, allow.

The further development of Marxism demanded, first of all, the *restoration of the* true teachings of Marx and Engels and the struggle for his real theoretical foundations with all the opportunist distortions of Marxism. This task is performed by Leninism, which both *revives and moves* forward the revolutionary teachings of Marx and Engels. Continuing the work of Marx and Engels in the new historical epoch, Lenin pursues a merciless struggle against all types of opportunism, leads the line to split with open opportunism and with opportunism, covered with a "left" phrase, and centrism.

*But Leninism is not only the restoration of the teachings of Marx and Engels, but also its concretization and further development in relation to the new historical conditions of the struggle, to the peculiarities of the era of imperialism.* Imperialism, as the last and highest stage of capitalism, while preserving all the basic contradictions of developed capitalism, sharpens them and brings them to the highest limits. At the same time, the era of imperialism reveals new contradictions and unique features in the capitalist economy. Imperialism leads to a change in the period of free capitalist competition with a period of capitalist monopolies, to an increase in the role of finance capital, to the creation of capitalist trusts and syndicates uniting individual capitalist enterprises, to the export of capital to backward countries, to the struggle of imperialist states for sources of raw materials, for colonies, for redistribution already divided by the capital of the world, to the inevitability of imperialist wars. Capitalist monopolies become chains that hinder the further development of the productive forces of society, cause a tendency to stagnation, to decay. The epoch of imperialism is the epoch of dying, decaying capitalism.

As Comrade Stalin points out, imperialism brings to its extreme three main, most important contradictions.

The first contradiction is the basic contradiction of capitalism, the *contradiction between labor and capital, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie*. Under industrial capitalism, long periods of relatively "peaceful" development were possible, when the working class used mainly the economic form of struggle against the bourgeoisie exploiting it, when it prepared its forces for revolution, limiting itself to using the parliamentary tribune and parliamentary struggle. Known economic concessions in the form of shortening the working day or raising the wages of the workers were sometimes possible to get from individual capitalists or capitalist groups through legislative reforms, trade union methods of struggle, the organization of sickness funds and workers' cooperatives. This circumstance created, in certain layers of well-paid or ideologically backward workers, political inertness, gave rise to opportunistic sentiments in them, a tendency to reconciliation with capital.

Under imperialism, a completely different situation is created when individual capitalists are united by powerful trusts, syndicates, when all-powerful banking capital makes them dependent on themselves. Here the economic and political pressure of the bourgeoisie on the working class becomes unlimited. At the same time, the growing mechanization of production and the methods of capitalist rationalization lead to an increase in the staff of low-skilled labor, increase the army of the unemployed, simplify the technical functions of the worker, finally turning him into an obedient slave of the production process. Under these conditions, the working class proceeds with the task of overthrowing capitalism and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"Imperialism," says Comrade Stalin, "is the omnipotence of monopolistic trusts and syndicates, banks and the financial oligarchy in industrial countries. In the fight against this omnipotence, the usual methods of the working class — trade unions and cooperatives, parliamentary parties and parliamentary struggle — proved to be completely inadequate. Either surrender to capital, stay the same and go down, or take up new weapons - this is how imperialism poses the question to the millions of proletariat. Imperialism brings the working class to the revolution " <sup>[40]</sup> .

The second main contradiction of imperialism is rooted in the contradictions between the interests of *various capitalist groups* , between the *capitalist states* representing and protecting these interests . Replacing free competition by capitalist monopolies, imperialism, however, does not destroy capitalist competition. Competition, as Lenin points out, persists *alongside* with monopolies, and this combination of competition and monopoly leads to an even greater aggravation of contradictions and conflicts. Capitalist competition between individual world trusts, syndicates, between various groups of finance capital is reflected in their bitter struggle for markets, areas of capital export and sources of raw materials, for the redistribution of industrially backward areas already divided by world capital. The struggle for the colonies is *intensified* thanks to the *law of uneven capitalist development, which is intensifying in the period of imperialism*. . The unevenness and spasmodic character of capitalist development lead to the fact that each time new powers, groups of powers and financial groups act on the world stage as competitors of the existing monopolists. The inevitable desire to seize foreign territories entails imperialist wars.

The imperialist war weakens the economic power of the imperialists: it leads to the need for capitalists to arm the many millions of working people, at the same time increasing their exploitation with the burden of military burdens. This, in turn, creates the conditions and possibilities for turning an imperialist war into a civil war. Thus, the competition of capitalist groups, according to Comrade Stalin, "leads to a mutual weakening of the imperialists, to a weakening of the position of capitalism in general, to an approaching moment of the proletarian revolution, *to the practical necessity of this revolution*" <sup>[41]</sup> .

Finally, the third contradiction of imperialism is the contradiction between the few *dominant imperialists of various countries and the masses of the colonial dependent peoples*. This contradiction stems from the merciless and insolent exploitation and inhuman oppression with which imperialism exposes the working people of the colonies and dependent countries. By exploiting the colonies as sources of raw materials, foreign imperialism oppresses the broad masses of the colonial peasantry, which is also subjected to exploitation by the local landlord feudal lords. Imperialism turns local feudal lords into its agents, and this interweaving and the alliance of foreign imperialism with local feudalism lead to a delay in the economic and political development of the colonies, causing opposition in the form of peasant uprisings. But at the same time, imperialism makes the colonies the subject of application of imported capital, it builds in them communications, factories and plants, and this circumstance contributes to the industrial and commercial development of the colonies, the education of the cadres of the national proletariat there, the creation of a local trade and, later, the industrial bourgeoisie, the formation of a local intelligentsia and the growth of the national liberation movement. At first, the national movements are headed by the local bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, but the proletariat, which leads the working peasantry, plays the role of the fighting cadres in them. He leads the people's revolution as he betrays the national bourgeoisie, which is easily satisfied with the handouts of the imperialists. Such is the basis of the broad revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries. but the role of combat personnel in them is played by the proletariat, which leads the working peasantry. He leads the people's revolution as he betrays the national bourgeoisie, which is easily satisfied with the handouts of the imperialists. Such is the basis of the broad revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries. but the role of combat personnel in them is played by the proletariat, which leads the working peasantry. He leads the people's revolution as he betrays the national bourgeoisie, which is easily satisfied with the handouts of the imperialists. Such is the basis of the broad revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries.

Thus, squeezing superprofits from the proletariat and the peasantry of the colonies, imperialism creates all the conditions there for the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the working peasantry headed by it. This circumstance, according to Comrade Stalin, "*fundamentally undermines the position of capitalism, turning colonies and dependent countries from the reserves of imperialism into reserves of the proletarian revolution*" <sup>[42]</sup> .

Such are the main contradictions of imperialism, which lead the working class to the revolution, which make the proletarian revolution a practical necessity, which create the reserves of the proletarian revolution. In these new conditions as compared with industrial capitalism, under the conditions of rotting, dying capitalism, the revolutionary theory of the working class, Marxism, should have its further development. Under these conditions, Leninism was born *as the further development of the teachings of Marx and Engels, as Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions* .

However, the question arises: why precisely the Russian revolution could and should have generated Leninism? Why precisely Russia could at the same time become the birthplace of Leninism, the theory and tactics of Bolshevism?

"Therefore," answers t. Stalin, to this question, "that Russia was the focal point of all these contradictions of imperialism. Because Russia was pregnant with a revolution more than any other country, and only she was able, in view of this, to resolve these contradictions in a revolutionary way" <sup>[43]</sup> .

By the end of the 90s and the beginning of the 900s, Russia was already a country of developed capitalism, which passed into its imperialist stage. In tsarist Russia, however, imperialism was closely intertwined with feudal relations, with the despotic-autocratic police system, which condemned the workers and peasant masses to particularly strong lawlessness, poverty, inhuman exploitation, and cultural backwardness. Russian imperialism was, in Lenin's phrase, "feudal-military imperialism"; he was "concentrating the negative sides of imperialism squared."

At the same time, the interests of tsarism and Russian capitalism were closely intertwined with the interests of Western imperialism. Tsarist Russia was the greatest reserve and the most important ally of Western imperialism. Western capitalism, along with Russian capitalism and intertwining with it,

carried out the economic enslavement of the Russian proletariat and held in their hands the most important branches of the Russian national economy.

It should be noted that, due to the same reasons, the Russian labor movement hardly knew the labor aristocracy; it was strongly its revolutionary traditions, it was supported by the peasant revolution against landlordism. The contradiction between labor and capital in Russia was felt with particular urgency and had the possibility of its revolutionary resolution: the *Russian working class was the closest to the revolution*. Already the 1905 revolution was viewed by Marxist-Leninists as a step towards the world proletarian revolution.

Representing a springboard for the application of Western capital, its agents in relation to the millions of workers and peasants who inhabited Russia, Tsarist Russia at the same time pursued an imperialist colonial policy both in relation to its foreign edges and its eastern neighbors (Persia, China, etc.) d.). *Tsarist Russia, therefore, was an absolutely necessary link in the imperialist chain*, an essential component of imperialist contradictions and imperialist wars, and moreover such a link where the revolution was most of all a practical necessity.

Finally, in Russia, for the same reasons, the contradiction between the dominant nationality and the peoples enslaved by tsarism (Ukraine, the Caucasus, Poland, Central Asia), deprived of elementary rights and representing inexhaustible reserves of revolutionary ferment, was particularly strong. The national revolutionary movement in Russia supplied the loyal reserves of the proletarian and peasant revolution.

Back in 1902, in his work "What is to be done?" Lenin pointed out that history set the most revolutionary task before the Russian proletariat — overthrowing the stronghold of reaction in Europe and Asia and the struggle to transfer the revolution to proletarian rails. The fulfillment of this historical task, said Lenin, will place the Russian proletariat in the vanguard of the world proletarian struggle against imperialism.

From all that has already been said it is clear that it is fundamentally wrong to regard Leninism only as a "practice," and Marxism as a theory (Ryazanov). It is also wrong to regard Leninism as a narrowly national, specifically Russian phenomenon (as the Social Democrats do), as the application of Marxism to the Russian situation. It is wrong to say that Leninism is a theory of the proletarian revolution, "directly started in a country dominated by the peasantry," and see in the question of the role of the peasantry the main issue of Leninism (Zinoviev).

Leninism is a deeply international phenomenon in which the highest development of the *theory of Marxism* is in the closest connection with the practice of the proletarian revolution. There is not and cannot be for us a different Marxist theory in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution, except for one, the only militant theory of the proletarian struggle - Leninism. And the slightest departure from Leninism, both in theory and in practice, hits the most theoretical foundations of Marxism.

"Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular ... Leninism is a *further development of Marxism*" <sup>[44]</sup> .

These provisions determine the content of Leninism. Leninism is based entirely on the theoretical principles of Marx and Engels and at the same time represents something new in comparison with what Marx and Engels gave. Leninism represents both the concretization and further development of Marxism decisively in all areas of Marxist theory - the development of all three components of Marxism: its philosophy, political economy, scientific communism. Lenin's questions related directly to the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat were especially deep and complete: the question of monopoly capitalism as a new phase of capitalism, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its state form, the question of methods of building socialism and the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, teaching about the party of the proletariat, its strategy and tactics,

Leninism means the creation of a new type of party of the proletariat capable of taking on the fulfillment of the historical tasks of the proletariat in the new historical epoch.

Lenin's method, as Comrade Stalin formulates it, "is not only restoration, but also the concretization and further development of Marx's critical and revolutionary method, his materialistic dialectics" <sup>[45]</sup> . Leninism is a *new and higher stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism - the philosophy of dialectical materialism*. . Like Marx and Engels, according to Lenin's characterization, so also Lenin himself has a central point, to which the whole essence of the ideas expressed and discussed by him is reduced - materialistic dialectics. Continuing and developing the teachings of Marx and Engels, brilliantly applying the materialist dialectics to political economy, history, science, philosophy, politics and tactics of the working class in the new historical conditions, Lenin is the surest follower of Marxism.



The Communist International and our party, led by Comrade Stalin, continue the work of Lenin, the work of further developing the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution. Led by Comrade Stalin, world communism continues the further development of the materialist dialectics, the philosophical basis of Marxism-Leninism.

## **Chapter 2. Materialism and Idealism**

### **2.1. Two lines in philosophy**

Behind the verbal tinsel of numerous philosophical systems, behind the variety of variegated labels pasted on their teachings by philosophers, lies the long and brutal struggle of two main lines in philosophy: *materialism and idealism*. The history of philosophy, for all its complexity, is a history of the struggle and development of these two antagonistic philosophical trends. All philosophies and schools are the essence of their varieties. Every philosophical doctrine, whether it declares it openly or tries to hide it in every way, must be adjacent either to the camp of idealism or to the camp of materialism. Claims to become outside both directions, "above" them, "above" them, to create some new, non-idealistic and non-materialistic philosophy - are only a maneuver used by some modern bourgeois philosophers to hide their belonging to idealism, or shy fear of others to openly declare materialism, or helpless trampling between the two, a philosophical jumble, *eclecticism*, confusion.

The history of philosophy does not flow in a closed world, outside the historical class struggle. Philosophical teachings arise and develop in a particular human society, they are created by people belonging to certain social classes, the consciousness of which is due to historically defined social being. Philosophical teachings grow in a specific social environment and are determined by it, expressing the needs and aspirations of certain social classes, reflecting the level of development of the productive forces of society, the historical level of human knowledge of nature. Their fate depends on the extent to which they meet the requirements of social classes, how perfectly they serve its purposes.

The social roots of the existence throughout the history of two irreconcilable lines in philosophy must be sought in the class, contradictory structure of society. Idealism arose initially as a product of the limited and ignorant ideas of the primitive savage. The development of scientific knowledge, due to all the subsequent development of the productive forces of society, it seemed, should have led to the complete triumph of materialism and the suppression of all idealistic ideas. However, idealism not only did not die, but continued to develop. The main reason for this is the *division of society into classes, the rule in the capitalist society of the bourgeoisie, which secures idealistic theories and teachings for the sake of its interests*.

In its historical development, idealism was an ideology of exploiting classes and, as a rule, played a reactionary role. Materialism, the development of which was an expression of the worldview of the revolutionary classes, had to make its way in class society in an incessant struggle against the philosophy of reaction — idealism. Of course, one cannot establish any obligatory historical scheme here. We know cases when immature social classes express their new revolutionary demands in the language of idealism (German idealism of the beginning of the 19th century, theories of natural law, in part - utopian socialism). On the other hand, the fighting French materialism of the 18th century was the ideology of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie. The materialism of the seventeenth century, as Engels pointed out, was of aristocratic origin.

Similarly, materialism at the present stage of historical development, if it has the form of a vulgar or a form of mechanical materialism, can play a reactionary role in modern conditions. However, the very essence of idealism makes it a particularly convenient weapon in the hands of reactionary classes.

In class society, there is only class science. It functions in accordance with the tasks and interests of certain classes. To the extent that the consciousness of the ruling class and its interests require a true knowledge of reality in order to develop the productive forces, science contains materialistic elements; to the extent that they require the concealment of truth in order to preserve and strengthen their domination, idealism prevails in science. Since science reflects the studied area of being in knowledge, since it is focused on the revolutionary transformation of reality and on the subordination of the forces of nature by identifying the objective laws of the development of nature and society, science cannot but be a materialistic science. Since the condition of the social being of the exploiting classes makes it impossible for them to truly comprehend reality, because it distorts and limits their views, since true knowledge threatens their class interests, so far their science is idealistic. He who does not understand this will understand nothing in the vicissitudes of the philosophical struggle. *He who disputes the class character of science and philosophy tries to hide the class affiliation of his philosophy.*

What is the fundamental difference between the main directions in philosophy? Which doctrines belong to materialistic and which should be attributed to the number of idealistic?

The difference between materialism and idealism is rooted in the opposite resolution of the *main question of philosophy, the question of the relation of thinking to being*. "Take Whether nature, matter, the physical, the external world - and considered secondary consciousness, mind, sensation (- experience of *common* terminology of our time), mental, etc., -.. That is the root question which *in fact* continues to divide philosophers *into two big camps*" [46]. All those philosophies that recognize being, the objective world, nature, matter, are primary, independent of our consciousness, and the thinking, subject, cognition, and spirit are secondary, derivative, belong to the materialistic camp. To idealists are those who primary, basic, recognize the spirit, idea, subject, human consciousness, and the external, objective world, the material reality considers dependent on consciousness, secondary. One way or another, differences from the whole research path follow from the resolution of this main issue. In this question, the core of philosophical differences. The place of individual teachings in the struggle of philosophical views is mainly determined by what position they occupy in the matter of matter and consciousness, which of them they consider primary and secondary, where they see the key to understanding being and knowledge.

For an idealist, the world is either a collection of our sensations or a spiritual process, created by our own or the world mind, consciousness, will; the external material world is either completely declared as something imaginary, apparent, or is understood as an external envelope, as a material expression of an active spiritual principle. For an idealist, human cognition is the self-activity of the subject, the self-generation of thought, sensation, and will.

The materialist, on the contrary, sees "the unity of the world in its materiality." Consciousness, thinking - one of the properties of matter, arising only at a certain, high level of its development. Nature, matter, the objective world exist outside and independently of consciousness. *Cognition is a reflection by a thinking subject, that is, by a person, outside and independently of an existing objective reality.*

The resolution of the question of the relation of thinking to being is the only reliable criterion (measure) for determining the essence of the considered philosophical doctrine. That is why philosophers who seek to conceal the traces of the origin of their views, to push through idealism under the guise of materialism, try to divert attention from this basic question, to replace it with a different, unsuitable, imperfect measure. The latest attempts of this kind include the statements of L. Axelrod, I. Varyash and other modern mechanists *that the fundamental difference between materialism and idealism is the fundamental difference between materialism and idealism*. . The question of the primacy of matter or spirit is replaced by the mechanists with the question of whether the philosopher adheres to a causal explanation of phenomena, reducing the explanation to one mechanical reason, He who explains all occurring phenomena by their causal connection and at the same time understands the causes as mechanical movements, belongs to, according to the mechanists, to the materialists. Those who deny the possibility of a causal explanation are idealists. There is no dispute, the materialistic understanding of causality is fundamentally different from its idealistic understanding of it or from the complete rejection of causality by idealists. But in order to clarify the essence of this difference, to understand what the basis of discrepancies on the question of causality is, it is necessary to turn first to the main question of philosophy: What precedes - being or thinking? - since it is precisely this that also determines the materialistic or idealistic solution of the question of causality.

Only understood as a form of objective material connection between things, causality is materialistically understood causation. Idealism, on the basis of the fact that matter is generated by spirit, understands a causal relationship not as an objective connection of things, but as a form of thinking or as their logical connection, as a special way of connecting the senses to the subject. Other types of idealism completely deny a causal explanation, replacing causality with a will or some other spiritual force or goal, supposedly driving the world. By putting the question of mechanical or non-mechanical causality at the center of philosophy, opponents of dialectical materialism try to hide from the question of an idealistic or materialistic starting point of view in understanding causality.

*Idealism is directly related to religion.* Like religion, idealism is a development, the development of an *animistic* understanding of the world, that is, the spiritualization of things, endowing them with soul and will in the image and likeness of man. Idealism and religion have not only common sources, but also homogeneous social tasks and goals. Idealistic philosophy is more subtle, in scientific form it performs the same ideological function, which is more simplified, rougher, is religion. Without exception, all forms of idealistic philosophy, no matter how camouflaged, are a justification of religion, since upon closer examination, the basic position of idealism turns out to be identical with the

foundations of religious ideology. Different idealistic teachings differ only in their *form* justify and "justify" religion. We find in idealists that direct, logical proof of the correctness of religious tenets, the depreciation of reason and the exaltation of faith, feeling, instinct, the delimitation of the spheres of influence of science and religion for the purpose of their peaceful coexistence. *The struggle against religion therefore requires the disclosure of idealism, and the overcoming of idealism is a struggle against clericalism in science.*

Claiming that in knowledge we confine ourselves to the spiritual field, supposedly lying on the "other side" of matter, idealism asserts false criteria of truth, wrong ways and methods of scientific research. An idealistic mathematics is also being created, which extracts its principles from the pure reason that is supposedly independent of the objective reality of reality, which studies the particular ideal realm of mathematical concepts; idealistic physics dissolves all nature in the sphere of subjective sensations; idealistic biology refers to the intangible, purposeful "life forces"; idealistic psychology deals with the "soul", the free "will" and the self-sufficient, independent world of mental experiences. Idealism penetrates all the gaps, uses all the gaps that exist at this level of knowledge. *Idealism parasitizes on the weakness of science, on its underdevelopment*, it speculates on the difficulties of its growth, on the incompleteness of the quest, often taking place in the process of revolutionary breaking of obsolete ideas.

Idealism overshadows the true state of things with the "philosophical fog", which condemns the reactionary class; he brings up the oppressed classes in the spirit of reconciliation with the hardship and adversity of the material world in the name of the ideal world, "higher" values; he educates the proletariat in the consciousness of the necessity of subordinating physical labor to the leadership of representatives of the "spirit", "mind", "higher", "enlightened" classes; in the ruling classes themselves, he educates the ideology necessary for consolidating their domination.

Idealism is not something "external" in relation to bourgeois science. It is not the case that reactionary idealistic philosophy forces immaculate, classless science to serve the ruling classes. This would mean that only philosophy is class science, and the rest of exact science is itself classless science and can only be used in the interests of a particular class. Such an understanding, which is peculiar in particular to "our" mechanists, implies their uncritical admiration for "science", their alignment "with exact science", their struggle for the "liberation" of science from dialectic-materialistic philosophy that allegedly corrupts it from the truth. In a class society, all science is class science by its very essence: blind, uncritical following "science" is nothing else,

A brutal, implacable struggle must be waged with idealism. In this struggle it is necessary first of all to expose the class nature of all idealism, its exploiting essence. It is necessary to discover his clerical character, his protection of religious ideas. But it is also necessary to reveal what causes, which are hidden in the peculiarities of human knowledge itself, contribute to idealistic distortion, it is necessary to clarify the *epistemological (epistemological) roots of idealism*.

Human knowledge is the process of reflecting the laws of the objective world. But this reflection is not frozen, not dead. No, the process of knowledge is movement, there is a split of one. In the very process of knowledge lies the possibility of the departure of knowledge aside from objective truth.

Thinking a person applies general concepts. For example, the concepts: person, class, society, formation, etc. Without operating with these concepts it is impossible to think. But on the other hand, here the possibility of departure to the side and the danger of idealism are revealed. When we make a judgment: Ivan is a man, then here it is possible to think separately and independently what is common to all people without as to whether Ivan is he, Peter or Sidor. We cannot do without operating the notion of "man", since in this case we are not going further than the ideas that we have about Ivan, but we just need to express the common thing that all people have, i.e. go into knowledge from Ivan to Peter, Sydor, etc. In this way, knowledge divides, on the one hand, the particular — Ivan, on the other, the common — man. The particular and the general are inextricably linked. Breaking them means breaking away from objective truth expressed in the unity of the general and the particular. The objective truth lies precisely in the fact that there is no common thing without the private and the particular without the common. Ivan exists only as a man, and man exists only as Ivan, Peter, Sidor, etc. The separation of the general from the individual, giving it the meaning of an objectively existing reality is the transfer of knowledge to the side. When, along with really existing, living people - Ivan, Peter, etc. - put " giving it the meaning of an objectively existing reality is the departure of knowledge aside. When, along with really existing, living people - Ivan, Peter, etc. - put " giving it the meaning of an objectively existing reality is the departure of knowledge aside. When, along with really existing, living people - Ivan, Peter, etc. - put "*man in general*", man as such, and Ivan, Peter, etc., are declared only as the form of existence of this person in general, then this is idealism, because here the starting point is taken by the thought of man (abstraction: man in

general), and not real people. These are the techniques of all idealists. All idealists in place of matter, that is, objective reality that exists independently of human consciousness, put consciousness, that is, thought or sensation.

This perversion is beneficial to the exploiters. Through idealism, they sanctify exploitation; trying to prove the eternity and inviolability of the existing order. Thus, class interest reinforces the departure of knowledge, seeks to perpetuate it, and to approve idealism as a universal worldview.

"The knowledge of man is not (there is no corresponding line), but a curved line, infinitely approaching a series of circles, a spiral," says Lenin. - Any passage, fragment, piece of this curved line can be transformed (one-sidedly turned) into an independent, complete, straight line, which (if you don't see the forest for the trees) then leads to the marsh, to clericalism (where it is *reinforced by the class interest of the ruling classes*). Straightness and one-sidedness, woodenness and ossification, subjectivism and subjective blindness voilà are the epistemological roots of idealism. "Philosophical idealism is *one-sided*, exaggerated, (überschwengliches (Dietzgen)) development (bloating, swelling) of one of the lines, sides, edges of knowledge into the absolute, *cut off* from mother, by nature, deified. Idealism is clericalism. Right. But philosophical idealism is ("*more correctly*" and "*besides*") the road to clericalism through one of the shades of an infinitely complex cognition of a (dialectical) person " <sup>[47]</sup>.

That is why the struggle against idealism, a consistent, irreconcilable struggle against the theory that prevailed over a huge segment of history, requires us not simply to discard the entire theoretical content of the old idealistic philosophy, but to overcome critical overcoming idealism. We must, by revealing the class roots of idealism, at the same time not dismiss the questions posed by idealistic philosophy. By revealing the internal logic of one or another idealistic system and exposing it to Marxist criticism, we find out the idealistic one-sidedness of resolving these issues, its subjective blindness, the idealistic swelling of individual lines and aspects of phenomena.

Idealism is false. But idealism is not simply nonsense, nonsense, not having a support in the peculiarities of our process of knowledge. Idealism could not fulfill its class purpose, if it were absolutely groundless, meaningless, without points of support in the objective process of knowledge. "Clericalism (= philosophical idealism), of course, has *gnosiological* roots, it is not groundless, it is *barrenness* indisputably, but barren flowers growing on a living tree, alive, fruitful, true, powerful, all-powerful, objective, absolute, human knowledge" <sup>[48]</sup>. Therefore, it is impossible to simply erase, to regard, as it were, the former, all previous development of philosophy, which was marked by the struggle against idealism. In their heyday, the exploiting classes contributed to the development of knowledge, but this development was accomplished by them in a perverted, mystifying, idealistic form. By destroying idealistic philosophy, modern materialism does not undermine the living tree of knowledge, but removes empty space from it, dead growths: it is the heir of everything true and valuable that was achieved in the preceding movement of science.

*Dialectical materialism* — the highest form of materialist philosophy — *is the philosophy of the proletariat*. . Openly declaring his class, partisanship, dialectical materialism, at the same time, exposes the class essence of the opposing views opposing him, tears off the covers of "classlessness", "purity" and "objectivity". Dialectical materialism is the most consistent and irreconcilable form of materialism, just as the proletariat is the most consistent and radical class in its revolutionism. The materialism of the advanced classes of society that preceded the proletariat was already limited by virtue of the conditional limited revolutionary nature of these classes. The progressive bourgeoisie, waging a struggle against feudal reaction under the materialist banner, had to look with caution at their "allies" —the proletarians; its revolution was the establishment of a new form of exploitation, a new kind of class oppression. Her revolutionism was inherently flawed: it carried the germ of a new subsequent reaction. The revolutionary character of the proletariat is radically different: it is directed against all exploitation and oppression, it bears the destruction of the classes themselves to replace class domination. Hence, to the end, the consistent dialectical materialism of the proletariat, to the end the intolerant, hostile attitude towards all and every kind of idealism and religiosity, anti-science, ideological reactionism.

*The history of the development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy is the history of an irreconcilable struggle with reactionary philosophical idealism*, whatever form it takes, whatever clothing it may wear. "Marx and Engels, from the beginning to the end, were party in philosophy, they were able to discover deviations from materialism and the concession to idealism and fideism in all and every" modern "direction" <sup>[49]</sup>. For hypocritical phrases and verbal quirks, they caught the idealistic enemy. They also found him when, pretending to be a friend of the proletariat, under the guise of "deepening", "correcting" dialectical materialism, he replaced it with idealism. But they did not give the descent to those materialists who evolved from the highest form of materialism to the less

consistent, pre-Marxist, vulgar mechanical materialism, long surpassed by the development of knowledge and powerless in the fight against modern idealism. "Either materialism, consistent to the end, or the lie and confusion of philosophical idealism — this is the formulation of the question that is given" <sup>[50]</sup> in every page of Marx and Engels.

*The struggle of parties in philosophy is one of the fronts of the struggle of classes.* And in philosophy there is a class against a class. The epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution that we are experiencing, the era of the deepest general crisis of capitalism, the utmost aggravation of its contradictions, the era of rapid socialist construction in the USSR, the rise of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat throughout the world, is the era of the most acute and bitter class struggle that history knows.

Treason of the philosophical line of the proletariat, flirting with idealism is treason in the class struggle, surrendering positions to the enemy. Idealist philosophers are learned clerks of theology, idealist philosophers are certified lackeys of the bourgeoisie.

Dialectical materialists are the ideologues of the working class, which must put an end to the enslavement of man by man, the class building socialist society. In the fierce struggle of classes there can be no middle; it is not in philosophy either. Of all the parties, therefore, "the most vile is the middle party." "Conciliatory charlatans" are agents of a weakening, wanting to delay the struggle and gather strength with the enemy.

The scientists lackeys of the imperialists do not disdain in anything to aspire Marxism. "Solid" professors in "solid" philosophical writings do not shun even "arguments" borrowed from the white emigrants' garbage pit, combining the struggle against communism with the struggle against materialism.

Thus, for example, the notorious herald of intervention, the ideologist of "pan-Europe", Count R. Kudengove-Kalergi, in the special book "Away from Materialism" he wrote intimidates the petty bourgeoisie with immorality, immorality of materialism: "Since (for materialists) nothing exists except matter, that is, neither God nor ideas, then every duty is fraud for them, every moral requirement is fraud, every morality is fraud ... "The materialists" relate to people around either friendly or hostile, but indifferent. Other people for them is only a means to increase their enjoyment of life. They treat them no differently than good cigars, good wines and delicacies, or as annoying flies and poisonous snakes ... "This is the way the most advanced ideologists of imperialism" overthrow "materialism.

*The reactionary nature of bourgeois philosophy now reaches its highest limit.* Hitler's "ideologues" directly proclaim the cry: "back to barbarism!". From the depths of the historical idealistic arsenal, the infamous mystical systems are extracted. Reason refuses to serve bourgeois philosophy. She appeals to the supramental, "frank", intuitive mysticism. The vile middle party, the bourgeois agents among the proletariat - social democracy, finally reborn into the "left" party of the bourgeoisie, finally joins with its masters, becomes a reliable pillar of fascism - this latest political stake of unbridled imperialism. Accordingly, the philosophers of social fascism are also unbelted. Philosophical revisionism — a concealed approach to the policy of the working class for an idealistic foundation with the goal of emasculating its revolutionism — has now become a frank idealism among the official philosophers of the Second International. Dialectical materialism is openly and unceremoniously declared obsolete by them. Kant, Mach, Bergson, Freud — anyone will take social fascism into his philosophical teachers in order to "end" Marx and direct proletarian thought to the bourgeois channel.

Communist parties, confidently and adamantly leading the proletariat to victory, must especially vigilantly preserve the firmness of the principles of dialectical materialism - the philosophy of the Comintern, must be merciless to the enemy and to connivance towards him.

*But our radical and primordial enemy — idealism exists not only outside the Soviet Union, in countries still dominated by capitalism, where the proletarian revolution still has to be accomplished — its remnant remained in the pores of our Soviet country.* The obscurant idealism of reactionary philosophers like Losev, the reactionary attacks of representatives of various social and natural sciences - Platonov, Berg, Savich, and many others - the wrecking interventionist machinations of the Ramzins, Kondratievs and Grohmans - all are different faces of the same restorative ideology.

Our struggle against the enemy cannot be victorious if it is not combined with the struggle against revisionism, which is trying to penetrate into the Marxist party ranks, hiding behind "Marxism". Vulgar, philosophical hardening backwards *mechanism*, disarming dialectical materialism in the face of idealism, *Menshevist idealism*, replacing dialectical materialism with Hegelian idealistic dialectics — these are the two main types of modern revisionism in the philosophy and theory of Marxism-Leninism, both alien to the Bolshevik party and philosophy, providing the philosophical foundations of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, rightist and left-wing opportunism, playing for the people and the people in the game, and playing the spirit of the revolutionary leftist opportunism, right and leftist

opportunism. The struggle against all these anti-Marxist doctrines is an immutable duty of the dialectical materialists, since "without an uncompromising struggle against bourgeois theories based on the Marxist-Leninist theory, it is impossible to achieve complete victory over the class enemies" [51] .

## 2.2. Mechanistic materialism

Materialism, as well as its antipode - idealism, does not remain unmoving and unchanged. He has his own story. Materialism, went through various *stages of development* , before it acquired the highest form in Marxism-Leninism. Materialism went through a series of stages, conditioned by social development, the change of struggling classes, the nature and level of their struggle. Materialism did not remain indifferent to the development of science and took a new look, transformed into a *new form* in accordance with the revolutions in natural science, with the turning discoveries of science making the era.

Mechanical materialism of the XVII – XVIII centuries, which developed in England, France and the Netherlands, entered a glorious chapter in the history of philosophy. He was the brainchild of a young, progressive, vital class, which replaced the feudal nobility. Mechanical materialism of the XVII – XVIII centuries. was a philosophy that expressed the desire for hegemony and the power of the new class - the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie, matured in the depths of feudal society, shattered its economic, political and ideological foundations from within, carried with it a new form of production relations and an unprecedentedly *powerful development of productive forces* . It expanded the framework of the old world, pulled new continents into the economic orbit of capitalism, it carried new political forms, needs, ideas, set new tasks for science. The development of the productive forces — this historic mission of the bourgeoisie — could not take place in the old social forms, in the close framework of the feudal economy and medieval political institutions. The bourgeoisie had to overthrow the feudal nobility domination, break the medieval economic forms and destroy the ideology generated by them and consolidate them.

*Revolution in natural science* corresponded to the rapid development of the productive forces . Navigation, military affairs, industry, and trade brought a whole series of great discoveries and inventions to life, raised mathematics, mechanics, and physics to a level unattainable for previous centuries. Mechanical materialism of the XVII – XVIII centuries. was a philosophical expression of the requirements of the development of productive forces and the level of a new science. It was a doctrine corresponding to the new natural sciences, directed against the obsolete scholastic methodology of the old natural sciences. The philosophy of revolutionary natural science could only be a materialistic philosophy.

As the bourgeoisie grows stronger, as its needs and capabilities grow, it more and more firmly and persistently expresses its revolutionary aspirations, openly opposes the whole complex of feudal ideas and principles. Materialist philosophy ideally armed the revolutionary bourgeoisie. In the old materialism, the social and political ideals of the bourgeoisie, the rejection by it of the old feudal culture and the justification of the methodology of the natural science, the struggle against the philosophical stronghold of feudalism — priesthood and idealism — went hand in hand.

As the bourgeoisie strengthens and direct revolutionary battles are approaching, atheistic fighting motives sound louder and more resolute in its philosophy. In the 18th century, especially in France, where the bourgeois revolution did not have such a half-compromise character as in England, combat anti-religious propaganda and materialistic doctrines attain high development.

From Bacon, Gassendi, and Descartes' physical teachings, through Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke, mechanical materialism was developed, reaching the teachings of 18th century French materialists. its most complete and comprehensive development.

What are the guidelines of mechanical materialism in the form that it received in the philosophies of the 18th century French materialists. - the teachings of Holbach, Helvetius, Lametri and Didro?

*Materialism of the XVIIIth century above all, with all determination he fought against religion* , considering it to be the greatest evil and the biggest obstacle to the progress of mankind. He opposed the power of traditional baseless dogmas over the minds of people. Everything was *judged by reason* . All ideas, beliefs, establishments had to justify themselves in the light of reason, to prove their rationality. Reason became the measure of everything, and everything that could not withstand its criticism was rejected. Of course this mind was the mind of a certain epoch, it was the *bourgeois mind*, and that which did not correspond to the interests of the revolutionary bourgeoisie was declared inappropriate to reason. Religion, a stronghold of feudal reaction, was recognized as the ideological enemy of reason and the support of ignorance. Religion, in the opinion of the materialists of the eighteenth century, grew up on the basis of ignorance and the darkness of people: since it was

perpetuated by the priests of ignorant masses. "Religion," the old materialists said, "was born from the meeting of a fool with a priest".

From the sky, from the other world, materialism directed human interests and thoughts to the world of this world, to physical reality. In the knowledge of *nature* he saw the sole purpose of science. Nature, of which man himself with his feelings is part, is the only reality. There is no other world except the physical, material, earthly world. There is a single and only substance, that is, the only thing that exists independently, by itself, is primary and does not need anything else for its existence - the material substance is the basis and carrier of all the diversity of the existing. Intangible substance - an absurd fiction. "Matter in general is everything that affects our senses in any way, and the qualities we attribute to different substances are based on different impressions or different changes they make in us" [52]. Thus, the primacy of being, matter, and the secondary nature of thinking are affirmed.

The world, according to the views of these materialists, is a combination of material elements, the combinations and movements of which form the fullness of reality. He does not need any supernatural, intangible driving principles and forces. He lives according to the intrinsic nature of matter itself, inviolable and eternal natural laws, to know which constitutes the task of the mind. The main and inalienable properties of all matter are: length, mobility, divisibility, hardness, gravity, force and inertia. From them there is all set of other derivative properties. Matter is mobile in nature, and this movement is understood mechanically, that is, as the spatial movement of elementary parts and complex body masses, as a change of place and position in space. All the diversity of qualities and events that we see in the world is nothing but as diverse manifestations of the mechanical motion of matter. Not only dead nature in all its manifestations, but also animals and even man are just more or less complex mechanisms, the existence of which is reduced to various mechanical processes, to combinations of mechanical movements. A man differs from a machine only in greater complexity and subtlety of his design and can be exhaustively cognized as a perfect mechanism. Human A man differs from a machine only in greater complexity and subtlety of his design and can be exhaustively cognized as a perfect mechanism. Human *the will is not free*, as priests and idealists assure, but is a link in a chain of natural laws and its activity is determined by material causes. The mechanism of human passions is as natural a process as any other mechanism. There is no soul, as a special substance along with the body or even dominating it. Soul, or rather sensitivity, *is one of the properties of the body*. Where there is no body, there is no sensitivity. With the death of his organism, his "soul" is destroyed. The immortality of the soul, its existence independent of the body, is a ridiculous and harmful superstition.

The materialists decisively rejected the idealistic doctrine of the existence, supposedly in the human mind, of primordial, innate human ideas that were not acquired by means of the senses in experience. The only source of knowledge materialists recognized the *experience* gained in the process of the impact of nature on our sense organs. Man is born with a brain like a clean board (*tabula rasa*), which experience fills with his letters. *Materialists were sensualists* that is, they, in the senses, exposed to the external world, saw the only channel through which knowledge is acquired. There is nothing in the mind that has not come into it from sensation. The mind only processes the data of experience. Therefore, in experimental knowledge, in observing nature and experimenting with it, the materialists saw the main task of science.

The sensual theory of the knowledge of these materialists is determined by their understanding of human development. If ideas, inclinations and beliefs are formed in the experience of a person, then all people at birth are equal in their predispositions. The nature and psyche of people are entirely determined by the nature of life experience, environmental conditions and upbringing. *Man is a product of the environment*. You want to change people, eradicate ignorance and vices, - change the environment, create social conditions that bring up rational and virtuous people. At this point, the connection of the philosophical ideas of the French materialists with their revolutionary nature is revealed with particular depth.

But here the bourgeois limitations and the class nature of the revolutionary materialism of the old materialists are also revealed. There are two paths from this starting point. One path is the path to socialism. Utopian socialists proceeded from the idea of innate equality of people and the need to change the social environment in the development of their views. But the French materialists themselves did not follow this path, otherwise they would cease to be bourgeois revolutionaries. Instead of coming to an understanding of the material driving forces of the development of the social environment, they remained at the point of view, proclaiming the "eternal", "natural" ideals of bourgeois society, law and the state. Old materialists remain with an idealistic

understanding of social life. *Social structure, social relations, the state of the environment, the objective laws of social development, they explain with the opinions of people, their views, the ideas dominating in society.*

Thus ideas turn out to be the driving force of social life. In changing ideas, in educating and eliminating ignorance, they see the key to transforming social order. By a change in social consciousness they hope to cause a change in the old, feudal social being.

These are the guiding ideas of the French materialists. They opposed not only direct clericalism, but also modern clericalism, clothed with philosophical attire, especially the subjective idealism of Malebranche, Berkeley, and Hume. The French materialism of the 18th century, as we see, expressed the advanced aspirations of its era and its modern science. He must enter the history of philosophy as a progressive step in the development of scientific thinking. But the same social relations and level of knowledge that determined the historical merits of the old materialism also determined its *historical limitations*. Thanks to its revolutionism, the philosophy of Holbach, Helvetius and their associates became a link in the chain of ideas that *ultimately led* to the teachings of Marx. Thanks to the bourgeois character of this revolutionism, this philosophy did not go beyond the framework of the idealistic policy of enlightenment; she failed to conduct materialism in the sphere of social phenomena. It fell into a vicious circle: ideas are determined by the social being of people, and at the same time their being is determined by ideas. She was unable to resolve the dilemmas: the social environment creates people, and at the same time, people create their own social environment.

Of all the science of that time, only *mathematics and mechanics*, mainly the mechanics of solids, achieved significant development. The rest of the sciences were in their infancy, undeveloped state. This imposed a stamp of *mechanical limitations* on old materialism. They applied the scale of mechanics to all of nature, to all supermechanical, chemical, biological, etc. areas. They simplified, discolored reality, reducing it to the simplest mechanical laws. *Their materialism was metaphysical*. They did not understand the diversity of forms of movement, the principles of the emergence of new and the complexity of the processes of change. The notion of nature was "about an always equal to oneself whole, always moving in the same limited spheres" <sup>[53]</sup> according to the constant number of eternal laws. Brilliant glimpses of thought, in which individual materialists of the eighteenth century. towered over this concept (especially Diderot), do not change the general metaphysical nature of their materialism.

*The three main features of the historical limitations of the old materialism are as follows: mechanism, metaphysical, inability to extend materialism to the field of social life.* They had to overcome a new form of materialism, which had grown at a different level of social relations connected with the development of a new revolutionary class — the proletariat — and at a new level of scientific development.

Materialistic philosophy has passed the mechanical stage in its development. From the old form of metaphysical materialism, it has traveled the path of development to modern, *dialectical materialism*, corresponding to the current state of knowledge of nature and society.

However, even now there are people - and even imagining themselves Marxists - who seek to galvanize, revive the already surpassed, obsolete forms of materialism, to oppose to the higher form of materialism its lower forms, already overcome in the further development of materialism. Such aspirations are inevitably reactionary: they pull back science and philosophy, retard their development, discredit materialistic philosophy in the face of the demands made of the current state of science. The advanced forms of materialism *for their time* are becoming reactionary in our time, at a different level of knowledge, at a new level of philosophy, in a new social environment. Here we mean the return to the old mechanical materialism of the XVII – XVIII centuries. (Hobbes, Holbach, Helvetius, Lametri, etc.) among representatives *modern* mechanical materialism (Bukharin, L. Axelrod, A. Timiryazev, etc.).

In modern conditions, the protection of *mechanical* materialism, a return to the long-surpassed philosophical ideas of the materialists of the XVII – XVIII centuries. mean the rejection of the conquests of materialistic philosophy throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an attempt to reduce materialism to its old, past stage. Mechanical materialism in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution is not only a philosophical atavism. Now, in the presence of dialectical materialism, which has left far behind itself the historical limitations of old materialism, mechanical materialism is reactionary. "Our" mechanical materialists (Bukharin, Timiryazev, Varyash, Axelrod) are captivated by the ideas of old materialism. They are not able to understand the complex dialectic of material reality, the richness of its contradictions, transitions and overflows, its qualitative diversity and specificity of various areas. They reduce the highest qualitatively peculiar laws (social, biological, etc.) to purely quantitative laws borrowed from mechanics, to the principle of balance and crossing of



oppositely directed forces. All the variety of qualitatively different forms of movement they try to put in the scheme of spatial mechanical movement. Like their spiritual ancestors in the XVII – XVIII centuries, they do not know a scale other than the scale of mechanics.

At the present stage of development, mechanistic materialism disorganizes the struggle of materialism against idealism, facilitates the struggle of idealism against us, serves as a wedge, driven in between the discoveries of modern science and materialistic philosophy. Dialectical materialism must, therefore, with all the intransigence, fight against mechanistic materialism. This struggle is a necessary condition for its development and victory over idealism.

Whether the mechanists want it or not, they inevitably turn into a hindrance to the ideological struggle waged by the proletariat, become an obstacle in this struggle. In the following, we will dwell in detail on the class roots of modern mechanical materialism, on its methodology and on the political role it plays in Soviet conditions, being basically the philosophical basis of right-wing opportunism.

### **2.3. Subjective idealism, Machism, intuitivism**

Diametrically opposed to the old materialism of the XVII and XVIII centuries. is his contemporary *subjective idealism* of Berkeley and Hume's *agnosticism*. Subjective idealism (phenomenalism) of Berkeley marked the intensification of reactionary clericalism, supported by the bourgeoisie that had already won and established its rule. Hume's agnosticism is a product of the transformation of the bourgeoisie from the revolutionary class into the conservative, the closure of bourgeois and renewed feudal ideologies.

The considered idealistic doctrines reflected the interests and moods of the victorious English bourgeoisie, ahead of its French sister and a century before its coming to power by ending with the compromise of the English revolution, "bourgeois feudalism and giving feudal shape to bourgeois society" [54].

This feature with exceptional brightness is reflected in the philosophical doctrine of Bishop Berkeley, which represents the adaptation of Protestantism to the level and new needs of the bourgeoisie which has become a reactionary class.

An excellent analysis of Berkeley's views was given by Lenin in his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. Berkeley proceeds from the fact that, apart from sensations, there is no other source of knowledge about the world in man, that concepts, abstract ideas, because they are possible, are not primary and are the product of sensations. But Berkeley denies that the real objective world is reflected in these sensations, regardless of these sensations. From here, Berkeley comes to the inevitable logical conclusion for him that the *only thing known to man, the only possible object, the object of knowledge, is our sensations*. Sensations are primary elements, from the combination of which consists all that exists. A person in his cognitive activity cannot go beyond sensations, know something other than them, beyond them, or different from sensations. In the process of knowledge, we, according to Berkeley, are not dealing with things outside of us, not with the objective world, reflected in our sensations, but only with our own sensations: sensations of redness, hardness, height, roundness, etc. experience as a collection of sensations. We are not able to know anything besides our own sensations, that is, subjective states of consciousness. Not things, but only sensations, that is, something mental, are given in our experience.

According to subjectivists, we have no reason to assert that there is an external world regardless of sensations. We have no right to talk about anything authentically real, that would be outside of our sensations. The belief that an objective external world exists outside of our consciousness, according to subjective idealists, is not at all based on experience, is a prejudice and does not stand up to scientific criticism. The most we can allow is that our psyche is inherent in the idea of the existence of the external world. But there is no reason to argue that this view really corresponds to something outside the subject.

*What we call a thing is from this point of view nothing but a bundle, the totality of our sensations*. The group of sensations (solid, round, blue, etc.), given together and repeated more or less constantly, we call a thing. To suppose that a thing is something more, that behind our sensations lies the body, substance, objective world that produces them - such an assumption, according to Berkeley, is groundless.

"Being of things," Berkeley formulates his views, "is their *perceptibility*. It is impossible for them to have any existence outside of the spirit or thinking things that perceive them. True, there is a strikingly common opinion among people that houses, mountains and rivers, in a word, all sensed objects have a natural or real existence, different from their perceptibility by mind. But with whatever confidence and general agreement this beginning is asserted, anyone who has the courage to subject it to research will find, if I am not mistaken, that it contains a clear contradiction, for what are the above-mentioned objects but things we perceive in sensations and what we perceive as not our own

ideas and sensations. And would it not be a complete contradiction to assume that some combination of them exists without being perceived " [55] .

Thus, Berkeley comes to the denial of matter, which he himself considers very important for the struggle against materialism and the justification of idealism, this reliable support of religion. Matter dissolves in the spirit, the object is reduced to the subject. " *To be, to exist is to be perceived* " (esse is percipi) - and nothing more. If a thing is not felt, it does not exist. The existence of things for us, for our consciousness, is the only reality; the ability to perceive things is the only evidence of their being, as being for our consciousness.

"I do not deny," wrote Berkeley, "the existence of not one thing that we can *perceive* through sensation or reflex. The fact that the things that I see with my eyes or that I feel with my hands really exist, I do not doubt at all. The only thing whose existence we deny is what philosophers call matter or bodily substance " [56] .

Such is the subjective-idealistic solution of the question of the relation between being and thinking. Based on the same sensationalistic doctrine of sensations as the only source of knowledge, subjective idealism gives it an idealistic character, bringing it to the absorption of an object by the subject. The subject becomes the only reality. The world dissolves in the thinking subject. Object, nature, matter is nothing but a product of mental activity, a product of the subject. *The object of perception is identified with the perception of the object*. The source of sensations Berkeley recognizes the Lord God himself, from which our soul receives its content.

Berkeley does not hide the fact that his entire philosophical structure has been erected with a definite purpose - *to hit the growing atheism and materialism that raised his head* . In his diary, he says bluntly that the desire *to strengthen faith* led him to invent his system.

Hume is sent from the same recognition of experience as the only source of knowledge as Berkeley. He shares with Berkeley the denial of the possibility of our knowing the external material world, the reduction of things to experiences.

Hume refuses to know anything besides subjective experiences, he cuts off science to the path beyond the subject and limits its self-observation. His philosophy is *agnostic* , that is, he denies the possibility of objective knowledge, the possibility of knowing the external world that exists independently of us.

Hume especially pays much attention to the criticism of the materialistic *concept of causality* . According to Hume, causality is not given in experience. We do not perceive it in a number of qualities given to us in perception — color, form, sound. In experience we find only following one after another of two or several sensations, the accompanying of one another, but not an active cause, not the force causing the phenomena. From the *habit of* having two any phenomena connected with each other in experience, a person is inclined to conclude about their necessary and constant dependence. But such a conclusion, according to Hume, is inappropriate. We can talk about the usualness of this following, we can consider it possible to repeat it, but not the right to argue the *need* connection between the two phenomena. In experience there can be no guarantee that the following of phenomena, observed a thousand times, will be repeated a thousand first time. Thus, Hume is tied up with causality and regularity. The world turns into a chaos of phenomena, from which knowledge has no way out.

Subjective idealism, being consistently brought to its limit, with fatal inevitability should lead to *solipsism* . Solipsism is a view that asserts that only "I" exists, and everything else, including other people, is a product of my sensations. I and my unreasonably and baseless sensations are the only reality. *Solipsism is extreme philosophical individualism*. From the point of view of solipsism, the world must be destroyed with me, and it exists only as far as I exist and feel. I am not in the world, but the world is in me. The universe is me. A solipsist is like a mad feeling instrument who "imagined that he was the only instrument in the world and that all world harmony was taking place in him" [57] . If we only consistently pursue the principle of "immanence" of knowledge, that is, understanding the world as the inner content of our consciousness, then we must inevitably come to the statement that the subject can hourly, instantly destroy the world and re-create it from nothing. If I die, the whole world will collapse with me, for it will cease to exist as a collection of my sensations, the other being is not inherent in it. True, the subjective idealists themselves will not decide on such a frank sequence either. Subjective idealists are trying to get out of this difficulty, pointing out that the world after the death of the subject will not cease to exist in the perceptions of other people, but at the same time they inevitably fall into intractable contradictions. Indeed, after all, other people, like all other things, are nothing but complexes of my sensations, having no other reality, except subjective. Consequently, if I cease to feel, then together with me, humanity must be destroyed, as a complex of my

sensations. Linking to other people means accepting the existence of things outside of my consciousness, acknowledging being.

But what is "me"? Obviously not a physical being, since material existence is not accepted. In order to be a consistent subjective idealist, one should recognize that my body, legs, hands, head, brains are nothing but a complex of my sensations, and exist only as a phenomenon of consciousness, as an intrapsychic reality. Thus, if you sail along a subjective-idealistic current, you will not only drown in the swamp of solipsism, but, like Baron Munchhausen, you will have to extract your hair from there. Not only does the universe dissolve into the "I", but the "I" turns out to be quite ephemeral, dissolves in its own perceptions, turns into a feeling that feels like.

The subjective idealism considered by us here, a reactionary product of the 18th century, was revived and received great popularity by the beginning of our century. Modern materialists have to wage a brutal struggle with subjective idealism.

The imperialist phase of capitalism is the *social basis* on which Berkeley-Humist idealism has been revived; its nutritious juices are in the modern *crisis of natural science*. Imperialism leads not only to the crisis of the economic system of capitalism, but also to the general crisis of the whole capitalist culture. "We live in an extraordinary world," the famous bourgeois physicist M. Planck exclaimed in 1930. "Wherever we look, in all areas of spiritual and material culture we are in a period of severe crises that imprint numerous on our private and public life traits of anxiety and fragility ... As it has long been in religion and art, so now also in science there is hardly a basis in which someone would not doubt, hardly any nonsense in which anyone would not believe ... " [\[58\]](#)

The crisis of bourgeois natural science, which is an integral part of the general agony of bourgeois culture, was already outlined by the first years of this century. The further development of knowledge on the basis of material accumulated under capitalism by natural science can be accomplished only in spite of the dominant bourgeois worldview. *Modern natural science painfully gives rise to dialectical materialism*. It comes to him spontaneously, in incessant conflicts with the original philosophical principles of the bourgeois scholars themselves, but nevertheless inevitably comes to the confirmation of the correctness of the basic tenets of the philosophies of Marx and Engels. The starting philosophical principles of bourgeois naturalists hostile to Marxism impede their full and correct conscious understanding of the results of their research. This contradiction gives rise to the crisis of bourgeois natural science, the social roots of which must be sought in the general contradictions of the imperialist era.

The most significant of the already manifested in the late XIX and early XX centuries. attempts of bourgeois thought to use a crisis of natural science for reactionary purposes, to give an idealistic interpretation of new natural science theories and discoveries — is the restoration by Mach, Avenarius and others of Berkeley's subjective idealism under the banner of *empirio-criticism*. If natural science is approaching "such homogeneous and simple elements of matter, the laws of motion of which allow mathematical processing," modern subjective idealists repeat, "then matter has disappeared, only pure mathematical relationships remain." The old, unchanging atom gave way to a system of moving and changing electrons; therefore, the Machists say, "matter has disappeared." The primitive physical laws are replaced by new, more perfect physical principles — the Machists say: "there is no objective knowledge." Cosmic metaphysical ideas about space and time give way to a dialectical understanding of the unity of time and space as a form of existence of the motion of matter - the idealists cry out: "space and time have disappeared". Meanwhile *that they are the forms of the existence of matter, that material motion is the unity of time and space, that our concepts of time and space change, are refined and developed in connection with the general development of science* . Therefore, modern Machists also attach a rejection of causality to the rejection of matter, from substance. The newest quantum mechanics deepens the concept of causality, introduces corrections to the old mechanistic understanding of causality - empirio-critics say: "causality has disappeared". The collapse of the old mechanical-materialistic principles of natural science, the triumph of the highest form of materialism, is presented by modern subjective idealists (Machists) as the end of materialism.

On this unsteady soil, the Machists resurrect only the reactionary philosophical ideas of the 18th century that were slightly covered with new words: on the basis of subjective idealism they solve the problem of being and thinking.

Empirio-criticism acts as a philosophy of " *pure experience* ." He denies the reality of all that is not given directly in the experience of the subject. The only reality for him is the subjective sensations, the true reality is directly "given" in perception. Everything else is baseless, uncritical "injections" of the mind. Feelings of red, round, bitter, etc. - these are the real "elements" of reality. Matter, bodies, things are no more than "complexes", "bundles" of our sensations, having no being outside sensations, outside our consciousness. In the same way, space and time are nothing but a special kind

of our sensations, experiences. *Thus, everything physical is dissolved in mental elements, in sensations.*

The Machians 'denial of objective reality determines their understanding of the purpose and tasks of knowledge. Since for them there is no objective world, so far as they do not exist and the task of approaching the complete reflection of objective reality, set and resolved by materialism. The goal of knowledge is for them only the systematic ordering of perceptions, the systematization of the diversity of our sensations. *The progress of science consists in the simplest description of a set of sensations.* The subjective idealist position of empirio-critics excludes the possibility of objective knowledge, for them there is no objective truth. If all reality is only the content of consciousness, then truths should be different for different consciousnesses. "Man is the measure of things," as the ancient Greek sophist Protagoras said. Cognition, truth - are subjective and relative (relative). Here the Machians widely open the gates of obscurantism and superstition.

The Machists consider the basic principle of scientific knowledge to be the "*principle of economy of thinking*" or "*the principle of the least expenditure of energy* ." According to this principle, from the two systems describing our experience, from two different theoretical constructions one should choose the most "economical" ones, describing the experience with the greatest simplicity.

For the sake of "economy", everything that complicates and clutters up the description of sensations should be eliminated; therefore, matter, things that do not depend on consciousness, the causal connection of phenomena should be eliminated.

The new Machists "deepen" this reactionary, anti-scientific philosophy with the "doctrine of signs" and the "logic of relations." According to these "teachings," the ordering, unambiguous description of sensations or experiences is accomplished by science through "signs." The knowledge system consists of signs (Schlick). Science deals not with the *reflection of objective things and their relations*, but with *arbitrarily invented physical and mathematical signs*, symbols denoting the relationship between the experiences of the subject. From combinations of signs with the help of mathematical equations, new combinations are deduced, denoted by new signs, etc. The development of science consists, in the opinion of the Machists, in improving the construction of this system of signs.

The Machists want to replace the development of a living, objective knowledge of a multi-complex reality with a reactionary game of abstract mathematical mathematics. Here it is especially clearly seen how their *subjective idealism is combined with mechanism* .

To complete their philosophy, modern subjective idealists "invented" the logic corresponding to the "doctrine of signs". This is "mathematical logic" or "relationship logic" (Ressal). The logic of relations is a new system of signs, invented to denote all possible relations between signs of the experimental sciences. Logical signs and symbols are arbitrarily grouped into new equations in all ways. Philosophy has never reached a more empty, emasculated, empty and barren constructions than the "logic of relationships". If there is any sense in this "logic", then only one - to create one more quirk to deny objective reality. The basic principle of this logical rubbish is the same expulsion of matter, the negation of objective reality. The old logic is bad, they say, because it allowed things and their properties. *properties* and deals with "pure" relations (ie, not with relations between things, but with *pure* , meaningless relations, *without* related objects).

So, sparing no effort, modern idealists "clear" science ... from content, from meaning, from truth.

The first to understand the essence of modern crisis of natural science in its entire meaning, discovered its roots, revealed true tendencies, exposed the reactionary maneuvers of empirio-criticism and showed how to beat Machism, how to overcome the crisis and how the union of dialectical materialism with the achievements of modern science should be overcome was *Lenin* . Verbal tricks did not hide from him the anti-scientific, clerical nature of Machism. Not only did he much deeper, more consistently than Plekhanov, fought against Machism, completely saturating it with its party spirit, he made this struggle many times more fruitful in its results by establishing a *link between Machist ideas and the crisis of natural science theories* and exposing the reactionary nature of the empirio-critical game on this crisis.

Along the way, Lenin corrects the mistakes made by Plekhanov in the controversy with the Machists, including the *mistake in Plekhanov's understanding of the central concept around which the struggle is centered - the concept of experience* . Plekhanov succumbed to the Machist trick, that experience is understood by them not as a "means of knowledge," but as a "subject of knowledge." Plekhanov believed that if the Machists had only held the understanding of experience as a "subject of knowledge," this would have erased the line between Machism and materialism. But the essence of the matter is not at all whether the experience is understood as a subject or as a means of knowledge. The essence of the matter is basically a question of philosophy: *experience is subjective or objective*. whether experience is an immanent generation of consciousness or experience is created in

the process of influencing the subject of the external world that is independent of it and the practical, transformative influence of society on the external world.

Plekhanov in this matter slips from the materialist position. Satisfied with the definition of experience as a "subject of knowledge", he had to come to an agnostic position - that the subject of knowledge is experience, and not objective reality.

Lenin's struggle against Machism was of particular importance, since these bourgeois, subjective-idealistic theories began to penetrate into the ranks of pre-war social democracy. First of all, the influence of Machism affects the views of social fascism. Not only frank Machists such as Fr. Adler, but also Kautsky, from the very beginning conciliatory to Machism, is now parallel with his transformation into a social interventionist more and more linked with Machism in his philosophical convictions. In those years when Lenin created his "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism", in the dark years of reaction after the revolutionary storm of 1905, certain Bolsheviks took up the position of Machism and slipped into the Mensheviks. A. Bogdanov (whose departure from dialectical materialism ended later with his divergence from Bolshevism), comrade Lunacharsky, and others, transferred the fashionable reactionary teaching to the Russian soil. Lenin's work dealt a crushing blow to all these theories, and made scores with the "philosophical headless" who were led by an idealistic reaction.

Bogdanov's empirio-monism is nothing but a *kind of subjective idealism*, and is based on the same Machist understanding of the relation of being to thinking. Terminological tricks of Bogdanov seek to cover up the idealistic essence of his teachings, in no way eliminate his idealism. Bogdanov's "empirio-monism" is nothing but a kind of Machism.

Bogdanov, like the rest of the Machists, does not go beyond the limits of experience. The initial, primary for him is the chaos of elements. These elements — sensations already familiar to us, cut off from the sensing person and from objects causing sensations — are pure sensations, sensations in general, a deadly idealistic abstraction. Direct complexes, combinations of these elements form, according to Bogdanov, mental experience. Thus, psychic experience is recognized as immediate, existing before nature. Physical experience is the next, highest stage of development. It is *derived* in relation to mental experience, transformation, reflection of the latter. Being a subjective idealist, Bogdanov does not distinguish the objective, independent of experience and the physical world that exists before any experience, from the physical experience of people. Instead of understanding the mental as a derivative in relation to the physical, Bogdanov does the opposite: he declares the physical world as a "permutation" area, in which the physical world is "substituted" by us for the mental, that is, gives a psychological, idealistic explanation. Bogdanov's "Universal Substitution Theory" is only a new name for the old idealistic solution of the fundamental question of philosophy. The final link of the Bogdanov's construction, following the "elements", mental and physical experience, is our knowledge arising from it.

Such a subjective idealistic position inevitably leads Bogdanov to the *denial of objective truth*. and the possibility of an objective criterion of truth. In fact, if there is no reality independent of experience, then it is impossible to speak of truth independent of our consciousness as a reflection of objective reality. Truth is understood by empirio-monism subjectively, as is what is true for us. Bogdanov thought to eliminate the endless contradictions of the former subjectivism and avoid solipsism by the fact that instead of individual experience he made the central concept of his philosophy "socially organized experience". He hoped in this way to distinguish the true, the scientific from the false, the superstitious. Objectivity turns into his collectivity of experience, its validity for a number of people. "The objectivity of the physical world is," he wrote, "that it exists not for me, but for everyone." "The physical world is socially coordinated, socially harmonized, - in short, socially organized experience. " But this Bogdanov in reality does not overcome idealism and a subjective understanding of the truth. Consciousness of humanity, replacing the consciousness of the individual, is still consciousness: the idealistic principle is preserved. The existence of the physical world is made dependent on social consciousness, instead of being independent of any (also social) consciousness and preceding it. Generally significant, "socially organized" experience is not always objectively true at all. After all, religious beliefs over the long period of history were "generally significant" and "socially organized," but this did not at all make them true. there is nevertheless consciousness: the idealistic principle is preserved. The existence of the physical world is made dependent on social consciousness, instead of being independent of any (also social) consciousness and preceding it. Generally significant, "socially organized" experience is not always objectively true. After all, religious beliefs over the long period of history were "generally significant" and "socially organized," but this did not at all make them true. there is nevertheless consciousness: the idealistic principle is preserved. The existence of the physical world is made dependent on social consciousness, instead of being independent of any (also social) consciousness and preceding it. Generally significant, "socially organized" experience is

not always objectively true. After all, religious beliefs over the long period of history were "generally significant" and "socially organized," but this did not at all make them true.

*In his teaching that truth is nothing more than "an ideological form, organizing a form of human experience," empirio-monism thus opens the gates of religion and other reactionary lies.*

In his later works, written by Bogdanov already after Lenin exposed the idealistic essence of his "empirio-monism", Bogdanov develops a supposedly new "tectological" teaching - "*universal organizational science*". Here Bogdanov completely remains on the same subjective-idealistic, Machist position, in the realm of the elements - sensations and their system of complexes. Behind the many new verbal twists lies an old philosophical concept. This, by the way, was not understood by Comrade Bukharin, whom Bogdanov managed to deceive by ripping his teachings. Comrade Bukharin, as Lenin pointed out, did not understand the idealistic identity of Bogdanov's "tectology" and his "empirio-monism".

Remaining with the former solution of the basic question of philosophy, Bogdanov in the "General Organizational Science" develops anti-dialectical *mechanistic views* on a subjective-idealistic basis. He criticizes the materialistic dialectic of Marx and Engels, replacing the principle of universal development by the "organizational process", the law of the unity of opposites - by mechanical "collision of oppositely directed forces", "activities", dialectics - by the mechanistic theory of equilibrium (it will be considered later). In Tectology, we again have a vivid example of how Machism and Mechanism perfectly coexist with each other. Bogdanov is trying to establish universal forms of organization of elements, regardless of the "content being organized." He invents scientifically fruitless "universal laws", applied to all branches of knowledge without exception, without taking into account their originality. In fact, all these laws of selection, conjugation, ingression, etc. are empty mechanistic schemes, energy and biological labels,

It is not uninteresting to note that subjective-idealistic principles find refuge in the teachings of "our" modern mechanists. Mechanistic understanding of the world, reducing nature to the movement of identical, qualityless particles, with its reverse side must naturally have an acknowledgment of the *qualitative differences*, given in experience, as purely *subjective* differences. Acknowledging the subjectivity of the so-called secondary qualities, that is, asserting that sounds, colors, etc., are nothing but our feelings, and not a reflection of objectively existing differences, L. Axelrod, S. Sarabyanov and their colleagues came to more "General" conclusion about the subjectivity of quality in general. For them, quality is a product of consciousness. Without a subject there is no quality object. The qualitative certainty of an object depends on the differences of subjects and their *points of view*. For example, comrade Sarabyanov denies objective truth. Truth, in his opinion, as much as subjective attitudes, approaches.

The same elements of "bashful agnosticism", according to Lenin, and subjectivism are also found in Comrade Bukharin, for whom the *dialectic is only one of many "points of view"*. So a departure from dialectical materialism entails a link with subjective idealism. Such a combination of mechanism and subjective idealism, as we have seen, is by no means accidental. The history of philosophy shows that such a combination is very usual and natural. The reduction of all phenomena to a mechanical, qualityless identity serves for the subjective idealists as the guiding principle of systematization, ordering, bringing to unity the complex diversity of our sensations. Denying objective reality, subjectivists consider the task of science to systematize experience, the "organization" of perception. The mechanism is for them the most convenient, economical principle of organization.

Subjective idealism is very close and interlocks with it in certain points of their views *philosophical intuitivism* - a direction that has received the widest distribution in the bourgeois philosophy of recent decades and which has generated a number of fashionable philosophical schools in various capitalist countries. The most prominent representative of intuitivism is the philosopher of French imperialism, Henri Bergson. The essence of his teaching, as well as all intuitivism, lies in the fact that the mind is reduced and limited, rational logical knowledge in favor of a different, "higher" method of comprehending the truth - direct instinct, intuition, instinctive penetration into the essence of things.

Science, according to intuitionists, is capable of delivering only limited, empirical truths that have only practical value. With the help of intuition, Bergson promises complete comprehension of objects. "Either philosophy is impossible at all," he says, "and all knowledge of things is only practical knowledge (not revealing their essence. - *Auth.* ), Aimed at extracting benefit from them (and not at knowing the truth. - *Auth.* ), Or philosophizing is to penetrate the object itself with the help of the tension of intuition".

By intuition, Bergson calls "that kind of feeling or sympathy, through which we penetrate into the interior of the subject in order to merge with the fact that there is in it only and therefore ineffable" <sup>[59]</sup>. The worst enemy of materialism, Bergson, furnishes his call for the search for the

"ineffable" by mystical "empathy" and his criticism of scientific knowledge of objective reality with a multitude of supposedly learned considerations and subtle sophistry, falsifying natural-scientific data for its own purposes.

So Bergson comes from the rupture of space and time. Time, the understanding of which Bergson ideally distorts, giving him a purely psychological meaning, he opposes to space as a living principle to the dead, moving, creative, spiritual - inert, lifeless materialism. At the same time moving, living world, he understands in such a way that " *there are changes, but there are no things that change. Changes do not need media*. There is movement, but there is no need for unchanging objects that move: movement does not contain any moving bodies ".

This clearly affects the relationship of *intuitivism and subjective idealism* . The study of the material motive forces of the universe, Bergson, replaces faith in the "vital impulse", which, according to intuitivism, is the true basis of all vitality and development. Of course, everything ends with a mystical belief in the underworld and the immortality of the soul and leads to direct clericalism. "From all this," writes Bergson, "clearly follows the concept of a *creative and free god* , who gives rise to both matter and life, and whose striving for creation continues from the side of life by the development of species and the formation of human personalities."

Bergson is by no means an exception among modern-day bourgeois philosophers. The turn to mysticism is characteristic of all modern bourgeois "lords of thought". The same tendency, albeit in a different form, is also found in another philosophical pillar of decaying capitalism — that of *Edmund Husserl* striving for objective idealism but falling into subjectivism . Husserl proclaims a new science - *phenomenology*, which he declares to be "basic philosophical science." Phenomenology is distracted from the entire real world, it does not deal with real phenomena occurring in time and space. It deals with "surreal phenomena", with "ideal being", with "meanings", "meanings", with "the world of eidos" (ideal essence). Being directed towards consciousness, phenomenology means not real manifestations of human consciousness, not mental processes. It "purifies" the consciousness of all individual, mental, deals with the "pure", non-individual "I", with the "absolute consciousness", with the "essence" of consciousness. Phenomenology Husserl - "science" is purely descriptive. It does not rely on logic, does not have the latter as its premise. Phenomenology precedes logic. She explains nothing, proves nothing, but only describes directly given in the "ideal intuition." Phenomenology, according to Husserl, must be a purely descriptive discipline, exploring with the help of pure intuition the sphere of transcendental pure consciousness. Direct "seeing the essence", "pure ideal intuition" - these are the methods of this, if I may say so, "science". "Philosophy," asserts Husserl, "in his scientific work is compelled to move in an atmosphere of direct intuition, and the greatest step that our time must take is the recognition that with a philosophical, in the true sense of the word intuition, with the phenomenological comprehension of the essence, the infinite field of work opens " Direct "seeing the essence", "pure ideal intuition" - these are the methods of this, if I may say so, "science". "Philosophy," asserts Husserl, "in his scientific work is compelled to move in an atmosphere of direct intuition, and the greatest step that our time must take is the recognition that with a philosophical, in the true sense of the word intuition, with the phenomenological comprehension of the essence, the infinite field of work opens "<sup>[60]</sup> . This is one of the last words of bourgeois philosophy.

#### **2.4. Kant's dualism and modern Kantianism**

Another trend of bourgeois philosophy, which has long led the struggle against materialism and, until recently, has been advanced in opposition to materialism, is Kantianism.

Modern Kantian philosophy opposes Marxism not only in an open bourgeois form, but also in a "socialist" one. *Neo-Kantianism is the dominant philosophy in the social-fascist environment*. Bernstein, Vorländer, Adler, Bauer, Kautsky bring together the "Marxist" understanding of social life with neo-Kantian philosophy. As a result, neo-Kantian philosophy is still the main form of the influence of bourgeois philosophy on the proletariat. Neo-Kantian perversions sometimes seep into Soviet science and philosophy. Hence, all the actual importance of exposing this type of idealism, this philosophical weapon of the bourgeoisie and its agents in their struggle against the philosophical foundations of the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat is clear.

By its social nature, the classical German idealism of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. was to some extent a peculiar analogue of French materialism. Like the old materialism, he was a philosophical herald of the bourgeois revolution. But the historical features of the preparation and

development of the bourgeois revolution in Germany were different from the French conditions, in both cases the forces and class ratios were different. The German "enlighteners" still do not lead, like the French, "an open war with all official science, with the church, often even with the state," they do not break with religion and do not raise the banner of materialism. Their "revolutionary" half-hearted, powerless, dreamy. *This is the powerlessness and half-heartedness of the philosophy of the advanced German bourgeoisie of the early 19th century. rooted in the backwardness of the social relations of the then Germany and the weakness of the bourgeoisie.* The productive forces of Germany in their development lagged behind the industry of the advanced countries of Europe. The insignificant and impotent German bourgeoisie, fragmented and disunited by many small independent feudal provinces, had not dared to speak in full voice and think with revolutionary courage. She could only dream of new social forms. It reached only "goodwill", the *idea of due* social order. Her philosophy is therefore idealistic and compromise. It was not for nothing that Marx called the philosophy of Kant "the German theory of the French Revolution." She overthrows God with one hand, raises him to the throne with the other; she tries to push off from idealism, but recoils in horror from the materialism in front of her and again plunges into the abyss of idealistic speculation.

Ancestor of German classical idealism was the famous Koenigsberg thinker Emanuel Kant. "The main feature of Kant's philosophy is the *reconciliation of materialism with idealism* , a compromise between the two, a combination of heterogeneous, opposite philosophical trends in one system" <sup>[61]</sup> . Any such attempt is doomed in advance, and Kant's teaching is a split, *dualistic* system torn apart by internal contradictions .

From the very beginning, literally from the very first lines of the research, Kant tries to dissociate himself from subjective idealism. "Without a doubt," he writes, "all our knowledge begins with experience, for what would the ability of knowledge to awaken to activity, *if not objects that act on our feelings* and partly produce ideas, partly motivate our mind to compare them, to combine or to divide and, thus, process the gross material of sensory impressions and the knowledge of objects, called experience " <sup>[62]</sup> . And in another place, he says: "Therefore, in any case, I recognize that there are bodies outside of us, that is, things ... which we know from the ideas, aroused in us by their influence on our sensuality" <sup>[63]</sup> . By such a statement, the "critical" idealism of Kant tries to isolate himself from Berkeley and Hume. Our sensations suggest the existence of objective reality, which is their source. The objective world really exists outside of our consciousness and affects our consciousness. But, recognizing, with good reason, the existence of an object outside the subject, Kant had to explain what the relationship between them was, how dependent the subject and object were from each other, and what was the role of both in the formation of knowledge. Here Kant again moves to the position of idealism.

Our experience, according to Kant, is the result of the interaction of an object and a subject. He is a cross between these two principles. Things, influencing our sensuality, give us the content of knowledge in the form of sensations. However, it depends on the organization of the subject, on the characteristics of the perceiving apparatus, on the structure of our sensuality and mind, what this material, given by external influence, will turn into in consciousness. *The subject with its inherent organization and functions is opposed to the object, it organizes, draws up, processes sensations according to its inherent, subject, laws, in forms peculiar to consciousness.* The impact of external things gives ideas their content, our consciousness gives them shape. Such is the initial, *dualistic* formulation of the question. *The form* consciousness is opposed to its *content* . The forms of experience, that is, those forms of sensuality and categories of reason, with which experience is formed, space, time, causal relationship, do not exist outside of us, but within ourselves, are the actual *forms of the subject*, its integral original identity. They are a priori, originally inherent in our consciousness, they are not brought into the mind from the outside, but our consciousness dictates the experience of its form, the laws of its construction.

Already long before Kant, among the philosophers, the division (which is still maintained by the mechanists) of all the qualities we perceive in things into *primary* and *secondary*, was widespread . The secondary were called qualities that are supposedly not inherent in the things themselves, but are due to the organization of the knowing subject himself. These qualities included color, smell, taste, and so on. Primary qualities inherent in objective things — the length, impermeability, shape, and movement — were distinguished from secondary ones. Kant focused his criticism on exploring the relationships underlying the primary qualities themselves. The basis of this relationship, as is easy to see, is *space and time*. as a form of existence of objective reality. Kant seeks to prove that we cannot get an idea of space from experience, from single sensations, because experience already presupposes the existence of this idea and is impossible without it. According to Kant, space and time are not real forms of material existence, but the initial forms, inherent in our



own sensuality, are *a priori*, that is, pre-assumed, necessary forms of our *contemplation*, determined by the nature of our *consciousness*.

Not because, according to Kant, our entire experience is spatial, that such are the things themselves, but because such is the nature of our sensuality, that it cannot fail to clothe the content of experience in the form of space and in the framework of time. Space, like time, are pure forms of our sensuality and make sense only in relation to human experience, and not outside it. They are the initial *subjective conditions*, defining the nature of our experience. On the basis of such an understanding of space and time, Kant transfers the so-called primary qualities from the objective world to the subjective one. Not only smells and sounds, but also the length and movement are subjective, they are not inherent in things in themselves, but due to the organization of the subject, since the length and movement are unthinkable without space and time. They are not the result of experience, but its subjective conditions, premises.

Nature, however, is not a chaos of ideas, a disorderly diversity, but some sort of ordered, organized unity: correctness and regularity are characteristic of it. What explains its causal relationship and pattern? Kant is convinced that the content of experience is in itself chaotic and erratic, that sensations are not the source from which we draw our beliefs about unity and order of the world. This unity of perception is acquired through involvement *in a single mind*. The unity of the knowing subject (the so-called "transcendental apperception") is the basis of the unity of experience, the center connecting all our perceptions. Thanks to its unity and constancy, *reason brings order and connection* in the multiplicity of perceptions. Consciousness creates some orderly unity according to the rules, according to the so-called categories of reason. The rules of nature, its connections, including the causal connection of phenomena, its unity and its laws do not stem from things outside of our consciousness, but represent the activity of the very reason. "Order and lawfulness are introduced *by ourselves* into the phenomena that we call *nature*, and could not be found in phenomena if we had *not invested in them originally by ourselves* or the nature of our soul" <sup>[64]</sup>. Reason as the creator of the unity of experience and its order is the legislator of the world, the source of the laws of nature, understood as the totality of our experience. We have no reason to talk about patterns beyond our experience.

Thus, Kant gives the subject a more and more decisive role in cognition. One after another, all the qualities and relationships that we perceive in nature are transferred by him from object to subject. As a result of this research, the subject becomes everything, and the object, the things - nothing. Objects that are the source of sensations, things themselves turned into an incorporeal shadow, elusive and unnecessary for knowledge.

True, things that exist outside of us, affect our feelings and cause sensations. But sensations, according to Kant, are not at all *similar* to the things causing them. There is even less similarity between things and the phenomena caused by them than between fire and the smoke it causes, between pain and the cry it causes. Sensations suggest things that cause them, but do not reflect them, do not say anything about what they are - these things. To things, knowledge has no way out; *things themselves are unknowable*. That which is knowable must be a subjective, wholly and completely conditioned organization of the subject. To know that which is outside the subject, such as it is in itself, is to wish to reason without reason, to contemplate without contemplation, to imagine without representation. *Our knowledge can deal only with phenomena, and not with things in themselves, it finds in "nature" only what it invests in it*. To things themselves, the path is cut off. We know not the very things that awaken feelings for activity, but only the means of their influence on us. Such is the final *agnostic* Kant's conclusion. Behind the phenomena "things in themselves" are supposed, the world exists outside of our consciousness, but it is completely unknowable and absolutely inaccessible to the subject. The subject of knowledge can and should be the world of phenomena. The laws of nature are the laws of understanding and are valid only within the boundaries of our subjective understanding. Nature as an object of knowledge loses its materiality. "Bodies and movements," says Kant, "do not exist as something outside of us, but only as representations in us, and therefore the movements of matter do not produce representations in us, but the essence themselves (just like based movements) only representations" <sup>[65]</sup>.

*Kant's answer to the basic question of philosophy is dualistic*. Objective reality opposes the subject as an "thing in itself" independent of it. For its part, the subject with its "a priori" preserves its independence from the external world and creates from itself the very special world. The subject is detached from the object of perception from their cause, the "thing in itself" from the phenomenon, cognition from the real world, the form of knowledge from its content, the experienced world from the "super-experienced" *Sensation and reason do not connect the subject with the object, but tear them apart*. Kant's agnosticism closes the path from object to subject. The contradiction between the

recognition of objective reality and the doctrine of its unknowability is a fundamental organic vice of Kant's philosophical system.

Since, according to Kant, only the content of consciousness, the forms of sensuality and the categories of reason are cognizable, science is completely locked into the sphere of the subjective. *Kant's agnostic dualism actually turns out to be an inconsistent subjective idealism*, not going beyond the limits of idealistically understood experience.

Kant's theory of knowledge is metaphysical. It is based on a *non-historical* approach to the subject and its relation to the object. Kant takes the ready, frozen, once-given thinking of the modern man, the contemporary bourgeois. He does not care that thinking only in the process of development has become what it is. Kant does not consider cognition in its origin, movement, and change. He metaphysically breaks the forms of knowledge and their content and explores completely isolated, empty, "pure" logical forms. Instead of the indivisible unity of the content and form of knowledge, Kant operates with dead, immovable, empty, ready, divorced from the object and content forms of knowledge.

Plekhanov and even more A. Deborin reveal their misunderstanding of the essence of Kantian agnosticism when they *identify it with the teachings of the French materialists about knowledge*. The French materialists, in the opinion of Deborin, opposing the *essence of a thing to its properties*, expressed provisions that were supposedly identical with Kant's teaching about the "thing in itself" and the phenomenon. In reality, the teaching of French materialists on knowability is the *opposite of Kant's teachings*. Kant asserts the absolute, principled *unknowability of "things in themselves,"* old materialism speaks only of the actual "*unknowing*"The essence of things in their era. Kant rejects any possibility of penetration into the world of "things in themselves," but old materialism believes that *we have learned the objective properties of things themselves*, that through the manifestation of properties we are approaching an understanding of their essence. For them, things in themselves are material, extended and objectively regular; Kant, on the other hand, turns experience, the materiality of things, their objective regularity, etc. into subjective forms. The Plekhanov-Deborin position on this issue smoothes the fundamental contrast between materialistic and idealistic views. It brings materialism closer to idealism instead of exposing their opposite in all its sharpness.

*The teaching of Kant, like any non-materialistic teaching, opens the way to religion.* By limiting knowledge to phenomena, hindering the mind the way to things in itself, closing it in the subjective world and rejecting its claims to have a judgment about objective reality, Kant's philosophy leaves room for faith. Cognition covers only phenomena, "things in themselves" are inaccessible to him, they are accessible only to faith. This establishes the cohabitation of faith and knowledge. Kant's philosophy substantiates the ideological compromise between science and religion, between the theoretical tasks of the progressive bourgeoisie and the reactionary ideology. Kantian dualism is the classic philosophy of conciliation, social compromise, liberalism and reformism. This characterizes the social essence of Kantianism and determines its further role in the class struggle.

The revolution of 1848, the appearance on the historical arena of the proletariat as an independent force with special class interests, the consolidation of capitalism, the formation of the German Empire — deprived the bourgeoisie of any remnants and up to that very relative "revolutionism", sent its ideology *along the way of reaction*. From the 60s of the last century, the "revival" of Kantian idealism in bourgeois philosophy began. Neo-Kantianism, unlike Kant's philosophy itself, represents a turn from all half-heartedness, ambiguity, flirting with vulgar materialism towards the most reactionary sides of idealistic philosophy. "Restoration" of Kantianism is directed in a certain direction, - it must "finish" with materialism (Libman, Lange, Cohen, Rickert, etc.).

Neo-Kantianism is just as different from the teachings of Kant himself, how different are the interests of the bourgeoisie in different periods of its development. Neo-Kantianism is not the restoration of the true dualistic doctrine of the historical Kant, but its reactionary publication, undertaken by the "correction" on the right, the consistent development of Kant's teachings. In the face of the developing class struggle, the bourgeoisie could not be satisfied with the petty-bourgeois natural-scientific materialism that prevailed at that time. She appeals to the idealistic reactionary side of Kant's teachings, "deepening" them and adapting them to her new tasks.

The main difference between neo-Kantianism and historical Kant is the *transformation of the inconsistent subjective idealism of Kant's dualistic philosophy into subjective idealism*. . Despite the fact that various representatives of neo-Kantianism retain in their views significant elements of dualism (between being and ought, nature and history, purpose and means, etc.), yet basically they "correct" Kant from the "right", trying to root out from it all sorts of materialistic elements. The "thing in itself" is rejected by the neo-Kantians. "The thing in itself" as a materialistic element in Kant, which causes our sensations, is rejected and declared an unnecessary appendage, which should be removed

from philosophy (G. Kogen, P. Natorp, social-fascist M. Adler, etc.). "Thinking cannot have any origin other than itself." "There are no things except in thinking and thanks to him" (G. Cohen). Consciousness itself is the only true "thing in itself". Moreover, it is not the consciousness of specific real people, but the mystical "consciousness in general", independent of the brain (Adler). Both form and content in knowledge, all "experience" and "nature" are depicted as *spawn*, thinking himself and his objects (Natorp). Thinking is not given anything other than what it itself produced.

Bringing idealism to the end, neo-Kantianism rejects the distinction made by Kant between "sensuality", sensations and reason, between "view" and thinking. Visual representations, sensations are reduced by neo-Kantians to thinking, to the products of logical "me". If, for Kant, the content of experience is given to consciousness due to the influence of "things in itself" on it, then for neo-Kantians nothing is given to consciousness, *but everything is produced by thinking.* "Creative sovereignty" of "pure" thinking (Natorp) is proclaimed. Being for neo-Kantians is only thinking. "The world rests on the basis of the laws of thinking" (Kogen). It exists only to the extent and only since we think (M. Adler). Thus, in its essence, according to the solution of the fundamental question of philosophy, neo-Kantianism closely approaches clericalism. At the same time, the philosophers of the Second International are not at all behind their masters.

The main scientific method, in the image and likeness of which the neo-Kantians develop logic, they consider the idealistically distorted method of mathematical natural science. Cohen tries to rely on the method of calculating the infinitely small that he distorts, which he declares to be the universal method of genuine scientific thought. Natorp proclaims "pure number" alpha and omega logic. The number for him is "the purest and simplest way of thinking that justified science as exact." From the "pure number" he makes the transition to the concepts of measurement and direction, from here he "deduces" space and time as pure acts assumed by thought, and from "space" and time "deduces" the "concept" of matter. It is necessary to pay attention to this connection of neo-Kantian idealism with the principles of mathematical science that are being mutilated, since this way, with the help of the concepts of number, quantity, etc. *Neo-Kantian idealism is combined with mechanism.*

Neo-Kantianism "corrects" Kantian dualism of form and content of experience by discarding the real content of experience, remaining in the sphere of "pure" forms and relations. All reality is dissolved in "pure" logical-mathematical relations and empty forms of thinking. The logical relation "determines", "rely" - according to neo-Kantianism - related elements, "members of a relationship".

We settled on one of the main currents of neo-Kantianism, the so-called *Marburg* school. Another, no less reactionary course is associated with the names of Windelband and Rickert. The main task of their philosophy is to break the social and natural sciences and "substantiate" the impossibility of studying social patterns. We will further dwell on this trend, which *denies the law in the development of social life and the possibility of its scientific research*, when considering historical materialism.

The fight against relapses of Kantianism, especially in its reactionary neo-Kantian form, its irreconcilability towards it is a matter of course the duty of modern materialists. However, even with Plekhanov, who mainly pursued the philosophical line of dialectical materialism and fought against his Kantianism of his Menshevik friends, we find not only the connivance of Kantianism, but also direct Kantian errors. *The theory of knowledge of Plekhanov, as Lenin showed with absolute certainty, suffers from elements of agnosticism.*

We have seen that, according to Kant, our ideas do not give a true depiction of things. Caused by "things in themselves" representations do not reflect them. There is no similarity between things and phenomena. Plekhanov, agreeing with the "theory of hieroglyphs", becomes on Kant's indicated agnostic position. According to this theory, our sensations refer to things that cause them, like symbols or hieroglyphs to the objects they designate. Symbols are *not like* the things they designate, do not reflect, do not reproduce them. So the symbol "v" is not a *reflection* of the *speed* indicated by it. or the hook on the music line is not at all similar to the sound it stands for. Similarly, the ratio of things and their perception of hieroglyph theory represents. In our experience, signs and symbols of things are given, but not their reflections. The world of experience is the realm of symbols, not at all similar to the defiant objective world. In this, not reflecting the real world, the realm of signs, human knowledge is closed. Plekhanov deeply imbued with this dualistic concept and although he later admitted that he had made a mistake agreeing with the theory of hieroglyphs, he still did not understand the essence of his mistake, did not overcome it. Plekhanov believed that this was only a terminological mistake, whereas in fact he had a departure from the materialistic solution of the fundamental question of philosophy. Having rejected the word "hieroglyphs", he continued to stand on that point of view, *communication*, not a *reflection of the* consciousness of things, i.e., remained in the same agnostic position. Plekhanov indicates that each symbol corresponds to the object

designated by it, but the fact is that, according to Plekhanov, the object is not *reflected* in consciousness.

It is quite characteristic that both forms of the perversion of Marxism — mechanism and Menshevik idealism — adhere to Plekhanov's agnostic errors. The mechanists (Sarabjanov, Axelrod) on this crucial issue directly declare their disagreement with Lenin; insist on the Kantian hieroglyphic theory, deepening Plekhanov's mistake. Menshevik idealists are in this issue in an idyllic alliance with the mechanists. Deborin and Luppol, recognizing Plekhanov's mistake as "purely terminological," cover up the fundamental discrepancy on the main issue of philosophy, become advocates of Kantian agnosticism.

If Plekhanov shamefully extended his finger to Kantianism, then the ideologists of modern *social-fascism* gave him hands and a heart. *Kantianism is the main form of conducting bourgeois influence on the proletariat along the line of philosophy; it has become the official philosophy of the Second International.*

The very attitude of the social fascists to theory in general and philosophy in particular and the understanding of their role in the class struggle are directly opposed to Marxism-Leninism. The social fascists are separating theory from social practice, they do not see the necessary dependence between the two. Philosophical views, like religious beliefs, they consider a private matter, indifferent to the party and political activities. What theoretical base a social democrat brings under his political program is his own business. This doctrine, which fundamentally contradicts the Marxist doctrine of class ideology, is necessary for social traitors to directly replace Marxism with bourgeois ideology. Breaking the link between their practice and Marxist theory, they make room for the connection of this renegade practice with anti-Marxist idealist currents,

The ancestor of modern social betrayal E. Bernstein, at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries, caught on the slogan of bourgeois philosophical reaction: "Back to Kant". Since then, attempts to "supplement" Marx with Kant, "correct" with his neo-Kantianism, and "deepen" with his idealistic apriorism have become the leitmotif of social-traitorous philosophy. M. Adler attempts to idealistically interpret Marxism, throwing the bridge between Marx and Kant in the form of a "social a priori," that is, a priori categories of reason, diluted by sociological phraseology. Vorlander brings a Kantian ethical rationale under socialism. He is echoed by Bauer, who "enriches" Marxism with Kant morality and "national apperception," that is, it applies the principle of the primacy of the subject to the national question.

The "Sam", the disgusting social interventionist Kautsky, who for decades played the role of "guardian of Marxist orthodoxy" in the Second International, does not lag behind the "spirit of the times." Kant's "criticism", in his opinion, is capable of raising materialism to a higher level. He agrees with the dualism of things and phenomena, and basically accepts the teachings of Kant about the unknowability of "things in themselves." Certain things and their nature, according to Kautsky, are unknowable. Cognizable *relationship* only between things, identity and the difference of things between themselves. The identity or difference of symbols "expresses" the identity or difference of the objects they designate, but, according to Kautsky, it says nothing about the objects hidden from us behind the symbols. The differences we study, according to Kautsky, are the essence of the differences of ideas among themselves, i.e. they are subjective, they *are not taken out of the sphere of phenomena*. If Kautsky criticizes Kant, does not agree with him on some issues, then only in order to "correct" Kant's teachings with the teachings of Mach, to "improve" one kind of idealism to others. Kautsky's eclectic philosophy is positivism, a teaching limited to experience in the subjectively idealistic understanding of the latter. If Kautsky continues to use the term "materialism," he also considers Kant to be a materialist, since this term is for him only a synonym for the philosophical method that remains within "pure experience".

According to the social interventionists, social pests are equal in Soviet conditions. In unison, Kautsky and the Bauers are echoed by the *wrecking methodology of the Menshevik Rubin*, which is nothing more than a counter-revolutionary neo-Kantian doctrine, adapted to the use of Soviet "legal possibilities." Rubin's scientific activity was an integral part of his entire counter-revolutionary work. His wrecking role was to divert Soviet economic thought from the pressing issues of socialist construction in the jungle of scholastic disputes. Preventing the ministry of economic theory from building a socialist economy is the goal pursued by Rubin. In order to distract from Soviet reality, Rubin followed a purely formalistic neo-Kantian methodology, "studying" "pure" non-material economic forms, social relations abstract from class content. The historical was absorbed by the logical, the social became formal, the class was supplanted. Short:

## **2.5. Absolute, objective idealism of Hegel and modern neo-Hegelianism**

German classical idealism reached its end in Hegel's philosophy, whose teaching represents the highest peak of philosophical thought to which *bourgeois idealistic* thinking was capable of reaching .

The teaching of Hegel is a philosophical reflection of the further development of ideas, inspired by the French revolution in German conditions, in the conditions of the backward development of the bourgeoisie and the undeveloped class struggle. The further it was from the then Prussian reality to the broadcast ideas of the French Revolution, the more attractive the ideals were, the more they inspired the philosophical thought of the German idealists. In the transcendental heights of philosophy, they accomplished great feats that they were powerless to accomplish in earthly reality. If, for Kant, the realm of reason is still only the realm of the due, then for Hegel it already becomes *necessary*. . He is deeply convinced of the rationality of reality, of the inescapable triumph of reason. But while in the French materialists the mind was hostile to faith and incompatible with religion, in Hegel religion turns out to be the highest stage of development of the spirit, reason only purifies and elevates religion to philosophical heights.

Hegelian philosophy is a product of the era of bourgeois revolutions. It is a reflection in the ideological sphere of the class struggle of the end of the XVIII and the first quarter of the XIX century. Hegelian philosophy is a product of the epoch of the Great French Revolution. Marx, describing the philosophy of Kant, pointed out that it was "the *German* theory of the French Revolution." This characteristic can be attributed with a certain right to the philosophy of Hegel. Being undoubtedly the product of the whole epoch of the bourgeois revolution at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, it was at the same time a product of the German conditions, the class relations of Germany of this period. It is precisely these circumstances that explain the contradictions of Hegelian philosophy, the contradictions between the reactionary and revolutionary side of his philosophy, between the method and the system.

Hegel subjected Kant's philosophy to brilliant criticism. With all the insight available to idealistic positions, he revealed the imperfections of Kantian dualism and subjectivism. But this criticism, which has deeply damaged Kantianism, is being conducted by Hegel in the name of a more consistent and deeper idealism, in the name of *objective* , dialectical idealism.

Hegel contrasts Kant's *rupture of being and thinking* with their *identity* . Kant fences off being from thinking. Hegel turns the objective world, the universe, *of which* only man and his consciousness are a part, into a spiritual process, into the realization of the *world mind* . For Hegel, the original beginning, the primary essence of the world is the objectively existing spirit, the world mind, the universal, universal thinking.

The development of the universe is a rational development, accomplished according to the laws of reason, according to logical laws. The evolution of the universe is a logical development of the world mind. In the logic of the world mind, one should look for an explanation of everything that is happening, the beginning and the cause of everything that is happening is rooted in it. The history of nature and society is essentially nothing but the otherness of self-development, the self-movement of eternal, absolute spirit according to its inherent logical principles. Everything that happens in the world is nothing but a manifestation of the world mind. The history of the world is universal logic, various stages, stages of development of *an absolute idea*. . The latter does not depend on our knowledge or sensation. We think such a stage of the existence of the world mind, when there were no people and no cognizing beings at all. On the contrary, the emergence of cognitive people is characterized by a high level in the development of the world spirit. Not the world is our creation, but, on the contrary, we, like everything that exists, are the embodiment of the world spirit, the stage of its self-development.

Only the spiritual is real. Nature, things, the material world is nothing but a manifestation of the realization of the world mind, one of the incarnations of the absolute idea. In this realization, the spirit turns into the opposite of its own nature, it is realized in the form of unreasonable matter, in the form of many things. Nature is, according to Hegel, the otherness of the spirit, its *other being* "in the form of an indifferent external objectivity ... The formation of nature is the formation of its spirit." "Nature should be considered as a system of steps, each of which necessarily follows from the others, but this does not mean that each of them is naturally produced by the other. Such a sequence of them exists only in the inner idea underlying nature " <sup>[66]</sup>. These words express with full clarity Hegel's recognition of the objective reality of the absolute idea. Thus Hegel affirms the primacy of the spirit, of thinking, which forms the basis, the essence of objectivity itself. The subjective spirit, the "I," is understood by him as a derivative, secondary, but derived from the world spirit — the absolute, universal spirit. Subjectivism is denied by Hegel on the basis of *objective idealism* . In nature, as we have seen, the estrangement of the spirit from itself occurred, the spirit was realized in things.

The next stage of his movement is the reverse transformation of nature into spirit, the return of the spirit to itself in the form of a *subjective* spirit, self-consciousness.

What does science represent from this point of view? Knowledge is activity, manifestation of the spirit. And the object, the object of knowledge - the same spirit in all the diversity of its manifestations, including nature. Thus, in science, the *knowledge of the spirit itself*, self-consciousness. A cognizing subject as one of the manifestations of the spirit knows its essence in its various manifestations. Here the spirit is aware of itself, its principles, laws, its history. "A spirit that knows itself in development as a spirit is science. It is his activity and the kingdom, which he builds for himself in his own sphere" <sup>[67]</sup>. Science differs from art or religion in that the comprehension of the spirit is accomplished not in images or feelings, but in concepts. "Science is," according to Hegel, "comprehending in terms of the knowledge of the absolute spirit" <sup>[68]</sup>. And since scientific knowledge is a logical process, and the knowable, that is, reality, the history of the universe is also a logical process, then "knowledge is a concept that is the object of itself and comprehends *itself*". In this identity of knowledge with its subject matter, in the fact that in science the spirit remains in its own sphere, Hegel sees a guarantee of our correct knowledge of reality. The spirit learns not something alien, inaccessible to him, but himself, his own laws as they are in reality. To understand the history of nature and society, to comprehend its driving forces is to know the logical process of self-development of the absolute idea underlying it. Logic is the science of science. *The history of the world* must be understood as the *logic of the world mind*. In the face of the philosophical teachings of Hegel, the spirit knew itself, understood its development and its principles.

This completes the self-development of the absolute idea.

The world mind of Hegel bears an undoubted resemblance to God, with a subtle, very idealized, dematerialized god. Hegel's idealistic solution to the problem of being and thinking is essentially a scientific theology. Hegel himself does not conceal that his philosophy is the highest stage of the spirit, immediately following religion, elevating it to a perfecting level.

In reality, the assumption of absolute spirit, the world mind, the attribution to the objective world of the properties of the subject is nothing more than the humanization of nature. Objective idealism is nothing more than a projection, the transference of human consciousness *to the outside*. The property of man - thinking - turns into an independent world being here and gets an independent existence outside of man.

Objective idealism puts *on head* the actual relationship between being and thinking. The mind, which arose as a result of the long development of living beings, is detached from its base and is portrayed as the first real. Objective idealism seeks to penetrate nature into the spiritual world, concealed ostensibly behind its appearance. For him, the material world is a veil, through which knowledge should penetrate into the world of true reality, into the realm of spirit. In reality, however, objective idealism finds on the other side of things that which he himself placed there — transformed into an absolute human consciousness. Hegel's idealism envelops the real world with a spiritual envelope and, as a result, perceives nature through a hazy mystical veil. Marx and Engels needed to remove this mystical veil from the world in order to see it as it really is.

*In essence, the problem of being and thinking is not at all resolved by Hegel.* If Kant "eliminates" the problem by placing being and thinking in two different mutually impenetrable worlds, then Hegel, with his objectively *idealistic* identity of being and thinking, discards one of the common principles and leaves only the thinking that he inflates into an absolute.

Nevertheless, in evaluating Hegel's philosophy, one cannot detract from its historical significance. In a reactionary mystical form, Hegel's philosophy "for the first time presented the whole natural, historical and spiritual world as a process, that is, explored it in continuous motion, change, transformation and development and tried to uncover the mutual internal connection of this movement and development" <sup>[69]</sup>. Hegel's teaching is *dialectical* idealism. Developing the dialectical tendencies contained in the previous representatives of German classical philosophy, Hegel displayed in a *mystified form* his dialectical logical doctrine controversial development of nature, society and human thought. In an ugly idealistic form, he overcame metaphysics, which dominated the thinking of philosophers and naturalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

But idealism is not in Hegel's teaching something indifferent to the dialectical method, which does not touch it. In the *idealistic* system of Hegel, his most dialectical *method* stands on his head, is limited and blunted, is an *idealistic* dialectic.

Hegel's dialectic is an *idealistic* dialectic. Self-development and the contradictions that motivate it are not material, but spiritual, the categories and forms of movement are connected by ideal-logical, very often fictional, artificial connections. The historical is in Hegel, depending on the *logical*. History is shredded in favor of logic; it becomes nothing more than *applied logic*.

While the materialistic dialectic, which asserts universal variability, and therefore the need to destroy the existing system, is a revolutionary methodology, the *absolute system and idealistic dialectics* led Hegel to justify the Prussian monarchy .

Hegel's dialectical idealism signified not only the completion of classical German idealism, but also the whole of bourgeois philosophy. The current revival of Hegelianism is only a "repetitive course," the resurrection of Hegel's dead idealism, the *repetition of idealistic asses* . At the same time, everything that was progressive in the resurrected doctrine was emasculated, and everything that was reactionary in it was aggravated.

Particular attention is paid by the modern representatives of the fascist neo-Hegelianism to questions of the *state, the nation* . The Hegelian "Philosophy of History" and especially the "Philosophy of Law" are used by these "theorists" in order to lay a theoretical foundation for the fascist state. Hegel becomes the father of modern fascist theories of an authoritarian, corporate state, etc.

Twice the bourgeois philosophical thought was carried out by the movement from Kant to Hegel. But for the first time it was a triumphal procession of developing idealism, in the second - its final degeneration. The barren thought of decaying capitalism is not able to further move even idealistic philosophy. Imperialist philosophy feeds on everything that was stillborn in the great idealists of the bourgeois revolution, the products of the decomposition of their idealism. The ideologists of imperialism, who are in the last line, no longer satisfy neo-Kantianism, the last years, the years of the fascization of capitalist states, are characterized by a transition from neo-Kantianism to neo-Hegelianism, which is the philosophy of the worst reaction, the philosophical expression of fascism.

The epoch of imperialism, when the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie reaches an extreme level, is accompanied in the field of philosophy by a *decisive turn of bourgeois ideologists to complete metaphysical and mystical systems* . Half-hearted, compromise doctrines do not satisfy the ideologues of imperialist reaction.

Bourgeois philosophy revives the most terry forms of obscurantism, resurrects everything that was most reactionary in the history of idealism.

In recent years, in the years of the all-round exacerbation and deepening of the general crisis of capitalist society and the growth of elements of the revolutionary crisis, bourgeois philosophy has turned particularly intensely to Hegel's philosophy. Slandered and forgotten by the bourgeoisie, Hegel became again a fashionable philosopher. Neo-Hegelianism occupied a prominent position in modern bourgeois philosophy. Neo-Kantians, the philosophers of "life" and "culture", Husserlians, etc., are more and more attached to neo-Hegelianism, which becomes the focus of reactionary aspirations of modern bourgeois philosophy.

It would be a mistake to think that neo-Hegelianism is a complete and direct reproduction of the philosophical doctrine of the historical Hegel. Far from it. Neo-Hegelianism is alien to and hostile to the revolutionary tendencies of Hegelian dialectics, it rejects the rational core of his teachings, those truly valuable elements that are contained in mystical form in Hegelian idealistic dialectics. *Neo-Hegelianism clings only to what is dead, reactionary, mystical in Hegel, to the husk, the rubbish of its idealistic system, to the absolute idea — goddess*. The modern bourgeoisie is seduced by absolute idealism. Neo-Hegelianism exaggerates the reactionary elements of Hegel's teachings, inflates them, brings clericalism contained in Hegel's system to the limit.

The views of the leader of neo-Hegelianism, the chairman of the international Hegelian union, R. Kroner are very characteristic in this respect. Kroner strongly proves the *irrational* nature of Hegelianism, that is, Hegel's denial of rational knowledge. In the dialectic of Hegel, he finds the highest form of irrationalism. "Before Hegel," he writes, "there has never been an irrationalist who would be so philosophical, so thinking, as scientifically as he is ... Hegel is without a doubt the greatest irrationalist that history of philosophy knows. No thinker before him was able to so irrationalize the concept, to enlighten the rational through the concept as he ... "" Hegel is an irrationalist, for he is a dialectician, for dialectics is turned into a method *made rational irrationalism*, - for dialectical thinking is rational-irrational thinking. Hegelian philosophy was called "rational mysticism," which in fact marks its dual nature " [70] . Mysticism, unreasonableness, irrationalism - this is what captivates the Neo-Hegelians.

It is quite clear that Marxism cannot pass by this turn towards Hegel. Neo-Hegelianism acts as the worst reactionary antipode of the revolutionary materialist dialectics. We are obliged to reveal the true face of Neo-Hegelian philosophy, expose its class nature, its hierarchical clerical nature, tear off a phraseological veil from the ideology of the enemy. We are obliged to *expose the role and significance of neo-Hegelianism in the modern class struggle, its hostility to the interests of the proletariat* . Moreover, we must do this, because the main support of the bourgeoisie — the social fascists are not far behind their masters and hurries to rebuild their philosophical lira in a Neo-

Hegelian way. Z. Mark, G. Markuze, K. Korsch and the like try to keep up with the philosophical evolution of the bourgeoisie. They are trying to spread the poisonous philosophical "ideas" of Neo-Hegelianism in the ranks of the working class.

It is not by chance that the modern bourgeoisie, in its search for a complete idealistic prototype for its philosophy, turned to *dialectical* idealism. She is attracted to Hegel, preferably before other idealists, by his idealistic dialectic, which modern reactionaries completely distort and emasculate and in this form are used as an ideological weapon of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary materialistic dialectics of Marxism-Leninism.

The reason for the enthusiasm of the ideologists of the modern bourgeoisie by the idealistic dialectic is rooted in the nature of the stage experienced by modern capitalism. The most severe crisis, the deepest class contradictions, the extreme instability of capitalism, the collapse of all bourgeois culture, the crisis of bourgeois science, "the most painful dissonances and almost intractable antinomies that break reality" - this is the root of the appeal to Hegel. "Will we have a look," complains the Hegelian Husserlanean T. Lit, "for the external conditions by which our people's existence is limited to unforeseen time, or we turn to the internal division of tribes, estates, classes, whether we ask about political, moral, religious beliefs, lurking in its depths, there is heavy struggle everywhere, tension of restraint, everywhere confusion and irreconcilable elements,"<sup>[71]</sup>.

On the basis of decaying capitalism, the most severe crisis of the capitalist system, reflected in the collapse of bourgeois culture, the mystical dialectic of neo-Hegelianism grows. Having lost stability in a hopeless crisis and "tragic and gigantic contradictions" (A. Liebert), bourgeois philosophy tries to attain self-awareness in idealistic, mystical teachings about movement and contradictions of logical categories, spiritual entities.

At the same time, we observe two important varieties of neo-Hegelianism, which are idealistic representations of two different sides of the same process of decay and the crisis of capitalism: the *philosophy of hopeless despair* and the *philosophy of unbridled fascist "efficacy"*. The first of these trends is nothing but variations on the theme most pronounced by Spengler, the singer of the decline of capitalist Europe and the death of bourgeois culture and at the same time the singer of fascism and "fascist culture", criticism of bourgeois democracy, liberalism, pacifism and other "values" that have lost their meaning to the fascizing bourgeoisie.

The sentiments expressed by Spengler are widespread among the modern bourgeois intelligentsia.

The connection between the hopelessness of the modern bourgeoisie and the turn towards Hegelianism in the idealistic "tragic dialectic" of A. Liebert is very pronounced. He, like I. Kohn, understands dialectical contradictions as antinomies, that is, as *insoluble contradictions*, absolute, eternal, insurmountable opposites and ruptures. Here the "dialectic" expresses unequivocally a sense of hopelessness from chaos, a sense of hopelessness.

However symptomatic the course may be, it is nevertheless not dominant in neo-Hegelianism. While the "tragic dialectic" in modern Neo-Hegelianism reflects in itself mainly the moment of decay, the collapse of capitalism, the dominant form of Neo-Hegelianism, to which we will now pass, puts forward the offensive tendencies of the bourgeoisie losing ground. This is the *militant* neo-Hegelianism of the fascist thugs, the philosophy of the bitter struggle of the reactionary bourgeoisie for the suppression of the revolutionary proletariat, for the preservation of their domination at any cost and by any means, the philosophy of a deadly fight with the enemy.

The essence of the fascization of bourgeois democracy is "the process of transition of bourgeois dictatorship to the open forms of suppression of the working people"<sup>[72]</sup>. "The main thing in fascism is its open attack on the working class by all methods of coercion and violence, it is a civil war against the working people"<sup>[73]</sup>.

For a correct understanding of the essence of fascism as a dictatorship of monopoly capital, it is necessary to understand the interpenetration of two sides in it. First, we should understand fascism (and, accordingly, its ideology) as a product of *rotting, hopelessly crisis imperialism*. "The emergence of the fascist movement in the current historical conditions suggests that *capitalism has become obsolete, all the prerequisites for the social transformation of society have matured*." Fascism is "one of the symptoms of the disorientation of the ruling classes and their desire to suppress the working class on the ways of suppressing the working class." "The ugliness of its ideological forms is influenced by the fact that it is a political superstructure of *decaying capitalism*"<sup>[74]</sup>.

The one who does not understand this aspect of fascism, the fact that it arises on the fragile soil of decaying capitalism, who regard fascism as the usual offensive of the bourgeoisie, who sees in it signs of the *power of capitalism*, inevitably slides into a right-opportunist position, falls into pessimism, disbelief in the strength of the working class and the near victory of the socialist revolution.



But it is equally wrong to see in fascism *only* one characterized side - rotting, decay, degeneration. This would lead to a "left" error (in the form of the opposite, and essentially identical to the right), to believe in the automatic fall of capitalism, in its *very* disintegration *itself* decomposition, to opportunistically underestimate the importance of active revolutionary struggle as a necessary condition for the death of capitalism. "Fascism is not *only an* expression of the crisis of capitalism and the beginning of the disintegration of the ruling classes. To say this only means not to say everything. Fascism is one of the forms of *capitalist offensive*. containing elements of overcoming this crisis by methods of getting out of it on the capitalist roads. Fascism is both offensive and capital defense ... The fascist movement is in fact one of the forms of *capital attack in the midst of a general crisis of capitalism* and the incipient disintegration of the ruling classes. And this makes fascism a special, unusual *form of capital attack* " [75] .

Thus, for a correct understanding of fascism, it is necessary to clarify the dual unity expressed in it by the offensive activity of the reactionary big capital and the conviction, the groundlessness of this activity.

A typical example of fascist philosophy is the "teaching" of the life philosopher Mussolini, his "spiritual maestro" and former Minister of Education J. Gentile.

The philosophy of Gentile - this "spiritual ancestor of fascism" - is a vivid expression of the "ugliness of the ideological forms" of fascism. This is a clear and unambiguous philosophy of "consolidated at the helm of state power" and fully "revealing itself as a terrorist dictatorship of big business" fascism. Gentile Neo-Hegelianism is a clear philosophical reflection of the above reactionary offensive of capital in the conditions of the deepest mortal general crisis of capitalism.

The starting point of Gentile's philosophy is Berkeley's priestly *subjective idealism* , which Gentile wants to combine with idealistic dialectics, free from inconsistency and contradictions and bring to a logical end. Gentile does not hide the fact that his "actualism" - idealism brought to an extreme - is a kind of mysticism and clericalism.

The basic principle of the Gentile philosophy is the unbridled implementation of idealism to the end, the denial of objective reality independent of consciousness. "Once the world is the world of higher experience, once the world of experience is the work of the I, and therefore the expression of both the creative energy and the cognitive abilities of the same I ... reality, I am ... It is necessary with all determination, meekly, courageously and with the passion of a person who is conscious of his responsibility to assert this truth, containing all the rest: that we are the true world; being is knowledge, knowledge which is being " [76]. The reality for the subjective idealist Gentile is an eternal, primary, pure subjectivity. The object dissolves in the subject. Nothing exists outside of the spirit. Thinking absolutely and independently. It needs no carrier, no thinking creature. Not only things, but people do not exist outside of thinking. "Because we have known another ... our neighbor ceases to exist outside of us." This thinking without a real thinking being, not needing a brain and absorbing its neighbor "we," according to Gentile, "is not in space and time, on the contrary, space and time, everything that is spatially and gradually, should be in time, within us " [77].

But this does not satisfy Gentile, is not sufficient for him. To be completely consistent, idealism must take another step forward. And this step Gentile considers the most important feature of his "teaching", the "new" that he made. This "new" is that not only material things, but also thoughts dissolve into thinking. Thoughts conceivable as too "objective", "objective", "must give way to the primacy of thinking as a " *pure act* ", "pure subjectivity". This act is the basis of the "dialectic".

The dialectic, according to Gentile, is inherent only in the *spirit* . Nature, things, are not dialectical, they are dead, inert *products of the dialectic of spirit* , the result of the termination of the process. Hegel's idealistic dialectic is imperfect for Gentile because it is the dialectic of a conceivable, not a thinking, actual spirit, it is too "objective," "subject," "substantial." For the fascist philosopher, dialectic is pure *subjectivity* ; reality is never an accomplished exercise. I, the dialectic, is the *freedom of I*.

Here we come to the principle that forms the core of the black-shirt philosophy, the principle of "freedom." No matter how wild and absurd this phrase (freedom and fascism) was, the principle of "freedom of the spirit" is a favorite philosophical fable of the ideologists of fascist executioners and jailers. But what kind of "freedom" is it? It is clear that it is not about freedom from class oppression. This is not about the curtsy of bourgeois "freedom" - the formal democratic "freedom" of speech, press, assembly, which the bourgeoisie so bragged about; the ghostly remnants of such freedom are being brutally attacked by the fascists. The fascist "philosophy of freedom" represents the philosophy of the frenzied *opposition to historical necessity*. the desperate convulsive attempt of the bourgeoisie, which had lost its ground, by all means hold up the wheel of history, hold on, resist the

inevitable fateful for it. Fascist actualism is a philosophy of *reactionary activity*, the onset of losing ground of the doomed class.

The reactionary class, condemned by history to death, the bourgeoisie, cannot rely on objective necessity. This necessity is incompatible with its "freedom," that is, with its class interests, and totally contradicts it. That is why the philosophy of the modern bourgeoisie declares an objective necessity as a ghost from which the bourgeoisie wants (but cannot) get free. And since this ghost makes it very realistic to know about oneself, then bourgeois philosophy has no choice but to declare the holy crusade of all the forces of black reaction against historical necessity. It creates "teachings", urging the bourgeoisie to struggle, to activity, to use all means, all forces, to hold out and stand, despite and against historical necessity. This is *actualism* Gentile. This actualism of pure subjectivity is the philosophy of militant fascism, the philosophy of the last frantic battle of the doomed bourgeoisie for the preservation and maintenance of its rule.

"Actualism" is a philosophical justification of fascist "effectiveness": economic strangulation of the working class, fascization of the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie, intensification of repression and savage white terror, mass arrests of workers, closure of revolutionary organizations, shootings of workers demonstrations, strikers, murders of revolutionary revolutionaries without trial and perennial convictions (see resolution XII of the ECCI).

In its *logical form* Gentile's philosophy is closest to the subjective idealistic dialectic of Fichte, but it is different in its reactionism from the philosophy of the German classical idealist Fichte that is bourgeois revolutionary in its tendency. In both cases, there is a position of efficacy, activity on an idealistic basis. But Fichte's idealistic doctrine of effectiveness was an expression of the revolutionary anti-feudal aspirations of the young German bourgeoisie, and at the same time its weakness, limitations, backwardness. Therefore, revolutionary activity was transferred by him to the sphere of pure spirit in the intelligible world, becoming an ethereal dream of efficacy. In Gentile, "actualism" expresses a reactionary attack on the proletariat, and moreover an offensive of capitalism, losing ground,

The theory of Gentile seeks to "free the spirit from all boundaries of space and time as well as from any external conditions ..." <sup>[78]</sup> "Our only support is the creative, creative activity of the spirit itself, agitated in us ..." <sup>[79]</sup> History is proclaimed a product of free creativity miraculous spirit. Such is the meaning of "actual idealism" - the philosophy of the frenzied big bourgeoisie of the era of decaying imperialism and the victorious socialist revolution, such is the meaning of the fascist "dialectics".

Gentile does not hide the connection of his philosophy with politics. "To specifically philosophize means to include your actual personality in the policy system of your country." He glorifies the cult of the fascist state, which embodies, in his opinion, an absolute and concrete universality, to surrender to which, each person must identify with. This cult of the fascist state, "integrity" (O. Shpann), allegedly "erases" class contradictions, passes through all the writings of the fascist "theorists" recommending "concrete cooperation of citizens" instead of "abstract class struggle" calling for sacrifice on the altar of absolute value states of frantic bourgeois dictatorship.

Neo-Hegelianism now spreads with great force in bourgeois philosophy, winning primacy from the previously dominant idealistic currents, drawing all the forces of philosophical reaction from all sides and in different ways.

As mentioned above, the social fascists in the general process of fascization of the bourgeoisie and the turn of its philosophers to Hegel hurry to make their "contribution", not to fall behind the bourgeois philosophy. *Especially lately, the "interest" in Hegel on the part of the ideologues and philosophers of social-fascism has increased.* Elements of Hegelianism are sounding ever stronger in Max Adler, in Kunov, who directly speaks of Marx's "Hegelianism," in Kautsky. There are a number of social-fascist philosophers who openly stand on the Neo-Hegelian positions (for example, G. Heller) or combine Kant with Hegel (for example, Siegfried Mark).

Such are the trends in the development of modern bourgeois, social-fascist philosophy.

In the face of reactionary mysticism appealing to Hegel, the harm that has been done on the ideological front of us, in the Soviet Union, is especially aggravated by a group of philosophers led by A. Deborin who dragged Soviet philosophical thought *from Marx and Lenin to Hegel*. Despite the well-known achievements of this group of philosophers in the struggle against mechanism, this struggle cannot be considered satisfactory, since it was conducted from the wrong positions. Menshevik idealists completely misguidedly solved the problem of studying Hegel's dialectics, without being "materialistic" friends of Hegelian dialectics.

If Western Neo-Hegelianism is a reactionary perversion of Hegel's teaching, *then Menshevik idealism is a Hegelian revision of Marxism*. The first is the fruit of fascist ideology, the second is the

form of petty-bourgeois influence on proletarian ideology. The first calls for the defeat of the labor movement, the second objectively contributes to the ideological disarmament of the proletariat.

Menshevist idealism behind the screen of the development of dialectics resumes *idealistic* dialectics, uncritically acquires the teachings of Hegel and tries to transplant his ideas one after another on a socialist basis. The Deborinsky group, under the guise of deepening and developing Marxism, revisited it, replaced it with Hegel's philosophy, put Marxism utterly. Instead of clearing the logic of Hegel from the mysticism of ideas, to melt it in a materialistic crucible, "they took it as a *given*". Instead of "reading Hegel materialistically," reworking it in the light of the teachings of Marx and Lenin, they read Marx in Hegelianism, combing it "under Hegel." Instead of developing dialectic categories, relying on the work of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of party congresses, studying the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the discovery of modern natural science, the group of Deborints closed into the sphere of "pure" self-moving logical categories, separated from the material reality and the practice of class struggle. From the height of Hegelian logic, concrete reality ceased to be distinguishable. Matter disappeared, turning into "an infinite ... aggregate of mediation, i.e. relations and connections" (Deborin), non-material "synthesis of space and time" (Hesse), moving matter was replaced by "moving motion" (Tymyansky). In short: dialectical materialism, Marxism, has degenerated into Hegelianism, tinted by Marxist phraseology.

On closer examination, Hegelian revisionism finds itself in close spiritual affinity with Menshevik neokantianism; the philosophy of the Second International shows where Menshevist idealism is growing. We see the same *separation of theory from practice* in Menshevist idealists. which is typical of the Second International, the same departure from the reality of the class struggle, from its theoretical understanding, the same separation of logical forms from concrete, material content, the same inability to maintain harmony between the historical and the logical, the same autocracy of the abstract-logical. The shattering of the materialistic foundations of Marxism, the introduction of bourgeois idealistic philosophy into the proletarian worldview, the distraction from revolutionary practice, from the defense of the general line of the party - such is the role objectively carried out by Menshevist idealism.

*The Menshevist idealism of the Deborinsky group returns the philosophy of Marxism to Hegel, the mechanists are pulling us towards pre-Marxist materialism.* We do not want to go back to Hegel, nor to mechanical materialism, and we equally struggle with both types of revisionism. We do not reject, like the mechanists, *any* dialectic, but only an *idealistic* dialectic. We "must organize a systematic study of Hegel's dialectics from a *materialistic point of view* ... Relying on *how Marx applied the materialist Hegel dialectic*, we can and must develop this dialectic from all sides" <sup>[80]</sup>.

In developing the *materialist* dialectic, we move philosophy forward along the lines drawn by Marx, Engels and Lenin.

## 2.6. The materialistic philosophy of L. Feuerbach

The development of post-Hegelian philosophy followed two paths. The first path is reactionary, idealistic imitation, back to Kant and again from Kant to Hegel. The second way is materialistic criticism and processing of Hegelian dialectics. Feuerbach - the immediate predecessor of the materialist philosophy of Marx - was a true successor of the 18th century French materialism. In the struggle against classical German idealism, he continues the *materialistic* line in philosophy. During the revolution of 1848, the advanced bourgeois democracy, the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, found in Feuerbach's philosophy an expression of its radical sentiments and ideals.

Teaching Feuerbach is materialism. Its guiding principle is the recognition that it is not thinking that determines being, but, on the contrary, being that determines thinking. Nature exists independently of thinking, by itself. It is primary, independent, infinite. The concrete, sensual world, existing independently of consciousness and perceived through the medium of our five senses, is the only real world. The task of science is to know this sensual material world as it is in itself. Man himself is a part of nature, flesh of its flesh. Our sensations are caused by the influence of things on the senses. Thinking, according to Feuerbach, is nothing more than a property of a living, bodily man and his brain. The fact that the brain with which we think is itself part of the material world,

From this materialistic position, Feuerbach leads a tireless struggle against idealism and religion. Idealism and religion, according to Feuerbach, are not two different enemies; idealistic philosophy - the last refuge of religion, logically expressed theology. Therefore, the struggle against religion requires the defeat of idealism. Idealism separates thinking from the whole material being, the property of which it is, ascribes to it an independent objective being. The human property - thinking - is alienated from man. That is the secret of idealism. The secret of religion is the same. Religion is the belief in ghosts. *God is nothing but the mystified idea of human power and intelligence.* By creating

and worshipping him, man exalts *his own being*, alienated from man. "*The objective being as a subjective being of nature, as distinct from nature, as a human being*, is what a divine being is, *what is a religion, what is the secret of mysticism and speculation*" [81]. Man creates God in *his own image and likeness*. "God is the mirror of man," his projection, says Feuerbach. Feuerbach pays a lot of attention to clarifying the psychological foundations of religion, thereby exposing its falsity, although it is not able to clarify its social, class roots. The idea of God arises, but his opinion, from a sense of lack, from the experience of human need and imperfection. The feeling of lack of something is connected with desire, with need. These unfulfilled desires that a person is not able to satisfy, give rise to religious faith. In reality, the person transfers the impossible to the fantasy world invented by him. In religion, a person dreams in reality. The other world is nothing but the unrealizable desires of this world.

Thus, according to Feuerbach, the origin of religion is not rational, rational, but emotional — religion gives rise to feelings, desires and fantasies.

Feuerbach emphasizes the importance of *man's dependence on nature*. Creating the concept of God, man expresses to them not only the dream of his own power, independence, immortality, but also his own powerlessness against nature, infinite, powerful, indifferent to human joys and sorrows. Such, according to Feuerbach, are the roots of religious illusions.

The central concept of the philosophy of Feuerbach is *man*. Not an abstract "I" of idealism, not a skinny abstraction of "I" as pure thinking, pure sensation or pure will, but a person as a *physical being* in flesh and blood, as *part of nature*, and not "I" should be the starting point of the theory of knowledge, but "I" and "you" in their unity. This formulation of the question follows from the fact that there is no such "I" that would not be with you at the same time and vice versa. In other words, the object and the subject are not two severed, independent beings, *but unity*. The subject must be at the same time the *object*. There is no subject without an object. "What for me, or subjectively, is a purely spiritual activity," says Feuerbach, "that in itself, objectively, is a material sensory act."

*The doctrine of Feuerbach was of great historical importance for the struggle of materialism against idealism and for overcoming the "all-powerful" Hegelian philosophy.*

With all the positive meaning that Feuerbach's restoration of materialism in the heyday of idealistic systems, with all the undeniable historical value of his struggle against religion in general and Christianity in particular, opposing them to the sober materialism philosophy of drunken speculation of idealism - with all that as his positive teaching, and criticism to them of their opponents bear the imprint of historical limitations. Criticism of Feuerbach's idealism, especially his criticism of Hegel, does not give a materialistic transformation to the mystified idealism of dialectics and does not save it in a revised form, but rejects it "from the threshold". *Feuerbach in the fight against idealism Hegel underestimated the values of dialectics*, failed to make it materialistic. As a result, his materialism did not take on that higher form, which had already been demanded for the discovery of nineteenth-century natural science. His materialism, representing a certain step forward in comparison with the materialism of French thinkers of the eighteenth century, still did not rise, despite some brilliant dialectic moments, to the height of dialectical materialism. Matter and history, nature and development are scattered in his philosophy.

*Feuerbach materialism has an abstract character.* The man at the center of his attention, no matter how Feuerbach emphasizes his concreteness, is nonetheless not a concrete *historical* person. This is a man "in general", an abstract representative of a biological species, and not a real person of a certain historical epoch, social formation, or class. Therefore, Feuerbach "is forced to see, for example, instead of healthy people, a crowd of scrofulous, torn-up and consumptive poor people, resort to" higher contemplation "and ideal," leveling in kind", ie, again falling into idealism just where communist materialist sees the need and at the same time the condition for the transformation of both industry and the social system " [82].

The naturalism and antihistoricism of the teachings of Feuerbach also determined the limitations of his criticism of religion. Religion, according to Feuerbach, is generated by the essence of man. He did not understand that religion is a product of a *specific* human *society* and is determined in each case by specific *social relations*, in which the solution of religious systems should be sought. Therefore, he limits his task to the destruction of religion, but does not come to the need to destroy its earthly basis.

In an effort to put the practice into the basis of the theory of knowledge, Feuerbach, however, understands this practice naturally, only as a man's struggle with nature, not seeing the true social practice of social man, without revealing the historical, class foundations of his social practice. Therefore, the materialism of Feuerbach, like all the preceding materialism, remains *passive-contemplative* materialism. The world is not perceived by Feuerbach as an object of human *activity*, as an object of *social practice*. Reality is understood by contemplative materialism *only* as a source of

sensation, and not as something *transformable*. in the process of human activity, industry, exchange, class struggle. The theory of knowledge of Feuerbach is based on the contemplative materialistically understood experience. The unity of the subject and object, human thinking and nature is carried out only in sensuality, in the process of receiving passive influences, in contemplation. Pre-Marxian materialism has not yet reached the understanding that only in social practice, in the activity and change of the world by man does a true unity of nature and man, object and subject, be achieved.

Another, closely connected with the abstractness of materialism, the most important feature of Feuerbach's philosophy, which caused its insufficiency, is the limitation of materialism to the limits of nature. Feuerbach lacks a materialistic understanding of social life. *He, like the French materialists, remains a materialist "from below," in natural science, and an idealist from "above," that is, in the social field.* He does not understand the material driving forces of social development. The change of social forms is defined by him as a change of religious beliefs. He sees no other relationships between people besides moral relations, love and friendship. Morality - the doctrine of morality - is at the center of his social views. Man's love for man, the union of "I" and "you" - he does not go further than this. He, however, is not satisfied with mere morality, but considers it necessary to sanctify it. "Man is a god to man," he proclaims and declares morality to be a true religion.

Thus, an idealistic understanding of history leads to the vulgarization of morality by a religious label, which inevitably diminishes Feuerbach's atheistic struggle.

All the shortcomings of Feuerbach's philosophy were discovered early by Marx and Engels, who, having overcome them in the development of their teachings, raised materialism to a new level, created a new, higher form of materialism. However, in some of the post-Marxist works we find remnants and recurrences of Feuerbachianism, a misunderstanding of the depth of the processing that Marxism subjected to the preceding materialistic philosophy. Even in Plekhanov there is an inability to rise above the contemplative materialism of Feuerbach type. *Plekhanov did not understand the full meaning of Marx Feuerbach's critique, the turn from contemplative materialism to dialectical.* Remaining on this most important issue in the Feuerbach position, he cannot understand Marx's criticism, it seems to Plekhanov unfair, he smoothes the difference between Feuerbach and Marx. According to Plekhanov, "Marx was wrong when he reproached Feuerbach with the fact that he did not understand" practical-critical activity ". It was clear to Feuerbach " <sup>[83]</sup> . Plekhanov did not understand that Feuerbach only had scattered guesses about the significance of the practice, which had an insignificant influence on his general outlook. Identifying Feuerbach's statement that the world is not only a matter of reasoning, but also a "object of desire", with Marx's doctrine of a revolutionary-effective attitude towards the world, Plekhanov himself reveals an inability to completely overcome Feuerbach's passive materialism.

Another Feuerbach feature of Plekhanov's philosophical works is not sufficiently deep comprehension of his *dialectic* . Plekhanov rather formally recognizes the meaning of materialist dialectics, uses it only for individual illustrations, does not grasp the core, the essence of dialectics. Accordingly, the critique of idealism by Plekhanov bears the stamp of Feuerbachianism. He does not correct idealistic reasoning, deepening it, but only "from the threshold" rejects these reasoning. Plekhanov criticizes idealism from the point of view of materialism "in general," that is, in reality, vulgar materialism, and not dialectical materialism.

It is not difficult to reveal the Feuerbach limitation of the modern *mechanists* . They, like their spiritual ancestors of the XVII and XVIII centuries. much closer to the materialism of Feuerbach than Marx. Of course they are not the orthodox disciples of Feuerbach, we will not find in them the religion of "love", but the type, *form* of their materialism is homogeneous with Feuerbach's abstract, contemplative materialism.

As far as the attitude to Feuerbachianism of *Menshevist idealism* is concerned , here we find the reproduction, deepening and transformation into the system of Plekhanov's mistakes, or rather Plekhanov's, semi-Feyerbach materialism. Representing mainly the idealistic, Hegelian revision of Marxism, the eclectic philosophy of the Deborinsky group does not formally break with materialism. Materialistic moments are interspersed with her Hegelian teaching, covering its true nature. But even this materialistic cover is a reproduction of the principles of *Feuerbach* materialism.

The evolution of Deborin's philosophical views can be described as a movement from Feuerbachian to Hegelianism. Therefore, if in later works only *traces of materialism* remain , then in the early works Feuerbach materialism prevails. This is clearly expressed in Deborin's slogan: "Feuerbach's time is ahead." What does this slogan after Marx and Lenin mean, if not a retrograde call to return to the steps of materialistic philosophy passed? How else can the opposition to modern idealism be defined not by Marxism, but by Feuerbachianism?

Deborin fully adheres to the Plekhanov revision of Marx's criticism of Feuerbach. All the literary activity of Feuerbach represents, in Deborin's opinion, a relentless struggle against the theoretically contemplative point of view of the preceding philosophy and the defense of a practical point of view. Deborin finally breaks here with the Marxist assessment of Feuerbach materialism. The historical-philosophical turning point in the development of materialism is accomplished, according to Deborin, not by Marx, but by Feuerbach, whose simple heir to the ideas is Marx. Thus, the lines between effective and contemplative materialism are erased, so that it is more convenient to return to the petty-bourgeois viewpoint of feeling and contemplation.

A fundamental flaw in Menshevik idealism is the *separation of theory from revolutionary activity*, the alienation of theory from current tasks and the interests of the proletariat. Menshevik idealism dissociates theory from practice. He does not understand the full significance of revolutionary practice for the development of theory and is unable to make a theory worthy and valuable for revolutionary practice. When Menshevik idealism dares to look into the field of socialist practice alien to him, he is only capable of Feuerbachian babbling "about the collectivization of feelings".

And this restoration of passive and contemplative Feuerbach philosophy is accomplished by Menshevik idealism during the agony of imperialism and the powerful offensive of socialism, in the years of uprooting the roots of capitalism and building the foundation of socialism in the Soviet Union and the unstoppable growth of the elements of the revolutionary crisis in capitalist countries. To develop a theory outside of practical revolutionary activity, aside from it, is to present the cardboard sword of scholastics instead of the steel blade of the revolutionary theory to the working class.

## **2.7. The development of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels and the transition to dialectical materialism**

The first chapter already showed the socio-political conditions for the emergence of Marxism and its theoretical sources. Let us dwell in more detail on the process of the development of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels.

In 1841, Marx worked on his dissertation on the philosophy of Epicurus. As Lenin points out, in this dissertation Marx still stands *on a completely idealistic Hegelian* point of view.

The greatness of Hegelian philosophy was that it was the first to fully formulate the idea of development. That was her progressive side. Hegel's idea of universal development reflected the liberation aspirations of the German bourgeoisie and was in its very essence directed against the dead serf orders. But it is already known that Hegel was a consistent idealist, that in Hegelian idealistic dialectics reflected the economic connection of the German bourgeoisie with serfdom, the weakness of its socio-economic positions. Standing from 1841 on the positions of Hegel's idealistic dialectic, Marx also conducted it in his dissertation, giving Epicurus a preference over Democritus on the question of atomic theory. In 1842, Marx's articles appeared in the Rhine newspaper, in which Marx is already planning a transition from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary democratism to communism. Marx's attempts to give the Hegelian doctrine of the state are already manifested here, in which it could be used in favor of protecting the rights of the exploited masses, freeing politics from theology, etc. In Berlin, he is adjacent to the circle *Left Hegelians* "(Bruno Bauer and others), who sought to draw practical and revolutionary conclusions from Hegel's philosophy.

In Hegel's philosophy of law, Hegel's striving to reconcile the needs of capitalist development with the feudal state structure of Germany at that time found its vivid expression. In "The Philosophy of Law", Hegel interprets the state as an expression of the development of an objective idea, which acts in the form of the moral spirit of the people. The state, according to Hegel, is a political organism, representing the unity of the universal spirit of the people with its special manifestations in the form of the interests of individual citizens. The government is, according to Hegel, the "soul", the "exponent of the will" of the national spirit, and therefore its activities should be tested by citizens not as something external, coercive, but as the discovery of their freedom, their own rational moral essence. From here, Hegel dogmatically asserts the necessity of the unconditional, voluntary obedience of all citizens to their government. Hegel in fact philosophically serves here the feudal dictatorship. It is not surprising that Marx and Engels should have had an early sense of all the negative aspects of the Hegelian philosophy of law and in 1842 began its revolutionary criticism.

From the very beginning of his theoretical activity, Marx and Engels, starting from the Hegelian idea of development, remaining still in idealistic positions, were, however, the *most revolutionary thinkers of all Hegelians left*. This position must be particularly emphasized in contrast to the perverters of dialectical materialism, who argue that Marx in the early period of his activity was an ordinary Young Hegelian and a bourgeois radical. The famous Menshevik historiographer of Marxism

Ryazanov, who eventually slipped into the direct betrayal of the interests of the working class, worked especially hard in this direction.

The left-wing followers of Hegel, the so-called Young Hegelians, showed a negative attitude to the right-wing Hegelianism, who tried to justify Hegel's philosophy with the nationalist ideal of the Christian-German state. But, in their polemics against the right-wing Hegelianism, the Young Hegelians did not go beyond the limits of all the preceding German bourgeois education, and in particular beyond the limits of Hegel's philosophy. Following the example of their old enlighteners, they limited their theoretical activity to only half-hearted criticism of religion, declared it the main cause of all social evils, completely unaware that religion, like all old forms of consciousness, can be destroyed not just by theoretical criticism, but revolutionary-practical revolution in the socio-economic conditions of public life.<sup>[84]</sup>

This criticism of religion by the Young Hegelians was extremely half-inconsistent and inconsistent. We find in them a decisive criticism of religious tenets and at the same time philistine worship of religion, attempts to prove that religion, "it is Christianity, is identical with the highest philosophical truth" (Strauss), the idealistic deification of human thought, its transformation into a mystical "self-consciousness" in the form of "critics makes history" (Bruno Bauer). We find the exposure of the earthly roots of the heavenly deity, the deification of man, the statement that "man is a god to man" (Feuerbach). On the one hand, the most consistent denial of all divine, the statement that "for an egoist, there are no so exalted and independent objects that could make him adore them, to live exclusively for them and sacrifice oneself for them", on the other hand, absolutization, deification of egoism, through the religious statement that "I", like God, is above all else, since "I", mine is" everything", since I am the only one. "I" is nothing in the sense of emptiness, creative nothing, from which I myself, as a creator, will create everything"<sup>[85]</sup>. All Young Hegelians in one way or another were held captive by the Hegelian system, for, says Marx, "none of these newest critics have even tried to proceed to a thorough criticism of the Hegelian system"<sup>[86]</sup>. Their controversy with Hegel and with each other was limited by the fact that everyone pulled out one side of the Hegelian system and directed it against the whole system. "The only result of this philosophical criticism is some - and even one-sided - studies on the history of the emergence of Christianity"<sup>[87]</sup>. The rest of the critical activities of the Hegelians left themselves to fight "only against phrases," with a complete misunderstanding of the fact that, "fighting against the phrases of this real world, they do not fight against this world at all"<sup>[88]</sup>.

According to Marx, these "sheep who considered themselves wolves, with all the hype of their theoretical activity, only invested the German burghers in the philosophical jargon."

Marx's early theoretical activity in its class character and trends in its development has a number of features that differed sharply from the theoretical activity of other left Hegelians. Marx's political and theoretical views were shaped in a huge dependence on the revolutionary mentality of the era of the French Revolution and the mass revolutionary movements of the late 30s and early 40s of the last century.

As Lenin points out, Marx and Engels became socialists from democrats, and the democratic feeling of hatred for political arbitrariness was extremely strong in them. As early as 1842, they have emerged as consistent advocates for the broad masses of working people, the urban and rural poor. During this period, materialist tendencies made their way into their works.

*On the experience of political struggle* for a short period, Marx and Engels are convinced that it is not "the contradictions of the Hegelian idea embodied in law and the state", but the irreconcilable struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is the driving force of social reorganization and that therefore not law and not the state, as Hegel taught, determine the forms the so-called civil society, but, on the contrary, the dominant mode of production determines the forms of state institutions, legal and religious, and all kinds of other ideas of people. This process of the transition of Marx and Engels from the standpoint of a revolutionary democrat to the position of a proletarian revolutionary, the process of their critical denial of Hegelian dialectics, the process of creating dialectical materialism as a world view and method of the proletariat by them can be traced.

In one of his first articles in the Rhenish Newspaper, Marx expresses such provisions that clearly reveal in him a consistent revolutionary democrat who is gradually shifting to communist positions. The serf-reactionary statement that "only religion is the basis of the state" and that therefore "newspapers should not discuss politics from the point of view of philosophy in the so-called Christian state", Marx contrasts this assertion with revolutionary argument. Philosophy, according to Marx, should declare itself a "newspaper employee" and completely openly discuss all political issues "not in the church or in salons, not in the family circle", but in print, because "newspaper issues have become the battle questions of the day. Philosophy should "change the ascetic priestly robe to light

fashionable clothes of newspapers", for "philosophers do not grow like mushrooms from the earth, they are the product of their time, their people, the most subtle, precious and invisible juices of which roam in philosophical ideas. The same spirit that builds railways with the hands of artisans builds philosophical systems in the brain of philosophers." <sup>[89]</sup> . Philosophy does not hover outside the modern world; on the contrary, it "invades the heart of contemporaries," just as it does in the "editorial board of newspapers."

Starting from the Hegelian idealist position of the state as a "moral organism," Marx seeks to use this provision to protect the freedom of the democratic press against serf censorship. "The state must be built not on the basis of religion, but on the basis of the mind of freedom." "The newest philosophy ... considers the state as a great organism in which legal, moral and political freedom must be realized, and an individual citizen, obeying the laws of the state, obeys only the natural laws of his own mind, human mind" <sup>[90]</sup> . In such an ideal state, the press must be free, because it is "the open eye of the national spirit, the people's confidence in themselves, the eloquent link connecting the individual to the state and the whole world ... She is the merciless confession of the people before itself ... She is the spiritual a mirror in which people see themselves ... She is the light of the state of the mind, which can penetrate every hut ... She is the ideal world, which, growing out of reality, in turn, enriches and inspires this action totalness" <sup>[91]</sup> . Marx strongly protests against the representatives of those classes who "in order to save the particular freedoms of their privileges ... condemn the universal freedom of human nature." Marx argues that the argument against freedom of the press, which was developed in the Landtag by a representative of the nobility, as well as the argument of a representative of the princely class, cannot be of any value, as it opposes the special privilege spirit to the universal "historical spirit of the people". But Marx denounces his criticism not only of orators from princes and noblemen, he no less sharply criticizes the representative of the bourgeoisie, who demanded freedom of the press as "trade freedom", that is, as an expression of property freedom. "But," says Marx, "is it *free* a seal that goes down to the level of a craft?" <sup>[92]</sup> . "Let's open the speaker's thought. To the question: what is freedom? he replies: *trade freedom* . It is as if a student asked the question: what is freedom? would answer: " *Free night* " " <sup>[93]</sup> .

The idea of violence against the "freedom of the universal popular spirit" by the privileged classes Marx expresses, however, in a somewhat different form, in his other article, written about the promulgation of the law against the theft of firewood, in defense of the customary law of the poor. Still firmly convinced that the state should embody "the freedom of the universal popular spirit", Marx demands that the law take care of protecting the interests not only of the owner of the forest, but also of the violator of forest rules, "for the state must see ... a citizen. The state cannot lightly cut off one of its members from all these functions, because the state cripples itself when it makes a citizen a criminal " <sup>[94]</sup> .

So teaches the Hegelian idealistic theory of state law. But Marx is already well aware that the forest owner is guided not by ideal principles, but by practical interests. "A practical forest owner argues in this way: this decree of the law is good because it is useful for me ..." <sup>[95]</sup>

However, it is important that Marx is no longer limited to criticizing forest owners. In contrast to the feudal and bourgeois classes, Marx declared to the poor the legitimate bearer of his "ordinary rights". Marx argues that picking up a dead man in privately owned forests is a legitimate manifestation of the "grab right" of the poor, who "in their very work ... finds an excuse for their right" <sup>[96]</sup> . So Marx as a revolutionary democrat uses certain provisions of the Hegelian philosophy of law. This meant that *Marx followed the path of denying the Hegelian "idea" of the state*, because instead of expressing the freedom of the "universal popular spirit", Marx forces it to express a *particular, private, class spirit of the poor*.

If at the beginning of his activity Marx was deeply convinced that the ideal state as the embodiment of the universal popular spirit determines the forms of existence of the so-called civil society, then during his work in the Rhine newspaper, in the process of practical political struggle Marx came to the conclusion that "Means the mind is realized", in fact "it falls into a contradiction between its ideal purpose and its real data" <sup>[97]</sup> .

The further development of Marx and Engels, namely, their activities in the German-French Yearbooks and their Critique of the Holy Family (1843–44), are aimed at exposing Hegelian understanding of state and law. The appearance of the works of L. Feuerbach (1841–1843) helped Marx and Engels to realize and formalize the materialistic provisions that had already been made before them. As Engels notes, "we (that is, Marx and Engels) immediately became Feuerbachians." *During this period, the final transition of Marx and Engels from idealism to materialism, from revolutionary democratism to communism, takes place.*



It would be wrong to deny the well-known influence of Feuerbach's materialism on the formation of the materialist theory of knowledge of Marx and Engels. However, it would be no less a mistake to see in Marx and Engels the orthodox Feuerbachians in the sense that they shared the limitations of Feuerbach's views even in this early period of their activity. Since Feuerbach's criticism of religion helped Marx expose the ideal Hegelian state, he was Feuerbachian to the extent that he belonged to Feuerbach's philosophical views and defended Feuerbach from the attacks of noisy idealistic criticism from the Young Hegelians. Marx placed Feuerbach immeasurably higher than the Young Hegelian Critical Critique. But Marx was never an unconditional follower of Feuerbach, for from the very beginning of philosophical development, Marx's activity was directed against the basic vice of Feuerbach's philosophy — its contemplativeness, against the misunderstanding that religion can be destroyed not by theoretical criticism, but by a revolutionary-practical revolution in social and economic conditions of social life. That is why Marx, in connection with the appearance of Feuerbach's Theses to Reform Philosophy, in one of his letters says: "In my opinion, Feuerbach's aphorisms suffer, in my opinion, *that* he is pushing too much on nature and *too little on politics* . Meanwhile, this is the only union thanks to which the present philosophy can become ideological " [98] .

In contrast to the inconsistent abstract-theoretical criticism of religion by Feuerbach, Marx, from the very beginning of his work, advocated *an practically effective philosophy*. On the experience of the political struggle, Marx is completely convinced that the Hegelian ideal state is an abstraction and, as such, cannot be the cause of social development. During this period of its development, Marx argues that "the German philosophy of law and the state" is "the ideal continuation of German history" and that it is not, as Hegel believed, the cause of social development, but is only a "philosophical reflection" of the social life of modern advanced peoples . Therefore, the criticism of the Hegelian philosophy of law was for Marx not only criticism of the German serf orders, but also leads him to criticize the already developed English and French capitalism at that time.

In this criticism of Hegel's philosophy of law, which took the stand of bourgeois political economy, in the process of his study of economic theory and criticism of utopian socialism and communism, *Marx leaves the revolutionary-democratic positions and becomes the proletariat* . In the famous article "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law", Marx already appears as a proletarian revolutionary, and therefore he now understands much more deeply the dependence of theoretical criticism on practical revolutionary struggle. Marx writes that he is "a decisive opponent of the former form of *German* political consciousness, the criticism of the speculative philosophy of law does not flow in itself, but in *tasks* for the resolution of which there is only one means - *practice*". "Weapons of criticism," he says further, "cannot of course replace the critics of weapons, material force must be overturned by material force; but the theory becomes a material force as soon as it masters the masses " [99] .

The following places confirm our thought: "Just as philosophy finds its material weapon in the proletariat, so does the proletariat find its *spiritual* weapon in philosophy , and as soon as the lightning of thought thoroughly hits this naive popular soil, the *Germans* will be emancipated *into people* " [100] . Trying to find out more specifically the ways of "emancipating Germans into people", Marx poses the question: "What is the *positive* possibility of German emancipation? *Answer* : in the formation of a class linked by *radical chains*., a class of civil society, which does not constitute any class of civil society; estate, which is a decomposition of all classes; a sphere that is universal in nature due to its universal suffering and does not *claim any special right* , because it is not any *particular injustice that is being done , but injustice in general* ; which can no longer refer to the *historical* , but still only to the *human* right; which is not in any one-sided contradiction with the results of the German state system, but in complete contradiction with the foundations of this system, finally a sphere that cannot emancip itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and at the same time all other spheres of society; which, in a word, represents the *total loss of a person* and, therefore, can only gain itself by a *complete new rebirth of a person* . This disintegrated society, as a special class, is the *proletariat* " [101] .

Marx here finally rejects Hegel's thought that the ideal state determines the forms of social life. In contrast to Hegel, Marx begins to look for the dependence of the forms of state institutions in the pattern of social life, although at first it can only give a very general definition of this pattern. "Hegel forgets," says Marx, "that a special individuality is a human individuality, and state functions and spheres of reality are human functions; he forgets that the essence of a personality trait is not its blood, not its beard, but its *social quality* and that state functions, etc., are nothing but forms of being and forms of manifestation of social qualities of people. It is therefore clear that, since individuals are carriers of state function and state power, they are considered not by their private, but by their social qualities. "

The next decisive step in their development is Marx and Engels in the Critique of the Holy Family, where, whipping and exposing the followers of Hegelian idealism, they are finally strengthened as proletarian revolutionaries in the positions of *dialectical materialism*. Marx shows here that the state, law, religion, morality are determined by the implacable class struggle. In the Critique of the Holy Family, Marx gives a class characteristic of the opposition between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Here Marx more clearly outlines the historical role of the proletariat, the need for its struggle with the capitalist system, with the outrageous conditions of its existence. Marx and Engels in The Critique of the Holy Family finally felt the main springs of social development - the material production process and the associated law of class struggle, and thus laid the foundations of dialectical materialism.

"German ideology" (1846) is a further step in the development of dialectical materialism. The starting point of the "*German ideology*" is fundamentally opposed to the entire preceding pre-Marxist philosophy in general, and in particular to German philosophy. Marx and Engels come out of "really active people, trying to deduce from their real life process also the development of ideological reflexes and reflections of this life process" <sup>[102]</sup>. The point of departure in the study of social life should not be a fantastic representation of people, not an abstraction from reality, but "real people, their actions and the material conditions of their existence, both existing and created by the activity of the people themselves".

"So we have this fact: certain individuals who produce in a certain way enter into certain social and political relations" <sup>[103]</sup>. "The notions made up by these individuals for themselves are the essence of the ideas either about their relationship to nature, or about their relationship to each other ... intercourse, their social and political practice" <sup>[104]</sup>. The material existence of people is the actual process of their life: "Consciousness can never be anything other than just a conscious being" <sup>[105]</sup>. And Marx already gives here his classical formulation about the *dependence of consciousness on being*. "It is not consciousness that determines life, but life determines consciousness" <sup>[106]</sup>, he says.

Having thus formulated the *basic principle of materialism* Marx gives merciless criticism of the philosophy that preceded him. Marx and Engels dealt particularly mercilessly with German philosophy, which, instead of a concretely acting person, studied an abstract, fictional, imaginary, word, fantastically represented person. "The thought of the German ideologues, - according to Marx, - revolves in the realm of 'pure spirit', seeing in the religious illusion the driving force of history. " German philosophy operates only in heaven, never descends to earth. But a truly scientific knowledge of the path of its research must begin with the study of the real, with the study of the production process, from a concrete person living on earth. We must proceed from a certain, historical person in order to understand that the social conditions of production determine their ideological mapping. Hence the philosophy

Thus, "phrases about consciousness disappear, real knowledge should take their place". At best, the place of philosophy can be "summation of the most general results", abstracted from consideration of the historical development of people. Therefore, the true and only science is history, which must fully depict the process of changing social forms of production, and the tact of the various forms of consciousness that depend on them.

To show that the development of material production is the main all-determining law of social life, Marx and Engels repeatedly refer to the empirical fact tested by practice that people, in order to live, must produce "the means necessary for their life" and thereby produce "indirect way "their material life, for" this activity, this incessant sensual work and creativity, this production is as much the basis of the whole sensory world as it now exists, for if it had stopped at least for one year only, then Feuerbach would not only find great changes in the physical world, but very soon would have found the whole human world, their own abilities and opinions, even his own existence" <sup>[107]</sup>.

But if production is the all-determining law of the development of society, then it is also a side that establishes the difference between man and animal, because "people can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, religion, anything. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce the means necessary for their life*" <sup>[108]</sup>. Even at the lowest, primitive stage of social development, production lies at the basis of human life.

Consciousness, on the first steps of social development, is directly dependent on practical human activity, being "first of all the consciousness of the nearest sensory environment" <sup>[109]</sup>. Consciousness and language arose in primitive man in the process of labor from the needs for practical-active relationships with each other, and only when there was a separation of material and spiritual labor, consciousness imagined, "that it is something other than the consciousness of existing

practice" <sup>[110]</sup> . "From this point on, it is able to free itself from the world and go on to the formation of a" pure theory "" <sup>[111]</sup> , thus acquiring the form of the illusion of domination over man.

This division of labor is due to the historically evolving process of *material division of labor* . The division of labor makes a person's development one-sided, disfigures him, dominates a person in the form of entrusting certain social functions to him. "According to the division of labor taking place, everyone has a certain, exceptional range of activities that is imposed on him and from which he cannot leave: he turns out to be a hunter, fisherman or shepherd ... or a critical critic" <sup>[112]</sup> . Marx and Engels consider the division of labor between *town and country to be* especially negative for human development. Because it "is a crude expression of the fact of an individual's subordination division of labor and certain forcibly imposed on it, the activities, submission, converting one person in a limited urban animal, the other - in a limited rustic animal" <sup>[113]</sup> .

In this way, Marx and Engels show us how the law of the division of labor causes the appearance of the illusion of self-development of ideology, how the division of labor disfigures human development by attaching it to individual professions. In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels clearly formulate the law of the division of labor as the basis for the formation of *classes* , for, they say, "the division of labor and private property are identical expressions: in one case it says the same thing in relation to activity, says in relation to the product of activity " <sup>[114]</sup> . Therefore, "various forms of ownership at each stage of the division of labor determine by themselves the relationship of individuals with respect to the material, instrument and product of labor." Thus, in the "German Ideology," Marx and Engels fully disclose the reasons for the division of society into classes.

In the same place, they give a very specific definition of society as a socio-economic formation, establish the dependence of their structures on the dominant form of ownership, and investigate the class struggle developing specifically in them.

The struggle between the feudal aristocracy and bourgeois democracy, the struggle for universal suffrage, equality and freedom of citizens, etc., are all deceptive forms that are the perfect expression of the economic interests of the bourgeoisie.

On the example of the analysis of class struggle in the era of bourgeois revolutions, Marx and Engels conclude that the class that *materially dominates* is always *dominant and spiritual* . The class that owns the material means of production also owns the means of spiritual production. The thoughts that prevail in this epoch are the ideal expression of the class relations prevailing in this epoch. Therefore, Marx again and again emphasizes that the old forms of consciousness can be destroyed not by spiritual criticism, but by a practical revolution in real public relations ... "Not criticism, but revolution is the driving force of history ."

So in the "German ideology" Marx and Engels, along with the discovery of the basic laws of social development, also clearly reveal the historical inevitability of the revolution. The revolution is the inevitable result of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production; "The contradiction between the productive forces and the forms of intercourse ... had to break through every time in the form of a revolution" <sup>[115]</sup> . Marx and Engels have repeatedly explained the fact that all previous revolutions were limited only to the redistribution of property, without affecting the very foundations of the rule of private property. This is one of the fundamental differences of all previous revolutions from the future proletarian-communist revolution. Only the communist revolution will finally destroy all class domination, because the proletariat, a class that has the same interests in all nations, a class for which not only its relationship to the capitalist is intolerable, but also the "division on itself all the burden of society, not using its benefits ", the class" from which comes the awareness of the need for a *communist revolution*". The proletariat must make a revolution "not only because it is impossible to overthrow the *ruling* class in any other way , but also because the *overthrowing class can only be cleansed in the revolution from all the dirt of the old society and become capable of creating a new society* " <sup>[116]</sup> . Consequently, "communism for us is not a state to be established, not an ideal with which reality must conform. We call communism a *real movement that destroys the present state* " <sup>[117]</sup> .

Thus, the "German ideology" represents a significant step forward in the development of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels. Here they spread materialism to the knowledge of society, finish building materialism to the top, reveal the basic laws of social development and thereby *finally* formulate dialectical materialism as a world view and method of the proletariat.

Before turning to a more detailed examination of dialectical materialism, let us dwell on those views that distort the actual course of development of Marx's philosophical views.

*Plekhanov's point of view* is widespread and nevertheless fundamentally distorting the actual process of the formation of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels . In his article "The philosophical evolution of Marx," Plekhanov states that "the whole of them (Marx and Engels) presents

three stages: the first stage is abstract Hegelian self-consciousness, the second stage is Feuerbach's concrete-abstract person and the last stage is real people living in real class society, in a certain socio-economic environment. " From Hegelianism through anti-Hegelianism to the synthesis of Feuerbach's materialism and Hegelianism on a new basis - to Marxism in the proper sense.

*The fundamental defect of this point of view is that the philosophical development of Marx is considered purely logical*, as a simple development of ideas, regardless of class struggle, of the level of development of science. We also showed that Marx and Engels created dialectical materialism in the fight against Hegel and Feuerbachianism. Plekhanov did not understand that the philosophical development of Marx was always subordinated to the tasks of the revolutionary struggle, that in the revolutionary struggle Marx quickly understood the shortcomings of the Hegelian and Feuerbach weapons.

Both the mechanists and the Menshevik idealists are adjacent to the Plekhanov scheme of Marx's philosophical development. , though significantly worsening it, bringing it to the point of absurdity. Thus, in his book "Marx as a Philosopher" L. Axelrod writes: "In particular, Hegel's disciple - Feuerbach, who passed through his teacher's system and learned the dialectical method of thinking, spoke against idealism in general and Hegel's idealism. Feuerbach with amazing skill took advantage of the dialectical weapon with which he destroyed idealistic constructions. And where he graduated from Feuerbach, Marx just started there. Marx fully shared the Feuerbach critique of idealism ... In short, Marx created a higher synthesis, expressed in the combination of Hegel's dialectical method with the materialistic basis of Feuerbach's knowledge. " In essence, Axelrod here only more vulgarly repeats Plekhanov, posing as a combination of Feuerbachianism and Hegelianism for dialectical materialism.

Menshevik idealists entirely agree with the mechanists on the emergence of dialectical materialism. They regard Marx's dialectic as Hegel's dialectic, corrected by Feuerbach's materialism, as a synthesis of Hegel's dialectics and Feuerbach's materialism (Deborinus).

What is the *social meaning* of these perversions of the history of the emergence of dialectical materialism? All these perversions converge on one common statement for them: dialectical materialism is the union of Feuerbach's materialism and Hegel's dialectic. But to assert this is to try to *dissolve the philosophy of the proletariat in the bourgeois worldview* . Dialectical materialism is a continuation and at the same time the complete *opposite* of all forms of bourgeois philosophy. The path of its development is a struggle against *all the* philosophical theories of the bourgeoisie, including, first and foremost, the idealistic dialectic of Hegel and the contemplative materialism of Feuerbach.

One cannot be a dialectician "in general", but only *either* idealistic *or* materialistic dialectician. The Menshevik idealists are among the first, the Marxist-Leninists represent the second. Mechanists do not belong to either one or the other, and they are *not* dialectics *at all* .

We are the " *materialistic* friends of Hegelian dialectics." We do not reject this dialectic, but process it and develop it as a materialistic dialectic. Although "a lot of mysticism and empty pedantry in Hegel ... but the basic idea is ingenious: the world-wide, comprehensive, *lively* connection of everything with everything and the reflection of this connection - materially put on Hegel's head - in terms of man, which should also be chipped, broken off, flexible, mobile, relative, interrelated, united in opposites, in order to embrace the world " [\[118\]](#) . Marxism put Hegel's dialectic from "head to foot"; he extracted "a rational core from under its mystical shell." We are the dialectical materialist enemies of Hegelian *idealism*.. We overcome the false, idealistic, mystical, theological dialectic of Hegel. Ridding the dialectic of idealistic captivity, materialism acquires in it a natural ally and an accomplice. Dialectics is by no means an accidental companion of materialism. Sequential materialism is *necessarily* dialectical, as well as the *only consistent dialectic - materialistic* .

### **Chapter 3. Dialectical Materialism**

#### **3.1. Materialistic dialectics as a philosophical science**

Dialectical materialism is the worldview of the new social class, on which history has entrusted the great task of destroying classes. In dialectical materialism, the working class finds the spiritual weapon of its struggle and its liberation, the philosophical basis of its views, which testifies to its transformation from the class "in itself" to the class "for itself". Dialectical materialism is a worldview that can be properly and completely mastered only if one approaches the knowledge of the world from the class positions of the proletariat and its party. It is these positions that are such that from them the reality is cognized truly objectively. For only the philosophy of Marxism represents such a system of views in which the highest and strict scientific character is combined with consistent and irreconcilable proletarian revolutionism.

The philosophy of Marxism is the *historical result*, the conclusion, the result of the entire previous development of science and philosophy. But Marxism is not just mechanically combining previous teachings, it is by no means (as the Menshevik idealists believe) a simple mechanical *synthesis of previous theories*, but their *critical processing*. It is a *new* holistic philosophical doctrine, based on the findings of the study of nature, history and practice of the class struggle.

Modern materialism is not a mere heir to the preceding philosophies; he was born and grew up in the *struggle* against the previously dominant philosophy, in the struggle for the liberation of science from idealism and mysticism that erode it. Marxism not only inherited what was fruitful in the teachings of Hegel - the highest product of idealism, but also overcame the idealism of this doctrine, reworked its dialectics materialistically. He not only appeared as a continuation of the whole previous development of materialism and its completion, but also becomes an opponent of its limitations, an opponent of mechanical, contemplative materialism. The philosophy of the proletariat inherits the scientific results of the previous civilization and subject them to revolutionary processing.

Dialectical materialism as a philosophy of Marxism is also a *method of knowing* the world around us and revolutionary action. Dialectical materialism is a unity of worldview and method. Just on this issue, there are often wrong views that pervert Marxism. Representatives of the idealistic revision of Marxism saw the whole being of dialectical materialism in that it is a "method". Putting the question in this way, they *separated the method from the general philosophical world outlook*, separated the dialectic from materialism. The mechanistic point of view, which sees in the philosophy of Marxism *only* general philosophical outlook, moreover, identical with the conclusions of mechanical natural science, without understanding that our philosophy is not just materialism, but *dialectical* materialism.

Marx and Engels developed very deep thoughts on the question of the philosophy of Marxism and its subject, unlike all previous philosophy, in their early works. So in "German Ideology" they wrote on the question of philosophy: "Thus, where speculation stops, that is, at the threshold of real life, real positive science begins, an image of practical activity, a practical process of human development. Phrases about consciousness disappear, real knowledge should take their place. When they begin to depict reality, their *own* philosophy loses its *raison d'être* (meaning). In its place, at best, the *summation of the most general results*, abstracted from consideration of the *historical development of people*, may become " [\[119\]](#) .

Marx and Engels directing the point of their teaching against the separation of philosophy from reality and its transformation into some independent entity, the need for philosophy, which grows on the basis of analysis of real life, real relationships, with particular force. They emphasize that with *such an* understanding of philosophy, *independent* philosophy loses all meaning, that is, philosophy that has only logical ideas and their self-generation as its subject. Thus, a positive definition of the role and tasks of philosophy is given here, which gets a detailed development in the subsequent works of Marx and Engels and in the works of Lenin. We are referring to the indication that the task of philosophy should be the *summation of general results*. who abstract from consideration and study of the historical development of people. Vulgarizers and perverters of Marxism in general and Marxist philosophy in particular, who deny the right of philosophical science to exist, try to refer to Engels' statements on this issue in the Anti-Dühring. In Engels it says: modern "materialism is essentially dialectical and makes any philosophy unnecessarily pretending to become higher than other sciences. When the requirement to find out its place in the general system of things and knowledge is applied to each individual science, any particular science about this common connection becomes superfluous " [\[120\]](#) .

First of all, Engels emphasizes here that the philosophy of Marxism is not just materialism, but dialectical materialism. Secondly, from the point of view of dialectical materialism, each science requires an understanding of its place in the general process of our knowledge of the objective world — given this position in philosophy, which is above other sciences, which is like a "science of sciences" and inventing general connections without analyzing genuine material science, there is no need. *Such* "Philosophy" in this old form of it disappears. However, there remains a need for a philosophical science that has real content - in philosophy as a science about the laws of the development of human thinking, reflecting the laws of the development of nature and human society. That is why, speaking of dialectical materialism, Engels wrote: "Philosophy is thus" withdrawn, "that is," buried, "" simultaneously destroyed and preserved. " Destroyed formally, preserved in its actual content " [\[121\]](#) .

Thus we see that all sorts of opportunists and revisionists who deny Marxist philosophy distort the views of Marx, Engels, Lenin. What, then, did the founders of Marxism-Leninism understand by materialist dialectics as philosophical science?

Marx, Engels, Lenin under the materialist dialectic understand the *doctrine of development*. Engels in his works calls the dialectic the doctrine "of the universal laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thinking" <sup>[122]</sup>. Lenin, like Marx and Engels, sees in dialectics "the most comprehensive, rich in content and profound teaching on development" <sup>[123]</sup>. For Lenin, as well as for the founders of Marxism, a different formulation of the principle of development is limited, empty and "crippling the actual course of development ... in nature and in society" <sup>[124]</sup>. Dialectics is the most profound and comprehensive study of development, because it most fully and comprehensively reflects the leapfrog and contradictory nature of the processes of change in nature and society.

From philosophy, according to Engels, "there remains the doctrine of the laws of thinking, logic and dialectics." But the laws of our thinking reflect the laws of the development of nature and society.

"Over all of our theoretical thinking," says Engels, "the fact that our subjective thinking and the objective world are subject to *the same laws* and that they cannot contradict each other in their final results, dominates with absolute force, but must agree between by itself. This fact is an unconscious and unconditional premise of our theoretical thinking" <sup>[125]</sup>. The very laws of thinking, according to which our knowledge develops, reflect the development of nature and the history of human society. Therefore, outside the nature and history of the laws of dialectics have no meaning. The laws of thinking themselves are correct only because they reflect the development of nature and history. "The so-called *objective* the dialectic, wrote Engels, reigns in all of nature, and the so-called *subjective dialectic, dialectical thinking*, is only a *reflection of the* movement that dominates the whole nature of movement by opposites, which determine the life of nature with their constant contradictions and forms" <sup>[126]</sup>.

Subjective dialectics, being a reflection in the consciousness of the development of the objective world, is a method of thinking, as well as a method of practical activity of people, aimed both at nature and at society. She, according to Engels, is the most correct form of thinking, "for it alone represents an analogue and, therefore, an explanation method for development processes taking place in nature, for nature's universal connections, for transitions from one field of research to another" <sup>[127]</sup>.

### **3.2. The materiality of the world and the form of existence of matter**

Continuing and developing further the materialist line in philosophy, Marxism solves the fundamental question of philosophy about the relationship between being and thinking, consistently materialistically emphasizing the materiality of the world and the dependence of consciousness on being. "The unity of the world lies in its materiality, and it is proved ... by the long and slow development of philosophy and science" <sup>[128]</sup>.

The recognition of the *primacy of being*, the nature, of an object implies its *independent existence*. Indeed, the first condition for belonging to materialism is the recognition of the existence of the external world, of objective reality, *outside and regardless of anyone's consciousness*. The object is not something secondary in relation to the subject, it is independent, primary. We have already seen when familiarizing ourselves with subjective idealism, to what abyss of absurdities the rejection of this principle leads to.

The proof of the existence of the objective world is the social practice of man, carried out in the historical development of human society. Human activity and our very existence indisputably and irrefutably prove the reality of the external world and its independence from the subject. The fact that a person must daily, every hour, every minute encounter with the outside world, which he perceives through the medium of his senses; the fact that the world is opposed to man as a disobedient, often hostile force, which requires a tough, bitter struggle; the circumstance finally that a person not only *must* overcome external obstacles, but also *be able to* to overcome them is the best proof of the existence of an external world independent of consciousness.

The recognition of the material world, the dependence of consciousness on being, the primacy of matter is the cornerstone of Marxist philosophy. But what *is matter*? To clarify this issue should clearly distinguish between the *philosophical and natural science concept of matter*. These are not two contradictory concepts, but the definition of matter in two different ways. *The philosophical* concept of matter characterizes it in relation to cognition, to thinking, to the subject. Under the philosophical concept of matter, it goes without saying that "acting on our senses produces a sensation; matter is *objective reality given to us in sensation*." <sup>[129]</sup>. Matter - that which exists outside and independently of our consciousness, causes our sensations and is reflected in them. The natural scientific concept of matter has in mind the question of *what* this objective world is from the point of view of the level of physical knowledge that is contemporary to us. If the philosophical concept of matter is inextricably linked to the resolution of the question of the *relationship between being and cognition, subject and object*, then the natural science concept of matter has in mind the *structure of matter*, the

characteristic of this physical structure, and this characteristic changes with the development of our knowledge in various historical eras.

Matter is the whole world existing independently of us. The concept of matter is the most general concept. All that *is* is different types of matter, but matter itself cannot be defined as a particular case of some kind. For the same reason, it is not possible to indicate the species difference of matter. We distinguish matter from consciousness, oppose them to one another, but *this opposition is conditional and makes sense only within the "gnoseological" formulation of the question* , since we find its particular property in matter itself as a property of highly organized matter — consciousness. The juxtaposition of knowledge there being opposition *cognizing* matter *knowable* matter, but no more. A completely legitimate and correct opposition of the subject to the object loses its meaning beyond the limits of the theory of knowledge. If we began to oppose matter to the spirit from a natural-scientific point of view, this would mean a betrayal of materialistic monism, a transition to a dualistic position. There is only matter and its manifestations. The subject is also material. The knowing man himself is one of the manifestations of matter.

In view of the universality and uniqueness of matter, to give its full definition is to list all its properties and manifestations, that is, everything that exists in nature. That is why the *natural-scientific concept of matter* can always be only a *relative truth* , since its exhaustive definition implies the completion of the absolute cognition of nature, the exhaustion of its tasks by science. As physics and chemistry progress, the natural science concept of matter is refined. It is absurd to demand from philosophy what constitutes the striving and the task of the whole development of the natural sciences.

Classical mechanics, physics and other sciences, speaking of matter, had in mind such properties as mass, inertia, impermeability, gravity, etc. These properties of matter were considered as its absolute, unchanging and original properties. This understanding was due in part to the *level of development* of natural science itself.

Until the 20th century among naturalists dominated the views according to which the atom is the last degree of divisibility of matter: the atom is further indecomposable. But at the beginning of our century, in connection with the advances of physics, together with the discovery of the fact that the atom will also decompose, that electrons are a further step in the divisibility of matter, it became clear that the old atomic theory of the structure of matter is already insufficient, that it must be supplemented and developed electronic theory. When the further development of physics at the end of the XIX century radically changed the views of physicists and matter lost those properties that were previously considered the main features of matter, a crisis broke out in physics: some physicists took the position of idealism.

For bourgeois philosophers and naturalists, the discovery of the electronic structure of matter was the reason for concluding that "matter disappeared". Lenin, whose philosophical views were invariably associated with the recognition that matter does not arise and does not disappear, that matter *is an objective reality that exists independently of our consciousness* , came to a different conclusion. ""Matter disappears," writes Lenin," *it means that limit, to which we knew matter until now, disappears, our knowledge goes deeper* ; such properties of matter that previously seemed absolute, unchanging, original (impenetrability, inertia, mass, etc.) disappear and which are now found to *be relative, inherent only in certain states of matter* "<sup>[130]</sup> .

Philosophical materialism believes that "the *only* " property "of matter, with the recognition of which philosophical materialism is associated, is the property of *being an objective reality* , existing outside our consciousness" <sup>[131]</sup> , while physics and the natural sciences in general associate, as already mentioned, the recognition of matter with recognition of a number of its physical and other properties. Equally limited, he understood matter and metaphysical materialism of the 18th and 19th centuries (French materialists, Büchner, Focht, Molleshot, etc.), associating its recognition with a number of mechanical properties. Our mechanists did not get rid of such a metaphysical understanding of matter (A. Timiryazev and others).

This of course does not mean that dialectical materialism rejects certain physical properties of matter. He recognizes them. But he does not associate the recognition of matter with the recognition that it must necessarily be weighty, have mechanical mass, etc., etc. He considers these properties to be inherent only in certain states of matter, only in certain forms of material movement, and matter itself determines as an objective reality that exists outside of our consciousness.

The difference between the philosophical and the natural science concept of matter consists in the fact that the former is firmly and inextricably linked with "philosophical materialism", with dialectical materialism. Natural-scientific views on matter have repeatedly changed, are changing and will change in the process of developing specific knowledge about the structure of matter, etc.

This position is confirmed by the entire history of the development of philosophy and science. As Lenin correctly emphasizes, philosophical materialism *has always* been associated with the recognition of matter as an objective reality that exists outside of our consciousness, while the ideas about the structure of matter, about those specific forms and types in which matter can exist, have changed many times depending on the level development of productive forces and directly from the level of development of natural science and technology.

With the progress of knowledge, *materialism changes its form*, deepens and improves its understanding of matter, coming closer and closer to its all-round cognition. The philosophical formula, which speaks of the materiality of the world, its objective reality and its primacy in relation to consciousness, remains unchanged. No matter how our views change on quality, on the structure of objective reality, recognition of the existence of objective reality does not depend on this.

Another such fundamental position of dialectical materialism is Engels's position that "*matter without motion is as unthinkable as motion without matter*" <sup>[132]</sup>, that "*motion is a form of existence of matter*" <sup>[133]</sup>, "mode of existence of matter", "intrinsic attribute of matter." Lenin expressed the same thing, but in a new way, in connection with his special formulation of the question of matter and the further development of natural science: "To say: the world is moving matter or: the world is a material movement, this does not change" <sup>[134]</sup>. Thus, Lenin believes that by materially defining the world around us, we can say that he is a movement of objective reality, moving matter or a material movement. Each of these definitions expresses the same thing.

These provisions of Marxism-Leninism are directed against:

- 1) assumptions of absolutely motionless matter or of any absolute rest, at least for a part of objective reality,
- 2) attempts to think of motion without matter,
- 3) a simplified view of the movement of matter.

Matter is *moving* matter. There is no matter without motion, and there is no motion without matter. Matter has not acquired this movement from the outside, by any external force. It was originally mobile and was always moving matter. Movement is a universal, integral *form of its existence*. The question of "thanks to which" matter began to move is a ridiculous question. First of all, this question assumes that something supernatural exists or existed, something other than matter that drives this last one, that is, the material unity of the world, the universality of matter, the uniqueness of material reality is rejected. Secondly, it is assumed here that the matter was in absolute rest until the moment of impact. Thirdly, matter is understood in this question as a dead, lifeless abstraction, and not as a concrete, amateur, self-moving matter, as it really is. Finally, the movement itself is understood purely mechanically, as a result of an external impetus acting on the body, and not as an internally necessary self-movement of matter. Modern physics, which has deeply penetrated into the atomic depths of the atom, has discovered in it a complex,

*Absolute rest* assumption as such a state in which matter was originally located or may even be in general, characteristic of metaphysical systems in philosophy and for the so-called metaphysical period in natural science. In the new philosophy, for example, Descartes considered matter as a dense, solid and absolutely resting body, "which could have taken place before God set it in motion." Spinoza considered peace to be as necessary a mode as movement. Newton began his mechanics with the laws in which peace was considered as the most normal state of matter, and motion - as a consequence of some external "forces". On this basis, he recognized the need for a "first shock" from the side of the deity. The need for a first push is shared by almost all metaphysicians. The recognition of the primary impulse is the logical end and the beginning of all mechanical systems.

During the 16th - 17th centuries, the whole worldview characteristic of the natural science of this period developed. According to the views of this worldview, "nature remains always the same." The stars are resting, forever motionless in their places. In nature, there is no development at all. In the 18th century French materialism, all the main features of this metaphysical view were manifested.

Dialectical materialism does not recognize absolute rest. But of course he recognizes *relative peace*, relative equilibrium as *one of the moments of movement*, as a special case of movement. Dialectical materialism recognizes that "the possibility of relative rest of bodies, the possibility of temporary equilibrium states is an essential condition for the differentiation of matter, and therefore of life" <sup>[135]</sup>.

Attempts to think of *motion without matter*, force without the substance underlying it, are the beginning and the main essence of philosophical idealism and clericalism. The movement is detached from matter, from nature, turns into a thought and is deified. Lenin writes: "An attempt *to think of a movement without matter* drags a *thought* that is cut off from matter, and this is philosophical idealism" <sup>[136]</sup>.



An attempt to think of a movement without matter is characteristic of idealistic physicists and positivists and, in general, naturalists who hold idealistic positions, which Dietzgen also called "diplomaed lackeys of priesthood". Lenin paid great attention to the struggle against these attempts, speaking against the idealists Pearson, Mach, Avenarius, against the Russian Machists — Bogdanov and others, who dragged this same trend in philosophy, against similar mistakes made by the Ostwald energetics, etc.

Among the part of modern physicists we observe the continuation of the same idealistic tendencies. Many, in connection with the data of Einstein's theory of relativity, tend to depict motion without matter (for example, Frenkel). We also find peculiar attempts to detach movement from matter from Menshevist idealists. Tymyansky, for example, writes that the movement "is subordinated to itself, embraces itself, *moves itself*" (our emphasis) and that "this concept: the movement of movement ... is not alien to us." As we see, here the separation of motion from matter is presented in a very subtle form: instead of material motion, there is a moving motion. What is the difference between Menshevist idealists and those idealist physicists about whom Lenin wrote that they are asking what is moving - rejected as ridiculous and consider - "moves and is basta"<sup>[137]</sup>. Essentially no.

Dialectical materialism believes *that there can be no movement without matter as well as matter without movement*.

Dialectical materialism also does not allow a simplified view of motion, that is, the reduction of the entire motion to one of the forms, for example, to mechanical motion. Such a simplified view is characteristic of any mechanical world outlook in general, and in particular for modern Soviet mechanists (A. Timiryazev, Tseitlin, etc.). A simplified view of motion, an understanding of motion as soon as displacement, necessarily leads to the recognition of *equilibrium* as the only possible way of existence of matter, and *rest* as a preferential state. In the end, it leads as the necessary logical conclusion to the "first push" ...

*Dialectical materialism believes that "the movement of matter is not reduced to only rough mechanical movement, to simple movement; the motion of matter is also heat and light, electrical and magnetic stress, chemical combination and decomposition, life and finally consciousness"* <sup>[138]</sup>. Non-recognition of this, says Engels, leads to the negation of the law of conservation of energy. A view of motion as the movement of unchanged bodies, the rejection of the study of qualitative differences in the forms of motion is incompatible with the Leninist notion that the whole world is a material motion in qualitatively different forms.

Speaking about the material movement, you must always keep in mind its specific forms. The movement "in general", matter as such ("in general") - there is no such movement, there is no such matter. We know only the various forms of matter and its movement. "Words, like matter and motion, are simply *abbreviations* in which we embrace, according to their common properties, various sense-perceptible things" <sup>[139]</sup>.

But moving matter exists in *space and time*; the motion of matter already assumes these forms of existence of matter. Space and time are inseparable from the movement of matter. Space and time is not something different from matter, independent of it. The expression "matter exists in space" does not mean that there is some non-material, empty space filled with matter, something in which matter is placed. It means that the matter itself is spatial and extended, that the material world is a world in which inherent length. Space, like time, is neither an independent, intangible, nor a subjective form of our sensuality. They are the essence of the form of material existence, the *form of existence of matter itself*. They are objective and do not exist outside of matter, just as matter does not exist outside of them.

Together with Marx and Engels, Lenin defines space and time as forms of being of matter, forms of its existence, independent of our consciousness. He's writing:

"While recognizing the existence of objective reality, that is, moving matter, regardless of our consciousness, materialism must inevitably recognize also the objective reality of time and space" <sup>[140]</sup>. Engels speaks about the same thing in the Anti-Dühring:

"The main forms of all being are space and time; and being out of time is just as nonsense as being out of space" <sup>[141]</sup>.

A look at time and space as a form of being is a consistent view of philosophical materialism. Understanding of time and space by dialectical materialism is fundamentally the opposite:

1) understanding of time and space by Kant and Kantianism, who, standing on the point of view of subjective idealism, consider "time and space not an objective reality, but *forms of human contemplation*" <sup>[142]</sup>;

2) understanding of time and space by Hegelians, who believe that "the developing concepts of time and space approach the absolute idea of both" <sup>[143]</sup> ;

3) it is also opposite to the understanding of time and space by Machism, which considers them to be a "kind of sensations", means of "harmonizing experience", etc., etc.

All these trends do not recognize that the concepts of space and time reflect in their development the forms of existence of matter.

Kantianism transforms space and time into properties of the perceiving subject. Machism interprets space and time as purely auxiliary logical constructions, with the help of which we obtain a biologically expedient orientation, order the chaos of our sensations and which can be eliminated in order to describe the experience more economically. Hegelian idealism asserts that space appears only at a certain stage in the *development of an idea in the phase of its other being, in the form of nature* . Time is included in the Hegelian system even later - at the stage of development of the spirit.

All these idealistic quirks are rejected and refuted by dialectical materialism.

Concerning the Machist interpretation of space and time, Lenin wrote:

"If the sensations of time and space can give a person a biologically expedient orientation, then it is only under the condition that these sensations reflect *objective reality* outside a person: a person could not biologically adapt to the environment if his sensations did not give him an objectively correct idea of it " <sup>[144]</sup> .

The denial of the objective reality of time and space inevitably leads to clericalism and religion.

But not only idealistic distortions have to fight Marxism in this matter. We have to overcome the outdated, *mechanistic understanding of the issue* , which was refuted in the process of the development of natural science . As the natural science concept of matter was perfected, the unacceptability of the *metaphysical* understanding of space as an absolutely homogeneous container of matter became clear . In particular, Newton considered space as independent of time, as a kind of fixed frame, only containing matter in itself.

In contrast to metaphysical materialism and mechanists, dialectical materialism emphasizes the development of our ideas about time and space.

"There is nothing in the world except moving matter, and moving matter can move only in space and time," Lenin says. - Human *ideas about space and time are relative* , but absolute truth is formed from these relative concepts, these relative ideas, developing, *follow the line of absolute truth* , approach it. *The variability of human ideas about space and time just as little disproves the objective reality of both, as the variability of scientific knowledge about the structure and forms of motion of matter does not refute the objective reality of the external world " <sup>[145]</sup> .*

Considering that our ideas about time and space should remain unchanged, as our mechanists believe, to slip into the question of time and space to Descartes's metaphysical concepts <sup>[146]</sup> or to the mechanistic ideas of the Faraday school physicists, as A. Timiryazev does: mix the ether as one of the forms of material movement with space, that is, the objectively real form of being, it means taking the position of metaphysical materialism - the position of denying movement and development.

Dialectical materialism also fights against Menshevik idealism, which considers "matter as a synthesis of space and time" <sup>[147]</sup> , which thus reduces the objective reality of matter to the forms of its being, essentially becoming the position of Hegelianism.

*The newest natural science has brilliantly confirmed the dialectical-materialist understanding of space and time.* The modern scientific concept of space associated with the name of Einstein immutably establishes its materiality, the unity of space and time, the relativity of our ideas about space and time. In this question, as in many others, the progress of natural science confirms dialectically materialistic concepts.

### **3.3. Matter and consciousness. Dialectically-materialist theory of reflection**

According to the views of dialectical materialism, consciousness, psyche, thinking is not some kind of independent, second principle, located in external interaction with matter or existing parallel to it. Consciousness is dependent on matter, is derivative with respect to it. Consciousness is inherent only in a certain way organized matter. Only those higher representatives of the organic world who are endowed with a nervous system of greater or lesser complexity possess consciousness. The nervous system is a prerequisite for conscious activity. *Consciousness is a property of certain organized physical beings.* A public person in all his materiality, in all his physical and social concreteness, is the carrier of the highest forms of consciousness that develop as a result of human labor and social activity of a person. Consciousness is one of the manifestations of the life of matter at a certain stage of its development.

According to materialistic doctrine in full accordance with the irrefutable data of modern science, there is not and cannot be a consciousness where there is no matter, and moreover, matter organized

in a special, definite way. Consciousness is nothing more than a *special property of a certain type of matter*, very complex in its structure, which arose at a high level of the evolution of nature.

The stone can be moved, its position can be changed, but the stone, like the entire inorganic world, as well as the plant world and the lower forms of animals, has no inherent ability to perceive the processes that occur to them; they are unconscious. Only a certain way organized matter - the substance of the higher nervous system of animals has the ability to perceive internally reflect *aware* occurring on and off processes, ie to express these to be an objective study of the processes occurring in the nervous system.. *Special* the way they flow for the sentient and thinking being. The objective physiological processes in our nerve centers are accompanied by their internal subjective expression in the form of consciousness. What is objective in itself, that there is some material process, then for a creature endowed with a brain, there is at the same time a subjective, mental act. *Consciousness itself also has a long history of development.* If the lower levels of animal consciousness (instincts) are associated with the development of the nervous system in higher animals, then the further development of consciousness is associated with the transition from animal to human, with the development of social labor, which creates the conditions for the development of the human brain.

*Vulgar materialism* believes that thought or desire is something material, secreted by the brain, just as bile is secreted by the liver. Such a view completely distorts our views on this issue. Thoughts, feelings, volitional act - is not something that can be measured, weighed, moved. Just as roundness is not inherent in gravity, but both are different properties of the same body, so stretching and consciousness are different properties of matter. The views of the materialists of antiquity, based on the fact that man is inherent in the soul, consisting of the finest matter, of round, smooth and moving fire-like atoms, refer to the infant period of science. We are very far from such an understanding of the psyche. Sensation and consciousness is the *internal state of moving matter*, there is *special property* to reflect the physiological process taking place in it, - inseparable from the objective nervous process, but not *identical* to it. But we are no less far from recognizing thinking as a special spiritual substance, as idealists want it to be.

There is no spirit, a special thinking substance, but there is a *thinking matter*, a brain. Conscious, thinking matter is a specific, *qualitatively peculiar* matter, receiving its highest development along with the development of language in human social life. We do not identify higher and lower types of material organization, do not deny the consciousness and specificity of thinking beings. But we explain them as forms and the historical product of the *development of matter*.. Emphasizing the dependence of consciousness on the development of material production and the connection of consciousness with the development of human speech, Marx and Engels wrote in their early work: consciousness "is not in advance, as a 'pure' consciousness. In the "spirit" in advance the curse of "burdening" with its matter, which acts here ... in the form of language ... Language, like consciousness, arises from the need to communicate with other people. *My attitude to my environment is my consciousness.* Where there is a relationship, it exists for me " <sup>[148]</sup> . Consciousness is a historical product, inextricably linked with the development of social production.

The dialectical-materialistic solution of the problem of consciousness (the so-called psychophysical problem) is fundamentally different from the pseudo-Marxist theories of mechanists and Menshevik idealists. *Mechanists*, connecting with some left-bourgeois trends in psychology — with the reflexological school and the American school of biohierism (the study of behavior), essentially *eliminate consciousness* altogether. . They reduce consciousness to a physico-chemical, physiological process. The study of the behavior of higher beings for them is fully and completely exhausted by its objective physiological and biological study. Mechanists do not understand the qualitative originality of thinking, conscious beings, they do not see in the mind the product of human social practice. They replace concrete-historical unity of object and subject with their identity, one-sided, mechanistic objectivism. This mechanistic position received a particularly vivid expression in the so-called "enmenism". Enchmen in his book "The Theory of New Biology" identified consciousness with the physiological process, thereby eliminating essentially the main question of philosophy - about the relation of thinking and being.

The position of Menshevik idealists on this issue is also incorrect. Deborin and others are trying to replace the Marxist doctrine of consciousness with conciliatory theory, trying to *reconcile* materialism with idealism. They are supporters of "synthesis", a combination of objectivism and subjectivism. To the dialectical principle (neither mechanistic objectivism, nor idealistic subjectivism), Menshevik idealism opposes the *block* of objectivism with subjectivism, mutual assistance of both methods — one that studies only the physiological process, and the other that studies consciousness as a kind of independent entity.

Plekhanov's errors in the problem under consideration should be noted. Not seeing that the consciousness inherent in matter develops only at a certain historical level, Plekhanov arrives at "hylozoism", the doctrine of the universal animation of matter, that *all* matter has consciousness to varying degrees. With all the sharpness, this is expressed in his aphorism: "And the stone thinks." For Plekhanov, consciousness did not *arise* in the development of matter, but was originally inherent in *all* matter. The difference between the consciousness of man, the lower organism and the stone is *only to the extent*. In this understanding of Plekhanov, the insufficiently deep assimilation and realization of the materialist dialectics, the lack of understanding of the qualitative originality of the thinking matter affects it.

In order to be a consistent materialist, it is not enough to recognize the *primacy of matter*, it is necessary to recognize its *knowability*. Materialistic dialectics makes it possible to correctly solve the complex problem of knowability, over which the preceding philosophy was powerless. On the question of the possibility of knowing the objective world, dialectical materialism takes a position that is different from both agnosticism and the naive realism of the Machists. Above, we became acquainted with the agnostic views of Hume and Kant, who sever the knowing subject from the object, consider it impossible to go beyond the limits of the subject, see an impassable gulf between "things in themselves" and ideas. The naive "realism" of the Machists, as we know, identifies objects with sensations. He is convinced that the world is identical with our direct perceptions. The truth, in his opinion, is given in finished form already in sensations. At the same time, the Machists not only do not see in our sensations the products of the impact of the external world,

In the question of the knowability of the external world, dialectical materialism is based on a consistently carried out materialist-dialectical *theory of reflection*. Consistently carried out by Marx and Engels and received the further development and development of Lenin, the theory of reflection is the "soul", the heart of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. It gives an affirmative answer to the question of the knowability of objective reality. According to this teaching, our ideas and concepts are not only *caused by* objective things, but also *reflect* them. Representations and concepts are not the product of the subject's self-development (as idealists say), not hieroglyphs (as agnostics think), but *their reflection, pictures, copies*. Objective truth exists independently of the subject, although it is not reflected in our perceptions and concepts immediately, in finished form. But the human consciousness is able to reflect, to know this truth in the process of *knowledge*. The process of knowledge is a complex process in which the still unknown "things in themselves", reflected in our sensations, ideas, concepts, thereby become "things for us". Sensation and thinking do not block us from the outside world, as Kant believed, but connect us with it, representing a reflection of the objective external world. The ideal — our ideas and concepts — is nothing more than "material translated and processed in the human head" <sup>[149]</sup>. The material world in the movement of knowledge is getting closer, more precisely, multifaceted and more deeply reflected in our knowledge.

*There are no limits to our ability to know the world, but each time there are historically given limits to our approach to absolute truth.* The attainment of truth is accomplished in the historical movement of human knowledge. "From the standpoint of modern materialism, ie. E. Marxism, historically conditional *limits* of approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth, but *of course* the existence of the truth, of course that we are approaching it. The contours of the picture are historically conditional, but it is certain that this picture depicts an objectively existing model" <sup>[150]</sup>.

The theory of reflection, which received great development in the works of Lenin, is not however a new principle in the philosophy of Marxism, introduced or established by Lenin. *Marx and Engels were entirely at the point of view of the dialectical materialist theory of reflection.*

It is expressed in the following: Lenin regards *knowledge as a reflection*, but he understands this reflection *as a contradictory dialectical process*. "The reflection of nature in human thought," he wrote, "must be understood not "dead", not "abstract", *not without movement, not without contradictions*, but in the eternal process of movement, the appearance of contradictions and their resolution" <sup>[151]</sup>.

Lenin pointed out that the process of reflection must be understood not in the narrowly empirical sense of the word, in the sense of direct reflection in our sensations, as many tried to interpret Lenin, as representatives of mechanism and Menshevik idealism wrote about it. The process of reflection is not limited to sensations, ideas. The reflection of the objective world in our cognitive process is also given in thoughts, in abstract concepts. On this occasion, Lenin says: "Knowledge is a reflection of nature by man. But this is not a simple, *not an immediate*, not a complete reflection, but a process of a number of abstractions, formulation, formation of concepts, laws, etc." <sup>[152]</sup>.

At the same time, Lenin pointed out - and in this paragraph they give an extremely clear description of the dialectical materialist understanding of the relationship between the empirical and

rational moment in cognition - that the process of cognition and its movement from sensation to thought are performed in steps. Many philosophers do not understand the leap that occurs in the movement of knowledge from sensation to thought, from notion to notion. Understanding this transition as an abrupt transition, as a transition as a result of contradictions, understanding the *unity of sensations and thinking* as a dialectical unity - these are extremely important moments characterizing the essence of the Leninist theory of reflection.

In fact, what is the limitation of sensationalistic empiricism? In that they dug a *gulf between sensation and concept*. What are the limitations of the rationalistic trends in philosophy, down to Hegel? The fact that they have the concept of divorced from the sensation. Only dialectical materialism, which treats knowledge as a process, gives a genuine solution to these problems. Lenin's interpretation of this question gives us a powerful weapon for the defeat of all idealistic theories.

The naive realist *does not fit historically* to cognition; he does not understand how a cognitive act is performed, what are the relationships between a subject, a concept, and a concept. Lenin, developing the Marxist theory of knowledge, revealed the dialectical transition not only from matter to consciousness, but also from *sensation to thought*. Sensation, perception, representation give a *direct* reflection of the sensed object. Concept, idea, thought is not immediate: they are connected with the object *through the medium of sensation*. Making the transition from a visual representation to a concept, consciousness seems to recede, move *away* from the subject. The feeling, the idea seems to be closer to reality than thinking. But thinking seizes the subject *in overall*, in his movement and communication. It penetrates *deeper* into the object, reflects its essence. Thus, not being direct, it is nonetheless more perfect, it reflects the subject more deeply. Thinking takes us further away from the subject, but only to bring us closer to it. *Such is the dialectical unity of sensation and thinking in the process of cognition.*

The next moment, which is extremely important for understanding the theory of reflection and its development, which Lenin gave, is the understanding of reflection itself. Reflection is an image, a copy, a snapshot that gives a correct display of reality. However, this correct reflection of reality is obtained *in the process of development, in the process of social practice*. At the same time, Lenin, emphasizing this circumstance, directed this point and sharpened it against agnosticism, in whatever form it might appear. Lenin says: if we had more sense organs, could we know more? And indicates that no. Responding in this way, Lenin believed that we had sufficient means at our disposal to correctly understand the objective world, that all agnostic theories that give rise to doubt and skepticism with respect to our knowledge should be categorically rejected and exposed. However, knowledge does not give us a complete, absolute picture, the progress of knowledge goes through relative truths to absolute ones.

Finally, one more important point characterizing the Leninist theory of reflection is needed to pay attention to the question of how Lenin understands *sensation* itself. It was around this point that a big struggle was unfolding against Lenin even when his work "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" was published, from Axelrod-Orthodox. Both the mechanists and the Menshevik idealists also distorted the essence of the Marxist-Leninist approach to the question of sensation.

Sensation, according to Lenin, is primarily the result of the influence of matter on our senses. *Sensation is the transformation of the energy of external stimulation into a fact of consciousness, a subjective image of the objective world.* In this connection, an extremely important question arises, how does the feeling as an image, the feeling as a snapshot, the mapping to what is displayed relate? In what sense can we talk about the similarity of the display with the displayed copy of the original? In order to understand this point, let us analyze Lenin's extremely interesting statements on the question of the relationship between color and light.

Color is the result of a physical object, i.e., a light wave, on our retina. Color, however, is not a hieroglyph, a symbol in relation to light - an objective process affecting our retina. Color is not something purely subjective, as some of the mechanists, in particular, Sarabyanov, Axelrod, and others, tried to present. The subjective form, in the form of sensation, reflects the objective quality of the light wave. Color is similar to the light effect causing it, as an objective process, but *relative*.

Lenin wrote on this issue in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, criticizing mechanists and Bogdanovists: one-sided "idealism and go to the point of view of" one-sided "materialism. If color is a *sensation only depending on the retina* (as natural science makes you admit), then the *rays of light* falling on the retina produce a *sense of color*. It means that outside of us, regardless of us and our consciousness, there is a movement of matter, say, a wave of ether of a certain length and a certain speed, which, acting on the retina, produce in a person a feeling of a particular color. So it is natural science and looks. It explains the different sensations of a particular color by different lengths of light waves that exist *outside the human retina*, outside of a person and independently of him. This

is materialism: matter, acting on our senses, produces a sensation. Sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc., i.e., from a certain organized matter. The existence of matter does not depend on sensation. Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, consciousness is the highest product of a specially organized matter " <sup>[153]</sup> .

In another place, Lenin says: "Color is the result of the impact of a physical object on the retina = sensation is the result of the action of matter on our senses" <sup>[154]</sup> .

Thus, we see that Lenin *does not identify* the sensation of color and the ray of light causing this sensation. But without identifying color and light (and this can be said with respect to our other senses and other types of our sensations), Lenin at the same time gives a truly materialistic, excluding all elements of agnosticism, interpretation of this question.

*The slightest deviation from the theory of reflection inevitably leads to idealism and agnosticism.* In so far as the philosopher departs from the theory of reflection, he becomes a Kantian, Machist, Hegelian, and ceases to be a dialectical materialist. Plekhanov, and after him both mechanists and Menshevik idealists, also made a number of essential deviations from the theory of reflection towards the anti-Marxist theory of hieroglyphs.

In this most important question of the materialist dialectic, Plekhanov admitted "a departure from the wording of materialism given by Engels," taking the *hieroglyphic point of view* in matters of the theory of knowledge. The hieroglyphic point of view was formulated by Plekhanov in 1892 in the notes to "L. Engels Feuerbach. Agreeing with the thought of the Russian physiologist I. Sechenov, "whatever the external objects are in themselves, regardless of our consciousness, let our impressions of them be merely conventional signs, in any case, we feel the similarity and difference of signs corresponding to the similarity and difference valid " <sup>[155]</sup> . Plekhanov wrote: "Our feelings are a kind of hieroglyphs, bringing to our attention what is really happening. Hieroglyphs are not similar to the events that they transmit " <sup>[156]</sup> . Later, namely at the beginning of 1899, Plekhanov, developing his view, argued that "it would be very strange if the feeling and the presentation that grew on its soil *resembled* the thing that caused it and which itself is not, of course, *neither sensation nor representation* " <sup>[157]</sup> . "The forms and attitudes of things in themselves," wrote Plekhanov, "cannot be as they *seem to us* , that is, as they are to us, being" translated "in our head. Our ideas about the forms and relations of things are no more than *hieroglyphs.*, but these hieroglyphs precisely designate these forms and relations, and this is enough so that we can study the actions of things in us in ourselves and in turn influence them " <sup>[158]</sup> . In 1905, Plekhanov, essentially continuing to share Sechenov's views, on the question of the relation of consciousness to reality, spoke out against his terminology, arguing that "if a thing in itself has color only when it is looked at, smell" only when they smell it, and so on, then, by calling our idea of it with conventional signs, we give reason to think that, in our opinion, its color, smell, etc., existing in our sensations, correspond to the color in itself, some smell in itself, etc., - in a word, some *feelings in yourself* which can not be the subject of our sensations. " Rejecting the term "hieroglyph", Plekhanov *essentially continued, and afterwards, that our sensations and ideas were not similar to the objects by which they were caused.* . Menshevik idealists took Plekhanov's mistakes under their protection, which testifies to the closeness of the connection between their views and Plekhanov's views in the theory of knowledge. And modern mechanists also took the theory of hieroglyphs of Plekhanov under their protection, opposing it to the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the questions of the theory of knowledge. As far back as 1909, L. I. Axelrod, in his review of Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, categorically denied the theory of reflection. "Rejecting the theory of symbols and considering sensation as images or" inaccurate "copies of things," she slandered Lenin in this review, "Plekhanov's critic turns to dualistic ground, preaching Platonism inside out, and not a materialistic philosophy emanating from a single beginning. If sensations were *images or copies of things* then what the devil, one wonders, would we need things that in this case would really turn out to be things in themselves in the absolute sense of the word. To recognize sensations as images or copies of objects means to create an impassable dualistic gulf between the object and the subject " <sup>[159]</sup> . Axelrod cannot understand that the dualistic abyss is created not by the theory of reflection, but just by the theory of hieroglyphs, for this theory recognizes the existence of things in themselves and symbols unlike them, in the representation of man. Vividly spoke out in defense of the theory of symbols against the theory of reflection of the Sarabyans. "The process of learning," he writes, "is not the process of taking a copy from an object, but is a process of finding a *correspondence* between objective and subjective phenomena" <sup>[160]</sup> . Sarabyanov repeatedly stated directly: "In my books I clearly develop the Plekhanov point of view ... I resolutely stood up and stand on the point of view of Plekhanov."

In "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism," Lenin pointed out that in matters of the theory of knowledge, Plekhanov "made a clear mistake in presenting materialism."

What, according to Lenin, is Plekhanov's mistake, and why is the theory of hieroglyphs untenable? Plekhanov's mistake is *that he is slipping into an agnostic attitude*. That is, distrust of the indication of our senses, and therefore distrust of the knowledge of the objective world. In fact, if our sensations and ideas are not like objects displayed by them, but are hieroglyphs, symbols, then we cannot be sure that our knowledge really corresponds to the objective world to which they belong. We can not be sure of the truth of the information that gives us scientific knowledge about the objective world. In short, the hieroglyphic theory of knowledge leads to a denial of the existence of the external world, since signs or symbols are possible with respect to imaginary objects. In this sense, the theory of hieroglyphs is close to Hume's skepticism and Kant's agnosticism. This is the inconsistency of the theory of hieroglyphs or the theory of symbols.

Lenin in connection with the analysis of the error Plekhanov gave an exhaustive criticism of the theory of symbols. "It is indisputable that never," he wrote, "cannot fully align with the model, but an image is one thing, a symbol is another thing, a *conventional sign*. The image is necessary and inevitably implies an objective reality of what is "displayed." "Conventional sign", symbol, hieroglyph are concepts that introduce a completely unnecessary element of agnosticism " [161]. The theory of symbols, which Lenin opposed, was, before Plekhanov, proclaimed in one of the works of the famous natural scientist Helmholtz. Helmholtz, from the limitations of our vision, deduced evidence that the eye gives us false information about the properties of the objects we see. Lenin therefore acknowledged the correct statement of A. Rau (German philosopher, a follower of L. Feuerbach) that the theory of the symbols of Helmholtz pays tribute to Kantianism. It is remarkable that Lenin's criticism of the Helmholtz theory of symbols literally coincided with its criticism given for the first time by Engels in *The Dialectic of Nature*, published only in 1925.

### **3.4. Objective, absolute, relative truth**

Lenin, developing the materialist dialectic as a theory of knowledge, figuring out the essence of reflection as a process, gave a brilliant description of the relationship between *relative, objective and absolute truth*. Refuting relativism (Bogdanov and others), according to the views of which the relativity of our knowledge makes objective absolute knowledge impossible, Lenin revealed the dialectical interpenetration of absolute and relative truth. Lenin found out that relative knowledge is not the metaphysical opposite of the knowledge of the absolute, but a *step* on the way to absolute knowledge, that it does not exclude absolute knowledge, but in its movement it increasingly comes to absolute knowledge. Hence the *objectivity of our knowledge*.

But what proves the objectivity of our knowledge, where is the guarantee of the correct reflection of the existence of thinking? "The question is," answers Marx, "whether objective truth is inherent in human thinking is not at all a question of theory, but a practical question. In practice, a person must prove the truth, that is, reality and power, the true side of his thinking. The debate about the reality and the invalidity of thinking, isolated from practice, is a purely scholastic question " [162].

The question of the possibilities and limits of knowledge can be resolved only in the *process of knowledge itself*, which is determined by social practice. Just as the best and only possible evidence that a person is able to swim will be the very result — the practice of swimming will clarify the question of the strengths and possibilities of the floating person — the same way the question must be solved with respect to knowledge. The application of knowledge, history and practice of science prove its possibility and determine its historical boundaries. Science with its practical achievements solves the question of the reliability of scientific knowledge.

*The history of mankind, the history of science and technology are the best proof of the knowability of the external world.*

The theory of reflection, as we know, is the most important basis of the materialist and at the same time dialectical *theory of knowledge*. The recognition of the primacy of matter and the secondary nature of consciousness is inextricably combined in it with an understanding of the contradictory, dialectical character of reflection. Cognition is seen as a historical process. From here opens a wide prospect of studying knowledge in its dependence on social development.

Under objective truth, materialistic dialectics understands the objective *content of our ideas*, which does not depend on consciousness — neither on man, nor on humanity. The objective truth reveals to us the historically developing knowledge of the social man. Truth is not something frozen, but a *process*. "Truth," says Lenin, "is a process. From a subjective idea, a person goes to objective truth through "practice" (and technique) " [163].

The doctrine of objective truth is of great scientific and practical importance. This teaching is the best weapon in the fight against all kinds of idealistic and relativistic theories. For if there is no objective, that is, independent of the subject, from man or from humanity, truth, then there can be no assurance that regardless of people's awareness, there is an objective reality, which is the only

content of our knowledge. If our knowledge does not have such content that does not depend on people, then one cannot be sure that the practical activities aimed at changing the surrounding world, guided by theoretical predictions, correspond to the objective pattern that is reflected in these theoretical predictions. The knowledge of objective truth, the recognition that scientific knowledge, reflecting the real world,

Consequently, the denial of objective truth leads to the denial or there is a denial of existence regardless of the knowledge of material reality, and, conversely, the recognition of objective truth is equivalent to the recognition of objective reality that exists outside and without consciousness.

At one time, Bogdanov spoke against the Marxist doctrine of truth. As an advocate of subjective idealism, reject, as we know, materialist proposition of consciousness independent of the existence of the real world, Bogdanov wrote: "For me, Marxism contains a denial of the unconditional objectivity of whatever truth ... the truth is *an ideological form, an organizing form of human experience*". According to Bogdanov, truth is an ideological form of organization of experience. If so, then truth depends on people's consciousness, that is, there is no objective truth. Essentially, Bogdanov admits inconsistency when he uses the term "objective" truth; from his point of view, one can only speak of subjective truth, at least not a single person, but the whole of humanity would be taken as a subject. The concept of "objective", according to Bogdanov, means not independent of consciousness, but *universally significant*, that is, having the same meaning for many people, for all of humanity.

According to Bogdanov, the objective truth will be such a representation, which is established "on the basis of mutual verification and coordination of the statements of various people." It is not difficult to see the absolute inconsistency of the Bogdanov idealistic point of view. Bogdanov gives such a definition of objectivity, which includes religion and various prejudices as truth, although they are a delusion, of a more general character, more common among people than, let us say, for example, scientific discoveries expressing objective truth. and remaining unknown to most people. Rejecting the existence of objective truth, Bogdanov opens the door to clericalism, "clears the place for" organizing forms "of religious experience."

Bogdanov's denial of objective truth is in close and consistent connection with his *subjective idealism*. A point of view, similar to Bogdanov's view of truth, was developed by relativists and agnostics of various stripes, ranging from Hume and Kant to empirio-critics — Mach and Avenarius. For all of them, rejecting directly or doubting the existence of objective reality given to man, in his sensations, is characterized by denial of objective truth.

At present, the teaching of materialist dialectics on objective truth is being audited by individual representatives of *mechanism*. T. Sarabyanov, for example, promoted the point of view according to which "no objective truth exists at all, every truth is subjective". "Why," asks Sarabyanov, "I call all truth subjective?" Because the truth is not objective being, that truth is our *understanding* of the world, things, processes " <sup>[164]</sup>. Sarabyanov, like a subjective idealist, considers the ideas of people only to be subjective, that is, not having an objective content in them. Where does the content of our ideas come from, then? It is not at all necessary to understand or consciously revise the position of dialectical materialism in order to search for the content of our ideas not in the world around us, but in the consciousness itself. For anyone who is not confused by the reactionary ideas of solipsism, it is clear that the content of our ideas is nature and history. The content of our ideas, our knowledge, independent of man and of humanity, is objective truth. Our knowledge belongs to us, to people, but what is contained in this knowledge of ours is not ours, but is *independent* of us. This is not what Comrade Sarabyanov can or will not understand.

If the content of knowledge belongs to the subject, depends on it, as Comrade Sarabyanov thinks, then the assertion of the science of the existence of the earth before humanity cannot be considered objective truth, the teaching of Marxism-Leninism about the historically inevitable revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into a communist society and so on cannot be considered objective truth. In a word, none of the scientific propositions can be considered true, besides those that are proclaimed Sarabyanov.

So, according to the materialistic dialectic, the idea, knowledge of people expresses *objective* truth. Now, one wonders, can our knowledge, expressing objective truth, give it all at once, absolutely, absolutely, or does it express it approximately, not immediately? This question is a question about the relationship between absolute and relative truth. We note first of all that the materialist dialectic does not reject absolute truth. On the contrary, recognizing the objective truth, it thereby somehow recognizes absolute truth. "To be a materialist," says Lenin, "is to recognize the objective truth revealed to us by the senses. To recognize the *objective*, that is, *not dependent on man and on humanity, truth*, means in one way or another to recognize *absolute* truth " <sup>[165]</sup>. In fact,



when we say that the content of our knowledge is the objective world, this means the recognition that our knowledge belongs to the eternal, absolute nature, that the content of our ideas is an eternal, absolute world. "All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, infinite, and therefore it is essentially absolutely" <sup>[166]</sup> . In this sense, Lenin writes that "one can deny the relative element in certain human notions, not denying objective truth, but one cannot deny *absolutetruth*, without denying the existence of *objective truth*" <sup>[167]</sup> . However, the objective, absolute truth is given to our knowledge not immediately, not entirely, but in the endless process of the development of knowledge itself, given through the medium of relative truths, the totality of which expresses absolute truth.

"Knowledge," says Lenin, "is a reflection of nature by man. But this is not a simple, not immediate, not a complete reflection, but a process of a number of abstractions, formulation, formation of concepts, laws, etc., which concepts, laws, etc. ... conditionally *cover* , approximately, the universal pattern of the ever-moving and developing nature. . There *really* , objectively, *three* members:

- 1) nature
- 2) human knowledge = human *brain* (as the highest product of the same nature),
- 3) the form of reflection of nature in the knowledge of man, this form is the concepts, laws, categories, etc.

A person cannot embrace = reflect = reflect the nature of the *whole* , completely, of her "immediate wholeness", he can only come close to this *forever* , creating abstractions, concepts, laws, scientific picture of the world, etc., etc. " <sup>[168]</sup> .

According to the materialist dialectic, "human thinking is by its nature capable of giving and giving us *absolute truth* , which is made up of a *sum of relative truths* . Each step in the development of science adds new grains to this sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific position are relative, being either moved apart or narrowed by further growth of knowledge " <sup>[169]</sup> . Absolute truth finds expression in *relative truths*, except by means of relative truths, the absolute cannot be known. And in every scientific truth to which humanity comes, despite its relative nature, the grains of absolute truth are enclosed. The materialistic dialectic does not deny the relativity of all our knowledge, but only in the sense of the *historical conventionality of the limits of our knowledge's approach to objective, absolute truth* . "We can learn only under the conditions given by our era and as *far as these conditions allow* " <sup>[170]</sup> .

Historically conditional, limited, with respect to any scientific discovery, but it is certain that scientific knowledge, in contrast to delusions, reveals, reflects *objective truth*, absolute nature.

This dialectical understanding of the relation between absolute and relative truth is fundamentally different from the views of supporters of metaphysical materialism and the views of supporters of relativism. Representatives of metaphysical materialism *recognize absolute truth*.. They proceed, as is well known, from the position that the existing world is in an unchanging state, that it is an unchangeable material substance. Further asserting the immutability of human thinking, metaphysical materialists believe that in the minds of people this unchanging objective world is displayed immediately, in its entirety. For example, Dühring recognized "eternal truths in the final instance." The main defect of the metaphysical materialists is, as can be seen from what has been said, not that they recognize absolute truth, dialectical materialism agrees with them, but that they take the objective world and the knowledge of people outside their historical development. Therefore, metaphysical materialists see the truth as something immobile, dead, not developing, according to their view, the truth is only absolute. *the development of human cognition* , and each step forward of knowledge, expressing the absolute content, has a relative value, i.e. it does not exhaust this content to the end.

Proponents of relativism are limited to recognizing the relative importance of knowledge. Relativists reject the absolute truth. From their point of view, no scientific discoveries contain absolute, and therefore objective truth. From such a point of view, one can sophistically justify any delusion and nonsense. Such an extreme view of relativists on the truth arises from denial, regardless of the people of the existing world.

On the point of view of *relativism* in the question of truth at the present time, some representatives of the modern mechanistic world outlook and Menshevism idealism have rolled. Tov. Sarabyanov, in almost all his works, explicitly stated that knowledge is only relative. The very relativity of knowledge, comrade Sarabyanov, turns into an absolute. In fact, the Menshevist idealists express the same view. One of the students of Deborin wrote that "knowledge is always relative, it always just comes close to an object" <sup>[171]</sup> . Notice: " *It always only approaches the object* ." There is nothing to say, the "Marxist" theory is good, according to which our knowledge always only approaches the object. If our knowledge only approaches the object and never *reaches it* then it is impossible to be sure of the existence of people of the objective world outside the ideas ...

According to Deborin himself, "any given truth is not absolute, but relative truth ... we *never possess the absolute truth itself* . We are only getting closer to it in our knowledge and in our activity " <sup>[172]</sup> . We are only approaching absolute truth and never grasping it. This position of Deborin directly contradicts Lenin's view, which we considered above.

But if the Menshevik idealists do not draw their own conclusions from their philosophy, then, on the contrary, Sarabyanov spoke in a full voice. "Can a materialist assert," he wrote, "that there are ideas that do not correspond to the objective state of affairs?" Of course not. Consciousness is *always* determined by being. Exceptions you will not find. God's representation corresponds to objective processes " <sup>[173]</sup> . From the fact that religious beliefs are rooted in the social conditions of class society, Sarabyanov makes the wrong conclusion about the truth of those. The apparent confusion of two different things: objective truth and class interest of exploiters, which, although objectively exists, does not contain objective truth. Thus, the theory of a relativistic understanding of truth justifies all sorts of illusions and delusions; it opens wide the doors of the Black-Hundred clericalism and mysticism.

So, neither metaphysical materialism, nor idealistic relativism can correctly solve the question of the relationship between absolute and relative truth. Only materialistic dialectics, giving the deepest solution to the question of the relation of thinking to being and the most comprehensive substantiation of the objective nature of scientific knowledge, also gives a correct understanding of the relationship between absolute and relative truths.

### **3.5. Social practice as a criterion of knowledge. Party philosophy**

The link between practice and the process of knowledge is by no means limited to the fact that practice verifies the truth of knowledge. This relationship is deep and multilateral. Cognition, *theories arise from practice* . A public person not only perceives the objective world, not only is exposed to its influence, but also acts in relation to the external world as an object of its activity, *changes* and transforms it. In the practical *activities* our sensations are accumulated and formed; in the same activity, the ideas and theories that have arisen from them must prove their truth, and here the forces that correct and improve them are laid. Knowledge grows from practice, is accomplished in unity with it, and serves practice, organizing and perfecting it. In practical activities, the unity of the object and the subject, nature and man, is realized: by acting on nature and transforming it, man changes his own nature.

Why does practice give evidence in reality of our knowledge and why there is no criterion of the truth of this knowledge outside practice? The fact is that the consciousness of people is only one of the sides of *social* life, which has no meaning outside of it. The activity of people's consciousness would cease immediately, as soon as the production of the material means necessary for human existence ceased. At the heart of all aspects of social life is the material production, in the words of Marx, *sensual-practical, objective activity of people* .

The knowledge of people will therefore be valid only when, in the process of social practice, first of all in the process of material production, they achieve the result intended in thinking. If human knowledge did not reflect the processes in the external world in the form in which they exist, then in their practical activity people would not be able to achieve the results of this activity that were supposed to be in consciousness. And practical activity, beyond which even the existence of human society is impossible, will force people to change their perception of the world around them if it is false. That is why the *indicator of truth* is in the practice of a public person, in his objective activity. our ideas about the outside world. In the process of development of social, material production , ideas and concepts *that correctly* reflect the objective world arise, develop , etc. Society practically influences nature, changes its forms in it, and thereby changes itself and its concept of the external world. As a result, the objective activity of people creates material objects that are integral parts of material reality. According to Lenin, " *practice is above* (theoretical) *knowledge* , for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also immediate reality" <sup>[174]</sup> . The theoretical knowledge of people about the outside world and the processes occurring in it, reveals the laws and trends of historical development; but only social practice gives the theory a final confirmation, covers the subject in its historical concreteness.

"Theoretical knowledge," says Lenin, "must give the object in its necessity, in its all-round relations, in its contradictory movement in and for itself. But the human concept of this objective truth of knowledge "finally" grasps, captures, masters it only when the concept becomes "being for itself" in the sense of practice. That is, the practice of man and mankind is a test, a criterion of the objectivity of knowledge " <sup>[175]</sup> . We must not forget that the objective material production activity of people is the main one, which determines all others, a kind of *practical* activities. But social activity is not yet exhausted by this type of activity, it is much more comprehensive. A public person participates in the

class struggle, lives a political life, creates science, in a word, participates in all areas of the practical life of society. Therefore, the criterion of the truth of our knowledge is the *totality of social practice*. "All human practice must enter into a complete" definition "of an object, both as a *criterion of truth and as a practical determinant of the connection of an object with that which a person needs* " <sup>[176]</sup>.

In his works, Lenin repeatedly notes the need to see this dialectical relationship between theory and practice. Thus, for example, in the notes on Bukharin's book "The Economy of the Transition Period" regarding Bukharin's statement: "since the collapse of capitalist production relations was really given and once theoretically proved impossible to restore them," Lenin notes: "The *impossibility is provable only practically*. The author does not set a *dialectical* relation of theory to practice " <sup>[177]</sup> .

But the knowledge of people, being one of the parties, one of the moments of social life, if it is correct, is crucial for the practical activity of people. Proper knowledge illuminates the path of practical activity of people. "The theory, if it is really a theory, gives practitioners the power of orientation, clarity of perspective, confidence in work, faith in the victory of our cause" <sup>[178]</sup> . But in order for theoretical knowledge to be correct, it must be based on practice, must be inextricably linked with it.

The practice of a social person does not remain unchanged, and each step of its *development* requires new and new comprehension of its own, awareness. That is why the science that currently does not meet the demands of the practice of socialist construction ceases to play a positive role for it and turns into a theoretical weapon of class forces hostile to the proletariat.

Material reality is perceived not by an individual isolated from society, but by a social person dependent on him as well. Human nature has a social character. The life of each individual person is entirely determined by the life of society, the contradictions of the class struggle taking place in him; it is connected with the life of a social *class* . An individual is a social being, therefore any manifestation of his life, starting from practical activities and ending with theoretical knowledge of the world around him, is a special manifestation and expression in the final account of social life. "Even when I am engaged in *scientific* , etc. Activities, an activity that I can perform myself, without direct communication with others, I still *act in a social way* , for acting like a *man* . I have not only been given, as a social product, material for my activity, but in the same way the language with which the activity of the thinker takes place, but also my *own* being *is* social activity; therefore, what I make of myself, I make of myself for society, conscious of myself as a social being " <sup>[179]</sup> .

The ability to not only feel, but also to think is a property of highly organized matter. This property has only the brain of a social person. The activity of the senses and the activity of thinking a person develops only in society. The feelings and thoughts of a person are therefore not forever given, permanent properties. Being a product of social life, they undergo changes depending on the development of society itself. And society is a part of nature, changing which it changes itself. The basis of multilateral life, including the basis of knowledge, is the practical activity of people, the production of material resources necessary for the existence of people. All the knowledge about the world around which the human society has reached, it has reached thanks to the entire previous history of the development of the material *production* , as a result of driving this development within the class society of the class struggle.

Metaphysical point of view on questions of knowledge developed by Feuerbach. According to his view, the essence of man lies in his body, the body, able to feel and think. Feuerbach was alien to the idea that a man with his senses and thinking is a product of the historical development of society. He took a person out of touch with society and therefore never got to the real-life active people, and remained under the abstraction of man. Due to the fact that Feuerbach excluded his social nature from man, he did not understand the dependence of knowledge on social practice. Cognition, according to Feuerbach, was a constant reflection of an equally unchanging, once and for all given nature. However, the consideration of the question of knowing outside the practice of people and outside its historical development was the main drawback of not only Feuerbach's materialism

So, according to the materialist dialectic, knowledge of a person must be taken in his dependence on the development of social material production and the class struggle that drives it, depending on social practice. That is why "the point of view of life, practice should be the *first and main point of view of the theory of knowledge* " <sup>[180]</sup> .

Human knowledge of material reality begins with sensory *sensations* caused by the effects of objects of the world on the senses, begins with the testimony of our senses. However, sensory cognition gives us only a random, empirical knowledge of the nearest sensory environment and limited external connections. It still does not reflect the objective world in its many-sided relationships, internal relations and in its wholeness. The real task of knowledge is the awareness of the laws of reality. This awareness is achieved on the basis of the *generalization* of those sensations that we

receive in the process of interaction with this reality. The result of generalization and processing in the mind of the material of direct contemplation are the *concepts*. This is the moment of logical knowledge. Of course, the sensual and logical sides of knowledge are not separated from each other. They always appear together, starting with the primary sensations. Moreover, thinking *arises* from representations, without which it does not exist and cannot develop. The content of our knowledge is the objective world. Our sensations connect us directly with this objective world. Therefore, it is only on the basis of sensory representations that logical knowledge of the object is possible, that is, thinking.

However, one cannot identify with each other *sensual* and *mental* moments of knowledge. Sensual cognition does not go beyond the display of single things and external relations between them, while cognition, mediated by thinking, seizes the internal connections of objects, reflecting them in their objective unity.

"A submission," notes Lenin, "cannot grasp movements *as a whole*, for example, does not grasp movements with a speed of 300 thousand kilometers in 1 second, and *thinking* seizes and should grasp" <sup>[181]</sup>. In his notes "Abstract", "The Sciences of Logic" by Hegel, Lenin, revealing the dependence of thinking on the sensory moment in knowledge, pays special attention to the difference between direct contemplation and thinking.

"Thinking, going from the concrete to the abstract," he says, "does not depart - if it is *right ... from the truth*, but approaches it. The abstraction of *matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value*, etc., - in a word, *all scientific (correct, serious, non-healthy) abstractions* reflect nature more deeply, rather, *more fully*. From living contemplation to abstract thinking *and from it to practice* - this is the dialectical way of knowing the *truth*, knowing the objective reality" <sup>[182]</sup>. Thus, the sensual and mental moments are the different moments of a single process of cognition, reflecting objective reality in our thinking. This is the dialectical understanding of the relationship between the empirical and rational moments of the cognitive process.

The Marxist theory, which emphasizes the *crucial importance of practice* for theoretical knowledge, is the direct opposite of pragmatism, the modern idealist course of bourgeois philosophy, which is especially popular in the United States. Pragmatism, founded by William James, is based on the subjective idealistic concept of truth. For him, it is true not what reflects objective reality such as it is, but what is useful, expedient for our practical activity. Truly what is practically useful. Utility is a measure of truth. From here pragmatism comes to the relativistic theory of the *multiplicity of truths*. Different views can be equally true, since they best serve the interests of a certain epoch, people, social group, individual. This philosophy justifies any lie, obscurantism, since they are useful for the practice of the ruling classes. In the end, pragmatism leads to open clergy. "If it turns out," says James, "that religious ideas have a value for life, then from the point of view of pragmatism they will be true, as they are suitable for this purpose."

The position of Marxism is diametrically opposed to pragmatism. Based on objective truth and rejecting relativism, Marxism considers not that true that is useful, but useful that which is *true*. In material revolutionary-critical practice, objective knowledge of the world is born and tempered, contributing to its further transformation.

Marxist theory is unthinkable in isolation from revolutionary practice. At the same time, Marxism is deeply alien to the neglect of theory, vulgar practicality, and "headless division." A revolutionary theory growing in the thick of practice serves as a guide to practice. " *Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement* " <sup>[183]</sup>. Only the revolutionary practice illuminated by Marxist-Leninist theory gains confidence, foresight, accuracy and depth of forecast, and flexibility to maneuver. The communist strategy and tactics cannot rely on the empiricism of crusade, they are guided by the most perfect of theories - dialectical materialism. It is only thanks to the leading role of the theory that "the unification of the Russian revolutionary scope with the American businesslike" is achieved, in which the "style of Leninism in party and state work" (*Stalin*) is achieved.

The greatest victory achieved by Marx and Engels is the spread of materialistic knowledge to *human society*. Even the most consistent materialists before Marx did not extend their materialism to the knowledge of the processes of social development, confining themselves to philosophical and natural-scientific materialism. This was not a historical accident, but was determined by the class essence of the old materialism. Discovering the truth of social life, discovering deep-seated contradictions and driving forces — this was not on the shoulder of the ideologists of the exploiting class, however revolutionary it may be. This task — to transform the history of human society into a science, into a subject of materialistic knowledge — could only be accomplished by the creators of the philosophy of the proletariat.

The sensationalism of the French materialists led close to the materialistic understanding of society, to the understanding that the social environment, the social being of people determines their thinking, desires, interests. But the French materialists were slipping into historical idealism, since they explained social life by the opinions and convictions of people.

Feuerbach, despite the fact that he had some insightful remarks, remained an idealist "from above," did not go beyond the ethical understanding of society. Calling his philosophy anthropologism, that is, having made man the center of philosophy, he did not understand the social man. Like the materialists of the XVII – XVIII centuries. Feuerbach believed that there was a certain eternal and universal "nature of man", a special essence of man "in general".

Some representatives of the old materialism considered man to be good by nature, others - evil, gave him one or another characteristic, but they all operated on the concept of an abstract, non-historical human essence. The specific historical conditions of human existence could be "unreasonable", to diverge from "human nature", then they "crippled" human nature, "spoiled" people. It was necessary to bring social relations in line with "human nature", to make them "reasonable". It is not difficult to find that the man about whom the old materialists spoke was thought by them in the image and likeness of the bourgeois, that the capitalist essence for them was the human essence, that the "ideal human nature" was only the embodiment of the bourgeois ideal.

Dialectical materialism ended Feuerbach's anthropological metaphysics. The man to whom Feuerbach addressed was understood by Marxism not as an abstract person, but as a concrete historical person, as an aggregate of certain *social relations*. Historical materialism has given such an understanding of social development, which consistently holds the principle of the primacy of social being and the secondary nature of social consciousness. The creation of historical materialism, the extension of materialistic knowledge to social being and social consciousness has turned materialism into the foundation of *all* human knowledge. "Spirit" is expelled from the last refuge. Materialism has involved all spheres of reality in its orbit.

The materialistic understanding of history has raised the struggle against religion to a higher level. Reconciliation with religion in any form and measure, directly or indirectly, flirting with clericalism or tolerance towards it is completely alien to Marxism and incompatible with it. Whether it is Christianity or Judaism, a "living" or "inanimate" church, sectarianism, Tolstoyism, Feuerbachian "religion of love" or "religious atheism" by Comrade Lunacharsky in 1908 - against all these forms of reconciliation and flirting with religion, dialectical materialism leads an inexorable crushing fight. "Every god is a cruelty - be it the cleanest, perfect, not sought for, but god built, it doesn't matter" <sup>[184]</sup>.

While for the French materialists, religion was the product of people who were ignorantly deceived by evil people, and for Feuerbach - a ghostly expression of the essence of man "in general" - Marxism exposes the class essence of religion, finds its roots in social life and exposes its exploiting function. Martial atheism of the Marxist-Leninist worldview regards the struggle against religion as one of the forms of the great liberation struggle of the proletariat. For us, religion is not only stupidity or meanness, it is a means to preserve class oppression, a weapon of enemies. In Marxist militant atheism, the insight of understanding the essence of religion and a deep active hatred for it, as well as its science-like echoes, idealistic philosophical systems, merge together.

These are the basic guiding principles of modern materialistic philosophy. It has nothing to do with a passive worldview. "Philosophers only *explained the world* in various ways, but the point is to *change it*," <sup>[185]</sup> said Marx about previous philosophy. Being a philosophy of the revolutionary proletariat that transforms the world, dialectical materialism is *an effective philosophy*. Philosophy for us is not a quiet abode, but a front, one of the fronts of class struggle, driving the development of society. The cognition of reality is not done out of curiosity, but to transform reality. Transformation of reality requires an awareness of its laws. Guided by true theory, practice is the most perfect practice, and the most perfect theory, correctly reflecting objective reality, is the most practical and fruitful theory.

Marxism-Leninism is equally alien to unprincipled divisiveness and contemplative theorizing, divorced from the practice of class struggle. Theory and practice develop in it in the closest unity, mutually reinforcing each other. However, the primacy in this unity belongs to the *practice*; The unity of theory and practice is carried out on the basis of revolutionary practice. "A *theory becomes pointless if it does not associate with revolutionary practice, just as practice becomes blind if it does not illuminate for itself the road of revolutionary theory*" <sup>[186]</sup>.

Marxism is in the right to be called only such a theory that goes hand in hand with the practice of proletarian struggle, which in the capitalist countries strengthens the will of the working class to assault capitalism and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, arming it with the knowledge of the

enemy and shows the path to victory organizes the working class to uproot the roots of capitalism, to build socialism, overcoming the resistance of the class enemy and its opportunist agents on the right and the "left". The unity of the practice of class struggle and Marxist-Leninist theory at each stage of history finds its most perfect expression in the *general line of the Communist Party*, in decisions of party congresses and conferences of the Central Committee of the Party, the Communist International.

The teachings of Marx and Engels are not a dead *dogma*. It does not complete the history of knowledge, but opens up gigantic prospects before it. The advancement of dialectical materialism and its further development are the works of Lenin and Stalin. Lenin developed "Marxism further in the new conditions of capitalism and the class struggle of the proletariat ... Leninism is Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution" <sup>[187]</sup>. This is dialectical materialism, which has reached a new and higher stage of its development on the basis of the experience of class struggle in the era of imperialism and the socialist revolution and the generalization of the findings of the newest natural science.

Dialectical materialism grew and developed in the tireless defense of the work of the working class, in its tireless struggle with its opponents, with various anti-materialistic and anti-dialectical teachings. In the battles for the general line of the Communist Party and the Comintern, in tireless struggle with its opponents, with all the priests, idealistic and revisionist theories, dialectical materialism will follow the path of new victories. Marx's teaching is "omnipotent because it is true". It is complete and harmonious, giving people an integral world view, irreconcilable with no superstition, with any reaction, with any defense of bourgeois oppression" <sup>[188]</sup>.

### 3.6. Dialectics as logic and theory of knowledge

In bourgeois philosophy, especially in Kantian, it is customary to distinguish between several separate, unrelated philosophical "problems", forming several independent philosophical sciences. There are *gnosiology* or theory of knowledge, - the science of the boundaries and abilities of human knowledge, of the sources and forms of knowledge. Then, *logic* is distinguished - an independent science about the laws according to which human thought develops, about concepts, judgments, and conclusions. Allocate further *ontology* - the doctrine of being, of the nature of the objective world. The Kantians thus tear apart philosophical science into several opposing sciences.

In contrast to the Kantians, dialectical materialism establishes the unity and indissoluble integrity of philosophical science. Dialectical materialism as a science is an inseparable whole, which is both logic and theory of knowledge, and the theory of objectively real being of matter ... "In Capital, Lenin says, "logic, dialectics and theory of knowledge of materialism applied to science in one (three words are not necessary: they are one and the same)" <sup>[189]</sup>. "Dialectics is the theory of knowledge (of Hegel and) of Marxism: this is the" side "of the case (this is not the" side "of the case, but the *essence of the matter*) that Plekhanov did not pay attention to, let alone other Marxists" <sup>[190]</sup>.

As we see, Lenin attaches great importance to the fact that in dialectical materialism *coincide* logic, dialectics, theory of knowledge. Indeed, these Leninist provisions contain not only Lenin's reference to dialectical materialism as a science, but also an indication of Lenin's understanding of the essence of the tasks of philosophy. Lenin's thesis about the coincidence of dialectics and the theory of knowledge is a special expression of the general position of dialectical materialism about the unity of theory and practice. Such a view of dialectics as a theory of knowledge obliges, if only it is understood Leninist, and not distorted in Hegelian, as the Menshevik idealists did, to link the development of dialectics with the practice of socialist construction and world revolution, as stated in the decision Central Committee of the CPSU (b) about the magazine "Under the banner of Marxism."

The reason for the rupture of logic and the theory of knowledge from the Kantians is that they approach both logically and the theory of knowledge formally; they are taken outside of practice, not historically. The logic of the Kantians is the science of the forms of thinking as such, irrespective of their content. Formal logic is interested only in the form, but not in the content of thinking, and therefore it is an idealistic logic. The theory of knowledge of the Kantians should explore the "abilities and limits" of knowledge before any knowledge, isolating itself from the process of learning. Before learning, it is necessary to investigate what knowledge is capable of and what it is not capable of — this is the Kantian formulation of the question.

Hegel, who for the first time, albeit in an *idealistic* manner, understood that the logic and theory of knowledge coincide, if they were taken not *formally*, but *historically*, subjected the Kantian formulation of the question to criticism. "One cannot learn to swim without entering the water", one cannot determine the abilities of human knowledge, without seeing how knowledge works *in practice*, without examining the actual *history of human knowledge*. Base *theory* knowledge is the history of knowledge, the practice of knowledge. On the other hand, if we take logic, then it is equally

unreasonable to study the forms of human cognition, its concepts, judgments, and conclusions in isolation from how these forms were used in practice, in the real historical process of cognition, as they developed as knowledge developed. human knowledge, complicated, evolved. In a word, and for logic, the basis must be sought in the history of knowledge. In this *historic* the approach of Hegel and philosophy is the reason why, as in Marxism, Hegel has the same dialectic and theory of knowledge. "Dialectics, in Marx's understanding, also agrees with Hegel, includes what is now called theory of knowledge, gnoseology, which should consider its subject equally historically, studying and summarizing the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from *not* knowledge to knowledge" <sup>[191]</sup> .

To understand why Hegel has the same dialectic (logic) and the theory of knowledge, what has been said is not enough. Both the theory of knowledge and logic - both must be studied on the basis of the *history of knowledge* . However, they are *not reduced* simply to the history of knowledge. In the theory of knowledge and logic, the history of knowledge must be taken as a whole, in a generalized form, in terms of the result, the results of knowledge. In such cases, it is said that the *historical* must be taken from a *logical* point of view, that is, from the point of view of general results. The resulting logical will be the same story, the same process, but in *genera*/Without complicating details, discarding any irrelevant random deviations. This is how Marx's "Capital" was built, which is the logic, that is, a general *theoretical analysis of capitalism* . But at the same time, Marx's Capital also provides a generalized, summarized *history of the development* of capitalist production relations. For example, Marx himself points out: " *Commodity* as the most elementary form of bourgeois wealth was our starting point, the prerequisite for the emergence of capital. On the other hand, the *goods* now act as a *product of capital* . This cycle of our presentation also corresponds to the *historical development of capital* " <sup>[192]</sup> . Summarizing Marx's methodology in Capital, Engels also emphasizes the unity of the historical and logical in Capital, which did not prevent, however, the interventionist Menshevik Rubin from proving that Marx's analysis of the goods is not historical, but only logical in character <sup>[193]</sup> . Engels says: "The logical method was the only appropriate one. But in essence it is the same historical method, only freed from its historical form and from violating accidents " <sup>[194]</sup> .

When applied to the theory of knowledge and logic, this means that logic is a generalized and summarized history of knowledge, is "the result, the sum, the conclusion of the history of knowledge of the world." On the other hand, the theory of knowledge is, after all, also a summarized and generalized, taken as a result of the development of the history of knowledge. This most common result of the history of knowledge is both logic and the theory of knowledge. The categories of logic are reflected in the human mind the laws of the material world. The logic and theory of knowledge coincide.

We have one philosophical science - the dialectic, which is both a logic and a theory of knowledge. In each category of logic should be shown:

- 1) what is the objective, in reality itself, attitude, this category reflects,
- 2) how this objective relationship is cognized by man.

Engels makes this distinction already in the definition of matter, in the question of the relation of thinking and being. Engels first points out that materialism considers nature to be the main principle. Matter is an objective reality that exists independently of cognition. "But the question of the relationship between thinking and being," says Engels, " *has another side* : how do our thoughts about the world around us relate to this world itself? Is our thinking able to know the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions about the real world to give the correct reflection of reality? " <sup>[195]</sup> . Thus, Engels, as we see, distinguishes two sides — the being of the objective world and its knowability.

Here it is necessary to point out the fundamental difference that exists between the Hegelian idealist understanding of the coincidence of dialectics and the theory of knowledge and the materialistic one. In both Hegel and Marxism, the dialectic and the theory of knowledge coincide as a result of the history of knowledge. However, as an idealist Hegel, the history of knowledge is taken as an independent process of the spontaneous development of the spirit, a certain world thought. For Hegel as an idealist, the history of knowledge is divorced from the history of the development of the material world and the material practice of mankind - its production activities and class struggle. For dialectical materialism, on the contrary, the history of cognition is only historically reflected in the human brain the history of the development of the most objective material world, knowable in the material practice of man, changing and transforming the world. *the change of nature by man* , and not one nature as such, and the human mind developed in proportion to how he learned to change nature " <sup>[196]</sup> - this is materialistic, totally different from Hegel's, the question about the history of knowledge, about the base on which in Marxism, logic and theory of knowledge coincide.

#### **Chapter 4. The laws of materialistic dialectics**

#### 4.1. The law of the unity of opposites

In "The Dialectic of Nature," Engels wrote: "(To develop the general character of dialectics as a science of connections, as opposed to metaphysics).

Thus the laws of dialectics were diverted from the history of nature and human society. But they are nothing but the most general laws of both these phases of historical development, as well as the thinking itself. In essence, they boil down to the following three laws:

The law of the transition of quantity to quality, and vice versa.

The law of mutual penetration of opposites.

The law of negation of negation " <sup>[197]</sup> .

Engels further points out that all these laws were already developed by Hegel, but *in idealistic manners* , that is, they were not derived from nature and history, but were imposed on the latter as necessary laws to which history and nature should obey. From here, inevitably, Hegel obtained a "forced and often terrible construction."

Meanwhile, it is only materialist to approach these laws, as everything becomes, in the words of Engels, simple and clear. These basic laws of dialectics are the real laws of the development of the objective world, as well as the laws of knowledge of the world, since they are a reflection in our consciousness of this very objective world itself.

We now turn to the consideration of the basic law of materialist dialectics - the law of the unity of opposites.

The history of human thought knows *two basic concepts of development* . According to one of them, development is understood as a *decrease* and *increase* , as a quantitative growth and *repetition* . the same as before. Things, no matter how they arise from the very beginning, as well as their mental representations in the human head, according to this concept, always remain their own equal. Once a thing has arisen, while remaining unchanged in its nature, it makes a uniform path of movement along the same unchanging circle. The development of any thing, the development of a plant, animal, man is essentially reduced to growth, an increase in various aspects and properties that he has in advance, but in a "small" embryonic form. In this view, devoid of a hint of the actual historical character of the development of things, is the meaning of the metaphysical concept of development, whose support ultimately lies in the study of the absolute invariance of nature, completely dominated in the XVII and XVIII centuries. and which received in the XIX and XX centuries. its rebirth in bourgeois vulgar evolutionary theories.

With this concept, inexplicable remain, firstly, the reasons for the diversity of objects that appears to our eyes, the reasons for the emergence of a different, *new*, and change of old. Secondly, and most importantly, the *source* of movement and development assumes an inexplicable nature . Unable to explain the internal causes that give impetus, the impetus to development, the metaphysical concept is forced to transfer this source out-of-out either under the guise of material metaphysical "entities" and "forces", or under the guise of an overworld spirit!

Lenin points out that by the end of the 19th and 20th centuries, "everyone agrees" with the principle of development, but that this is an external, superficial "agreement" that vulgarizes and obscures the true understanding of this development. "If everything is developing, - Lenin says - then everything changes from one to another, because the development is certainly not a simple, *universal* and eternal *growth, increase* (or decrease), and so on ... It is necessary. *More accurately* understand the evolution as the origin and destruction of all , mutual transitions " <sup>[198]</sup> . Not understanding this basic development, the vulgar-evolutionary theories do not see the ways of the development of our thinking, reflecting the development of being, do not understand the *objective meaning and role of the dialectic of knowledge* They do not know how to connect the principle of development with the materialistic principle of the *unity of the world* .

Not understanding that the development of any thing (and phenomena) is its own, internal features of the thing itself, the conditioned transition from one to *another* , the vulgar-bourgeois concept of development does not see in the development of its own movement a thing, as expressed by Hegel, self-movement. The development of a plant, animal, human, human society seems to bourgeois evolutionists as a repetition in an enlarged form, as a simple growth, the unfolding of some eternal, immutable properties and peculiarities, which are originally inherent in a given plant, organism, society, and only previously hid in the bud. This growth, according to the theoreticians, is accomplished under the influence of *external* conditions environment due to "pumping energy", thanks to the plant, animal, human body food from the outside. The development of human society is depicted by them as the repetition and deployment of some unchanging, eternal features characteristic of the *bourgeois* societies with its capitalist exploitation, competition, individualism, etc., which bourgeois scientists manage to find in ancient slave-owning society and even among primitive



savages. Bourgeois science therefore either does not think at all about the reasons, the source, the driving forces of the development of society, or explains it by the mental progress of humanity, which, due to repeated repetition, begins to become better aware of the eternal and natural features of any human community, or climatic conditions of life of various societies, conditions of "balance" of society and the external environment!

In contrast to the evolutionary concept, dialectics requires the study of the "*thing in itself*" (Lenin), *its relation to other things*; it considers the development of a thing as its spontaneous development, that is, as an internally necessary independent, *own* movement of the thing, as its *self-movement*.

Regarding Hegel's teaching on development as self-movement, Lenin wrote: "Movement and" *self-movement* "(this is spontaneous (independent) spontaneous, *internally necessary* movement)," change ", " movement and vitality ", the impulse to "movement" and to "activity" is the opposite of " *dead being* " - who will believe that this is the essence of "Hegelian", abstract and abstruse (heavy, ridiculous?) Hegelianism ?? This essence had to be discovered, understood, saved, husked, cleaned, as Marx and Engels did " <sup>[1991]</sup> . In the Hegelian idealistic doctrine of *self-movement* Marxism revealed the rational core, cleared it of mystical ideas about purely logical development, understood as the law of the development of the objective world.

Some external causes, taken by themselves, can only cause a mechanical change of this thing, an increase or decrease in its volume, size, etc. But already the simple growth of a plant or animal organism is not only a quantitative increase: it also implies a qualitative change in the organism, its transition from one state to another. Approximately the same geographical and climatic conditions have operated in Europe for many centuries and apparently not the development of society is explained by them. On the contrary, the same geographical conditions would most likely cause the monotony of social relations, the repetition of the same methods of work, etc., as the example of many African and Asian tribes shows. Meanwhile, in Europe, for example, with approximately identical conditions of the geographic environment, we have a huge variety and unevenness in the historical development of individual countries. Obviously, the impact of external conditions is refracted through *internal* features of this social formation. Only by identifying the inner, own driving forces of development, only by discovering impulses, thrusts from within, given the development of the subject's own life, can one understand the real essence of development as self-movement of natural phenomena, society, and human thought.

What is finally self-motion? Would it not be in the idea of the self-movement of things some taste of mysticism and Hegelian idealism, as Comrade Bukharin, for example, thinks? In no case, if only to approach the movement and development purely mechanically, not to see in it a simple movement or a quantitative increase, if, on the other hand, to approach self-movement idealistically, not to see in it a purely logical development, self-generation of concepts, understand that self-movement is self-movement of the objective world. Self-movement has *its own* the movement of a thing, caused by both internal and external circumstances, but occurring according to internal laws peculiar to the thing itself, its transition due to internal impulses, its transformation into another thing. The study of any object in self-movement saves us from idealistic ideas about higher external forces (God, world spirit) or about higher inner spiritual entities. And at the same time, it does not at all relieve us of the need to study also the role that external conditions play along with the internal causes for this development. It is a view of development as the self-movement of things that makes our attention to rush to the knowledge of the actual internal, own *source of development*. This source, this motive force, the materialistic dialectic finds in *internal contradictions* of all existing, in the movement and development of internal contradictions. Inconsistency in the thing itself, internal contradictory forces and *tendencies*, sides in any phenomenon of nature and society is the main thing from which materialistic dialectics comes in its understanding of development.

For metaphysics, for formal logic, contradictions are possible only in *our thinking*, and not in objective reality. But these logical contradictions, in the view of formal logic, are precisely the evil that must be avoided; Contradictions, according to formal logic, speak about the *inconsistency* of thoughts, about the wrong course of thinking, they *interfere with the* proper development of thought. If the bourgeois believes that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is directed against democracy," then it will be a logical contradiction for him to recognize at the same time that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the highest form of democracy": these two thoughts are incompatible for him. For the dialectic logic, the contradictions of thinking are a reflection of the *contradictions of real objective being*: it is not content with external definitions, the seeming inconsistency of two conflicting positions. The materialistic dialectic penetrates into the inner essence of the studied subject and in the subject itself finds the *internal connection* of contradictory forces, tendencies, parties, definitions. In the most objective reality, Marxism reveals the contradictions characteristic of it and its motivations. The denial

of the old bourgeois democracy and the creation of a new proletarian democracy in the dictatorship of the proletariat is a real *bilateral* contradictory process. "In the proper sense of dialectics," Lenin pointed out, "there is a study of the contradiction *in the very essence of objects* " [200] .

The recognition of the *inconsistency* of things in metaphysics seems to be impossible, because it considers things and phenomena outside of their connection, outside of their continuous interaction.

"But something quite different happens," Engels points out, "when we begin to consider things in their movement, in their change, in their life, in their mutual influence on each other. Here we immediately run into *contradictions* . The *movement itself is a contradiction* ; even a simple mechanical movement can only occur in such a way that the *body is in one and the same moment of time in one place and at the same time in another place, in the same place and not in it* . And the constant supposition and at the same time the resolution of this contradiction is precisely the movement " [201] .

The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the reality of contradictions, revealing these objective contradictions also in the socio-historical life of the people, becomes the most important theoretical basis of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat. It is not surprising that this doctrine encounters violent attacks from bourgeois theorists. Numerous "critics" of Marxism have repeatedly tried to refute Engels's reduced position on motion as a contradiction. They referred to the fact that in reality a moving object at different points in time passes supposedly different points in space. If we divide, we proved "critics" (Struve, V. Chernov, and others), a spatial line continuously traversed by an object, into a series of small segments, points, "interruptions" of space, then at every single moment of time the object takes some *one position* in space, occupies one point corresponding to *one* any segment of this space.

Lenin showed all the absurdity of this "criticism", which in fact reduces the continuous movement to a series of *interruptions* of this movement in space and time, to a number of states of *rest* , motionless states of objects. In fact, each new position of an object is possible only as a result of some movement from one point of space to another; critics do not understand that to move means to be at a given point and at the same time *not to be* in it, that without this contradiction, without this unity of continuity and discontinuity, the movement itself would be impossible, and to deny a contradiction simply means to gloss over it. "This objection," wrote Lenin, "is *false* :

1) it describes the *result of the* movement, *not the movement itself* ;

2) it does not show, does not contain the *possibility of* movement;

3) it depicts movement, as a sum, a connection of states of *rest* , i.e. (dialectical) contradiction is not eliminated by them, but only covered, pushed, obscured, curtailed " [202] .

"Motion is the *unity of continuity* (time and space) and discontinuity (time and space). Movement is a *contradiction* , there is a unity of contradictions " [203] .

But the contradiction underlies not only the simplest and most common forms of movement. Dialectical contradictions manifest themselves in the special forms of movement and development of individual objects and processes.

It is not difficult to notice these contradictions driving development in any area: in nature, in society, in thinking.

The process of life, Engels pointed out, is inextricably linked with the opposite process of death: the constant death and renewal of cells is - and this is a contradiction! - the condition of life and development of the whole organism. In mechanics, any action is internally contradictory, it causes opposition and is inexplicable without the latter. Any value in mathematics is internally contradictory, it can be both positive and negative. Any phenomenon in the social life of this society is permeated by contradictions and class struggles penetrating all aspects of the life of a class society, be it the purchase and sale of labor power or an exalted philosophical teaching. Vulgar bourgeois thinking only notes the *difference of* things, not their *opposite*.; it is limited to indicating the diversity of our ideas, but does not penetrate the *very essence of* things. Meanwhile, in every difference, in the diversity of our ideas, one must be able to see the *difference in essence, the opposite of the sides, forces, and tendencies of the objective world*. "The opposite of forces, sides, tendencies, enclosed in any thing, is their *negative* attitude (negativity) to each other, there is their living contradiction, which gives internal impulses to the self-movement of a thing."

So, what is this internal contradiction of any thing (and phenomena)? In that it is a *single* subject (process, phenomenon, etc.), in which at the same time opposites both *mutually exclude and penetrate* each other. Opposites are *internally linked* in their development, one is a condition for the existence of another opposition, and at the same time hostile to one another, they are *fighting* among themselves .

"The thinking mind (mind), - notes Lenin, - sharpens the blunted distinction of different, simple variety of ideas to a *significant* difference, to the *opposite* . Only to climb to the top of contradictions, diversity become mobile and live in relation one to another, - acquire the negativity that is the *inner pulsation of self-movement and vitality* " <sup>[204]</sup> .

This *bifurcation of a single* , internal contradiction, observed in any phenomenon of nature, history and spiritual life, from the time of the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus noted by thinkers, Lenin described as the *essence of dialectics*, as its main feature. The materialistic dialectic of Marx - Engels - Lenin sees in *unity (interpenetration) of opposites* the fundamental law of dialectical development. He gets his specific manifestation in the contradictions inherent in all special forms of movement.

The variety of things is explained by the specificity of the forms of movement, each of which characterizes the special quality of a thing. We observe in nature a number of forms of motion, such as: mechanical motion, light, heat, electricity, chemical combination and decomposition, etc. All these forms of motion mutually condition each other, passing one into the other. Man's knowledge of matter is exhausted by knowledge of the *forms of motion of matter* , because in addition to moving matter in nature there is nothing. Each form of movement must be taken in its originality, qualitatively different from others. The materialist dialectic finds out *that any form of movement has a special, own contradiction* , its own unity and the *struggle of opposites*.. The knowledge of each given unity of opposites, specific to a given area of phenomena, is the subject of separate sciences. So for mathematics, the main opposites are positive and negative values, the differential and the integral; for mechanics - action and reaction; in physics, positive and negative electricity, etc .; in chemistry - the connection and dissociation of elements; in human society and social science - the struggle of classes.

The dialectic concept of development understands development as "a *split of one into mutually exclusive opposites and the relationship between them*" <sup>[205]</sup> . This "relationship" of opposites is the *internal source of movement*. When this concept of "chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of *the source of " self"movement*" <sup>[206]</sup> . A characteristic feature of this concept is recognition due to the internal struggle of the opposites of the *appearance of the new* in place of the old. While all bourgeois evolutionary theories, without denying the possibility of the emergence of a new one, the main attention is paid to this *commonwhat* the old and the new have, they strive to consider the new as enlarged and repeated in one respect or another the old, dialectical teaching about development, on the contrary, emphasizes the peculiarity, the *peculiarity of the new* . The limitations of every bourgeois-evolutionary theory, fundamentally opposite to the dialectical theory of development, consists ultimately in *reducing the new to the old* , and therefore in identifying the former with the latter. Meanwhile, it is the *qualitative features that actually give rise to the new*, which has emerged in the place of the old, to be called new. For the dialectic concept, development involves the transformation of things, the transition from one quality to another.

*The law of the unity of opposites* , according to Lenin's definition, is "the recognition (discovery) of contradictory, *mutually exclusive* , opposite tendencies in *all* phenomena and processes of nature (and spirit and society *including* )" <sup>[207]</sup> .

The interrelationship - the interpenetration and struggle - of the opposing, contradictory sides concluded in the subject, determines his life, gives him impulses to self-movement, to development. That is why the law of unity, interpenetration of opposites is the main, most important, decisive in dialectics. "The split of the single and the knowledge of the contradictory parts of it," says Lenin, "is the *essence of the dialectic*" <sup>[208]</sup> . He calls the unity of opposites in his notes the *core of the dialectic*.

The law of the unity of opposites is the most general law of the objective world and knowledge. "The condition of the knowledge of all the processes of the world in their" *self-movement* ", in their spontaneous development, in their living life," says Lenin, "is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites" <sup>[209]</sup> .

Thus, the law of the unity of opposites is the *basic* law of dialectics. The law of the unity of opposites, being the most general law, applies to *all* phenomena of the objective world and to the process of cognition. Plekhanov's mistake, which Lenin points out in his fragment "On the Question of Dialectics", was that he did not understand the decisive and universal significance of this law as a law of knowledge and a law of the objective world, that he reduced it to a " *sum of examples* ".

While Engels, in *Anti-Dühring*, cited a number of examples of this law in the interest of *popular* exposition, while considering the interpenetration of opposites as the most general law of development <sup>[210]</sup> , Plekhanov reduces this universal law to its *particular* cases and manifestations. Plekhanov focuses his attention only on the law of the transition of quantity into quality, on the contradiction of content and form. Often, accusing Lenin of not understanding

dialectics, Plekhanov, in his many works, failed to substantiate this core, the essence of dialectics, failed even to understand the theoretical significance of Hegel's Logic, in which this law was developed on an idealistic basis. Often, Plekhanov discovers *an eclectic* understanding of this law as a "combination of opposites."

Dialectics is fundamentally hostile to any eclecticism: Marxism-Leninism would not be a guide to *action* if it did not give precise and definite answers characterizing the essence of the subject or process, no matter how "complicated" it may appear. Therefore, in the materialist dialectic, it is extremely important to correctly understand what is the *relationship* between opposites. The unity of opposites is at the same time their mutual penetration, their *identity* and their mutual exclusion, denial, *struggle* .

Defining: "a thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum and *unity of opposites* " <sup>[211]</sup> , Lenin wrote: "Not only the unity of opposites, but the *transitions of each* definition, quality, trait, hand, property to *each* other (in its opposite ) " <sup>[212]</sup> . "The usual idea," Lenin said in another place, "captures the difference and contradiction, but not the *transition* from one to another, *but this is the most important* " <sup>[213]</sup> . " *Dialectics* ," therefore formulated Lenin, "is a doctrine about how there can be and how there are (how the *opposites* become) *identical*, - under what conditions they are identical, turning into each other, - why the human mind should not take these opposites for the dead, frozen, but for the living, conditioned, mobile, turning one into the other " <sup>[214]</sup> .

Lenin considers *the* identity of opposites, their interpenetration, their mutual transition from one to another to be *most important* for understanding the essence of dialectics. At the same time, he emphasizes the *conditional* nature of this identity of opposites, its possibility only under certain conditions, the fact that the unity of opposites is relative, and their struggle is absolute. The process of life and the process of death, it was stated above, is mutually continued one another in a certain respect: the death of the cells of the body is a necessary condition for their renewal, a necessary moment of the life process; the opposites — life and death — become, as it were, identical with one another, mutually transmigrate one into another. But the conditional character of this identification is clear: life is still life, not death; the elements of life win in this process the moments of extinction and dominate them. Production and consumption, Marx pointed out, are not only opposites, but also mutually penetrate each other in a number of ways. "Each is directly its opposite. However, at the same time, there is a movement between the two that is mediating. " <sup>[215]</sup> . Production makes it possible to consume, creates a commodity, gives its consumption certainty and character. Consumption completes the process of production of products, causes the need for production, is an integral point of production. However, this does not mean that we can identify production and consumption. Their immediate unity, says Marx, does not destroy their immediate split.

The bourgeoisie and the proletariat in capitalist society are external opposites hostile to each other. However, these classes are inextricably linked in the economic structure of capitalism, and the presence of one class is a condition for the existence of another. Without the bourgeoisie there can also be no capitalism, as well as without the proletariat. The creation by the working class, deprived of the means of production, of surplus value for the bourgeoisie that buys labor and the exploitation of labor by the bourgeoisie, the owner of the means of production, is a *single* process that determines the very existence of capitalist society. At the same time, the conditional nature of this unity, "interpenetration" is obvious: about any unity of *interests* both classes can not speak; not a coincidence of class interests, but, on the contrary, their struggle is the basis of social development. Strengthening the proletarian state, indicates t. Stalin, is *preparing the conditions for its withering away* in the future. Strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and the future withering away of the state are thus not external opposites: strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat is *identical to* preparing the conditions for its future withering away. However, it would be the greatest mistake to forget about the antithesis of these stages and simply identify both processes, to consider that with the strengthening of the proletarian state, its death directly occurs ...

Modern mechanism, Menshevik and Menshevist idealism fundamentally distort the correct Leninist understanding of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. The mechanists, beginning with Dühring and ending with Comrade Bukharin, regard all kinds of opposites that are in unity, as *external to* each other, *oppositely directed against one another* . Mechanists identify any unity of opposites, any contradiction with *external* contradiction, with *antagonism* of hostile forces, and they explain the coexistence of these forces and the maintenance of contradiction by *equilibrium*. opposites. Engels ridiculed the flat understanding of Dühring of contradictions as opposing forces. Lenin pointed out to Comrade Bukharin, reading his "Economy in Transition", that it is wrong to identify a contradiction

with antagonism, that under socialism, for example, class antagonisms will disappear and contradictions between nature and society, productive forces and production relations will take place.

Antagonism is a special kind of contradiction, in which the parties treat each other as irreconcilable extremes.

The best example of antagonisms of a social nature are *class* contradictions between exploited and exploiting classes. But with the dialectical understanding of contradictions, we must look for and find a possible inner connection *even* and between antagonistic opposites, otherwise it would be unthinkable for some long-term coexistence of these extremes in one subject, phenomenon, society, etc. (see above the example of the bourgeoisie and the working class). The entire transitional era permeates the antagonism of dying capitalism and the revolution-born socialism. Nevertheless, at the early stage of NEP during the recovery period, Lenin considered it possible to use the methods of state capitalism controlled by the dictatorship of the proletariat, the use of the Nepmanian bourgeoisie for the rise and development of productive forces under the condition of its complete subordination to the proletarian laws and at the same time limiting and ousting it. The period of socialist reconstruction and the onset of socialism on all fronts puts forward the task of eliminating the kulaks as a class, the destruction of the remnants of capitalism in the economy and the minds of people: the antagonism of the capitalist elements and the socialist structure makes it impossible for them to continue to coexist, the class struggle escalates. The right-wing opportunists, who identify antagonisms and contradictions and depict contradictory development as an equilibrium of antagonistic forces, delivered a sermon *reconciliation*, the balance of the struggling forces, the capitalist and socialist sectors, with the theory of attenuation of the class struggle in the Soviet economy in the process of "balancing" the sectors.

Menshevism and Menshevik idealism also distort the correct understanding of the unity of opposites. Menshevik idealists understand it as "subjectively applied flexibility," as *sophistry* and eclecticism. They view the unity of opposites as their eclectic combination. The Menshevik idealists, moving away from the Leninist formulation of the law of the unity of opposites, draw a completely mechanistic scheme, according to which we first have a simple distinction, then an opposite, and then a contradiction. They do not understand that in every distinction there is already a contradiction, they *limit*, like Plekhanov, the universal character of the law of contradictory development. Meanwhile, Lenin, on the contrary, emphasizes the *conditional, temporary, relative* the nature of unity, identity, interpenetration of opposites and the *absolute* nature of their mutual negation, mutual exclusion of opposites, their *struggle*, which is the *source of development*.

A certain unity of opposing sides, tendencies in the subject each time is not absolute, it has a relative value. But if temporarily, a relatively transitory *unity of opposites*, which also do not remain unchanged, like the object itself, then their *struggle is absolute*. Everything that exists on earth is changed by the struggle of opposites, whatever the latter in nature.

"Unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites,, emphasizes Lenin, - *conditionally*, temporarily, transiently, relatively. *The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, as absolutely development, movement*" <sup>[216]</sup>.

And in the relative, relative there is the absolute, Lenin says in another place. And in the interpenetration of opposites we must see *their struggle*: we must consider the very identity, interpenetration of opposites *as a manifestation of their struggle* - and this is the deepest meaning of Lenin's words about the transition from one to another as "the most important".

The emergence of a new object gives the resolution of contradiction, in which the old unity is eliminated along with its opposites. Instead of the former phenomenon, its history begins a new one, containing from this moment on its own, a new contradiction, moving it along the path of further development.

The task of scientific research in any field is to, guided by this *general* law of materialist dialectics, which is the conclusion, the result of the entire history of the development of human knowledge, each time on the actual material to *study the specific* nature of the controversial development inherent in this phenomenon of nature or society. Not a single principle of materialist dialectics can be turned into an abstract scheme from which answers to specific questions can be derived from a *purely logical* way. For materialistic dialectics requires a relentless concrete study of the processes occurring in nature, society, and human thinking.

It teaches to capture not only the general features inherent in all objects and at all stages of their development, but also the special features of the controversial development that characterize the subject under study at this stage of its development. There can be no example of resolving a contradiction that is valid for all times and for all cases. It is impossible, for example, to look for explanations of the ways of transition from capitalism to socialism in the particular nature of resolving

social contradictions that took place when the feudal socio-economic formation turned into a capitalist one.

Hegel, who for the first time gave expression to the law of the unity of opposites, understood him, however, in an idealistically perverted way. Hegel considered the objects of knowledge to be the stages of the development of thought — not real objects as they exist in the real world, but only mental, abstract objects created in the same abstract thinking as the objects themselves. Therefore, the law of the unity of opposites in Hegel meant the law of thinking, which is of the most general nature, but divorced from the actual, concrete development of nature and history.

The interpenetration of opposites according to Hegel expresses the interpenetration of opposites not in reality, but in thinking. And if Hegel appeals to the phenomena of the surrounding world for examples, it is to confirm his logical construction, and not to explain, on the basis of the study of the specific conditions of their real movement, under what *conditions* the resolution of contradictions occurs and in *what* special way transition of the phenomenon to its opposite. That is why, in Hegel's dialectic, the transitions of the concepts of one into another are arbitrary. The resolution of contradiction in Hegel is arbitrary, illusory, introduced into reality from abstract thinking: it is only a *mental* the resolution of contradiction and therefore abstract, divorced from the development of the real world.

Thus, recognition of the law of the unity of opposites as the essence of dialectics, as well as other laws of dialectics, giving us the key to dialectical knowledge, at the same time, does not eliminate the careful study of the phenomena of nature and social life, but, on the contrary, necessarily requires their specific study. A concrete analysis of the actual development of phenomena should serve as an accurate justification and confirmation of this law, applied in its general form to any subjects. His reverse understanding is the vulgarization of the materialist dialectic, its perversion. The law of the unity of opposites, like the whole materialistic dialectic as a whole, is a guide to *action* and to scientific research.

Marx and Engels put Hegel's idealistic teaching on the unity of opposites "on their feet," reworked it materialistically, made it the universal law of the development of the material world and the thinking reflecting it. Applying this law to the knowledge of the historical process, they saw the main causes of social development in the contradiction between the development of productive forces and production relations, in the contradictions of the class struggle, in the contradiction derived from them between the economic foundation and the political and ideological superstructure. Applying the materialist dialectic to the knowledge of the economic structure of capitalist society, Marx revealed its main contradiction - the contradiction between the social nature of production and the particular nature of appropriation,

As an illustration, we present some samples from the dialectic of Marx's Capital. Only by understanding the *general* idea of "Capital", understanding "Capital" as a whole as a logic, dialectic and theory of knowledge, can we trace the dialectic of individual economic categories of "Capital". Without this, we would be in danger of falling into the "sum of examples" from the dialectic of Capital, which is so common for mechanists and Menshevist idealism.

The dialectics of the individual economic categories of Capital can be seen from the economic movement of capitalist society as a whole. The transition from simple commodity production and appeal to capitalist production and the further destruction of capitalism and the prerequisites for the emergence of a new, socialist system are due to the *duality* and contradiction underlying the capital-commodity production. This duality and contradiction determine the nature and *all the individual economic phenomena and categories* : product, money, capital, value, etc.

Let's start with the goods. This product has a dual, i.e. contradictory nature. As a thing, it has useful properties, referred to in an economic language as use value. On the other hand, as a commodity it has a value, it can be exchanged for another commodity. If the use-value reveals the qualitative side of the goods, then the quantitative side of the goods is expressed in the exchange value. Due to the cost of goods can be equated to each other.

This product is a product of labor. Like a commodity, labor has two sides, two natures: concrete (qualitative), relevant to use value, and abstract (quantitative), creating the value of goods. "If in relation to the use-value of a commodity, only the *quality of the* labor contained in it matters , in relation to the magnitude of value, only the *quantity of* labor is important " <sup>[217]</sup> .

Others flow from this contradiction. Each commodity measures its value by *another* commodity that possesses *other* , incommensurable useful properties (the doctrine of relative and equivalent value), the value of the value of commodities is *inversely proportional to the* mass of goods produced at a given socially necessary time, etc.

Whatever the productive force, it can only change the form of the useful properties of various substances. Productive force can not change the properties of the canvas, it can only give the canvas a form of clothing. Changing the shape of various things depends on the specific type of work. But in the society of commodity producers, labor has another side - the quantity of labor, acting as labor in general, as abstract labor, creating value in general. "Labor is the father of wealth, the earth is his mother."

A further dialectical movement of goods consists in turning goods into money, as Marx points out.

"The historical process of expanding and deepening the exchange develops the contradiction between consumer value and value dormant in commodity nature. The need to give an external expression to turnover for this contradiction forces one to look for independent forms for the realization of commodity value and does not give rest until the task is finally solved by dividing the goods into goods and money " [218] .

Thus, the *quantitative* development of the exchange of goods leads to a new *quality* - monetary form. The source of this movement lies in the *contradiction of the commodity form*, i.e. ultimately in the *contradiction* between the social form of production and the private form of appropriation.

Money is also a commodity, but it is a commodity in the "removed" form. Money is a commodity and at the same time *denial of the goods*. Money is the absolute commodity by which the values of all other commodities are measured. As such, money turns into a means of circulation of goods. Here comes a new *contradiction* . Being a product of historically defined social relations, money expresses the totality of contradictions of a given society. Money is the unity of opposites. If we take money in relation to ourselves as an identity, it immediately turns out that this identity is the source of a new division, a new contradiction of money — as a medium of circulation and as an independent being of the exchange value of an absolute commodity.

"The function of money as a means of payment is a direct contradiction. As payments become equal, money functions only ideally, like counting money, or a measure of value. Since, indeed, payments have to be made, money does not act as a means of circulation, not as just a fleeting intermediary in metabolism, but as an individual embodiment of social labor, as an independent being of exchange value, or an absolute commodity. This contradiction is revealed with particular force at that moment of industrial and commercial crises, which is called the monetary crisis " [219] .

Every movement is dialectical. Of particular interest from the point of view of dialectics is therefore the movement, or, as Marx says, the *metamorphosis of goods*. Marx begins this chapter with the following words, which are particularly important for understanding the dialectical method of "Capital": "We have seen that the process of exchanging goods involves *conflicting and mutually exclusive* relationships. The development of this process, which reveals the *dual nature of the commodity*, which is the use value and exchange value, and leads to the division of the commodity world into simple commodities and money commodities, does not eliminate these contradictions, but creates a form for their movement.

Such is the general method by which real contradictions are resolved " [220] .

So the *contradiction of the commodity form* determines the form of movement of goods. The commodity as value is exchanged through the medium of money for use value: T - D - T. This circulation of goods has two opposite phases of movement. At the beginning of the commodity form is converted into monetary. Then back: the money form turns into a commodity. There is a kind of *negation of negation* . On the one hand, the commodity form is denied monetary, and the latter is again denied by the goods. On the other hand, at the beginning of the cycle the commodity is not the use value, at the final destination it is the use value.

If we take further the *circulation of goods* as a whole, then it is denied, in turn, the *circulation of capital* . In the first case, we have the movement of goods, in the second - the movement of money that has become capital. In the first case, the money was the medium of circulation, in the second they are the goal. In the circulation of D - T - D, the commodity acts only as a necessary phase for the transformation of one value (D) into another — a greater cost (D ').

"Cost becomes thus self-propelled value, self-propelled money, and as such it is capital. It leaves the sphere of circulation, enters it again, maintains and multiplies itself in it, comes back in an enlarged form, and again and again begins the same circuit " [221] .

The circulation of capital is only a further development of the movement of goods, and therefore a further development of the contradictions of social relations. As its historical prerequisites, capital has:

- 1) the accumulation of money
- 2) the emergence of a new product - *labor* .

Labor power is the only commodity from all other commodities that, in the process of consumption, is capable of creating surplus value in excess of its value in the labor process. Money spent on its purchase, return to the capitalist with a profit.

But only a certain amount of surplus value received makes the owner of money a capitalist, and therefore only a certain amount of money can become capital. We need just such a sum of money that can provide for the purchase of labor that is capable of producing surplus value in the amount necessary for the maintenance of the capitalist and the increase of both constant and variable capital. Thus, capital *as a new quality* is associated with a certain *amount* .

The surplus value (quantity) has that particular form or *quality* that it expresses the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist. Commodity production generates the circulation of goods on the basis of equivalent exchange. The owner of the goods exchanges him for goods of the same value of another owner. The picture "qualitatively" changes under capitalist production and circulation. Here the capitalist, the owner of capital, appropriates the unpaid labor of the worker. This new *quality* expresses a new form of value (quantity) - surplus value.

In a letter to Engels (August 24, 1867), Marx wrote:

"The best in my book (" Capital "):

1) in the *first* chapter, the emphasized feature of the *dual nature of labor* , depending on whether it is expressed in use or exchange value (the *whole* understanding of facts rests on this theory of the dual nature of labor );

2) *surplus value* is considered *regardless of its particular forms* as profit, interest, land rent, etc. " [222] .

It is understandable why Marx distinguishes these two points. They are crucial in understanding the essence of the economy of capitalism. The duality, contradictory nature of labor under capitalist production reflects the *main contradiction* of capitalist society — the contradiction between the *social* nature of production and the *private* form of appropriation. Tracing the development of this contradiction in economics, Marx finds in the capitalist society itself both the material possibility, and the way and the strength to *overcome* this contradiction. This is the socialization of the means of production; such an opportunity - the concentration of production; force - the proletariat, well-trained, disciplined by capitalist production itself, seasoned and politically mature in class battles with the bourgeoisie.

The doctrine of surplus value, considered regardless of its special forms, formed the basis for a clear, sharp opposition of the antagonistic positions of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This made it possible to emphasize the class contradictions between the proletariat and *all the* oppressed, on the one hand, and between all groups of exploiters, on the other.

In these two points, Marx's dialectical method was most pronounced. The entire exposition of Capital, relying on these two points, unfolds in a spiral, revealing the fetishistic nature of capitalist relations, more and more revealing the internal contradictions of capitalist society, tracing the economic basis and various forms of capitalist exploitation and the growth of antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, further and further further tracing the historical trend of the destruction of capitalism and the development of the prerequisites of a new communist society. For whom the dialectic of the theory of commodity and surplus value, based on the law of the unity of opposites, is clear, he will easily understand the dialectic of Capital as a whole.

*Lenin and Stalin raise the Marxist understanding of the law of the unity of opposites to a higher level.* Lenin pays special attention to the identification of the full significance of this law as an essence, as the core of dialectics. "In short, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This will capture the core of the dialectic, but this requires clarification and development. " [223]. Lenin explains and develops this essence of dialectics on the basis of the indissoluble unity of theory and revolutionary practice, as applied to the analysis of the most important stages of the proletarian struggle. The cognition of the internal contradictory development was of enormous importance for Lenin's analysis of the development of the Russian revolution, for his teaching on the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. The Bolsheviks viewed the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolution "as two links of one chain, as a single and coherent picture of the scope of the Russian revolution" [224]. Lenin and Stalin emphasize all the uniqueness of the Russian "military feudal imperialism", which made it possible to combine the historical development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution against tsarism and which was carried out under the leadership and hegemony of the proletariat with capitalism. "From the democratic revolution," wrote Lenin, "we will immediately begin to shift and just to the best of our strength, the strength of a conscious and organized proletariat, we will begin to shift to a socialist revolution. We stand for continuous revolution. We will not stop halfway " [225] .



By emphasizing the *unity of the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolution* in the historical conditions of Russia's development, in contrast to the right-wing alarmists (Kamenev, Zinoviev) , Lenin at the same time struggles with a Trotskyist misunderstanding of the stages and transitional stages in the development of the revolution, the attitude of the proletariat to the peasantry at various stages of the revolution. "After completing the bourgeois-democratic revolution together with the peasantry in general, the proletariat of Russia finally went over to the socialist revolution, when he managed to split the village, take over its proletarians and semi-proletarians, unite them against the kulaks and the bourgeoisie, including the peasant bourgeoisie ... " [226] If the revolutionary proletariat did not manage to take into account the class stratification of the village, "then it would be a Blanquist distortion of Marxism, then it would be an attempt of the minority to impose its will on the majority, then it would be a theoretical absurdity, a misunderstanding that the all-peasant revolution is *still* a bourgeois revolution and that *without a series of transitions, transitional stages* , it is impossible to make it socialist in a backward country " [227] .

The law of the unity of opposites laid Lenin the basis of the analysis of imperialism as a special and new stage in the development of capitalism. Here Lenin reveals the unity of the *general* and the *particular* , the general laws and contradictions of capitalism and the features that are introduced by the imperialist stage. Lenin shows that these special features of imperialism not only do not abolish, but also *reinforce the* manifestation of general capitalist contradictions, that the unity and interweaving of monopolies and competition not only do not reduce the severity of capitalist contradictions, but also *sharpen* them more, contribute to the deepening and intensification of capitalist competition. Lenin and Stalin establish that *the dictatorship of the proletariat is the basic law of the period of the struggle of the people who gave birth to communism with dying capitalism* . Lenin and Stalin reveal the dual nature of NEP as a policy that allows the struggle of socialist and capitalist elements and is designed for the victory of socialism, "as a *bilateral* process of development of capitalism and the development of socialism, a controversial *process of struggle* of socialist elements with capitalist elements, the process of *overcoming* elements of capitalist socialist elements" [228] .

Tov. Stalin shows how the exacerbation of capitalist contradictions in the new era is accompanied by the emergence of a new contradiction, no longer the intracapitalist order, but contradictions between capitalism as a whole and the country of socialism under construction, as this last contradiction " *reveals to the roots all the contradictions of capitalism and gathers them into one node* , turning them to the question of the life and death of the capitalist order themselves. "

#### **4.2. The law of the transition of quantity to quality and back**

Another law of materialistic dialectics is the law of the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa. To understand the process of development, this law is of paramount importance, for in this law of dialectics a revolutionary abrupt transition from one quality to another is expressed.

Quality should be understood as the *certainty of phenomena* , due to which they are separated from each other and which makes them what they are. Scientific research achieves success if, studying a certain object, it takes it in its qualitative originality in comparison with other subjects. The certainty that characterizes a subject is quality. The qualitative diversity of objects of objective reality is explained by the presence in the outside world of *various forms of motion of matter* . Everything that exists is in the form of a certain form of motion of matter. True, not one form of movement is inherent in certain things, but a series of them. For example, the human body contains the forms of movement of matter, ranging from mechanical and ending with thinking. But for each specific, definite thing, one of the forms of movement is characteristic, which plays a decisive, decisive role for it. Consequently, when we talk about quality, we mean the existence of qualities, not independent of the objective world, but the very objects, phenomena that possess one quality or another. Quality is objective; the qualitative certainty of things in nature exists independently of consciousness. Human thinking only reflects this qualitative certainty of objective processes.

Due to their quality, things are different, delimited from each other. This border, however, is not absolute, for there are no absolutely individual, absolutely single objects in nature. Each object contains something in common with all other objects, with which it is always in inseparable connection. The qualitative certainty of things is not something permanent, unchanging, as representatives of medieval scholasticism thought. The qualitative certainty of the phenomena of reality is constantly evolving, changing, becoming more complex.

In order to properly understand the category of quality, it is necessary to consider the issue of *quality and property* . This question examines Hegel in his Science of Logic. He writes: "Quality is a *property* first and foremost, primarily in the sense, since it reveals itself *externally* as an *immanent definition*. " [229] . Hegel's idea here is that, while quality expresses an immanent, that is, a certainty inherent in a given phenomenon, process or object, the property expresses this certainty in relation to

other objects. For example, a rose as a flower has certain qualities as one of the plant species, and this quality is its certainty, which distinguishes it from all other plants. This certainty is expressed in a *number of properties* - in the smell of a rose, in color, etc.

Quality is inextricably linked with the very being of the thing. Without this or that property, a thing still does not lose its definiteness, losing the same quality, a thing ceases to be what it is, it becomes a different one. The qualitative certainty of a thing is expressed in a specific pattern that determines the nature of its development. The scientific definition of a thing acquires a meaningful character only when it catches its qualitative definiteness.

The knowledge of a thing, however, does not stop at one qualitative characteristic; it also captures the quantitative certainty inherent in the object under investigation. What is the number? We turn first to how Hegel determines the number.

He writes: " *Quality* is generally identical with being, direct definiteness, in contrast to the *quantity* considered after it, which is also definiteness of being, but not directly identical with the latter, but indifferent to being, external to it" [230].

Thus, Hegel defines quantity as indifferent to being, external definiteness. In this definition, the seed of truth is that, for the time being, changes in quantity are really outward in relation to quality. Despite the change in quantity, the quality remains the same. However, this is all only up to a certain point, when a further change in quantity leads to a change in quality. In this case, this certainty does not just increase or decrease, but, on the contrary, changes radically. The quantitative definiteness of phenomena, like the qualitative, is objective. The concept of quantity is a reflection in the consciousness of those quantitative relations that are peculiar to the phenomena themselves. Therefore, scientific knowledge must grasp and reflect the real reality not only in its qualitative, but also in its quantitative diversity. Quantitative definiteness of an object does not exist outside its qualitative definiteness, it is always closely connected with the latter. Similarly, a certain specific measure of quantitative measurements is characteristic of a certain quality.

So, in nature there is not just quality and quantity, there are things that possess both qualitative and quantitative certainty. The quantitative and qualitative definiteness of the subject constitutes an inseparable *unity*. But this unity is the unity of various determinations, the unity of opposites. Therefore, according to Lenin, the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa is an example of the mutual transition of opposites. A certain unity of quantity and quality inherent in one thing or another of the world around is a *measure*. The measure expresses the specific qualitative definiteness of the subject, which also has a specific quantitative characteristic. However, quantitative changes in objects occur on the basis of a certain quality that is appropriate for them. Quality also limits for the time being the limits of quantitative changes in the subject. For example, the feudal mode of production extremely limited the possibilities for the growth of the productive forces, material wealth and the entire level of development of society. These feudal relations were eliminated as a result of the bourgeois revolution that established the capitalist mode of production. In turn, capitalism, having played a progressive role in history, has become, at the imperialist stage of its development, an extreme obstacle to the further movement of society forward. *new quality* !

In a word, the quantitative change finds its basis and its limitation in the qualitative definiteness of the subject. In turn, the quantitative change of the subject affects its qualitative side. A definite object remains what it is only up to a certain point. The quantitative process of change, having reached the limit for a certain quality and under the given certain conditions of the face, requires a change in quality, causing a *transition from one quality to another*. At the same time, this transition is and the *transition quality in quantity*, because through the destruction of the old quality, the possibility of a new quantitative advance is now achieved. Under any possible conditions for quantitative growth in a capitalist society, the realization of a socialist type of production relations is impossible. But in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a new socialist form of production relations is created, and even the simple addition of the means of production in collectivized agriculture gives an incomparably greater quantitative increase in production.

The law of the transition of quantity into quality, like other laws of dialectics, was formulated by Hegel in his Science of Logic. But in Hegel this law received an *idealistic expression, as the law of self-movement of categories, and not the law of the objective world*. It goes without saying that the Hegelian idealistic understanding of the law of the transition of quantity into quality is absolutely unacceptable for us. The founders of Marxism, proving the inconsistency of Hegel's understanding of the law of the transition of quantity into quality, revealed a rational kernel in it, gave it a deeply materialistic interpretation, as Engels puts it. "For this purpose, we can express this law in such a way that qualitative changes can occur in nature - in a way specifically defined for each individual case - only by quantitative addition, or quantitative reduction of matter or movement (so-called energy).

All qualitative differences in nature are based either on different chemical composition, or on different quantities or forms of movement (energy), or - which is almost always the case - on both. Thus, it is impossible to change the quality of any body without adding or taking away matter, or movement, that is, without a quantitative change of this body " [231] .

In support of this thought, Engels and in the "Anti-Dühring" and in "The Dialectic of Nature" cites a number of examples showing how a purely quantitative reduction or increase in the same chemical elements turns into a qualitative difference.

Engels, referring to the law of transfer of quantity in quality and vice versa, indicates that "the law of nature, discovered by Hegel, celebrates its greatest triumphs in the field of chemistry. Chemistry can be called the science of qualitative changes in bodies that occur under the influence of changes in the quantitative composition " [232] . Then Engels gives the following examples: oxygen and ozone. Two atoms are connected to the oxygen molecule, and three atoms - into the ozone molecule - a new body is obtained, which differs in its properties from oxygen. "And what to say," Engels writes further, "on the various proportions in which oxygen combines with nitrogen or sulfur and of which each gives a body that is qualitatively different from all other bodies! How is laughing gas (nitrous oxide  $N_2O$ ) different from nitric anhydride (nitrogen nitrate  $N_2O_5$ )! The first is gas, the second at ordinary temperature is a solid crystalline solid! Meanwhile, the whole difference between them in composition is that the second body has five times more oxygen than the first, and between the two there are also other nitrogen oxides ( $NO$ ,  $N_2O_3$ ,  $N_2O_7$ ), which all differ qualitatively from both of them and from each other " [233] .

These are examples from chemistry, which Engels cites as illustrations to the law of the transition of quantity into quality. Engels believes that this law is of great importance for the chemical elements themselves. The periodic system of elements discovered and developed by Mendeleev shows that the quality of elements and their place in the system is determined by the number of their atomic weight.

So the quantitative changes of phenomena are, up to a certain limit, the character of the continuous growth of the same thing in its quality of the subject. The subject, changing quantitatively *within the same measure* , does not cease to be what it is. Only at a certain stage of its development, under certain historical conditions, the object loses its quality, ceases to exist. The transformation of one quality into another, as opposed to a continuous quantitative process of change, does not occur gradually, but abruptly. The object, which has become a new quality, shows only its many-sided properties, the parties, remain in their quality with the same subject until the struggle of the opposite sides leads to a change in quality. *Jump, break continuous process* and there is a moment of transition from one quality to another.

Only quantitative continuous change of phenomena never leads to the emergence of new qualities. The recognition of only continuous change entails a denial of the possibility of the emergence of qualitatively new things. And this would mean standing on the point of view of the immutability of things that, once appeared, make a movement in an eternally immutable circle. In the same way, the recognition of the qualitative development of phenomena alone would be untenable. Only qualitative transitions without a corresponding quantitative change would mean the absence of a historical connection between the different phases of a change in phenomena.

The dialectic concept of development, in contrast to the vulgar theory of evolution, recognizes the intermittent, discontinuous nature of the changes in the phenomena of the world around us. A jump, the transition of one quality to another, is not prepared immediately, but in the process of *gradually* changing things. And in this gradual change lies the possibility of a break from the very beginning, a jump that will come immediately, as soon as the quantitative changes necessary for each case are sufficiently matured.

The law of the transition of quantity into quality and back causes particular hatred from the enemies of Marxism, all kinds of reformists and opportunists, for this law, when applied to the phenomena of social life, means the recognition of the need for revolutionary change in society, the recognition of the need for *leapfrogging*. in the transition from one social formation to another. Reformists and social-fascists, emasculation of the revolutionary content of Marxism, hold the view that the transition to socialism is not at all obligatory through the revolution, through the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the simple quantitative development of democracy will lead society to socialism. Hitler's fascism personally showed where the development of bourgeois democracy leads, and the whole value of the social-fascist "theoretical" fabrications on the issue of "gradual reform" of capitalist society.

Under Soviet conditions, the teaching of materialist dialectics about the quality and quantity is subject to *revision by the mechanists and the Menshevik idealists* .

Proponents of the mechanistic worldview explain "any changes from place changes, all qualitative differences from quantitative and do not notice that the relationship between quality and quantity is mutual, that quality also goes into quantity, like quantity to quality, that there is an interaction" <sup>[234]</sup> .

Giving a brilliant refutation of the mechanistic world view, Engels shows that if we "reduce all differences and changes in quality to quantitative differences and changes to mechanical movements, then we need to come to the proposition that all matter is composed of *are identical* smallest particles, and that all the qualitative differences in the chemical elements of matter are caused by quantitative differences in the number and spatial grouping of these smallest particles when they are combined into atoms " <sup>[235]</sup> . But in this case, the question arises, where is the reason for the diversity, that multi-quality, which we observe in nature? The mechanists cannot answer this question without getting into the marsh of desperate metaphysics. For example, modern mechanists deny the qualitative uniqueness of all forms of movement, reducing them to mechanical movement and explaining to the latter positively all the phenomena of the reality surrounding us.

The denial by the mechanists of the fact that qualities are objective in nature leads, as their inevitable consequence, to the denial of the abrupt development of phenomena. Indeed, if the objects of the world are only definable from the quantitative side, their development may consist solely in a quantitative *increase or decrease* , but not in the transformation of one quality into another, as the dialectical concept of development teaches. Therefore, mechanists are restorers that have long outlived themselves and, consequently, the reactionary now vulgar evolutionary theory, which reduces development to an increase or decrease and denies leaps.

The vulgar theory of evolution, which denies the abrupt nature of development and the transformation of one quality into another, is the theoretical basis of revisionism. The father of revisionism, Bernstein, based on this theory at the time, advocated the blunting of class contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, denied the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and the need for a proletarian revolution. Modern social-fascists argue their tactics with the vulgar theory of evolution, pushing it against the doctrine of the proletarian revolution. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the vulgar conception of evolution is a *methodological* prerequisite for the right-opportunist theory of the attenuation of class struggle and the growth of the kulak in socialism. The reactionary views of modern mechanists give a philosophical justification of the right opportunistic conclusions.

In contrast to the mechanists, Menshevik idealists recognize in words the unity of quality and quantity and the objective nature of quality. However, these categories, like all others, they turn into abstract formulas and purely logical categories, divorced from the real world. The isolation of the general categories of quality and quantity from their concrete, material content consists of an idealistic understanding of the law of the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa. By imparting self-sufficiency to the concepts of quality and quantity, Menshevik idealists deduce quantity-to-quality conversions in a purely logical way, considering it possible to consider any specific transition cases, *regardless of conditions, time and place* .

### 4.3. Denial of Denial

The law of negation of negation is one of the very general and widely-functioning laws of dialectics and, at the same time, the specification of its basic law, the unity of opposites. In Hegel, the negation of negation appears as the basic law in the construction of his entire philosophical system. In materialistic dialectics, the negation of negation has such an important and general significance in the development of nature, human society and thinking that Engels attributes it — along with the law of the unity of opposites and the law of the transition of quantity into quality — and vice versa to the *most general* laws of dialectics.

Further development of the Marxist understanding of the law of negation of negation and its meaning for the materialist dialectic gives us Lenin, in his vivid characterization of dialectical doctrine of development: "Development, - he says - as it *repeats* the stages already passed, but *repeats* them *otherwise, on a higher basis* ( "Denial of denial"), development, so to speak, *along a spiral, and not along a straight line* " <sup>[236]</sup> . In another place, listing the elements of dialectics, Lenin also points out: "a *repetition in the highest stage of well-known* features, properties, etc. lower and *supposedly return to the old* (denial of denial) " <sup>[237]</sup> .

The unity of opposites, their interpenetration and their struggle reveal the source of self-movement, development, its internal driving forces, internal impulses to development, given by contradiction. The law of the transition of quantity into quality reveals the very process of development, its qualitatively unique steps, the abrupt, revolutionary course of this development - with interruptions of gradualness and the inseparable interdependence of quality and quantity. "Denial of denial" further deepens our understanding of the development process. Speaking about the

negation of negation in development, the materialistic dialectic emphasizes that a certain sequence, movement through various *stages*, stages, stages is observed in development. The course of development is not *straightforward*., but zigzagging, contradictory, and during the transition from one stage to another, sharp *turns* are inevitable, so that the development of the internal contradictions of the object or phenomenon leads at each next stage to their transition into its opposite.

In this contradictory development, each lower stage of development prepares for itself the condition of its *self-denial*, its transition to the opposite, new, *higher* level; this negation — overcoming each subsequent stage of the previous one — creates an internal *connection* between both stages, signifies the *preservation* at the new stage of the positive results of the preceding development.

In the transition to a new opposite, to the next, third stage, development *seems to repeat* the well-known features and properties of the lower, first stage, supposedly *returns* to the starting point of the process, but at the same time enriches it with the results of subsequent development, reproduces these repeated features on a higher basis, and the whole process of development in general proceeds in converging and diverging circles - *in a spiral*. Since every second stage of development is the negation of the first stage, and the new, third stage, in turn, "denies" the second stage, all development appears as a denial of denial. Such, in short, is the rich content that Marxism-Leninism puts into the concept of the negation of the negation.

Often one has to deal with a misconception when one sees a rare case of development in the negation of a negation and hardly finds examples of it. Meanwhile, as Engels notes, the denial of denial is a very general and widely applicable law of the development of nature, society and human thinking, a law inherent in *each* development process. Grain, the well-known example of Engels, thrown into the ground, under normal conditions of its development turns into its negation - into an ear, which, reproducing grains, in larger quantities and sometimes qualitatively improved, signifies, as it were, a return to the starting point. But after all, the development of a tree, of any plant, of any insect, of any plant and animal organism, is carried out in the same way. The height of a person and his puberty, pregnancy of a woman, new childbirth and the development of a new person, subject to certain laws of heredity, unless all these phenomena can not be seen as a manifestation of the same great and universal law of negation of the *old* and the emergence of this *old new*, then the new denial, which reproduces in one way or another the well-known features of the old on a qualitatively higher basis? Engels rightly pointed out that the negation of negation takes place in the inorganic nature, for example in the processes of development of the earth's crust, etc.

The law of negation of negation is expressed in the development of human society. From this point of view, Marx and Engels view the historical preparation of socialist society from this point of view, seeing in it the product of the whole past — the "denied" and "surmountable" historical development. Such is the historical development of property — the transition from primitive communal ownership of land to private land ownership — and — a new denial of this latter — public ownership of land under socialism; This is the transition from ancestral property by uniting genera to ancient "collective private property" and then to individual property, after which the concentration of private property begins again.

In development through negation of negation, Marx, in *Capital*, summarized the main historical "tendency of capitalist accumulation." Marx shows how small-scale production and private property, based on his own labor, themselves prepare the conditions for their denial, their destruction. The expropriation of direct producers is "the transformation of individual and fragmented tools of production socially concentrated", but owned by the capitalist. Together with the victory of the capitalist mode of production, the further socialization of labor and the means of production takes a different form. The very immanent laws of the capitalist mode of production - through the concentration of capital, the development of the cooperative form of the labor process and the transformation of the means of production into those that can only be used socially, causing a rise in poverty, exploitation and resentment of the ever-growing working class, trained, united and organized by the capitalist production process itself, prepare a new denial: the expropriation of the expropriators, the destruction of capitalism. Under socialism, public ownership of the means of production is harmoniously combined with individual ownership of the means of consumption.

Finally, *in the field of human thinking* it is not difficult to notice the same stages of development. Lenin portrayed the development of philosophical thought in the form of "circles", and pointed out that the matter was not in strictly chronological order, but in identifying the main lines of thought development: Holbach's materialism, the denial of the possibility of knowledge from Hume-Kant, the denial of this denial in Hegel's idealistic dialectic: Hegel's idealistic dialectic, a return to Feuerbach's metaphysical materialism, the negation of denial in Marx's materialistic dialectic, which

"repeats" Hegel's dialectic, but also reprocesses enriching its materialist content. The same kind of development shows Engels in the "Anti-Dühring". Ancient Greek naive dialectic is like the first step, which is then denied the spread of metaphysical materialism in the subsequent period. But metaphysical materialism is also denied. Modern materialistic dialectics is such a form of materialism that holds all the positive things that were in the previous development, but in a transcended form. And here the same rhythm of development - the previous stage in one way or another prepares the transition to the opposite side and then to a new denial, as if returning to the starting point, but on a higher basis.

The *connection of this law of dialectics with the law of the unity of opposites* is quite obvious. In each case of the unity of opposites, we can, among the contradictory tendencies characterizing the phenomenon, highlight a *positive* moment, affirming this phenomenon, contributing to the preservation of the temporary, conditional unity of its opposites, and another moment - *negative*, the development of which leads to the struggle of opposites, to overcome this form, to the resolution of contradiction. In addition to the grain-forming nutrient, the grain contains an embryo of a future plant, which absorbs this nutrient as it grows; The private ownership of the small commodity producer has already laid the beginning of the future capitalist property - its denial. The negative moment of development is in the internal *connection* with the positive moment. The old positive content of a developing object is not rejected in vain, not completely destroyed in the process of its denial: it serves as a *prerequisite* and the material to be processed and *assimilated*. A new stage of development, using everything in it is valuable and viable, moving forward.

Denial in dialectics, as we already know, is by no means a bare, sly, empty negation. Dialectic negation is also not questioning and not based on anything concrete, *skeptical* denial characteristic of subjectivism, relativism, sophistry and eclecticism. Denial is the *overcoming* or, as Hegel puts it, the *removal of the old*, old stage of development, that is, its denial with the retention of everything positive created by the former development. Denial is the driving force of development; it is that "evil" which, according to Marx, "leads forward". But thus, the positive content of this phenomenon, which is denied in the further development, not only prepares its own negation, but in a certain sense it is *preserved* in the negative, it is overcome, processed by it, passes in its negation to a higher level.

In denial this way there is not a grain of subjectivism or bare skepticism. Denial is a certain moment, a stage of objective development that requires certain answers and certain actions.

Emphasizing the unity, the connection of the negative with the positive, finding this positive in the negative, Lenin wrote: "Not bare negation, not obvious negation, *not skeptical* denial, hesitation, doubt is characteristic and significant in dialectics, which undoubtedly contains an element of negation and, moreover, as the most important its element is not, but *negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, with retention of a positive*, that is, without any hesitation, without any eclecticism" <sup>[238]</sup>.

Development through *denial* is only a different expression of development through the interpenetration and struggle of opposites; *denial of denial* is a further concretization of the same law in a number of stages of this development.

If the transition of quantity into quality explains to us the emergence of *new* qualities, then the negation of negation shows how this *new* quality by self-denial arises from the *old* quality, reveals the internal connection between the *new and the old* as successive stages of development. Only the conscious application of all the laws of dialectics fully reveals to us the problem of the new, the problem of development, the problem of revolution.

Summarizing the process of development in the formula "negation of the negation", the materialistic dialectic identifies in it *three* most important steps, the starting point, the step of the negation and the third, higher step of returning to the starting point - the negation of the negation. However, it would be erroneous to believe that this stage of denial *ends* the development process: development knows no boundaries, denial of denial not only completes the course of previous development, but in turn serves as a starting point for *further* development, for the emergence of new contradictions, for new "denials."

This external form of the three stages of development, with a return to the starting point, has long been noticed by a number of thinkers. The idea of development along three successive steps was reflected in the ancient mystical and religious philosophy of the so-called Neo-Platonists. Later on the development of "circles" taught the brilliant J. Vico. As Lenin notes, "both astronomical and mechanical (on earth) movement and the life of plants, animals and humans - all this drove humanity into the heads not only the idea of movement, but precisely *movement with returns to the starting points*, that is, the dialectical movement" <sup>[239]</sup>. Hegel gave her expression in his famous "triad" - thesis (position), antithesis (opposition), synthesis (unity) - at the same time denial and preservation

of both positions. In the form of a "triad" according to Hegel, the self-development of the spirit, the self-development of each logical category, is accomplished. Hegel overcomes in a purely mental way, "removes", in accordance with this triadic scheme, the contradictions of concepts, without attaining, however, a genuine resolution of the real contradictions of the objective world. The logical steps of the "triad", "denying" one another, are connected in Hegel by artificial logical transitions that do not reflect the real material, natural-historical, and socio-historical connection.

Revisionists of all interpretations have long blamed the Marxist dialectic for allegedly subordinating the real development to the far-fetched scheme of the Hegelian "triad": critics claim that in this purely scholastic way, without any other evidence, Marxism allegedly seeks to justify the controversial course of historical development and the inevitability of the revolution. With such an accusation at the address of Marx's "Capital", his famous chapter on the law of capitalist accumulation, the mechanist Duerg also spoke; Later, Russian populists like N. Mikhailovsky and others repeated this slander on Marxism.

Engels, in his criticism of Dühring, gave a brilliant answer to all such accusations. Engels emphasized that Marx *does not prove* anything by denying denial, but he only summarizes and summarizes in this general dialectical formulation his long and careful study of the genuine, concrete, historical process of development of capitalism and its historical tendencies, which were reflected in all the enormous material "Capital". It is only as a result of a concrete historical study, supported by a huge amount of factual material, did Marx characterize this process additionally as taking place according to a definite dialectical law. Covering the most diverse phenomena with a single universal negation of negation, Engels pointed out, we do not say anything about the *peculiarities* each individual development process. Meanwhile, it is necessary to deny not in vain, but in such a way that the first and second "negatives" express the process of actual *development*: "the way of denial is determined ... firstly, by the *general*, and secondly, by the *special* nature of this process" <sup>[240]</sup>. Only a *concrete*, comprehensive study of each individual case of development on factual material can give such a deep understanding of all the *features and contradictory* steps of this process that it becomes possible to characterize this development in one particular respect or another as occurring according to the general law of negation of negation.

Lenin also strongly rejects the accusation of the Marxist populists in reducing evidence to Hegelian "triads" and the "indisputable" dialectical scheme. Lenin explained to Mikhailovsky that the very term "negation of the negation" in Marx and Engels is only "a mode of expression", indicating the historical *origin of the materialist dialectics*, which had one of its sources the dialectic of Hegel. According to Lenin, Marx "recognized as the only criterion of the theory *its loyalty to reality*." If ... at the same time, it sometimes turned out that the development of some social phenomenon fell under the Hegelian scheme: position, negation - negation of negation, then there is nothing surprising here, because *it is not uncommon in nature* " <sup>[241]</sup>. Only with the Hegelian *idealist* understanding of development, in which the development of reality is subject to the development of an idea, can one interpret the meaning of the "triads", the "indisputability" of the dialectic process. In the Marxist dialectic "for triads, there is no other place as the role of the cover and the husk" <sup>[242]</sup>. The essence of the law of negation of negation is not in the external form of "triads", but in the concrete study of the internal features of the process, which inevitably lead development to sharp turns, preparing its "self-denial", in studying the successive stages of development of the new from the old, higher stage.

And much later, Lenin argued with Comrade Bukharin, who abused the word "dialectical denial", that "one cannot use it without *first* proving cautiously with the facts" <sup>[243]</sup>. At the same time, Lenin raises the Marxist understanding of denial of denial, formulating its connection with the law of the unity of opposites, stressing the sequence of inevitable *stages of development*, the course of development in circles, in *spirals*, with inevitable turns, with returns, as a characteristic feature of dialectical development. to the starting point, revealing the controversial path of development of the new from the old and the connection of the *new* with the old in this development.

Studying the process of development of our party and party struggle, in particular, on the analysis of materials of the Second Party Congress, Lenin showed that the *development of party struggle is subject to the same law of denial of denial* and goes through contradictions: the minority at the congress becomes the majority, the majority is a minority; the starting point of the ideological struggle for the 1st paragraph of the statute is denied, giving way to non-fundamental issues, and then the *denial of denial* begins, return to the starting point of the ideological struggle; but the "thesis" has already been enriched with all the results of the "antithesis" and turned into a higher "synthesis" when two different systems of views are associated with the right or wrong position on the 1st point, the revolutionary and opportunist wing of the party is revealed. "In a word," wrote Lenin,

"not only oats grow but Hegel, but Russian Social Democrats also fight each other according to Hegel" <sup>[244]</sup>.

However, this recognition of the contradictory development of the party struggle should not at all justify the sophistry, eclecticism, zigzags and personal mistakes of politicians: "True dialectics does not justify personal mistakes, but studies *inevitable turns*, proving their inevitability on the basis of a *detailed study of development in all its specificity*" <sup>[245]</sup>.

The paths of development of the party struggle through contradictions were designated with particular vividness during the transition period. The fight against the anti-Bolshevik, Menshevik position of Kamenev and Zinoviev on the eve and in the period of October, the struggle against the "left" communists after the victory of the proletarian revolution in the period of Brest, the concentration of fire "left" against Trotskyism in the recovery period, then the transformation of right opportunism into the main danger in the era socialist reconstruction, further "synthesis" of the right and left in the "right-left" block, etc. Tov. Stalin further develops the Leninist doctrine of the inconsistency of the process of development and the sequence of passable stages, of the controversial ways of development of the Soviet state, national forms and the international content of culture, etc.

The mechanists understood *outwardly the* negation of negation, perceiving it as a Hegelian "triad", filling it with a different, mechanistic content: for example, Bukharin reduced the negation of the negation to "imbalance" and then to a new "restoration" of this equilibrium, depending on the external environment.

Menshevik idealists replaced negation with eclectic synthesis, the combination of pieces of the *old*: dialectical materialism, according to Deborin, is a synthesis of Hegel's dialectics and Feuerbach's materialism. From the point of view of right-wing opportunism, the entire transitional era is the restoration of the balance broken by the October revolution; It is not surprising that, according to Bukharin, all development takes place in the order of a smooth evolution, without class contradictions, without the need to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotskyists and "left" opportunists made logical "leaps" through the necessary *stages of development*.

Neither the right nor the "left" understood the new in the structure of socialist production relations, the contradictory ways of its development, the role of the old in relation to the new in the development of the proletarian revolution.

#### **4.4. Essence, phenomenon, content, form**

We have clarified in the previous chapters the *basic* laws of materialist dialectics. However, they by no means exhaust the materialist dialectic as a science. It is necessary to find out why the scientific knowledge of the objective world consists in knowing the laws of its development; it is necessary to show how the laws of special forms of movement and development of this objective world reveal the essence of the phenomena and processes occurring in it. In this regard, we must dwell on such important categories of dialectics as phenomenon and essence.

The practice of a social person, which transforms the world, is the basis upon which our knowledge of the internal connections of phenomena develops, not limited to their external appearance.

The task of scientific knowledge is to penetrate into the depths of things, to reveal their internal connections, hidden by their external, direct visibility, to deepen our knowledge of the quality of things by this way, to reveal their identity and difference behind reality, to discover the most common and important in them - their basis, their *essence*, the necessary logical connection of phenomena. The historical practice of social man, the practice of material production and class struggle generates and consolidates the main categories of scientific knowledge — essence, law, causality, etc.

The most general and basic concept of scientific knowledge, indicating the penetration of knowledge into the depths of things, is the concept of their inner connection, their *essence*, which is opposed to immediate phenomena.

The concept of internal communication, patterns of phenomena, their essence, hidden behind the immediate phenomena, appears already at the early stages of the history of human thinking, but only gradually receives its materialistic content. Engels notes that the embryos of abstraction (the idea of a genus) and analysis (breaking of nuts) are characteristic of animals. The labor process, which distinguishes human society from nature, leads man to domination over nature, to the ability to "comprehend and correctly apply its laws," develops the ability to "foresee ... and regulate ... the consequences ... of ordinary production processes" <sup>[246]</sup>. Engels, using the example of the theory of heat, shows how slowly knowledge of internal connections and laws develops, capturing many centuries and millennia. Already the ancient Greek philosophers (the Eleatic) sought to find the essence of all things. The concept of essence acquires a metaphysical character in the Middle Ages (the doctrine of unchanging "essences" of things, "elements", etc.). Only together with the successes of physics and chemical analysis does the materialistic view of the essence of things strengthen. Kant,



as we have already seen, turned the essence of things into the world of unknowable "things in themselves," which he has been cut off from the world of phenomena. This metaphysical gap between the essence and the phenomenon of things, held by Kant's philosophy, was subjected to the most severe criticism by Hegel. Hegel overcomes the old, metaphysical view of essence as if it were something otherworldly, unchanging, motionless, fundamentally fenced off from the world of visible phenomena. Hegel sets *the relative* nature of the concept of "essence", its close interdependence with the world of phenomena, with the "appearance" that is outwardly opposite to it: the inner essence of things, Hegel points out, reveals itself only in phenomena. Hence the importance of studying phenomena for understanding the very essence of things.

But the concept of "essence" received from Hegel a purely idealistic development: through logical development, essence as it *constructs* its "reality". The genuinely deep, materialistic meaning of the concept of *essence is* obtained only in the materialist dialectic, on the basis of the study by Marx and Engels of the essence of social life, in the process of developing the class struggle of the proletariat. Marx does not ignore the "essence", as some vulgar materialists and creeping empiricists tend to do. "If," he says, "the form of manifestation and the essence of things coincided directly, then any science would be superfluous" [247]. "Dialectics," notes Lenin, "require a comprehensive study of this social phenomenon in its development and information *external, seeming to the fundamental driving forces*, to the development of productive forces and to the class struggle" [248]. At the same time, Lenin emphasizes the unity of essence and phenomenon, their transition from one to another. "We see," Lenin gives a materialistic description, "a transition, overflowing one into another: essence *is*. The phenomenon is *significant*. The thought of man infinitely deepens from phenomenon to essence, from the essence of the first order, so to speak, to the essence of the second order, and so on *without end*" [249].

In Marx, Engels, Lenin we have the opposition of the internal connection of things to their immediate "appearance", and at the same time the recognition of the unity of essence and phenomenon, internal and external. The essence is not *outside of* phenomena, it is *in them*, although not always this essence of things appears in phenomena entirely and *directly*. The essence of phenomena is their *relationship*, their *internal connection*, it is a pattern penetrating phenomena, the *integral unity of a given set of phenomena*. "Human essence," Marx criticizes the abstract view of Feuerbach, "is not an abstract characteristic of an individual individual. In its reality, it is the *totality of social relations*." [250].

Marx's "Capital" reveals to us all the enormous scientific significance of the category of "essence." Investigating the essence of capitalist production, Marx begins his study with direct existence, with the goods. The analysis of a commodity as a social relation, a logical and historical analysis, verified by facts and practice, reveals in the commodity a unity of use value and value, a unity of direct *phenomenon and essence*; analysis reveals in various goods their common unity, due to which various goods appear to be qualitatively the same, the cost, the measure of which is socially necessary labor. "Labor," says Marx, "is that the different goods are the same, their *unity*, their *essence*, the internal basis of their value" [251]. Various things, - he points out, - "should be considered as respective incarnations, expressions of *the same general unity*, an element that is completely different from their natural existence or phenomenon" [252]. Marx traces this unity of essence and phenomenon in such economic categories as price and value, price, supply and demand, wages and price of labor, etc.

The category of essence of Marx plays the same important role in the analysis of surplus value. Analyzing the surplus value and its disintegration into parts, Marx points out that it takes on special forms, independent of each other and regulated by various laws. Therefore, "their common unity — surplus value — and therefore the nature of this common unity — becomes more and more unrecognizable, it does not appear in the *phenomenon*, but should only be revealed as a hidden mystery" [253].

Considering the transformation of the rate of surplus value into a rate of profit, Marx notes that "historically, the starting point has been the rate of profit. The surplus value and the rate of surplus value are, relatively, something invisible, requiring substantial disclosure, while the rate of profit, and therefore such a form of surplus value as profit, is found on the surface of the phenomenon" [254]. "Profit is a form of manifestation of surplus value, and the latter can only be hatched out of the first through analysis" [255].

No less important is the notion of essence in the Marxist analysis of class production relations. So for example, referring to the fact that in the last unfinished chapter of Capital, Marx speaks of "three large social classes" [256] - landowners, capitalists and workers - receiving some rent, profit and salary, some authors consider all these three classes *major* classes of bourgeois society, inextricably linked

with the capitalist mode of production. Of course, landowners play a very important role in the development of capitalism: as Marx points out, large landowners act as the personification of one of the most essential conditions of production, land; besides, the formation of large landed property is a historical prerequisite for capitalism, which needs the expropriation of the working conditions of small landowners and the formation of a class of wage workers. Nevertheless, we must consider the class of large landowners as a derivative phenomenon, not arising from the *essence of the* capitalist mode of production. "The capitalist and the wage worker are the only figures and factors of production whose attitude and opposition to each other derives from *the essence of the* capitalist mode of production " [257] . Capitalism is possible even if the land belongs to, say, the capitalist state, if only it does not belong to the working class. Therefore, Marx considers "based on the essence of the capitalist mode of production — and unlike the feudal, ancient, etc. — reduction of classes directly involved in production ... to capitalists and wage workers, with the exception of the landowner, who comes only post factum due to property relations on the forces of nature that *did not grow* out of the capitalist mode of production, *but by the inherited* "... adequate theoretical expression of the capitalist mode of production " [258] . Proceeding from this essence of capitalism, we must, however, have to consider the important role that the class of landowners plays in the concrete historical conditions of the development of capitalism, in capitalist reality, as the third major class of bourgeois society.

The concept of "essence" gets its further development in the works of Lenin and Stalin. In the struggle with Trotsky and Bukharin on the issue of trade unions, where Lenin gives a brief description of dialectical logic, he requires us to " *study* : first, the essence of disagreement, and, second, the development of party struggle. Both are necessary, "said Lenin," because the essence of disagreement is developed, explained, concretized (and very often and modified) *in the course of the struggle* " [259] .

Lenin further develops the Marxist doctrine of essence, paying special attention to the *development of the* essence and its *concretization* , finding out the connection of the essence with *concrete phenomena* , with the visibility, with the insignificant - their relationship, their *unity* . Kant not only severed the world of phenomena from the world of "things in themselves," but at the same time turned the visibility of phenomena of reality into something purely subjective. Subjected to sharp criticism of Kant's subjectivism, Hegel emphasized the objective significance of visibility, the appearance of this particular world of phenomena itself. He showed that the appearance of a thing is a manifestation of the thing itself, its essence in one of the moments of its movement, that the appearance, the appearance of things is a special expression, a *manifestation of their very essence*. Hegel showed that the inner essence of things is not something immovable, divorced from the world of phenomena, that the appearance, the appearance of things is not "nothing" in the sense of objectively non-existent, as Kantians think. The seeming, the visible are non-essential aspects of the thing, "nothing," but these non-essential moments simultaneously reflect a certain *moment* in the movement of the most *objective*. essence of things. But the idealist Hegel sees in the movement from essence to appearance a purely logical movement - "from nothing to nothing". Lenin corrects here the idealist Hegel, pointing out that a movement even towards a disappearing "irrelevant" is always a movement "from something", while emphasizing the materialistic nature of the notion of essence and its connection with the concrete world of phenomena, with the "unimportant". "The insignificant, seeming, superficial disappears more often," Lenin commented and corrected Hegel, "it doesn't hold itself so tightly, it doesn't hold itself so tightly as the essence. For example: the movement of the river - foam above and deep currents below. *But foam* is an expression of essence " [260] .

Not only the essence, but all the unimportant has an objective meaning: the essence expresses the general unity, the necessary internal connection of things, and all the insignificant that we discard in analyzing the essence are separate facts, a single, random, external *existence of* things. But the external existence of each individual object also has its basis in the internal essence, in internal relations, and laws of the given object. On the other hand, the general exists only in the individual, in the individual, and the essence of things cannot be imagined outside of things themselves, without the unity of essence and its manifestations, without *mediating* this essence, that is, without *realizing* it in reality. The essence of a phenomenon must be studied in all *connections of the* subject, in its *development* , at the *concrete* levels of this development, in the process of *struggle* , which is conducted during the course of its development.

In a whole series of Lenin's speeches in connection with the development of the 1917 revolution, this one correct approach to the study of the class essence of historical phenomena can be traced. So in the Letters on Tactics, criticizing Kamenev's position, Lenin notes that the old Bolshevik formulas about the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry are *generally* confirmed by history, but their concrete *implementation* in fact, it turned out more complicated. The February revolution meant the transfer of power to the bourgeoisie. However, at the

same time, a side government emerged and existed in the face of the councils of workers and soldiers' deputies, voluntarily giving their power to the bourgeoisie. Already in April 1917, the indignation of the masses deceived by the defencism began, and this is "the essence of the crisis, which must be strictly distinguished from the opinions and assumptions of individuals and parties." Next, Lenin analyzes the *essence* the maneuver of the bourgeoisie, which consists in turning the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries into an appendage to the bourgeois government. In this regard, he reveals the class essence of the struggle of the Cadets and Mensheviks against the Bolshevik Party. Lenin clarifies the essence of the class position of the petty bourgeoisie, which seeks to occupy the "middle line" in the class struggle. Whatever the external forms, the essence lies in the *relationship of classes* .

During the events of July, Lenin clarifies the *modification of the essence of the slogan* "all power to the Soviets", as well as the essence of the conditions that in the previous period made possible the peaceful way of the revolution. "The essence of the matter is that the power cannot be taken peacefully now" <sup>[261]</sup> , power in fact passed into the hands of a military gang; one should not take the deceptive *appearance of the Kerensky government as an essence* and not see its Bonapartist essence. Lenin argues to Kautsky and Co. that "the economic *essence of capitalist exploitation* is not at all affected by the replacement of monarchical *forms of government* with republican-democratic ones" ... etc., etc.

With the same clarity finds Lenin class essence of Marx's theory of the state and the fundamental difference between the proletarian state against bourgeois: "The essence of Marx's doctrine of the state has been mastered only by those who understand that the dictatorship of *a single class* is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for *of the proletariat* , which overthrew the bourgeoisie, but also for the whole *historical period* separating capitalism from "a society without classes", from communism. The forms of bourgeois states are extremely diverse, but their essence is the same: all these states are one way or another, but in the last analysis it is obligatory the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*. The transition from capitalism to communism certainly cannot but give an enormous abundance and diversity of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: the *dictatorship of the proletariat* " <sup>[262]</sup> . Lenin also clearly characterizes the main essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat: "Its main essence is in the organization and discipline of the vanguard of the working people, its avant-garde, its sole leader, the proletariat" <sup>[263]</sup> .

We find a deep analysis of the essence of the October Revolution and the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Comrade Stalin. The essence of the October Revolution, Comrade Stalin, sees in its two features: first, that the dictatorship of the proletariat was born from power that arose from the alliance of the proletarian and working masses of the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat; secondly, the dictatorship of the proletariat has become firmly established in us as a result of the victory of socialism in one country that is capitalistically underdeveloped, while capitalism is preserved in capitalistically more developed countries. There is a *significant*, the fundamental difference between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, that is, the dictatorship of the exploiting minority over the exploited majority, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, the dictatorship of the majority over the minority of exploiters. "The essence of Soviet power lies in the fact that the most mass and most revolutionary organizations of those classes that were oppressed by capitalists and landowners are now the" *permanent and only* basis of all state power, of the entire state apparatus " <sup>[264]</sup> .

In connection with this, the criticism by Comrade Stalin of Comrade Zinoviev's attempts to identify the concept of the dictatorship of the *proletariat* with the concept of the dictatorship of the *party is of great theoretical importance* for the materialist dialectic . As Comrade Stalin points out, Lenin understands only *in a certain sense*, by the dictatorship of the proletariat , *essentially the dictatorship of its organized and conscious minority*, that is, the party, precisely in the sense of the *governing party* roles. "To say," in essence, "explains Lenin's thought, Comrade Stalin explains, does not mean to say," entirely. " We often say that the national question is essentially a peasant question. And this is absolutely correct. But this does not mean that the national question is covered by the peasant question ... The dictatorship of the proletariat in scope is wider and richer than the leading role of the party " <sup>[265]</sup> .

The party *exercises its leadership through advice, through the intermediary of the masses*, listening keenly to their voice. Zinoviev did not see these intermediary links through which the party leadership finds its implementation. According to Zinoviev, the party directly exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. Zinoviev, then, identified the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in a certain sense ("leadership") with a specific form of its implementation.

According to all these instructions of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, the essence of the subject or issue, its "core" we must not only reveal, "expel" from the "unimportant", ie, random, single facts: we

must simultaneously consider the movement of this essence , its formation, the transition to the form of its manifestation, its implementation. The essence of any thing is not a dead immovable abstraction, a certain "self-identical" essence, not a "thing in itself", but an internal regular connection of phenomena, their basis for the correct understanding of which requires various specific moments of its manifestation. Therefore, we must see in the very essence of the *unity of opposites* , a living unity of identity and distinction between positive (positive) and negative (negative), movement, *transition* from one to another.

In the process of historical practice of a social person, along with the concept of essence, another, more specific, single-order category is developing, showing *how* the essence is connected with the form of its manifestation and development. This concept is *the base* , the base. "The smaller philosophers," Lenin explains, "argue about the essence *or* directly given (Kant, Hume, all Machists). Hegel instead *or* puts *and* , explaining the specific content of this "and" " [266] .

"Essence" and "basis" are concepts of one order. The basis - the same essence, taken in the inner necessity of its transition into its mediation, expresses not only the interpenetration of opposites, but also their struggle. The base expresses the real connection of these opposites. Identity and difference, necessity and chance, cause and action — both conflicting moments, *considered separately, turn into each other* . "And then," Engels notes, "we must come to the aid of the" *foundations* "" [267] .

In historical development, the different becomes identical, and in the identical, differences are found, the need manifests itself in the form of diverse accidents, etc. In order not to get lost in this eternal and continuous *interaction* of phenomena, in order not to become eclectic and sophistic, we must discover the *basis* , the decisive beginning *in this controversial process* , we must reveal the *basis* on which this interpenetration of opposites proceeds.

Mechanists usually ripped the foundation from the reasonable, did not see the *transition of the foundation* into its effect. For philosopher-idealists like Leibniz, the "foundation" was a purely logical concept, through which they tried to *rationaly* explain the pattern of phenomena. The law of "sufficient reason" as a more flexible and subjectivistic formulation was advanced by them against the supposedly "mechanistic" study of the *causal connection* of phenomena. Everything that exists has its "sufficient basis" , - this empty and vague formula stated. Hegel already distinguishes from the purely logical "formal foundation" the "real foundation", which really gives rise to this effect, however, understanding it as a certain stage of development of the spirit.

The practice of proletarian struggle poses the most difficult question to Marx and Engels — about the foundations of social life. Overcoming and generalizing the achievements of contemporary knowledge to him, Marx overcomes Hegelian idealism, putting into the concept of the real basis a new, materialistic content. In the field of public life, we are dealing with an economic *basis* as a real basis on which political forms and ideological superstructures grow. The historical practice of the proletariat gives further development to the concept of the basis in the works of Lenin and Stalin. Large-scale industry, we say, is the material basis of a socialist economy. It was impossible to develop further on two different economic bases, on the basis of large-scale socialist industry and on the basis of small-scale agriculture, Comrade Stalin pointed out, justifying the slogan of collectivization of agriculture. We single out the main thing in that particular and new that Lenin brought to the treasury of Marxism when he spoke about the *fundamentals* of Leninism.

In any thing and in any process, we find an *internal connection* of various *external properties* , "mediations", manifestations, taken in unity with their inner essence, with the regularity that manifests in them. The concept of external and internal - therefore, both are necessary to characterize the process of development. To understand the nature of the development of any process, we must proceed from its essence, hence from its internal connections and relations. This is the true *basis of development* , and this is not understood by mechanists, who seek to reduce development to a number of *external* provisions or look for its basis in an external push. But it would be wrong to forget from the role that external conditions play for development, in which the internal properties of a thing receive their concrete development; it is wrong, as the Menshevik idealists do, to limit development by deducing it from the *internal* properties of the object, without taking into account the role of *external* conditions for development. We proceed from the unity of the internal and external in the development of nature and society, and the leading role is played by the internal regularity, say, the internal regularity of the development of a certain formation.

The essence is not *on the other side* of phenomena. *Phenomena* , manifestations of essence are not at all something lower than the very *essence of phenomena*, as Kantian philosophy believed. On the contrary, the world of phenomena is a richer, definite, concrete being than the essence taken *from itself* , divorced from its manifestations, because the concrete manifestations of the essence *imply the presence* of an inner connection in them. Development reveals the objective opposite of essence

and phenomena, since every single phenomenon *does not fully* reveal essence. But the development of matter itself makes this opposition - the essence and phenomena, external and internal, the basis and reasonable -*relative* ; it gives *permission* to their contradiction, development is carried out only with the active role and internal and external conditions. *The unity of the inner and the outer, the unity of the essence and form of manifestation*- this is the most important position that runs through the whole Marxist dialectic.

This unity gets a vivid expression in the *content* . The content of any phenomenon is simultaneously *compared with its form* and at the same time implies a certain form: the content both generates the form and includes this form.

Cost is the economic content in which its essence crystallizes - social labor and which simultaneously finds its "certainty of form" in exchange value. The material relations of production are social content, each time adopting one or another "historically social definiteness," that is, the form of *certain* production relations, a certain economy: capitalist, socialist, etc.

Content and form are in a dialectical unity: *they transform one into another, manifest themselves in one another, determine the development of one in another* . "Form," says Hegel, "is *content that turns into form* , content is form that turns into content" <sup>[268]</sup> . The form is therefore not passive in the development process: as an *essential moment of content*, the form back *actively* influences the course of development of the content and its changes. In contrast to all idealism, Marxism, speaking of the unity of content and form, emphasizes the *leading role of content* - in contradictions and in the *struggle* content and form. Content generates, conditions, predetermines its form. But at the same time, it always assumes the presence of one form or another. There is no unformed content, as well as no empty form. Form is the law of the structure of the content, its specific structure, representing its essential moment, but due to the essence of this phenomenon. "Form is essential," Lenin points out. "The entity is formed in one way or another, depending on the entity" <sup>[269]</sup> .

The form is thus not alien to the essence, content, and at the same time opposes it as a special, defining moment of essence, content. They interpenetrate each other in the unity of the subject and the process of development. Nevertheless, the objective *basis* (essence) of this unity, we must always look in the content, did not identify it with the form.

Historical development leads to the fact that the internal turns into the external and vice versa. This leads to the fact that the *form is separated from the content* . It gets its *own* , relatively independent development. The form is opposed to content as something external, hindering its development; it sometimes lags behind the development of the content and contradicts its further development. In the development process, therefore, there is a "struggle of content with form and vice versa. Dumping the form, altering the content " <sup>[270]</sup> . The old form, which has become the external content, is reset in its further development by overcoming the resistance of the form. A new form matured with the content is finally approved and begins to actively contribute to its further alteration. So it is with the productive forces and production relations with political and legal forms and the economic content of modern capitalist society.

Historical materialism focuses on the contradictions and conflicts between the material *foundations of production* and its social *form* . The contradiction of content and form occupies an important place in Marx's analysis of capitalist society. Having identified the controversial essence of commodity production, Marx further specifies it as a contradiction between the socially necessary content of value and the form of value (exchange value). On the other hand, analyzing the external manifestations of capitalist reality, Marx teaches to distinguish between the economic content of commodity transactions and their legal forms.

The dialectic movement of the economic categories of goods ,value, money, capital, surplus value, rent, etc., analyzed by Marx in *Capital*, reflects the class relations of people. A thing, a product of labor, takes the form of a commodity with its inherent contradiction, not because of the natural natural properties of this product, but because of a certain attitude of people in the process of production and distribution. So it is with all other economic phenomena. In a review of *The Critique of Political Economy*, Engels says: "Political economy deals not with things, but with relations between people and ultimately between classes, but these relations are always *connected with things and manifest as things* " <sup>[271]</sup> .

Marx expressed the same thought as follows:

"The goods cannot go to the market and exchange among themselves ... In order for these things to relate to each other as goods, commodity owners must treat each other as persons whose will resides in these things" <sup>[272]</sup> .

Idealists such as Rubin and mechanists like Bukharin, Bessonov, A. Kohn, and others. They pervert this basic dialectical materialistic position. The former have a Kantian *separation of form from*

*content*, the emasculation of all content. The mechanists, on the contrary, completely fail to understand the *role and significance of the social form.*, не видят своеобразия закономерностей различных общественных формаций и тем самым также не понимают действительных процессов общественного развития и классовой борьбы. Следовательно всюду, где Маркс раскрывает диалектику товара, денег, капитала, стоимости, прибавочной стоимости и т. д., мы имеем дело по существу с общественными отношениями, принявшими вещную форму. Экономический закон движения капиталистического общества, вплоть до его последней стадии — империализма, — представляет выражение и отражение развития и роста классовых противоречий между буржуазией и пролетариатом.

Here lies the point that fundamentally distinguishes Marxism from bourgeois theories. To the bourgeois, it seems that goods, money, value, capital have natural properties that determine the attitude of people towards them and the attitude of people towards each other. "In the eyes of the latter," says Marx, "their own social movement takes the form of the movement of things, under whose control they are, instead of controlling it" <sup>[273]</sup>. Marx's critique of commodity fetishism, which constitutes one of the most brilliant, if not the most brilliant chapter in *Capital*, for the first time disrupts the hazy veil from bourgeois economic relations. Marx's dialectical method found itself here to its full height, with all its sharpness and clarity. Marx's dialectic has revealed the public *content*. Marx's criticism of *naturalism*, a mechanistic approach to social phenomena, showed the *specificity of the quality of social relations*. Thus, the solution to the mystery of ideology, and in particular of bourgeois ideology, is given, consisting in the fact that every ideology reflects the social relations of people.

The problem of form and content gets Marx a detailed exposition also when analyzing the issue of productive forces and production relations. In the introduction of "Towards a Critique of Political Economy", Marx wrote: "The *dialectic of concepts, the productive forces (means of production) and production relations*, the dialectic, the boundaries of which are to be determined and which does not destroy the real difference" <sup>[274]</sup>. The dialectic of productive forces and production relations is the dialectic of content and form. In *Capital*, Marx, without ignoring the real difference between the productive forces and production relations, establishes their unity. In fact, the relations of small commodity producers, which are reflected in the internally contradictory nature of labor and goods, are determined by the scattered and limited nature of the means of production of small-scale farming and handicrafts. Capitalist relations rest on the separation of the means of production from the direct producer. Finally, the socialist socialization of the means of production is inevitably accompanied by the socialization of production, distribution, the establishment of planning, etc. This mutual penetration of productive forces (content) and production relations (form) is consistently shown in *Capital* on such economic phenomena as cost, wages, crises, etc. The role of productive forces in the formation of value (the problem of the average socially necessary time); the role of productive forces in the enrichment of capital and the impoverishment of the working class (exploitation of female and child labor), the creation of a "reserve" army of labor, a fall in the wages of the worker below the cost of labor, etc. due to the growth of the organic composition of capital; finally, crises - a vivid indicator that production relations have already become fetters for the productive forces - on all this Marx masterfully discovered the dialectical unity and difference of productive forces and production relations.

Marx did not only establish this relationship between the productive forces and production relations. He accurately indicated the basis of this connection. *The content determines the form*. In turn, the form as a *meaningful form* does not remain external content, represents the *form of the development of content*. The level of the productive forces determines the relations of production, although the latter are the essence of the forms of development of the productive forces. This, for example, was not understood by Proudhon, who believed that it was not the development of the means of production that determined the corresponding division of labor, but, on the contrary, the division of labor necessitates a certain kind of means of labor:

"For Proudhon, who, if he sees things, sees them differently, the division of labor, in the sense of A. Smith, is born before the workshop, meanwhile, as it is, it determines its existence" <sup>[275]</sup>.

The concepts of form and content are of particular importance for the scientific and class analysis of imperialism. Thus, criticizing the absurd opinion of the opportunists that the internationalization of capital is a means of peace between nations, pointing out that international trusts and cartels are the clearest expression of the internal struggle between capitalists, Lenin says: "The *form of struggle* may change and changes constantly depending on different, relatively private and temporary reasons, but the *essence of the struggle*, its class *content* can *not* change as long as there are classes ... Replacing the *content* question the struggle and agreements between capitalist combines the question of the

form of the struggle and agreements (today - a peaceful, tomorrow - the warlike, the next day - warlike again) - then sink to the role of a sophist ... " [276] As an example of the slogan of the United States of Europe, put forward by Trotsky, Lenin shows as a slogan of the united states of the world, by its economic *content*, it turns out to be identical with socialism after the victory of the proletarian revolution, and as under capitalism this Trotskyist slogan is identical with the defense of imperialism and leads to wrong the impossibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

In another case, in "Childhood Illness of" Left-Wing "," pursuing a line of struggle on two fronts - with right and "left" doctrinaire in understanding the struggle methods of international communism, Lenin points out that the new powerful *content of the work of the Communist Party (proletariat)* "can and *should* prove itself in any form, both new and old, can and should regenerate, conquer, subjugate all forms not only new, but also old" ... [277]

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the main *content of the* proletarian revolution. This fundamental position of Lenin and Stalin finds its concrete manifestation when considering a number of more specific issues. Such, for example, is the question of a *new form of* proletarian democracy. "The forms of democracy inevitably changed over the course of millennia" [278], notes Lenin. It is absurd to suppose that the deepest revolution in the world will occur within the framework of the old parliamentary, bourgeois democracy, "without creating *new forms of democracy*" [279]. "Soviet power," says t. Stalin, "is a *new form* state organization, fundamentally different from the old, bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary form, the *new type of state* " [280]. The real *content of this new form of proletarian democracy*, the real content of the tactics of the proletariat are the abolition of classes and the construction of a socialist society. "The proletariat needs the destruction of classes — this is the real content of proletarian democracy, proletarian freedom ..., proletarian equality ... Whoever does not understand this content of the dictatorship of the proletariat (or, equivalently, Soviet power or proletarian democracy) in vain accepts this word" [281].

*The dictatorship of the proletariat is the main content of the proletarian revolution and at the same time a new form of state in which the struggle for the complete destruction of classes takes place.* But the new powerful content can use for its development and the old forms, exposing them to a radical change. Such are the national forms of *culture* in which new, international, proletarian content develops under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Sometimes a certain content may appear in a form that is outwardly opposite to it. Such, for example, are the capitulatory, counter-revolutionary content and the "left" form of Trotskyist phraseology. "Capitulum in practice, as *content* ," left-wing "phrases and" revolutionary "-avantuyurist habits, as a *form* covering up and advertising capitulatory content — such is the essence of Trotskyism [282].

#### 4.5. Law, reason, purpose

Materialistic knowledge of the phenomena of nature, society and thinking in their *universal connection*, knowledge of the *essence of each individual thing* in its unity with the manifestations of this essence leads us to consider the dominant *laws* in nature and society, to clarify the *patterns of development*.

The concept of the law reflects the *essential relation*, i.e. the relation of the essence; the law acts in relation to phenomena, is carried out in them not as an external force, but as an objective, immanent, internal tendency of their development characteristic of the phenomena themselves. The law acts as a universal form of their internal communication.

"The concept of *law* ," Lenin notes, "is *one of the stages of man's knowledge of unity and connection*, interdependence and integrity of the world process" [283].

Engels shows how our knowledge of the laws of nature has historically gradually developed - how from more particular generalizations we gradually turn over the millennia to a "judgment of universality". The practice and technology of material production plays a decisive, definite role here. Already in the prehistoric years they knew practically that friction generates heat, but thousands of years passed before a judgment was created: friction *in general* is a source of heat. Only in the epoch of industrial capitalism, in connection with the study of thermal sources of energy, Mayer and Joule put forward a generalization: every mechanical movement is transformed into heat by friction. *Further generalization* leads to a more universal law: any form of movement under certain conditions turns into another form of movement. So historically develop knowledge of the general laws of nature.

Man can not immediately embrace, reflect, reflect the whole, *all of nature*; according to Lenin, "he can only *forever* approach this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world, etc." [284].

"There is a law," Lenin stresses Hegel's thought, "a reflection of the universe that is essential in the movement" <sup>[285]</sup>. But the concept of law is a dialectically contradictory concept, reflecting the development of objective laws in their internal contradictions. In the law we have something repetitive, *identical*, "strong", *remaining*, something unchanging and "calm" in comparison with mutable phenomena. The law takes the *essence of movement* and the development of phenomena in its abstract, "pure" form: the law is the "form of the universal" (*Engels*). "The law takes calm," Lenin continues, "and therefore the law, every law is narrow, incomplete, approximate"; in this sense ... "the phenomenon is *richer than the law*" <sup>[286]</sup>.

However, the law should not be considered only as an abstraction from a variety of *repetitive* phenomena. The law also has a *qualitative* aspect: it is fixed to us every time as a special necessary *development trend* in which the law, as it were, seeks to *embrace its* endless manifestations and *needs to be realized* in them. In this respect, the abstraction of the law is *deeper* or rather, reflects reality more fully than each individual phenomenon. The law of value, Lenin pointed out, is much truer than its every single manifestation, than every act of exchange, than the law of supply and demand. The law covers and expresses each individual phenomenon approximately, relatively, at one stage of knowledge, on the one hand, in one respect; he does not give all the concrete fullness, the whole integrity of the phenomenon, which can be fully known only through the knowledge of its infinite number of sides. In this sense, the law is *poorer than a single concrete, holistic* phenomenon. And at the same time, covering the group of homogeneous phenomena, the law is deeper, or rather, more constant than its every single manifestation. This is the peculiarity of the law, of any scientific abstraction, reflecting the internal *inconsistency* any development.

Marx, Engels, Lenin constantly emphasize this internal contradiction of the law. They fight for the only scientific, *natural* knowledge of reality — with all kinds of idealistic negation or idealistic distortion of the meaning of the general laws of nature and society. And at the same time, they are fighting a fetishistic, simplified, vulgar understanding of the law, as a certain unchanging "absolute", which directly and in its entirety, in its "pure form", manifests itself in every single concrete phenomenon. They emphasize the relative, historical nature of the laws, the variability of the laws themselves.

"The ultimate goal of this work, Marx says about *Capital*, is to reveal the law of the economic development of modern society" <sup>[287]</sup>. At the same time, Marx strongly emphasizes the relative, historical, transient nature of the laws of capitalist society. He sharply criticizes the views of the bourgeois economy, which sees in the laws of capitalism eternal "natural" laws. According to one of the early reviewers of *Capital*, an essay which Marx himself recognized as successful, "for Marx only one thing is important: to find the law of phenomena, of which he is studying. And while it is important for him not only the law that governs them, as long as they have a known form and while they are in the relationship that is observed at this time. For him, moreover, the law of *their variability* is still important. , their development, i.e., the transition from one form to another, from one order of relationship to another " <sup>[288]</sup>. General, suitable for all times of economic laws for Marx does not exist. "In his opinion, on the contrary, each historical period has *its own laws* " <sup>[289]</sup>. His scientific goal is "to clarify those *particular laws* that govern the emergence, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement with another, higher" <sup>[290]</sup>.

Marx sharply contrasts the blind laws of capitalist elements with the laws of socialist society, comprehended by the collective mind of people and directed by them to their good.

Engels emphasizes the historical, relative nature of the laws of nature — the seemingly universal, eternal, and immutable laws. It shows that the physical laws - for example, the liquid state of water from 0 to 100 ° C - that these laws are ultimately determined by the conditions of the earthly planet and could be modified by the sun or the moon. The most general formulation of the theory of the transformation of energy, according to Engels, in its application to the world system turns into the history of the rule of various laws at different stages of its development.

Marx, Engels, Lenin are fighting with the abstract-fetishist understanding of the laws, which is characteristic of both mechanics and idealism. They show that, expressing "in pure form" the *essence of phenomena*, the laws cover only *approximately the* universal law of nature. Laws are carried out in concrete capitalist reality only among constant deviations, only as a mainstream, overcoming permanent violations of laws, that is, as some average of constant fluctuations and deviations from the law. The law of value, the universal law of capitalist accumulation, the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and so on - Marx considers all phenomena of capitalist reality in this natural way. At the same time, Marx emphasizes not only *the historical* nature of the laws of capitalist production, but also the fact that they are only approximately carried out in capitalist reality as mainstream *tendencies* seeking to destroy, overcome fluctuations and deviations. "In general," says



Marx, "in capitalist production, every *general law is implemented only as the mainstream* , in a very confusing and approximate way, as some *average of constant fluctuations* that can never be sufficiently established" <sup>[291]</sup> .

In another place, noting that the prices of goods deviate from their value, that goods are sold in capitalist society in accordance with their market value only in those rare cases where supply and demand cease to operate and cover each other, Marx explains: "The actual internal laws capitalist production, obviously, can not be explained from the interaction of supply and demand ..., since these laws are implemented in a *pure form* only when supply and demand cease to operate i.e. cover each other. Supply and demand never really cover each other, or, if they cover, they only *accidentally* therefore, from a scientific point of view, this case should be equated to zero, should be considered as non-existent. However, in political economy they are supposed to cover each other. Why? This is done in order to *consider the phenomena in their natural form, corresponding to their concept* , that is, to consider them regardless of what they *seem to be* due to fluctuations in supply and demand. On the other hand, in order to find the *real tendency* of their movement, so to speak, to fix it " <sup>[292]</sup> . Marx shows that only by considering the result of the movement over a more or less long period, we get a complete balance between demand and supply, that this result is obtained only as an average of completed oscillations, only " *as a constant movement of their contradiction* ." Here we have " *evasion* of market prices from market values and, on the other hand, a *tendency* seeking to eliminate these deviations ..." <sup>[293]</sup>

In the concrete reality of capitalism, the laws are never realized in their pure form. Each specific phenomenon represents a certain *deviation* from the law manifested in it and the *confirmation of the law*, since the dominant tendency of development of the *entire* given set of phenomena seeks to eliminate this deviation, which takes place in *individual* phenomena. The law is always implemented only as a development trend, often in intertwining with other trends. And only in this way we correctly recognize the *specific content* of reality.

This is exactly how Lenin approaches the question of the regularity of phenomena, elucidating the question of the relationship between *general* laws and the laws of the *special* stages of development of capitalist society. The production of monopoly by the concentration of production, Lenin points out, is in general the *general and fundamental law* of the modern stage of development of capitalism: "In its economic essence, imperialism is monopoly capitalism" <sup>[294]</sup> . But with all this, imperialism remains a special stage in the development of capitalism and is subordinated along with this special law and the general laws and contradictions of capitalism - the contradiction between social production and private appropriation, between the organization of production in individual enterprises and anarchy throughout society. Therefore, the tales of bourgeois economists about the possibility of eliminating crises under monopoly capitalism are wrong. No, capitalist contradictions are even more acute in the period of imperialism. "On the contrary," says Lenin, "the monopoly created in *some* industries *intensifies and sharpens* the chaos inherent in all capitalist production as a whole."

Monopolies tend to stagnate and rot. However, "it would be a mistake to think that this tendency to decay precludes the rapid growth of capitalism ... On the whole, capitalism is immeasurably *faster than ever before, it is growing* , but this growth is not only becoming even *more uneven* , but the unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the *decay* of the most strong capital countries " <sup>[295]</sup> .

From this dialectical understanding of the law, Lenin and Stalin proceeded, substantiating the law of uneven development under imperialism and the possibility of building socialism in one country. Social-opportunists such as Kautsky, completely *abstract* approaching the laws of the imperialist stage, argued from a purely "economic" point of view, that the contradictions of capitalism unevenness *weakened* under the domination of finance capital, because the development of "talking" to monopolies, hence towards a single world monopoly, to one world trust.

Trotsky and Zinoviev also argued that the unevenness in the development of imperialism was less. Comrade Bukharin developed a point of view close to the theory of "ultra-imperialism", proving that the laws of capitalist competition cease to operate, if only within individual states.

Development goes to monopolies. "This is indisputable," Lenin replied to the discourse on such pure "abstractions" of development, "but this is completely empty ... The best answer to the dead abstractions of ultra-imperialism ... is to contrast the *concrete economic* reality of the modern world economy" <sup>[296]</sup> . Kautsky pulls through the idea that "the domination of finance capital *weakens* the unevenness and contradictions within the world economy, whereas in fact it *strengthens* them" <sup>[297]</sup> .

Lenin also conducts the same dialectical understanding of the historical regularity of development in his famous rehearsal of Sukhanov on the issue of the "regularity" of the October Revolution. Lenin shows that "with a *general pattern of development* in all of world history, they are not at all excluded,

but, on the contrary, *separate* development lines are *assumed*, representing the *originality* of either the form or the order of this development" [298]. October not only did not violate the general line of development of world history, passing from capitalism to socialism, but confirmed these general laws, and nevertheless, in the October proletarian revolution we had the *peculiarity of a separate line of development*, the peculiarity of transition.

Developing Lenin's thought further, Comrade Stalin explains the *features of the October Revolution*, which consist, firstly, that the dictatorship of the proletariat was born in us as a power that emerged from the union of the proletariat and the toiling masses of the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat that the dictatorship of the proletariat has become firmly established in us as a result of the victory of socialism in one country, while preserving capitalism in other capitalist countries.

At the same time, Comrade Stalin argues that the October Revolution has an international nature, that it is a *classic* example of Lenin's theory, obligatory for all countries, that this *peculiarity of October*, in the words of Lenin, also went "along the general line of world history." The breaking of the chain of imperialism by the proletarian revolution in those of its links where imperialism is *weaker* becomes the *general* law of the proletarian revolution in the epoch of imperialism.

In these provisions of Lenin and Comrade Stalin, we have an inseparable connection between the natural knowledge of reality and revolutionary *practice*. The practice of the proletarian revolution gives us a genuine criterion for verifying the significance of the general laws of capitalist development and for combating their opportunistic fetishism. The practice of socialist construction brings a number of new moments to our understanding of the law. She brings a conscious, *reasonable*, *planned* beginning in the laws of the transition period (this conscious beginning is carried out by the dictatorship of the proletariat). In contrast to the "law of primitive socialist accumulation" and the "labor cost law" that the Trotskyists and the right to understand the new economy put forward, by analogy with the elemental laws of capitalism, we see all the uniqueness of the laws of history after the victory of the proletariat leading the masses of the working people and the building of socialism.

One of the most important steps towards the cognition of the universal, universal connection and the laws of nature is the cognition of *causal* connections, causes and effects, the so-called *causality*.

The development of a causal, causal point of view is an absolutely necessary step in the development and strengthening of the materialistic understanding of nature. Early materialists put forward the concept of causality as opposed to idealists who deny the existence of causal connections in nature and society. But early materialists tended to understand the causal connection of phenomena primarily as *mechanical* causality. Modern mechanists, such as L. Axelrod, are even inclined to see in mechanical causality the main difference between materialism and idealism.

Kantian philosophy pays a lot of attention and space to the category of causality, seeking to turn causality into a *subjective* concept, into the category of our *reason*, which we bring from ourselves into the external world.

Hegel from the standpoint of idealistic dialectics criticized the old mechanism and Kantianism on the issue of causality, he showed that causality is only a small particle, only a moment in the knowledge of universal world communication, which was understood by Hegel as the development of absolute spirit.

Engels and Lenin give a deep dialectical materialist interpretation of the concept of *causality*. At the same time, they clarify the whole meaning of this concept for materialism, its *objective* content and at the same time emphasize its relativity, one-sidedness and incompleteness in the process of cognition of universal law.

Even in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, harshly criticizing the denial of causation by the Machists and Kantians and noting all the enormous significance of causality for materialism, Lenin at the same time pointed out that in terms of cause and effect we have a certain simplification of the objective connection of phenomena. Lenin emphasizes in his summary "the comprehensiveness and comprehensiveness of the world connection, only *one-sided, fragmentary and incompletely* expressed causality" [299]. "The formation of (abstract) concepts and operations with them," says Lenin, " *already includes* the idea, conviction, and *consciousness of the laws of the objective connection of the world. To single out causality from this connection is ridiculous.* " [300]. "Cause and effect, *ergo*, are only moments of world interdependence, connection (universal), interconnection of events, only links in the chain of development of matter" [301].

For Hegel, according to Lenin, "causality is only *one* of the definitions of the universal connection, which he had already embraced much deeper and more comprehensive" [302]. Hegel "brings *quite a story* under causality and understands causality a thousand times deeper and richer than the darkness of the" scientists "now" [303]. "Causality, usually understood by us, is *only a small part of the*

world connection," but — this is where the *materialistic addition and correction of Lenin* by Lenin follows , "a part not of a subjective, but of an objectively real connection" [304] .

The relationship of cause and effect, understood by the mechanists as the relationship of some external "substances", we must study more deeply, proceeding from the movement of matter, from the movement of history and their universal connection. The starting point of the Marxist-Leninist view of the causal (causal) relationship between phenomena, said Engels, is the recognition of their mutual conditionality, their *interaction* . "The first," says Engels, "what strikes us when considering moving matter, is the interconnection of separate movements, separate bodies between themselves, their *dependence* with each other" [305] .

Our knowledge is not satisfied, however, by one such initial common point of view. We therefore *single out the* conditions under which each *individual* phenomenon or combination of these phenomena occurs , separate links of the process, considered separately from other links. In the general flow of motion of matter, we distinguish between the movements that affect, which are transferred to other bodies or phenomena, and those movements that arise as a result of this influence or movement transfer. In order to understand individual phenomena, says Engels, "we must remove them from their natural or historical connection and, examining each separately, examine its properties, its particular causes of action, etc." [306] . "If any movement ... is transferred from one body to another, then *since this movement is actively transferred* , it can be considered the cause of the movement, *since it is transferred passively* as a result " [307] .

This dialectic view of the causal connection of phenomena is justified and confirmed in the *practice of the social man*. The reason, as our practical activity proves it, *must be* turned into its "actions"; it manifests itself in them as a movement active in relation to its effect, as a movement reproducing an object in a certain way. Practice reveals this objective causal connection of phenomena, creates an idea of causality.

Hegel also pointed out that in order for a *necessary* connection to occur between phenomena , not only conditions and not only a subject arising from all these conditions are necessary, but also an activity that " *translates a condition into a subject and a subject into a condition*". It is a different matter, Engels notes, when we also find that we are able to *reproduce a certain movement* , creating the conditions under which it occurs ... and that we can give this movement *acertain* direction and dimensions in advance.

*Due to this* , thanks to *human activity* , the idea of *causality* is created , the idea that one movement is the *cause of* another and "human activity gives the possibility of *proving causality*" [308] . Lighting a match on the box, we each time confirm that it is friction that generates heat and fire. True, even here a deviation from the rule may occur, the expected action may not follow, the match will not suddenly light up. "But," Engels adds, "that's what *proves* causality does not disprove it, because with each such deviation from the rule, it is possible, by making an appropriate study, to find the reason for this (for example, the dampness of matches, etc. - *Auth.* ), so here a *double* check of causality is actually performed " [309] .

The causal point of view is thus not at all introduced by us into the cognitive process from our consciousness, as skeptics and Kantian philosophers believe. It inevitably *follows from the very objective connection of things* , it inevitably is generated by the social practice of man and is confirmed in this practice. From this objective connection of things and confirming its practice it follows the need for our knowledge to *consider* certain things and phenomena as separate *links* , as moments of the overall process.

However, the separation of "causes" and "consequences" (actions) makes sense only if, distracting from the unity of the world's natural or historical process, we also have as a starting point their interaction, their movement, their internally necessary natural connection . "Cause and effect," Engels sums up, "are the essence of a concept, having meaning *only in application to a separate* phenomenon, but ... if we consider the same phenomenon in its *general world connection*, then these two concepts are connected and turn into an idea of universal interaction, in which cause and effect are *constantly changing places* , and what is now or here is a consequence, then it becomes there or then a cause and vice versa " [310] .

"The *human concept of cause and effect* ," according to Lenin, " *always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of natural phenomena* , only approximately reflecting it, artificially isolating certain aspects of one *single world process*" [311] .

A correct dialectical understanding of the causal connection of phenomena is therefore fundamentally opposed to the *mechanistic* point of view and idealistic *relativism* . The concept of causality in itself cannot yet serve as a watershed between the materialistic and idealistic worldview; still less, one can speak of the principle of *mechanical* causality as a distinctive feature of

dialectical materialism, - as L. Axelrod does, for example, forgetting the basic question of philosophy - about the relation of being to consciousness. Under mechanical causality one should understand the lower, *simplest forms*. causal relationships that take place within pure mechanics. Counter-motion of solids is the cause of the impact, turning the tap causes a water jet, mechanical work is the cause of heat, etc. Here we, at best, have a purely external transition from one form of mechanical movement to another, just as simple; cause and effect remain external; they are *not in the internal, necessary connection* between them. The cause of the blow may be not only the meeting of the bodies, but also the fall of the body.

The situation is completely different when we turn to more complex physical, chemical, and especially biological and social phenomena. Causes and effects are here in the *internal, necessary, connection* between themselves, which can only be understood on the basis of the laws of development. The reason not only *produces* its effect, not only *turns* into its action, but in turn the presence of this particular combination of causes *must be assumed to be the* presence of these effects. Cause and effect are interconnected by an internal, regular link. Therefore, it is erroneous to say that one "recognition of the principle of mechanical causality is the soul of materialism" [312]. It is a mistake to suppose, as K. Kautsky does, for example, that the concept of causality must be connected with the concept of impulse, collision (der Anstoss) [313]. The "push", as well as any previous action in the socio-historical development, which is not connected with its effect by an internal connection, can only be an *external cause*, and not at all a *necessary cause* of this phenomenon.

In every possible way Engels condemned the "ordinary, non-dialectical conception of cause and effect as two permanently disconnected poles, absolutely not seeing interaction" [314].

That is exactly the question of the causal relationship of Lenin, when he, for example, covers the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks in October 1917. Supporters of the Second International, he points out, cannot "even raise the most serious historical and political question about the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks" [315]. Meanwhile, this question is "resolved indisputably" if we proceed not from the external coupling of the event, but from the general "point of view of class struggle and socialism" [316].

And Lenin proves the historical inevitability, the necessity of the victory of Bolshevism. The Bolsheviks won *because* they had behind them the vast majority of the proletariat, and in it the most conscious part, *because* they had a huge majority in the army, so that their forces were at crucial points in the capitals and military fronts, so that the proletariat was able to lead the broad non-proletarian working masses.

So it is precisely the question of causality, and so on. Stalin, when he explains, "what is the reason that the USSR, despite its cultural backwardness, despite the lack of capital, despite the lack of technically-forged economic cadres, is in a state of increasing economic *growth*?" and is at the front of economic construction decisive *progress* and the advanced capitalist countries, in spite of the abundance of capital and an abundance of technical personnel and a higher level of culture, are in a state of growing economic of *the crisis* and suffer in economic development *defeat after defeat*" [317].

Tov. Stalin sees this reason not in external circumstances, but in the deep inner-necessary *laws* of various economic systems. "The reason," notes t. Stalin, "is in the *difference between the economic systems of the economy* in our country and in the capitalists. The reason is the *failure of the capitalist economic system*. The reason is the *advantages of the Soviet economic system* over the capitalist system" [318].

But modern bourgeois idealistic philosophy prefers *not to talk about the reasons at all*. Machists and other subjective idealists tend to use the abstract expression "functional connection" between phenomena. In this case, the concept of a function denotes a general *connection and interdependence of phenomena*: each of the interrelated phenomena is a function of the other. In other words, the use of the concept of a function in this case smears the fact that this phenomenon, being variously connected with another, can be either an *action* (consequence) or another *cause*.

Such externally "scientific" claims of bourgeois idealistic methodology, its desire to completely exorcise the concept of "causal relationship" have as its source an idealistic *denial by it of objective causal connections*.

The dialectical understanding of the interaction of causes and effects has nothing to do with such a *relativistic view*. All our ideas about the causal connection of phenomena develop in connection with *human practical activity*: they are strengthened, confirmed hourly by our practice. For the last time we have a particularly large growth of mysticism, the negation of causality in bourgeois science. A number of discoveries in the field of the structure of matter are used by bourgeois scientists to deny causality. These are the works of physicists: Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Planck, and others.

The split into reason and action, with all their internal unity and connection, exists objectively, regardless of our knowledge, in the things themselves. Causes and actions undoubtedly interact with each other; each cause is already in the fetus and carries its action and back; nevertheless, in *this connection of phenomena, it is precisely the reason that* each time is the *starting* point of the movement — its initial, defiant, generating, *active* moment. Since the effect of a cause stems from the very essence of the regularity of this phenomenon, this effect of causes must be the original, *previous* corollary and in time moment. However, Hume has already noticed that to say: "This phenomenon occurs after that (post hoc)" does not mean yet: "It is *due* to that (propter hoc)". Speaking about the reason, it is important to emphasize that in it we have not only the starting point of interaction, but also the *defining condition causing, generating* this effect, the given object, *reproducing* it in a *certain way* .

To talk only about the functional connection of phenomena means essentially to confine ourselves with stating their mutual connection, without trying to get to the objective *basis* of their interaction: this position clearly leads to *relativism* , to sophistry! Replace the knowledge of the causes of the knowledge of all conditions at all - mean to take the path of *eclecticism* , which can not be isolated from the whole *total* weight of the possible conditions of *the special* , the most essential conditions *actually determine in this context* the nature of the investigation. Meanwhile, in the process of human activity, there is a continuous "release", isolation of such determining, *essential conditions* . (causes) of the whole mass of other conditions — more general, less significant, etc. The close *connection with practice* allows the *materialistic* understanding of causality to overcome both the relativism of "functional theory" and eclecticism, which replaces causality with "conditions".

It is also extremely important to be able to distinguish the causes of events from the *external cause* that led them: you need to remember the *internal* connection that always exists between the cause and the effect. Finally, in the process of *concrete* study of this phenomenon, among the causes of the phenomenon, one must be able to find the root, *main* reasons that can later cause a repetition of this phenomenon, distinguish these main reasons from the causes of special, specific, temporary, which have only a passing value, also taken into account by us in order to recreate the entire specific situation.

So, for example, Comrade Stalin raised the question of the reasons for our difficulties on the grain front in 1928. The right-wing opposition sought these reasons only in planned miscalculations, losing sight of the main reasons. Tov. Stalin revealed the *main* reasons, the *essence* of our difficulties, which then consisted in the dispersion of small peasant farming at that stage and the need for its collectivization. Tov. At the same time, Stalin also noted specific, temporary causes of difficulties — the rapid growth of solvent demand from the peasantry, the unfavorable state of the price of bread, mistakes of the planned leadership, etc.

It is easy to see that only such a deep understanding of the laws and causes of these phenomena can help us correctly highlight our *goals and objectives* . This inextricable link between causes and goals, however, is often ignored by bourgeois science, opposing *expediency to causal knowledge* . The causal, or causal, point of view on the interdependence between phenomena for a long time has opposed a completely different, frankly idealistic view - the *teleological* point of view . According to teleology, any phenomenon, whether it has a place in nature or in public life, is the fulfillment of a certain *goal* . Implementation of *goals* - all the same, the goals set by God, or the goals of the internal characteristic of the subject, - leads this phenomenon to development, to *perfection* . Therefore, the "teleologists" say, if we establish in the observed phenomena a connection of constancy, regularities, then we should consider these relations not at all from the point of view of the causes generating them, but from the point of view of how certain higher goals are realized in them.

Such a view leads its original origin from *religious* ideas about the "divine providence." Church writers, beginning with the "father of the church," Augustine, especially zealously attached teleology to an understanding of social life; human life on earth was depicted by them as the path of sinful trials leading to a higher goal, to a different "kingdom", to the erection of the "city of God", etc.

Together with the development of productive forces and the development of scientific knowledge, the teleological point of view itself was modified. The "goal" was no longer sought beyond phenomena, but within *them* : the expedient nature of a natural phenomenon is declared to be intrinsic to this phenomenon, its *immanent* expediency.

The doctrine of the internal expediency of the structure of things was advanced by Aristotle. This teleological view has received the highest development from Leibniz, in his theory that the world is built from isolated entities (souls) - "monads". Each monad, according to Leibniz, represents the realization of some *innergoal* that drives its development. In idealistic philosophy, a distinction is

gradually created between the "active cause" (*causa efficiens*), that is, the cause in our usual understanding, and the "final cause" (*causa finalis*) or goal.

The best example of internal expediency, which is most often indicated by "teleologists", is the expedient structure of organisms in animals and plants; here the structure of each organ seems to find its justification in the function it performs. On the perverted understanding of this internal expediency of the structure of organisms, some modern bourgeois biological theories rest. Such, in particular, is the background of all *vitalistic* theories that ascribe to living organisms the existence of some special vital force (for the modern leader of vitalism, Drish, etc.). The study of intrinsic and organic expediency is carried out by bourgeois idealistic science and, in the study of social life, by representatives of the "organic school" and neo-Kantianism in the "subjective sociology" of the Narodniks. All these areas of bourgeois science believe that causal study is unsuitable for history and must be replaced or supplemented by the search for internal goals and higher values that are supposedly carried out in the development of society.

The strongest blow of teleology in natural science was delivered by Darwin. He pointed out that the very expediency of the structure of organisms must find and find for itself a *causal* and natural explanation. This expediency is not at all explained by the rationality of their organization, but by the death for many millennia of all unsuitable for the conditions of existence, the "inexpedient" of the constructed species. It is obvious that nature does not set itself conscious goals. Most importantly, however, the teleological point of view quite inconsistently *contrasts* causal explanation of phenomena and their expedient nature of one another, that it arbitrarily divorces one side of the case from the other. It is impossible to isolate the question "for what" certain actions of people flow, for which, for example, ciliate cilia are needed, for example, this phenomenon takes place from the question "why". To do so means either to *pre-suppose, outside the actual connection of phenomena, a realization of their rational will*, or at least to consider in advance that the "goal" *does not depend on the causes of the phenomenon*.

Meanwhile, a thing in all respects, including in the "goal" it implements, must be understood from the conditions causing it: *every full definition of this phenomenon, every explanation, "why" it proceeds in a certain way, contains in itself and an explanation of "for what", for what purpose this phenomenon is being performed*. When we figured out why the eyes were arranged expediently, then by this we established and "for what" they are so arranged. If we explain why, according to what laws, these public actions of people are performed, and show that they can be accomplished only in the direction of this and not another goal, then by this we will much more fully and correctly explain the goal that these public actions. Communism Marx and Engels did not explain as an ideal condition that must be established, but as a real historical movement that destroys the current state and, by revealing the laws of capitalist development and class struggle, thereby clarified the historical mission of the proletariat.

"The concept of a goal," according to Hegel, "is *equivalent to a simple definition of the object itself*." "In fact," Lenin comments on Hegel, "the goals of man are generated by the objective world and suggest it," they find him, as given, present. But *it seems to man that his goals outside the world are taken, they are independent of the world ("freedom")* " <sup>[319]</sup> . Expediency should not be mechanistically discarded in the course of our study of reality, but it should not be ideally opposed to regularity and causality, it requires a special, but nonetheless causal and regular explanation of it. The expediency of the phenomena of nature and social actions of man, we must therefore be considered as a *special*, a specific expression, a special form of manifestation of their laws, their causal relationship, the main tendency of their development.

The internal expediency of the structure of organisms is a special expression of the *unity of the whole* and of the individual parts, the unity of the content of the functions of the body and their forms.

The meaning of the concept of goal in public life is that it allows one to study phenomena in continuous connection with practice — with the practical role of things, with social actions of a person. "The idea, as *truth*, - Lenin notes, - Hegel approaches *through* practical expedient human activity," he goes "from a subjective concept and a subjective goal to *objective truth*" <sup>[320]</sup> .

Marxism-Leninism does not at all deny the meaning of goals in a person's social life, in the practice of class struggle, but, on the contrary, reveals their real historical significance. The pursuit of certain goals, indicate Marx and Engels, a characteristic feature of social life, the socio-historical actions of people, distinguishing them from elemental forces and the laws of nature. Already analyzing the simple process of labor, Marx shows all the profound difference of expediently directed labor from the labor of the most skillful bee. All the development of technology expresses these distinctive features of the purposeful activity of man.

Explaining certain provisions of Hegel and translating them into the language of materialist dialectics, Lenin emphasizes the logical basis of our expedient activity, its *objective character* as a form of an objective process. At the same time, Lenin explains that the opposition of human goals to the laws of nature has its basis in the very process of cognition and in the peculiarities of human cognition "not immediately and not just coinciding" with cognizable nature. "The laws of the external world of nature ... the essence of the basis of *expedient* human activity" [321] . - "Two forms of the *objective* process: nature (mechanical and chemical) and *goal-setting* human activity ... At first, human goals seem alien ("other") to nature. Human consciousness, science ... reflects the essence, substance of nature, but at the same time, this consciousness is external in relation to nature (not immediately, not just coinciding with it) " [322] .

The collision of goals pursued by various people and entire social classes has led so far to the fact that social life developed according to spontaneous laws, not according to a predetermined plan, not in accordance with the goals set.

Marx shows how a contradiction arises between the capitalist's *limited goal* — the increase in surplus value, and the *means* for this goal — an unlimited increase in production and the unconditional development of social productive forces.

However, it would be erroneous to think that under capitalism the class goals of the bourgeois classes and the proletariat, which are fighting among themselves, are not pursued and do not achieve the class goals.

The bourgeoisie uses the state power as an instrument of forcible suppression of the proletariat and all the working people. The task of the proletariat is to overthrow the bourgeoisie, deprive it of state power, and use *this weapon* in the course of *their* class goals.

The implementation of these class goals by the dictatorship of the proletariat leads to the fact that the contradiction between "means" and "goals" characteristic of capitalist production disappears, that the *ultimate goal of the* proletarian struggle - "organizing socialism on the ruins of capitalism" (*Lenin*) - is fully in line and in unity with its means — the growing economic and political power of the Soviet country — on the basis of the planned, purposeful activities of the working class and its party.

#### 4.6. Necessity and chance

"Every single thing ," says Lenin, "is connected in thousands of transitions with a different *kind* of individual (things, phenomena, processes). And so on. *Already* here there are elements, rudiments, concepts of *necessity* , objective connection of nature, etc. Random and necessary, the phenomenon and the essence is already here, for saying: Ivan is a man, Bug is a dog, *it* is a leaf of a tree, etc., we *discard* a number of signs, as *random* , we separate the essential from the being and oppose one another " [323] .

Recognition of the existence of an objective connection throughout the world, recognition of the need for everything accomplished — or, as they say, its determinism (conditionality) — is one of the most important starting *prerequisites* of our knowledge, only under the condition of the universal connection does the materialistic dependence of the phenomena of consciousness become apparent .

However, one recognition of the dominant connection in the world, the recognition of determinism, does not yet serve as a *watershed* between the two main lines in philosophy - between materialism and idealism. The mere statement of need is far from predetermined by *character*. dependence existing between being and consciousness. It is possible to recognize the necessity of all occurring phenomena and at the same time look for the basis of this need for thinking, in objective "spirit", in God, etc. On the basis of mere statement of need alone, it is easy to combine both mechanical materialists and even some idealists. The father of revisionism is Ed. Bernstein believed that in order to be a materialist, it suffices only to assert the need for everything that is happening, to be a determinist. F. Mehring, objecting to Bernstein, quite reasonably referred to such thinkers as Voltaire and Schopenhauer, who were adamant determinists, which did not prevent them from remaining ardent enemies of materialism. Determinism can be the starting premise of dialectical materialist knowledge only in a strictly its *materialistic* understanding: the *content* of materialistic determinism arises from the relationship between being and consciousness established by materialism. Equally important is the form recognized by us need.

In the reality around us, at every step, in each *individual* case, something appears at first glance just the opposite of this need — an *accident* appears . Marx states this, for example, in the entire sphere of capitalist competition, "over which, if we consider each *individual* case, *chance* prevails , in which consequently the *internal law* , which is enforced among these accidents and regulates them, becomes noticeable only under the condition large masses " [324] .

Necessity and contingency are usually *contrasted with* one another. Random events are those events, facts, actions that apparently do not find an explanation for themselves in the necessary course of things. Accidentally, a person was crushed by a car, we accidentally met a friend on the street, accidentally won a government loan, and so on. Not knowing how to explain chance, bourgeois science at first seeks either to limit our knowledge to the range of phenomena in which the need for causality is most clearly manifested phenomena, or completely banish the concept of "chance" from the field of scientific knowledge, declaring chance a purely subjective concept. Together with Spinoza, the whole mechanistic philosophy asserts that "a random phenomenon is called solely *because of the lack of our knowledge*". Everything has its reasons, and therefore, everything happens is necessary. But we can not always accurately determine *all the* causes that caused this phenomenon. A number of reasons led to the fact that the car was driving down the street, another row brought a person there, and as a result of the mutual action of these two series of reasons, an event happened. So, says the mechanist, everything that *seems* random happens in reality is *necessary*. The notion of chance is, therefore, of relative importance - only in relation to the unidentified causal connection of phenomena. The latter view is confirmed, as it were, by the laws of statistics, which establish a certain regularity in the most "accidents": the strict repetition of cases of car victims, suicides, etc.

In Soviet literature, Comrade Bukharin expressed a mechanistic view of chance: identifying chance with impartiality, Comrade Bukharin argues that we speak of contingency only because we do not know all the causal causal series that intersect: *. causeless* no phenomena. Phenomena may appear to us "random", since we do not know enough of their causes " <sup>[325]</sup> .

This point of view, however, speaks of a purely *mechanical* understanding of necessity. Accident is not causelessness at all. Causality is one character of the links between processes in the objective world. Accident and necessity are a different type of these connections. These types of relationships involve each other. However, this does not at all imply that these types of relations should be identified. The concept of necessity does not at all exclude *accidents* that also have an *objective* meaning. To recognize the objective nature of accidents does not mean at all to deny the fact that they are caused by certain reasons. Every chance has its extremely complex *reasons*. More precisely, absolutely everything is causally caused - even the fact that a dry leaf of a tree fell on my hand, and not on the ground, that I choked for food. But it is obvious that such an abstract *declaration of everything in the world is necessary*, all sorts of arguments about the need for "in general" *do not explain anything* to us. But the most important thing is to find out what each time the specific, *special nature of this particular manifestation of this need*. Consistent materialism must *give the phenomena a concrete explanation*. A dialectical materialist, therefore, speaks not only of causation, but always studies concrete, definite forms of this necessity. Can't speak *only* about the necessity of this phenomenon or event when it is a *separate* event, entering as part of the *general* course of events, *does not significantly affect the basic* pattern of development. The abstract recognition by us of everything "necessary" will not differ from the old theological determinism, which explained absolutely everything in the world by the predetermined will of "divine providence."

As Engels points out, metaphysical thinking is therefore lost in this "impassable" opposition between necessity and contingency, because it purely *abstractly* imagines necessity, certainly *excluding chance from the general process*. In this case, there are two types of metaphysical worldview. Some believe that "some thing, some relation, some process is *either* random *or* necessary, *but it cannot be either*" <sup>[326]</sup>. For example, the old natural scientists declared the main species signs of animals and plants necessary, and the rest signs random. Only the necessary signs they declared the only worthy of scientific interest, and all the random - indifferent to science. But with this view in relation *to chance, any scientific explanation ceases*, and therefore it becomes possible to reduce the accidental to supernatural reasons.

So an abstract understanding of necessity leads to religious ideas.

Other representatives of mechanical materialism *completely* deny randomness, giving it a purely subjective meaning. At the same point of view are the Soviet modern mechanists. In this case, according to Engels, "the so-called necessity remains a *simple phrase* ... Accident is *not explained* here out of necessity: rather the opposite." Once everything is necessary, then the very "*need is reduced to something purely random*" <sup>[327]</sup>.

A proper understanding of necessity therefore does not at all eliminate the concept of chance as an objective category. Accident is not causelessness at all. Hegel rightly wrote on this subject that science has as its subject matter the discovery of "the necessity hidden behind seeming accident; but it should not imagine that chance is *only the product of our subjective thought* and that it is necessary to reject it in order to reach the truth" <sup>[328]</sup>. But for the idealist Hegel, the category of chance was a



step in the development of the objective *spirit*, world consciousness. The modern Menshevik idealists, taking randomness under their "defense", turn the whole question into a scholastic discussion of purely logical concepts.

Accidental is *necessary*, since every chance is included in the dominant connection between nature and society; and at the same time, random is *not necessary*, because chance is not *essential* for the development of a given pattern and does not have a significant effect on the course of its development, since here, on the place of one chance with the same general pattern, another chance due to others external causes, and not the most internal laws.

Accident is therefore the *addition of necessity* (its opposite) and the *form of manifestation of the same necessity*. Due to the complexity of social development, chance often turns out to be the *historical concrete form in which social need is fulfilled*. The aspirations of people "intersect," says Engels, "and in all such societies, therefore, *necessity* prevails, the addition and form of which is an *accident*" [329]. "Necessity," according to Engels, "is composed entirely of purest accidents, and these imaginary accidents constitute a form beyond which necessity is hidden" [330].

The role and significance of each randomness is *governed by necessity*, and at the same time, randomness *forms* this necessity. Each individual phenomenon bears the *essential* imprint of the dominant pattern and at the same time has some features that are *not essential* for this pattern. Each individual coincidence is *balanced by other accidents* and therefore may not affect the *general* course of development, its main trends.

However, this does not mean that chance plays *no* role in the development of necessity. It must play a certain role precisely because it represents a *special form of necessity*. Darwin also pointed out that small "random" changes in the organism, intensifying, can lead to changes in the very "necessary" nature of a biological species. "History," wrote Marx to Kugelmann about the role of the individual in history, "would have a very mystical character, if 'accidents' would not play *any* role. These accidents *are included*, of course, itself an integral part in the overall development, *balancing the other accidents*. But *acceleration and deceleration* strongly depends on these accidents" [331]. Everything depends, of course, on how much a given chance is *essential for a given connection of phenomena*. It cannot be said, as the previous bourgeois historians did, that the course of history depended on the beauty of Cleopatra's nose or on the cold of Napoleon. But undoubtedly, for example, the apparent dementia and short-sightedness of the last representatives of the house of the Romanovs only *accelerated the revolutionary explosion* in Russia. There is no doubt that the genius of Marx and Lenin had a tremendous accelerating effect on the development of the revolutionary labor movement.

#### 4.7. Opportunity and reality

The essence and the basis, the content and the form, the law, the need - all these basic concepts of dialectical logic are the steps in the process of cognition of the material world, the essence of the form of thinking in which the cognized *reality* finds its diverse reflection.

When we speak of reality, we mean something deeper than just the actual *existence of individual things* or than their immediate, external *existence*. As Hegel pointed out, reality is a unity, an integral totality of all internal and external moments that form it, the ratio of all sides; the process of development of reality is *anecessary*, internally determined, natural process. "Separate being (object, phenomenon, etc.)," Hegel develops his thought, "is (only) *one side of the idea* (truth). Truth still needs other aspects of *reality ... The totality of all aspects of the phenomenon, of reality and their (inter)relationships* are what make up the truth" [332].

The idealist Hegel, as already known, identified the necessity, the regularity of things with the laws of the mind, with the development of absolute spirit. Hence his famous position: everything real is *rational*, everything rational is *valid*. This provision Hegel applied to the course of socio-historical development - due to the idealistic expression, which it received from Hegel - often led his followers to the *reactionary* conclusions: the so-called "right-Hegelians" it served as a justification for *existing* in a society of oppression and exploitation. Since everything is really rational, they interpreted, including, for example, our famous critic Belinsky, who at one time was entirely under the spell of the "philosophical cap of Egor Fedorovich" (i.e. Hegel), which means that Prussian semi-feudal monarchy and autocracy are also necessary and necessary Nikolay Palkin, etc.: all this, they say, has its justification in the laws of the development of the world spirit. Hegel himself, however, put into his thought a different, essentially revolutionary, content. He distinguished between the simple external existence of things, which may be unreasonable, and their reality, which must be reasonably necessary.

"Reality as a unity of internal and external is so little opposed to reason that, on the contrary, it is completely rational; and that which is *unreasonable is precisely why it should not be regarded as*

valid " [333] . "The reality that does not correspond to the concept is simply a *subjective, random , arbitrary phenomenon , not true*" [334] .

Everything that is rational or, in the materialistic language, everything historically necessary should become a reality: therefore, all unreasonable public institutions that still exist, but no longer have internal foundations in the necessary, regular course of history, should sooner or later be destroyed by the course of historical development. Hegel distinguishes reality from the temporal, random realities, "corresponding to the idea," that is, it regards it as something essential, internally necessary, and natural.

Marxism reveals this materialistic content behind Hegel's idealistic shell of thought. However, it cannot be limited to a single translation of the Hegelian proposition on the rationality of the real into a language of historical necessity, as for example Plekhanov does. It should not be forgotten that this position itself led to the reactionary defense of the Prussian feudal order [335]. To confine ourselves to the recognition that everything real is historically conditioned and in this sense necessary, it means that one can easily slip into the path of objectivism, fatalism, contemplative materialism. The bourgeois philosopher, Stammmler, was once ironic, indicating that if socialism is historically inevitable, then there is no need to fight to accelerate its offensive, as there is no need to create a party for the onset of a lunar eclipse. Struve argued, on the other hand, that if capitalism in Russia is historically necessary, then there is no need to fight with it. Kautsky later tried, with the same arguments, to come out in defense of imperialism, which is also historically necessary! The Russian Mensheviks, including Plekhanov, they abstractly argued the historical inevitability of the bourgeois revolution for Russia and did not really seek our historical development for those forces that could change the whole character of this revolution and lead the proletariat to victory. Meanwhile, the most important aspect, the necessary moment in the development of reality is the human *activity , our practice ,* which sets forth certain *goals* and implements them by constantly *transforming* external reality in the process of its cognition.

"Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate reality" [336] . A person's will, divorced from external reality, suffers from subjectivism and itself hinders the achievement of its goals.

Marxist-Leninist cognition implies not only strict consideration of the totality of *all moments* and aspects of reality and its *development ,* its development at each specific stage, it also implies taking into account the real *possibilities of the course of historical development, its conditions ,* its driving forces, including *activities of the revolutionary class in its development, its revolutionary practice, taking into account the ways and means necessary to turn an opportunity into reality .* "The development of the totality of moments of reality NB = the essence of dialectical cognition" [337] , Lenin points out.

In this regard, it should be pointed out that the Marxist-Leninist theory emphasizes the distinction that exists between possibility and *reality ,* and at the same time notes the essential significance that real possibilities have for the development of reality.

When we speak of the possibility of anything, a strict distinction must be made between an *abstract ,* purely formal possibility and a *real* possibility. From the point of view of formal logic, it is possible to absolutely everything that you can think of, what you can imagine (without formal logical contradictions), everything that you can come up with any logical basis. Here the opportunity turns into an abstract, *subjective* concept; the content of one or another conceivable possibility is pulled out of a definite, objectively necessary connection of things. The dialectician Hegel, evil, mocked such talk of empty, abstract possibilities: air; it is possible that the Turkish Sultan would become Pope, because he - the person may itself apply to the Christian faith, to become a Catholic priest, and so on ... The uneducated man, the less he knows. *certain ratio of objects* that he wants to be seen, the more it is inclined to spread about every kind of *empty* Perhaps, as it happens for example in the political field with the so-called policy of beer ... reasonable, practical people do not allow themselves to seduce possible because it is possible, and hold for a valid " [338] .

The most profound substantiation of this difference between abstract and real possibilities was given by the Marxist-Leninist theory. Lenin repeatedly underlines that *possibility is not yet reality ,* that Marxists should proceed not from abstract possibility, etc., but from reality. Lenin argued the entire fallacy of the views of R. Luxemburg, which, during the war, put forward such an empty, abstract "opportunity" —the transformation of an imperialist war into a national defensive war. In his notes on Bukharin's "Economy in Transition", Lenin pointed out the complete fallacy of Comrade Bukharin's abstract discourse on the "possibility" or "impossibility" of restoring capitalist relations during their disintegration outside of the examination of these discourses by *practice:* "" Impossibility

"is provable only practically, said Lenin. "The author does not put the dialectical relation of theory to practice" <sup>[339]</sup> .

At the same time, criticizing the Menshevik Sukhanov, Lenin pointed out that the uniqueness of the situation in the era of imperialism opened up the possibility of a different transition to the creation of basic premises of civilization than in all other Western European states, and that this possibility does not violate the general pattern of world history, but lies along the general line of world development.

It is extremely important to identify the *real possibilities* of development and the *conditions* for their transformation into reality. Real possibility has its own *objective, necessary foundations* in the very content of a developing reality, in the laws of its development. The real possibility is already something not only conceivable, but also objectively existing, it consists in a certain number of conditions which are inherent in the objective reality itself and which therefore contribute to the development of this latter. However, we must firmly remember that the *real possibility is not yet reality* . One real opportunity can be countered by *other* real possibilities, also having known objective bases in reality itself, although not laid down in this reality with absolute necessity. The process of the development of reality is a process in which the range of possibilities is gradually more and more determined and thus the range of possibilities is limited, in which all other possibilities gradually disappear and finally one certain *possibility turns into reality* .

What is the reason for the victory of one opportunity over other possibilities? First of all, this victory is due to the presence in the structure of the given object of objective, necessary grounds in favor of the implementation of this particular definite opportunity and the absence of such necessary grounds in favor of another opportunity. For example, Lenin pointed out at the beginning of NEP and on the possibility of a split between the two cooperating classes, the workers and peasants. "If serious class disagreements arise between these classes, then a split will be inevitable, but in our social system it's not *necessary to establish such a split* " <sup>[340]</sup> .

To understand the conditions for the victory of any opportunity, when we talk about the socio-historical reality, it is not enough to talk about its objective necessity: here our decisive *activity* also plays a decisive role , turning possibilities into reality. Here a definite struggle of the social class solves, aimed at maintaining and strengthening one real possibility and at weakening, preventing, destroying all other possibilities.

Here, the important role is played by certain *ways and means* by which this activity and this struggle are directed and used. The main task of our party, Lenin saw, was to closely monitor the circumstances from which "a split can flow out and *warn them* " <sup>[341]</sup> .

It is extremely interesting to trace all the moments of the development of reality on the problem of the possibility of building socialism in one country. Trotsky's position was characterized by a *subjective-idealistic, abstract understanding of the possibility*, in fact leading to the opportunist, and later leading him to counter-revolutionary conclusions. Trotsky denied that the working class in Russia would be able to remain in power without the direct state support of the European proletariat. Denying this real opportunity, the possibility for the working class to build socialism in one country, Trotsky at the same time put forward such an abstract, empty opportunity as the "one-act" world revolution, in which the working class of one country begins a revolution in full confidence that his initiative will immediately give push revolution in other countries. "The genuine upsurge of the socialist economy," Menshevik Trotsky "argued", "will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the most important countries of Europe" <sup>[342]</sup> . Subjectivism in understanding the possibilities of the proletarian revolution easily forced Trotsky to switch from these unreasonable views to the outwardly opposite position of complete "hopelessness." "And if this had not happened, it would be hopeless to think ... that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could resist in the face of a conservative Europe" <sup>[343]</sup> .

In complete opposition to Trotsky, in his understanding of the possibility of building socialism in one country, Lenin proceeds from the law laid down in the historical reality itself, from the law of uneven development of capitalism, which is especially strengthened and sharpened during the period of imperialism. "The unevenness of economic and political development is the unconditional law of capitalism. It follows that the victory of socialism is possible initially in a few or even in one capitalist country taken separately " <sup>[344]</sup> . Lenin accurately defined that range of *conditions*. which creates a real opportunity for us to build a socialist society: the power of the proletarian state on all major means of production, the power of the state in the hands of the proletariat, its alliance with millions of small and tiny peasants and the leadership of these latter by the proletariat, the development of cooperation, etc. Is this not all that is necessary to build a complete socialist society? This is not yet a building of a socialist society, but it is all *necessary and sufficient* for this building " <sup>[345]</sup> .

At the same time, Lenin noted that "the free association of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less long, stubborn *struggle of the socialist republics with backward*

states" <sup>[346]</sup> . Lenin pointed out at the beginning of the recovery period, that although the imperialists as a result of the intervention, and could not overthrow the new system created by the revolution, but "they did not give him a chance to make *right now* a step forward, which would have justified the forecasts of the socialists, who would give them *the possibility of a huge to quickly* develop the productive forces, *to develop all the possibilities that would have developed in socialism*, to prove to everyone and everyone clearly, with their own eyes, that socialism is fraught with gigantic powers and that humanity has now passed to a new stage, which carries extraordinarily brilliant possibilities of development " <sup>[347]</sup> .

*Tov. Stalin develops further the teaching of Lenin on the real possibility of building socialism in one country.* While fighting on two fronts, with Trotskyism and right-wing opportunism, Comrade Stalin found out the enormous significance that *confidence* in this possibility has for our practical action , which the Trotskyists denied, found *ways and means* of turning this possibility into reality that the rightists did not see and pervert. .

"What is the *possibility of the* victory of socialism in one country?"

To this question, Comrade Stalin replies: "This is the possibility of resolving contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry by the internal forces of our country, the possibility of the seizure of power by the proletariat and the use of this power to build a full socialist society in our country" <sup>[348]</sup> . And, in contrast to the Trotskyists, this real possibility of building socialism in our country differs from the question of the impossibility of the *final* victory of socialism in one country without the victory of the revolution in other countries, Comrade Stalin says: "Without such an opportunity, building socialism is building without perspective, building without confidence socialism ... The denial of such an opportunity is disbelief in the construction of socialism, a departure from Leninism " <sup>[349]</sup> .

However, " there is a big difference between the *possibility of* building socialism and *its actual construction* . It is impossible to confuse opportunity with reality " <sup>[350]</sup> . Along with this opportunity, which the Trotskyists did not want to see, there was another possibility that the right opportunists had forgotten — the possibility of the restoration of capitalism in our country. Only in the *struggle* against this last opportunity, in its prevention and destruction, only under certain *conditions* does the possibility of building socialism in our country come about and turns from possibility into reality. " *We can* destroy the *opportunity* the restoration of capitalism, we can root out the roots of capitalism and achieve a final victory over capitalism *if* we carry out the hard work of electrifying the country, *if* we put together the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, industry, agriculture and transport <sup>[351]</sup> .

Summing up at the XVI Party Congress the results of the struggle against Trotskyism and right-wing opportunism, Comrade Stalin pointed out: "The Soviet system provides tremendous opportunities for the complete victory of socialism. But the *possibility is* not yet *reality* . To turn an opportunity into reality, a number of conditions are necessary, including the party line and the correct implementation of this line play an important role " <sup>[352]</sup> . These conditions were not understood by the right deviationists, despite the fact that they abstractly recognized the possibility of building socialism in our country. "The trouble of the right deviationists is that, recognizing *formally the* possibility of building socialism in one country, they do not want to recognize *those ways and means* struggle, without which it is impossible to build socialism " <sup>[353]</sup> . Thus, in practice, right-wing deviationists rolled into the viewpoint of denying the possibility of building socialism in our country.

Speaking about the results of the first five-year plan, Comrade Stalin therefore emphasized the *need and real opportunity* for us *to* implement the policy of the most accelerated rates in the first five-year plan: Only in this way could the country be given the opportunity to quickly re-equip on the basis of new technology and finally get out on a wide road. " "But did the party have a *real opportunity* implement the policy of the most accelerated pace. Yes, it did. She had this opportunity not only because she managed to shake the country in time in the spirit of fast progress, but above all because she could rely on widespread new construction on old or renovated factories and plants that had already been mastered by workers and engineers. in view of this, the technical personnel have been *able to carry out the* most accelerated rates of development " <sup>[354]</sup> .

In the second five-year plan, especially in its first years, there is no longer any need to implement the policy of the most accelerated rates, since a certain period is required to master and fully use the new technology.

Mastering the new technology, organizational and economic strengthening of the collective farms - these are the ways and means, those are the conditions that will make it possible to turn into reality the real possibilities of the complete victory of socialism, already conquered by the proletariat, which will lead to the destruction of classes and the construction of a complete socialist society.

#### 4.8. General nature of categories

Criticizing the theoretical eclecticism of Trotsky and Bukharin on the issue of trade unions, Lenin established four basic requirements of materialist-dialectical logic. Here he makes, firstly, the requirement to study the subject from all its sides, in all its connections and mediations, despite the fact that we will never "fully achieve this"; secondly, the requirement to "take the object in its *development* and self-movement," in changing its connections; thirdly, according to Lenin, "all human practice must be included in the full" definition "of the subject both as a *criterion of truth* and as a practical determinant of the connection of the subject with what is *necessary for man*". Fourthly, the requirement of *concreteness* of knowledge.

These concise, but deeply substantive provisions put forward by Lenin, we must bear in mind when considering the *categories* of materialist dialectics.

Let us dwell on the most important features of the categories of dialectical logic.

The main and most important requirement of materialist dialectics, Lenin points out, is "the *objectivity* of consideration (not examples, not deviations, but a thing in itself)" [355]. This is the basic premise of the materialist theory of reflection. The categories of materialist dialectics are not *empty* concepts of formal logic, but meaningful forms *reflecting the objective*, material, concrete content of the knowable world. These are "moments of man's knowledge of nature." "The form of the reflection of nature in the knowledge of man, this form is the concepts, laws, categories" [356]. In logical concepts there is something subjective, since these are concepts of human thinking, since they only reflect objective processes in our consciousness. While logical concepts remain "abstract" concepts, as long as they remain divorced from the processes they reflect, they are subjective. However, it is important for us to emphasize that in the process of knowledge, our concepts more and more fully express the objective content of the world. "Human notions," Lenin summarizes, "are *subjective* in their abstractness, isolation, but *objective* in general, in the process, as a result, in the trend, in the source" [357].

But the subject, the thing, any question, as we already know, must be studied in all its connections and mediations; must be taken, as Lenin formulates, "the whole aggregate of the many-sided *relations* of this thing to others." The "development of this thing (of the phenomenon), its own movement, its own life" [358] should be studied.

These requirements of dialectical logic primarily apply to the most general concepts. Each concept is in a certain respect, in a certain connection with *all* the others. This is because each concept, taken separately, reflects any *one side* of a single objective reality. "The *totality* of all aspects of the phenomenon, reality and their (inter) *relationship* is what makes up the truth," Lenin points out. "Relations (= transitions = contradictions) of concepts = main content of logic" [359].

The categories of logic, its basic concepts should be considered by us in their interrelations - in those connections and relations that exist between essence and phenomenon, between content and form, between possibility and reality. *Each category is associated with all other categories*. These concepts do not "flow out" purely logically one from the other, as idealists believe, but reflect the objective world, nature and society from various sides.

However, this circumstance does not mean that the categories of logic are fixed: in the fixed, dead notions, the living life of nature and society, with all its changes, its connections and changes of these connections, could not get the correct reflection ... "If everything develops," asks in one Lenin's place - does this relate to the most general *concepts and categories of thinking*? If not, then thinking is not connected with being. If yes, then there is a dialectic of concepts and a dialectic of knowledge, which has an objective meaning " [360]. Therefore, along with the interdependence of the concepts of *all* "without exception", Lenin also emphasizes the " *transitions of concepts from one to another*, all without exception. "Human notions," he notes, "are not immobile, but eternally move, transform into each other, pour one into another, without this they do not reflect living life. The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the "art of operating with them" (*Engels*) always requires studying the *movement of concepts*, their connection, their mutual transitions " [361].

This movement and development of concepts is not, however, a purely logical self-movement of the concept itself; *the process* of human knowledge reflects the objective movement of nature and society and human activity. Knowledge of the world, its reflection, the unity of the subject with the object, with things, is a *process*. Only in the *process* of cognition, reflecting the process of changing the objective world and therefore only gradually, side by side, step by step, covering the universal connection and pattern of the real world, - in a number of relative truths, our knowledge of absolute truth takes shape.

Therefore, Lenin compares the knowledge of a person reflecting this world with a river, and the concepts with individual drops of a river reflecting particular aspects, positions and connections of

things. "Concepts as *accounting for* individual aspects of movement, individual drops (= "things"), separate jets" <sup>[362]</sup> .

The development of the most common concepts, categories of logic is inextricably linked with the entire history of human society, with the practice of material production and the process of production development. It is connected with the *history of thinking*, with the history of philosophy.

Every process of development is a process proceeding as a result of the struggle of opposites. We must study, Lenin continues to enumerate the elements of dialectics, the development of a thing, "internal contradictory *tendencies* ( *and sides*) in this thing", "a thing as a sum and *unity of opposites* ", "a struggle or development of these opposites, contradictory strivings, etc." <sup>[363]</sup> .

Accordingly, our concepts "must also be hewn, broken, flexible, mobile, relative, interconnected, united in opposites in order to embrace the world" <sup>[364]</sup> . The reflection of nature in human thought, Lenin says, must be understood " *not without movement* , not without contradictions, but in the eternal process of movement, the emergence of contradictions and their resolution" <sup>[365]</sup> . The movement of our knowledge in its internal contradictions is a process in which a *split of the forms of logical knowledge* occurs. . The world is embraced by our thinking in opposite concepts to one another, in mutually exclusive and at the same time interpenetrating one other category: essence and phenomenon, content and form, cause and effect, necessity and chance. These categories are opposites, but these opposites become identical, mutually penetrate each other, they pass one into another.

Distinctive features of the concepts and categories of materialistic dialectics are thus their objectivity, their mutual connection, their movement and mutual transitions, their development on the basis of the unity of opposites. But the concepts of dialectical logic are materialistic *abstractions* . They reflect not individual objects or relations of individual things, but have a *universal* , universal meaning. With the help of logical categories, we reveal a *common* in separate phenomena and objects , we reveal the unity of the general and the particular in each *separate* subject.

Marx, Engels, Lenin, in contrast to the vulgar creeping empiricism of bourgeois science, with all their strength emphasized the enormous scientific significance of materialistic abstractions. They showed that the abstractions of matter, law, etc. , reflect reality more truly , *or rather* , more *accurately* than each individual case or individual of our ideas, because with the help of scientific abstraction we understand the hidden *essence of* phenomena, their *law* , their necessary connection with random signs .

At the same time, Marx, in his Introduction to the Criticism of Political Economy, pointed out that the method of dialectical logic implies that we not only select from the directly given concrete material, through analysis, some defining general relations, the simplest definitions, but also the reverse — ascent, movement from the simplest and abstract to the more complex and more *concrete* , not only disassembly, analysis, but also summation, connection, synthesis.

Each concrete thing is an *infinite* set of sides and relations, each side separately is studied by us by highlighting the general definitions of the essence, laws, and necessary connections. We do not fully know, do not exhaust completely the given subject in its concreteness, studying its general connections and separate sides. However, there is no other way and method to at least get closer to the knowledge of the concrete, as *through the general* , as through the analysis (highlighting) of its individual sides and synthesis, summing up the obtained general concepts, the simplest definitions. This idea is also emphasized by Lenin: "The meaning of the *general* ," he says, "is contradictory, it is dead, it is unclear, incomplete, etc., etc., but it is only the *degree* to the knowledge of the *concrete*, for we never know the concrete completely. The infinite sum of general concepts, laws, etc., gives a concrete in its completeness " <sup>[366]</sup> .

Our cognition reveals directly in being, in immediate phenomena, their essence, their law, their causes, their identity, their difference. "Such," says Lenin, "is truly the *general course of* all human knowledge, of all science in general. Such is the course of *natural science, political economy, and history* " <sup>[367]</sup> . Using the example of Marx's Capital, Marx shows how analysis here takes "the simplest, usual, basic, most massive, most ordinary, billions of times the meeting *attitude of a* bourgeois (commodity) society: the exchange of goods" <sup>[368]</sup> . Marxist analysis reveals in this main cell of bourgeois society the germs of all the contradictions of modern society. The further exposition of Marx shows the development and growth, and the movement of these contradictions and this society in the sum of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end. Lenin shows that in any simple sentence connecting the individual and the common, for example, Ivan is a man, Bug is a dog, is dialectic. " *Already here* ," Lenin emphasizes, "there are elements, beginnings, concepts of *necessity* , objective connection of nature, etc. Random and necessary, phenomenon and essence are already here, for saying: Ivan is a man, Bug is a dog, *it is* a leaf tree, etc., we *discard* a series of signs, as

random, we separate the essential from the being and oppose one to the other " [369] . By any example, Lenin argues, one can show "the transformation of the separate into the general, the accidental into the necessary, transitions, play, interconnection of opposites" [370] .

The categories of logic are the moments of the movement of knowledge, in which there is an ascent from visual contemplation to abstract thinking and a return to concrete reproduction of the concrete by thinking. In scientific thinking, as in actual development, we are thus moving *in a circle* , returning, as it were, to the starting point, to a concrete, objective world, carrying out the unity of analysis and synthesis in the dialectical method. In this same movement of our concepts, opening us total in a separate entity for the phenomena we have the opposition of a part, the essence of the phenomenon, the content of the form, the law of its forms, causes of action, etc. -.. All this movement concepts in the Marxist method of investigation *only reflects the real relationship of things themselves*. The contradictions of categories only reflect the unity of opposites, revealed by us in the objective world that we are studying. This process of research and the movement of thought in "circles" can be accomplished *infinitely by us* , for the sides and properties of things in their development are inexhaustible, because, as things develop, each time even deeper knowledge of their connections and interdependencies is possible, even more complete assimilation of the concrete by thinking for each new abstraction gives us only a partial, relative truth about the subject.

Lenin vividly expressed this idea when he formulated the "circles" of our knowledge:

"The movement of knowledge *to the object*," says Lenin, "can always go only dialectically: to step back, or rather to get there, to retreat, to better jump (to know?). Lines converging and diverging: circles touching each other. Key point = the practice of man and human history " [371] . Or in another place: "The activity of a person who has compiled an objective picture of the world, *changes the external reality*, destroys its certainty (= changes one or another of its sides, qualities), and thus takes away her features of appearance, insignificance and insignificance, "in and of itself and for itself for itself (= objective truth)" [372] .

Practice and even more specifically the technique - the technical practice of humanity, the process of development of its productive forces, Lenin includes in the process of knowledge, inextricably linking *logic and history* in this way , turning categories of dialectical logic into *historical* categories into categories of revolutionary practice. The concepts and categories of dialectical logic - the essence, law, content and form, necessity, possibility and reality - we must consider not only in their connection, in their movement, in the unity of opposites, but also from the point of view of revolutionary practice as a category not only of logical thinking but also revolutionary *action* .

#### **4.9. Formal logic and dialectics**

Dialectics in its historical development had to endure a serious struggle with the metaphysical worldview, which, as we already know (see Chapter III), completely dominated in the XVII – XVIII centuries. and which to this day is a characteristic feature of bourgeois ideology, bourgeois science.

Describing metaphysics, Engels says: "For metaphysics, things and their mental images, that is, concepts, are separate, unchanging, frozen, *once and for all given* objects, subject to study one after the other and one independently of the other. Metaphysicist thinks in *complete, direct oppositions* ; his speech consists of "yes, yes, no — no; what more than that, from the evil one " [373] .

Both idealistic and materialistic metaphysics are suitable for this characteristic, despite the fundamental difference in their starting points. A metaphysical materialist proceeds from the recognition of an objectively real world that exists independently of our consciousness. The idealist completely denies the existence of the material world, or in any case makes its existence dependent on consciousness, thinking, and spirit. But both the first and second equally metaphysically approach the subject of their research whether they are things and concepts, as in the first case, or only concepts, as in the second case.

Metaphysics is distracted from the movement of a thing, from its internal processes, and takes a thing or a concept as something completely *finished* , finished, frozen, given once and for all. Things and concepts for metaphysics *do not arise* they always exist in finished form or arise "suddenly", without any preparation, without a process of becoming. Cash things and concepts do not change in the period of their existence, they are always equal to themselves, new signs do not appear in them, existing ones do not disappear, they are internally fixed, there are no contradictions in them, there is no internal source of movement, there is no self-movement. Therefore, for the world of things, the metaphysician assumes or inevitably must allow some initial force, the first engine, an external impulse that leads or has once set in motion things. The movement of concepts metaphysicist usually puts in an exclusive dependence on the arbitrariness of the subject. He does not understand and does not recognize movement, the inner connection and interdependence of concepts as a reflection of the movement and interrelation of things of the objective, real world.

The metaphysical viewpoint gets its rationale *in formal logic*. Formal logic is born and develops in ancient Greece. The young Greek trading bourgeoisie, who led a cruel criticism of feudal principles and feudal morality in the face of the *sophists*, as the victory of merchant capital is indicated, comes to the need to give a positive justification to the logical methods and forms of thinking that can ensure the stability of the new bourgeois order and the development of its productive forces. This task takes on the logic of *Aristotle*, the brilliant thinker of antiquity, who first formulated the basic laws of logical thinking. For Aristotle himself, his logic still did not bear the character of that logical scholasticism of formal logic in the proper sense of the word, which later followers turned it into, which completely failed to understand its inquiries and searches. According to Engels, Aristotle investigated all essential forms of dialectical thinking. "The logic of Aristotle," says Lenin, "is the inquiry, the quest, the approach to the logic of Hegel," and from it, from the logic of Aristotle (which *everywhere* at every step poses the question of *dialectics*) made the dead scholasticism, discarding all searches, fluctuations, techniques posing questions" [374]. The main disadvantage of Aristotle is that he allows helpless confusion around the main issue, the question of the general and the individual; This confusion is created by the fact that, not doubting the reality of the external world and spontaneously to materialism, Aristotle is *inconsistent* in resolving the issue of the relation of thinking to being. Struggling against the vulgar empiricism, seeing only a single, separate, Aristotle admits the existence of a general concept *independently* of individual objects.

According to Lenin, Aristotle is confused "in the *dialectic of the general and the separate* - the concept and sense-perceptible reality of a separate object, thing, phenomenon" [375]. Lenin shows that this gap between the general and individual, between concepts and sense-perceived reality is characteristic of the entire further development of formal logic, has its gnoseological roots in the *idealistic* formulation of the question of being and thinking, concepts and the things reflected in them: "Primitive idealism: common (concept, idea) is a *separate being*. It seems wild, monstrous (or rather, childish) ridiculous. But is it not in the same way (*quite* the same way) modern idealism, Kant, Hegel, the idea of God?" [376]

Разрыв между общим и отдельным — обозначившийся уже у Аристотеля, получает своё дальнейшее развитие, усиливается и обостряется сначала в средневековой схоластике (так называемый «реализм»), затем в буржуазной логике, особенно по мере того как буржуазия становится консервативной и реакционной силой. Если восходящая буржуазия стремилась превратить логику в метод отыскания новых результатов, внося в неё новые приёмы исследования (например метод индукции, введённый Беконом), то уже в логике Канта мы имеем идеалистический разрыв между миром вещей и нашими понятиями: превращение логических понятий в пустые, бессодержательные формы особенно характерно для логики неокантианства.

As already mentioned above, the categories of dialectical logic reflect objective laws and therefore are *meaningful* forms of thinking. The development of categories of dialectical logic reflects in a generalized form the real development of the objective world and human cognition. The profound difference between formal logic and dialectics is that the concepts and laws of thinking established by formal logic are only *formal* principles of thinking "as such", taken regardless of what the *content* of this thinking is. The author of a large course of formal logic, the bourgeois idealist-neo-Kantian Siegart, for example, considers logic as a collection of *technical methods of thinking*. and says: "Compliance with its rules does not guarantee the necessary material truth of the results, but *only the formal correctness of the techniques*" [377]. Formal logic reflects the external forms of things considered by it as unchanging, frozen. The content of thinking does not interest her even if it is a matter of sheer absurdity. "Formally correct, but essentially mockery," this Leninist characteristic of bureaucracy applies to formal logic.

Formal, metaphysical logic is inevitably *subjective*. in any case, even the materialist metaphysician, thanks to the principles of his formal logic, is always on the verge of subjectivism and sophistry, not to mention the metaphysical idealists. Not seeing in the concepts of reflection of the developing and moving world, formal logic is naturally unable to embrace the world as a unity of opposites, does not notice the internal movement and changes of objects, their comprehensive, often contradictory connections and interactions. She metaphysically regards things and concepts as eternally immutable, as completely separate, isolated, separated from each other, without internal relationships. Therefore, the study of formal logic is not historically. Analysis in formal logic is dead, mechanistic; this is a simple, crude division of things in space, the dissection of an object into its cash, separate parts, pure quantitative disintegration of a thing, its fragmentation. Formal-logical synthesis is also dead, mechanistic, non-historical - this is the simple addition of the presence of these things, bringing them into a purely external spatial or temporal relationship. Analysis and synthesis are considered purely subjectively as simple research techniques. Indeed, scientific analysis and synthesis should be



analogous, a reflection of analysis and synthesis, differentiation and connection, occurring in the objectively real world. The forms of analysis and synthesis in dialectics are therefore qualitatively as diverse as the ways and forms of separating and connecting things in the objective world. Formal logic breaks analysis and synthesis into two completely opposite, completely external and alien to each other actions, whereas in reality they do not exist one without the other,

Formal logic sees, of course, not only the identity of things, but also their opposite. But it does not reach the unity (identity) of opposites. The identity is in one pocket, the difference is in the other. Identity in formal logic is an abstract identity, the difference is an abstract difference. Stopping at the unity of things or concepts, metaphysical logic overlooks their split, and passing into a split of things, it misses their unity. In a word, formal logic recognizes both identity and opposite, not seeing their unity. Therefore, the contradictions of formal logic are the contradictions of concepts, and not the contradictions of the objective world. It is *intractable* contradictions, fixed, dead, these are not dialectical contradictions, they are neither the source, nor the basis, nor the result of movement. At the same time, formal logic does not tolerate any real contradictions, its logical "principles" are entirely pointed against the materialist-dialectical law of the unity of opposites.

The three basic "principles" of the law of formal logic perfectly illustrate the foregoing.

*The first "principle" of formal logic* says: A is A, or A is equal to A. This is the principle of abstract *identity*. All the things of the world and all concepts are once and for all defined by A, they are always identical, equal to themselves, independently of any development, of any movement. The world is one, not opposite, not split in itself, not contradictory, unchanging, without movement.

*The second "principle" of formal logic*, the principle of *contradiction*, reads as follows: But not is not-A, but not equal to not-A. This position is a negative expression of the first principle, the principle of identity: since A is A, it cannot be equal to non-A. But, on the other hand, it can also be viewed as the absolute opposite of the first principle (which Hegel indicated for a long time and which Plekhanov completely misunderstands when describing formal logic in his preface to Engels's Ludwig Feuerbach). If the first "principle" speaks of the absolute identity of the world, the second "principle", on the contrary, comes from an absolute difference, from the inner tornness of the world, from its absolute duality, as each A is opposed forever and always every absolutely opposite non-A. Therefore there is an opposite in the world, but this world is not one, its opposite parts exist absolutely independently of each other, they are external and alien to each other, there is no connection between them, no movement, no development, and there are no separate movements in each of them. They are absolute opposites, but they do not lead a struggle between themselves because the struggle requires one or another form of their unity. Therefore, the combination of opposites in formal logic is possible only in a purely mechanical, external, eclectic way, and this connection inevitably depends on the arbitrariness of the subject.

*The third "law" of formal logic* says: something is either A or not-A, something is either A or not-A. This position of formal logic (the law of elimination of the third) is a synthesis of the first two principles. Every existing "something" - every thing or concept is either A or its opposite, non-A, but not the unity of opposites. Thus, this principle negates the unity of identity and opposition. Consequently, this law is the core of formal logic, fundamentally opposite and hostile to the core of dialectical logic, that is, the law of the unity of opposites.

In addition to the basic laws of formal logic, the subject of its research is usually the study of *concepts, judgments, and conclusions*.

The empty formalism, the separation of the laws of thinking from all real content, characteristic of metaphysical logic in the theory of the laws of thinking, is also manifested on the question of concepts, judgments and conclusions. In his doctrine of the concept of formal logic comes from the following position: "*the volume and content of the concept are inversely proportional to each other*". The meaning of this law is that the more concrete content in a concept, the narrower its scope and vice versa: the smaller the content, the wider the scope of the concept. The task of creating concepts from the point of view of metaphysical logic is to arrive at concepts as wide as possible in their scope, in other words, to increasingly dilute all content from the concept. Formally, a logical abstraction consists in the fact that all separate, special features are distracting from things or processes, until a general concept is obtained, in which everything separate, special, has already disappeared. For example, the general concept of a tree is by its scope broader than the concept of an oak, an apple tree, a linden; the concept of a plant is broader than the concepts of a tree, a bush, etc. The general concept in its content is poorer than a more particular concept.

At first glance it may seem that the point of view of formal logic on the issue of the concept correctly reflects reality. Meanwhile, it is easy to see the entire metaphysical nature of this position.

The basis of the formal-logical doctrine of the concept lies in the perfect idealistic *gap between the single, the particular and the general*, their opposition. Already Hegel seeks to bridge this gap: he put forward the doctrine of the concept as the unity of the general, the particular and the singular. Hegel gave a deep criticism of the emptiness of formalism and the metaphysical nature of the formal-logical doctrine of the concept. However, his teaching on the unity of the individual, the particular, the general is based on the fact that the *concept, the idea*, is the essence of the world. The gap between the world of individual things and the general is thus preserved in Hegel, since the concept gives rise to the objective world.

The only consistent to the end doctrine of a concrete, meaningful concept is given by materialistic dialectics. *This doctrine of a concrete concept* fully and to the end overcomes the entire void of formal logic, vulgar empiricism and idealism in the doctrine of the concept. Marx, in his Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, provides guidance on this issue. Considering the basic concepts that political economy usually begins with, he points out: "It seems right to start with real *and concrete*, from the real prerequisites, therefore, for example, in political economy from the population, which is the basis and subject of the whole social process of production. Meanwhile, upon closer inspection, this turns out to be erroneous. The population is an abstraction, if I, for example, leave aside the classes of which it consists. These classes are, again, an empty sound, if I do not know the elements on which they rest, for example, wage labor, capital, etc." [378].

Criticizing such a method of presenting political economy, Marx further specifies what the method of genuinely scientific knowledge of reality should be. Moving from directly concrete to more and more simple concepts, to more and more lean abstractions is one way. This path was political economy in its appearance in the XVII century. However, after some common basic definitions have been extracted through analysis, it will be correct to go from the abstract to the concrete. "The latter method is obviously scientifically correct. *The concrete is concrete because it is a combination of numerous definitions, being the unity of the diverse*. In thinking, it is therefore presented as a process of connection, as a result, and not as a starting point, although it represents the starting point in reality, and as a result is also the starting point of contemplation and representation. On the first path, the complete representation evaporates to the degree of an abstract definition, while in the second the abstract definitions lead to the reproduction of the concrete by thinking. Hegel, therefore, fell into the illusion that the real should be understood as the result of an ascending to inner unity ... of the developing thinking deepening in and out of itself, while the *method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete is only a way by which thought absorbs the concrete*, reproduces it spiritually as concrete. However, this is by no means the process of the emergence of the most concrete" [379].

In these provisions, Marx is given the deepest interpretation of a specific concept from the point of view of materialist dialectics. Marx, first of all, reveals Hegel's idealism in his theory of a concrete concept, which he considers the real world as the result of the development of thinking. The concrete concept of materialist dialectics reflects directly this particular reality, but taken in its *internal connections* and laws. It is the *unity of the general, the particular, the individual*. The concrete concept of materialistic dialectics does not kill the individual, does not reject everything special, does not give an empty and skinny abstraction. On the contrary, being a general concept, a concept that revealed patterns, it includes *the wealth of the individual and the particular*. The concrete concept of materialist dialectics reproduces in thought the actual, concrete in all its concreteness. Any category of "Capital" of Marx, starting with the goods and ending with the rent of land, is an example of such a concrete concept. The materialistic dialectic does not at all deny the role and meanings of abstract thinking, analysis, the task of creating common concepts.

On the contrary, it raises this question to a higher level. However, there is a huge difference between the abstractions of formal logic and the concepts of materialist dialectics. The concrete concept of materialist dialectics is a *meaningful* concept, there is a concept that reflects all the wealth of reality and at the same time the internal, general laws of the development of this reality.

The wider it is in its scope, the *richer* it is in its content. The concept of a commodity, the concept of a class, is not empty empty abstractions: they do not belong *only to thinking*, as modern mechanists believe. They reflect the real, objective connections of things. The working class is not an empty abstraction from a multitude of individual workers, but their integral unity, a real social group that occupies a certain place in a historically defined production system.

In contrast to the formal logic, which emasculates any concrete content from its empty forms of thinking, dialectical logic highlights the *concreteness* of our scientific knowledge. There is no abstract truth, truth is always concrete, - Lenin repeated this position repeatedly. Not only the concepts of dialectical logic should be specific, include in themselves all the wealth of the particular and the individual, but vice versa - the knowledge of the individual, individual subject must be concrete, it

must embrace this individual, as a *unity of the general and the particular*, as a special case of the manifestation of the general regularity, to reveal its place and role in overall development.

This comprehensive, concrete knowledge of *individual* moments, sides, areas, etc. of development in that *particular*, decisive meaning that they receive at special stages for the whole development as a whole, for the development of *general* regularity, ensures the unity of theory and revolutionary *practice*. In this particular cognition of the singular, Lenin's formulation of the question of the decisive *link* lies in matters of strategy and tactics of the struggle of the proletariat. The link for which at this stage you need to grasp to pull out the chain of development can only be determined on the basis of the indissoluble unity of theoretical knowledge and revolutionary practice, only by a concrete study of specific aspects of the process, their characteristics and their significance for the whole development. Lenin's and Stalin's teachings on the possibility of the middle-weak links of the imperialist chain for the proletarian revolution to break through; strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet government as a crucial link during the entire transition period; mastering trade as the most important link in the recovery stage of NEP; development of new technology as a crucial element of technical reconstruction; organizational strengthening of collective farms and alignment of the *artel* form,

Formal logic has carefully developed a classification of various types of judgments and conclusions. Staying true to her starting point, she analyzes only the *form* of judgment, the type of connections between concepts, distracting from the real content of judgments.

Due to its ahistoricity and metaphysical character, formal logic cannot apply developmental perspectives to the forms of judgment and reasoning that it studies. "Dialectical logic," wrote Engels, "in contrast to the old, purely formal logic, is not content to enumerate and compare without connection the form of movement of thinking, that is, various forms of judgment and inference. It, on the contrary, *derives these forms from one another*, establishes a relation of subordination between them, and not coordination, it *develops* higher forms from the lower ones <sup>[380]</sup> .

It is the point of view of *development*, the historical point of view, applied to the study of the *form of thinking*, the forms of judgment and inference, which turns logic into a science. This work was mainly done by Hegel on an idealistic basis. True to the principles of all his *logic*, for the first time in the history of philosophy and logic he gave a rational grouping of judgments as judgments of singularity, judgments of particularity, judgments of universality. Using examples from the history of the development of science, Engels shows the "inner truth and necessity" of the Hegel group, simultaneously showing the dependence of their development on the social and historical practice of man.

As we have already indicated, only a long historical development of practice and knowledge led to a positive judgment: "*Friction is a source of heat*" <sup>[381]</sup> . This judgment can be considered as a *single*. The further historical development of science led to a deeper generalization: "Any mechanical movement is capable of being transformed by friction into heat" <sup>[382]</sup> . This is a judgment of a *peculiarity*, for we are talking about a special form of motion — mechanical. Further historical development led to the judgment of *universality*, to the universal law: "Any form of movement is capable and forced under certain conditions for each case to turn directly or indirectly into any other form of movement" <sup>[383]</sup> .

Thus, we see that only a *historical* approach, an approach to the problems of logic from the point of view of the development of science and technology, provides a real basis for dialectical materialist, genuinely scientific logic. Hence it is also clear that there is not and cannot be any particular science of logic, separate from the theory of knowledge, from dialectics. Logic, dialectics, theory of knowledge is one and the same philosophical science - materialistic dialectics.

The materialistic dialectic overcomes, "removes" the formal logic in the sense that it gives *its* answer to all the problems of logic, based on the history of the development of technology and science.

Formal logic as a whole does not reflect the real laws of the material world. But she is not just nonsense, but, in the words of Lenin, a barren flower growing on a mighty tree of dialectical knowledge. Formal logic is the result of one-sided, forced straightening in the process of knowing curves, moving, flexible faces into ossified straight lines. If dialectical logic fights against the vagueness of concepts, for their definiteness in the sense of concreteness and richness of living, real content, then formal logic turns this definiteness into something absolutely stable, once and for all given, limited to fixed frames, always identical to itself. Therefore, the social basis of formal logic has historically been backward, inactive forms of social life, like the feudal system or such a society, whose deep inner dialectics is hidden under the form of the gross external movement of things (goods), like capitalism. To this we must add that the formal logic, distorting the picture of the

world, has always served as the surest tool in the hands of the ruling exploiting and oppressing classes, has always been a pillar of religion and obscurantism. The hostility and intransigence of dialectics and formal logic is becoming clear. This circumstance does not exclude the fact that historically formal logic in the hands of progressive classes played a certain positive role both in science and in social development. Learning formal logic always served as the most faithful tool in the hands of the ruling exploiting and oppressing classes, has always been the mainstay of religion and obscurantism. The hostility and intransigence of dialectics and formal logic is becoming clear. This circumstance does not exclude the fact that historically formal logic in the hands of progressive classes played a certain positive role both in science and in social development. Learning formal logic always served as the most faithful tool in the hands of the ruling exploiting and oppressing classes, has always been the mainstay of religion and obscurantism. The hostility and intransigence of dialectics and formal logic is becoming clear. This circumstance does not exclude the fact that historically formal logic in the hands of progressive classes played a certain positive role both in science and in social development. Learning formal logic *with known amendments*, even now it will bring its own benefit, if not to forget its root vices. Within certain limits, this lower level of knowledge allows one to struggle with vulgar empiricism and relativism and prepares for the perception of a higher level of dialectical knowledge.

But if formal, metaphysical logic prevailed in the history of cognition, if an individual becomes dialectic only through practical experience and accumulation of knowledge, then it does not follow at all that dialectics and formal logic are fundamentally related to each other, represent equivalent things or differ only quantitatively, as a whole and part.

A very common point of view, according to which formal logic is declared to be a subordinate moment and a special case, is an *integral part of the dialectic*. The author of this point of view is Plekhanov. Plekhanov argues that the laws of dialectics act only where the subject is in a state of visible change, transition; when it comes to individual objects as such, formal logic reigns there. " *Thinking according to the rules of formal logic (according to the "basic laws" of thought) is a special case of dialectical thinking,* " <sup>[384]</sup> says Plekhanov. Elsewhere, Plekhanov expresses himself in the following way: " *Dialectical thinking does not exclude also metaphysical:* it only gives him certain limits beyond which the realm of the dialectic begins " <sup>[385]</sup> .

Regarding this separation of the "two kingdoms" - dialectics and formal logic - we must immediately note that it is closely connected, firstly, with Plekhanov's general understanding of dialectics as a sum of examples, and secondly, with his tactical opportunism. It justifies liberalism, Plekhanov's opportunism in politics. Directly referring to Plekhanov, this viewpoint is developed by the idealist Asmus, warmed by the Menshevik idealists. The latter comes to the anti-Leninist and thoroughly idealistic conclusion that the dialectic is the sphere of only "wide" horizons, that is, the general concepts of philosophy, and the formal logic is the sphere of "narrow" horizons, the sphere of *practice*, ie, class struggle and socialist construction. So Asmus helps the mechanists and Menshevik idealists to substantiate the metaphysics of opportunism and counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. He has no idea that a truly revolutionary practice is impossible without dialectics and, in turn, is its cradle and element.

To include formal logic as a moment in dialectical logic is as ridiculous as declaring alchemy a moment of chemistry, astrology a moment of astronomy.

Scholastic defenders of "offended" formal logic like to refer to Lenin's remark that formal logic should be studied in the lower grades; they should answer with an exact quotation from Lenin: "The logic of the formal, which is limited in schools (and should be limited - as amended - for the lower classes), takes formal definitions, guided by what is most common or most often striking and ... The dialectical logic requires that we move on " <sup>[386]</sup> .

Consequently, it is not at all the case that Lenin recommends that the school should study not formal dialectics, but formal logic. This "limitation" is the lowest level of knowledge, preparation for the study of dialectics. In addition - and this is the main thing - Lenin adds: with known "amendments". Formal logic "with amendments" is no *longer the old formal* logic.

Lawyers of formal logic, allegedly proving "according to Engels" that formal logic is suitable in everyday homely situations, must be answered: we are struggling with this home household situation, for which formal logic is good, no less than with its logical product. We are fundamentally rebuilding life, raising it to the level of the great tasks of socialist construction. The new socialist life will, along with all the processes of struggle and socialist restructuring of life, produce a dialectical thinking.

The learned lackeys of the bourgeoisie use formal logic for their class interests; they are fighting against the materialist dialectic - the basis of the revolutionary worldview of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, we need to study the formal logic not only from the point of view of using its

actual content, but also in order to study the weapons of our class enemy. Only materialistic dialectics is the scientific method of research and the logical basis of the socialist practice and class struggle of the proletariat.

As materialistic dialectics is the methodological basis of the general line of the party, so metaphysics and formal logic in Soviet conditions are the methodological basis of both right and "left" opportunism and counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. For example, NEP is the economic policy of the proletariat, designed to allow capitalism within certain limits and to fight, oust and destroy capitalism at the same time. "Whoever does not understand this transitional, dual nature of NEP, departs from Leninism" <sup>[387]</sup>, - says Stalin. And the Trotskyists, as metaphysicians who do not understand the dialectical contradictory nature of NEP, saw only one side - the assumption of capitalism - and therefore called NEP state capitalism. Likewise, Bukharin saw only one side of NEP - the freedom of market relations - and missed what NEP moreover suggests government regulation of trade: "Destroy one of these parties - and you will not have NEP," <sup>[388]</sup> says Stalin. Our difficulties are the difficulties of growth, the party says, and the opportunists do not understand this dialectic, consider the difficulty " *as such*", Identify our difficulties with the hopeless difficulties of capitalism and cry out about the death of Soviet power. The nature of the middle peasant is dual: on the one hand, he is a hard worker, and on the other - a small proprietor. The Trotskyists see only one small-ownership side of the peasantry, while the right opportunists, on the contrary, forget this side of it. Every purely *formal* implementation of the Party directive has a metaphysical methodological basis: they fulfill the letter and not the meaning of the directive, beat off the "number", perform unilaterally, incorrectly. For example, if a party talks about eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis of *complete collectivization* then the "leftist", formally fulfilling the directive of the party, will carry out the elimination of the kulaks, forgetting about its basis. The party proposes to increase the percentage of collectivization, seeking to strengthen the organizational and economic work on collective farms, and the "leftist" drives the percentage of collectivization, forgetting about the need to work to strengthen the collective farms.

A one-sided view of the controversial process of socialist construction is typical for Trotskyists and opportunists, and this is formal logic: a one-sided approach to a thing from the point of view of its abstract *identity* .

The varieties of metaphysical thinking are *eclecticism and sophistry* .

Eclectic is any unprincipled combination of internally unrelated, fundamentally contradictory points of view or teachings. Lenin called the eclectic Machist Bogdanov because he wanted to unite historical materialism and Mach's idealistic philosophy. Eclectics are also mechanists and Menshevik idealists who, in their anti-Marxist philosophy, combine one — mechanical materialism, Kantianism, positivism, etc., and others — Hegelianism with elements of Kantianism, mechanism, etc. Lenin's brilliant eclecticism was given in 1921 during trade union discussion <sup>[389]</sup> in connection with the eclectic position in this discussion of Bukharin. The dispute was about what the trade unions are under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky took a purely metaphysical position in this dispute: the trade unions, or the school of communism, or the administrative apparatus — no third — was given to the point of view of the nationalization of the trade unions. In opposition to Trotsky, Lenin pointed out that trade unions should be taken as a dialectical unity of political education (trade unions - the school of communism) and economic functions (participation in government, for example, in economic planning), but with the latter being subordinated first, with economics being subordinated to politics. Lenin demanded to indicate what is the main and decisive factor for trade unions, in which internal connection between them are the various functions of the trade unions. This was mainly educational functions and in accordance with this, the party decided: the trade unions are the school of communism. Bukharin took a "buffer" position: trade unions *and the school of communism, and the management apparatus, and politics, and economics*. "The theoretical nature of that mistake," says Lenin, "which Comrade Bukharin makes here, is that he replaces eclecticism with the dialectical relationship between politics and economics (which Marxism teaches us). "And the one and the other," "on the one hand, and on the other," is Bukharin's theoretical position. This is eclecticism. " <sup>[390]</sup>. At the same time, Lenin gives a famous example with a glass. There is a glass and a faceted cylinder, and a butterfly cap, and a device for prespaun, and a tool to strike, and a tool for drinking. All this must be taken into account. But it is necessary to indicate the main thing in this particular connection and situation: what is it for a speaker speaking on the podium? A tool for drinking.

"If (as Bukharin does. - *Auth.* ), Two or more different definitions are taken and connected together quite by accident (both a glass cylinder and a drinking tool), then we get an *eclectic* definition pointing to different sides of the subject and only" <sup>[391]</sup> .

*Sophistry* is “flexibility, applied subjectively” (*Lenin*), there is an identification of opposites, not seeing their struggle, there is an erasure of the faces between opposites on the grounds that they can turn one into another.

Once in antiquity Kratyl, a pupil of Heraclitus, perverted the words of his teacher (who said that one cannot enter the same river twice), adding Heraclitus in the formula that one cannot enter the same river once. If Heraclitus claimed that the river (water) flows, and therefore, when we enter it the second time, it will actually be another river (water), then from the point of view of Kratyl the river never happens by itself. This is a clear exaggeration. Plekhanov rightly points out that Kratyl replaces the *moment of existence with the moment of formation* <sup>[392]</sup>.

It - sophistry, because a dialectic requires that every thing has been taken from the point of view of the unity of the date of formation, development, ie, the changes that occur in the thing, and now.. *Determinate being*, ie qualitative certain things.. *In this its stage development* in this regard and setting. A living person is precisely a living person, not a corpse, since the process of life takes place in it. Undoubtedly, a simultaneous process of the death of a part of the cells occurs in his body, but on this basis it would be sophistry to call him a corpse. Materialistic dialectics requires precise and definite answers at any given moment. Capitalism, until it is destroyed by the proletarian revolution, is precisely capitalism, not socialism, although it contains in its depths its denial — the socialist proletariat. It would be sophistry, however, on this basis to declare capitalism socialism. Lenin explained to R. Luxemburg that sophistry is the blurring of the line between imperialist and national war on the grounds that one *can* turn into another. The modern Mensheviks are social-fascists, declaring the growth of state monopoly capitalism as an increase in socialism, they are thoroughly burned by sophists, outspoken defenders of wage slavery.

From all this it follows that eclecticism and sophistry are the sworn enemies of materialist dialectics. It is necessary to fight against them as against the methodology of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, fascism and social fascism.

## **Chapter 5. Fighting on Two Fronts in Philosophy**

### **5.1. Philosophy and politics**

Marxism-Leninism develops in the struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois movements that oppose it or recognize it in words, but pervert it in essence. The struggle of these currents against Marxism was carried out in a variety of forms and forms, from direct denial or silence of Marxism to attempts to combine Marxism with the bourgeois worldview and blow it up from the inside by diluting its revolutionary content. The struggle of Marxism for hegemony in the international labor movement has been going on and on in various forms in all fields from the first days of the rise of Marxism until the last time.

“When Marxism ousted all doctrinal exercises that were hostile to it, those tendencies expressed in these teachings began to look for other ways for themselves. The forms and causes of the struggle changed, but the struggle continued. And the second half-century of the existence of Marxism, Lenin says, began (the 90s of the last century) from the struggle of a current hostile to Marxism within Marxism” <sup>[393]</sup>.

Lenin and Stalin revealed the deep *social roots of the* various deviations from Marxism in the development of the international labor movement. Alien and corrupting influences oppose the proletariat not only in open struggle, they penetrate the ranks of the struggling army of the proletariat, finding there elements of instability, vacillation, hesitation. The capitalist elements that remain and revive on the basis of small-scale production “surround the proletariat from all sides with petty-bourgeois elements, infiltrate it with it, corrupt it with it, and cause recurrence of petty-bourgeois spinelessness, fragmentation, individualism, transitions from hobbies to despondency” inside the proletariat <sup>[394]</sup>.

This *pressure of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements*, which often lend themselves to the least stable sections of the proletariat and its party, is one of the sources of contradictions within the proletarian party, a source that feeds various opportunist trends.

The second source, indicated by Comrade Stalin, is the *heterogeneous composition of the working class*. The working class fights and comes to power, being *heterogeneous*. The bulk of it is the “pure-blooded” proletarians, who “have long broken ties with the capitalist class. This layer of the proletariat is the most reliable pillar of Marxism” <sup>[395]</sup>. Another layer is people from the peasantry, from the petty bourgeoisie, from the intelligentsia, who have recently joined the ranks of the proletariat and brought with them old skills, habits, hesitations and vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie. “This layer represents the most favorable soil for all kinds of anarchist, semi-anarchist and” ultra-leftist “groups. <sup>[396]</sup> It was this stratum that followed the “Left Communists” in the Brest period, then the “workers' opposition”

and the Trotskyists (until 1928–1929), when these groups formed the ideology of the “furious petty bourgeois”, behind the left benders of recent times. The third layer, characteristic of the proletariat of capitalist countries, is “the labor aristocracy, the upper class of the working class, the richest part of the proletariat” [397] . This part has a strong desire for compromise, an agreement with the bourgeoisie, from which it received certain handouts. “This stratum represents the most favorable ground for outspoken reformists and opportunists” [398] .

This characteristic of Comrade Stalin, given to them at the seventh plenum of the ECCI, means above all the proletariat of the capitalist countries. But essentially (taking into account the fact that in Soviet conditions there can be no labor aristocracy and a professional bureaucracy associated with monopoly capitalism, but only certain decomposed and bureaucratic elements of the working class and the party are possible) this characteristic applies to the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the development of Marxism, within it, in the international labor movement itself, *two main streams of deviations from the revolutionary Marxist line* with theoretical and practical principles opposed to Marxism were revealed . Lenin in 1910 revealed their features. Speaking about this, Lenin wrote: “The main tactical differences in the modern working-class movement in Europe and America are reduced to a struggle with two major trends, receding from Marxism, which actually became the dominant theory in this movement. *These two directions are revisionism (opportunism, reformism) and anarchism (anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-socialism)*. Both of these deviations from the dominant Marxist theory and Marxist tactics in the labor movement have been observed in various forms and with different shades in all civilized countries over the course of more than *half a century* of mass labor movement. Already from this fact alone it is clear that these deviations cannot be explained either by accidents or the mistakes of individuals or groups, or even by the influence of national characteristics or traditions, etc. *There must be root causes underlying the economic structure and development pattern of all capitalist countries. and constantly generating these digressions* ” [399] .

In this position, Lenin thus establishes two types of directions that depart from Marxism: frankly-right direction and revisionism “from the left”, retreating to anarchism. The roots of these revisionist tendencies lie in the economic structure and character of the development of capitalism, both as a whole and in individual countries. Among the reasons for these two directions, Lenin points not only to the controversial, abrupt development of the labor movement, but also to its source — the *uneven development of capitalism and the dialectical nature of social development* . Lenin explains the latter in the following way: “The constant source of disagreement is the *dialectical nature of social development, which goes in contradictions and in the way of contradictions...* Capitalism itself creates its own grave-digger, creates the elements of the new system itself, and at the same time, without a “leap”, these individual elements do not change anything in the general state of things, do not affect the domination of capital. These contradictions of living life, the living history of capitalism and the labor movement can embrace *Marxism as a theory of dialectical materialism* . But it goes without saying that the masses learn from life, not from a book, and therefore individuals or groups are constantly exaggerating, building into one-sided theory, into one-sided system of tactics, one or another feature of capitalist development, then one or the other. “This development” [400] .

This extremely important position of Lenin is of tremendous importance for understanding the dialectic of struggle on two fronts. It also indicates the class and theoretical roots of various kinds of deviations from Marxism. Both the right and the “left” trends, both reformism and anarcho-syndicalism, take *one side* or tendency of the labor movement, make it absolute, unilaterally develop it and consider it the only correct and possible one. They do not understand the dialectical contradictions of reality. “And real life, real history *includes* these various tendencies, just as life and development in nature include both slow evolution and fast jumps, breaks, gradualness” [401] .

Reality also includes a gradual, slow development. But this development prepares jumps, evolutionary development is replaced by a revolution, opening a new era, taking all development to a new higher level. But reformists take *one of these sides of reality, namely, gradual development* .

In the reforms, in all kinds of partial changes and improvements, they see the realization of socialism. Anarchists, syndicalists, on the contrary, deny the gradual development. They do not see that “new content makes its way through all and all forms” (*Lenin*) , including through some old forms. Metaphysical one-sidedness is peculiar to both the right and the “left”, and reformism and anarchism. *Outwardly*, these are the two extreme poles. Essentially, both inhibit the development of the revolutionary movement, organization, rallying of the proletariat, litter its *theory* bourgeois trash, interfering with his political education. Therefore, revisionism and anarcho-syndicalism are two types of perversions of Marxism-Leninism, two types of deviations from Marxism, two types of revision of Marxism. These two types - right and “left” - are observed in the labor movement in all civilized

countries, but in different forms and forms, with the most varied shades at different levels of development of the labor movement. In the struggle against these two types of deviations from Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary theory of the proletariat continued to develop.

These two types of perversions of Marxism also took place in our country, in the history of Russian Social-Democracy, where their development took on special forms reflecting the peculiarities of the class struggle in Russia. *Bolshevism grew and was tempered in the struggle on two fronts with the indicated two types of revision of Marxism, in the struggle against opportunism.*

Already since the 1990s, a split has been taking place among the Social Democrats into " *Iskra-ists* " and " *Economists* ." The latter were the opportunistic current of Russian social democracy. In the epoch of growth of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, "economism" has changed into Menshevism, which stands for a bloc with the bourgeoisie. Only the Bolsheviks consistently fight for the revolutionary tactics of the proletariat. At the same time there was a struggle with the "left" direction -sindikalistiskim as " *mahaevschina*". The epoch of reaction (1908-1910) in a completely new form again raised the question of the opportunist and revolutionary tactics of social democracy. The main course of Menshevism gave rise to liquidationism, the renunciation of the struggle for a new revolution in Russia, illegal organization and work, scornful mockery of the "underground". The emergence of *otzovism* , the "left" trend in Bolshevism, which preached the rejection of the use of legal forms of struggle, from participation in the State Duma and the withdrawal of the party faction from there , dates to this time .

With both of these trends, representing two varieties of bourgeois influence on the proletariat, Bolshevism led an irreconcilable and consistent struggle, a struggle on two fronts. On this occasion, Lenin wrote that "the Bolsheviks *in fact* conducted a struggle on two fronts from August 1908 to January 1910, that is, a struggle against the liquidators and otzovists" <sup>[402]</sup> .

The appearance of these trends, Lenin explains a number of deep objective historical reasons. Not an accident, not a mistake, "but the inevitable result of the action of these objective reasons — and an inseparable from the" base "superstructure over the entire working-class movement in modern Russia — is the bourgeois influence on the proletariat that creates liquidationism (= semi-liberalism, wishing to classify itself as .) and otzovism (= semi-anarchism, which wants to identify itself with the community) " <sup>[403]</sup> .

Lenin in his work "Left-wing Children's Disease in Communism," listing all the main points in the development of Bolshevism and examining the question: "In the struggle with which enemies within the working-class movement did Bolshevism grow up and harden?" Reveals the essence of the struggle against Menshevik opportunism "Which in 1914 finally turned into social-chauvinism, finally went over to the side of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. This, according to Lenin, was naturally the *main enemy of Bolshevism* within the labor movement. This enemy remains the main one on the international scale " <sup>[404]</sup> . At the same time, "Bolshevism grew, developed, and hardened in a long struggle against *petty-bourgeois revolutionism*."which looks like anarchism or something borrows from it, which retreats in any way significant from the conditions and needs of the enduring proletarian class struggle " <sup>[405]</sup> .

Describing both of these deviations within Marxism, right and left doctrinal studies, Lenin wrote: "Right-wing doctrinal studies rested on the recognition of *old forms* alone and went bankrupt to the end without noticing a *new content* . Left doctrinaire rests on the unconditional *denial of certain old forms* , not seeing that the new content makes its way through all and every form " <sup>[406]</sup> .

This conclusion of Lenin also has great methodological significance. This basic characteristic covers the *essential side of each variety of hostile currents within Marxism*. One of them, the *right* revision form, does not see the *new content, the new quality* and does not go beyond the old forms, the other revision - the *left one* , on the contrary, notices only the new content, the new quality, but does not understand the ways and stages of development of this content, completely discarding the forms struggles that still need to be used in a given environment.

For Lenin, we find a dialectical substantiation of the *need to combat deviations within the party* . The very deviation from Marxism-Leninism, from the revolutionary path goes through various stages of development. As Lenin says: "Bias is not yet a ready current. This bias is something that can be corrected. People are somewhat strayed from the road or begin to stray, but you can still fix it. This, in my opinion, is expressed by the Russian word "bias" " <sup>[407]</sup> . Hence the bias is a deviation from the correct line, a departure from it. This is not yet a ready-made current, but such a deviation that leads away from the correct line, and if we insist on this deviation consistently, then at a certain level it may develop into a certain opportunistic current, completely alien and hostile to Marxism and the party.



In contrast to Lenin, Trotsky held an opportunistic position in this issue in the pre-revolutionary era. Like Kautsky, he opposed to the correct Marxist-Leninist demand for struggle on two fronts his own formula of "overcoming by expanding and deepening," which was reduced to *centricism* tactics, i.e., an attempt to occupy the "middle" line, to eclectic *reconciliation* of various trends, i.e. in fact helped opportunism and covered it.

That is why "Trotsky's proposal to put *instead of struggle on two fronts the* "overcoming by expanding and deepening "met with the ardent support of the Mensheviks and followers of the war" <sup>[408]</sup> .

As early as the 1980s, Engels wrote to Bernstein: "As you can see, *every working party of a large country can develop only in the internal struggle, in full accordance with the laws of dialectical development* " <sup>[409]</sup> .

Tov. Stalin pointed out at the seventh plenum of the ECCI, citing in particular these words of Engels: "There is not and cannot be a" middle "line in matters of principle" <sup>[410]</sup> . "The policy of the" middle "principled line is not our policy. The policy of the "middle" principled line is the policy of withering and reborn parties " <sup>[411]</sup> . "The history of our party is the history of the struggle of contradictions within this party, the history of overcoming these contradictions and the gradual strengthening of our party on the basis of overcoming these contradictions" <sup>[412]</sup> . " *Overcoming intraparty differences by means of struggle is the law of development of our party* " <sup>[413]</sup> .

The materialist dialectic is the methodological basis of the practice of the revolutionary proletariat, the general line of its party. It is materialistic dialectics, its application in the knowledge of society, makes it possible to correctly discover and understand the pattern of class struggle, to take into account the class distribution at any given moment, to correctly determine the nature of social contradictions, to outline trends and direction of development, to separate the essential, the important, the unimportant, the minor and accidental, to understand their dialectical unity, to choose the decisive link in the struggle of the proletariat, by grasping which one could pull out the whole chain of development; ensure the success of the proletarian revolution and consolidate them as a basis for further progress.

The Comintern also conducts its struggle on the basis of dialectical materialism, which is reflected in the program of the Comintern. "By defending and propagating the *dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels* , applying it as a revolutionary method of cognizing reality in order to revolutionize this reality, the Communist International is actively fighting all types of bourgeois worldview and all types of theoretical and practical opportunism" <sup>[414]</sup> .

The main thing in Marxism-Leninism is the *doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat* . As the whole of Marxism as a whole, this teaching also has a materialistic dialectic as its philosophical foundation. The misunderstanding and distortion of the philosophical basis of the policy of the proletariat must inevitably affect the practical implementation of this policy. The theoretical philosophical struggle is one of the forms of class struggle, and, like any form of class struggle, it is filled with *political* content, it is subject to political struggle. The perversions of dialectical materialism are *always* are closely linked with deviations from the general line of the party, non-proletarian political trends, with a reflection of the class hostile ideology in the ranks of the proletariat and its party. The philosophical development of Marxism-Leninism is always closely connected with the political development of the working class, with its struggle against reformism, anarchism, right-wing and "left-wing" opportunism. Lenin repeatedly pointed to this. "The debate about what philosophical materialism is," wrote Lenin in 1911, "why erroneous, what are dangerous and reactionary deviations from it, is *always* connected" with a "lively real connection" with the "Marxist socio-political trend" it would not be a Marxist, not a socio-political and not current. Only limited "real politics" of reformism or anarchism can deny the "reality" of this connection. <sup>[415]</sup> .

Lenin, speaking of political deviations, does not detach them from the general philosophical attitudes. He reveals their social roots, their political essence, determines which of these deviations constitutes the main danger, the reasons for this, characterizes the role of conciliationism in the struggle on two fronts, it also reveals the methodological aspect of deviations, etc., i.e. gives a comprehensive , a specific analysis of the conditions, forces and forms of struggle, while applying and developing the materialist dialectics.

The revolutionary effective role of the materialist dialectic has always been the cause of the most acute hatred and rabid malice of the bourgeoisie throughout the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. There are thousands of tricks developed by the bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois agents within the labor movement to somehow tear Marxist theory from revolutionary practice and to emasculate the revolutionary "soul" of Marxism - the materialist dialectic. Marxism had to wage a merciless struggle with both the root enemy - idealism, and petty-bourgeois agents inside Marxism

itself, that is, with various forms of philosophical revisionism, which under the specious pretext of introducing amendments, "additions", clarifications, etc., were constantly trying to bourgeois Marxism,

Such is the class position of the petty bourgeoisie; vacillating between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, that in the ideological sphere it also shows its indecision, inconsistency, disregard for serious theoretical work, limited to fragments of theories borrowed partly from the theoretical arsenal of the proletariat, partly from the reactionary bourgeoisie and other classes. Trifling, snatching individual pieces, fragments and their mechanical connection from everywhere, reconciliation, eclecticism — in theory and cowardice, vacillation, wavering — in practice are those features that Lenin repeatedly pointed out to the ideologues and "leaders" of petty-bourgeois parties: the Mensheviks, the Social Revolutionaries etc. The petty bourgeoisie could never work out a coherent and consistent materialistic worldview,

With philosophical revisionism, Marx and Engels, and then our party, also always waged an implacable, merciless theoretical struggle *on two fronts* : both against the vulgarization of materialism and the idealistic perversions of dialectical materialism (Marx, Engels and Lenin struck each time at form of audit, which was the *main danger* for the practical-political movement of the proletariat). The conditions of the political struggle, depending on the basic form of the struggle against the bourgeoisie, also determined the main direction of the theoretical blows inflicted on philosophical revisionism within the party. For example, after the 1905 revolution, the leader of our party, Lenin, simultaneously had to wage a theoretical struggle on two fronts: against the Machism of Bogdanov, Bazarov and others, and against the Menshevik, mechanistic and agnostic distortions of the materialist dialectics Plekhanov, as well as his students Deborin and Axelrod. *The main danger then was the idealistic, Machist, revision of materialistic philosophy.* This revision led straight to the rejection of Marxism and the complete theoretical disarmament of the proletariat in front of the bourgeoisie. "Increasingly subtle falsification of Marxism," wrote Lenin about Machism and Machists, "more and more subtle counterfeits of anti-materialist teachings for Marxism," is what characterizes modern revisionism in political economy, tactical matters, and philosophy in general, as in epistemology and in sociology " [\[416\]](#) .

This audit is for the time the main danger because it was the theoretical expression of the crisis, wavering in the ranks of the Marxists after the defeat of the revolution of 1905 "Resolute resistance to this disintegration, a resolute and persistent struggle for *the basics* of Marxism, was again placed on the day of all" [\[417\]](#) , - Lenin wrote then. Machism theoretically harbored both the political liquidationism of the Mensheviks (Valentinov, Yushkovich and others) and the ultra- "leftist" otzovism of Bogdanov and others. This is why Lenin directed the main blow against the Machists, leading this struggle together with Plekhanov and his students, but without stopping for one minute of the struggle, neither with the Menshevik distortion of Plekhanov's materialist dialectics, nor with its individual philosophical errors in matters of materialism. And then Lenin fought on two fronts.

During the period of the imperialist war and revolution (1914–1917), the theoreticians of the Second International (it inflicted tremendous damage on the revolutionary movement of the proletariat) —*the Kautsky, Bauer, Plekhanov and the mechanistic and idealistic perversions of dialectical materialism, Bauerom, Plekhanov and the revolutionaries of the Second International* flourished especially strongly on the front of the Marxist theory of theory .

These revisions were specifically expressed in the discourse on the "immaturity" of the prerequisites of the proletarian revolution, in the separation of revolutionary theory from practice, in the substitution of concrete for abstract dialectics with eclecticism and sophistry. 1914–1917 - this is the period of the bitter struggle of Leninism against the prostitution of Marxism, the abdication of the leaders of international Menshevism from the concrete and revolutionary dialectic of Marx. This is the band of the most passionate, implacable war with Menshevik idealistic and mechanistic revision of the foundations of dialectical materialism. At the same time, Lenin is waging a struggle against "leftist" errors in the field of theory — with Bukharin's anarchist mistakes on the state, etc. In the same way, the theoretical struggle develops on two fronts and during the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The defense of the general line of the party necessarily includes the struggle for the purity of the materialist dialectics — this most faithful and most acute weapon of the struggle of the proletariat. *The struggle against reformism and anarchism, the struggle on two fronts - against right and "left" opportunism - necessarily implies a struggle on two fronts also in the field of philosophy.*

The relationship between philosophy and politics, between philosophical deviations and political trends always exists. But this connection between philosophy and politics does not act as a direct, immediate and permanent correspondence between philosophical and political currents. Mechanism is the philosophical base of the right deviation, Menshevik and Menshevist idealism - basically the theoretical basis of the "left" deviation and Trotskyism. However, this does not at all imply that the

right has only mechanism and no elements of idealism, while counter-revolutionary Trotskyism and the "left" have one idealism and no mechanism. Trotskyism, for example, will also penetrate right through the most vulgar and vulgar mechanism. An abstract arrangement of slopes according to contrived "schemes" would be completely wrong. The only consistent method and worldview is dialectical materialism. Any deviation from it inevitably leads to bourgeois eclecticism with a predominance of either vulgar mechanical materialism or more or less disguised idealism.

Philosophy and politics are always inextricably linked. This inherent link between them is due to their *specific social roots in a given society*. But this connection of philosophy and politics does not always get a direct and immediate expression. Here we see various transitions, overflows, zigzags and deviations in determining the connection between various philosophical and political deviations. This relationship can only be established by a specific analysis of all aspects of a particular philosophical and political bias. The struggle against opportunist deviations in theory and in political practice cannot be limited to the struggle against any of the parties - political or only theoretical - it must be comprehensive.

*The Menshevik idealists*, exactly like the mechanists, do not understand the dialectical connection of philosophy and politics, do not understand the Marxist-Leninist statement of the question of a struggle on two fronts in politics and philosophy. They completely identified deviations in either area, replacing the struggle against right-wing opportunism with the struggle against mechanism alone. Moreover: the struggle of the party against the right, especially in the theoretical field, is considered by Menshevik idealists to be a simple continuation of their "struggle" against the mechanists! As one of the representatives of Menshevik idealism wrote: "*the struggle against the theoretical foundations of the right deviation is a direct continuation of our struggle against the mechanists and the verification of the correctness of the theoretical philosophical positions that we have taken in this struggle. This is a political test of our theoretical positions*" <sup>[418]</sup>.

The party waged and is fighting against any deviations from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, against opportunism in politics and all revisionism in theory and in philosophy. Struggling against political opportunism, she digs up to the theoretical, philosophical foundations, based on Lenin's instructions that "you cannot completely understand any mistake for yourself, including political, if you don't get the *theoretical roots of an error* from someone who makes it, on the basis of certain, consciously accepted by him provisions" <sup>[419]</sup>. In the struggle against deviations in the field of theory, in the field of philosophy, including, the party reveals their political content, exposes the class essence of theoretical opportunism and revisionism, no matter what mask they hide.

The struggle with only one bias while ignoring the second front shows that the fundamentals and positions of this struggle are not Marxist-Leninist. Such a line leads to a distortion of the struggle on two fronts, to one-sidedness, which creates the conditions for new perversions of a different order, the accumulation of errors, going along the line of a different bias. In this way the ground is created for a link with another front. This closure of various opportunist currents in practice occurs very often. Right help the "left", "left" pour water on the mill right. The "struggle" against deviations while ignoring this wrong side, the reverse side of each deviation, helps not the party, but opportunism, and only leads to confusion and new forms of perversion of Marxism-Leninism.

## **5.2. The struggle on two fronts and the tasks of the theory under the dictatorship of the proletariat**

The dictatorship of the proletariat *advanced new tasks before revolutionary theory* and, moreover, immeasurably wider and more difficult than they were before. The dictatorship of the proletariat does not mean the cessation of class struggle, but the continuation of class struggle in new forms: in the form of ruthless suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, in the form of a sharp and bitter civil war, in the form of leading the main masses of the peasantry, the use of bourgeois specialists and petty-bourgeois intellectuals, in the form of educating a new discipline to achieve a new, immeasurably higher level of labor productivity.

A whole period of the proletariat's struggle against the remnants of the exploiting classes, against attempts to restore the capitalist system, the struggle for the rebuilding of small-scale commodity economy, on the basis of which "is preserved and revived again in the bitter struggle against communism", is capitalism and the bourgeoisie. A struggle is needed to preserve and consolidate the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry, to lead the non-proletarian mass of working people, to re-educate this mass in the spirit of organizing a new social discipline of labor. A whole period is needed in order to create the material and technical basis and the economic basis of a socialist society, and a certain amount of time is required to re-educate the workers themselves in the process of "a long and difficult mass struggle with mass petty-bourgeois influences" (*Lenin*).

The victorious proletariat cannot immediately shrug off the shoulders and throw out the legacy of capitalism. The habits of the past, the bourgeois tendencies among the backward layers of the proletariat make themselves felt and will manifest themselves until the classes are completely eliminated. The difference in attitudes, skills and attitudes among the different layers of the proletariat at the turning points of the transition period, in the process of the development of the class struggle, is manifested in the appearance of opportunistic biases in the party, manifestations of right and "left" opportunism. Here it must be borne in mind that the party has not only representatives of different layers of the proletariat, but also people from other classes who have not broken ties with them or made their way into the party of the proletariat because it is the only party under the dictatorship of the proletariat that penetrated it because it is the ruling party. "They,<sup>[420]</sup> .

Despite the apparent opposite of right-wing and "left-wing" opportunism, they very often *agree* with their own assessments and requirements, since they are fed from the same class roots. Both types of opportunism express the pressure of bourgeois ideology in the petty-bourgeois element, with the only difference that frank right opportunism reflects mainly the ideology of the kulaks, and the "left" opportunism mainly reflects the ideology of the urban capitalist classes, the ruined urban petty bourgeoisie. This fact of the closure of both types of opportunism is not surprising. Lenin said more than once that the "ultra-left" opposition is the wrong side of the right, Menshevik, opportunistic opposition.

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle, bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, pedagogical and administrative against the forces and traditions of the old society" <sup>[421]</sup> . Only the Communist Party, armed with the materialist dialectic, tempered in the struggle, can successfully wage the class struggle of the proletariat in the era of its dictatorship.

Dialectical materialism has become the dominant world view in our country, the weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat in uprooting hostile ideologies, a weapon against religious obscurantism and clericalism. The proletarian worldview became the most important means of revolutionary education of the many millions of masses of the peasantry, a weapon for the liberation of the working people from spiritual, centuries-old slavery, from political and national oppression by the exploiting classes.

New forms of class struggle raised the demands placed on revolutionary theory. First, the requirement of maximum *flexibility of the theory* so that it can not only keep up with practice during the period of rapid revolutionary changes, but also be *ahead of practice*, correctly orienting practitioners during the largest and sharp turns and transitions from one form of struggle to another, indicating the direction during transitions from one stage of development to another. Secondly, that the theory gives an accurate Marxist analysis of class relations in their originality at each stage of the movement, helping to comprehend the movement as a whole. Thirdly, that the theory would help to *reveal the main contradictions and the main tendency of development* so that each time at each new turn the party can correctly grasp the main link, the main crucial task on which the success of the whole movement depends.

Hence the important task that Lenin posed to Marxist-Leninists is to fully develop the *theory of materialist dialectics* from all sides, at the same time fully *subordinating this theoretical development to the general interests of the proletariat's class struggle and the political goals of the party* . the practice of socialist construction and the world revolution.

An incorrect and one-sided understanding of this task leads to two kinds of dangers: either to the *separation of theory from practice* , that is, to empty scholasticism, or to an underestimation of theory, to narrow division, tailism, empiricism. The latter also means in fact the opposite side of the first danger - *these separation of practice from theory* . The development of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic can only be achieved in a decisive, merciless struggle on two fronts, only in the struggle against both these dangers, which equally, although from different sides, lead to a Menshevik gap between theory and practice.

The ingenious development of the materialist dialectic under the dictatorship of the proletariat was given by Lenin on the specific problems put forward by the world revolution and socialist construction in the USSR. This work was *continued by Comrade Stalin* on the basis of resolving key, fundamental problems connected with the construction of the foundation of a socialist economy and the destruction of classes. The decisions of the CPSU (b) and the Comintern are based on the consistent Marxist-Leninist application of the theory of materialist dialectics to specific stages of the class struggle of the proletariat. The party resolved and resolved all the fundamental tasks of the revolution, guided by the Marxist-Leninist dialectic, at the same time developing and refining it on new concrete material that revolutionary practice in practical and theoretical struggle gives on two fronts.

The correct application of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic in the field of political leadership of economic and cultural construction made it possible for the Leninist party to win world-historic values - by successfully building the foundation of a socialist economy, carrying out a plan for complete collectivization and on its basis eliminating the kulaks as a class.

Struggling on two fronts - with right and "left" opportunism, the party at each main stage determines the main *danger*. At the same time, the party is guided in determining the nature of biases by striving to reveal the class essence of these biases. For example, the "left" deviation of the Trotskyists and the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition was the main danger in the transition to the reconstructive period, at the beginning of it, before the XV Party Congress. With the unfolding of the socialist offensive, the main danger for the party is the right deviation.

Any attempt at a double-dealing policy, an attempt to occupy a position of undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, by representatives of the right-left bloc, always received a crushing blow from our party.

The path of opportunism is the path of departure of unstable communists from the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist line, from the general line of the party. The path of abandoning party ideology is the process of shaping a hostile and alien ideology. The path of opportunism is a transition to the positions of class forces hostile to the proletariat, a movement that objectively reflects the pressure of the bourgeoisie and its ideology. The deviationists objectively become the channel through which the party penetrates, into its unstable links, the influence of the petty-bourgeois element and the capitalist elements emerging on its basis. The draft evaders become the mouthpiece of the anti-proletarian class forces in our country. Such are the class roots of right and "left" opportunism in the transitional period.

But the ideology, politically hostile to the proletariat, is also *reflected in the field of theory, in methodology*: the indicated types of opportunism differ from each other not only in their social nature, but also in their general theoretical roots, in their *philosophical* basis. And this is despite some *common features* of their methodology, as indicated by Lenin: their perversion of materialistic dialectics, eclecticism, etc. Modern right-wing opportunism is based mainly on mechanistic methodology. It is characterized by the fact that it does not see the new content, the qualitative uniqueness of the proletarian dictatorship, denies the inconsistency of development, stands for a "peaceful" evolution, denies the class struggle, etc.

"Left" opportunism and "left" bends are sent from the methodological setting that is inclined to deny certain old forms, does not see the paths and stages in development, does not take into account the material foundations of progress, jumps over unfinished developmental stages, which leads to adventurism in politics, replaces reality with what is desired, confuses possibility and reality, etc. The main methodological basis for this kind of opportunism is *Menshevik idealism*.

The struggle for the general line of the party demands Bolshevik party definition, an irreconcilable principled struggle against right opportunism — the main danger at this stage, against "left" opportunism, against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. But this struggle for the general line of the party requires a struggle on *two fronts, both in theory and in philosophy*: against the mechanists — the main danger in this period, against Menshevik idealism, against reconciliation to both, as well as against open bourgeois influences on the proletariat, requires struggle with consistent Marxist-Leninist positions on the basis of the inseparable connection between theory and the practice of socialist construction.

The Trotskyists and the "Left" Zagibiks could not understand the essence of the struggle *on two fronts*. They called the struggle that our party fought "centrism". They slandered the party, believing that two extreme wings are created in the party, and that the general line of the party is created as a result of the "balance" of both currents. In the same vein, the Deborynites interpreted the problem of struggle on two fronts in philosophy, when the party raised the question of turning the philosophical front to the tasks of socialist construction and the development of self-criticism. Under the guise of combating "centrism" and "eclecticism", and Trotskyism and Menshevik idealism *rejected the* task of fighting on two fronts. In fact, the struggle of the party on two fronts includes, involves the struggle with centrism - this concealed opportunism, *conciliation* to opportunism. The party's consistent struggle for the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist theory went through several stages during the transition period. After the October Revolution, the overthrown exploiting classes were deprived of ideological influence within the country, and the world bourgeoisie and its Social Democratic agents in the person of Kautsky and Vandervelde - outside the country and in the face of the Russian Menshevism and social emanation turned out to be the spokesmen for their bestial hatred of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism outside and inside the country. Bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, especially

Menshevism, whose social characteristic, as Lenin repeatedly emphasized, is an amazing adaptability, began to penetrate into Marxism under all sorts of signs of "Marxist science."

The frankly Menshevik theories of Sukhanov and Co. proved the "untimely" proletarian revolution in Russia, which, did not reach the necessary "height of the productive forces". Not understanding the uniqueness of the situation in the epoch of imperialism and the peculiarities of Russia's historical development, they mechanically transferred here the general forms of capitalist development. In the early period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Mechanism again turned out to be a more veiled form of bourgeois attack on dialectical materialism, which was originally combined with mechanism and was expressed in a number of Bogdanov's works during this period.

Bogdanov carefully disguised his idealism, speaking under the banner of "proletarian culture", "socialism of science", "organizational science", etc. He allegedly "refused" any philosophy, but in fact, under "Marxist" phrases he dragged idealism in political economy, in the theory of historical materialism, in literary criticism. Bogdanov substituted the materialist dialectic with the idealistic theory of the "organizational process" and the mechanistic "theory of equilibrium" - the theory of reconciliation of contradictions. As the main form of the movement towards socialism, he advanced "cultural" work, denoting his theories with the loud name of "proletarian culture", opposing them to a revolutionary political struggle. Objectively reactionary philosophy of Bogdanov reflected the deep *defeatist and decadent moods of the cowardly petty bourgeoisie* hiding from the revolution, trying to escape from it by returning to peaceful "organizational" work in the "normal" framework of the renowned bourgeois democracy.

The rotten philosophy of Bogdanov was reflected among a portion of the university youth, among the workers of Proletkult, in the group of the so-called "workers' opposition", in the views of some theorists - the "left" communists. She said in particular her influence on the theoretical views of Comrade Bukharin. The idealistic "leftist" mistakes of Comrade Bukharin in his "Economy in Transition" were "substantiated" by Bogdanov idealism and mechanism.

During this period, Lenin gave a sharp rebuff to the Menshevik ideology of the Sukhanovs. But Lenin is also leading a decisive struggle against "left" communism and its methodological errors - its subjectivism and abstractness. In particular, Lenin responded to Bogdanovism with the second edition of "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" with the application of the article by V.I. Nevsky, where a critical analysis of the latest Bogdanov's works was given. In the preface to this book, Lenin pointed out that under the guise of "proletarian" culture, A. A. Bogdanov conducted bourgeois and reactionary views.

With the introduction of NEP and the known growth of capitalist relations in the town and country, the bourgeoisie began to count on a *peaceful* return to capitalism through the gradual *rebirth of Soviet* power. Part of the bourgeois professorship, attracted to work in Soviet institutions, took an openly hostile position in relation to Soviet power. From university departments, from the pages of journals, she led counter-revolutionary work and acted as an open enemy of dialectical materialism along the whole line of science, opposing it with idealism and reactionary views. Another part of the bourgeois intelligentsia proclaimed "a *change of milestones*", But "Smenovekhovstvo" also meant nothing more than proclaiming the need for cooperation with the Soviet authorities in order to "facilitate" the latter a peaceful return to capitalism.

In order to fight against idealism and religion, to fight against vulgar empiricism and mechanism, to expose the scholars of feudalists and graduate lackeys of the priesthood, an organ " *militant of materialism* " - the magazine "Under the banner of Marxism", the tasks of which were formulated by Lenin in the famous article "On the Meaning of Militant Materialism."

For a number of years, "leftist" opportunism continued to remain the main danger for the party. Counter-revolutionary Trotskyism begins its subversive work, first as a faction of communism, as an inter-party opposition. In all areas of the theory, we have various forms of the Menshevik theories of the Second International that have penetrated under every possible disguise: the methodology of "left" opportunism, Trotskyism and the "bourgeois" groups conciliatory to it, which is characterized by a combination of idealism and mechanism; the Menshevik-Kautsky idealist theory of Rubin in political economy, the Menshevik "development" of the history of Marxism by Ryazanov, pulling and further deepening of Plekhanov's mistakes in Marxist philosophy by his students Axelrod and Deborin both through the positivist-Kantian and mechanistic revision of Marxist-Leninist philosophy (Axelrod) and Menshevik idealism (Deborin, Karev, Sten); the revival of subjective-idealistic and Kantian concepts in philosophy (in Sarabyanov and others), Menshevik-idealistic theories in literary criticism (Pereverzev, Voronsky, etc.). In the field of party politics, the struggle of the party led by comrade Stalin against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism is developing. The main danger in the theory was the idealistic revision of Marxism, which, being smashed to pieces in politics as a

methodology of Trotskyism and "left" opportunism, was still not fully exposed in theory and philosophy.

But in the recovery period, along with the idealistic danger, various forms of *mechanism and vulgar, vulgar empiricism* also arose. The most vivid expression of creeping empiricism and the bourgeois form of the revision of Marxism were Mininschina (1922) and Enchmenism (1923). Minin threw out the slogan: "Philosophy overboard", and Enchmen, following him, began to propagate confused biological theory among young students, opposing it to the supposedly "outdated" Marxism.

*The mechanistic danger* was most vividly expressed in the revision of dialectical materialism by Bukharin, precisely in the application and further development of Bogdanov scholasticism in the theory of historical materialism and in political economy. Despite the warning of V. I. Lenin, Comrade Bukharin and his students stubbornly continued to develop the Bogdanov *theory of equilibrium*, opposing it to the materialist dialectic. In addition to the Bukharin theoretical "school," a significant group of naturalists and partly anti-religious propagandists was outlined, trying to respond in this vulgar-empirical form to the rising head of clericalism.

They replaced the open attack on Marxism with a struggle that was covered up — under the slogan of defending science from "philosophical scholasticism", identifying dialectical materialism with the latest conclusions of natural science.

By the beginning of the reconstructive period, mechanism became a mouthpiece for various trends hostile to Marxism-Leninism (Machism, Freudianism, Kantianism, positivism, etc.), he joined up with the Menshevik-Kantian group Axelrod and the Bukharin-Bogdanovsky "sociological" school. Mechanists-naturalists and anti-religious scholars (Timiryazev, Sarabyanov, Varyash, etc.) became hawkers of the Bukharin-Bogdanov equilibrium theory. The transition from the reconstruction period to the reconstructive was a transition to new forms of class struggle of the proletariat, to the solution of the most difficult and supreme tasks of the proletarian dictatorship:

- 1) building the foundation of a socialist economy,
- 2) the complete transfer of small-scale peasant farming to the socialist rails of large-scale machine-driven collective production,
- 3) on this basis to the task of destroying the kulaks as a class and then destroying classes in general.

The world-historical task of building socialism could not be solved using Trotskyist or Bukharin-Bogdanov, essentially bourgeois, formulas. The questions posed by the party about the ways of further development required their resolution using the method of Marxist-Leninist dialectics, the class struggle method of the proletariat.

"Development has been going on with us and continues to go beyond the formula of Comrade Bukharin. The development went on and continued to go according to the formula of Lenin - "who is whom." Whether we will exploit them, exploiters, suppress them, or they will crush and crush us, the workers and peasants of the USSR, so the question is ... *Organization of the offensive of socialism along the whole front* - that's what the task confronted us in developing the reconstruction of the *entire* national economy. The party understood its mission in this way " <sup>[422]</sup> .

The Party, starting with the XIV Congress, mobilized all the material resources of the state and the strength of the proletariat to accelerate the pace of industrialization of the country in every way, and from the XV Congress began to resolutely carry out a plan for state and collective farm construction. By increasingly implementing the policy of restricting the kulaks and stepping on it closely, by the summer of 1929 she had achieved a radical change in the development of agriculture from small, individual to large, to collective.

At the same time, a decisive breakthrough in the area of labor productivity came: the development of mass socialist competition and shock training. This moment was a "leap", a transition to an accelerated movement forward, a decisive and radical turn in our policy from restricting the kulaks to a policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, the transition to socialism's onset of capitalism along the whole front.

In the reconstructive period, the general line of the party develops under the sign of an organized offensive against capitalism. Such is the course of the proletariat's class struggle for the completion of the foundation of a socialist economy. This is also the way of the development of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic developed by the Central Committee of the Party and its leader, Comrade Stalin.

The forms of class struggle in the reconstructive period are different from the forms of class struggle at the last stage. The transition of socialism into a general and unfolded offensive could not but cause desperate resistance of the old world and the aggravation of class contradictions. Carefully disguised "malicious sabotage of the tops of the *bourgeois intelligentsia* in all sectors of our industry, the brutal struggle of the *kulaks* against collective forms of farming in the countryside, sabotage of the

measures of Soviet power by the *bureaucratic elements of the apparatus*, which are the agents of the class enemy, are still the main forms of resistance of the outdated classes of our country " [423] .

The struggle against the wrecking bourgeois theories of Kondratieff, Chayanov, Grohman, with the Menshevik ideology of Bazarov, Rubin, Sukhanov gained purely practical and political significance in the conditions of the reconstructive period. " *Without an irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois theories based on Marxist-Leninist theory, it is impossible to achieve complete victory over class enemies* " [424] .

The aggravation of the class struggle and the revival of petty-bourgeois elements in the country were reflected in the form of right and "left" deviations from the general line of the party, which threatened the party with a breakdown of the socialist offensive policy. At the same time, the right deviation (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky) as a kulak agents within the party was the main and *main danger* at this stage. Only in a merciless struggle with deviations the party could achieve the results that we now have.

Marxist philosophy was faced with the task of theoretically crushing the philosophical foundations of both these biases and the frankly hostile wrecking methodology. Meanwhile, the philosophical leadership led by Deborin divorced philosophy from party politics, from the practice of socialist construction, from concrete knowledge. Not only did it not cope with the exposure of hostile methodologies, but it itself was captured by the wrecking concept of rubezh; for a number of years it peacefully coexisted with it, and at a crucial moment, during the economic discussion, it took up the position of active defense of Rubin, placing his articles in the magazine "Under the banner of Marxism" and praising him as a "deepener" of Marxist political economy.

The pressure of hostile ideologies reflected on the further intensification of the mechanistic and idealistic dangers in various fields of Marxist-Leninist theory: in philosophy, science, political economy, literary criticism, history, etc. This danger was revealed by the *party* in a number of *discussions* held in various areas of theory.

The mechanistic revision of the Marxist dialectic in the field of historical materialism, political economy, etc. in the new situation, in the drastically changed conditions of the class struggle in the country, took on a particularly pressing, political character, becoming the *theoretical banner of the right-leaning party*. In order to crush right-wing opportunism as the main danger in the party, it was also necessary to crush Bukharin's entire system of philosophical mechanistic views, with which he substantiated his opportunism in politics. *Under these conditions, the mechanism turned out to be the main danger*.

The revision of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle and its underlying Bukharin-Bogdanov mechanistic concept were taken up along with the Menshevik Grohman-Bazarov-Sukhanov group, which fully shared the Bogdanov theory of "organizational process", that is, equilibrium theory, and tried to carry it out in their practical work in the field of planning, procurement, etc. Thus, at the new stage, mechanismism became not only the philosophical basis of the right deviation, but also the theoretical knowledge of the Menshevik sabotage Bazarov-gromanovskoy group banner of capitalist restoration.

Tov. In his speech at the conference of Marxist agrarians, Stalin pointed out the *inadmissible lagging of theoretical work from the practical successes of socialist construction* and the need to quickly eliminate this gap in certain areas of Marxist theory. "It must be admitted," said Comrade Stalin, "that theoretical thought has not kept pace with our practical successes, that we have a certain *gap between practical successes and the development of theoretical thought* . Meanwhile, it is necessary that theoretical work *not only keep up with practical work, but also be ahead of it*, arming our practitioners in their struggle for the victory of socialism. " [425] . Tov. Stalin severely criticized a number of opportunist and bourgeois, sabotage theories that had circulated in our literature, and set before the theoretical front the task of both uprooting these theories and developing new questions put forward by practice.

But none of these tasks, the *preboring philosophical leadership* could not put in front of the available philosophical cadres, failed to mobilize these cadres to help the party to overcome the difficulties of the reconstructive period. The Deborinska group continued to ignore the task of eliminating the separation of theory from practice and after the slogan put forward by Comrade Stalin on the theoretical front.

The stubborn unwillingness of this group to understand the tasks of the party line in philosophy at the new stage, the well-known political and theoretical blindness of this group had deep *roots in the class struggle* in the country. Even during the struggle against the Trotsky opposition, the active part of this group had a close connection with Trotskyism, sharing Trotsky anti-party attitudes in politics. By systematically evading the theoretical criticism of Trotskyism and the "left" bends, while



continuing to defend a number of Trotskyist attitudes in theory, it thereby continued to feed the Trotskyist sentiments in theory. At the same time, the group of Comrade Deborin did not render timely assistance to the party in exposing the ideology of the *rightist* opportunism. Only after the right deviation was shattered by the party, the Deborino group tried to link abstract criticism of mechanism with criticism of right-wing opportunism in politics, but could not carry it out completely due to its revisionist attitude to Marxism-Leninism. Nothing was done by the Deborinsky group to expose the bourgeois and Menshevik sabotage methodologies of the Grohmans, the Kondratievs, the Chayanovs and other ideologues of hostile classes. On the contrary, as we have already indicated, the Deborinsky group itself found itself in captivity of the idealistic theory of the ruby in political economy.

The party organization of the IKP of Philosophy and Natural History correctly understood the instructions of Comrade Stalin, managed to expand the discussion with the Böborin group and correctly identify the main lines of disagreement: as a new stage in the development of dialectic materialism, about the need for an expanded struggle on two fronts in philosophy and natural science, about new tasks of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in connection with the socialist construction, etc.

" [426]

As a result of the discussion under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and so on. Stalin managed to expose the Menshevist idealistic anti-party essence of the views of the Deborinsky group. The course and results of the philosophical discussion once again revealed the closest link that exists between philosophy and politics, between science and the class struggle, and the inadmissibility of any gap, especially in conditions of heightened class struggle, the elimination of the kulaks as a class and the offensive the whole front. The discussion once again found that the *slightest deviations from the correct Marxist-Leninist positions, even in the most abstract questions of theory, now acquire important political significance and express a certain class conditionality, ultimately directed against the dictatorship of the proletariat* .

The Central Committee of our Party, in its resolution on the journal Under the Banner of Marxism, put forward in the Marxist-Leninist philosophy the slogan "to wage a steady *struggle on two fronts: with the mechanistic revision of Marxism, both the main danger of the modern period and the idealistic distortion of Marxism by the group tt. Deborin, Karev, Stan and. et al.* " [427] set the task of Marxist philosophy and the magazine Under the Marxism," to wage a resolute struggle for the general line of the party, against any deviations from it, conducting consistently throughout his work the Leninist principle of partisan philosophy " [428]

"Taking philosophy away from politics," says the decision of the Central Committee, "not spending the partisanship of philosophy and natural science in all of its work, which led the magazine" Under the banner of Marxism, "the group resurrected one of the most harmful traditions and dogmas of the Second International - the *gap between theory and practice* , rolling down in a number of critical questions on the position of Menshevist idealism " [429]

The party paid serious attention to the theoretical section, including it as an integral link in the general chain of the socialism's unfolding offensive against capitalism along the whole front.

Life put on the order of the day the task of carrying out the strictest conduct of the Leninist principle of the partisanship of science, the subordination of science to the tasks of the party policy in the building of socialism. The party demanded an *implacable struggle on two fronts in theory and the eradication of all hostile influences in science.*

### **5.3. Mechanistic revision of dialectical materialism and right-wing opportunism**

As we have already seen, modern mechanists represent an unprincipled bloc of revisionist groups: here we have mechanistic naturalists (Timiryazev, Perov) and the Bogdanov-mechanistic group of Bukharin, and Menshevik-Kantians (Axelrod), and mechanistic-Freudian (Varyash), and positivists, sliding down to subjective idealism (Sarabyanov).

Despite the existing shades in philosophical views, despite all the differences in the political views of N. I. Bukharin and L. Axelrod, they are all united in their *revision of the foundations of dialectical materialism* , the replacement of materialistic dialectics by a mechanistic methodology. They are all united in the lack of understanding of the partisanship of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the class roots of mechanism, all of which are characterized by the rejection of Marxist-Leninist dialectics as a science.

A common feature for all mechanists, inextricably linked with their misunderstanding of the revolutionary dialectics, is the lack of *historicism* , the lack of understanding of *partisanship* theory and unity of theory with revolutionary practice. Borrowing from the old revisionists the worn-out, battered "arguments" and sophisms against materialistic dialectics, the mechanists forget and revise the basic position of dialectical materialism that every theory is determined by revolutionary practice. Mechanists, like Menshevist idealists, having debated for a number of years, have never

asked themselves the question: what kind of socio-political trends, what ideology of classes did mechanical materialism have in the historical past, what classes does it have in the present? If the mechanists were able to ask themselves this question, they would immediately expose themselves as ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie.

Until the proletariat entered the arena of the historical struggle, old mechanical materialism was a *revolutionary theory*. Despite his shortcomings, he was the revolutionary weapon of the French advanced bourgeoisie in the struggle against feudalism and religion as a stronghold of medieval reaction; It was a revolutionary theoretical basis for the first socialist and communist doctrines, which arose long before the independent movement of the proletariat. Feuerbach's materialism, opposed by the radical German bourgeoisie to the former idealism, was also revolutionary at a certain historical stage. But already with the rise of the *dialectical* the materialism of Marx and Engels, and with the very first battles of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, the old, metaphysical materialism began to turn its reactionary side against Marxism, turning more and more into a "refuge of indecisive cripples and writing industrialists". On the philosophical basis of Feuerbach's limited materialism, grasping its "idealism" above and its contemplative, metaphysical character, reactionary petty-bourgeois "true" socialism of Grün in Germany flourished with which Marx and Engels made a decisive struggle before the 1848 revolution. which reflected indecision, passivity, inconsistency of the petty bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels had to wage a stubborn struggle for decades, because these forms of inconsistent materialism served as the theoretical basis of numerous petty-bourgeois movements in socialism. Only in a tireless struggle against the reactionary petty-bourgeois currents did Marxism become the dominant teaching in the ranks of the proletariat.

The whole struggle of Marx and Engels with the inconsistent materialist Dühring, who at every step stumbled into idealism, and his supporters - the left phrase "Most" and the opportunists Vollmar, Bernstein, etc., also shows that inconsistent mechanical materialism is alien to Marxism ideology.

But mechanism was not only a *bourgeois* methodology in the past: mechanismism, combined with idealism, continues to play a significant role in bourgeois theory. The mechanical theory of equilibrium serves as a theoretical justification for the bourgeois evolutionary theory of slow and quiet progressive development, the teachings on the need to maintain the capitalist system in the "equilibrium". Social Fascism (Kautsky and others) also substantiates the theory of social equilibrium and the need to adapt society in its development to the natural environment - its hatred for the proletarian revolution. The reflection of this bourgeois ideology in Soviet conditions was the views of "our" mechanists.

Modern mechanists continue to call themselves dialectical materialists. In words, both Bukharin, and Axelrod, and Sarabyanov, and Varyash, and others "recognized" and "defended" dialectics.

In fact, they "defended" mechanism from the *materialistic* dialectic, from revolutionary Marxism-Leninism. Is this not a direct mockery of Marxism, when Bukharin asserted that the "general trend" of his innovations in Marxist philosophy "goes along the line of the development of the orthodox, revolutionary understanding of Marx"? In fact, NI Bukharin has been propagandizing bourgeois equilibrium theory for more than a decade. Is it not strange that even now, when these theories have been shattered by the practice of socialist construction, Comrade Bukharin does not abandon his erroneous mechanistic philosophy! The same applies to the rest of the mechanists - Timiryazev, Axelrod and others who had fought for a number of years with Marxist-Leninist philosophy, expelling it from the field of theoretical natural science - again with an oath of loyalty to dialectical materialism.

What arguments have mechanists opposed to materialist dialectics and in favor of the mechanistic world view?

First of all, following their revisionist predecessors — Bogdanov and other "fighters" of dialectical materialism, modern mechanists again put forward as the main argument against dialectics the *identification of dialectical materialism with the "latest conclusions of modern natural science"* and positive science, which, ostensibly, require a revision of Marx's views, Engels and Lenin. As another "argument," they advanced a naked phrase about the presence of elements of *mysticism and teleology*. in dialectics: at the same time, Hegel's idealistic dialectics substituted them for Marxist dialectics. This hackneyed, haggard technique, which the revisionists invariably enjoyed throughout the whole history of Marxism, for some reason fell in love with N. I. Bukharin. In order to more easily defeat the dialectic of Marx, he invariably fights with Hegel's triad, believing in this the essence of Marxist dialectics and imitating Mikhailovsky, Bogdanov and other Machist-positivists, social fascists Bower, Adler, etc. in this case. - they fought with the Marxist-Leninist dialectic under the flag of the struggle against the "Deborinsky scholasticism".

The third argument of the mechanists is an appeal to *empiricism*. In this respect, the mechanists completely followed the old vulgar materialists, whom Engels had called pathetic, insignificant croffers, who had not made a single step forward in the development of the theory. They considered it possible

to replace Marxist theory with narrow-mindedness, vulgar empiricism, revealing a complete lack of understanding of the meaning of revolutionary theory. These are the main "arguments" of the mechanists, who in general do not represent anything new for Marxism and the party.

And the mechanists' perceptions of the mechanistic perversion of Marxism remained the same as those of all revisionists. Constant dodging of the subject matter, silence and detour of the main, basic in the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, snatching of separate quotations, their deliberate distortion in order to bring Marxism under the mechanism, and Marx, Engels and Lenin under the mechanists, sophistry and eclecticism in all writings the mechanists are the old revisionist methods by which the mechanists were engaged in systematically perverting Marxism-Leninism for a number of years.

This is also the attitude of Bukharin to the philosophical foundations of the theory of historical materialism and Marxist political economy. The dialectical laws of historical development and the capitalist economic formation Bukharin turns into metaphysical laws of equilibrium, replacing Marxism with bourgeois sociology, dialectics with flat evolutionism. Timiryazev and other mechanists have the same attitude towards Engels: they carry out the mechanistic perversion of Engels's "Dialectics of Nature" and the rejection of Engels dialectics under the guise of the need to revise Engels's supposedly outdated form of materialism.

What is the attitude of mechanists to the *philosophical legacy of Lenin* ? On the part of the mechanists, we had a complete disregard for Lenin's works on dialectics and on natural science. With regard to Bukharin, the words of t. Stalin on the "hypertrophied pretentiousness of the under-learned theorist" are fully justified. Leninism as a new stage in the development of dialectical materialism for Comrade Bukharin did not exist. As for Axelrod, she has long led a systematic struggle against Leninist revolutionary dialectics.

Other mechanics, such as Varyash, in their work try to turn Lenin into an apologist for mechanism and Menshevism, in unscrupulous way try to slip Lenin's mechanistic formulations, carefully avoiding the question of the struggle of Lenin and our party with Menshevism and with Menshevik distortions of materialistic dialectics, politics, tactics.

The blindness of our mechanists in relation to the Menshevik danger, the desire to gloss over this danger reveals the petty-bourgeois nature of modern mechanism. This is even more confirmed by the fact that the mechanists do not want to, *do not wish to learn* Leninist revolutionary dialectics, fight with it, distort it, distort it. They ignore the task of developing the theory of dialectics, put forward by Lenin, and the problem of studying the dialectic of Marx and Engels.

But mechanists in every possible way resurrect and deepen the theoretical errors of Plekhanov. In confirmation of their mechanistic world view, and to refute Engels materialism, Axelrod, Timiryazev, Perov, and others, and at one time, and so, Stepanov referred to Plekhanov, erecting his mistakes into a whole system of anti-Marxist views.

In short, the revisionist attitudes of the mechanists are as follows:

1. Identification of dialectical materialism with the modern mechanistic worldview; the identification of philosophical materialism as the worldview of the proletariat with modern natural science and the "latest conclusions of positive science." Hence the elimination of materialistic dialectics as a philosophical science. Hence, positivism, vulgar empiricism, the separation of practice from theory, and disregard for the development of revolutionary theory.

2. Revision of the materialist theory of reflection and the slide to agnosticism, positivism, Kantianism, idealism.

3. The denial of dialectics as a theory of knowledge. Contrasting theory of knowledge dialectic. Revision of dialectics as the science of the universal laws of the development of nature, society and thinking. Replacing dialectics with mechanics, flat evolutionism and equilibrium theory. The mechanists did not understand the law of the unity of opposites and replace it with a theory of reconciliation of contradictions, collisions of variously directed forces. Hence, the denial of the objective nature of quality and thus the denial of qualitative, abrupt development. Reduction of dialectical causality to mechanical. The denial of the dialectical unity of chance and necessity. Hence the fatalism, the theory of gravity, tailism, the failure to understand the active revolutionary role of the proletariat, the revolutionary practice. In the field of historical materialism - a revision of the Marxist doctrine of class struggle,

4. Replacing dialectical logic with formal logic, eclecticism and scholasticism.

The result is an unprincipled surrender of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist positions and the dissolution of Marxism in the petty-bourgeois ideology.

Such is the essence of modern mechanics. Undoubtedly, mechanism has nothing to do with the revolutionary theory of the proletariat.

The party has repeatedly fought off vicious assaults on Marxism-Leninism by petty-bourgeois agents in its ranks, trying to replace consistent materialism with some old theoretical waste paper. The same historical rubbish is the mechanistic methodology, which at the first practical test turned out to be the weapon of kulak agents against the party, against socialist construction. The mechanistic methodology of the Right has already been *broken by the* revolutionary practice of the proletariat's class struggle. In the fire of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, in the fire of living practice, mechanism did not stand the critical test. The main point of the Marxist doctrine that the revolutionary theory "finally develops only in *close connection with practice* a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement " <sup>[430]</sup> - the theorists of modern rotten mechanism cowardly bypassed this point, they" forgot "it.

What kind of classically alien influences in the ranks of the party is a reflection of mechanism, with which ideological and political currents is it associated with in the past, of which classes and class groupings is it in our era? Without a comprehensive clarification of these issues, without clarifying the political consequences of their theoretical mistakes, without this the criticism of the mechanists would have been half-way, one-sided. The Deborinsky group criticized the mechanists in an abstract "professorial manner," criticized them from the standpoint of idealistic dialectics, without linking their criticism with revolutionary practice and party politics. Therefore, their criticism, having some positive significance, could not fully expose the mechanists, because it itself was conducted from anti-Leninist positions. Moreover, in a number of issues, the Deborinsky converged with the mechanists.

Now let's take a closer look at the basic theoretical errors of the mechanists.

### **5.3.1. Positivism of mechanists and their rejection of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism**

Without understanding the class character of revolutionary practice, the mechanists also do not understand the role and significance of revolutionary theory. They slide to vulgar empiricism, to the rejection of philosophy, to the rejection of the theory of materialist dialectics.

"Is there a dialectic as a special science or is it a method?", Asked the truly "metaphysical heads" from the mechanistic camp. They give a monstrously illiterate revisionist answer to this, that talking about dialectics as a science and even less talking about some kind of dialectics, for example, in natural science there is "scholasticism", "logistics", "mysticism", "lack of thought", etc. *Science is a philosophy to itself*, "the mechanists say, trailing behind the vulgar, vulgar empiricists. "For Marxists, there is no area of some kind of" philosophizing, "separate and separate from science: materialistic philosophy for Marxists is the last and most general conclusions of modern science <sup>[431]</sup>, - wrote t. Stepanov, having fallen for the bait of bourgeois professors who" banish "the dialectic from science. Axelrod, Bukharin and other mechanists tried in one way or another to reduce the philosophy of Marxism to "modern" science, "modern conclusions of natural science", eliminate Marxist dialectics as a philosophical science, declared it "obsolete scholasticism." In this regard, the mechanists are definitely following in the footsteps of the previous revisionists and are lagging behind the Menshevism of the Second International. Marxism does not have its own philosophy, says the modern social-fascist M. Adler. Marxism is compatible with any philosophy, the social fascist Kautsky is now preaching. Marxism is fully compatible with Kantianism, "Struve, Bernstein, Vorlander and other bourgeois theorists said earlier. Now our mechanists have added to this gallery of the "fighters" of the dialectic. Their slogan is: *there is the liquidationism of Marxist philosophy*. It means the rejection of the revolutionary materialist dialectic, that is, of Marxism.

When in the early years of NEP Minin threw out the slogan: " *philosophy overboard* ", then his performance in the ranks of the party was given a decisive rebuff as a hostile outing. Mininshchina was a manifestation of petty-bourgeois vacillation on the part of theoretically unstable elements in the party. The same empty petty-bourgeois claim to "overcome" Marxist philosophy, that is, to reject it, which Minin sounded at one time, is heard in the slogan of modern mechanists. Minin openly proposed to throw overboard the philosophy of Marxism, and our mechanists propose to "replace" it with the conclusions of "modern science." But the essence remains the same - the desire to eliminate Marxist philosophy as a science.

For naturalistic mechanists, this desire means a direct refusal to defend Marxism, to pursue a consistently materialistic line in the natural sciences. The rejection of dialectics means the weakening of the materialist front in the fight against idealism, the cession of materialist positions to the class enemy.

Of course, mechanists can free themselves from philosophy only in imagination. In fact, no science has ever managed and could not do without a philosophical basis, without a clear answer to elementary questions about what to take as a starting point: matter or thinking — without a clear answer to the question that we are learning: is it real? irrespective of consciousness, the existing world and its objective laws, as materialism teaches, or the fantastic world of illusions, sensations and

its laws invented by people, is based on, as idealists think. No science is possible without the *theory of scientific thinking*. For without thinking, it is impossible to connect two simplest natural science facts, not to mention studying the natural connections in nature and in society. In the same way, no science can do without a clear answer to the question of the knowability of the world.

No matter how much the mechanists shout against philosophy, they still cannot do without it. And since in a class society there are only *two fundamental directions in philosophy* — materialism and idealism, they thereby take the side of some particular direction, for the despicable, cowardly "party of an imaginary middle", called positivism, agnosticism, etc. , there is also an expression of one of the main directions, only littered, littered with garbage of petty-bourgeois prejudices.

"Naturalists," says Engels, "imagine that they are freed from philosophy when they ignore it or scold it. But since they cannot move even a step without thinking, logical definitions are necessary for thinking ... , in the end, they are still captured by philosophy, but unfortunately for the most part - the worst; and here people, especially diligently scolding philosophy, become slaves of the nastiest, vulgarized remnants of the nastiest philosophical systems " <sup>[432]</sup> .

Engels considers the transition from metaphysical to dialectical thinking to be the only way out of the impasse to which flat naturalism and empiricism in the field of natural science leads. For vulgar empiricism, Engels criticized the vulgar materialists — Buchner, Focht, and others — for the fact that they, like our mechanists, arrogantly criticized the dialectic, neglected philosophy and, having no vocation for the further development of the theory, step did not go beyond their teachers ", the French materialists. Our mechanists, as if in mockery of Engels, are now trying again to drag us into the vulgar empirical swamp of Büchners. "The names of Moleschott, Focht and Buchner," sings Boris Borichesky, the mechanist, "are still the embodiment of" vulgar "materialism. Meanwhile, after actually studying these half-forgotten thinkers *we come to a completely different conclusion* : we have very respectable scientists who stand at the level of the then positive knowledge, with all its virtues and with some problems " <sup>[433]</sup> . Such speeches, directed against Engels and Lenin, are commonplace with other modern mechanists who have lost the remnants of the party-theoretical sense. They are ready to raise from the graves of all the old mechanists, as well as creeping empiricists, if only to "slay" the consistent dialectical materialism of Marx and Lenin.

The mechanists completely ignore Lenin's position, which is clear and obligatory for every party member engaged in the natural sciences, that "without a solid philosophical foundation, no natural sciences, no materialism can withstand the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas and the restoration of bourgeois worldview. In order to withstand this struggle and to carry it through to the end with complete success, Lenin says, the naturalist must be a modern materialist, a conscious supporter of the materialism that is represented by Marx, that is, must be a dialectical materialist " <sup>[434]</sup> . Lenin, like Engels, insists on the further development of materialist dialectics. Without the full development of the theory of dialectics, Lenin says, "materialism cannot be militant materialism. He remains, to use an expression of Shchedrin, not so much *fighting* , how *to fight* . Without this, the major scientists as often as before will be helpless in their philosophical conclusions and generalizations " <sup>[435]</sup> .

With the Leninist instructions on the development of the theory of dialectics, which are now the directive of the party, the mechanists are not at all considered. Speaking against Leninist philosophy, they abandon the consistently materialistic theory of knowledge, slipping straight into bourgeois positivism.

What is *positivism* , with which modern bourgeois science is now infected, and which is confessed by the "certified" lackeys of clericalism, modern "learned" feudalists, reactionaries? Positivism (from the word "positive" - positive) is evolved since the second half of the XIX century. the current in bourgeois science, which *in words* does not want to know anything except positive (positive) science, which in words rejects any philosophy as scholasticism. But in fact, under the mantle of scientific "positivity", reactionary and idealistic views and clericalism are dragged in and out. Positivism believes that the theory of knowledge is generally superfluous. The main question of any philosophy - the question of the relationship between consciousness and matter - positivists consider "unscientific", "scholastic", intractable. Consequently *in fact*, positivism is also a kind of *philosophical* doctrine, dragging the philosophy of Kant, Hume, Mach, or another idealist under the banner of "scientificness". Positivists are in fact either agnostic or outright idealists.

Positivism is especially dangerous now, when, under the influence of the deepest crisis and decay of capitalism, on the one hand, the tremendous successes of the natural sciences, confirming dialectical materialism, on the other, there is a stratification among modern bourgeois scientists. Some of them are beginning to switch to the positions of dialectical materialism, while a significant part of scientists, especially in capitalist countries, has swung toward open reaction, leaves

the positions of shy materialism (hidden by positivism, agnosticism) and goes into the camp of reaction, hitting mysticism, clericalism (all under same flag positivism). The largest modern scholars, Planck and others, who earlier under the flag of positivism to some degree shyly defended materialism, now in their scientific works try to take the path of compromise with religion. Modern largest physicists, Millikan and Eddington, are arguing about how the "god" could create the world. Eddington preaches that the world was created by a single act, and Millikan uses all his scientific erudition to "prove" that "the creator *tirelessly* at work." Such is the modern scientific positivism, which is the direct agent of fideism, mysticism, clericalism, modern imperialist reaction. And all this shame is accomplished under the banner of a positive "positive" science!

From this it is clear that the rejection of philosophy and the preaching of positivism is a complete rejection of Marxism. However, until now, mechanists continue to stand on the view that Marxist philosophy does not exist as a science and that it is replaced by "modern science", modern mechanistic natural science.

### **5.3.2. Revision of the dialectic and the materialist theory of reflection**

Modern mechanists did not understand the core of *materialism*, abandoning the materialist theory of reflection in its form, which was developed by Marx and Engels and raised to a new level by Lenin.

Even in the controversy with the metaphysical materialist Dühring, Engels ridiculed Dühring's manner of throwing "eternal truths of last resort" and his lack of understanding of the relationship between absolute and relative truths. In contrast to Dühring's metaphysics, Engels showed that concepts, logical categories, all scientific, experimentally obtained knowledge are not frozen, unchanging, but developing relative *historical* products, *reflections* objective laws of the historical development of nature and society. For lack of understanding of dialectics, Marx Proudhon criticized in his time "Poverty of Philosophy" and classics of bourgeois political economy and vulgar economists, showing and proving the transitory and relative nature of economic categories, which are merely reflective reflections of objective, historically transient material-production capitalist relations in Capital public formation.

In their time Bogdanov, Bazarov, and other Machists could not understand the dialectical doctrine of relative and absolute truth. Lenin wrote about the Machists that "they did not understand anything about Engels's application of dialectics to gnoseology (absolute and relative truth, for example)" <sup>[436]</sup>. Acknowledging the relative nature of the concepts of physics, the Machists slid toward relativism: they could not understand their *objective* values, refused to recognize them as reflections of the objective, regardless of the humanity of the existing material world. As we have already pointed out, Plekhanov, in his criticism of the Machists, did not pay enough attention to this side of the matter. A characteristic feature of Plekhanov's criticism of Kantians, agnostics, Machists, Lenin finds that this criticism was conducted "more from a vulgar materialistic than from a dialectical, materialistic point of view."

In connection with this, Lenin's words that "Plekhanov, in his remarks against Machism, did not care much about the refutation of Mach, but about inflicting factional damage to Bolshevism" <sup>[437]</sup>, have a deep meaning. Criticizing the Machists, Plekhanov made a number of unacceptable concessions to Machism, overlooking the need for a dialectical view of the nature of knowledge. He himself was of the opinion that we would never know how our consciousness arises <sup>[438]</sup>. This was undoubtedly a tribute to agnosticism.

Plekhanov's hieroglyphic theory of knowledge was also in the hands of the Machists, because it ultimately led to subjectivism, to the denial of objective reality and objective truth, that is, it led to the Machist subjectivist swamp. With his hieroglyphic theory, Plekhanov "made a clear mistake in presenting materialism" (*Lenin*). Plekhanov made a concession to Machism with his incorrect theory of "experience" and a number of other mistakes.

Lenin's criticism of Machism, and along the way of Plekhanov's mistakes, helps us to reveal the *epistemological* roots of the modern positivism of the mechanists. The main gnoseological mistake of the mechanists is that they incorrectly, non-dialectically raise and resolve the basic philosophical question about the relation of thinking to being, the question of the relation of the subjective and objective, relative and absolute. And they cannot be correctly scientifically understood without recognizing the Marxist-Leninist theory of *reflection*, without the doctrine of absolute and relative truth, that is, without applying dialectics to the theory of reflection.

From a *consistently materialistic* position, Lenin reveals the epistemological roots of Comrade Bukharin's mistakes in his notes on "The Economy of the Transition Period" and in other works. "The error of the" Bogdanovian "terminology" in Bukharin "stands out: *subjectivism*, solipsism. It is not the case of who "considers", to whom it is "interesting," but that it is independent of human consciousness" <sup>[439]</sup>. Where Bukharin speaks of the "cognitive value" of Marx's method, Lenin writes in the margins:

"Only" cognitive value "? and not the objective world reflecting? "Bashful" ... agnosticism! " [440] In another place, where Bukharin, instead of talking about the disclosure of the objective dialectic of the transitional era, again subjectivistically argues only about the "dialectical-historical *point of view* ", Lenin writes: , the dialectical "point of view" is only one of many equal "points of view" ... " [441] And Lenin, in the final review of the book of Bukharin, reproaches the latter for the fact that he uncritically borrows the terminology of Machist Bogdanov, does not ponder its content: agnostic, Humevsky-Kantian, according to philosophical foundations), into idealism ("logic", "point of view", etc.) *outside the consciousness of their production from matter* , from objective reality, etc. " [442] .

Unwillingness to correctly, dialectically understand the derivative character of sensations and logical categories, their dependence on matter, on objective reality, the constant silence about the objective content of concepts is generally characteristic of revisionists, both mechanists and Mensheviks idealists. Bukharin in words *for* philosophy, he even spoke in the "defense" of philosophy - as for example in his criticism of Enchmen, but in this defense he does not have an understanding of the dialectical theory of knowledge. Nowhere did Bukharin raise or examine the question of the relation of subjective and objective, relative and absolute moments in the knowledge of objective reality, of the dialectical character of the process of knowledge. There is nothing accidental about this for Bukharin. He was never consistent, that is, a dialectical materialist. He hesitated before, in his younger years, and after the revolution he continued to oscillate between materialism and positivism. In his younger years, Bukharin eclectically "combined" Marxist views with the philosophy of Mach-Avenarius;

It was not for nothing that V.I. Lenin, when he had to reveal these or other mistakes of Bukharin, concentrates every time the fire of his criticism on Bukharin's *epistemological* untidiness, which points to the unacceptable ignoring of the materialist theory of knowledge.

" *His theoretical views* ," Lenin wrote about him, " *can be very doubtfully attributed to quite Marxist, because there is something scholastic in him (he never studied and, I think, never understood completely dialectics)* " [443] .

As can be seen from this cited commentary on Bukharin, Lenin puts the anti-dialectic, scholastic errors of the latter in direct connection with the lack of understanding of dialectics as a theory of knowledge and the negation of the theory of reflection. Other mechanists (Stepanov, Varyash, Timiryazev, Perov) philosophical materialism is openly replaced by vulgar materialism. The problem of the relation of thinking to matter is solved metaphysically, not dialectically.

Mechanists Axelrod and Sarabyanov do not trust human knowledge at all. Their views are close to Kantianism and Machism. In his polemic with the Machists, Lenin asked them the question: "Is a person given when he sees red, feels solid, etc., is objective reality or not?" [444]

The Machists gave a negative answer to this question; they denied an objective source of sensations. Axelrod and Sarabyanov gave the same approximate answer. In their opinion, the sensations of red, solid, etc., i.e., in general, the sensations of man are devoid of objective content, they do not reflect the objective world that is independent of sensation. In their opinion, sensations, concepts are conventional signs, hieroglyphs, they *do not reflect* objective reality.

The philosophical mistakes of Plekhanov, following the line of the well-known departure from consistent materialism to vulgar materialism and Kantian agnosticism, are now being repeated by LI Axelrod (Orthodox), defending them and deepening them further. Axelrod aggressively defends Plekhanov's agnosticism and hieroglyphism. It stands on that essentially Kantian point of view, that "sensations caused by the action of various forms of motion of matter are not similar to the objective processes that generate them" [445]. She especially emphasizes this "dissimilarity" of forms of knowledge to the forms of the material world. Thus she has, like Kant, knowledge does not connect, does not bring people closer to nature, but only separates. The hieroglyphism of LI Axelrod is in glaring contradiction with the Marxist-Leninist consistent-materialist theory of reflection. At Axelrod, we actually have a *gap between knowledge and the material world*.. Axelrod's dialectics turns into subjectivism and sophistry and is not a reflection of the dialectics of the objective world. The agnostic theory of Axelrod inevitably follows the denial of dialectics as a science and the transformation of dialectics "into a system of formal principles," which do not reflect anything objective, but serve only as some purely subjective conventional cognitive means known as "point of view" for the approach to the subject of knowledge.

Mechanical materialists of the 18th century they did not suffer from such an ugly one-sidedness as modern mechanists, distinguished by exceptional "stiffness" and "ossification" of thought. The old materialists and in sensations were able to understand and find the *subjective image of the objective, material world* , they were able to *reflect the* objective in the subjective . And with modern mechanists, the subjective is only subjective.

Mechanists do not understand that the question of the objective content of sensations and concepts is at the same time a question of recognizing *their objective source*, that is, *matter* as the only and last objective reality independent of human consciousness. The knowledge that the material world exists outside of us is given as a result of historical, social, sensual human practice. Nature is reflected, that is, it makes itself known, is copied in the sensations and concepts of man, and this existence of an objective reality independent of man and mankind, confirmed in life at every step, is objective truth. "To regard our sensations as images of the external world — to *recognize objective truth* — to stand on the point of view of the materialistic theory of knowledge, they are the same" [446]. This is the truth for any consistent materialist, both for Marx and Lenin, and for Feuerbach and the French materialists.

When Sarabyanov and Axelrod refuse to recognize the objectivity of the content of our sensations, this suggests that they have completely *abandoned materialism*.

Mechanists agree with old materialists only in their inability to apply dialectics to the process of cognition. Marxism-Leninism teaches that dialectics also includes "what is now called theory of knowledge, gnoseology, which should consider its subject equally *historically*, studying and generalizing the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from *not* knowledge to knowledge" [447].

This is absolutely not able to understand the mechanists. And yet it is impossible to correctly understand the theory of reflection, if we consider it metaphysically, anti-dialectically, as Feuerbach and the old materialists considered it. *The Marxist theory of reflection* considers knowledge as a process, as a *transition from ignorance to knowledge*, as a *historical* process of more and more profound reflection in the heads of people of the ever-evolving nature and society.

What kind of scholasticism LI Axelrod held, to what extent she has a vulgar idea of the theory of reflection, can be seen at least from her polemic on this issue with Lenin. "If sensations were images or copies of things," she wrote, "what devil, one wonders, would we need things that in this case would actually turn out to be things in themselves, in the absolute sense of the word?" To recognize sensations as images or copies of objects means again to create an impassable dualistic gulf between the object and the subject" [448].

As can be seen from the above quotation, Axelrod did not understand dialectics at all. She was *treading around Feuerbach's extrahistorical man*, abstract non-historic categories - "subject and object". Moreover, it goes back from Feuerbach, who recognized, in sensations, concepts, an image or a copy of the objective material world, to Kant's metaphysics and idealism, which, as we know, could not link reflection with the reflected in itself, that is, tore the sensation from matter. Axelrod's antihistoricism is Feuerbach and Kant's antihistory in the theory of knowledge, ugly folded together.

The metaphysical, anti-dialectical view of the relation of thinking to matter, inherent in general to all mechanists, has nothing in common with Marxism.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin enriched the theory of reflection with dialectics, the doctrine of relative and absolute truth. They were taught to consider the process of reflecting the material world in the consciousness of man historically, in the course of the historical *practice of work*, in the course of *class* battles of humanity. Just as consciousness reflects matter in general, and the concrete historical social consciousness reflects the historical material process of the production of social life — this is the basic premise of the theory of knowledge of Marxism. The revisionist, formal-logical views of mechanists on knowledge have nothing in common with the Marxist dialectic.

Mechanists do not understand the objective meaning of dialectical materialist logic, do not understand its *derivatives from the material world, from the historical* development of the world and society. Therefore, they turn logical categories into empty abstractions, mystic, scholasticism, without being able to specifically apply them in practice.

Mechanists, as we have seen, forget the role of a revolutionary, world-transforming practice, confirming that objective truth, absolute content, reflecting objective reality, is in relative truth. Therefore, they do not understand that "human thinking is by its nature capable of giving and giving us absolute truth, which is made up of a sum of relative truths" [449].

*Modern mechanists, not understanding the doctrine of absolute and relative truth, are slipping into Kant's agnosticism, Hume, subjectivism, relativism and sophistry.*

The agnostic theory of hieroglyphs after Axelrod stubbornly defended himself and so. Sarabyanov. He came to the recognition of truth only as something subjective and to the negation of objective truth, that is, not only to the Kantian direct denial of the knowability of the objective world, but also to the subjective-idealistic denial of the existence of the world outside of consciousness.



With the denial of objective truth, Sarabyanov also agreed to the denial of objective qualities, etc. Sarabyanov thus assumed the position of subjective idealism, he had only a materialistic phrase, one appearance of materialism.

"Why," says Sarabyanov, "I call all truth subjective?" Yes, because truth is not objective being, that truth is our *understanding* of the world, things, processes " [450] .

So comrade Sarabyanov signed in his subjectivism. "To put relativism into the basis of the theory of knowledge," wrote Lenin, "means inevitably to condemn oneself either to absolute skepticism, agnosticism and sophistry, or to subjectivism" [451] . The relativism of Sarabyanov and the Kantian skepticism of Axelrod have nothing in common with the Marxist theory of knowledge. "The difference between subjectivism (skepticism and sophistry, etc.) from dialectics," writes Lenin, "among other things, that in (objective) dialectics is relatively (relative) and the difference between relative and absolute. *For objective dialectics and in the relative there is absolute.* For subjectivism and sophistry, the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute. " [452] . The distinction between the ideal and the material is also not unconditional, not excessive, and historical practice at every step confirms to us how human concepts, thoughts, knowledge, being derived from matter, entirely conditioned by it, turn back, mastering the masses, into practical action, into material force

For the vulgarizers of Marxism, these truths are incomprehensible, for they are trying to resolve the relation of thinking to matter in an abstract-scholastic, contemplative, and not dialectical way. Subjective - subjective, objective - objective, relative, not absolute, not objective, etc. The mechanists have a whole series of other idealistic, Kantian and Humerian mistakes. Axelrod defends the Menshevik-Kantian non-class theory of morality, merging with Kautsky in this matter. Sarabyanov, for example, supported Berg's idealist in biology and opposed Darwin. He considered, for example, wrong that "we in the mass still stand unconditionally on the positions of Darwinism" [453] . Varyash still has his Freudian, idealistic mistakes.

All these idealistic waverings of the mechanists are by *no means accidental* . They inevitably derive from the false positivist position taken by the mechanists in relation to Marxist philosophy, from their revision of the Marxist-Leninist theory of reflection, from the revision of materialist dialectics as a philosophical science.

No matter how much the mechanists would like to be materialists, Marxists, a departure from the position of inconsistent mechanical materialism against their will and desire leads to idealistic vacillation, to open revisionism. The mechanical, inconsistent, vulgar materialism of the mechanists could not withstand the onslaught of bourgeois ideas; a number of the most important combat points of materialism, the mechanists surrendered to Kantianism, Humism, subjective idealism. In other words, the mechanists did not withstand the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elements during the period of heightened class struggle in the country, succumbed to the ideologies of bourgeois-Menshevik positivism.

### **5.3.3. Contrasting the theory of knowledge dialectic**

The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of dialectics as a theory of knowledge and logic is the only consistent doctrine from which one cannot retreat a single step in order not to fall into the swamp of revisionism and bourgeois reaction. For a number of years, the modern mechanistic camp has been systematically combating dialectics as a theory of knowledge, developing positivistic empirical philosophy hostile to revolutionary Marxism, or, as Axelrod calls it, "philosophy of scientific experience", *as opposed to dialectics as a theory of knowledge* . "The systematic development of the philosophy of dialectical materialism still does not exist" [454] , says Axelrod; although she still believes that only Marxism "can provide a genuinely scientific theory of knowledge, or a *theory of experience*, and the general philosophical outlook, scientifically grounded " [455] . The materialistic dialectic of Marx and Engels and its development by Lenin - is this really not a "genuinely scientific theory of knowledge"?

Obviously, Lenin and his party, on the one hand, and Axelrod, and behind it the whole mechanistic camp, on the other, speak different languages. Following Marx and Engels, Lenin understood Marxist theory as a materialistic dialectic, which sets the task of changing the world. Following Kant, Axelrod understands philosophy, the theory of knowledge - the theory of experience, gnoseology, which deals with questions about "conditions and prerequisites" of "experience", the possibility of justifying "experience", the possibility of "justifying" causality, etc. Dialectics, in the opinion Axelrod cannot be a theory of experience, gnoseology, because she understands dialectics metaphysically only as a *method* or teaching about *purely formal principles of thinking* , and not as a philosophical science about the universal laws of the development of nature, society and thinking.

What should be the theory of knowledge according to Axelrod? Following the revisionist and bourgeois philosophers, Axelrod believes that "the theory of experience must be based on experience data", that experience in turn "requires its justification" [456] . Her positivist philosophy of experience

should, in her opinion, address serious problems, including the "important problem of the primary prerequisites of experience": the problem of reality, as it manifests itself in experience, "the problem of causality, the problem of the criterion of truth", "the question in which ontological premises necessary from the point of view of dialectical materialism are permissible" <sup>[457]</sup>, etc.

What is experience? How is experience possible? What are the conditions and prerequisites of experience? - this is what, in its opinion, revolutionary Marxism-Leninism should do under the dictatorship of the proletariat. In other words, the Bolsheviks should deal with the old chewing problems of Kantianism. However, the party has to expose this old rot, as the mechanists stubbornly continue to defend this theory of experience, directing it against Marxist-Leninist dialectics. None of the mechanists spoke out against the Menshevik-Kantian prostitution of the Marxist dialectic, on the contrary, they are doing the same thing in their "philosophical works".

Varyash, in his special book devoted to Lenin's dialectic, circumvented the central position of Marxist-Leninist philosophy that dialectics is the theory of knowledge and the logic of Marxism. He attributed to Lenin his own Axelrod-Plekhanov views on dialectics only as a "method," and not as a theory of knowledge and the logic of Marxism. Therefore, the first question in the section devoted to Lenin's dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, Varyash has the question: "what is experience?" Lenin's criticism of the word "experience" as a cover for both the materialist and idealistic line in philosophy, as well as a sharp Leninist criticism of the Plekhanov error on about experience - all this is forgotten and circumvented by Varyash in favor of Menshevik positivism. The concept of experience on Varyash, which he attributes to Lenin, there is a supposedly "important category" of the materialist theory of knowledge. Analyzing the rationale of Kant's experience, Varyash notes: "an explanation of Kant's experience ... comes down essentially if not to the complete abolition of experience, then in any case to a radical reworking of this important concept," and the trouble is that "Kant's experience means not that that for us." To save the theory of experience, according to Varyash, is still possible by introducing materialistic corrections, which he makes in his book in full agreement with the program of developing the "theory of experience", which is outlined in Axelrod.

None of the Marxists so harshly and mercilessly attacked "the uncritical borrowing of the notion of" experience "alien to Marxism, worn out by the whole philosophical reaction of the notion of" experience, "like Lenin. "At the present time," wrote Lenin, "the professorial philosophy of all shades puts its reactionary nature on the outfits of the recitation about" experience "" <sup>[458]</sup>. Idealists, empiricists, all empirio-critics, all Machists, and the subjective idealist Fichte connected their philosophy only with experience, were sent from experience. "I declare solemnly," Fichte wrote, "the inner meaning, the soul of my philosophy, is that man has nothing at all but experience; a person comes to everything he comes to, only through experience" <sup>[459]</sup>.

Under the same word "experience" mechanists revise the dialectic. "All our knowledge comes from experience and rests on experience. Dialectic materialism is empirical from beginning to end, "echoes Axelrod, echoing the common choir of Marxist enemies. At the same time, Axelrod understands experience in one case idealistically, in the other case materialistically. When she writes that "Kant's whole mistake was that he separated the form of experience from the content of experience, a priori forms from sensuality," she identifies experience here with consciousness, that is, interprets "experience" idealistically. When she says that "experience" is a process of interaction between the subject and *independent* from his object, she understands him materialistically. But even in this case, it does not go beyond the Feuerbach contemplative understanding of "experience." In addition, she later surrenders her materialistic position to Kantianism. The sensations arising in the course of this interaction are, according to Axelrod, not images of the real world, but hieroglyphs, conventional signs. In other words, the philosophy of "experience" Axelrod should serve as the basis for the theory of hieroglyphs, a cover for the old Feuerbach contemplative materialism and Kantian agnosticism. Such is the objective class-political content of the latest "Marxist theory of knowledge" developed by the Menshevik empiricists in opposition to the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist dialectic. The struggle of the mechanists against the dialectic as a theory of knowledge is clearly essentially *the struggle of Menshevism with Bolshevism in philosophy*.

The theory of knowledge of Marxism has nothing in common with the Menshevik half-Kantian declamation about "experimental", "empirical" knowledge. In materialist dialectics, the source of knowledge is matter independent of consciousness, moving. Living, sensory knowledge, determined by practical, revolutionary-critical activity, is the most important moment of a single dialectical process of knowledge, which is only a reflection of the dialectics of the objective world.

What kind of "empiricism" the mechanists are talking about, it can be seen at least from the following thesis of Sarabyanov: "not only the senses deceive us," wrote Sarabyanov, "but also nature itself misleads us." According to the theory of Sarabyanov, all sensory knowledge turns into a

continuous deception, and therefore all actions of people should also turn into a complete mistake, that is, some kind of eternal, fundamental discrepancy between perceptions and the material world is legalized. It is impossible to build a scientific revolutionary theory on the "empiricism" of mechanists, which would make it possible to foresee the course of concrete historical reality and put words into action in a revolutionary way, that is, you cannot build bold, revolutionary, decisive Bolshevik tactics. Against such a rotten "empiricism", the main position of Lenin is directed,

Our mechanists talk about empiricism not at all in order to seriously study the *role and significance of empirical, sensory cognition* to substantiate revolutionary theory and successful practical action. On the contrary, with cries about empiricism, they want to cover up their rejection of dialectics, of revolutionary theory, in order to oppose empirical knowledge to theoretical, in order to oppose semi-Canadian, agnostic epistemology to dialectics as theories of knowledge.

The Marxist dialectic is revolutionary and concrete; it is not divorced from sensual, lively historical practice and sensual empirical knowledge. Mechanists are trying to isolate it. tear away from empirical knowledge, expel the dialectic from its "positive" theory of knowledge, turn it into objectless, reflecting nothing of the forms of thinking. By this they show only their complete ignorance about the dialectical nature of the most empirical sensory knowledge, as well as a lack of understanding of the connection between empirical and theoretical knowledge.

After science has proven the historical development of nature, the historical origin and development of the organic world and human society, it is completely absurd to return to the old *metaphysical theories about nature, boundaries and abilities of knowledge* and isolate the doctrine of the method from gnoseology, logic, etc., as mechanists try to do. Metaphysical view on the essence of knowledge is a long past historical stage. Meanwhile, the mechanists' arguments are thoroughly metaphysical. They have absolutely no dialectical understanding of the relationship between sensual and theoretical knowledge. They take a separate perception of an individual without a historical approach to it, select individual cases of erroneous perceptions, whether damage to any sense organ, incompleteness of conditions for correct perception, etc., are selected and, on the basis of this "experience," Sarabyanov: "because the feelings are deceiving us." Or, they argue, "the sensitivity of the senses all the time changes depending on the training and the state of the body," and therefore "one cannot trust the senses". One asks how can we still know the world, if feelings are deceiving and nature leads us by the nose? "Only by means of an instrument and an experiment," answers Comrade Sarabyanov, "we can know things and their processes," with the tools "we correct our senses." A truly miserable, miserable "theory of experience" of the mechanists. It turns out that the sense organs deceive us only with respect to the subjects being studied, but they never deceive a person who knows with the help of tools ...

Meanwhile, in reality, the situation is just the opposite: experiment, practice, technology - the same tools prove that *in the end*, in sum, the human senses *faithfully* reflect objects and processes of nature. If they were deceiving us, there would be no equipment or tools; effective historical practice would be impossible. Of course, the senses of a single person, just like no single instrument, will give us *absolute* accuracy and never able to completely and accurately reflect nature. But humanity in its historical development can endlessly develop and refine its knowledge. It is impossible on the basis of varying degrees of limitedness of our individual perceptions to draw conclusions that feelings generally deceive us. The experiment does not refute, but confirms the ability of perceptions to reflect things correctly. The experiment does not undermine confidence in sensory cognition, but expands, enriches spheres of sensory cognition, transforming the forms of material movement that are not perceived or difficult to be perceived by the senses into movements that are accessible to our perception. Artificial instruments of knowledge do not oppose the senses, but *complement them*, helping to better understand the phenomena and relationships of nature.

Engels, objecting to Helmholtz-type agnostics, provides detailed and detailed evidence that perceptions correctly reflect nature. He developed a dialectic view of the nature of sensory cognition, pointing to his active and historical character, to the dialectical *connection of* sensual thinking and practice. In the article "On the role of labor in the process of humanizing the monkey," Engels gave a consistently materialistic, that is, dialectical substantiation of the origin and development of human cognition - unlike modern mechanists, scholastics who still question Kant:

The origin and development of sensory knowledge and thinking according to Engels cannot be understood apart from historical practice, apart from active labor activity and class struggle. Marx, Engels and Lenin set before us the task of substantiating and developing further dialectics as a theory of knowledge based on the development of technology, the history of all sciences and in particular the development of the organic world, the history of the development of a child. Darwin's theory of development, Engels says, "was given not only an explanation of the existing representatives of

organic life, but also laid the foundation for the prehistory of the human spirit, for studying various stages of its development, starting from simple, structureless, but experiencing irritation of the lower organisms to the thinking human the brain. Without this prehistory, adds Engels,<sup>[460]</sup> . Thanks to the theory of development, thinking is explained by *natural* causes. that is, scientifically grounded and explained. Not to take into account, like the mechanists, the dialectic active character of human knowledge as a whole and its direct dependence on practical activities aimed at changing the nature and transformation of society, means engaging in empty scholasticism. Therefore, the mechanists' attempt to isolate dialectics as a theory of thinking from sensual, empirical knowledge and from objective dialectics is a reactionary venture that has nothing to do with Marxism, with Marxist science in general.

#### **5.3.4. Replacing the dialectic of mechanics. Equilibrium theory**

The misunderstanding of materialistic dialectics as a theory of knowledge is combined among mechanists with a one-sided mechanistic view of nature and society, with the restoration of old mechanistic materialism.

"The materialism of the past (XVIII) century," wrote Engels, "was mostly mechanical, because of all natural sciences, by that time only mechanics had reached certain completeness, and it was only mechanics of solid bodies (earthly and celestial), in short, gravity mechanics. Chemistry still had a childlike appearance, it still adhered to the phlogiston theory. Biology was still in diapers: the plant and animal organism was studied only in rough, it was explained by purely mechanical reasons. In the eyes of the materialists of the eighteenth century, man was a machine, like animals — in the eyes of Descartes. The exceptional application of the measure of mechanics to chemical and organic processes, in the field of which the mechanical laws, although they continue to operate, but recede into the background before other higher laws, is the first, peculiar,<sup>[461]</sup> .

The greatest merit of Marx and Engels is overcoming the shortcomings of the old, contemplative anti-dialectical materialism, enriching materialism with dialectics. Materialistic dialectics - as a comprehensive doctrine of the universal laws of the development of nature, society and thinking - is the only consistent materialistic theory of knowledge and the method of revolutionary action.

The universal character of dialectics as the science of the laws of nature and society has been repeatedly revised by bourgeois fellow travelers of Marxism. Lenin criticized the bourgeois apologist Struve for "the primordial ignorance of dialectics." The most severe criticism has subjected Lenin to contemporary naturalists for their inability to rise from elemental materialism to dialectical, for their descent from materialism to Machism. Similarly, modern mechanism is associated with "primordial ignorance" of dialectics among a number of comrades who are engaged in Marxist theory.

The universal character of the laws of materialist dialectics is subject to revision by the entire modern mechanistic course. *Naturalists are trying to replace the dialectic with the mechanics of the natural sciences.* A considerable part of the mechanistic camp, mainly in the person of Bukharin and his "school", replaced the dialectics with the mechanistic theory of equilibrium in the field of *history, political economy, strategy and tactics of the class struggle of the proletariat*. i.e. in the field of social cognition and action. Thus, the aspirations of the mechanistic camp are aimed at undermining the dialectical materialist basis of revolutionary Marxism as an integral and unified worldview and replacing it with a mechanistic worldview. True, expelling the dialectic from nature and society, the mechanists continue to talk about the "dialectical" method of Marx. But this is only a phrase; in fact, the dialectical method of thinking turns into a formal logic, eclecticism, sophistry, into a dead scholasticism.

The mechanists consider Marxist dialectics insufficiently materialistic, they are trying to "supplement", "deepen", "concretize" and, under the guise of development of "concretization", dialectics revise Marxism-Leninism along the whole line.

An attempt to replace the revolutionary dialectic with mechanics, an attempt to narrow down, curse the Marxist dialectic and reduce it to an empty verbal trinket and characterizes the revisionist essence of modern mechanism. This striving is expressed primarily by N. I. Bukharin.

Back in 1922, Bukharin wrote that Marx and Engels "freed the dialectic from its mystical husk in *action*"<sup>[462]</sup> , but allegedly did not substantiate it theoretically and never gave a theoretical and systematic presentation of it. Bukharin reproaches Marx and Engels for abandoning to the proletariat a worldview that is not liberated "from the *teleological* taste, inevitably associated with the Hegelian formulation, which rests on the *self-development of the " Spirit "*"<sup>[463]</sup> . And therefore, instead of "mystical" Marxist dialectics, he proposes to base Marxism on a mechanistic "equilibrium theory", which supposedly "is both *more general and purified from idealistic elements* formulation of the laws of moving material systems "<sup>[464]</sup> . "We consider it quite possible," says Bukharin, "to shift the

mystical, as Marx called it, the language of Hegelian dialectics into the language of modern mechanics" <sup>[465]</sup> .

Following bourgeois professors, Bukharin does not hesitate to reproach the Marxist dialectic with Hegelian mystic a thousand times for the first time, point out that in the Marxist worldview there is a "teleological (mystical) flavor", "idealistic elements" hint at the "narrowness" of Marxist dialectics and look for "more common (!) formula of the laws of motion of matter. " But this also means - to lead a new campaign against Marxism in favor of the "more general" bourgeois "point of view"! Bukharin realizes that revision of the dialectic inevitably entails a revision of the whole of Marxism, and the corresponding revision of the whole of Marxist science: the theory of historical materialism, political economy, Marxist-Leninist politics and tactics must also be carried out with bringing the theory of equilibrium to Marxism. "Theoretical work",

However, reproaching Marx and Engels for "mystification", Bukharin bypassed their main statements about dialectics. Marx and Engels knew well that the bourgeoisie and its theoretical minions would muddy their revolutionary doctrine, calling it "Hegelian sophistry." Marx replied to bourgeois criticism with the following words: "I criticized the hemispheric side of Hegelian dialectics almost 30 years ago, while it was still in fashion." "My dialectical method," Marx said, "is not only radically different from Hegel's, but represents its direct opposite" <sup>[466]</sup> .

Bukharin did not understand the revolutionary significance of the materialist dialectic. And he said nothing new. He repeated only the old Bogdanov-Machist slander of Marxism: "The basic concept of dialectics in Marx, like in Hegel, did not reach full clarity and completeness; and because of this, the very use of the dialectical method is made inaccurate and vague, arbitrariness is mixed in its schemes, and not only the boundaries of the dialectic remain uncertain, but sometimes its very meaning is distorted " <sup>[467]</sup> .

Bukharin also repeated Bogdanov's thought, word for word, on the narrowness and historical limitations of dialectics and the need to move to a broader and "common point of view." "Organizational processes in nature," wrote Bogdanov, "are accomplished *not only* through the struggle of opposites, but also in other ways; the dialectic is therefore a special case, and its scheme cannot become a universal method. The resulting new point of view is formulated by empirio-monism " <sup>[468]</sup> . This point of view of Bogdanov's empirio-monism, about which Bukharin is silent, is Bogdanov's mechanistic, "organizational science", with its notorious equilibrium theory, for which Bukharin grasped, ignoring Lenin's warnings about the idealistic, reactionary basis of Bogdanov's "organizational science," his "tectology ".

"Bogdanov deceived *you* by changing ... and trying to *move the* old argument. And you give in! " <sup>[469]</sup> - wrote Vladimir Ilyich to Bukharin. In response to this warning, Bukharin discovered a complete unwillingness to understand Lenin. "But this is precisely what needs *to be proved* ," he replied to Lenin. - In my opinion, *in essence*, there really is no philosophy here, and tectology is something other than empirio-monism. It's not so easy to inflate me in such things " <sup>[470]</sup> .

This pretentious response of Bukharin, the "unlearned theorist," very vividly characterizes his attitude towards Lenin as a theorist and towards the Lenin stage of development of Marxist philosophy in particular.

To this day, Bukharin has not refused this Bogdanov-scholastic methodology, despite its clearly idealistic, reactionary character, completely hostile to Marxism-Leninism. In fact, let us see how, according to Bogdanov, his mechanistic, or as he calls it, "tectological" point of view from the Marxist critical-revolutionary dialectics should differ.

First of all, the tectological "point of view" of Bogdanov, in accordance with his subjectivism, should be a universally broad scheme, completely *indifferent to its content* . "Before tectology, as well as before mathematics, all phenomena are equal, all elements are indifferent" ,this is the basic principle of Bogdanov's methodological scholastics. The mechanistic methodology should drown all life, the concrete in the abstract, give universal, empty, empty, formal "symbolic schemes" according to all the rules of formal logic, separating the general from the particular and the individual. "Its generalizations, like mathematical symbols, should *be distracted from the concreteness of the* elements, the organizational link of which they express, should hide this concreteness under the indifferent symbols" <sup>[471]</sup> .

Thus, the concrete materialistic dialectic, for which there is no common outside the particular and the singular, no abstract outside the concrete, Bogdanov contrasts idealistic abstract scholastic, *universal schematics* , like the world schematics of the positivist Dühring. This dead scholasticism, capable of killing everything revolutionary in empty abstraction, covering it up with an empty phrase, lubricating everything, going around everything, is an invaluable methodology for

bourgeois agents in the labor movement. This universal Bogdanov's schematism of Bukharin was adopted entirely.

The second subjective-idealistic principle of Bogdanov's methodology, which was not noticed by Marxist Bukharin, states that "for tectology" the unity of experience is not found, "but is created in an active-organized way". According to Bogdanov, we must proceed not from the conditions of a concrete objective situation, not from the material external world and its unity, which for the idealist Bogdanov does not exist, but from our own mind, from mental "elements" we must create, create, organize, construct nature and society, create unity of experience. "How *is experience possible* , how are the elements *to add* up their system, how to harmonize experience?" - this is the question that Kant pursued; he pursues both Bogdanov and ... Bukharin. The fewer contradictions between the "elements", the easier it should flow *the organizational process* , the higher the better the system should be. Therefore, "the task of practice and theory is reduced to a tectological question: how *is it most expedient to organize* a certain set of elements, real or ideal?"

Bukharin is trying to "materialize" this, essentially subjectively idealistic, method of a priori designing systems from elements! "Any thing," he says, "whether it be a stone, or a living object, or a human society, or something else," we can consider as a whole, consisting of parts (elements) connected with each other; in other words, we can consider this whole as a system " <sup>[472]</sup> . "Each system consists of component parts (elements) interconnected one way or another. Human society is made of people, the forest is made of trees and bushes, a heap of stones are made of these stones, a herd of animals is made of individual animals, etc. " <sup>[473]</sup> . .. All the wisdom of Bukharin's "organizational", ie, mechanistic, "dialectic" is the formula: "if you are such and such elements, then *what should* be the conditions under which it is possible *to keep the balance* of the system, which includes, or should include its elements. "

Bukharin has not advanced one step from the Kantian question, "how is experience possible," "how is unity of experience possible," how is equilibrium possible? Bukharin's answers are made like this: class societies *exist*, then there must be additional equilibrium conditions. There must be something that plays the role of a hoop that stiffens classes, which prevents society from disintegrating, falling apart, and finally breaking up. Such a hoop is the state, i.e. a condition for the unity of society, according to Bukharin, must be reconciling, connecting classes, smoothing the contradictions of the hoop - the state. This empty idealistic and reactionary scholasticism blurs the class essence of the state and leads to bourgeois lies about the extra-class nature of the state. Here Bukharin's classes are reduced to empty abstractions, "elements", society to an equally deadly abstraction — a system. The state is reduced to an external hoop - an empty abstraction, which must bind elements, give "unity", consistency, stability to the system.

This Kantian method of constructing a "system" of elements, the method of finding the conditions, Bukharin tries to attribute to Marx and Engels. "The method of finding the *necessary conditions* on the basis of the available (or assumed) facts was extremely often used by Marx and Engels, although so far very little attention has been paid to this. Meanwhile, in essence, the whole "Capital" is built that way " <sup>[474]</sup> .

The method of finding the necessary conditions has nothing to do with Marxism as a consistently materialistic doctrine. This method is imbued with *antihistoricism* . Meanwhile, the Marxist method consists in the *historical* approach, in the approach from the point of view of *development* to the question of grounds and conditions. This is what the whole Capital of Marx is really saturated with. In theoretical constructions, Bogdanov and Bukharin proceed not from the material world, as the consecutive dialectical materialists Marx, Engels and Lenin proceed, but from the initial, scattered, disconnected "elements", parts, from which they then mechanically construct a whole, unity, looking for his "conditions". Therefore, their elements and the "systems" made of them remain dead abstractions, and not reflections of the living, concrete, material world. The living material unity of the world, developing through the struggle of opposites, itself produces its parts. But for Bukharin and our other metaphysical mechanists, the parts exist *before the whole* , separately from the whole.

Third, Bogdanov demands that his idealistic organizational mechanistic scholasticism not be confused with the "harmful" materialistic dialectics. Bogdanov is the sworn enemy of materialism, NI Bukharin did not understand this, an ardent opponent of the basic law of materialist dialectics: the unity of opposites. Materialism - the recognition of the external world, according to Bogdanov, is a mystic. Therefore, he does not want to have anything in common with the "mystical", that is, the materialistic, Marxist dialectic, and in every possible way is denouncing it. However, he leads the attack on the dialectic of Marx not only by attacking materialism, but also uses another method, accusing Marx of Hegelianism. He believes that the Marxist dialectic is "formal" because it makes the concreteness of the study a prerequisite, takes the external material world as its starting

point, objective reality. Bogdanov lumps together the materialistic dialectic of Marx and the idealistic dialectic of Hegel, on the grounds that both Marx and Hegel recognize development as a struggle of opposites. In the materialist dialectic as a doctrine of the self-development of matter, Bogdanov sees "logism", "mystic", and "teleology" in Marx and Marxists.

Instead of criticizing the reactionary essence of Bogdanov's theory, Bukharin reconciles it with revolutionary Marxism. In the remarks on "The Economy of the Transition Period," Lenin noted Bukharin's fascination with Bogdanovism. "The author gives valuable *new facts*, but worsens, verballhornt Marx's theory of" sociological "scholasticism" <sup>[475]</sup>. The dialectic process - "the author puts it *next* (and in 2nd place) with Begriffsscholastik Bogdanov. But it is impossible to put near: either - or " <sup>[476]</sup>. Bukharin connects the "human language with the organizational gibberish of Bogdanov."

To what slavishly, blindly Bukharin follows Bogdanov, it can be seen from the fact that among Bogdanov's identification of organic with mechanical is among the innovations that he "brings" to Marxism.

Bukharin's entire argument is borrowed from Bogdanov, and he understands "organic" not in the biological sense, but in the specifically Bogdanov sense, in the sense of the organizational process. And for this purpose, Bukharin, following Bogdanov, refers to the electronic theory, which allegedly represents the "organized system" of elements as opposed to the old, isolated, single and now extinct element - the atom. There is nothing more shameful and disgraceful for a Marxist theorist than this reference to electronic theory for refuting Marxist dialectics and justifying the mechanism and Machist scholasticism!

*So the whole point of Bukharin's slogan of transcribing dialectics into the language of mechanics is to try to "kill" dialectics, the revolutionary soul of Marxism, and turn Marxism into bourgeois theory, to substitute Marxist theory for Machist, metaphysical scholasticism.*

The rest of the mechanists also replace dialectic with mechanics, although they do so in a much more hidden form. Tov. Stepanov, for example, considered the dialectical understanding of nature as "too general a name" and tried to "concretize" dialectics as a mechanistic worldview. He believed that "to understand any phenomenon of life for modern science means *to reduce it to relatively simple chemical and physical processes*" <sup>[477]</sup>.

The main starting point and with it the crown of the whole methodology of the mechanists - in their striving to substitute dialectics for mechanics - is their perversion of the essence, the core of dialectics, the law of the unity of opposites, its replacement by the *theory of equilibrium*. The idealistic roots of this theory, in various forms appearing in the works of the bourgeois positivists and especially developed in our country by Bogdanov and Bukharin, reveal Bogdanov's "organizational science". According to Bogdanov, the "organizational process" (which Bogdanov, for catching simpletons, is called organizational "dialectics") does not tolerate any *internal contradictions* in its elements and systems. Bogdanov's organizational "dialectics" expelled every living contradiction of the world. It is allowed only *external* inconsistency, external collision of "elements", parts, which, however, in every system must be fully coordinated, so that these elements themselves mechanically, "organizationally" grow into the system. To do this, the system must be stable, be at *rest, in balance*. But since there is no absolute equilibrium in nature, in his "organizational process" Bogdanov is forced to allow *an imbalance* in order for the system to receive at least the appearance of movement. This organizational process must take the form of the Hegelian triad: first equilibrium - then its violation - then restoring equilibrium. This is the whole Bogdanov-Bukharin "dialectic" of the "organizational process".

The normal state of the system is declared to be consistency and balance of parts, "elements". Any internal contradiction is an imbalance of the system, which entails a crash, destruction, - as Bukharin says, the links between the "elements" burst. Therefore, an imbalance in both Bogdanov and Bukharin is an *abnormal state* in nature and society, and it cannot continue for a long time.

The theory of equilibrium is most pronounced in Bukharin's The Theory of Historical Materialism.

"In the world," says Comrade Bukharin, "there are differently acting forces directed against each other. Only in exceptional cases do they balance each other for a moment. Then we have a state of "peace", i.e. their real "struggle" remains hidden. But one has only to change with one of the forces, as now "internal contradictions" are found, an imbalance occurs, and if a new equilibrium is established at the time, it will be established on a *new basis*, i.e., with a *different* combination of forces, etc. this implies? *And it follows from this that "struggle" is "contradictions," that is, antagonisms of variously directed forces and cause movement*" <sup>[478]</sup>. Bukharin, as can be seen from the above extract, takes the state of equilibrium of forces directed against each other as the initial position. From here it is sent in order to explain how and thanks to what reason the object *moves*, develops. It turns out, in the opinion of Comrade Bukharin, that when a subject comes into motion, a

phenomenon is derived from a state of equilibrium or, which is the same, from a state of rest, thanks to a change in *one* of the forces (note, thanks to one of the forces. - *Auth.*) are in the phenomenon. The question is, for what reason does a change in one of the forces occur, and therefore - due to which the state of rest is disturbed? To this question, Bukharin answers definitely: "It is absolutely clear that the internal structure of the system (internal equilibrium) should change depending on the relationship that exists between the system and the *environment*. The relationship between the system and the environment is crucial. For all the positions of the system, the main forms of its movement (decay, development, stagnation) are determined precisely by this attitude" [479].

If so, since the state of the object (system) changes depending on the relationship between the object ("system") and the external environment (that is, other objects surrounding it), then one cannot speak of an internal contradiction inherent in the object itself. According to the materialist dialectic, the struggle of opposites is the internal source of self-movement of each object or phenomenon. Bukharin, like all mechanists, transfers the source of movement and development to *the outside*, portraying the external environment as the cause of the imbalance.

Therefore, we can only talk about the contradiction between the system and the environment. As for the *internal* contradiction within the "system", about which Bukharin sometimes tries to talk, his opposites peacefully coexist, forming a state of equilibrium and changing his position relative to each other only depending on the environmental conditions.

For example, the relationship between classes in society is explained by the attitude of society to nature. Nature is the cause of the direction in which one of the classes will change, and therefore the class struggle will go. But if the development of society is explained by the impact on it from the side of nature, then, one wonders, where does the cause of the movement and the change of nature itself lie?

On this Comrade. Bukharin does not give a clear answer. And there can be no other answer, of course, if only to observe a logical sequence, as soon as the one that this cause is supra-cosmic force, which can be called whatever you like and which in the XVII – XVIII centuries was called the first divine impulse, then just the creator! So equilibrium theory leads straight to the justification of religion ...

Equilibrium theory is primarily trying to eliminate self-movement, and therefore the self-development of phenomena - this is one of the basic principles of materialist dialectics. In the very concept of self-movement, Comrade Bukharin sees a bad, "teleological" aftertaste. Secondly, the opposite sides of the object are understood by Comrade Bukharin as *external* to each other, which are mechanically in contact with each other. And, thirdly, that follows from all the previous, the contradiction is understood *only as antagonism of forces*. Bukharin states so directly: "The struggle of" contradiction, "that is, antagonism."

*But contradiction and antagonism are not the same thing.* Antagonism is only a special case of contradiction. The antagonistic form of contradiction alone is not obligatory. For example, the antagonism of classes of capitalist society will disappear along with the classes, and the contradictions that internally condition the movement and development of society will remain under socialism.

Thus, the mechanists reject the dialectical law of the unity of opposites, replacing it with a purely mechanical law of equilibrium. To verify this, it suffices to compare Bukharin's statement of the theory of equilibrium with the basic formulations of the laws of mechanics.

#### **The laws of mechanics:**

According to the first law, "each body retains *its state of rest or uniform* rectilinear motion, if it is not forced *by the forces acting on it* to change this state." The second law says: "the *change in motion* is proportional to the impact of the *driving force* and occurs in the direction of the straight line in which this force acts". Finally, according to the third law, "action is always *equal to opposition*, or the actions of two bodies against each other are always equal and directed in the *opposite* way."

#### **Equilibrium theory:**

" *The relationship between the environment and the " system "* (read: external cause and phenomenon. - *Aut.* ) *Is the value that ultimately determines the movement of any system!* " [480]

"In the world there are differently acting forces directed against each other. Only in exceptional cases do they balance each other for a moment. Then we have a state of "peace", i.e. their real "struggle" remains hidden. But one has only *to change with one of the forces*, as now "internal contradictions" are found, an *imbalance* occurs, and if a new equilibrium is established at the time, it will be established on a *new* basis, i.e., with another combination of power, etc. [481]

After this, it is not difficult to notice all the inconsistency of the theory of equilibrium. The theory of equilibrium is distracted from the absolute, universal character of motion, without which, as we have



shown before, neither the existence of matter nor its knowledge is possible. This is the mechanistic and metaphysical character of the theory of equilibrium. But the recognition that the movement of objects does not occur due to internal contradictions, as materialistic dialectics teaches, but due to *external* interaction of phenomena, things and the world around us, is essentially a denial of their actual movement and development. It inevitably entails a denial of their historical development, i.e., changes in their *quality* .

It is not surprising that the mechanistic theory of equilibrium negates the *objectivity of qualities* and the *uniqueness of various forms of motion*. It reduces all types and forms of movement to movement. Mechanists consider it "quite possible to shift,, mystical ", as Marx called it, the language of Hegelian dialectics into the language of modern mechanics" <sup>[482]</sup> .

It is known that mechanists reduce the whole essence of materialist dialectics to the theory of *evolution* . The most outspoken of them, Comrade Stepanov, wrote: "The *evolutionary point of view, the point of view of development* , is one of the characteristic features of modern science" <sup>[483]</sup> . Moreover, under the "modern science" m. Stepanov implied dialectical materialism.

The mechanistic theory of equilibrium is therefore inextricably linked with the denial by the mechanists of *objectivity of qualities* , with their return to Locke on the question of qualities: only the "primary" qualities of things that are studied by mechanics are recognized by them as objectively existing. Mechanism therefore requires the *reduction of all other qualities to the mechanics under study*, the reduction of all higher forms of motion to its lower, mechanical forms. The mechanists 'perversion of the law of the unity of opposites entails their failure to understand the unity of the internal and external, content and form, necessity and chance, in particular, the mechanists' denial of randomness as a special form of manifestation of necessity (see previous chapters).

Equilibrium theory is a necessary component of the *bourgeois* worldview. It is inextricably linked with bourgeois philosophy — with its positivism and empiricism, with their denial of the significance of theory and philosophy. It is one of the whales of bourgeois science in the matter of "scattering" and "overthrowing" Marxism with its dialectical materialism, revolutionary dialectics. *Equilibrium theory is inextricably linked with the political views of the bourgeoisie, which seeks to portray the existing capitalist order as the "harmonious" cooperation of classes, with all its forces trying to maintain the balance of capitalist society.* The mechanistic theory of equilibrium helps bourgeois scientists to "scientifically" substantiate class goals and tasks that are directly and frankly advanced by bourgeois sociology. In the future, we will have the opportunity to show how the theory of equilibrium fully reveals to us the goals and objectives of modern sociology as a bourgeois science of society. It is not surprising that the theory of equilibrium enjoys great honor among the theorists of social fascism (Kautsky and others).

Bogdanov is much more outspoken than Bukharin; he contrasted his theory of equilibrium with the dialectic of Marx. He directly wrote that in the Marxist dialectic "the inevitably associated with its Hegelian and Prehegelian terminology" remnants of "logism" can be *harmful* in an "organizational", that is, mechanistic, analysis.

Tov. Bukharin, literally repeating Bogdanov's slander against Marxism, entirely borrowing his theory of equilibrium, however, is silent about the fact that Bogdanov openly calls materialist dialectics "harmful" (!) To the theory of equilibrium.

Instead of understanding the bourgeois-class, reactionary essence of the theory of equilibrium, Bukharin tries to give her a "Marxist", "dialectical" rationale, tries to reconcile it with the revolutionary dialectics of Marxism-Leninism.

An extremely flat understanding of dialectics, above which the mechanists in their theory of equilibrium cannot rise in any way, is a direct result of the influence of bourgeois ideology. This direct revision of the materialist dialectic served as the theoretical prerequisites for a right-wing agonist understanding of the issues of transition and the world revolution.

## **5.4. Menshevik idealism**

### **5.4.1. Misunderstanding of partisanship theory. Denial of Lenin's stage in philosophy**

The Marxist-Leninist principle of partisan philosophy is the most important principle of materialist dialectics. Marx, Engels, Lenin in all his activities were led by him, developing it on the most diverse material of the natural and social sciences.

Lenin always emphasized that "materialism includes ... partisanship, obliged at any assessment of an event to directly and openly take the point of view of a certain social group" <sup>[484]</sup> . Bourgeois theorists and social fascists are trying to challenge the scientific nature of Marxism-Leninism precisely because of its partisanship, which makes it *truly scientific* , "to the end of a revolutionary theory." All revisionist groups and trends, and in the first place, seek to discredit the principle of partisanship that

pervades the theory of Marxism. Ignoring the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy is also a characteristic feature in the activities of Menshevik idealists.

*Menshevik idealists* ignore the axiom of Marxism, which is that in a class society, the theory in all its forms and forms is nothing more than a kind of weapon of the class struggle. It was not by chance that the Menshevik idealists bypassed this Marx-Lenin doctrine, since all their theoretical work proceeded along a different line, was conducted from other fundamental principles, and expressed an ideology hostile to the proletariat. The Menshevik idealists ignored the Marxist-Leninist principle of partisanship of philosophy, expressed primarily in the fact that they divorced philosophy *from the practice of socialist construction*, from the core tasks of the proletarian revolution, from the tasks of active struggle for the general line of the party.

In the works of Menshevik idealists one can find quite a few general declarative statements on the topic that the theory is partisan. But there was absolutely no genuine scientific analysis and substantiation of this position, much less holding partisanship in theoretical work. The practice of their activities showed that these declarations served for them only as a cover for the idealistic revision of materialistic dialectics. The social-fascist henchmen of the bourgeoisie in the ranks of the labor movement, powerless to "throw the Marxist theory overboard," strive to dogmatize it, emasculate its revolutionary content and, tearing it away from the class struggle of the proletariat, into a set of empty abstract categories and thereby discredit its value as an effective, essential weapon of the revolutionary struggle. In the same direction, a revision of the philosophy of Marxism was conducted by the Menshevik idealists. In contrast to the mechanists with their slogan "overboard philosophy", the Menshevik idealists conducted a revision of Marxist philosophy under *flag of its development*. In fact, instead of developing categories of materialist dialectics based on the material of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions: materialistic processing of Hegelian philosophy based on history, science and technology, they uncritically retell *Hegelian* philosophy, completely ignoring the need to comprehend those fundamental, specific tasks that faced the party and the country for the last period.

The general line of the party over the years has been subjected to revision by both the Trotskyists and the right and "left" opportunists. The party mobilized all forces in order to defend Lenin's work, the ways outlined by him for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. Menshevik idealists have passed this struggle. Moreover, some of them actively came out with Trotskyist theoretical principles: Karev, with his "theory" of one main class in the transition period; Stan, who taught the Komsomol members to personally verify the correctness of the general line of the party, etc. Instead of being guided by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy, put philosophy at the service of the general line of the party to actively fight against its deviations, Menshevik idealists themselves played the role of suppliers of methodology for various deviationist and counter-revolutionary movements. Separating philosophy from the practice of socialist construction and the class struggle of the proletariat, the Deborino group simultaneously audited almost all problems of Marxist philosophy.

Ignoring Deborin's group of partisanship of the theory was vividly expressed in the fact that Menshevik idealists *did not recognize in Leninism a new, higher stage in the development of Marxism*. They denied the Leninist stage in philosophy, they considered Lenin only a practitioner, a conductor of Marx's teachings in the revolutionary movement.

Tov. Stalin classically illuminated and developed the main issues of Leninism, described Leninism as Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, characterized and showed on concrete material the role of Lenin as the most brilliant theorist who developed Marxism comprehensively and raised it to a new, highest level. Menshevik idealists denied this role of Lenin. Karev in the magazine "PZM" for 1924 made a description of Lenin, which is different from the installations of the party. "Lenin," Karev wrote, "stands entirely on the basis of Marxism, applying it to our present situation — the period of decay of capitalism. He brings Marx's theory, cleared of the debates of the Second International, into action. Leninism is Marxism of the epoch of the collapse of capitalism, the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. This is Marxism in the practice of the proletarian revolution, for which there were not yet sufficient material prerequisites in the Marxist International. Most of all, Lenin would have been surprised if he had been told that he was opening a new era (!) In Marxism."<sup>[485]</sup> So the Menshevik idealists, contrary to the facts, tried to deny Leninism - they fought against the characteristics of Leninism as a new, higher stage in the development of Marxist theory and practice. Denying the Leninist stage in the development of the theory of Marxism, they thereby revealed their misunderstanding of the main thing in Marxism, its teachings on the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the revolutionary "soul" of Marxism - materialistic

dialectics, describing Marxism as a fixed dogma, objectively in common with similar theories of social-fascist theorists.

The epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions with its enormous scope and intensification of the class struggle, the greatest discoveries in all areas of science and technology, the complication of old and the emergence of new forms of class struggle, sharp differentiation and exacerbation of the class struggle in various forms of ideology - gave the richest material for further comprehensive development of the theory of Marxism. Lenin, being at the head of the Bolshevik Party, in its revolutionary experience of unparalleled in the world, based on the generalization of the practice of the class struggle of the international proletariat and the achievements of world science, comprehensively developed Marxism, raised it to the highest level. The revolutionary essence of Marxism in the works of Lenin found its brilliant development. Naturally, the theorists of social fascism, seeking to undermine the influence of Marxism among the masses,

Under the conditions of the USSR, the Menshevik idealists could not openly preach such views. But in unison with the Trotskyists and the right, they also characterized Lenin as a "practice", only successfully "applying" Marx's teachings in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. This touching unity of the Menshevik idealists with the Right and the Trotskyists in assessing the greatest leader and theorist of the world communist movement once again indicates that, in the person of Menshevik idealists, we have peculiar suppliers of methodology for various counterrevolutionary and anti-party groups and movements.

Denying Leninism as a new, highest stage in the development of Marxism, the Menshevik idealists quite logically rejected the *Leninist stage in philosophy*. After the release of Lenin's abstracts of philosophy, representing the richest treasury of thoughts and ideas, highlighting many of the most important problems of philosophy in a new way, Deborin wrote in the preface to the IX Lenin Collection: there is no doubt that if he were able to bring the work begun to the end, he would give a serious impetus to the further development of dialectical materialism, raising it to a higher level " [\[486\]](#). Here the essence of the views of the Menshevik idealists on the question of the Lenin stage in the philosophy of Marxism is formulated in a concise form. Deborin denies Lenin's greatest achievements in the further development of materialist dialectics. This is entirely linked to his assessment of Lenin only as a "practice." Deborin argues that Lenin " *could* " give a serious impetus to the development of the philosophy of Marxism. What kind of Leninist stage in dialectical materialism can be discussed from the standpoint of Menshevik idealists, if, in their opinion, Lenin *could not* , did not even have time to *give an impetus* for the development of dialectical materialism? Thus, while rejecting Lenin's role in the development of philosophy, Menshevik idealists objectively carried out the social order of various camps hostile to Marxism, merged on a number of issues with the theorists of the Second International.

*The refusal by the Menshevik idealists of the Leninist stage in philosophy is accompanied by their completely uncritical, apologetic attitude to the works of Plekhanov.* In previous chapters we have already dwelt in some detail on Lenin's criticism of Plekhanov's philosophical errors. Now let us just remind once again that Lenin, criticizing Plekhanov, emphasized Plekhanov's misunderstanding that dialectics is the *theory of knowledge of Marxism*, its vulgar interpretation of the laws of dialectics as the *sum of examples*. Lenin noted that Plekhanov inconsistently criticizes Kantianism, he himself makes a number of concessions to agnosticism, that he leads the struggle against Machism more from the vulgar-materialist positions than from the dialectical-materialist. Plekhanov's mistakes, as is already known, exist on such issues as reassessing Feuerbach's philosophy, incorrect characterization of Marx's philosophical development process, reappraisal and incorrect characterization of the role of the geographical environment in the development of productive forces, wrong Feuerbachian understanding of the problem of unity of subject and object, separation elements logical from the historical in matters of the history of philosophy. The presence of such erroneous views indicates the need for critical work on the works of Plekhanov, enjoying - and rightly - great popularity among the wide circles of the proletariat of the USSR and foreign countries. It is necessary to clear the valuable in Plekhanov's works from everything non-Marxist, opportunist, especially since at present these mistakes (or similar) are used by social-fascists, and in the conditions of the USSR mechanists and Menshevik idealists give these ideas the last word Marxist philosophy.

The question of the role of Lenin and Plekhanov in the development of philosophy did not accidentally attract the attention of the party and the workers of the philosophical segment of the theoretical front. In connection with the development of the Leninist stage in philosophy, the depth of Plekhanov's philosophical errors, their connection with Plekhanov's Menshevik position in the revolutionary movement, were particularly pronounced. The struggle against the mechanistic and Menshevik-idealistic revision of Marxism personally showed that the mistakes and organic flaws in

Plekhanov's works are used by them to revise the most important problems of the philosophy of Marxism. With the stubbornness worthy of better application, the mechanists continue to uphold and develop further the erroneous views of Plekhanov that follow the line of Kantian agnosticism. *apologetics* of everything written by Plekhanov on philosophical problems, trying to obscure his mistakes.

Contrary to the precise, brilliant characterization of Comrade Stalin's role of Lenin in the development of philosophy, Menshevik idealists came forward with their theory of Plekhanov as a *theorist who supplemented Lenin's practice*. In his pamphlet "Lenin as a Thinker", Deborin wrote: "Both these thinkers (Plekhanov and Lenin. - *Auth.* ) Complement each other in a certain sense ... Plekhanov is primarily a theorist, Lenin is primarily a practitioner, a politician, a leader ..." [487] Thus, Plekhanov, the leader of Russian Menshevism, was transformed by the will of Deborin into a theoretical mentor of Lenin.

It is characteristic that this completely false, non-Marxist theory Menshevik idealists still until very recently sought to defend with the help of various sophisms. In the preface to the IX Lenin Collection, Deborin attempted to lay the historical basis for this thoroughly false concept. "Between Plekhanov and Lenin," writes Deborin, "there is a distinction reflecting the peculiarities of the historical phases in the development of the revolutionary movement and the class struggle of the proletariat" [488]. *This theory of Deborin is nothing more than an attempt to weaken the need to criticize Plekhanov's mistakes, reduce the significance of these mistakes and obscure their connection with the Menshevik line of Plekhanov in the revolutionary movement.* Undoubtedly, as a Marxist, Plekhanov spoke on the arena of political struggle several years before Lenin, and his first works were of great importance for the propaganda of Marxism. But all the most important Leninist basic theoretical works refer to the same period in which the works of Plekhanov-Marxist were published. Moreover, the Leninist Friends of the People were written a little earlier than even the Monist View by Plekhanov. The political activities of Plekhanov and Lenin mainly proceeded in the period of the imperialist stage of development of capitalism. Methodological failures in the philosophical works of Plekhanov and his mistakes in the interpretation of many of the problems of philosophy *are connected* with its opportunistic, Menshevik, liberal stance in the revolutionary movement. Back in 1908 Lenin emphasized in a letter to Gorky that "Plekhanov harm this (Marxist - *Ed.* ) Philosophy, linking *here* struggle with factional strife, but because the present Plekhanov not a single Russian Social-Democrat must not be confused with the old Plekhanov" [489].

Lenin and Plekhanov are not representatives of different eras, but the spokesmen of the ideology of *various social classes*. Plekhanov, who wrote brilliant pages in the history of the revolutionary movement in general and of the proletariat in particular, in the first decades of its activity, since the early 900s, has more and more become the spokesman for the petty-bourgeois ideology in the labor movement and during the war is completely bourgeois. This Menshevik line in the revolutionary movement explains the causes of theoretical errors and in its specifically philosophical works. Deborin's attempt to treat Lenin and Plekhanov as people of different periods (epochs) in the development of the revolutionary movement is nothing but a means to belittle and conceal those major fundamental methodological errors of Plekhanov that Lenin repeatedly criticized, revealing their class and logical background.

It is characteristic that this installation of the Menshevik idealists, which was too crudely formulated by Deborin, under the fire of unfolding criticism, was tried to "fix" by another prominent representative of this group, Karev. In an article in the "PZM", he writes that "in this respect, Plekhanov and Lenin represented not different epochs in the labor movement, but *different jets in him*, in Marxism, *different depths of his understanding*" [490]. Karev, faithful to his Menshevik-idealistic methodology, ignores the simple truth for the Marxist that explaining the difference between Plekhanov, the greatest theoretician of the Second International, and Lenin, the depth of understanding - this means not explaining anything. The difference in depth of understanding itself needs a *class* explanation. No matter how personally talented any ideologue of the bourgeoisie is at present, in the era of decay of capitalism, his creative activity, his ability to penetrate into the laws of development are "constrained" by his class nature, conservatism of the class he represents. The inability of the bourgeoisie to look into the future determines, narrows the boundaries and reduces the depth of its understanding by theorists of the phenomena of social development. The ideologists of the classes descending from the historical arena, despite all their talents, are not able to give truly profound scientific generalizations and discoveries. This truth of Marxism is confirmed by the entire history of the development of science and philosophy. As Plekhanov became clearer and more frank in his position of Menshevism, the depth of his "understanding" of the problems of the philosophy of Marxism decreased.

Menshevik idealists ignore the simple truth that it is impossible to talk about the existence of "various jets" in Marxism without changing the essence of the teachings of Marx - Lenin. Only from the standpoint of Menshevism can Plekhanov's mistakes and his misunderstanding on a number of critical issues of the essence of the materialist dialectics of a certain "stream" located "within" Marxism be characterized. This means to identify with the social-fascist characterization of Marxism as a conglomerate of various currents, jets and inclinations in the interpretation of theoretical issues. The Menshevik idealists embarked on this path, wishing, by all means, to defend their typically revisionist attitude.

The Menshevik idealists completely ignored *Lenin's criticism of the* theoretical mistakes of Plekhanov.

On this issue, the revisionist groups in the USSR, the mechanists and the Menshevik idealists largely converged. At least the Menshevik idealists, perverting themselves and not understanding the theory of Lenin's reflection, could not lead the struggle against the *mechanistic* revision of the Marxist-Leninist theory of reflection. Contrary to Lenin, they characterized the questions of criticism of the theory of hieroglyphs as unworthy. "There is such a theory of hieroglyphs," said Deborin during the discussion, "that she died a long time, does not care for anyone, who was finally criticized by Lenin." In this thesis of Deborin, not only is the lack of understanding of the danger posed by the Machist and Kantian revisions at the present stage, especially in the conditions of the crisis of capitalism, but also the desire to divert the attention of criticism from the Kantian jet, which takes place in the works of Deborin himself. In such articles by Deborin as *Dialectics in Kant*, in the works of Asmus, etc., Kant's agnosticism is *obscured*, his philosophy under their pen becomes for the present time almost a dialectical and revolutionary philosophy. The linkage along this line with the social-fascist views largely explains the solidarity of the Menshevik idealists with the neo-Kantian revision of Marx's political economy, conducted by the Menshevik-pest Rubin.

#### **5.4.2. Hegelian revision of the materialist dialectic**

Until recently, the Menshevik revision of Marxism in capitalist countries proceeded mainly under the slogan of "cantianizing" Marxist philosophy. The social-fascist theorists, trying to substantiate their revision, tried to characterize Marxism as a "one-sided" teaching, which needs to be *supplemented* by its theory of knowledge of Kant (Max Adler, Vorländer, and others). Exfoliating the revolutionary content of Marxism, they led the line on the "addition" of his *Kantianism*. By bringing this reactionary theoretical base under its counter-revolutionary practice in the ranks of the labor movement. At the present stage, as the bourgeoisie is fascized and its attack on the working class increases, the bourgeoisie is trying to use Hegel's idealistic dialectic in a perversion and reactionary form for a philosophical foundation of its activity. This new trend of bourgeois thought, as mentioned, is also reflected in social-fascism (Kautsky, Kunov, Siegfried Mark).

In the USSR, where Marxism is the dominant ideology, taking advantage of the interest shown by the broad masses to Hegel, a group of philosophers led by Deborin revised the philosophy of Marxism under the guise of the need to "supplement" it with Hegelianism. "The fascination with Hegel, the dialectician," writes Karev, "was a completely legitimate and necessary reaction to the opportunist disdain of the majority of theoreticians of the Second International. But at the same time as the revolutionary Marxists headed by Lenin in Hegel were looking for *additions* (emphasized by us - *Avt.*) To Marx ... the Mensheviks in Hegel were looking for an antidote to Marx's state theory (Coons), and bourgeois apologists were an instrument against Marxism at its very foundation." <sup>[491]</sup> In this thesis of Karev, dating back to 1924, the essence of the Menshevik-idealistic revision of the philosophy of Marxism by the Deborin group is formulated. Marxism is incomplete, "one-sided", needs to be supplemented, especially in its philosophical part — this is the attitude of the Menshevik idealists. Therefore, in contrast to the empiricists, the mechanists who simply threw philosophy overboard, the Menshevik idealists took the line to eliminate the philosophy of Marxism by separating it from the practice of class struggle, by complementing it with Hegelian philosophy, ultimately fulfilling the same task by using more subtle means. the elimination of the philosophy of Marxism, as the mechanists. Karev is against the essence of Marxism-Leninism against Lenin's instructions that "the doctrine of Marx is omnipotent because it is true, it is complete and harmonious, giving people a *whole* a world view irreconcilable with no superstition, no reaction, no defense of bourgeois oppression. " This doctrine does not need any addition from the bourgeois-idealistic teachings of the dying capitalist world, just as the philosophy of Marxism does not need any additions like " *complete* philosophical materialism that gave humanity great tools of knowledge, and the working class in particular" (*Lenin*) . The attempt to revise the philosophy of Marxism under the guise of its "complement" is not new and represents one of the methods of covering up the revisionist activities of various anti-Marxist groups, including the Menshevik idealists.

Let us turn to a concrete consideration of those questions on which, "complementing Hegel," the Menshevik idealists, who revisited the philosophy of Marxism, revisited. Lenin in 1922, set the task of *materialistic processing* rational content of Hegel's philosophy, at the same time pointing out that Hegel's method is radically opposed to Marx's method, as he thoroughly idealistic, that it can not be used without processing or materialistic especially *connected* with materialism. Other views are held by Menshevik idealists. In Hegel's teaching, they see, on the one hand, idealism, personified in the system, on the other hand, *materialism* expressed in the method of Hegel. "According to the definition of Engels and Lenin," writes Karev, "Hegelian philosophy was put on the head by materialism. The method was materialistic in it " <sup>[492]</sup> . Thus, under the pen of Menshevik idealists, the method of the classical idealist Hegel receives a characteristic as a materialistic method. The apologetic attitude of the Menshevik idealists to Hegel's philosophy, its uncritical acceptance are expressed in this position by Karev with exhaustive completeness.

Conducting their line on the hegelianization of Marxism, the Menshevik idealists, as a rule, sought to back up their revelations with references to Marx, Engels, Lenin. Meanwhile, the classics of Marxism never approached the consideration of Hegel's method in isolation from his whole teaching, from his philosophical system. They always took them in unity, describing Hegel's philosophy as a philosophy in its content, structure and idealistic method. "My dialectical method," wrote Marx, "is not only radically different from Hegel's, but represents its exact opposite. For Hegel, the process of thought, which he, under the name of an idea, turns even into an independent subject, is a demiurge (creator) of reality, representing only its external manifestation. For me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing but <sup>[493]</sup> . Marx with exceptional clarity emphasizes here the *opposite of his method to the method of Hegel* .

The Menshevik idealists ignored Engels' direct, completely clear statements that "a method which, by its own admission (Hegel. - *Avt.* )" From nothing through nothing came to nothing "was ... completely inappropriate", that "the Hegelian method in its *existing* The form was completely unsuitable. He was essentially idealistic " <sup>[494]</sup> . Engels puts this systematic criticism of the Hegelian method, the discovery and development by Marx of the method of materialist dialectics, on a par with the discovery of the basic materialistic view of the world.

The classics of Marxism always emphasized that the most important task in overcoming Hegelian philosophy, in its criticism, is the task of *reworking* its dialectical-idealistic method. The same task set before the philosophy and Lenin. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about any "synthesis", about any combination of Hegel's method with materialism, without changing Marxism, just as you cannot talk about the combination or addition of Marxism with Kantianism.

Nevertheless, this theory of combination, "synthesis" of the Hegelian method with the materialism of Marx and Lenin, is developed by Menshevik idealists on various issues of materialist dialectics and the history of philosophy. Dialectical materialism, in their opinion, "is a synthesis of Hegel's dialectical method with a materialistic understanding of nature and history" <sup>[495]</sup> . Following the methodological attitudes of Deborin, his followers came out with the assertions that dialectical materialism is nothing more than Feuerbach's materialism plus Hegel's method, etc. So in the most vulgar form, the most complicated process of historical genesis and the formation of Marxism was presented.

Conducting the theory that dialectical materialism is nothing more than a materialistic view of the world plus Hegel's method, Menshevik idealists confused this idealistic, eclectic confusion as a materialistic reworking of Hegelian philosophy, while opposing and tearing apart not only Hegel's method and system, but also the proletarian world outlook, promoting the idea of the possibility of synthesizing an idealistic method with a materialistic world view.

Leading the struggle against the Marxist-Leninist principle of partisan theory, tearing philosophy away from the concrete tasks of the class struggle, the Menshevik idealists in their works gave a theoretical non-Marxist interpretation of *practice and theory* . The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the specific socio-historical practice of transforming the world according to the role of theory as an instrument of changing the world, Lenin's teaching about the unity of theory and practice - based on practice, Lenin's specific instructions that "the point of view of the life of practice should be the first and main point view of the theory of knowledge, the Menshevik idealists, as a rule, replace Hegelian-Feuerbach's understanding of practice. "The main idea of Hegel in criticizing them of criticism and any theory of knowledge comes down to," writes Deborin, "that *criticism* thoughts, that is, the study of her abilities, must go hand in hand with the *activity of thought*. Hegel solves the problem of knowledge in the light of the world-historical practice of mankind. The dualism of the subject and object, knowledge and the subject is overcome not through *contemplation* , so to speak, of these opposites, but as a result of the subject's *struggle* with the object, their mutual comparison and comparison in the process of the historical life of mankind " <sup>[496]</sup> . Thus, Deborin interprets Kant's so extensive Hegelian criticism

that he almost identifies it with Marxist criticism. Deborin does not understand that Hegel in this criticism of Kant does not go beyond the limits of his idealism and that therefore there is no question of how Hegel resolves these problems, and even in the light of the actual world-historical practice of mankind. And this is for the simple reason that the practice in the understanding of Hegel is by no means a concrete historical, sensual practice of humanity, not the practice of discovering the laws of the objective world and its transformation, but only a "practical idea", a category that completely fits into the Hegelian theory of the identity of being. and thinking. Thus, Deborin's assertion that Hegel, in his criticism of Kant, solves the problems of knowledge in the light of the world-historical practice of mankind, contradicts the facts, is further proof of the completely uncritical understanding of Hegel's views by the Menshevik idealists and their identification with the Marxists. Ignoring the Marxist-Leninist theory of practice takes place in Deborin's interpretation of the understanding of practice and theory by Feuerbach. "All the literary activity of Feuerbach," writes Deborin, "... since the break with Hegel, represents a relentless struggle against the" theoretical, "contemplative point of view of previous philosophy and the defense of point of view and *practical*" <sup>[497]</sup>. In this thesis *eclecticism* once again affects Deborin and his misunderstanding of the essence of the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the problem of practice. In fact, neither Hegel nor Feuerbach reached the true understanding of the essence of the social concrete historical practice of mankind, being the spokesmen for the ideology of the bourgeoisie. The first is mainly due to its idealism, the second is due to the metaphysical nature of its materialism and idealistic views in explaining social phenomena.

The philosophy of Feuerbach is a vivid example of philosophy, which sought only to explain the world. "Nature and man," writes Feuerbach, "both constitute something inseparable. Contemplate nature, contemplate man. Here before your eyes you have all the secrets of nature" <sup>[498]</sup>. In this thesis, Feuerbach most clearly formulated the essence of his philosophy and its passive, contemplative nature. Feuerbach's weak side is his lack of understanding of the revolutionary, transformative role of practice and the role of theory as an instrument for changing the world. Through all his works, the thought passes that "only contemplation of things and creatures in their objective reality frees a person completely and completely from all prejudices." The philosophy of Feuerbach did not go beyond the task of explaining the world, while the task of philosophy, according to Marx, was not only to explain the world, but to change it. With all the great significance of his philosophy, Feuerbach was and remained a preacher from a purely "theoretical", contemplative point of view, and not a fighter against it, as Deborin tries to present, contrary to the facts.

Hegelian-Feuerbachian, non-Marxist interpretation of practice and theory by Menshevik idealists is entirely linked with the line of *separation of theory from the practice* of socialist construction, the separation of the logical from the historical in explaining the problems of the history of philosophy. Menshevik idealists ignored Lenin's direct instructions that a revolutionary, truly scientific theory can only be developed *on the basis of practice.*, in the most immediate, closest connection with her. They then recognized the theory of equal importance with practice (see Luppol's book "Lenin in Philosophy"), then in Hegelian they dissolved practice in theory. Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action; losing sight of this, "we take out his living soul from it, we undermine its fundamental theoretical foundations — dialectics — the study of comprehensive and complete contradictions of historical development; we are undermining its connection with certain practical tasks of the era, which may change with each new turn of history." <sup>[499]</sup>. This gap in the connection of philosophy with the practical tasks of socialist construction was carried out by the Menshevik idealists on the philosophical part of the theoretical front, turning the development of the theory of materialist dialectics into empty literature, into abstract arguments about the logical ordering of categories, not even moving it forward.

Idealism in the interpretation of the major issues of materialist dialectics is not an accidental phenomenon in the concept of Menshevik idealists, but an expression of the *idealistic essence* of their revision. That this is so shows the nature of their interpretation of the main problem of philosophy. In his book "Lenin as a Thinker", Deborin, first giving the correct definition of matter, concludes: "In a broader sense, matter is the entire infinite concrete set of" mediations, "that is, relationships and connections" <sup>[500]</sup>. This is a typical idealistic definition, for that which characterizes matter has not been reflected in it. Matter as an objective reality that exists independently of our consciousness, as the source of our sensations, etc. — for some reason, all this has completely disappeared from the characterization of Deborin of matter "in the broad sense". Is this an *idealistic interpretation of matter* in the works of Deborin and his group? Far from it. This definition stems from the entire revisionist line of this group and is far from being single.

Idealism was especially strongly reflected in the interpretation of this fundamental, most important issue in the works of Deborin's students, in particular, in Hessen's book *The Basic Principles of the*

Theory of Relativity. In it, Hessen, following the general line of Menshevik idealists, declares that "dialectical materialism considers matter as a synthesis of space and time" <sup>[501]</sup>. This characteristic is basically identical with the above-mentioned Deborin characteristic. It also left only one connection, only the forms of existence of matter, without matter itself. Forms of existence of matter, time and space are identified by Hesse with matter itself. This has nothing to do with the interpretation of matter in the philosophy of Marxism and represents a kind of characteristic of matter by modern philosophers and idealist physicists.

These views on matter, thanks to the widespread attitudes of the Deborinsky group, made themselves felt in the most diverse areas of the theory, and in philosophy they led to frank idealism, to the statement that such an attribute of matter as stretching is not an attribute in itself, is not important for characterizing matter, etc. What then remains of matter from the interpretation of Menshevik idealists and from their oaths of loyalty to Marxist-Leninist philosophy ?!

In this way, the Menshevik idealists revisited *all the* main problems of the philosophy of Marxism, so under the guise of developing dialectical materialism and Hegel's critics presented idealistic scholasticism of the worst sense.

In his collection of articles "Dialectics and Natural Science", Deborin, describing the philosophy of Marxism, wrote: "Materialistic dialectics as a universal methodology must penetrate all concrete and empirical sciences, because it is, so to speak, an algebra of sciences, *introducing an internal connection to specific content*" <sup>[502]</sup>. In this formulation of the essence of the materialist dialectic, Deborin completely reproduced the following characteristic of idealistic dialectics by Hegel. "The dialectic is, therefore, a living soul in the movement of science: this beginning alone brings necessity and internal connection to the content of science ..." <sup>[503]</sup> Here is a sample of the "materialistic processing" of Hegelian philosophy by Menshevik idealists! The idealistic definition of dialectics is not an accident, but a kind of system in the work of Menshevik idealists.

Having characterized dialectic as an instrument *for making connections*, Deborin in other articles continues to develop this idealistic concept. "It is necessary to be aware of the fact," he writes, "that the basis of all scientific knowledge lies in *basic concepts* that have the character of a category. They are equally inherent in being, as well as thinking" <sup>[504]</sup>. According to the Marxist-Leninist theory of reflection, concepts are nothing more than *images*. In human thinking patterns of the objective world. The categories of logic are a conclusion from the history of man's knowledge of the laws of the development of nature and society. Marxism connects the development of science and certain philosophical categories with the development of human society and human thinking, for they are the product of practical human activity and the result of human knowledge of the laws of the world. Deborin, arguing that concepts are inherent in being and thinking, gives them an ontological meaning, the meaning of some primary entities, and in this interpretation makes a bias towards Hegelianism.

This type of position is very often repeated in the works of Deborin. So he writes: "Each separate area of reality - nature and society - is based on general laws and forms of movement, having their own foundation, at the same time rests on specific specific *categories* specific to this area" <sup>[505]</sup>. Here, Deborin carried out typical Hegelian installations.

As we already know, Hegel, guided by his teaching about the identity of being and thinking, builds his own logic, starting with an empty identity - pure being, which goes into its opposite - "pure nothing", seeing their unity in becoming, passes to the concept of what has become, existing being - quality - and then goes on to the categories of quantity and measure, and finally, in the second part of logic, considering the categories of essence, reveals the concepts of identity, difference, opposites, etc. Formation of these *categories* for Hegel becomes the objective world. *The process of knowledge Hegel identifies with the process of the development of the world*. The self-development of the concept for him is identical with the self-development of reality. Contradictions in Hegel appear after the concepts of differences and opposites, that is, in other words, they appear at the next stage of development. From the point of view of materialistic dialectics, this does not hold water. Matter - eternally existing, objective reality - is internally contradictory at *all* levels of its existence and development. There can be no matter without motion, and the motion of matter is nothing but a constantly ongoing contradiction.

To accept the Hegelian scheme of development of concepts and their interpretation of identity, differences, opposites and contradictions as stages of the development of the world means to accept his teaching on the identity of being and thinking, it means to propagate pure idealism. On this idealistic way of interpreting the differences, opposites and contradictions, Deborin becomes. "*The opposite*," he writes, "goes further into *contradiction*, which constitutes a new step in the process of knowledge and *development of the world*" <sup>[506]</sup>. Here, Deborin describes the opposition and



contradiction as different stages not only in the development of knowledge, but also in the development of the world, uncritically reproducing Hegelian views on this issue. Deborin objectively opposes here Marx's doctrine of internal contradictions of matter, as the basis of its self-movement, against the doctrine that difference and opposition are only forms of expression of contradictions of the material world. Deborin views the contradiction only as a later product of the development of the objective world, the contradiction in his interpretation appears only at the end of development. "When," says Deborin, "all the necessary stages of development — from simple identity through differences and opposites to exclusive contradiction — are passed, then the era of 'resolving contradictions' comes" <sup>[507]</sup>. *Here the stages of development of our knowledge of objective laws Deborin identifies with the stages of development of the objective world itself.*

A similar type of idealistic line is pursued by Menshevik idealists and throughout their interpretation of the general *problem of the relationship between the logical and the historical* in scientific knowledge. The classics of Marxism consider the logical as reproduced in thought, cleansed of historical accidents. In *Capital*, Marx gave a brilliant model for solving this cognitive problem. In the movement of concepts, he showed the historical process of development of capitalism, starting from simple commodity economy and ending with developed capitalism, gave a logical analysis of forms of exchange, ranging from a random form to a monetary form, and the course of Marx's logical analysis only reflects the course of historical development. real public relations expressed by these forms. Marx, Engels, Lenin never dissolved the historical process of the development of society in a logical process, did not identify them, but always actively fought against the substitution of the historical for the logical.

Meanwhile, in the works of Menshevik idealists, who readily refer to the classics of Marxism, pervasive logicism is the red thread. So they are characterized by complete oblivion of the class struggle in the study of the historical development of philosophical thought, the desire to present the history of the development of philosophical systems as a purely immanent, logical process of development. To explain the origin and essence of this or that philosophical system - for them it means analyzing from the logical side the content of the previous philosophical system and, finding in it similar elements with elements of the subsequent system, present them as causes and conditions that gave rise to further development of philosophy. In other words, as a rule, they took only the purely logical side, and the concrete historical basis for the development of philosophical systems was completely ignored; class struggle, the fundamental driving force of historical development in a class society completely fell out. At best, Deborin puts forward "the needs of society or the level of culture" as the main reason for the emergence of new philosophical theories, i.e., Hegel does not go further in solving this issue. "Thus," writes Deborin, "two points that determine philosophy: the needs of society in a given era or degree of culture form, as it were, the basis on which the philosophical system is built; here we have which defines philosophy: the needs of society in a given epoch or the degree of culture form, as it were, the basis on which the philosophical system is built; here we have which defines philosophy: the needs of society in a given epoch or the degree of culture form, as it were, the basis on which the philosophical system is built; here we have *historical* continuity, which goes hand in hand with the historical development of the various and diverse interests of society. The second point is *logical* continuity, which consists in the fact that philosophical teachings logically develop from each other and define each other logically " <sup>[508]</sup>.

It is not by chance, therefore, that in our time, the development of materialist dialectics has been attempting to conduct Menshevik idealists out of touch with the practice of class struggle and socialist construction, without having developed any of the pressing problems of materialist dialectics.

#### **5.4.3. Contrasting the dialectic of the theory of knowledge and the distortion of its revolutionary essence**

Menshevik - idealistic revision of philosophy in the USSR was carried out in a highly veiled form, in subtle and complex forms, being basically an idealistic revision of the Hegelian type. But the Menshevik essence of this revision, its kinship with international Menshevism, apart from the points previously noted by us, found its expression also in the *Kantian* interpretation of a number of major issues of materialist dialectics. In particular, on this line, Deborin inspected and such an important question of the philosophy of Marxism as the question of *dialectics as a theory of knowledge*.

On this occasion, Lenin wrote that "dialectics *is the* theory of knowledge (Hegel and) of Marxism: that was the" side "of the case (this is not the" side "of the case, but the *essence of the matter*) that Plekhanov did not pay attention to, let alone other Marxists <sup>[509]</sup>. To these other "Marxists" we can rightfully rank Menshevik idealists in our time. Contrary to the characterization of materialistic dialectics as a theory of Marxist cognition given by Lenin, Deborin and his students absolutely uncritically followed Plekhanov, deepening his mistakes in this question and opposing the theory of

knowledge to dialectics, as if only "methodology". Deborin in the article "Marx and Hegel" writes that "the significance of dialectics as a *methodology* opposed to the theory of knowledge, was fully recognized by the founders of Marxism and its largest representatives " <sup>[510]</sup> . Deborin argues that the theory of knowledge is no longer needed, that "the theory of knowledge has fulfilled its historical task," thus identifying the theory of knowledge of Marxism with the Kantian theory of knowledge. By this, Deborin turns dialectics into some pure, abstract methodology.

Deborin does not understand that materialistic dialectics *is* a genuinely scientific, to the end revolutionary theory of knowledge of Marxism, representing the unity of the scientific worldview and method. Deborin's reference to the founders of Marxism does not hold water. Marx, Engels, Lenin in their works never opposed, and could not oppose the materialist dialectic of the theory of knowledge. Dialectics is the science of the universal laws of the development of nature, society and thinking. The laws of being and thinking are identical in content and different in form. These propositions of Engels give the key to understanding Lenin's instructions that dialectics is the theory of knowledge of Marxism. Ways, methods of knowledge, therefore, can not be established outside the specific, socio-historical practice of a person, outside the process of his cognitive activity. Dialectics,

The social-fascists *oppose the* theory of knowledge of Marxism to the dialectic. And this is entirely linked to their disregard for the role of practice, their rejection of the partisanship of philosophy and the understanding of Marxism as dogma, with their neo-Kantian "complement" and "correction" of Marxism! In contrasting the dialectic of the theory of knowledge, the political Menshevism of Plekhanov and the insufficiently one-sided understanding of dialectics by him undeniably affected the political Menshevism. Menshevik idealists contrary to the doctrine of Marxism and Lenin's direct guidance, in spite of Lenin's criticism of Plekhanov specifically on this issue continued to be carried out in the conditions of the USSR to restore their revisionist installation Plekhanov, *taking thus the theory of knowledge of the dialectic*, method from worldview, theory from practice. Denying the role of the theory of knowledge behind dialectics, the Menshevik idealists thus bypass the basic question of philosophy about the relationship between being and consciousness and turn the dialectic into some kind of "pure", not including worldview issues, but essentially an idealistic methodology.

Such attempts to *oppose* , break the dialectic and the theory of knowledge or dissolve the theory of knowledge in some abstract methodology inevitably lead to agnosticism and idealism, to undermine the scientific significance of materialistic dialectics as the only scientific methodology and theory of knowledge.

Materialistic dialectics is essentially a revolutionary science, so revisionists of all kinds, striving to undermine the effectiveness of Marxism, to blunt its revolutionary essence, first of all direct their weapons against the essence, the core of materialistic dialectics - the law of the unity of opposites. Some of the revisionists (Bernstein, etc.) simply reject the study of the contradictions of the real world, calling the Marxian dialectic Hegelianism, others seek to replace it with the vulgar mechanistic theory of equilibrium, others interpret the basic laws of dialectics in an idealistic, Kantian understanding and try to discredit the laws of materialist dialectic dialectics in this way. their truly materialistic and scientific revolutionary value.

The latter is characteristic of the revisionist activity of Menshevik idealists. In his description of the law of the unity of opposites, Deborin essentially conducts social-fascist attitudes. Guided by the law of the unity of opposites in our knowledge - it means to understand that internal contradictions are the basis for development, that in every phenomenon we have to reveal internal, essential contradictions behind external relations, reveal the causes leading to its self-denial, in the phenomenon itself, remember that in each subject there are conflicting trends, the *struggle* which is the cause of its development. Lenin, specifying the law of unity of opposites, developing it further on the material of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, describing this law, wrote: "The unity (coincidence, identity, equal effect) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, as absolutely development, movement " <sup>[511]</sup> . Contrary to this classical characteristic of Lenin's law, Menshevikvuyushchie idealists give a fundamentally opposite interpretation, describe it not as a law of struggle, not as a law of development, but as a law of "synthesis", *reconciliation of opposites*. For example, one of Deborin's typical interpretations of this question. Speaking of the antinomies of Kant, Deborin writes: "... Kant contrasts the thesis with the antithesis, wanting to prove that the thesis excludes the antithesis and that therefore they cannot be reconciled, they cannot be resolved. The positive dialectic in the thesis and antithesis sees not mutually exclusive, but mutually reconciling opposites " <sup>[512]</sup> .

Thus, the Leninist formulation of this law, a formulation that most fully and comprehensively expresses the essence of the development of the world, the essence of the class struggle, Deborin contrasts his Menshevik type with the interpretation of this law. This interpretation of the laws of

materialist dialectics, characteristic of revisionists in general, is essentially the theoretical expression of their treacherous line in the ranks of the labor movement.

Tov. Speaking about the law of the unity of opposites, Kaganovich stressed that "to understand the unity of opposites in reality means not to be afraid of difficulties. It means not being afraid of the contradictions of life that arise on our way, but overcoming them with Bolshevik energy and perseverance" <sup>[513]</sup>. It is this understanding of the law that is truly scientific, Marxist-Leninist understanding of it. Proceeding from this scientific revolutionary understanding of the laws of dialectics, the laws of the development of class struggle and guided by them, our party has always led the way not to reconciliation and to obscure fundamental differences, but to their opening and revolutionary overcoming. On the contrary, the social fascists are characterized by a line of reconciliation, the blunting of contradictions, the glossing over of fundamental differences, and they are characterized by the desire to hide differences, blunt, reconcile them. Menshevik idealists also followed this path.

#### **5.4.4. Menshevik-Trotskyist understanding of the class struggle. Interlocking with Mechanism**

Historical materialism as a theory of the class struggle of the proletariat plays the largest role in the modern revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, in the practice of socialist construction in particular. The tasks of developing the problems of historical materialism, of studying new forms of class struggle and of the laws of the transition period are now acquiring exceptional importance. Historical materialism as the only scientific theory of knowledge and changes in the laws of social development must be put at the service of the practice of socialist construction. Without the closest connection with the practice of class struggle, without generalizing the experience of the struggle of the proletariat for socialism, theory cannot fruitfully develop and fulfill the tasks assigned to it to combat bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, to remake public consciousness, on the elimination of class remnants in the minds of people. Meanwhile, a group of philosophers headed by Deborin, divorcing theory from practice, philosophy from politics, is completely *ignored the task of developing questions of historical materialism*, and if it concerned them, it interpreted them in a Trotskyist or right-opportunist, Menshevik-idealistic or mechanistic sense.

In their works, not only is there no attempt to further elaborate and concretize historical materialism on the new problems put forward by the dictatorship of the proletariat, but also problems that at the time were sufficiently developed by the classics of Marxism were given, as a rule, non-Marxist, Menshevik-idealistic characteristic. All very few statements by Deborin on the theory of historical materialism are so *abstract*, in the worst sense of the word, that they are of absolutely no value and are often formulated in such a way that the question arises: who is the author or materialist or idealist?

Take, for example, the déborin characteristic of a class. He writes that "Marxism considers the *social* class as a reality, as a real fact, on the basis of historical evolution" <sup>[514]</sup>. This characteristic is not only general and empty, but it also clearly incorrectly depicts the true merit of Marx in the area of the development of the problems of classes and the class struggle. In a letter to Weidemeier dated March 5, 1852, Marx specifically noted that he showed the connection of the existence of classes with certain historical forms of development of material production, revealed and substantiated that the class struggle leads to the *dictatorship of the proletariat* and that the transition to *destruction grades* at all. Deborin, striving to "prove" to the mechanists the reality of classes, true to his Menshevik-idealistic methodology, bypasses the main, most important thing in Marxism. In his pamphlet *Lenin as a Thinker*, Deborin, attempting to more specifically characterize classes and class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat, wrote: "The dictatorship of the proletariat does not represent a kind of heavenly" state "in which class contradictions are eliminated. On the contrary, the dictatorship of the proletariat is a *continuation of the* class struggle and even civil war on a wider basis, in the *international* arena, where two hostile classes stand against each other" <sup>[515]</sup>. Here, under the pretext of presenting and developing Leninist views, Deborin carried out the right-opportunist theory of the attenuation of the class struggle, carried out the theory of the rejection of the class struggle in the USSR and its recognition *only* in the international arena.

This brightly ultra-opportunist characteristic of the class struggle is supplemented by him in the same pamphlet with the Kautskyan characteristic of the essence of imperialism. "Politically," writes Deborin, "imperialism means *reaction*, but economically, *progress*" <sup>[516]</sup>. So despite the clear Leninist characterization of imperialism as the last stage in the development of capitalism, as a stage of decaying capitalism in all respects, Deborin conducts the theory of economic progress of capitalism, *tearing politics away from economics* in a Kautsky *manner*, objectively slipping into solidarity with Kautsky's doctrine of imperialism as capitalist politics.

When trying to address issues relevant to the transition period, the Menshevik idealists turned out to be the outspoken guides of the theoretical attitudes of the defeated Party of Trotskyism and the Right deviation. Contrary to the teachings of Lenin about the proletariat and the peasantry as two main classes in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Karev puts forward the thesis about *one main class* in the transition period, Trotskyist denies the role of the peasantry as the second main class, opposing Lenin's teaching that the preservation of the union of the working peasants under the leadership of the working class.

Thus, the interpretation of the questions of the class struggle of Menshevik idealists shows that, through them and the mechanists, we have spokesmen for the ideology of various petty-bourgeois strata. Menshevik idealists attributed to themselves the role of almost the only, to the end consistent fighters against the mechanistic revision of materialistic dialectics. Did they fight the mechanists? Yes, they did, but they did not lead them from a dialectical materialist, not from a Marxist position, not in a party way, without finishing their criticism, without revealing the class essence of mechanismism. Moreover, on a number of issues, Menshevik idealists even *identified themselves with the mechanists* .

So, for example, one of the first questions on which the struggle against the mechanists was launched was the question of the latter's denial of the philosophy of Marxism and its replacement with the latest conclusions of natural science. The Menshevik idealists broke a lot of copies in the fight against the mechanists on this issue, but formally fighting them, essentially idealistic emasculating the content of materialistic dialectics, hegelizing the philosophy of Marxism, from the other end pursued the same line as the mechanists - the line of eliminating materialistic dialectic as a philosophical science. So Deborin wrote that "speculative elements are being supplanted more and more by purely scientific ones, and the worldview as a whole acquires a more scientific character. Philosophy reveals a tendency to merge with science. A large proportion of purely philosophical questions are already being absorbed by positive sciences. " Here, Deborin openly associates himself with the mechanists, holds completely erroneous views that have nothing in common with Marxist ones. Deborin, like the mechanists, talks about the destruction of philosophy, about its dying away and its replacement by positive sciences, not understanding that the philosophy of Marxism itself has a deeply scientific character and an independent field of study. There can be no talk of any merging of the philosophy of Marxism with other sciences, nor about the destruction of this philosophy as a science. Moreover, with the flourishing of positive sciences, Marxist-Leninist philosophy will be raised even higher in its development, and its role will become even more significant. about its dying off and its replacement by positive sciences, not realizing that the very philosophy of Marxism itself has a deeply scientific character and an independent field of study. There can be no talk of any merging of the philosophy of Marxism with other sciences, nor about the destruction of this philosophy as a science. Moreover, with the flourishing of positive sciences, Marxist-Leninist philosophy will be raised even higher in its development, and its role will become even more significant. about its dying off and its replacement by positive sciences, not realizing that the very philosophy of Marxism itself has a deeply scientific character and an independent field of study. There can be no talk of any merging of the philosophy of Marxism with other sciences, nor about the destruction of this philosophy as a science. Moreover, with the flourishing of positive sciences, Marxist-Leninist philosophy will be raised even higher in its development, and its role will become even more significant.

At present, after discussion and exposure of two varieties of the Menshevik revision of the philosophy of Marxism in the USSR, the struggle must continue with both the mechanistic revision in philosophy — the main danger on the theoretical front, and Menshevik idealism. This struggle is an integral part of the development of the Leninist stage in philosophy, the specific problems of materialist dialectics and historical materialism.

#### **5.4.5. Criticism of the methodology of counterrevolutionary Trotskyism and "left" opportunism**

We have already said that in the history of the labor movement there are two types of perversions of the revolutionary theory and practice of the proletariat. Along with social reformism, frankly right opportunism, anarcho-syndicalists and similar revisionists "left" always existed and fought against Marxism. Representatives of this type of revisionism, in practice pursuing an opportunistic line, in words sought to be "to the left" of the party of the proletariat, putting forward hierarchical demands and slogans.

A characteristic feature of the "left" opportunism is the crackling revolutionary phraseology that covers the petty-bourgeois essence of their views. *The theoretical basis of their views and their political practice is idealism, objectivism, abstract dogmatism, a complete break with*

*dialectics*. Revisionists "on the left" deny the need for flexible tactics, maneuvering, accounting for all conditions of the situation on the basis of materialistic dialectics. They do not set themselves the task of correctly considering all the specific stages of development and the difficulties to be overcome. They always act dogmatically "straightforwardly", unilaterally, subjectively arbitrarily. As Lenin wrote in his notes "On the Question of Dialectics" about idealism: "Straightness and one-sidedness, woodenness and ossification, subjectivism and subjective blindness, voilà (here) are the epistemological roots of idealism" <sup>[517]</sup> .

This assessment of Lenin is quite applicable to the Trotskyists, to anarcho-syndicalists and to all kinds of "left" deviationists. It reveals the essence of the philosophical foundations of their political views. On the question of "leftist" views, we find extremely important instructions from Marx and Engels, since they also had to fight on two fronts. After the revolution of 1848, the Willich-Schaper fraction of the minority arose in the workers' movement of Germany, which criticized Marx and Engels for their alleged lack of consistency and "non-revolutionary" in matters of the revolutionary movement in Germany.

Dogmatism, idealism, subjectivism and voluntarism - such is the philosophical characteristic of this "left" trend, given by Marx. Such are the features, such is the methodological essence of the "left" currents in the labor movement not only in the XIX century, but also in the XX century. This feature is not outdated and still. On the contrary, it received even greater confirmation of its correctness in the theory and politics of various "left" groups in the post-October period. This anti-Marxist methodology received the clearest expression in Trotskyism, in this type of Menshevism, which was covered with a left phrase at the previous stages and which has now become the vanguard of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The attempt to bypass the question of the methodology of Trotskyism, as the Menshevik idealists did, not to consider or criticize its general theoretical, philosophical foundations is fundamentally wrong. The attempt to reduce the whole affair to Trotsky's "personal sentiments", which from time to time ... " quite unexpectedly comes into conflict with the main governing core of our party, is often unsuccessful, too, on the most unexpected or random issue that is not of significant importance" <sup>[518]</sup> .

In fact, not only Trotsky himself, but all Trotskyists, we have some common methodological attitudes characteristic of them. For the seemingly "random" and "unexpected" speeches of Trotsky, we must reveal their class basis, their theoretical roots, their connection with the whole system of views of Trotskyism.

The desire to detach the political practice of Trotskyism from its theoretical foundations, as we have indicated, is extremely characteristic of Menshevik idealism, which bridges the gap between theory and practice. But Trotsky himself is trying to give a "philosophical" justification for such a *break in theory and practice* , which believes that theoretical activity should proceed independently of party political practice. For example, in his report on Mendeleev, Trotsky explicitly states that individual scientists may not think at all about the practical results of their research. *The wider, the bolder, the more independent* of the practical need of the day his thought works, the better " <sup>[519]</sup> .

This was said by Soviet scientists. It was Trotsky who urged them not to think about the practical results of their work for socialist construction. It turns out that the less they know about the needs of social construction, the better!

In this separation of theory from practice, science from party position, in bourgeois *objectivism*, Trotsky sees "the essence of Marxism." "It is the essence of Marxism," writes Trotsky, "that he finally approached society as an object of objective research, considering human history as a giant laboratory diary ... It is this objective approach that gives Marxism the unsurpassed power of historical foresight." Objectivism, divorced from revolutionary practice, is what Marxism looks like in the image of Trotsky.

Following the position of Plekhanov that "party science, strictly speaking, is impossible," Trotsky tried to substantiate this position in the future with the interests of the bourgeois reader. "But the reader has the right to demand," he wrote in his work, "for historical work to be not an *apology for a political position* , but an internally based image of the real process of revolution. Historical work *only fully responds* to its purpose when events unfold on its pages in all its natural coerciveness " <sup>[520]</sup> . Here political position is *opposed* Trotsky's "real process", as if the proletariat's implementation of their political position does not in itself constitute a real process. Denying in words the "perfidious impartiality", Trotsky puts forward in his place ... "scientific conscientiousness."

Trotsky completely misunderstood the essence of Marxism, its fundamental difference from bourgeois science, which is the consistent implementation of the principle of partisanship. "Marxism differs from all other socialist theories," wrote Lenin, "by a remarkable combination of complete

scientific sobriety in analyzing the objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with the most resolute recognition of the significance of revolutionary energy, revolutionary creativity, revolutionary initiative of the masses" <sup>[521]</sup> .

But Trotsky's "objectivism" is only a disguised cover for his true subjectivism, his sophistry, his play with empty phrases. Trotsky repeatedly spoke out against clear revolutionary slogans with his eclectic slogans covering his liberal political line. His slogans are a model of *sophistry* , the replacement of revolutionary assessments by petty-bourgeois, opportunistic deviation from *certain* answer to burning political questions. Sometimes, from the outside, his slogans look as if "dialectically", according to the formula that Plekhanov gave out as completely dialectical: "Neither yes nor no." In fact, this is a complete substitution of dialectics for sophistry. In the period of the Brest Peace Trotsky throws an empty phrase: "Neither peace nor war", during the imperialist war: "Neither victories nor defeats." The same Menshevik formula - "neither yes nor no" - was expressed in Trotsky's denial of Bolshevism and Menshevism in its eclectic attempt to rise above the "extremes", in an effort to create its own "special" trend. In fact, this sophistry of Trotsky led to political opportunism, to the passivity and betrayal of the revolutionary proletariat at decisive moments in the struggle. <sup>[522]</sup> . "This point of view of the matchmaker constitutes the whole" ideological basis "of Trotsky's conciliationism" <sup>[523]</sup> . Unprincipled eclecticism and sophistry, opportunism, disguised with loud empty phrases, such is Trotskyism in the past stages.

The formula "neither yes nor no" is an absolute negation of anything, an abstract movement in words, but essentially a passive trampling on the spot. This is the "poverty of philosophy", about which Marx, describing Proudhon, wrote: " Yes turns into *no* , *no* turns into *yes* , *yes* becomes both *yes* and *no* , *no* becomes simultaneously and *no* and *yes* . In this way, opposites are mutually balanced, neutralized and paralyzed " <sup>[524]</sup> .

That is precisely the meaning of the "philosophy" of negation in Trotsky. This is the philosophy of a liberal obscuring, blurring the actual contradictions of life, the class struggle, an attempt to circumvent sharp corners, evade a direct answer. Such a "philosophy" leads Trotsky to the same results as Proudhon did. "Despite the greatest efforts to climb to the height of the *system of contradictions* , Mr. Proudhon could never rise above the first two steps: simple thesis and antithesis, and here he reached only two times, and overturned and fell once" <sup>[525]</sup> . Like Proudhon, here Trotsky did not get the dialectical logic of contradictions, but the *formal logic of abstract negations*.

Subjectivism, sophistry, and formal logic lead Trotsky away from concrete study, to *abstract* reasoning from the point of view of "general principles" and therefore to politically incorrect conclusions , when considering any issue . In the discussion on trade unions, Lenin says: "When I take up the question of the production role of trade unions, I see the fundamental irregularity in Trotsky that he speaks about it" in principle ", about the" general principle ". He speaks in all theses from the point of view of the "general principle". The statement is already fundamentally wrong in this " <sup>[526]</sup> .

On the issue of trade unions, Trotsky does not give a concrete analysis of the position and tasks of the trade unions under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, Trotsky could not understand the essence of the trade unions, and therefore the role that the trade unions should play during the transition period. An abstract approach deprives Trotsky of the ability to correctly understand the nature of the Soviet state, the elements of bureaucracy in the latter, the correct balance of economics and politics, administrative bodies and trade unions.

The whole trade union platform of Trotsky, by Lenin's definition, takes "a step back from *business* theses ... setting concrete, practical, vital, living tasks ... to abstract, abstract," devastated ", theoretically incorrect, intellectually formulated general *theses* , with *oblivion of the most businesslike and practical* " <sup>[527]</sup> . "In order to put this question correctly," Lenin wrote, "one must move from empty abstractions to a concrete, that is, to a given dispute" <sup>[528]</sup> . From general reasoning, from the theses on "production atmospheres", "production dialectics", etc., it was necessary to move on to studying the practical experience of production propaganda, the actual work of trade unions as a school of association, a school of solidarity, a school of management, etc. Trotsky violated This basic rule, the basic requirement of dialectics, is the requirement of concreteness "with its tests, with its whole approach to the question." Trotsky has "the *whole* approach ... his whole direction is wrong," as he goes backwards, "from a living cause to a dead scholasticism of all sorts of" production atmospheres " <sup>[529]</sup> .

A characteristic feature of Trotskyist idealism is its *voluntarism*. (from the word "will"). For Trotskyism, the will is the most important thing, everything else is subject to it. Marxism-Leninism, as we know, never denied the role of the individual in history, much less the role and activity of the whole class. On the contrary, he emphasized the necessity and enormous significance of the conscious expression of the will of the working class. But at the same time, Marxism-Leninism believes that the

basis of this activity of the individual and class is not arbitrariness, but the economic interests of the class, rooted in objective reality. Engels pointed out, "that free will means nothing more than decision-making with knowledge of the matter." Practical activity, volitional actions and aspirations, the policies and tactics of the proletariat should be based on objective necessity. In Trotsky, volitional aspirations are not an expression of this class conscious inner necessity, but imposed on them from outside. "Overtaking", premature demands, "idealistic leaps" through the necessary stages of the development of reality, we can follow a number of examples of Trotskyism's speeches: ignoring the main stages of the revolution in his theory of permanent revolution, attitude to the Brest world, failure to understand the Chinese revolution of 1925–1926 the program of "super-industrialization", the slogan of expropriation in 1927, etc.

Idealism is especially vividly represented in Trotsky's "historical works": in "1905", "Lessons of October", "History of the Russian Revolution"; in all these works, Trotsky develops his views entirely in the spirit of Plekhanov's Menshevik historical concept, deriving Russian despotism not from the development of the Russian economy, not from the internal conditions for the development of class struggle in Russia, but from external conditions - from the need to protect the country from external attacks. Trotsky and the Mensheviks attributed these provisions to the bourgeois liberal historians — Milyukov, Klyuchevsky, and others. It was not for nothing that Lenin as far back as 1911, taking into account Trotsky's early work and comparing it with Martov, wrote: "Trotsky's philosophy of history is the same. The "sectarian spirit", intellectual *idealism*, and ideological fetishism are brought to the fore.

*Historical idealism* is reflected in Trotsky and in his approach to the essence of the historical process. In the work *My Life*, Trotsky wrote: "To put it bluntly, the whole historical process is a refraction of the natural through the accidental. If we use the language of biology, we can say that historical regularity is carried out through the *natural selection of accidents*" <sup>[530]</sup>. According to Trotsky, it turns out that the entire historical process is a natural selection of accidents. If the mechanists deny the objective nature of chance, then Trotsky, in contrast to them, turns chance into an absolute law of social development. Here we have a direct identification of chance with an objective regularity, in which objective necessity is ignored as the basis on which chance can take place. Here we have a transition to the point of view of bourgeois *empiricism* and *idealism* in the field of history.

Along with the basic idealistic features of Trotsky's views, we find in them a significant dose of *mechanism*. Although Trotsky himself points out that the "liberal-Manchester attempts" of mechanically transferring Darwinism to sociology led only to childish analogies, and considered that "there is no need to dwell on these vulgarities," he still contradicts himself, falls into the arms of bourgeois naturalism and social Darwinism. Trotsky declares that Darwinism is the premise of Marxism, that in his deep conviction "in the broad materialist and dialectical sense, Marxism is the application of Darwinism to human society" <sup>[531]</sup>.

In a report on Mendeleev, Trotsky also stated that "we live in an era of sifting and selection" <sup>[532]</sup>.

In the same report on Mendeleev, we find in Trotsky a number of other mechanistic interpretations, in particular, the notorious theory of the reduction of higher forms of the movement of matter to lower forms. "Psychology," he says, "is reduced for us in the last account to physiology, as this last one is to chemistry, physics, and mechanics" <sup>[533]</sup>. "Chemistry reduces the essence of chemical processes to the mechanical and physical properties of particles" <sup>[534]</sup>.

Consequently, the essence of these or those complex processes, according to Trotsky, can be revealed only by reducing this higher to the simple, to the primary. For example, the phenomena of consciousness - "the soul is - a complex system of conditioned reflexes, entirely rooted in primary reflexes of physiology, which, in turn, passes its roots through the powerful layer of chemistry into the subsoil of physics and mechanics" <sup>[535]</sup>.

Trotsky is inclined to extend this theory of the *reducibility* of all phenomena to mechanics to society. "The same can be said about sociology. To explain social phenomena there is no need to involve any eternal or otherworldly beginnings. Society is a product of the development of primary matter, like the crust of the earth or amoeba. Thus, from the most complex phenomena of social ideology, scientific thought gets to matter, to its constituent elements, to particles with their physical and mechanical properties using the methods of their diamond drilling" <sup>[536]</sup>.

Consequently, Trotsky also applies to his society a universal "law" of reducibility of all the most complicated phenomena to the simplest. Instead of studying social phenomena in all their originality, Trotsky proposes to study the physiological and mechanical properties of the simplest elements, to approach social life, to the class struggle, just as the physiologist approaches the amoeba. Instead of dialectical materialism, we have here the mechanism of the most vulgar variety, the most vulgar metaphysics, flat evolutionism and eclecticism.

Trotsky slavishly grabs every bourgeois fashion trend in the field of science and declares it a materialistic, even a materialistic, dialectical movement. So the reflexology of Academician Pavlov, who in the experimental works gave valuable data confirming materialism, but in general settings allows for a number of mechanistic errors, this reflexology is recognized by Trotsky as the only scientific psychology that goes "all the way through dialectical materialism" <sup>[537]</sup> .

We see the same thing in Trotsky's assessment of Freudianism. Freudianism is recommended by Trotsky as "a working hypothesis that can and will undoubtedly give conclusions and conjectures going along the lines of materialistic psychology" <sup>[538]</sup> . The same story with the characteristic of Mendeleev's philosophical views. In the theory of knowledge, Mendeleev clearly stands on idealistic, precisely on agnostic, Hume-Kantian positions — he denies the possibility of knowing the essence of things. If, according to Lenin, agnosticism contradicts and is incompatible with dialectical materialism <sup>[539]</sup> , then, according to Trotsky, agnosticism is only "verbal concessions" that do not affect the essence of views. And Mendeleev "in his methods and in his highest achievements is none other than a dialectical materialist" <sup>[540]</sup> . Trotsky could not give a correct analysis of the views of a scientist with the position of dialectical materialism, since in his philosophical views he himself did not have and has nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism.

We can find the same peculiar combination of idealism with mechanism in the analysis of views and other Trotskyist theorists - Preobrazhensky, Voronsky, etc. If in T. Preobrazhensky in the "New Economy" elements of mechanism were especially pronounced, then Voronovsky's critical literary works were clearly worn idealistic character.

The same methodological guidelines are also characteristic of the "semi-Trotskyists of the Zinoviev-Kamenev group." Here we also find a combination of subjectivism, - for example, in the question of the "dictatorship of the party", in their portrayal of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the dictatorship of the party over the working class — with abstract dogmatism and mechanism — the mechanistic transfer of capitalism to Soviet conditions and the interpretation of NEP as "state capitalism" etc. Here we also find a *scholastic approach* to the new facts of life, the inability to correctly understand and correctly apply Marxism-Leninism, its materialistic dialectics.

These methodological features of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition were revealed by comrade Stalin at the seventh plenum of the ECCI, when he characterized the Zinoviev understanding of "revisionism." "According to Zinoviev, it turns out that any improvement, any refinement of the old formulas or individual provisions of Marx or Engels, and even more so their replacement by other formulas corresponding to the new conditions, is revisionism. Why, one wonders? Is not Marxism a science, and does science not develop, enriching itself with new experience and improving the old formulas? ... If, for example, Marx said in the middle of the last century that with the *ascending line* of development of capitalism, the victory of socialism within national borders is impossible, and Lenin in 15th XX century said that when the *descending line* development of capitalism, with dying capitalism, such a victory is possible - it turns out that Lenin fell into revisionism in relation to Marx ... According to Zinoviev, it turns out in such a way ... that any improvement in individual provisions and formulas of certain classics of Marxism is revisionism" <sup>[541]</sup> .

A common methodological framework unites the Trotskyists of the Soviet Union with various Trotskyist and semi-Trotskyist groups in Germany and in other countries (Korsch, Bordiga, etc.).

Trotskyism also has a number of common methodological features with all kinds of "left" opportunism. "Left" opportunism and "left" bends at the present stage of socialist construction with "administration" and "jumping over" the nearest specific tasks, such as speaking out against the expansion of Soviet trade, for the dying off of councils in areas of complete collectivization, for the dying off of the monetary system, for dying schools, etc., with their bureaucratic-administrative, mechanistic "plans" - also sin with subjectivism, abstractness, etc.

The combination of subjectivism and voluntarism with mechanistic fatalism led the "left" opportunists and the Trotskyists to unexpected *flights* from one extreme to another — from the policy of administrative clamping to cries for "democracy", from plans of "super industrialization" to the camp of opponents of genuine industrialization.

However, it should be noted that, despite the peculiar combination of the subjective-idealistic understanding with the mechanistic-fatalistic, the most important thing that characterizes their philosophical essence in the philosophical foundations of Trotskyism and "left" opportunism, there is a *subjective-idealistic basis* . This is the well-known dividing line between the "left" and the right opportunism. The philosophy of "left-wing" opportunism reflects the social existence of the USSR, the ruining urban petty bourgeoisie, and expresses their aspirations and interests in the field of politics. Their political expression is *petty-bourgeois radicalism*, *petty-bourgeois revolutionism* with an opportunist being and external revolutionary phraseology.



As we have already seen, both common social roots and a whole series of general idealistic provisions, and finally, often political practice itself, link Trotskyism with lesser *idealism*. A number of representatives of Menshevik idealism at one time fought against the party, being in the ranks of the Trotskyist opposition (Karev, Stan, Gonikman, etc.). At a certain historical stage in the development of Trotskyism and its existence as a faction of communism, Menshevik idealism supplied Trotskyism with its main methodological weapon, acting as a philosophical conductor of Trotskyist ideas. Menshevik idealism played the same role and continues to play in relation to the "left" opportunism. It is not surprising that Menshevik idealists did not criticize the methodology of Trotskyism. If they tried to "criticize" Trotskyism on this side, at best they found elements of mechanism in it, that is, they could not reveal the very idealistic essence of the theoretical, philosophical foundations of Trotskyism.

## **Chapter 6. The main questions of the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism**

### **6.1. Lenin in the fight against international opportunism and revisionism in the field of philosophy**

The decision of the Central Committee of our Party dated January 25, 1931 on the journal PZM, summing up the philosophical discussion, set before the philosophical section of the theoretical front the most important task of actually developing the Leninist philosophical legacy, the task of widely propagating the questions of the Marxist philosophy.

The question of the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism is the *central problem of the whole struggle* with Menshevik idealism and mechanists and the main point that determines the path of all our further theoretical work in the field of dialectical and historical materialism.

Can and should we even speak about Leninism in philosophy, can we even speak about a new and higher stage in the development of Marx-Engels dialectical materialism. Does not such a statement of the question represent the opposition of Lenin to Marx and Engels, does this not lead to an underestimation of what Marx and Engels gave in the development of philosophy? Just on these issues we have an exceptional distortion of Marxism. Ryazanov, this traitor and traitor to the party, spoke out against the very legitimacy of raising this question. All this is not surprising, if we recall how Ryazanov once wrote about Leninism. It is to him that famous words belong: "I am not a Bolshevik, I am not a Menshevik and not a Leninist. I am only a Marxist, and as a Marxist I am a communist. "

Ryazanov's views on the question of Leninism in philosophy were by no means singular. On the contrary. These views were a red thread in the works of Deborin, Karev and others.

However, in this matter they were not alone. Such "theorists" such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Preobrazhensky, Bukharin developed such views in their philosophy on the question of Leninism in philosophy.

In the collection "Militant Materialist", book. 2, in 1925, Preobrazhensky's article "Lenin and Marx as Theorists" was published, raising the question of Lenin's theoretical legacy. In this article, Preobrazhensky develops the following mechanistic scheme: in Marxism, he distinguishes various elements "having different degrees of durability". Firstly, such elements, which should remain entirely, secondly, those that should be developed and supplemented, and, thirdly, those that should be replaced by new constructions. And now, from the point of view of this scheme, Preobrazhensky comes to the conclusion (and this is his main idea) that the methodology of Marxism, dialectical materialism - this is precisely the element of Marx's doctrine that does not tolerate any development. He writes: "As for the general philosophical method,<sup>[542]</sup> . Further, while continuing to develop these thoughts, Preobrazhensky found that the unity of the method of *Marx and Lenin* lies in the unity of the method of dialectical materialism .

We now turn to Bukharin. In his pamphlet "Lenin as a Marxist," Comrade Bukharin also raises the question of dialectical materialism in Lenin's works. He approaches this problem in the following way: in Marxism, he distinguishes two things: first, the sum of ideas, propositions, theoretical views, etc., second, *the Marxist method* , its methodology, with which this sum of ideas and views , theoretical positions are extracted, with the help of which a certain historical epoch is *analyzed* , etc.

And in this regard, he writes: "But if by Marxism we mean not the sum of ideas, what Marx had, but the tool, the methodology, which is incorporated in Marxism, then it goes without saying that Leninism is not something that modifies or auditing methodology of Marxist teaching. On the contrary, in this sense Leninism is a full *return* to the Marxism that was formulated by Marx and Engels himself "<sup>[543]</sup> .

So, from the point of view of Comrade Bukharin, Leninism, by its methodology, is a full return, and *only a return*, to Marxism, formulated by Marx and Engels himself. In this regard, there is no *further development*, no further deepening and concretization of Marx's doctrine. Thus, we see that in this matter we have a touching unity of views in Ryazanov, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Preobrazhensky, Bukharin, Deborin, Karev, etc.

In contrast to all the wrong attitudes in this matter, we have an attitude and a solution to this problem, given by t. Stalin as far back as 1924 in his "Fundamentals of Leninism." He wrote on the question of interest to us: "What was given in Lenin's method was already predominantly present in Marx's teaching, which, according to Marx," is essentially critical and revolutionary ". It is this critical and revolutionary spirit that penetrates Lenin's method from the beginning to the end. But it would be wrong to think that Lenin's method is a simple restoration of what Marx gave. In fact, Lenin's method is not only the restoration, but also the *concretization and further development* of Marx's critical and revolutionary method, his materialist dialectics " <sup>[544]</sup> .

Here are given the only correct statements and the solution of the question of Leninism in philosophy. Lenin's works on dialectical materialism, his brilliant use of materialistic dialectics are not only a return (after all the perversions and deviations from dialectical materialism that we had in the era of the Second International) *to dialectical materialism. Leninism in philosophy represents not only the return, but also the further development and concretization of dialectical materialism.* Leninism in philosophy represents a new, higher stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism.

It should be clear and understandable to everyone that such a question can in no way mean any kind of "opposition" of Leninism to Marxism or any misunderstanding or underestimation of the legacy of Marx and Engels. On the contrary, if you truly be faithful to the spirit of Marxism, and not its letter, if you correctly understand the relationship between method and worldview, between theory and practice, if you understand that Marxism is not a frozen dogma, but a living, developing teaching, then only that answer is possible. given by t. Stalin on the question of Lenin's stage in the development of dialectical materialism. The question about the method of dialectical materialism, given by Preobrazhensky, Bukharin, whose views proceed from the fact that in the content of Marxism, the richness of his ideas there can be a major movement forward, but in the field of Marxist methodology there can be no movement forward and deepening, based on a complete misunderstanding of the correlation of the method of Marxism and its other constituent parts, on a misunderstanding in essence, if you raise the question, the relationship between theory and practice, on the misunderstanding of the very method of dialectical materialism. Indeed, can there be significant new content in the very development of Marxism, such significant, such as Lenin's works on imperialism, on the state and revolution, on the Soviet form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc., etc., without development, specification, deepening the relationship between theory and practice, on the lack of understanding of the method of dialectical materialism itself. Indeed, can there be significant new content in the very development of Marxism, such significant, such as Lenin's works on imperialism, on the state and revolution, on the Soviet form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc., etc., without development, specification, deepening the relationship between theory and practice, on the lack of understanding of the method of dialectical materialism itself. Indeed, can there be significant new content in the very development of Marxism, such significant, such as Lenin's works on imperialism, on the state and revolution, on the Soviet form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc., etc., without development, specification, deepening *the very method of materialistic dialectics.* The new epoch, and precisely such a rich epoch as the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, gives new forms of communication, new laws, new types of relations, extremely complex forms of class relations, various forms of class struggle, the gigantic development of technology, natural sciences, and the peculiar contradictions development, etc.

One can understand all this (not only describe it) only on the basis of deepening and concretization of the Marxist methodology itself. Since dialectical materialism is a scientific methodology, to the extent that its deepening and concretization cannot but be based on the totality of the knowledge of the sciences of its time. And it is precisely in all these relations that Lenin is brilliant and great.

As you know, Comrade Stalin, in his letter On Some Issues in the History of Bolshevism, emphasized the tremendous international significance of the theory and practice of Bolshevism. This letter is a brilliant continuation and development of the basic principles of his "Questions of Leninism" on questions of the struggle of Bolshevism against opportunism. Just as in The Questions of Leninism, Comrade Stalin remarkably deeply and fully consistently conducts here one of the most important theses set forth by Lenin in his preparatory work for the famous book The State and the Revolution. Lenin throws one extremely important remark there. He says: "The Bolsheviks are not" *casus* ", they grew out of the struggle against opportunism from 1894–1914." <sup>[545]</sup> . And in Comrade

Stalin's "The Questions of Leninism" and in his last letter on the history of Bolshevism, all these problems are posed and developed precisely in the spirit of the Leninist principle of Bolshevism's uncompromising struggle against opportunism in all its forms and forms.

It is clear that when we raise the question of the new thing that Lenin introduced into the development of dialectical materialism, one cannot but depart from these most important points. It is clear that one cannot consider the philosophy of Marxism *without or outside the whole history of Bolshevism*, without or outside the whole history of the struggle of Bolshevism against opportunism, from which Bolshevism grew.

On the other hand, it is clear that it is impossible to give a true scientific history of Bolshevism without considering, studying *Lenin's theoretical struggle*. This is precisely what the letter of Comrade Stalin calls for. Starting from this basic position, we will be able to correctly approach the formulation and resolution of issues related to understanding and highlighting the Leninist philosophical legacy, the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism.

Tov. Stalin gave the classical *definition of Leninism as Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions*. To understand the essence of the theoretical questions and problems that inevitably had to arise and arose in connection with the practice of class struggle during this new historical period, it is necessary to recall some of the main features that characterize it.

As pointed out by t. Stalin, this new historical era is determined by three main points:

- 1) the extreme intensification of the struggle between the working class and capitalists,
- 2) the extreme aggravation of the struggle between imperialist powers for the redivision of the world, for the colonies, for the markets and raw materials,
- 3) the fundamental contradictions and the intensification of the struggle between oppressor and oppressed nations.

All these contradictions are an expression of the fact that the productive forces cannot further develop within the framework of the production relations created by capitalism at this stage, that this is the last stage in the development of capitalism, that this is the eve of proletarian revolution. This new epoch is characterized by an extreme aggravation of the class struggle, new forms of its manifestation, and extreme complexity.

This is a period of extremely fierce struggle in the field of ideology. This is the crisis of the whole system, the crisis of bourgeois ideology, bourgeois science, etc.

In the conditions of this new historical stage, new tasks arose and confront the proletariat and its party — the tasks of directly overthrowing capitalism. In the same new historical period, the whole bourgeois essence of the policy of the Second International was revealed. In "The Questions of Leninism", t. Stalin gives a description of the entire work of the Second International. Only by understanding the depth of this characteristic can one understand how Bolshevism grew on the basis of the struggle against opportunism in the Second International. Tov. Stalin writes: "Above, I said that between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, lies a whole lane of the domination of opportunism of the Second International. In the interests of accuracy, I must add that this is not about the formal domination of opportunism, but only about its actual domination. Formally, the leaders of the Second International were "faithful" Marxists, "Orthodox" - Kautsky and others. In fact, however, the main work of the Second International was carried out along the lines of opportunism. The opportunists adapted themselves to the bourgeoisie by virtue of their opportunistic, petty-bourgeois nature, while the "orthodoxes", in turn, adapted themselves to the opportunists in the interests of "maintaining unity" with the opportunists, in the interests of "peace and party". The result was the dominance of opportunism, because the chain between the politics of the bourgeoisie and the politics of the "orthodox" turned out to be closed "[546]".

An extremely profound description of the main line of the work of the Second International as an *opportunistic* line is given here. Tov. Stalin also shows the role and importance of *centrism* in the Second International, the role and significance of various forms of opportunism. It shows how the chain between the policies of the bourgeoisie and the policies of the Second International was closed. Further Comrade Stalin points out a number of characteristic features of the work of the Second International: the domination of eclecticism, sophistry instead of revolutionary theory, closely related to the living practice of the revolutionary struggle, the presence of fragments of Marxism, which, being divorced from the practice of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, turned into emasculated dogmas.

Tov. Stalin points out that instead of a revolutionary struggle the epoch of the Second International flourished flabby philistinism, politicking, etc. In connection with all this, the proletariat and its real ideologues were faced with the task of forging, creating really militant, truly revolutionary parties. It was necessary to make a complete revision of all that was created during the period of relatively

peaceful "organic" development of capitalism, during the period of the domination of the Second International. It was necessary to clear the Augean stables of the theory and practice of the Second International. And this part of the general verification of the theoretical and practical platform of the Second International fell to the lot of Leninism.

It is clear that this indication of Comrade Stalin, where he gives a historical analysis of conditions and outlines the historical tasks that befell Leninism, refers not to one of the sides of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, *but to all the constituent parts of Marxism* - to the economic, political and his philosophical side.

Lenin not only restored the revolutionary Marxist doctrine, having cleared it from the opportunism of the Second International, but also developed it further in relation to the new conditions, the conditions of imperialism, the conditions of the new forms of class struggle. Lenin gave further specification of all aspects of the Marxist-Leninist teaching.

It is necessary to examine the essence of the philosophical "positions" of the Second International, find out how the closure of the chain between the policies of the bourgeoisie and the policies of the Second International affected the *philosophical* views of the latter, in order to show the whole role and significance of the *Leninist struggle against philosophical opportunism in all its manifestations* .

Eclecticism, sophistry, the isolation of theory from practice, from revolutionary struggle are characteristic of the entire set of views of the most prominent theorists of the Second International, including their philosophical views, for their philosophical "line".

This "line" is mainly determined by the following points:

- 1) a complete separation of theory from practice,
- 2) rupture of economics and politics,
- 3) the separation of the economic and historical theory of Marxism, its constituent parts, from the philosophical basis.

Hence, among the most prominent theorists of the Second International, there arises the need to find some kind of "new" theoretical and cognitive rationale for the economic and historical theory of Marxism. It is clear that when the philosophical basis of Marxism is *disconnected* from the historical and economic theory of Marxism, one has to put some other philosophical foundation under Marxism. Among the most prominent "pillars" of the Second International, we just have the binding of the most terry-bourgeois points of view along the line of philosophy. In this regard, the representatives of the Second International are whipping completely around the tail of the bourgeoisie.

Finally, the moment characteristic of the general picture of their philosophical views is the refusal of the most prominent theorists of the Second International in one form or another from materialist dialectics. At one time, this found a clear expression in the position put forward by the "famous" Bernstein that dialectics is nothing more than a trap on the way to genuine knowledge, that dialectics must be abandoned. Other representatives of the Second International, the hidden opportunists, centrists, etc., expressed essentially the same thing, but only in a more subtle, veiled way.

Such is the general characteristic of the philosophical "line" (if it is even possible to use the word line at all) of the Second International. As for the theoretical-cognitive foundations that were brought under Marxism in connection with the elimination of the Marxist philosophical foundations by the representatives of the Second International, the following tendencies are typical for the latter: the essentially official jet is *neo-Kantianism*, then *Machism*, then the recently developing *neo-Hegelianism*. It is known that the Second International put forward quite prominent representatives of the neo-Kantian current, who linked Kant and Marx differently in questions of philosophy, ethics, etc. We find among them "theorists" such as Bernstein, Max Adler, Vorlander, Kautsky, Hilferding, etc.

The Machist stream is also strong (Friedrich Adler, Otto Bauer, and others) and the neo-Hegelian current that has developed in recent years in the ranks of Social Democracy, which is finally developing. One of his prominent spokesmen for the time being is Breslavl professor Siegfried Mark. An extremely curious process takes place, in which the closeness of the chain between politics, theory, the ideology of the bourgeoisie and politics, theory, the ideology of the Second International, is reflected. In recent years, bourgeois philosophy is increasingly turning to Hegel, trying to modernize it, adapt it in its own way. Fascist bourgeois philosophy puts Neo-Hegelianism in its service. This process, which takes place in the ranks of bourgeois philosophers, immediately receives its response in the ranks of social fascism. Social-fascist theorists, following the bourgeoisie's motive, are trying to move from neo-Kantianism to Hegelianism,

We now turn to a more detailed account of the attitude of the theorists of the Second International to these philosophical schools of the bourgeoisie. Let us first consider Kautsky's position on *neo-Kantianism* .

In his famous article "Marxism and Revisionism", Lenin described the neo-Kantianism that developed in the ranks of Social Democracy as follows: "In the field of philosophy," he wrote, "revisionism went at the tail of bourgeois professorial science. The professors went "back to Kant" ,and revisionism dragged on for neo-Kantians, the professors repeated thousands of times the cadres' vulgarity against philosophical materialism, - and the revisionists, condescendingly smiling, mumbled (word for word on the last handbook) that materialism had long been " refuted "; professors blamed Hegel like a "dead dog", and, preaching idealism themselves, only a thousand times smaller and more vulgar than Hegel's, scornfully shrugged their shoulders about the dialectic, and the revisionists climbed behind them into the morass of the philosophical debacle of science, replacing the "cunning" (and revolutionary) dialectic with the "simple" (and calm) "evolution"; professors practiced their state salary, driving both their idealistic and "critical" systems to the prevailing medieval "philosophy" (i.e. to theology) ,and the revisionists moved towards them, trying to make religion a " private matter "not in relation to the modern state , and in relation to the party of the advanced class. What kind of real class significance such "amendments" to Marx had, one cannot speak of this - the matter is clear of itself " trying to make religion a "private matter" not in relation to the modern state, but in relation to the party of the advanced class. What kind of real class significance such "amendments" to Marx had, one cannot speak of this - the matter is clear of itself " trying to make religion a "private matter" not in relation to the modern state, but in relation to the party of the advanced class. What kind of real class significance such "amendments" to Marx had, one cannot speak of this - the matter is clear of itself "[547] .

This scathing criticism, directed against revisionists such as Bernstein, against Conrad Schmidt, against Struve, and others, was directly related to the centrists and Kautsky, who in these matters essentially gave up the position to Bernstein. The Neo-Kantian revision of Marxism, exposed by Lenin, shown from its social roots, the theory advocated by social democratic "philosophers", in essence, did not differ from the idealistic reaction of the bourgeois neo-Kantians.

Previously, professors, honestly fulfilling the social order of the bourgeoisie, were dragged back to Kant. Now, in fulfilling the social order of the capitalists, they are striving to adapt the Hegelian theory of the state, even the Hegelian dialectic, to the need of black-shirts, to justify the terrorist rule of the bourgeoisie. Previously, the social democratic "theorists", lagging behind these bourgeois professors, "connected" Marx with Kant. Now the modern social-fascists, trailing behind the reactionary scholars, preach the neo-Hegelian views and try to somehow "connect" them with Marx.

Kautsky's position on the attitude towards the neo-Kantian revision of Marxism very well expresses in general that attitude to philosophical problems that prevailed in the ranks of social democracy. In his correspondence with Plekhanov, when the latter came out with very sharp criticism of Bernstein, Kautsky wrote: "In any case, I must openly declare that neo-Kantianism confuses me the least. I have never been strong in philosophy, and although I stand on the point of view of dialectical materialism, I still think that the economic historical point of view of Marx and Engels is at least compatible with neo-Kantianism; after all, Darwinism also gets along well with Büchner materialism, as with the monism of Haeckel and Kantianism of Lange. If Bernstein shed only in this direction, it wouldn't bother me in the least. "

Kautsky, as you see, is not at all embarrassed by the combination of Kant and Marx, the separation of the philosophical foundations of Marxism from the economic and historical theory of Marxism. True, he declares that he is entirely at the point of view of dialectical materialism, but this declaration is in fact replaced by a complete surrender of his positions. It must be said that Kautsky conducts this same point of view in his last work, *The Materialistic Understanding of History*, which is a theoretical generalization of all the opportunistic practices of social democracy. In this two-volume work, Kautsky speaks on the question of the relationship between the various sides of Marxism. He says:

"The recognition of a materialistic understanding of history should not be a prerequisite for membership in a Social Democratic party. This party should provide everyone who wants to participate in the struggle for the liberation of the proletariat, in the struggle against all oppression, exploitation, theoretically justify this desire, as it can - materialistically, Kantian, Christian, or in any other way. "

In essence, this point of view provides complete freedom to combine Marxism with religion, with Kant, Mach, etc. Kautsky's general position on the relation to neo-Kantianism, expressed in 1898 in correspondence with Plekhanov, found its theoretical expression here. If we take his interpretation of the questions of the theory of knowledge, things in themselves, problems of ethics, the neo-Kantian point of view of the author is felt everywhere.

Let us turn to the question of the general attitude of Kautsky to *Machism* . During the philosophical discussion of 1908-1910. with Bogdanovism, one of the workers, Bendianidze, appealed to Kautsky to

speak on the question of Machism. Kautsky answered him with a letter: "You ask me," he wrote, "whether Mach is a Marxist. It depends on what is meant by Marxism. I consider Marxism not as a philosophical doctrine, but as an empirical science, as a special understanding of society. This view, however, is incompatible with idealistic philosophy, but it does not contradict Mach's theory of knowledge. I personally do not see a significant difference between the views of Mach and Dietzgen. Marx is very close to Dietzgen "(1909).

This answer is extremely characteristic not only in its terry-opportunist essence, it also defines Kautsky's understanding of Marxism, its opportunistic attitude to Machism.

So Kautsky views Marxism not as a philosophical doctrine, but only as an empirical science. Secondly, Marxism is only a theory of society. And third, Marxism is incompatible with the idealistic revision of Marxism, but at the same time it does not contradict Mach's theory of knowledge, which, after all, is idealism. Such is Kautsky's "dialectic". This is the bawdy caricature of Marxism drawn by the "venerable" Kautsky worker Bendianidze. This small place from Kautsky's answer perfectly describes his views. It fully confirms the general description of the positions of the Second International, which was given above.

This is Kautsky's attitude to Machism, which was developed in the West, and we have Bogdanovism, etc. But we should take Kautsky's last work, "The Materialistic Understanding of History," we can say the same about neo-Hegelianism. Kautsky turns in order to prove that Marxism can be compatible with neo-Hegelianism, etc. The general process of fascization of social democracy gets its quite clear expression in the book in the field of philosophy. *Such is the philosophical "line" of this shameless eclecticism, this hardened sophist, reconciling, connecting everything and continuing to give such a "mess" for Marxism.*

It is necessary to dwell a bit on the characterization of the philosophical positions of the *left-wing Social Democrats* — Mehring and R. Luxemburg, as well as Plekhanov, the leader of Russian Menshevism, in order to imagine with all clarity what the Second International gave in the field of philosophy in order to understand the significance of the struggle against opportunism which was conducted by Lenin.

Mehring has written quite a few articles on philosophical questions, and paid quite a lot of attention to philosophical problems. A number of Mehring's articles devoted directly to the criticism of a literary work contain valuable, accurate characteristics from the point of view of dialectical materialism. But still, basically, Mehring does not go beyond the positions we have characterized above. First of all, dialectical materialism is not for Mehring a coherent outlook and the method of Marxism. He believes that you can set the view into the nature of *the mechanical* materialism and that this kind of materialism is combined with historical materialism. This view runs like a thread through all the works of Mehring. We also find statements on his attitude towards neo-Kantianism, Machism, etc. In a number of his articles he wrote that neo-Kantians did not at all encroach upon the existence of Marxism, but only wanted to "elevate" it or "supplement" it; that they do not find "fundamental" errors in historical materialism; that "Mach for natural science did the same thing that Marx did for the social sciences"; that "Mach does not want to be a philosopher at all ... he is confident enough in order to confine himself to the sphere in which he scientifically feels himself the master. In this respect, Mach is quite in agreement with Marx,<sup>[548]</sup> . These are some of Mehring's statements in a number of his philosophical articles.

On the question of mechanical materialism and historical materialism, Mehring wrote: "Historical materialism includes natural science in itself, but natural science does not include historical in itself"<sup>[549]</sup> .

"In the field of natural science, mechanical materialism is a principle of scientific research, which historical materialism is in the social sciences. To assert that Marx and Engels, who rejected the right of mechanical materialism to the sphere of history, would also deny him his right to the sphere of natural science, would mean to send these people from the field of scientific thinking to the area of superstition, in which devils of Australian blacks manage, philosophy of the unconscious and " the psychism of the "neo-Marmarists"<sup>[550]</sup> .

Mehring is not an idealist and does not combine Marx with Kant, Marx with Mach. However, he is not, as we see, a consistent dialectical materialist; on the contrary, in his outlook, in his views on nature, Mehring sticks to mechanical materialism.

What are the philosophical positions of *R. Luxemburg* ? It is absolutely clear that she is not a representative of consistent, that is, dialectical materialism. In the economic works of R. Luxemburg, in her "theory of automatic collapse of capitalism," in raising the question of the relationship between internal and external contradictions, we find a detailed *mechanistic* concept applied to the analysis of capitalism.

Also known is the assessment which Lenin gave to the views of R. Luxemburg on the national question. Touching on the philosophical side of the question, Lenin shows how R. Luxemburg *substitutes dialectics with sophistry* and completely abstract propositions. Lenin especially scourges her for not understanding a concrete historical approach to the national question. In the question of spontaneity and consciousness, R. Luxemburg combines idealistic moments with individual moments of mechanism, but consistently conducted dialectical materialism is absent in its theoretical statements and applied to this or that political particular-practical question.

The philosophical positions of the left social democrats, the left radicals in the Second International, as we see, did not differ significantly from the theoretical and philosophical views of the revisionists and centrists.

## 6.2. Lenin and Plekhanov

Plekhanov undoubtedly occupies a special place among the theorists of the Second International. The question of Lenin and Plekhanov was one of the most important questions of the entire philosophical discussion, one of the most important questions of the struggle against Menshevik idealism and mechanism. *In his philosophical views, Plekhanov undoubtedly represents the best among the theorists of the Second International.* Undoubtedly, along with the internal organic unity that exists between Plekhanov's political opportunism and his philosophical deviations from Marx and Engels, he has a certain contradiction, which is that he nevertheless, better than all the other theorists of the Second International, defended materialism from subjective idealism and positivism of the populists and from open Bernstein revisionism, led the struggle against Machism and Bogdanovism and at the same time turned the dialectic into sophistry, scholasticism. The difficulty lies in the fact that Plekhanov represents, as Lenin noted in his statements and characterization of Plekhanov, the figure

Truly *historic* the approach is to reveal a truly objective place and significance that Plekhanov occupies in the development of the labor movement. A genuinely historical assessment consists in giving, in recognition of the role played by Plekhanov, at the same time revealing all the mistakes that exist in his philosophical views. It is necessary to give a Bolshevik assessment of the role and significance of the struggle that Lenin led with Plekhanov on all major philosophical problems. Beforehand, one extremely important remark must be made to show that there is much in common between Deborin and Axelrod on the question of attitude towards Plekhanov. Despite all the struggles that Deborin and Axelrod fought between themselves, in the main question, on the question of Lenin and Plekhanov, on the question of Lenin's philosophical inheritance, there are many similarities in their views, and this general is extremely important to analyze and show here. For example, in the magazine "Under the banner of Marxism" was printed without comments, it should be like some kind of official material about Plekhanov, the letter of Axelrod-Orthodox and Deutsch, under the heading "G. V. Plekhanov never ceased to be a Marxist."

The content of this letter is as follows:

*"The number 110/1519" Izvestia All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets ", as well as in other organs of the press put the ECCI appeal" To the workers of all countries, "in which among other things in the first paragraph is printed:" More late Plekhanov, when he was a Marxist", And so on. We consider the words underlined as incorrect and offensive both for the memory of the founder of the Marxist trend in Russia, and for us, his friends, and like-minded people personally. We find it all the more necessary to protest against this insinuation, because it has been abandoned by an entire institution, moreover in its appeal "to the workers of all countries." The latter, not knowing the exact views of the late Plekhanov and relying on the statement of such an authoritative body as the Comintern Executive Committee, will undoubtedly believe that the founder of Marxism in Russia later changed him, which of course is absolutely wrong. We, persons close to Plekhanov, know what his views were until his death, we assert that up to the grave he remained faithful to the views of the founders of scientific socialism, which he had learned in his youth and invariably preached for forty years.*

*PS We ask all the bodies that printed the appeal of the Executive Committee of the Comintern to reprint our present letter. "*

*For the "Committee on the perpetuation of the memory of G. V. Plekhanov"  
Lyubov Axelrod-Orthodox, Leo Deutsch, May 20, 1922, Moscow.*

Here is a direct Menshevik attack, a direct Menshevik appeal against the appeal of the Comintern, who is accused by Axelrod of insinuations, etc. And this was placed at the time on the pages "Under

the Marxist banner" This is an extremely characteristic fact that needs to be clarified in order to understand how important the struggle with Comoria, as with the mechanists, was around the problem "Lenin and Plekhanov."

In essence, both Deborin and Axelrod for a number of years before the last philosophical discussion and during it defended and carried out this point of view, did not abandon it essentially even after discussion.

It does not make sense to dwell on the already well-debunked Deborin formulation of the question of Plekhanov as a theorist, who supplements Lenin as a practice. You can take another installation - "student" Karev. In his "Instead of an article for the fifth anniversary of the journal," he wrote the following:

"Nowadays, attempts are being made repeatedly to oppose Plekhanov to Lenin or Lenin to Plekhanov. Attempts are no good. Everyone knows the political mistakes of Plekhanov. It is known that in the twilight of his days during the war and in 1917, many of the political mistakes of such a consistent mind as Plekhanov was turned into theoretical mistakes. And before the war, Plekhanov had several inaccurate formulations and unsuccessfully set accents in the field of theory: the famous story with hieroglyphs and the concept of experience, the insufficient emphasis on Marx's inclusion of the theory of knowledge in dialectics, the loss of classes in the scheme of the public whole — that prepared Plekhanov's mistakes in the Russian History public thought ", etc. But all these *privatemistakes* cannot eliminate the general thing that Lenin repeatedly stressed - the philosophical works of Plekhanov still remain the best of what is written on these topics in the world literature of Marxism " <sup>[551]</sup> .

Here Karev expounded the whole concept in the understanding of Plekhanov. There is not a grain of Bolshevism in this concept. Here that no line, then gross errors. The general meaning of these errors: an apologetic attitude towards *the whole* .... Plekhanov, Plekhanov Menshevik, Plekhanov-author of the "History of Russian Social Thought," and so on and so forth Karev unaware that Lenin's Bolshevism *necessary* to oppose Plekhanov-Menshevik that Lenin's theory of reflection *must be* contrasted with Plekhanov's hieroglyphic theory, and so on and so forth.

Karev thinks that "falling out of classes in the scheme of a public whole" is "an unsuccessful emphasis"! This place is a bright spotlight reveals and illuminates the entire Menshevikovuyuschuyu, and even simply the liberal essence of the views of Karev and the entire boarding group.

This place magnificently reveals the anti-Marxist essence of Menshevik idealism.

These are the attitudes that the *group* from the *group* on the question of the relationship between Lenin and Plekhanov had.

Let us turn to Zinoviev. In his book "Leninism" there is a special chapter "Leninism and Dialectics". This chapter, being a vivid example of the "quotational" Marxism, shows how far Comrade Zinoviev understood neither Leninism nor dialectics, how he perverts the genuine Leninist dialectics, its revolutionary-effective character. Zinoviev completely misunderstood the partisanship of philosophy, so deeply and fully unfolded by Lenin. Not understanding this aspect of the matter, Zinoviev slides into a struvistic objectivist interpretation of materialist dialectics. This is how he perverts the creature of Lenin's views: "Lenin knew how to be the most active, passionate," rabid "(Lenin's favorite word) participant in events and at the same time knew how, as if going off to the sidelines, completely objectively observe, events with philosophical calm, <sup>[552]</sup> . Continuing to develop this installation, if I may say so, Zinoviev tries to prove with a number of examples how "in the midst of topical and political arguments Lenin" suddenly "turns to dialectics" <sup>[553]</sup> .

Nothing more than a complete perversion of the essence of the matter, such "characteristics" of Lenin should be called. Zinoviev, quite outwardly, mechanically imagines the connection between theory and practice, between "rabid, passionate" activity in political events and the supposedly "objective", "philosophically calm" observation of them in Lenin, between "current political argumentation" and argumentation from the point of view materialistic dialectic. Zinoviev does not understand at all that the power of Lenin as the greatest materialist-dialectic who developed the teachings of Marxism in the new historical epoch is that he provides examples of the revolutionary unity of theory and practice, of scientific analysis with deep partisanship. Zinoviev does not understand that Lenin has the organic internal unity of revolutionary theory and revolutionary politics,

It is clear that, having distorted the Menshevik theory of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice, Zinoviev completely misinterprets the question of Lenin and Plekhanov. In essence, he poses this question in the spirit of Menshevik idealism, or, rather, is one of the authors of this position. Here is what he writes about Plekhanov and Lenin: "As long as it is a matter of purely philosophical problems, Plekhanov understands dialectics as well as Lenin. As an enlightener, as a writer, as a propagandist, as a popularizer of the philosophical views of Marx, Plekhanov is strong. Academic presentation of the



dialectical method Plekhanov gives us brilliantly. But to reduce all these issues from the academic sky to the sinful land, to apply the dialectic to the revolutionary struggle, to the movement of the masses, to social development, to the liberation struggle of the working class - in this area Plekhanov turned out to be completely powerless. *And Lenin in this particular area was a real giant* " [554]. Doesn't Zinoviev here co-author Deborin's famous Menshevik thesis that "Plekhanov is a theorist and Lenin is a practitioner"? Did Zinoviev not break the theory and practice here? Zinoviev obscures the fact that, in the general understanding of materialist dialectics, we have in Plekhanov, despite the "brilliant" presentation, a number of gross, fundamental errors, a well-known system of deviations from dialectical materialism. Zinoviev completely blurs the fact that Plekhanov's political opportunism could not fail to get its expression in his theoretical views on the philosophy of Marxism, and vice versa - his deviations from dialectical materialism could not help but have an effect on his political views. Zinoviev, like Karev, like Deborin, does not understand *the connection* that Lenin repeatedly revealed in his works.

What is the real historical place of Plekhanov and how should one raise the question of the relationship between Lenin and Plekhanov in the development of the philosophy of Marxism? Undoubtedly, Plekhanov, who was at the head of the Emancipation of Labor group, is one of the representatives of Marxism in Russia. We know Lenin's statements about this. Undoubtedly, much of what Plekhanov wrote on dialectical materialism was of great positive importance for the strengthening and development of Marxist ideas in Russia. The works of Plekhanov were and are of considerable value in the struggle against philosophical revisionism. Taking these *historical merits of Plekhanov* At the same time, we must not forget the struggle that Lenin waged against the distortions of the materialist dialectics by Plekhanov, against the Plekhanov-Menshevik scholastics, sophistry and vulgarization of Marxist philosophy, especially in its application to political and strategic-tactical issues. We must know from the history of the entire revolutionary movement in Russia and in the West over the past four decades, know from the history of the struggle of our party that it is the only consistent follower of Marxism in the entire international labor movement who has raised Marxism in all its constituent parts, including the theory of dialectics, on a new level, is Lenin. There were repeated attempts to present Plekhanov as an intermediate link between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, attempts to portray Lenin as a disciple of Plekhanov (Deborin and others). It is necessary to repel this apparent falsification of historical facts in favor of Menshevism. We must also give a decisive rebuff to the claims that Plekhanov in the theoretical sense, in the academic presentation of Marxism gives "brilliant pages", that Plekhanov has no flaws in this respect and that only in practice he turned out to be non-dialectic. This is a totally wrong point of view.

Since, however, Marxism of the Second International epoch represents a step backwards, a retreat from orthodox Marxism, and since Plekhanov in his entirety of his works basically does not go beyond the limits of Marxism of this era, *we should consider his own philosophical works as a series of deviations from consistent Marxism* .

It is an erroneous opinion that in Plekhanov we have in the field of philosophy only a series of separate, random, erroneous formulations. There are a lot of individual mistakes from the point of view of Lenin's understanding of the problems of Marxist philosophy. The task of understanding these mistakes, the task of critical overcoming them is that it is necessary to search for and disclose the *internal logic* of these mistakes, as well as the organic link that exists between them and the political, mainly Menshevik, line of Plekhanov.

Approaching the assessment of the entire set of theoretical works of Plekhanov, it is necessary first of all to note that "the main tradition and dogma of the Second International" - the *gap between theory and practice, the gap between theoretical writings on dialectical materialism and the inability to apply it* - received a very vivid expression . One need only recall Lenin's characteristics of this Plekhanov "dialectic" ("dogmatics", "most harmful sophistry", "perversion", "mockery of the spirit of Marxism", etc., etc.) in order to understand what is strong, as described above. the gap exists in Plekhanov.

If we take Plekhanov's own philosophical works and analyze the totality of the mistakes that he has and which were criticized by Lenin, then in general we can outline about four rods around which these mistakes are concentrated:

- 1) the lack of understanding of "dialectics as a theory of knowledge," the lack of understanding of materialist dialectics as a philosophical science, the reduction of dialectics to the sum of examples;
- 2) commitment to formalism and logistics;
- 3) significant elements of agnosticism, Kantianism;
- 4) significant influence of vulgar, contemplative materialism.

Lenin's struggle against Plekhanov's opportunism and its perversions of dialectics has been going on throughout the history of our party. Here we will cite only some facts from this struggle, while noting a characteristic feature: the struggle that Lenin waged against Plekhanov on political issues all the time touches on the cardinal problems of materialist dialectics.

Let us point out here at Lenin's criticism of Plekhanov in connection with his adherence to formalism and logistics. We are referring to Lenin's remarks on the Plekhanov draft program of the party. Lenin in his remarks about Plekhanov's "second project" wrote the following:

"one. According to the method of formulating the most important department related to the characterization of capitalism, this project does not give a program of the proletariat *fighting* against very real manifestations of very definite capitalism, but a program of an economic *textbook* devoted to capitalism in general.

2. In particular, the program is not suitable for the party of the *Russian* proletariat, because the evolution of Russian capitalism, the contradictions and social disasters generated by Russian capitalism are almost completely bypassed and obscured by the same system to characterize capitalism in general ...

To get rid of the fact that capitalism "in its developed form" is *generally* distinguished by such properties, - and in Russia capitalism "becomes predominant," means *to evade* that particular accusation and declaration of war, which is more important for a practically fighting party " [\[555\]](#) .

These Leninist remarks, full of deep meaning, cast a bright light on all the difference between Lenin's materialist dialectics and Plekhanov formalism, its logistics in solving major issues.

Lenin has the requirement of concrete analysis of concrete capitalism in Russia and setting specific tasks for the party, the proletariat, and Plekhanov - a general characteristic of capitalism, abstractness and deducing the "properties" of Russian capitalism from the definition of the concept of capitalism in general. This "system to characterize capitalism in general" is extremely characteristic, as Lenin notes, for the entire program. Instead of concrete analysis on the basis of dialectical materialism, in Plekhanov we have a deduction from concepts, a logical definition of concepts. But this is a characteristic feature of formalism and logistics.

In July 1907, in the preface to the second edition of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Lenin returned to the same characteristic of the Plekhanov methodology, but on other issues. He wrote: "A concrete analysis of the position and interests of various classes should serve to determine the exact meaning of this truth in its application to a particular issue. The opposite way of reasoning, often encountered by right-wing social democrats with Plekhanov at the head of them - that is, the desire to seek answers to specific questions in a simple logical development of common truth about the main character of our revolution, is a debasement of Marxism and continuous mockery of dialectical materialism " [\[556\]](#) .

Lenin's struggle with Plekhanov's theoretical and tactical views, especially during the revolution of 1905-1906, was of great importance for the victory of the Bolshevik strategy and tactics in the labor movement and its implementation in the revolution. Along with directly political content, this struggle provides extremely rich material for studying and understanding Lenin's philosophical positions in opposition to Plekhanov's positions. It should be noted that Plekhanov conducts his entire "argument" on tactical issues allegedly from the point of view of dialectical materialism. All the time, he criticizes Lenin for "a complete lack of understanding of dialectical materialism," for deviating from him. In his article "Something about" Economism "and" Economists ", he throws the Bolsheviks accusation of being careless about theory. "In the" economist "practice, he wrote - The theory in general was not acquired in the worst way. But the current practice of the "political" tone (i.e. the Bolsheviks. - *Auth.* ) also not god knows how prilezhit to theory. If we really get to the truth, then we will say that our current practices, "politicians," are just as careless about the theory as the practices, "economists of the recent past," [\[557\]](#) .

With a zeal worthy of a better use, Plekhanov repeats this same slander on Lenin infinitely many times. Blaming Lenin in the absence of dialectics, he even states the "fourth period" in the labor movement. He writes: "And this is why the" liquidation of the fourth period "of our movement, characterized by the influence of Lenin's metaphysics, just as the" third period "of its movement is characterized by the influence of" economism "must, among other things, be to rise finally to the theoretical point of view this group (i.e. the group "Liberation of Labor"). Even very short-sighted people will soon see it. "

Plekhanov does not stop at these vile attacks against Lenin, he deepens them, spreading slander, then supported by Deborin and other Mensheviks at that time, regarding Machian philosophy, which is supposedly the official philosophy of Bolshevism. Here is what he wrote in his *Letters on Tactics and Tactlessness*.

"When I say that we, in words, actually hold on to Marx and his dialectic, I, of course, do not mean theorists of our present Blanquism. In the field of philosophy, these people even in words do not follow Marx. They act as his "critics"; for them, who stand on the point of view of empirio-monism, the dialectic is "a long-surpassed level" <sup>[558]</sup> .

This was written by Plekhanov in the spring of 1906.

The accusations of Lenin and the Bolsheviks of idealism are repeated by Plekhanov an infinite number of times. So he writes: "The tactics defended by our Bolsheviks bears obvious traces of petty-bourgeois idealism and petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionism" <sup>[559]</sup> . He further writes: "... Lenin lowers the level of revolutionary thought ... he introduces a utopian element into our views ... Blankism or Marxism - this is the question we are tackling today. Tov. Lenin himself admitted that his agrarian project was closely connected with his idea of seizing power. " <sup>[560]</sup> . In Letters on Tactics and Tactlessness, he addresses the Bolsheviks in the following way: "You are precisely dogmatists who have lost all ability to practice. You take your own will for the main revolutionary engine, and when we point you to a real relationship, you scream about our supposed opportunism. You think that a revolutionary who wants to reckon with these real relationships is "nothing left to do." Your faction, like two peas in a pod, is similar to the Willich-Schaper faction, and this faction was only a German form of Blanquism, which adopted Marx's terminology and some completely undigested scraps of his ideas ... Naturally being idealists in tactics, you naturally use idealistic criterion for evaluating all other parties; you try to define them more or less *goodwill*" <sup>[561]</sup> . "Your arguments about the" criticism of weapons "*aren't anything more than a simple transfer to the domain of tactical reasoning of the Dühringian theory of violence, which Frederick Engels once so mocked at mockingly*" <sup>[562]</sup> .

In the article we have quoted above, "The working class and the social democratic intelligentsia," Plekhanov accuses Lenin of both narodism, socialism and Bauerism. So he writes: "In Lenin's view, we see not *Marxism* , but, I apologize for the ugly sounding word, *Bauerism* , a new edition of the theory of *heroes and the crowd* , corrected and supplemented in accordance with the market requirements of the most modern time" <sup>[563]</sup> .

Such is the bouquet of lies, slander against Lenin, which Plekhanov puts forward in the process of the Bolsheviks' struggle against the Mensheviks for carrying out revolutionary tactics in the 1905 revolution, for the slogans of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, for exposing the Menshevik opportunism, their tailism to the Cadet liberal bourgeoisie

It would be possible to show that Plekhanov fought Lenin throughout almost the entire history of the party, with the exception of those periods when he himself showed fluctuations in the direction of Bolshevism. Here it is only necessary to cite the Plekhanov assessment of the April theses of Lenin in 1917, which are the greatest document of international socialism, the clearest example of the method of materialist dialectics, the deepest concrete analysis of the class struggle and the correlation of class forces in the February revolution. How does Plekhanov evaluate these theses? He wrote: "I compare him (ie, Lenin. - *Auth.* ) Theses with the speeches of the abnormal heroes of these great artists (Plekhanov means Chekhov and Gogol. - *Aut.*) and in some way enjoy them. And it seems that these theses were written just under the circumstances in which Avkenty Poprishin sketched one of his pages. This situation is characterized by the following note: "I do not remember the numbers. There was no month either. It was the devil knows what "is." We will see that it was under this situation, that is, with full distraction from the circumstances of time and place, Lenin's theses were written. This means that the reporter of Unity, who called Lenin's speech "delusional," was absolutely right " <sup>[564]</sup> .

That is how evil, frenzied insinuation Plekhanov comes to in the struggle against Bolshevism during the war and in the period after the February revolution. Plekhanov "criticizes" Bolshevism, dwelling on the philosophical, methodological side of the issue, in every way perverting, in every way juggling his views.

*Disclosing and overcoming Plekhanov's mistakes in the field of philosophy means overcoming Menshevism in such an important theoretical area as is the philosophy of Marxism.* It was along this line that the struggle against Menshevik idealism was, and has great party significance.

### **6.3. Lenin's struggle against philosophical opportunism in the history of our party**

Let us turn to the question of the falsification of the history of Lenin's philosophical struggle with opportunism, which we have in the works of representatives of mechanism and Menshevik idealism. It is necessary to note a number of characteristic features of the approach taken by Menshevik idealism to Lenin's philosophical struggle with opportunism. First of all, and this is in close connection with the general concept of Menshevik idealism, for the Deborinty there is a characteristic *separation of Lenin's "purely philosophical works" from all his other works.*.. Such works of Lenin, such as "What is the" Friends of the People "," "Development of Capitalism in Russia", etc., completely fell out of the attention of these philosophers when approaching the path of Lenin's

philosophical development, since these works are not "purely philosophical works. The second characteristic feature of Lenin's approach of Menshevik idealism to the philosophical struggle is the well-known theory that " *Lenin is a disciple of Plekhanov* " and therefore his philosophical works do not have independent meaning, but are important insofar as they complement Plekhanov's views. The third characteristic feature of their approach to the struggle of Lenin against philosophical opportunism is the *denial of the international significance of Lenin's works*. against neo-Kantianism, against Machism, the denial of the international significance of Lenin's struggle for materialist dialectics. Finally, the fourth moment is the intensified dragging of the Menshevik Plekhanov's *little idea about the organic connection that supposedly exists between Bolshevism and Machism* . Here are four important points that are a common thread in a number of articles, materials, works written by representatives of Menshevik idealism. Will we take the book "Lenin as a Thinker" by Deborin, the book "Lenin and Philosophy" by Luppol, Karev's works and articles — all these moments have been developed in one degree or another.

Let us recall first of all what Deborin wrote in his article "Mach's Philosophy and the Russian Revolution" as early as 1908, being a Menshevik, regarding the connection that supposedly exists between the philosophy of Machism and Bolshevism as a political movement.

"The seal of subjectivism, of" voluntarism, "he says there, rests on all the tactics of so-called Bolshevism, whose philosophical expression is Machism. Machism is a worldview without a world; as a philosophy of subjectivism and individualism, it forms, in combination with Nietzsche's immoralism, which gives justification for evil, exploitation, etc., an ideological fog covering the practical aspirations of the bourgeoisie. Bolshevik philosophers and "ideologists" do not go beyond the limits of the petty-bourgeois outlook. *Bolshevik strategists and tactics with their romantic revolutionism and petty-bourgeois radicalism put into practice the theoretical principles of philosophical nihilism* , based on which is the denial of objective truth and the recognition of the right for each person to determine the nature of what is permitted and unauthorized, true and false, good and evil, fair and unjust . Our maximized Marxists are conscious Bolsheviks, comprehending the practices and tactics of the latter. Bolshevik practices and tactics are unconscious Machists and idealists. Objectively, Machism is thus in Russian ideology of the revolutionary, radical stratum of the bourgeoisie, and within these limits, marks a progressive phenomenon. In relation to Marxism — the worldview of the proletariat — Machism plays a reactionary role. The powerlessness and political backwardness of the petty bourgeoisie force it to seek temporary allies among other classes of the population. But the most reliable revolutionary-consistent ally is the proletariat. But in order to "grasp" the latter for the sake of at least the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry", one has to resort to Marxist phraseology, which makes it possible to cover the petty-bourgeois "essence". After all, our Social Revolutionaries are „Marxists too". "

Special comments to this Menshevik slander on Bolshevism are hardly required. It is important to note that such views in a highly veiled form were reflected even in the work "Lenin as a Thinker", written by Deborin in 1924, published until 1928 without any corrections.

It must be said that in this question we can state that there was a touching unity between then Deborin and Axelrod-Orthodox. Axelrod-Orthodox has a number of malicious Menshevik articles on philosophical questions.

Here is what she wrote, for example, in the article "Two Trends".

"If the link between philosophy and social trends is hidden in most, if it has to be discovered only by analyzing the internal content of this social trend, then the link between Bolshevism and Machism is striking from the vulgar empirical point of view or, to put it in terms of empirical critics , - from a purely descriptive point of view. In fact, most theorists of Bolshevism profess empirio-critical teaching. Philosophy for these theorists is not a serious subject, but a method of thinking, which also determines the methods of their practical activity. It is clear, therefore, that their theoretical and practical activity also influenced this circle of Social Democrats, which has no direct relation to philosophy " <sup>[565]</sup> .

Further in the same article, she continues in the most slanderous way to depict "the psychology and logic of Bolshevism," as she puts it, striving to prove the kinship, the identity of Bolshevism with Machism.

Plekhanov's thesis about the relationship of Bolshevism with Machism, which was so zealously developed and promoted by Deborin and Axelrod, was exposed by Lenin. In his work Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin wrote:

"In his remarks against Machism, Plekhanov did not so much care about the refutation of Mach as about inflicting factional damage to Bolshevism. For this petty and meager use of fundamental

theoretical disagreements, he has already been punished by the right - two books of Menshevik-Machists " [566] .

Let us now turn to the work of Comrade Luppel "Lenin and Philosophy."

In it we find:

"In his book he did not develop in a positive form the principles of dialectical materialism, but he expounded them in the form of negative criticism of the philosophical revisionists of Marxism. The polemical task determined the method and nature of the construction of the book of Lenin. For each of the main provisions of the revisionists, he finds them rooted in the idealistic philosophical literature of the West and, thus revealing their idealistic, anti-Marxist character, contrasts briefly materialistic theses, drawing them not only from Marx and Engels, but also from such materialists like Diderot, Feuerbach , Iosif Ditsgen, Plekhanov " [567] .

Here is an example of the falsification of the philosophical path of Lenin. It is especially strange to read such lines about the Lenin book, written in 1925–1926. and printed in 1929, after that remarkable, deep posing of the question, which Comrade Stalin gave in his works in 1924

Exposing such falsification, it must be said that Lenin from his very first works gives us samples of the effective understanding of Marxism, which was mentioned at the beginning. Lenin from his very first works *connects philosophy with politics*, gives samples of the partisanship of philosophy. When he criticizes the economic, political views of the populists, he does not stop there, but also gives extensive criticism of their philosophical and sociological views. Let's compare at least two works: "On the development of the monistic view" of Plekhanov and "What is the" Friends of the People "" of Lenin and we will immediately see the enormous difference that exists between Lenin and Plekhanov, between the understanding of Marxism and Lenin and Plekhanov. What does Plekhanov give in his book? It is known that this book by Plekhanov is one of his best books on the philosophy of Marxism, that a number of generations of Marxists grew and grew on it. It is clear to us that this book must be studied, that without this it is impossible to become a genuine Marxist, a genuine Communist, but it is not necessary to study it in the way of Jordan. It needs to be studied critically, figuring out Plekhanov's mistakes and what in which Lenin surpasses Plekhanov. Plekhanov we find extremely *academic presentation of Marxism*, Marxist philosophy and historical preparation of Marxism. We already have in this book significant elements of mechanism, errors on the question of the role of the geographic environment; "Geographic bias", lack of understanding of the relationship between nature and society. We have in Plekhanov a completely insufficient formulation and development of the question of the role and significance of the theory of class struggle in Marxism, in the materialist understanding of history. From Lenin, from the very beginning, we are confronted with party militancy in the struggle against the Narodniks. Lenin establishes the connection between the philosophical, sociological, economic and political views of the populists. If we take Lenin's analysis of handicraft in the domestic production system, if we take the specific nature of the criticism of the populists, going from criticism of the general philosophical and sociological views of the populists, to questions about the community, about handicrafts, if we compare all the theoretical wealth that Lenin gives, and recall that it is in this work that sharpens the most important problem of historical materialism - the question of the socio-economic formation, we will see what difference there is between these works of Lenin and Plekhanov. Finally, it must be said that Lenin is essentially *the first and independently* , and not in the way that Deborin and Luppel depict, gives in Russia a detailed exposition of the Marxist world outlook in the struggle with the subjective sociology of the Narodniks. Plekhanov wrote his book *in the autumn of 1894* , and Lenin wrote his Friends of the People in *April 1894* , and wrote independently, regardless of the work that Plekhanov did. Comparing these works, revealing how much higher Lenin's work is, we can say that Lenin was the *first in Russia to give an extensive exposition of dialectical materialism in the struggle against the Narodniks in his book with subjective sociology* .

*Lenin was the first to lead the struggle against neo-Kantianism in the most consistent way.* As far back as the end of 1894, Lenin read in the Petersburg circle of Social Democrats a report on the reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature, which he published in a revised form, as a book aimed at two fronts simultaneously - against Struve and against populists. We have in mind Lenin's work "The Economic Content of Populism and His Criticism in the Book of Mr. Struve," written in. end of 1894 and published in 1895

This work provides an exceptional example of the irreconcilability of theoretical controversy, a sample of the struggle on two fronts. In it, Lenin also criticizes Struve's philosophical views, criticizes in a number of places and remarks the neo-Kantian revision of Marxism, which was outlined by Struve. *Concreteness criticism* characteristic generally for Lenin's works. Further, in his works against Bulgakov on the theory of implementation, etc. Lenin throws a number of remarks against the neo-

Kantians. At the same time, Plekhanov did not yet speak either against the Bernstein revision or against Struve. Much later, in a letter to Potresov of September 2, 1898, Lenin points out that Plekhanov still does not speak out strongly against neo-Kantianism, giving Struve and Bulgakov polemics about the main issues of this philosophy, as if it had become an integral part of Marxist philosophy.

The first version of Plekhanov's article "On the economic factor" published in PZM sheds bright light on Plekhanov's interpretation of a number of philosophical questions, in particular, describing his attitude to neo-Kantian revisionism of Struve, Bulgakov, Berdyaev, etc. Leninist criticism of Struve. In this version of the article, Plekhanov writes: "The philosophical views of the" students "who are opposed to the German" critical "philosophy are not similar to the philosophical views of the authors of" Capital ". They know this very well and do not consider themselves consistent with his philosophy. But this does not prevent them from recognizing the justice of his economic and philosophical-historical theory ... They are his students to the same extent as those who share not only his economic and philosophical-historical, but also philosophical views. Neo-Kantian *within these limits* can be the same loyal and consistent student of this famous thinker, like any of the modern materialists, that is, those who follow the author of "Capital" in philosophy as well.

But is it possible to share the philosophical and historical views of a writer, without at the same time sharing his philosophical views? This question can not be answered unconditionally, Sa depend, as the French say. But as for the neo-Kantians, it must be said in the affirmative that they can, without changing their philosophical point of view, recognize the validity of Marx's economic and philosophical-historical views " [\[568\]](#) .

This version of the article was written by Plekhanov at the end of 1897 or at the beginning of 1898. Here, for a number of tactical considerations, Plekhanov comes, as we see, to the theoretical protection of revisionism, allowing the *possibility of combining Marxism with neo-Kantianism* .

As a matter of fact, in these lines there is no difference in the statement of this question between him and Kautsky, who, just in a letter of May 22, 1898, wrote to Plekhanov about the same thing.

In contrast to this position, Lenin from the very beginning of his literary activity, from his first major work "What is the" Friends of the People "and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats" takes a clear, consistent, revolutionary position, defending the solidity and integrity of the Marxist doctrine, categorically speaking against any attempts or even hints of the possibility of combining Marxism with some "fashionable" philosophical theory. Lenin is essentially the first in the international arena to criticize the Russian neo-Kantians, with concrete criticism and analysis of their economic views, and so on. This is how it is in reality, and this reality completely contradicts what Deborin wrote.

It must further be said that Lenin is in essence also the *initiator of the struggle against Machism* , and this, again, is completely distorted by Deborin in the book Lenin as a Thinker. Deborin portrays the case as if the Plekhanov school, which included Plekhanov, Axelrod and himself, Deborin, came out in the struggle against Machism, and Lenin only joined them and wrote his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

Lenin was the first to initiate the struggle against Machism. In 1904, Axelrod, at the insistence of Lenin, wrote an article directed against Bogdanovism. Around 1901, after reading Bogdanov's book "A Historical Look at Nature" and seeing that it is an idealistic revision of Marxism, Lenin insisted that Plekhanov and Axelrod criticize Bogdanov, since he himself was then directly engaged in party affairs. At the same time, Axelrod wrote her article, and she herself pointed out that she was criticizing Bogdanov at the insistence of Lenin.

The Deborintsy, like the mechanists, completely covered the international significance which Lenin's struggle against Machism had. Meanwhile, Lenin himself wrote that this "philosophical dispute" was of international importance, that dialectical materialism needed to be "tackled" with new discoveries in the field of natural science, that Plekhanov did not raise this question at all, ignored questions of natural science.

Here are a number of points that should be specially theoretically developed to show the role and importance that Lenin's struggle against opportunism has in the field of philosophy in order to show the consistency and intransigence with which Vladimir Ilyich waged this fight throughout the entire history of the party.

One does not have to dwell on the meaning that the questions of the *struggle against neo-Hegelianism*. "Materialism and empirio-criticism", Lenin's works on Hegel, his article "On the meaning of militant materialism" provide a detailed theory of materialist dialectics, a deep appreciation of the role and significance of Hegel in preparing Marxism, an excellent weapon for really critical approach to Hegel, for exposing his idealism. In the struggle of Bolshevism unfolding in the international arena

against fascism, social fascism, the struggle against the fascism of science, which leads the fascists to try to portray every major bourgeois thinker as the ancestor and father of fascism, whether Hegel, Goethe, Spinoza, etc. D., - protection of the foundations of dialectical materialism is of particular importance. Lenin's teaching, his philosophical works are the most acute weapon of the struggle against modern neo-Hegelianism, weapons

#### **6.4. Lenin and the further development of materialistic dialectics**

We now turn to the question of what is new introduced by Lenin in the development of dialectical materialism.

*The starting point for understanding the Leninist stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism, for understanding that Lenin introduced the new to the development of Marxism as a whole, is the classic characteristic of Leninism given by Comrade Stalin. We must proceed from the fact that the main thing in Leninism is the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat.*

In developing these or other aspects of the Marxist-Leninist theory, one must proceed from the fact that the Marxist-Leninist teaching is a harmonious, coherent, consistent teaching that the three constituent parts of Marxism are not mechanically glued parts, one of which can be accepted and the other half accepted. one can not be realized, and the other can be realized in a few years, etc. We must proceed from the fact that Marxism is a consistent, harmonious, monolithic teaching, from which nothing can be pulled out, in order not to distort, not to debase it ... We must understand also that the *main thing in Leninism*, namely the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, defines and defines the tasks and direction of work, the development of individual aspects of Leninism as Marxism of the new era. We must proceed from this in order to understand the new that Lenin introduced into one or another component of Marxism. However, from these undisputed provisions, sometimes wrong conclusions are drawn, essentially meaning a *liquidationist point of view in relation to the philosophy of Marxism*. We have in mind vulgar-simplistic statements about this order: based on the correct idea that the main thing in Leninism is the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, they believe that one should not look for anything new that was introduced by Lenin into Marxist philosophy, proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is believed that the essence of the Leninist stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism is that Lenin developed the philosophy of Marxism as a theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In other words, they are trying to dissolve all the constituent parts of Leninism, including Leninist philosophy, in the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. To take on this point of view means to take on the liquidationist point of view with respect to the philosophy of Marxism, which, hiding behind phrases about the dictatorship of the proletariat, is essentially engaged in the destruction of the philosophy of Marxism. *original* and new, which brings Lenin in one direction or another of Marxism.

We must proceed from the exceptional in depth thoughts that Comrade Stalin unleashed in his conversation with the first American workers' delegation on September 9, 1927. He said:

"I think that Lenin did not add any" new principles "to Marxism, just as Lenin did not abolish any of the" old "principles of Marxism. Lenin was and remains the most loyal and consistent student of Marx and Engels, fully and fully based on the principles of Marxism. But Lenin was not only the executor of the teachings of Marx - Engels. He was at the same time the follower of the teachings of Marx and Engels. What does it mean? This means that he developed further the teachings of Marx-Engels in relation to the new conditions of development, in relation to the new phase of capitalism, in relation to imperialism. This means that, by developing further the teachings of Marx in the new conditions of class struggle, Lenin introduced to the common treasury of Marxism something new in comparison with what was given by Marx and Engels, in comparison with what could be given in the period of pre-imperialist capitalism, and this new, introduced by Lenin in the treasury of Marxism, is based entirely on the principles given by Marx and Engels. In this sense, we speak about Leninism as Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. "[569] .

There is not a single question of Marxist philosophy, there is not a single problem of materialist dialectics, historical materialism that Lenin would not develop, specify in accordance with the conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat in the new historical era. It is clear that in matters of dialectical materialism, *Lenin does not abolish any of the "old principles" of Marxist philosophy and does not add "new principles"* .

Lenin's greatness as a theoretician of the proletariat, as a person who has analyzed and revealed the laws of a new historical epoch, the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution, is that it is based on the principles of Marxism, without changing any of them, and without introducing new principles *developed all the constituent parts of Marxism as applied to the conditions and tasks of the class struggle of the proletariat* .

If we turn to the characteristics of the conditions, the peculiarities of the new era and the tasks that confronted the working class in working out the problems of the philosophy of Marxism, the following should be noted:

First, the *domination of idealism among wide circles of intelligentsia and bourgeois scholars*. In this regard, there is a big difference between the era of pre-monopoly capitalism and the era of the domination of monopolies. The political feature of imperialism, as Lenin repeatedly notes, is "the *reaction along the*". This reaction along the whole line gets its bright reflection in science, in philosophy. With the entry of capitalism into the new phase, the turn of broad circles of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia has intensified in the direction of idealism, mysticism, clericalism. Broad scientific circles began to turn away from materialism more and more. In this respect, the fate of Haeckel's *World Mysteries* and the idealistic orgy and whistle that has risen in the bourgeois press in connection with its publication are very characteristic.

Secondly, a *deep crisis of physics and the whole of natural science, which received great development already at the beginning of the 20th century*. All science, especially physics, has undergone tremendous development, leading to a change in the basic old ideas about the structure of matter, about space and time, about matter and motion, about the principle of causality, etc. The discovery of an electron, quantum processes, etc. created a whole revolution in the old views. On this basis, many bourgeois scholars began to draw reactionary idealistic conclusions. Lenin points to the development of "physical idealism", "physiological idealism", etc. Lenin emphasizes that here "we are confronted with some international ideological trend that does not depend on any one philosophical system, but arises from some general reasons beyond philosophy" <sup>[570]</sup>.

Lenin emphasizes that "the *essence of the crisis of modern physics consists in breaking the old laws and basic principles, in rejecting objective reality out of consciousness, that is, replacing materialism with idealism and agnosticism*". "Matter has disappeared" - this is how one can express the basic and typical difficulty in relation to many particular issues that created this crisis" <sup>[571]</sup>.

Thirdly, the *specialization of all bourgeois philosophy on all sorts of gnoseological questions, on all sorts of epistemological subtleties in order to bring philosophical justification under the turn towards clericalism in wide circles of intellectuals, under this crisis of bourgeois science*.

The widespread development of neo-Kantian idealism, the "mathematical rationale" of modern natural science, the flourishing of empirio-critical literature, immanentists, intuitionists, phenomenologists, etc., etc., inventing thousands of epistemological subtleties and details with the goal of refuting the hated materialism a thousand first time, that's picture of the philosophical development of the beginning of XX century.

Fourthly, the *reflection of all this idealistic reaction among the socialist parties and the development of philosophical revisionism, opportunism, starting with the neo-Kantian revision of Marxist philosophy and ending with Bogdanov's empirio-monism*. The cries about the absence in Marxism of a "theoretical-cognitive" justification, about the need to bring a "new gnoseological foundation" under Marxism, about the need for Marxism to take into account the newest "achievements" of philosophy in the field of the theory of knowledge, the writings that materialism has long been outdated - are getting wide spread. "The ever more subtle falsification of Marxism, the ever more subtle counterfeits of anti-materialist doctrines under Marxism - this is what characterizes modern revisionism in political economy, tactical issues, and philosophy in general, both in epistemology and sociology" <sup>[572]</sup>, - wrote Lenin.

Finally, fifthly, the *need on the part of representatives of Marxist philosophy to give its answer to the questions posed in connection with the revolution in natural science*; the need to "cope" with the latest discoveries; from the point of view of dialectical materialism, the need to break up all the latest tricks and subtleties in the field of bourgeois, professorial philosophy, relying on all the real achievements of science; finally, the need to give the most resolute rebuff to this anti-materialist reaction in the workers' parties. That is why Lenin so insisted on the need to consider the struggle against idealistic philosophy in the light of the real scientific discoveries of the new era, which is why Lenin wrote:

"The connection of a new physics, or rather, a certain school in a new physics with Machism and other varieties of modern idealistic philosophy, is not subject to the slightest doubt. To dismantle Machism, ignoring this connection — as Plekhanov does — is to mock the spirit of dialectical materialism, that is, to sacrifice Engels's method for one letter or another at Engels" <sup>[573]</sup>.

All this historical situation, these conditions, needs and tasks of the class struggle of the proletariat on the front of philosophy and science required the further development of the *theory of knowledge* dialectical materialism, demanded the further development of materialist dialectics. In this situation, it was impossible to confine ourselves only to the protection of general principles, and it was



necessary to give a detailed theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism, which answers all questions of the revolution of natural science, based on the deepest study and synthesis of the newest stage in the development of science and, first of all, social development. Lenin points out that "the revision of the" form "of Engels' materialism, the revision of his natural-philosophical propositions not only does not contain anything" revisionist "in the established sense of the word, but, on the contrary, is necessarily required by Marxism" <sup>[574]</sup> .

In *Fundamentals of Leninism*, Comrade Stalin wrote:

"No one else, like Lenin, took up the most serious task of generalizing according to materialistic philosophy the most important of what science has given for the period from Engels to Lenin, and the comprehensive criticism of anti-materialist movements among Marxists. Engels said that "materialism has to take a new look with every great new discovery." It is known that this task was fulfilled for its time by none other than Lenin in his remarkable book "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" <sup>[575]</sup> .

Lenin received further theoretical substantiation and development of the materialist theory of knowledge. It was Lenin who, in accordance with the needs of the new epoch, paid particular attention to the theory of knowledge of *dialectical materialism* , developing the teachings of Marx and Engels in this regard. This explains why Lenin interpreted so deeply the questions of Marxist philosophy, understanding the materialist dialectic as the philosophical science of Marxism, giving a very deep understanding of the unity of dialectics and the theory of knowledge. In all these problems, Lenin does not introduce "new principles" into Marxist philosophy and does not cancel any old ones, but proceeds from the principles of Marx and Engels.

The next point that needs to be noted when we are talking about the Lenin stage in the development of dialectical materialism is that it was *Lenin*, from all the Marxists of the modern era, who *gave the most complete, detailed criticism of the latest anti-materialistic trends*. with which you have to fight to the present. The newest forms of Hegelianism, Kantianism, neo-Kantianism, Machism, subjective idealism, Bogdanovism, and finally, physical idealism — all of this has been subjected to Lenin's merciless criticism and exposure. The Leninist criticism and the exposure of these antimaterialistic, anti-dialectical currents are the strongest, for this is not their criticism from the standpoint of vulgar materialism, to which even Plekhanov sometimes stumbled. Lenin, in his criticism of these teachings, dialectically combines logical criticism with a historical-class approach, a consideration of the connection of these trends with the state of modern science.

Another important question on which we can and should note the new and unique, connected with the name of Lenin, is the question *of the relation of Marxism to Hegel*. . In general, it must be said that the question of the relation of Marx to Hegel and the Hegelian dialectic is of tremendous theoretical significance. The entire pleiad of revisionists, beginning with Bernstein, Kunov, Kautsky and ending with our mechanists and Comrade Bukharin, who does not understand the revolutionary materialist dialectics, deny or pervert it, proceeds from the position that the works of Marx and Engels contain the stain of Hegelian idealism. Even Comrade Bukharin, in his book *The Theory of Historical Materialism*, in the chapter entitled "On the Statement of the Problem of Historical Materialism," believes that Marx is infected to some extent with Hegelianism. This is connected with the mechanistic concept of Bukharin, with his lack of understanding of the real relationship that exists between Marxism and Hegel. For Lenin on this question, we have, above all, a restoration, a return to a correct understanding of this problem after all the distortions in this matter in the era of the Second International. If, however, we were limited to only this, we would not fully express the essence of the Leninist solution of this problem. Lenin has not only a return, but a further development and concretization of this problem - since Lenin has a completely developed concept of a consistently and systematically developed theory of dialectical materialism. The concretization and further development of the teachings of Marx and Engels in this matter with Lenin consists in the fact that he (for example, in his philosophical tetrads) gives brilliant examples we would not fully express the essence of the Leninist solution of this problem. Lenin has not only a return, but a further development and concretization of this problem - since Lenin has a completely developed concept of a consistently and systematically developed theory of dialectical materialism. The concretization and further development of the teachings of Marx and Engels in this matter with Lenin consists in the fact that he (for example, in his philosophical tetrads) gives brilliant examples we would not fully express the essence of the Leninist solution of this problem. Lenin has not only a return, but a further development and concretization of this problem - since Lenin has a completely developed concept of a consistently and systematically developed theory of dialectical materialism. The concretization and further development of the teachings of Marx and Engels in this matter with Lenin consists in the fact that he (for example, in his philosophical tetrads) gives brilliant examples *Hegel's materialist processing of dialectics* in all the most important basic categories.

The next most important question to dwell on is the question of *the theory of reflection* in Lenin's works. In general, it should be said that the questions of dialectics as a theory of knowledge, the law of the unity of opposites as the core of dialectics, the theory of reflection are not at all some separate, isolated questions from each other. These are all the most important problems of the theory of materialist dialectics, brilliantly developed by Lenin. These are questions that are in organic connection with each other. None of them can be understood without the others. Tear off the materialist theory of reflection from Lenin's statement of the question that "dialectics *is* the theory of knowledge", and from this position, or rather to say from its Leninist content, nothing remains. But is dialectics as a theory of knowledge, can the theory of reflection be understood without the law of the unity of opposites as the core of dialectics? Is the Leninist doctrine of the unity of theory and practice, is the Leninist principle of the partisanship of philosophy and science not the constituent parts of this single concept? Only by understanding this can one dwell on each of these parties separately.

The theory of reflection is of exceptional importance for the most consistent justification of materialism. It is not at all accidental that it is precisely at this point that the notorious enemy of dialectical materialism, the social-fascist Max Adler, concentrates his attack against Leninism.

In his work, which is called the "textbook of the materialist understanding of history" and which is so far from materialism as heaven from earth, which is a work specifically aimed against Lenin, slanderous, malicious, anti-Bolshevik from beginning to end document, Max Adler specifically devotes two chapters the analysis of Lenin's theory of reflection in order to refute this theory, which is really the banner of the true materialist point of view.

This is what Max Adler writes about Lenin's theory of reflection: "Lenin very much loves, as we already know, to call critical idealism" old rubbish ". This not quite polite word should, however, be rightfully applicable to what Lenin in his book "Materialism and Empiric Criticism" repeatedly calls the materialist theory of knowledge. This is in fact nothing more than the old rubbish, the so-called, actually long ago buried under the noise and laughter of a critical philosophy — *the theory of reflection ...* "

Let us see what conclusions Adler himself draws after the "burial under the noise and laughter" of the theory of reflection. He develops a typically idealistic theory based on the findings of "modern natural science" about "the disappearance of matter", "theory", *really buried by Lenin* in "Materialism and Empirio-criticism". "Modern natural science," says Adler, "does not need as a hypothesis not only God, but also Matter, and the great English physicist Pearson could exclaim rightly: Matter disappeared." I hardly need any comments here ...

The theory of reflection in the Leninist sense takes the *whole process of knowledge*, starting from sensation and ending with the concept, and considers it historically. And the one who limits this theory of reflection, separates the theory of reflection from practice, from the whole historical path of knowledge, he certainly does not understand Lenin, he certainly cannot understand that Lenin introduced a new understanding of these issues.

The next question to dwell upon in the presentation of the Leninist stage is the question of *the law of the unity of opposites* .

We often have the opinion that supposedly only Lenin has an understanding of this law as the core of dialectics. This is of course a wrong opinion. One has only to point out Marx's analysis of Capital in the dual nature of labor, the exchange process, the process of creating surplus value, turning money into capital, crises in Capital, in order to understand that this law runs like a red thread all over Capital, is the real core of the dialectic in the works of Marx and Engels. Everyone knows the statements of Engels on this issue in the "Anti-Dühring" and in "L. Feuerbach. It is known that this law was developed in the works of Marx and Engels as the central issue of materialist dialectics. However, one should not at all conclude from this that Lenin does not contribute anything new to this question, does not develop Marxism.

In order to understand what the essence of this new, what Lenin brings to understanding of the law of the unity of opposites, it is necessary first of all to understand why this law, as the most important law of the development of the objective world, and how the law of knowledge took on special significance in the new historical era. If we take "Imperialism", "State and Revolution", these are the greatest works of Lenin, which analyze the relationship of state and revolution, the problems of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the analysis of the new era, then we will see that they are built from the point of view of applying all categories of materialist dialectics to these phenomena. But the law of the unity of opposites is of particular importance for understanding this whole Leninist analysis of the new era and its fundamental problems. Lenin points out that the problem of the contradictions of capitalism in the monopoly stage of its development is the crown task of the critique of imperialism. Lenin writes: "Questions about whether a reformist change in the foundations of

imperialism is possible, whether to go forward to further aggravate and deepen the contradictions engendered by it, or back to blunt them, are fundamental questions of the criticism of imperialism. Since the political features of imperialism are the reaction along the line and the strengthening of national oppression in connection with the oppression of the financial oligarchy and the elimination of free competition, the petty-bourgeois-democratic opposition to imperialism appears in almost all imperialist countries at the beginning of the 20th century. And the break with Marxism on the part of Kautsky and the broad international trend of Kautskyism lies precisely in the fact that Kautsky not only did not care, <sup>[576]</sup> .

It is clear that the question of how to understand the theory of contradictions, how to apply the laws of materialist dialectics to the analysis of imperialism, are the fundamental questions of the criticism of imperialism. This is the line between Bolshevism and opportunism of any order. This is the line between the true revolutionary understanding of the materialist dialectic and those who tried to reduce the materialist dialectic to the theory of blunting contradictions. Lenin points out: "Kautsky's theoretical criticism of imperialism therefore has nothing to do with Marxism, and therefore it is suitable only as an approach to preaching peace and unity with opportunists and social-chauvinists, because this criticism bypasses and obscures just the most deep and fundamental contradictions of imperialism : the contradiction between monopolies and the free competition existing next to them, <sup>[577]</sup> .

Opportunists of any kind, departing from Marxian dialectics, also cover up the main contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie, contradictions between imperialist states, contradictions between colonial imperialist countries, etc., etc. All these questions are *fundamental questions of analysis and criticism of imperialism* . It is clear now that in this epoch the question of the law of the unity of opposites could not but get an extremely large sharpening.

Naturally, this question should have received further theoretical development from Lenin. In his remarks and preparatory work for "Imperialism" Lenin repeatedly on the margin points out the importance of precisely the theoretical, that is, the philosophical, development of the law of the unity of opposites.

If we take Lenin's work "The State and the Revolution", then undoubtedly, the main line on which this work is built is to clarify the development of the Marxist view of the state as a product of the intransigence of the class struggle, as opposed to the social democratic teachings about the state as a product of reconciliation classes. Thus, here the main question of the methodological order is the question of the unity of opposites.

Lenin develops and specifies the question of the relationship between the moments of *unity* and the *struggle of opposites*. Let us recall the well-known Leninist position concerning the absoluteness of struggle and relativity of unity, identity, coincidence of contradictions.

Lenin emphasizes the need for a concrete analysis of contradictions and various *types* of contradictions. In fact, in the epoch of imperialism we have contradictions in the most extreme terms between the working class and capitalists, between the imperialist states, between the metropolises and the colonial countries. It's all a different type of contradiction. It is also necessary to point out the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry: the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry in the era before the victory of the proletarian revolution, the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry in the era of the proletarian revolution. Finally, we have an exceptionally brilliant formulation of the question of the relationship between the proletarian and bourgeois-democratic revolution, when the solution of the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution becomes a by-product of the proletarian revolution, etc. The entire set of these problems that have arisen in the field of social science,

In developing further the materialist dialectics as a philosophical science, Lenin did not confine himself to working out the law of the unity of opposites as the core of dialectics. He gave further theoretical development of all other categories of materialist dialectics, their connection with each other and with the law of the unity of opposites. Above, when setting forth the laws of materialist dialectics, we have seen how these questions were developed by Lenin on the basis of the practice of the revolutionary struggle of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution, on the basis of his study of the state of modern natural science.

Finally, the question of *the partisanship of philosophy and science* .

The doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy and science in general is the most important link in Lenin's development of dialectical materialism. It is no coincidence that the fact that it was Lenin who gave such a brilliant further development of this most important issue and in this direction. The new era, the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, is an era of gigantic class clashes, powerful proletarian uprisings, an era of unprecedented intensification of the class struggle. The struggle of

classes acquires an exceptional degree of aggravation in this epoch, the main classes of capitalist society come forward fully armed in the historical arena, this struggle is rising to a new level compared to the period of industrial capitalism. In this era, political parties get a very big development. Not only the proletariat forges its communist party in every country, thereby reinforcing to a very large extent their own consciousness, their cohesion and organization. The bourgeoisie is also hard forging their parties. Taking into account the lessons of the proletarian revolution in Russia, taking into account the experience of the first round of proletarian revolutions in the West, the bourgeoisie is intensively organized, strengthening its parties, creating powerful and disciplined, militarily built party organizations, such as the fascist party in Italy and Germany. The antagonism of capitalism receives its profound expression not only in the field of politics, economics, this sharp antagonism is also reflected in all areas of science, in the field of ideology. And here class differentiation runs with great clarity. Taking into account the lessons of the proletarian revolution in Russia, taking into account the experience of the first round of proletarian revolutions in the West, the bourgeoisie is intensively organized, strengthening its parties, creating powerful and disciplined, militarily built party organizations, such as the fascist party in Italy and Germany. The antagonism of capitalism receives its profound expression not only in the field of politics, economics, this sharp antagonism is also reflected in all areas of science, in the field of ideology. And here class differentiation runs with great clarity. Taking into account the lessons of the proletarian revolution in Russia, taking into account the experience of the first round of proletarian revolutions in the West, the bourgeoisie is intensively organized, strengthening its parties, creating powerful and disciplined, militarily built party organizations, such as the fascist party in Italy and Germany. The antagonism of capitalism receives its profound expression not only in the field of politics, economics, this sharp antagonism is also reflected in all areas of science, in the field of ideology. And here class differentiation runs with great clarity. like for example the fascist party in Italy and Germany. The antagonism of capitalism receives its profound expression not only in the field of politics, economics, this sharp antagonism is also reflected in all areas of science, in the field of ideology. And here class differentiation runs with great clarity. like for example the fascist party in Italy and Germany. The antagonism of capitalism receives its profound expression not only in the field of politics, economics, this sharp antagonism is also reflected in all areas of science, in the field of ideology. And here class differentiation runs with great clarity.

In his article "The Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionaryness" in December 1905, Lenin gave excellent characteristics of partisanship and non-partyism. So he writes: "Strict partisanship is a satellite and the result of a highly developed class struggle. And, on the contrary, in the interests of open and wide class struggle, the development of strict partisanship is necessary " <sup>[578]</sup> .

He goes on to say: "The most consistent, complete and well-formed expression of the political struggle of classes is the struggle of parties. Non-partisanship is indifference to the struggle of parties. But this indifference does not equal neutrality, refraining from the struggle, because in the class struggle there can be no neutrals, it is impossible to "refrain" in capitalist society from participating in the exchange of products or labor. And exchange inevitably gives rise to an economic struggle, and after it, a political struggle. Indifference in the struggle is not, therefore, in fact, a suspension from the struggle, abstention or neutrality. Indifference is the tacit support of the one who is strong, of the one who dominates " <sup>[579]</sup> .

So that there is no ambiguity in the sense that Lenin's provisions relate not only to political issues, but also to the ideological struggle, we present one place from the same Lenin article. He further writes: "Non-partisanship is a bourgeois idea. *Partyness is a socialist idea*. This provision is by and large applicable to all bourgeois society. Of course, one must be able to apply this general truth to individual particular questions and particular cases " <sup>[580]</sup> .

These places with remarkable clarity formulate the problem of partisanship. True, the application of these provisions, these truths to the field of ideology, to the field of science requires consideration of the uniqueness, specificity of the subject, the special nature of this area, the special forms in which the struggle is expressed. However, there is no doubt that these provisions reveal much to us for understanding the Leninist principle of partisanship of philosophy and science.

From what has been said it becomes quite clear why it is precisely in this direction that, in connection with and in accordance with the new epoch, the theoretical development of the Marxist provisions on the party character of science and philosophy is proceeding. Between the quoted lines of Lenin, written by him in 1905, the brilliant pages about the partisanship of philosophy and the struggle of parties in science in "Materialism and empirio-criticism" in 1908, Lenin's notes on philosophy in the IX – XII "Lenin collections" in 1914 and Finally, Lenin's article "On the Meaning of

Militant Materialism" - there is a deep internal connection, giving us the opportunity to fully clarify the essence of his teaching on the partisanship of philosophy.

Lenin's development of the principle of partisanship of science consists in the fact that he showed all the *limitations of objectivism*, which falls into the apologetics of the ruling classes, and all the limitations of *subjectivism*, which turns social science into a series of edifications of philistine morality. He showed all the limitations, objectivism, welcoming the spontaneous course of the historical process and not understanding the active, effective role of the revolutionary class in changing reality, as well as all the *limitations of subjectivism*, which reduces the historical process to the actions of an abstract far-fetched personality, endowed with the same reactionary morality and "modern moral ideas.

Lenin showed that the partisanship of dialectical materialism is not at all in the synthesis (in the sense of reconciliation) of subjectivism and objectivism, as Deborin presented this case in his book Lenin as a Thinker. Lenin showed that the point of view of dialectical materialism is the *highest* point of view, overcoming and removing both objectivism and subjectivism; he overcomes objectivism because he proceeds from the active, effective position of the revolutionary class — the proletariat, which is changing the world; he overcomes subjectivism because he firmly holds on to the objective reality of biased facts.

The party spirit of philosophy is the most important link, the central point, which is characteristic of Lenin's approach to the problems of philosophical theory. This is due to the fact that none other than Lenin gave the most profound, tested on the facts of the new era after Marx and Engels, the theoretical and practical resolution of the question of the relationship between theory and practice. It was Lenin who tirelessly emphasized in his works, in contrast to the theory and practice of the Second International, in contrast to Plekhanov, the position of the founders of materialism that "our theory is not a dogma, but a guide for revolutionary action." The Leninist doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy and theory is generally associated with deep inner roots with the whole concept of Leninism in general. It is connected with the fact that it was Leninism that gave and gives examples of the unity of revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice. The doctrine of partisanship, as if in focus, collects, reflects a number of the most important aspects of Marxism-Leninism. This doctrine expresses most fully, most consistently, most specifically for our era, the thesis of Marx that philosophers should not only explain the world, but change it. The Leninist doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy, the resolution of the question of subjectivism and objectivism, theory and practice is an excellent development and concretization of Marx's first thesis on Feuerbach.

The essence of the Leninist development of the principle of partisanship of philosophy and science can be reduced to the following five points:

First of all. The Leninist doctrine of the partisanship of science and philosophy is the best expression of the tasks of the proletariat in the field of science and philosophy, when all bourgeois science experiences the most severe internal crisis and decay, when "nonpartisan philosophy is only a contemptible conceit behind idealism and fideism" <sup>[581]</sup>. The Leninist doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy represents the best revelation in the era of acute class struggle in science of the class and party character of bourgeois philosophy and theory, as well as all sorts of similar social fascist theories.

Secondly. The principle of partisanship of the theory means the most complete and comprehensive interpretation of the Marxist thesis about the effectiveness of our theory. According to the teachings of Leninism, his party is the most advanced, most active, most effective part of the working class. Therefore, who really and consistently wants to hold the point of view of the class of science, he must extend this understanding to an understanding of the partisanship of science.

Thirdly. In Lenin's doctrine of partisan philosophy, the most complete and detailed resolution of the question of theory and practice, the primacy of practice, is given. Lenin's resolution of this issue provides a pattern of struggle with both the idealistic interpretation of this problem, when theoretical activity is considered a primate, and with a creeping-empirical point of view, which eliminates the role and significance of theory in general and theoretical work in particular. None other than Lenin in all his works emphasized the tremendous importance of revolutionary theory. Recognizing that without a revolutionary theory there is not and cannot be a revolutionary working-class movement, Lenin at the same time wrote: "With this emphasis on the necessity, importance and enormity of the theoretical work of the Social Democrats, I don't want to say that this work comes first *practical*, the less that the second was postponed until the end of the first. So only fans of the "subjective method in sociology" or followers of utopian socialism "could conclude" <sup>[582]</sup>. The doctrine of the partisanship of materialism expresses precisely the whole depth of the Leninist resolution of the question of theory and practice.

Fourth. The principle of partisanship of philosophy and science gives the classical resolution of the most important question about the relationship between philosophy, science and politics. We have seen above what absurdities piled up by bourgeois science on this issue and how Social Democratic theorists are trying their best to break all ties between politics and science. Meanwhile, in this question Lenin gave an extremely large amount of new things. It is worth remembering the discussion about the trade unions and the accusation of Lenin, then advanced by Comrade Bukharin, for his supposedly too "political" approach. It was then about the relationship between economics and politics. How did Lenin respond? He wrote: "Politics is a concentrated expression of economics," I repeated in my speech, because I had already heard this incomparable in the mouth of a Marxist completely unacceptable reproach for my "political" approach. *Politics can not have primacy over the economy. To argue otherwise - is to forget the ABC of Marxism* " [583] .

Here the Lenin understanding of Marxism and its dialectic, its concrete approach, have the most profound effect. He further explains: "For the question is (and in Marxist it *can* stand) *only* this way: without a correct political approach to the matter, this class will not retain its domination, and *therefore* will not be able to solve *its production task* " [584] .

Lenin here explains in what sense he puts in the forefront a *political approach* . Although the economy decides in the last analysis, however, without the right political approach, without the right political line, the proletariat cannot win its victory, and after its victory the solution of economic problems. It may seem that Lenin was given here the formulation of a question concerning only economics and politics. This is not true. These statements by Lenin have a much wider meaning, in particular, they are also extremely important for understanding our approach to the problems of theory. And here, in matters of theory and theoretical struggle, the *political approach cannot but have the primacy*. During the struggle with Menshevik idealism, some of its representatives zealously defended the primacy, the primacy of philosophy over politics, on the grounds that philosophy is a universal methodology, completely without understanding the point of view of our party on this issue.

Fifth. The doctrine of partisanship philosophy notes as its most important moment an active struggle for the general line of the party.

Even in his struggle with Struve, as we have seen, Lenin wrote that "materialism includes, so to speak, partisanship, obliging with any assessment of the event directly and openly to take on the point of view of a certain social group" [585] . Under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, when the communist party is the one and only party of the proletariat, when hostile, class ideological processes are reflected within the party in the form of various deviations from the party's general line, it *can only mean openly and openly : active defense and struggle for the general line of the party*. In connection with all this, it is possible to specify the Leninist position for the present epoch as follows: in the struggle against any open or disguised opportunism, dialectical materialism includes partisanship, i.e. obliges it directly and openly, actively and consistently to fight for the general line party. Representatives of Menshevik idealism, trying to define the partisanship of philosophy, gave an extremely abstract, extremely academic, non-partisan definition of the partisanship of philosophy, which supposedly boiled down to the fact that the philosophical section of the theoretical front should look for the "methodological" keys of each era. The anti-Party nature of such a definition is that the Deborin group "forgot" that the only guiding *theoretical and practical* the center in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the party and its central committee. The most important feature of Bolshevism and the Bolshevik Party is that the leading headquarters is not only the politically organizational center of the revolutionary movement, but also its ideological and theoretical center. The peculiarity of Bolshevism as opposed to the parties of the Second International consists precisely in the fact that it forges such a leadership of the Communist Party, which is a genuine theoretical synthesis of theory and practice, theory and politics, theory and organization, theory and tactics. It is precisely because the leading headquarters of Leninism gives such a synthesis that it is the center of truly *creative Marxism* .

### **6.5. Tov. Stalin and materialistic dialectics**

*The further development of Marxist-Leninist theory in all its constituent parts, including the philosophy of Marxism, is associated with the name of Comrade Stalin.* In all practical work, in all theoretical works of Comrade Stalin, all the experience of the world struggle of the proletariat, all the wealth of the content of Marxist-Leninist theory is embodied. Tov. Stalin develops and specifies the doctrine of Leninism decisively in all areas. Comrade Stalin devotes special attention in all his works to the problem of the unity of theory and practice, the question of the martial *creative* character of the Marxist doctrine.

The combat character of the Marxist-Leninist theory, the development of the Marxist doctrine as a revolutionary-critical weapon of changing the world, the *unity of theory and practice* — all this is

further developed in the works of Comrade Stalin. It was he who conducted a huge struggle with all sorts of dogmatic, scholastic distortions of Marxian dialectics. In the struggle against voluntarism, with Trotsky's eclecticism, with Zinoviev's "Quotation Marxism", with Bukharin's scholastics, with equilibrium theory, with Menshevik idealism — in the struggle with these theorists, Comrade Stalin lifts the development of our military theory to a new level.

With particular force, Comrade Stalin exposes the *dogmatism of international Menshevism, social-fascism, their emasculation of all revolutionary content from Marxism.*

Even at the VI Party Congress, Comrade Stalin, objecting to the statements of Preobrazhensky about the impossibility of the victory of socialism in your country, pointed out:

"The possibility is not ruled out that it is Russia that will be a country paving the way to socialism ... We must cast aside the obsolete idea that only Europe can show us the way. *There is a Marxism dogmatic and Marxism creative. I stand on the basis of the latter* " <sup>[586]</sup> .

The whole subsequent struggle: against Trotskyism, against the Zinoviev-Kamenev variety shows it, with what ingenious foresight the materialistic dialectic was applied by Comrade Stalin to the most important issue, the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country. Conducting a fundamental distinction between dogmatic "Marxism" and Marxism is genuine is the leitmotif of a number of further speeches by Comrade Stalin, in which he deals with these problems. Particular attention should be paid to the article by t. Stalin dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Lenin's birth, published in Pravda in April 1920. There, t. Stalin wrote:

"There are two groups of Marxists. Both of them work under the flag of Marxism, consider themselves "truly" Marxist. And yet they are far from identical. Moreover, there is a whole gulf between them, for the methods of their work are diametrically opposite.

The first group is usually limited to external recognition of Marxism, its solemn declaration. Without being able or willing to grasp the essence of Marxism, not being able or unwilling to translate it into reality, it transforms the living and revolutionary positions of Marxism into dead, non-speaking formulas. She bases her activity not on experience, not on practical work, but on quotations from Marx. It draws instructions and directives not from an analysis of living reality, but from analogies and historical parallels. The discrepancy between the word and the deed is the main illness of this group ...

The second group, on the contrary, transfers the center of gravity of the question from the external recognition of Marxism to its holding, *to its implementation. The purpose of the ways and means of implementing Marxism corresponding to the situation, the change of these ways and means when the situation changes is what this group mainly draws its attention to* ... Marx's words are quite appropriate to this group, by virtue of which Marxists cannot dwell on to explain the world, but must go further in order to change it. The name of this group is Bolshevism, communism " <sup>[587]</sup> . Do I need a clearer, clearer description of the works of Comrade Stalin himself? Speech at the conference of Marxist agricultural workers, where the task was to eliminate the kulaks as a class, a speech at a meeting of business executives — six historical conditions, recent speeches on collective farm issues, etc. — all are examples of the "implementation" of Marxist-Leninist teachings, everything these are examples of "outlining the ways and means of implementing Marxism, appropriate to the situation, changing these ways and means when the situation changes."

Comrade Stalin returns many times to the question of the *effective character of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine* of combating all and all opportunistic perversions. Here is another place:

"What is Marxism? Marxism is science. Can Marxism be preserved and developed as a science if it is not enriched by the new experience of the class struggle of the proletariat, if it does not digest this experience from the *point of view of Marxism, from the point of view of the Marxist method*? It is clear that can not.

Is it not clear after this that Marxism requires the improvement and enrichment of the old formulas on the basis of taking into account the new experience while *maintaining the point of view of Marxism*, while preserving its method, and Zinoviev does the opposite, retaining the letter and replacing the letter of Marxism with the individual provisions of Marxism, his method.

What can be common between real Marxism and the substitution of the main line of Marxism with a letter of separate formulas and quotations from individual provisions of Marxism? " <sup>[588]</sup> .

This characteristic of the Marxist method, the materialist dialectic as a science, which must be constantly enriched by the new experience of the proletariat's class struggle, which should theoretically generalize and digest this experience, is very important for understanding the essence of Marxist theory. Thus we see that the fundamental principle of the creative character of the powerful Marxist doctrine, of the unity of revolutionary theory and practice, of materialistic dialectics, the greatest tool of knowledge and changes in the world, is a common thread in all the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

And precisely because Comrade Stalin gives us a sample of such an effective understanding and application of Marxism, that is why he also gives us examples of further theoretical development of the questions of materialist dialectics. Indeed, it is worth recalling the statements of comrade Stalin on the issue of the link, the subjective and objective factors of historical development, the categories of possibility and reality, his criticism of the theory of equilibrium and the theory of gravity so that it becomes clear what profound theoretical development of the materialistic questions dialectics he gives us. It is precisely t. Stalin truly, in the spirit of Lenin's testament "On the Meaning of Militant Materialism", develops this dialectic from all sides, using "those examples of dialectics in the field of economic, political relations, such as modern history,"<sup>[589]</sup> .

Dialectics is the soul of Marxism, Comrade Stalin follows Lenin. . At the XVI Congress of the Party, Comrade Stalin follows characterized Lenin's formulation of the question of the right of nations to self-determination up to secession "this" contradictory "formula reflects that living truth of Marx's dialectic, which gives the Bolsheviks able to take the most impregnable fortress on the national question"<sup>[590]</sup> . Criticizing further opportunism, he said: "Whoever did not understand this dialectic of historical processes, he died for Marxism. The trouble with our draft dodgers is that they do not understand and do not want to understand Marxian dialectics "<sup>[591]</sup> .

We give here two or three samples of the dialectic of Comrade Stalin, which enabled and enables the Bolsheviks to take the most impregnable fortresses. Take the analysis of the nature of the collective farms given by Comrade Stalin in his speech at the conference of Marxist agrarians. Defining the type of collective farm economy as one of the forms of socialist economy ,t. Stalin approaches this definition from the point of view of analyzing people's relations in the production process, that is, from the point of view of the only consistent Marxist criterion for determining the social nature of the economy. And from this single correct point of view, "doesn't the collective farm represent the socialization of the main instruments of production on land belonging to the same state? What is the basis for asserting that collective farms as a type of economy do not represent a form of socialist economy?"<sup>[592]</sup> . Establishing the socialist nature of collective farms as a type of economy, Comrade Stalin turns to an analysis of the internal contradictions of the collective farm, distinguishing it from the consistently socialist type of economy and enterprises. Of particular interest is the analysis of the elements of class struggle on collective farms. He writes: "This is exactly the mistake of our" left "phrase phrase that they do not see this difference. What does the class struggle *outside the* collective farms, *before the* formation of collective farms? This means fighting the *kulaks who own the* tools and means of production and *enslaving* themselves to the poor with the help of these tools and means of production. This struggle is a struggle not for life, but for death. And what does the class struggle *on the base* collective farms? This means, first of all, that the fist is broken and devoid of tools and means of production ... This means, finally, that it is a struggle between members of collective farms, of which some have not yet freed themselves from individualistic and kulak remnants and are trying to use some inequality in collective farms to their advantage, while others want to banish these remnants and this inequality from the collective farms "<sup>[593]</sup> .

We see in this way how Comrade Stalin reveals the *qualitative* difference that exists between the class struggle in the countryside outside the collective farm and the elements of the class struggle on the collective farm. Only by proficiently using the materialist dialectic method, the method of truly concrete analysis of complex concrete reality, only by being able to apply the most important laws of dialectics, the laws of quality, quantity, measure, the unity of opposites in Leninist way, such a clear analysis of the collective nature of collective farms can be given. One thing - the contradictions in the village *outside the collective farms* on a qualitatively different basis, another thing is the existing contradictions in collective farms already on a different qualitative basis, in a different type of farm. It is one thing - the struggle with the fist, the owner of tools and means of production, the struggle for life and death, and the other thing is the struggle against kulak, individualistic remnants on the basis of collective farms. One thing is the first type of contradictions, another thing is second-order contradictions.

All the works of Comrade Stalin are an inexhaustible number of such samples of materialistic dialectics. We will only mention the next question here - this is a question about national and socialist culture. Everyone is familiar with the Stalinist analysis of the nature and slogans of national culture under the rule of the bourgeoisie and under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Here are two types of resolution of the unity of form and content, which gives us a living reality and which were opened with such skill by Comrade Stalin. This is what Comrade Stalin said at the XVI Party Congress: "What is national culture under the rule of the national bourgeoisie? *Bourgeois* in its content and national in its form culture, which aims to poison the masses with the poison of nationalism and strengthen the rule of the bourgeoisie. What is national culture under the dictatorship of the proletariat? *Socialist* in its



content and national in form culture, which aims to educate the masses in the spirit of internationalism and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. How can these two fundamentally different phenomena be mixed without breaking with Marxism " [\[594\]](#) .

The main point in the analysis of these phenomena by comrade Stalin is the difference in class structure and class nature of the dual type of domination - the domination of the national bourgeoisie and the domination of the socialist proletariat and its dictatorship. Extremely characteristic in this analysis is the materialistic primacy of content in the dialectical unity of form and content. Com. Stalin does not recognize once and for all the given unity of form and content — he analyzes the historical, class background of this unity. The application of the theory of development to the question of culture is extremely characteristic. We give this classic place from the work of t. Stalin. He wrote: "It may seem strange that we, the supporters of the *merger* In the future, national cultures in one common (both in form and content) culture with one common language, are at the same time supporters of the *flourishing of* national cultures at the moment, in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But there is nothing strange about it. It is necessary to let national cultures develop and unfold, revealing all their potencies in order to create conditions for their merging into one common culture with one common language. The flourishing of national in form and socialist in content cultures under the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country *for* merging them into one common socialist (both in form and content) culture with one common language, when the proletariat wins all over the world and socialism enters everyday life - this is precisely the dialectical nature of Lenin's raising the question of national culture [\[595\]](#) .

Here are vivid examples of materialistic dialectics. The one who would consider that we have here only the *application of* dialectics, and not its development, not the development of the theory of materialist dialectics, would be deeply mistaken . It must be understood that the *actual creative application of the method of materialist dialectics is at the same time its actual theoretical development* . In this case, the example of the unity of form and content shows what theoretical wealth we get here. In addition to the two types of unity of form and content, the theory of development applied to the national question provides a new type of unity of opposites: a uniform and in the form and content of the culture of a communist society.

We have given here two examples of the application and development of materialist dialectics in order to show how the party and Comrade Stalin, fulfilling Lenin's directives and instructions, develop from all sides materialistic dialectics, without which Marxism is, according to Lenin, not fighting, but fighting . In the light of the creative understanding of Marxism, the effective understanding of dialectical materialism, the scholastic nature of the development of dialectics, which was "conducted" by Menshevik idealism in isolation from the practice of socialist construction, becomes completely clear.

Our party attaches exceptional importance to revolutionary theory, without which revolutionary practice is unthinkable. The materialistic dialectic is the revolutionary soul of Marxism-Leninism.

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