

The Continuities and Discontinuities of Anti-Communist State Violence in Modern Japan

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Introduction

The history of the Japanese Communist Party (*Nihon Kyōsan-tō*) between its foundation in July 1922 and the San Francisco Peace Treaty between the United States and Japan in 1951 is one of oppression, persecution, exile, and violence. Since the party was considered a fifth column for the Soviet Union, the Japanese police kept its leaders, members, and even sympathizers under surveillance. Japanese authorities thought violence was an appropriate response to the communist threat throughout the country until 1945, as did the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) during the occupation period between 1945 and 1951. The use of suppression and violence against the Japanese Communist Party was thus continuous; the government in Tokyo responded to union gatherings, strikes, and leftist attempts to form a political socialist movement around the turn of the century with similar means. The state's evident anti-left violence occurred from the second half of the Meiji period (1868-1912) until the beginning of the second part of the Shōwa period (1926-1989).¹ The present paper's main goal is to elaborate on this trend of violence by following the Japanese left's historical developments while analyzing the forms of and reasons for the violence used against them by the Imperial Police. The first two parts will therefore deal with the events until the Communist Party's establishment in 1922, focusing on the development of socialism and unionism in the East Asian country. The period between 1922 and 1935 — when the party was established, suppressed, and acting in secrecy until its leaders were forced to seek asylum abroad — will be analyzed in the third part. The final analysis will deal with the American occupation, the initial re-installment of political freedom and the “Red Purge” that followed political concerns related to the Cold War in Asia.

Pre-Party History

The Japanese left did not evolve from isolation, but rather stemmed from the import of knowledge and theoretical discourse from abroad. As Sho Konishi recently emphasized, it was particularly Japan's geographical proximity to Russia that "invited non-state, often anti-state, cross-border activities."² The "Russian cultural presence in Japan" at the end of the 19th and during the early 20th century was decisive, since "Russian cultural and revolutionary figures in Japan often served as hubs" for new and extreme ideas.³ Japanese socialism, including all its subgroups, began to develop due to a wave of industrialization stimulated by the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). From the beginning, however — as Hyman Kublin correctly remarked — "the growth of the movement had been severely handicapped by the authoritarian character of the state."⁴ The reaction to the economic developments was also impacted by the development of a growing class consciousness among workers, but at the same time, it must be foregrounded that it was not only the import of Western theories and socialist ideas that caused the establishment of a political left. The early socialist movement and its leaders were influenced by a conglomerate of different ideas, which Kublin summed up as "Christian humanitarianism, sentimental utopianism, radical liberalism, union and labor consciousness, and sheer intellectual dilettantism," and these ideologies were eventually "blended into a mosaic of idealism and good will."⁵ The growth of socialism in Japan was also influenced by the return of Japanese intellectuals to their homeland, who had studied abroad and had been in contact with Western leftism in Europe or the United States. Men like Katayama Sen (1859-1933),⁶ who would later be a founding member of the JCP, were responsible for the organization of the first unions, publications, and possible party structures.⁷ Regardless of his later role in the movement, when Katayama returned from the United States, he considered himself a Christian missionary instead of a socialist.⁸ He left Japan in 1884 after hearing that even poor people without an elite family background were allowed to study in the United States. Arriving in

San Francisco at the age of 25, the young man not only became a university student, but he gained detailed insight into late 19th century American society.⁹ After a few semesters at Hopkins Academy in Oakland and Maryville University in Tennessee, Katayama eventually enrolled in Grinnell College (Iowa) in 1889 where he was exposed to the Richard T. Ely's works on European socialism.¹⁰ Regardless of his particular interest in German Socialism,¹¹ Katayama returned to Japan in 1896 as an enthusiastic Christian missionary.

In his letters to Leonard Fletcher Parker (1825-1911), his former professor at Grinnell College who taught Greek and Latin from 1860-1870 and history from 1888-1898, the young Japanese explained his goals; since "churches are looking [for] men of faith and spiritual harvestness [sic],"¹² Katayama was excited to "try to do what [he] intended to do while [he] was in America."¹³ In a previous letter, he explained his plans for his future life in Japan in detail:

I know think that the religion for me must be based up [sic] the experiences of nonbelievers, not on intellect, or philosophy. I think I shall preach a simple Gospel [...] when I go home, but not of abstract philosophy [...] I believe need for me to preach Gospel among common people of Japanese [sic].¹⁴

The young man was a true believer whose "faith [became] every step stronger in Jesus [sic]."¹⁵ Although he initially considered himself a missionary for Christianity,¹⁶ Katayama established close ties to the working classes in Japan where politics were corrupt and served the upper class:¹⁷ "I am preaching among the working classes of Japan [...] and directly I am preaching to them by various means the gospel of love and truth of Christ."¹⁸ After having taught English at a small college in Tokyo and "superintending a Sunday school which [had] about forty pupils and teachers,"¹⁹ the local conditions drew his attention away from Christianity and towards socialism and the labor movement.²⁰

On April 3, 1897 together with other leftist intellectuals, Katayama was involved in the founding of

the Shakai Mondai Kenkyūkai (Social Problem Study Society). The group would eventually consist of 200 members, but due to internal struggles and arguments, it dissolved in late 1898.²¹ In October of the same year, the Shakaishugi Kenkyūkai (Socialist Study Society) was established to enable not only the study of socialism's theoretical basics, but discussions about Japan's ability to adopt these principles. The Society was, to quote Kublin, "little more than a genteel debating society, functioning along Fabian lines, meeting monthly to hear lectures and hold discussions on the lives and writings of Western socialists, both utopian and scientific."²² Its 30 members were mainly Christian intellectuals who would travel to Europe and the United States to study the main corpus of socialist writings, later translating these works into Japanese.²³ Katayama also founded the first labor journal, the *Rōdō Sekai* (*Labor World*), which would provide valuable information to the working class.²⁴ As Marx and his writings became increasingly important for Katayama and his group, the Shakaishugi Kenkyūkai became too radical for many of its members, who then left the society once again.²⁵

While Katayama had not participated in the International Socialist Congress in 1900, he and his followers tried to establish a party in the following year because he considered the Japanese socialist movement too weak.²⁶ On May 20, 1901, the remaining members tried to found a party, the Social Democratic Party (Shakaiminshutō), with a platform inspired by Ely's writing and the German Social Democratic Party. However, one day after its founding, the government banned the party and forced its members to dissolve, basing its decision on the Public Order and Police Law of 1900 (Chian Keisatsu Hō).²⁷ The state disallowed the official organization of workers' rights activists into a political party because it was considered too dangerous for Japan's inner stability.²⁸ Due to the restrictions in Japan, Katayama returned to the United States in late 1903 and participated in the foundation of the Socialist Party of Japan in San Francisco on February 4, 1904. He also attended the convention of the Socialist Party of America in Chicago in May and left New

York on August 2 to visit the Sixth Congress of the Second International in Amsterdam.²⁹ After the congress, he returned to the United States and actively impacted the socialist movement there.³⁰ Katayama left Japan because he thought the Japanese police would prevent a powerful workers movement or socialist party structures. He would not return to Japan before 1906 and consequently missed the impact of the Russo-Japanese War at the home front.

The war between Russia and Japan would have major global repercussions,³¹ but it would also bring the social conflicts within both countries out in the open. Naoko Shimazu has shown that, in contrast to historiographic generalizations of Japanese society supporting the war in the past, Japan between 1904 and 1905 “reveals a complex society where different interest groups competed against each other, the prevailing popular sentiment being best characterized as ‘war-weariness’ (*ensen*).”³² In this “pluralistic and dynamic”³³ society, many criticized the war for its role in transforming the Japanese village and family structures, with the latter under heavy social and financial pressure due to the conscription system.³⁴ The struggle between the pro- and anti-war lobbies created numerous publications that demonstrate how the Japanese socialists and working class perceived and criticized the Japanese Empire’s war effort. While right-wing pressure groups were often tolerated due to their agitated support of the war,³⁵ the left’s desires for the conflict to end and for workers to be empowered were suppressed.

Socialist and Christian journalists founded the newspaper *Heimin Shinbun* (*The Commoner*), which would “symbolize antiwar conscience in Japanese society during the war.”³⁶ The war against Russia was considered the result of international capitalist interests, and the demand to end the seemingly useless conflict further stimulated war weariness in the Japanese people, who were attracted to the *Heimin Shinbun* in growing numbers. The paper’s circulation rose from an initial 3,500 copies to 8,000 copies, and the increasing criticism of journalists also got the government’s attention. Articles like “The Results of War,”³⁷ “The Delusions of Soldiers,”³⁸ and “The Heavy Burden of

Patriotism,³⁹ as well as reports about the troops' violent behaviors — including the Japanese soldiers⁴⁰ — led to the state's closer surveillance of and attempted countermeasures against the paper. However, one article in the issue from March 28, 1904 granted the police an excuse to interfere with the *Heimin Shinbun*'s publication. An article titled “Ah, woe! The rising taxes”⁴¹ criticized actual government policies and was considered too dangerous to be in circulation. The police prohibited the paper's sale, further circulation of the issue was condemned, and the editor Sakai Toshihiko (1871-1933) was forced to stop publishing the *Heimin Shinbun*. He was, in addition, found guilty of violating national press laws and was sentenced to three months in jail.⁴² The government, however, could not force an independent business to stop printing the paper, and regardless of Sakai's imprisonment, the *Heimin Shinbun* and its other editors (many of whom would also be sent to jail during the war) maintained anti-war positions. Kublin sums up the police's further pressure perfectly: “Direct subscribers were now visited by the police and advised to patronize another newspaper, while news dealers were intimidated and cautioned to discontinue handling it. As a result of such tactics, the circulation of the Heimin Shimbun dropped to about 3,700 by June, although, surprisingly enough, the number of direct subscribers actually increased by several hundreds.”⁴³ In these days, the police steadily surveilled journalists because the government feared the spread of socialist ideas among the troops if they became exposed to the paper. The socialists themselves, who were also closely watched, managed to organize more than 100 gatherings in 1904 to protest the war; numerous political pamphlets were smuggled to the countryside where farmers were to be politically educated. However, the *Heimin Shinbun* had to close once martial law was declared in the aftermath of the Hibiya Park riots in 1905, forcing a publication ban on the paper.⁴⁴ The war, which consequently provided the Japanese left with a podium for its anti-war messages, also entailed the first severe instances of state violence against a possible socialist threat. The Japanese socialists who returned to Japan after the war, particularly

Katayama, were unwilling to give up their cause, and the Socialist Party of Japan was thus founded on February 28, 1906. However, the party had to not only resist government oppression, but struggle with internal conflicts of interest.

From the End of the Russo-Japanese War to 1922

The impact of the Russian Revolution in 1905 and the increasing diversification of the political left around the globe also impacted Japan. Japanese socialists began to split as a consequence, and two antagonistic factions formed on the second party convention in February 1907. The Anarcho-Syndicalists, who demanded direct action against the state, supported Kōtoku Shūsui (1871-1911), while those who voted for parliamentarianism followed Katayama's lead, although he had already left Japan again at the time.⁴⁵ Due to this political climate, the government prohibited the party, whereas the anarchists went totally underground. In 1910, Kōtoku and other members of his group were arrested and, next to the anarchist leader himself, 11 of his followers were sentenced to death for having planned an attack on the Meiji Emperor.⁴⁶ To monitor the future activities of Japan's socialists, the government established the Special Higher Police (Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu, Tokkō for short), whose members were trained to spy on and observe political organizations.⁴⁷ Regardless of the increasing surveillance by the police, Katayama organized a Tokyo tram workers' strike in 1911. They had stopped traffic for two days before the strike leader and another 100 workers were arrested based on the Police Law. 63 of those arrested were sentenced to two to three months in jail, while Katayama received a five-month sentence after four months in investigative custody.⁴⁸ The man, who had criticized Japan's politicians for neglecting workers' interests and supporting violent state policies against them, eventually became a victim of state violence himself.

The working class of Japan, as he wrote in 1910, lacked "any form of lawful protection and [were] totally defenseless when [...] divulged to capitalist exploitation."⁴⁹ He also made it clear that there

was “no law, no constitution, and no freedom”⁵⁰ for the socialists in Japan, and the Japanese police system was “worse than the Russian [one].”⁵¹ One year later, he claimed that Japan was ruled by a small upper class that profited from the suffering of the working class, emphasizing that violence alone was able to keep this order alive: “To perpetuate this regime of violence by a small minority over the large mass of the people, the government and the bourgeoisie have to betake themselves to police despotism and suppress every freer government.”⁵² From Katayama’s perspective, the socialists suffered the most, especially since the municipality of Tokyo was said to have spent 50,000 yen in 1910 to spy on 170 members of the socialist organization.⁵³ The leadership of this organization was arrested within a year, and those who were still free were not only constantly monitored, but now struggled to earn a living.⁵⁴ In 1914, Katayama left Japan again and would never return. Regardless of his exile, he remained in touch with other leftist activists in Japan and became an active member of the global socialist network and the Communist International. He had given up his fight on the Japanese front where police used violence to suffocate any popular movements.⁵⁵

With the Russian Revolution of 1917 and its aftermath, Katayama eventually became more radical and identified himself with Lenin’s Bolshevism, pressing members of the Socialist Party of America to join the Communist International in March 1919. He also encouraged the foundation of the Communist Party of the United States in September 1919 and led a group of Japanese communists who joined the party.⁵⁶ In the same year, in a communication with the People’s Russian Information Bureau in London, Katayama criticized Japan’s position towards Soviet Russia. The Siberian Intervention by the Japanese government was useless, and

Our soldiers in Siberia, since the beginning of the intervention, died ‘a dog’s death,’ a useless death, and war expenses are simply wasted. We regret the loss on account of our mistaken policy, indeed! But by withdrawing our troops now we shall hereafter commit no more of such a senseless sacrifice and, moreover, the inimical

attitude of the Russians can be eliminated. This is the opinion of the best people of Japan [...] The Japanese Government's Siberian policy is upheld by the Allies, including America. It is a most outrageous policy. To them the Russian people are only the bourgeois class who are against the Bolshevik government and trying to sell Russia to the foreign capitalists!⁵⁷

He also maintained that Soviet Russia was a mere victim of corrupt capitalist governments:

All lies, falsehoods and twisting the facts about the Russian Soviet Republic and its doings have been poured on the people of the world over for the past eighteen months to fool and mislead them. These lies, skillfully fabricated by the capitalists and their paid agents — journalists, editors and pressmen of big dailies, even those truth-loving Christians and god-fearing men, may mislead and cheat the people for a while, but they are like a house built on sand, or storm clouds before the sun: they will soon fall away before the truth.⁵⁸

It seems that Katayama was blinded by his own hope in the Communist International, as well as his belief that Lenin was the representative of a better world rather than of a regime that would use another ideology to suppress the people, employing the same brute force that was used by the Japanese government in the years prior. Emphatically, Katayama declared that

Capitalistic governments and their diplomats will not make a lasting peace in the world. We know that. There is only one true lasting peace of the world, that is the Russian Bolshevik peace proposed by Lenin and Trotsky when they formed the Soviet government. At least this is the consensus of opinion among the great masses of the world, and I am glad to say that the Japanese Socialists are of firm belief on this aspect.⁵⁹

A year later in 1920, Katayama would lecture about “Recent Tendencies in the Labor Movement in Japan”⁶⁰ at the Rand School of Social Science in New York.⁶¹ Due to the First World War and its aftermath, the labor movement in Japan had become more vital, and several socialists had been active union leaders since the beginning of the war in 1914. Statistics dated from December 31, 1919 highlight increased unionism and a growth in the number of strikes since 1914.⁶²

Chart 1: The Status of Unionism in Japan, December 31, 1919.

Industrial Sector	Entire no. of workers	No. of union organizations	No. of members	Percent of total workers	Average no. of workers to a union
Textile	713,620	90	61,643	6.6	685
Machine	222,366	82	40,125	18.0	495
Chemical	141,769	67	9,047	6.4	135
Miners	433,843	94	52,135	12.0	555
Total	1,511,598	333	162,950	10.8	489

Chart 2: The Increase of Strikes in Japan between 1914 and 1919

Year	No. of strikes	No. of strikers	Average no. of strikers in each strike
1914	50	7,904	158
1915	60	7,852	123
1916	108	8,413	78
1917	397	57,309	144
1918	417	66,457	159
1919	497	63,137	127
Total	1,534	211,072	

The government once again reacted with violence to not only suppress the strikes, but also the socialist leaders of these movements:

In Aug. 1919, there was a general [printers' union] strike of [...] the daily papers (17) in Tokio for few days. The metropolis of 2,000,000 without a daily paper! But violent suppression of strike and arrests of strikers executed during and after the strike; and many other big strikes were suppressed by brutal police forces and some by calling out troops killing many strikers.⁶³

The government's harsh acts stemmed from the fact that "Japanese workers [had] ... a deep interest in the Russian revolution."⁶⁴ Katayama considered the rice riots in the end and aftermath of the First World War to be "direct revolutionary training,"⁶⁵ and the 7,831 rioters, who were arrested and tried by the courts, were the first envoys of the coming revolution. This assumption might have been shared by the Japanese government, because the "labor strikes [that] developed from the riots ... [were] always crushed by troops."⁶⁶ Due to the strike of 26,000 laborers from Yedamitsu Steel Works, violence was also used to silence workers' positions; as a result, many people were either injured or killed.⁶⁷

Katayama observed several cases of anti-left violence by the Japanese state, its troops, and its police forces, and he was among those who had been spied on by the police, arrested, and sentenced to prison. He had experienced a continuity of anti-left violence in Japan, which might have been why he never returned. Instead, he continued his work for the Communist International when he worked in the Pan American Office in Mexico in 1921.⁶⁸ This was just before travelling — via the United States, France, and Germany — to Russia, where he joined the delegation for the first congress of communist and revolutionary organizations in the Far East in November of the same year. The Soviet Union would later become his adopted home. There, he coordinated the development of the Japanese Communists from Moscow, arguing for the foundation of the Japanese Communist Party (which would eventually form in 1922).⁶⁹ Katayama himself stayed in Moscow, and later that year during the Fourth World Congress of the Communist International, he was elected as a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, a position he kept until he died eleven years later. He not only remained a supporter of Communist Internationalism until his death, but

became a negative part of the Japanese Communist Party's history for being an "imperturbable friend of the Soviet Union."⁷⁰

From Foundation to Suppression: The JCP, 1922-1945

When the Japanese Communist Party was founded on July 15, 1922, its establishment was not only orchestrated by Japanese living abroad like Katayama; it was a foreign transplant, mainly imposed on Japan by the Communist International (Comintern), i.e. Moscow. The first communist party on Japanese soil was therefore led by foreigners and had no real basis in Japan itself.⁷¹ In addition, the agitation of communist parties in East Asia — who opposed colonialism and imperialism — could only be directed against their own political leaders, which led to new waves of persecution. Since the JCP was also thought to support Moscow, authorities feared that they would establish a fifth column on Japanese soil to weaken the country and its government in Tokyo. With regard to "the extent and duration of its alienation from its national environment,"⁷² the JCP is different from other communist parties of Western or Asian origin. The continuous police violence since the earliest leftist uprising in Japan prevented the existence of a critical mass of supporters, which is why the party could not have existed without Moscow's aid. Tokuda Kyūichi (1894-1953) was supposed to lead the party in Japan but returned with a small group of delegates after receiving political training in Russia, where they "received funds, instructions, and theoretical guidance from Comintern officials."⁷³ The party could never openly operate and therefore became a secret organization, and its members mostly followed Comintern orders from 1922 until the mid-1930s when the party was crushed by the Japanese police. The JCP's foreignness doomed it from the beginning: "Under the circumstances, the Party could not evolve in such a way as to open channels of communication with the non-Communist left, for Stalinist guidance kept the Japanese Communists oriented toward the problems of Moscow rather than those of Tokyo and set as the JCP's principal objective the defense

of Soviet national interests.”⁷⁴ While the party was able to mobilize up to 1000 secret members — in 1922, it had counted only 40 — internal disagreements about the party’s ties with Moscow, strict dogmatism,⁷⁵ and the police’s anti-communist behaviors made it impossible to gain decisive political influence.

Two years before the JCP’s founding, the radical anarchist Ōsugi Sakae (1885-1923) went to Shanghai, where he contacted the Comintern to receive 2,000 yen in support of Japanese communism. However, and unfortunately for the Russians, “his connection with the Comintern did not last long, as he showed no sign of willingness to convert from anarchism to communism.”⁷⁶ In 1921, Kondo Eizo, who would later influence the course of the Japan Labour-Farmer Party (Nihonrōnōtō), also received money from the Comintern (6,500 yen) to support the communist cause in Japan. From the JCP’s establishment in 1922 until 1931, an envoy usually made the monthly trip to Shanghai to receive 2,000 yen from the Comintern in US Dollars. The money, as Sandra Wilson states, was “used for regular publications, leaflets, election expenses in 1928 and 1930 when Communists stood as candidate, to establish party headquarters and leaders’ ‘hideouts’ and as salaries for JCP leaders.”⁷⁷ Considering the party’s financial backbone, which was supported by 5-6 yen membership fees in March 1929 and 10 yen newspaper sales — chiefly from the newspaper *Akahata (Red Flag)* — Comintern money was necessary for the JCP to take any action.⁷⁸ Once the police cut this link in 1931, the party was stripped of nearly all its funding, and the party leaders’ incomes of 60 yen a month could no longer be paid.⁷⁹ Moreover, the Japanese government not only cut off the group’s money trail, but their human resources. Potential JCP leaders were all trained at the Communist University of the Workers in eastern Moscow to secure their loyalty towards Comintern interests. 43 Japanese students, all registered between 1923 and 1926, would replenish the JCP after each wave of arrests. After the mass arrests in 1928, the Comintern leaders ordered 15-20 students to return to Japan. In the 1930s, however, the Japanese government limited

this exchange and barely any Japanese students could travel to the Soviet Union.⁸⁰ While the internal struggle about the party's future, especially about the 1927 Comintern theses on Japan, tremendously weakened the JCP, the police force began a rigorous crackdown on any form of communism in Japan. It was so harsh that, as Langer pointed out, "Only a few Japanese Communists survived the decade of ultra-nationalism and repression (1935-1945), either in prison, hidden underground, or in exile."⁸¹ While the JCP's leadership was "obsessed with doctrinaire theoretical Marxist interpretations and notions of ideological purity,"⁸² major police raids against party members took place in 1923, 1928, 1929, 1930, and 1932. In 1924, the correspondent of the Russian Telegraph Agency reported on the smuggle of communist pamphlets into Japan,⁸³ as well as the trials against 20 communists from Gunma Prefecture who were accused of wanting to establish a communist party and a proletarian dictatorship.⁸⁴ The police, however, were not always successful. Arahata Kanson (1887-1981) was among those the police searched for in October 1924, but as the Russian correspondent reports, the "police again lost face when socialist Arahata, who was assiduously searched for by police, came voluntarily to judicial authorities."⁸⁵

In later years, the JCP was continuously weakened by debates about theoretical questions. In 1927, a group of members led by Yamakawa Hitoshi (1880-1958) "opposed the existence of the Japanese Communist Party as a vanguard revolutionary party under Comintern leadership,"⁸⁶ left the party. Moscow had argued in 1927 that Japan would need a two-step revolution, namely "a bourgeois-democratic revolution led by the proletariat," which would "be followed immediately by a socialist revolution."⁸⁷ Yamakawa and his followers disagreed, demanding a direct "proletarian socialist revolution."⁸⁸ The government, which had already prepared another Peace Preservation Law and the Public Security Preservation Law of 1925,⁸⁹ used the inner struggle to wage a merciless battle against socialism and communism in Japan. One of the most severe raids against the communists was the March 15 Incident (San ichi-go jiken)⁹⁰ in 1928, in which nearly the entire party was

arrested. The Tokkō had prepared the raid and had sought to extinguish the JCP once and for all. The “supply” of surrogates from Moscow, however, made further raids inevitable. Furthermore, the Secret Police would extend its net towards suspicious individuals and organizations, even to those who were not communists but had questionable loyalty towards the state.

Chart 3: Tokkō Arrests and Prosecutions, 1928-1937⁹¹

Year	Arrests	Prosecutions
1928	3,426	530
1929	4,942	339
1930	6,124	461
1931	10,422	307
1932	13,938	646
1933	14,624	1,285
1934	3,994	469
1935	1,772	113
1936	1,645	159
1937	1,291	210

Between June 1931 and October 1932, a large trial was held against the 200 leading members of the JCP. Eventually, 187 of them were sentenced to prison, ranging from sentences starting at two years to a lifetime.⁹² An increasing number of communists had to leave Japan to find shelter either in Moscow or China,⁹³ and even members who had left the JCP in 1927 became victims of police raids in the late 1930s.⁹⁴ In the end, the Japanese Communists had no chance but to stop resisting and hope for a better future. When Katayama, a “veteran Japanese Bolshevist”⁹⁵ closed his eyes forever

on November 5, 1933, the JCP had not only been weakened, but it had lost a major coordinating leader. As the Executive Committee of the Communist International's announcement emphasized, the JCP and the Comintern had lost one of "the oldest members of the Presidium of the Executive Committee, the organizer of the proletarian movement in Japan, the organizer and leader of the Communist party in Japan, a firm Bolshevik and a faithful struggler for the international proletarian revolution and the victory of socialism."⁹⁶ His successor, Nosaka Sanzō (1892-1993), would leave Moscow in 1940 to follow Zhou Enlai to Yan'an, returning to Japan to recreate the JCP only after the war's end.⁹⁷ While the American occupation promised more political freedom for this act, the Cold War and its political consequences would sanction anti-communist violence in Japan once again.

MacArthur, the Cold War, and Anti-Communist Violence

On August 30, 1945, in a C54 that had been named "Bataan," General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) landed in Atsugi near Tokyo. He wanted to be the first to set foot in Japan and, regardless of President Harry S. Truman's "distrust of MacArthur's self-serving behavior and the president's questioning of the general's WWII performance,"⁹⁸ the general would rule Japan in the following years as "American viceroy,"⁹⁹ "American Caesar,"¹⁰⁰ or even "American Shogun."¹⁰¹ MacArthur would personalize the occupation of Japan and announced his rule on September 1945: "*I hereby establish military control over all of Japan [...] All powers [...] will henceforth be exercised under my authority [...] All persons will obey promptly all my orders and orders issued under my authority. Acts of resistance [...] will be punished severely.*"¹⁰² It was also made clear that "ANY PERSON WHO: Violates the provisions of the Instrument of the Surrender, or any proclamation, order, or directive given under the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers [...] [will] suffer death or such other punishment as the Court may determine."¹⁰³ Despite the harsh tone

of these announcements, the initial occupation period promised political freedom, even to the communists, who were, like Nosaka, returning from Japan to re-establish the JCP. MacArthur's position towards Japan was based on Japanese cooperation, and the number of occupation troops was reduced from 430,000 to 200,000 in 1946.¹⁰⁴ Initially, there was a discussion about Emperor Hirohito's future, but MacArthur decided to leave him untouched to lighten the burden of the occupation.¹⁰⁵

MacArthur's main goals in Japan were 1) the emancipation of Japanese women, 2) the establishment of a union, 3) the liberalization of education, 4) the abolishment of repressive state organs, and 5) the democratization of the Japanese economy.¹⁰⁶ The "American Shogun" had also signed the order for a purge, and around 200,000 individuals who had actively supported the Japanese state within the media, politics, administration, or economy were forced out of their jobs. This purge in early 1946 was a "major shock" for the Japanese, especially because — as Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967) later stated in his memoirs — "we Japanese had no particular desire to prosecute and judge those who were, or might have been, responsible for our miseries."¹⁰⁷ The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) allowed the establishment of unions, whose numbers rose tremendously in the post-war years. In the first two years, the number of Japanese union members increased from 700 members to more than six million. MacArthur also favored a land reform that would prevent radicalization in the rural regions of Japan.¹⁰⁸ Initially, the outlook for communist activity in post-war Japan was more than promising, but the JCP could not gain more than four seats in the Japanese parliament during the 1947 elections; this, of course, made it obvious that they would not have true political influence.¹⁰⁹ However, Japan's existing political instability,¹¹⁰ the growing tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, the victory of the Chinese Communists in the Civil War, and the events leading to the Korean War (1950-1953) worsened the JCP's position. The notion of the "Red Scare" gained traction, and US correspondents

in particular stimulated fear of a communist revolution in Japan.

The *New York Times* was confident after the 1951 elections, declaring that

The Kremlin will be hard put to find any crumbs of comfort in the latest local elections throughout Japan. Though the Japanese Communist party ran several hundred candidates for various posts, not a single community elected a Communist Mayor. All sixteen Communist Mayors who ran for re-election were defeated. It will take masterful dialectics to convert these results into a “glorious victory.”¹¹¹

Other reports, however, were less optimistic and warned of the JCP’s influence, which “is the legalized descendant of the old Japanese branch of the Communist International which was organized in 1921 and sternly suppressed with mass arrests in the later Twenties and Thirties.”¹¹² It was consequently regarded as correct that MacArthur, in his Fourth of July statement in 1949, “denounced communism as ‘national and international outlawry’ and hinted that Communists might be deprived of protection of the law.”¹¹³ The author, in contrast to the election results, also claimed that the JCP already had 200,000 members and more than three million sympathizers. Nora Waln, a Japan correspondent, would add to these fears a year later by stating that

Communists are scattered throughout these islands. While staying as a guest in Japanese families I have met them. They are in the schools and universities. They are in factories and on farms. They have close links with other communists all over Asia. Their ambition is to make Japan a Soviet republic in the Soviet Union.¹¹⁴

She also told the story of a meeting with “Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, chief of General MacArthur's intelligence service” who showed her “telegrams sent in communist code and decoded by our intelligence officers, song books, scripts of plays, reports on public meetings and private communist conversations — all attempts to weaken the influence of the United States by obstructing economic revival.”¹¹⁵ Waln elaborates on this unsettling picture, stating that

Party members penetrated the ranks of labor and industry. They got jobs as accountants and bookkeepers. Even

so no rural mountain region was ever left entirely empty of communists. I have met communists in industrial centers and in rural places from Kyushu to Hokkaido. ... Throughout Japan I have talked at length with communists in steel mills, in machine shops, in universities, in rural schoolrooms and many other places. They addressed me in English. It amazed me to discover how many communists in Japan are literate in more than one language. They have studied in foreign schools on scholarship money which continued to flow to them while the party was outlawed by the Imperial Government.¹¹⁶

People like Nosaka were identified as communist leaders in Japan, and the article demanded an overall increase in security measures directed against the JCP and its members. They were also characterized as agents of the Soviet Union, which is why their actions needed to be limited and their influence contained.

In 1947, SCAP had already prohibited a general strike and, with the increasing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, also began to limit the influence of Japanese communism. In late 1949 and early 1950, MacArthur reacted as a consequence of the increasing division of the unions among communists and non-communists alike — as well as in consequence of the outbreak of the Korean War¹¹⁷ — by ordering a “Red Purge.” Again, the state used its power to identify Japan’s communists and force them into hiding. Those who had worked in administration, important businesses, the media, schools, and universities were fired for their political ideals.¹¹⁸ It is ironic, then, that the program of the JCP’s fifth party convention initially identified the occupation troops as allies for the revolutionary struggle ahead. Tokuda Kyūichi, who was released from jail after the war, initially led the party and demanded a peaceful policy that would focus on working with the new unions to support the party’s goals, which were no longer too radical for the common worker.¹¹⁹ When Nosaka returned from China in 1946, however, he had partially formulated the party’s platform in accordance with the Communist International, which is why the perception of the JCP as a Soviet agent was to be expected.¹²⁰ Regardless of Soviet influence, Nosaka and the JCP agreed on a “peaceful revolution” in 1946, and the party had not agreed on the idea that

communist policy had to be anti-American.¹²¹ With the purge, however, the JCP's militant period began and most of its members went into hiding again. Nosaka, who had been criticized for his peaceful tactics, lost influence, and a new program in 1951 established a radical political course that included terrorist acts.¹²² This policy change was directly related to the "Red Purge," which revitalized the experiences of the 1920s and 1930s.

Conclusion

Anti-left violence in general and anti-communist violence in particular — as it has been analyzed between 1895 and 1951 — were continuous in Japan. Socialist organizations, their members, and union movements were oppressed each time the state was concerned for its internal stability. During the Russo-Japanese War, socialists were considered a fifth column of Czarist Russia, which is why publications and members were closely screened to prevent pro-Russian or pro-peace agitations. Between the late 1920s and 1930s, the JCP was founded and considered an agent of Soviet Russia; the members were thus regarded as dangerous if left uncontrolled. The international influence of pro-Bolshevik actors like Katayama increased suspicion towards the communists. Between 1935 and 1945, however, the party was practically non-existent because its members were either imprisoned in Japan or waiting for the end of the war abroad.

With the end of the war, new beginnings seemed possible; under its new leaders, the JCP began to emancipate itself from Russia. Regardless of any potential peaceful revolution, the party members were eventually forced to go into hiding by the "Red Purge," a direct act of suppression against communism in a Cold War environment that was dominated by the Korean War at the time. One can consequently conclude that the perception of the JCP's "foreignness" and the respective government's fear of instability caused anti-communist action, which was often violent. The continuities, however, exist in the Meiji and Shōwa period, while the early Taishō period (1912-

1926), especially during the First World War,¹²³ provided some possibilities for Japanese unionism and leftist activity within the labor movement as described by Katayama. Besides the relative lack of communist suppression during this period, it is appropriate to say that before the end of the Second World War, the Japanese government and post-1945 occupational leaders thought violence was an appropriate measure against communist threats, whether imagined or real.

¹ This period is usually divided in two parts, separating the prewar/war (1926-1945) and post-war (1945-1989) events. See Handō Kazutoshi, *Shōwashi*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2004).

² Sho Konishi, *Anarchist Modernity: Cooperatism and Japanese-Russian Intellectual Relations in Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 2.

³ *Ibid.*, 5, 17.

⁴ Hyman Kublin, "The Japanese Socialists and the Russo-Japanese War," *The Journal of Modern History* 22, 4 (1950), 323.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 324.

⁶ For his biography see Hyman Kublin, *Asian Revolutionary: The Life of Sen Katayama* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964).

⁷ Rudolf Hartmann, "Die Anfänge der sozialistischen Bewegung in Japan und die deutsche Sozialdemokratie," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* 26, 2 (1984), 171-172. Katayama later described himself as being a common and uninteresting person. Katayama Sen, *Jiden* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shōten, 1971), 3.

⁸ Sven Van der Gucht, "Katayama Sen: Een Leven in Dienst van het Proletariaat: Een onderzoek naar de evolutie in het denken van Katayama Sen" (M.A. Thesis, University of Ghent, 2012), 6-14.

⁹ For a detailed discussion of Katayama's American experience, see Mitziko Sawada, *Tokyo Life, New York Dreams: Urban Japanese Visions of America, 1890-1924* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 116-144.

¹⁰ Rudolf Hartmann, "Japanischer Revolutionär und proletarischer Internationalist: Sen Katayama," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* 26, 2 (1984), 239. Among the relevant books was Richard T. Ely, *French and German Socialism in Modern Times* (New York: Harper, 1883). In his writings, Katayama would later state that the works of Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864) triggered his interest in socialism. Katayama Sen, *Waga kaisō* (Tōkyō: Tokuma Shoten, 1967), vol. 1, 219. However, in comparing this statement to his early letters from Japan, one can assume that this claim was a biographical construct. On autobiographical constructionism in Japan, see Noboru Tomonari, *Constructing Subjectivities: Autobiographies in Modern Japan* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008). In addition, there were obvious differences in the several versions of Katayama's autobiography. See Ōhara Satoshi, *Katayama Sen no shisō to Taigyaku Jiken* (Tōkyō: Ronsōsha, 1995), 4-12.

¹¹ In his senior thesis at Grinnell College, Katayama analyzed the unification of Germany in 1870/71. Katayama Sen, "Unification of Germany" (Senior thesis, Grinnell College, 1895), Grinnell College Libraries, Department of Special Collections, Grinnell, Iowa, MS 01.111.

¹² Sen Katayama to Prof. Leonard Fletcher Parker, Yugemura, February 25, 1896, Letters from Sen Katayama to L.F. Parker: 1895-1898, Grinnell College Libraries, Department of Special Collections, Grinnell, Iowa, MS 01.111, 2.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁴ Sen Katayama to Prof. Leonard Fletcher Parker, January 5, 1894, Letters from Sen Katayama to L.F.

Parker: 1895-1898, Grinnell College Libraries, Department of Special Collections, Grinnell, Iowa, MS 01.111, 3-4. Despite the fact that he had lived in the United States for ten years, Katayama's English was not terribly good at the time.

¹⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹⁶ Sen Katayama to Prof. Leonard Fletcher Parker, Amherst, MA, September 8, 1895, Letters from Sen Katayama to L.F. Parker: 1895-1898, Grinnell College Libraries, Department of Special Collections, Grinnell, Iowa. MS 01.111, 2.

¹⁷ Transcript of a letter from Sen Katayama to Prof. Leonard Fletcher Parker, Tokyo, January 27, 1897, Letters from Sen Katayama to L.F. Parker: 1895-1898, Grinnell College Libraries, Department of Special Collections, Grinnell, Iowa. MS 01.111.

¹⁸ Sen Katayama to Prof. Leonard Fletcher Parker, Tokyo, January 17, 1898, Letters from Sen Katayama to L.F. Parker: 1895-1898, Grinnell College Libraries, Department of Special Collections, Grinnell, Iowa. MS 01.111, 2.

¹⁹ Sen Katayama to Prof. Leonard Fletcher Parker, Tokyo, September 22, 1896, Letters from Sen Katayama to L.F. Parker: 1895-1898, Grinnell College Libraries, Department of Special Collections, Grinnell, Iowa. MS 01.111, 2.

²⁰ For a detailed discussion about the transformation of Katayama's Christian beliefs, see Inoue Fumi, "Katayama Sen no kikyō to jiden: yotsu no jiden ni okeru kirisutokyō kijutsu no henshen ni tsuite," *Kirisutokyō Shakai Mondai Kenkyū* 53 (2004), 53-84.

²¹ Tanaka Sōgorō, *Nihon shakai undōshi*, 3 vols. (Tokyo: Sekai shoin, 1947-1948), here vol. 1, 210.

²² Kublin, "Japanese Socialists," 325.

²³ Katayama Sen Seitan Hyakunen Kinenkai, *Katayama Sen chosakushū*, 3 vols. (Tokyo: Katayama Sen Seitan Hyakunen Kinenkai, 1959-1960), here vol. 3, 279.

²⁴ The journal was originally published semi-monthly (1897-1900), then monthly between September 1900 and February 1901, and eventually three times a month between June and December 1901. Reprints are available in *Rōdō Sekai* (Tokyo: Rōdō Undō Shiryō Kankō linkai, 1960).

²⁵ Hartmann, "Anfänge," 174.

²⁶ Despite his absence, Katayama was elected a member of the International Socialist Office.

²⁷ The law is part of a series of laws that are usually referred to as the Peace Preservation Law.

²⁸ Hartmann, "Japanischer Revolutionär," 241.

²⁹ For a contemporary report about the congress, see Daniel De Leon, *Flashlights of the Amsterdam Congress* (New York: New York Labour News Company, 1904).

³⁰ Kublin, "Japanese Socialists," 334-337 provides a survey of his activities in the United States. Katayama later published his memories about the Japanese labor movement in the United States, as well. Katayama Sen, *The Labor Movement in Japan* (Chicago: C.H. Kerr, 1918).

³¹ For more about its global impact, see Frank Jacob, *The Russo-Japanese War and Its Shaping of the 20th Century* (London/New York: Routledge, 2017) (forthcoming). See also Frank Jacob, *Tsushima 1905: Ostasiens Trafalgar* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2017).

³² Naoko Shimazu, "Patriotic and Despondent: Japanese Society at War, 1904-5," *The Russian Review* 67, 1 (2008), 35.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ See Jacob, *Russo-Japanese War*, chapter 3.

³⁵ Frank Jacob, "Secret Societies in Japan and Preparation for the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)," *Diacronie: Studi di Storia Contemporanea* 28, 4 (2016), http://www.studistorici.com/2016/12/29/jacob_numero_28/ (Last access, March 1, 2017).

³⁶ Shimazu, "Patriotic and Despondent," 37.

³⁷ "Sensō no kekka," *Heimin Shimbun* 14, February 14, 1904.

³⁸ "Heishi no byūsō," *Heimin Shimbun* 15, February 21, 1904.

³⁹ "Aikoku no omoni," *Heimin Shimbun* 17, March 7, 1904.

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- ⁴⁰ Several such articles were published in the issues of March 13, March 23, and April 17, 1904.
- ⁴¹ “Aa zōzei,” *Heimin Shimbun* 19, March 28, 1904.
- ⁴² Sakai appealed the sentence, but all he could archive was a reduced term of two months in jail. Kublin, “Japanese Socialists,” 330. On Sakai, see his autobiography *Sakai Toshihiko den* (Tokyo: Chūōkōronshinsha, 2010). For his intellectual development and political evolution within the Meiji period, see Ohara Hiroyuki, “‘Katei no wagaku’ kara Shakaishugi he: Meiji shisōshi no naka no Sakai Toshihiko,” *Tōkyō Toritsu Daigaku Hōgakukai Zasshi* 45, 2 (2005), 317-366, especially 348-354.
- ⁴³ Kublin, “Japanese Socialists,” 330.
- ⁴⁴ Shimazu, “Patriotic and Despondent,” 37-38.
- ⁴⁵ Hartmann, “Japanischer Revolutionär,” 242.
- ⁴⁶ For detailed studies on Kōtoku and the trial, see Frederick George Notehelfer, *Kōtoku Shūsui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) and Maik Hendrik Sprotte, *Konfliktaustragung in autoritären Herrschaftssystemen: Eine historische Fallstudie zur frühsozialistischen Bewegung im Japan der Meiji-Zeit* (Marburg: Tectum, 2001).
- ⁴⁷ On the Tokkō, see Elise K. Tipton, “The Tokkō and Political Police in Japan, 1911-1945,” in *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives*, ed. Mark Mazower (New York: Berghahn, 1997), 213-240.
- ⁴⁸ Hartmann, “Japanischer Revolutionär,” 243.
- ⁴⁹ Katayama Sen, “Industrie und Sozialismus in Japan,” *Die neue Zeit: Wochenschrift der deutschen Sozialdemokratie* 28, 25 (1910), 878.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 880.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵² Katayama Sen, “Die politischen Zustände Japans,” *Die neue Zeit: Wochenschrift der deutschen Sozialdemokratie* 29, 4 (1911), 109.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 111. Katayama consequently declared the Japanese proletariat to be the most exploited in the world. Katayama Sen, “Die Ausbeutung der Arbeiter in Japan,” *Die neue Zeit: Wochenschrift der deutschen Sozialdemokratie* 29, 52 (1911), 921.
- ⁵⁵ Katayama Sen, “Der Verfall des bürokratischen Regimes in Japan,” *Die neue Zeit: Wochenschrift der deutschen Sozialdemokratie* 32, 1 (1914), 18.
- ⁵⁶ Hartmann, “Japanischer Revolutionär,” 243.
- ⁵⁷ Katayama Sen, “Japan and Soviet Russia,” London, September 6, 1919, Warwick Digital Collection, 36/R30/22, 2.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁰ Katayama Sen, “Recent Tendencies in the Labor Movement in Japan,” Rand School of Social Science Papers (Dep’t of Labor Research), The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations, Box 2, Katayama-Tractenberg, Folder 1, Katayama-Laidler. Following quotes will refer to Katayama Sen, “Labor Union Movement,” New York, October 21, 1920, a handwritten lecture manuscript within the named folder.
- ⁶¹ On the school, see Rachel Cutler Schwartz, “The Rand School of Social Science, 1906-1924: A Study of Worker Education in the Socialist Era,” (PhD Thesis, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1984).
- ⁶² Katayama, “Labor Union Movement,” 2. The two charts are taken from these notes (pages 2 and 3).
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, 4.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁸ On Katayama’s work and experience in Mexico, see Takenaka Tarō, “Mekishiko Kyōsantō to Katayama Sen,” *Ketsudan Kagaku* 2 (2016), 46-53.

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- ⁶⁹ Hartmann, "Japanischer Revolutionär," 244.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 246.
- ⁷¹ Manfred Pohl, *Die Kommunistische Partei Japans: Ein Weg ohne Peking und Moskau* (Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1976).
- ⁷² Paul F. Langer, *Communism in Japan: A Case of Political Naturalization* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 1.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, 5.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.
- ⁷⁵ Langer emphasized that the leading Japanese Communists in the 1920s and 1930s were "willing to pay any price to be considered 'correct' and faithful Marxist-Leninists by their foreign friends." *Ibid.*, 7.
- ⁷⁶ Sandra Wilson, "The Comintern and the Japanese Communist Party," in *International Communism and the Communist International 1919-43*, ed. Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 1998), 287.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 291.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁹ In 1928, the party also received \$10,000 from Jacob Jansen, the Comintern Representative in Shanghai to provide resources for the JCP's election campaign.
- ⁸⁰ Wilson, "The Comintern," 292.
- ⁸¹ Langer, *Communism in Japan*, 8.
- ⁸² *Ibid.*
- ⁸³ Slepach to Moscow, Report 01004, September 11, 1924, in: Miscellaneous matters on foreign newspaper and communication organization as well as foreign reporter, 15 September to 27 October 1924, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, B03040921800.
- ⁸⁴ Slepach to Moscow, Report 07004, September 18, 1924, in: *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ Slepach to Moscow, Report 02404, October 13, 1924, in: *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁶ Germaine A. Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 35.
- ⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 36.
- ⁸⁸ *bid.*
- ⁸⁹ This law was especially created to crush the existing communist structures in Japan.
- ⁹⁰ For a detailed discussion of the events and their relation to the elections, see Kurata Minoru, "Sōsenkyo to San ichi-go jiken," *Shōgaku Tōkyū* 49, 1 (1998), 1-20.
- ⁹¹ Takabatake Michitoshi, "Ikoku shakai-shugisha – Sano Manabu/Nabeyama Sadachika," in *Tenkō*, ed. Shisō no Kagaku Kenyūkai (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1959-1965), vol. 1: 164-200, for the data especially 191. For more detail on the Tokkō, see Richard H. Mitchell, *Thought Control in Prewar Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976).
- ⁹² On the trial, see Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Tenkō: Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan" (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1969), 3-5.
- ⁹³ Pohl, *Kommunistische Partei Japans*, 30.
- ⁹⁴ Steinhoff, "Tenkō," 249-250.
- ⁹⁵ "Sen Katayama Dead; Japanese Bolshevik," *New York Times*, November 6, 1933, 19.
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁷ Peter Berton, "The Chinese and Japanese Communist Parties: Three Decades of Discord and Reconciliation, 1966-1998," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 37 (2004), 361-362.
- ⁹⁸ Russell D. Buhite, *Douglas MacArthur: Statecraft and Stagecraft in America's East Asian Policy* (Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 68.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 67.
- ¹⁰⁰ William Manchester, *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1946* (Boston: Little Brown 1978).

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- ¹⁰¹ Frank Jacob, "MacArthur's Legacy: Japan and the Early Years of the Cold War," in *Peripheries of the Cold War*, ed. Frank Jacob (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2015), 207-227.
- ¹⁰² General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Proclamation No. 1, September 2, 1945, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, Japan, C12120339600. (Emphasis by the author).
- ¹⁰³ General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Proclamation No. 2, September 2, 1945, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, Japan, C12120339700.
- ¹⁰⁴ Hiroshi Masuda, *MacArthur in Asia. The General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 196.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 204.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 205.
- ¹⁰⁷ Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis* (London et. al.: Heinemann, 1961), 148 and 160.
- ¹⁰⁸ Buhite, *Douglas MacArthur*, 75-76.
- ¹⁰⁹ Masaru Kohno, *Japan's Postwar Party Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997) 51; Reinhard Zöllner, *Geschichte Japans: Von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn et al.: UTB, 2006) 392.
- ¹¹⁰ Between 1946 and 1955, nine different governments ruled Japan (May '46, Yoshida; May '47, Katayama; March '48, Ashida; October '48, Yoshida; February '49, Yoshida, October '52, Yoshida; May '53, Yoshida; December '54, Hatoyama, and March '55, Hatoyama).
- ¹¹¹ "Japanese Communism," *New York Times*, April 28, 1951, 9.
- ¹¹² Lindsay Parrot, "Tricky Problem Posed by Japan's Communists," *New York Times*, July 10, 1949, 4.
- ¹¹³ *Ibid.* As incidents in which the Japanese communists seem to have been involved, Parrot named the assassination of the Minister of Transportation, Shimoyama Sadanori, as well as the sabotage of railway lines.
- ¹¹⁴ Nora Waln, "Can the Communists Take Japan From Within?" *Saturday Evening Post*, December 9, 1950, 24.
- ¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 24-25.
- ¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* 116.
- ¹¹⁷ Haruhiro Fukui, "Postwar Politics, 1945-1973," in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol. 6, *The Twentieth Century* (Cambridge/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 158. On the interrelation between the two events, see Steve Y. Rhee, "The Japanese Communist Party and the SCAP Purge of Left-Wing Elements During the Korean War," in *The Occupation of Japan: The Impact of the Korean War*, ed. William F. Nimmo (Norfolk, VA: General Douglas MacArthur Foundation, 1990), 83-100.
- ¹¹⁸ Zöllner, *Geschichte Japans*, 396. 12,000 people were affected by this decision. On the purge, see Central Committee, Japanese Communist Party, *Fifty Years of the Japanese Communist Party* (Tokyo, 1980), 153. For a detailed analysis of the US' position towards Japanese communists, see Henry Oinas-Kukkonen, *Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility. Changing U.S. Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944-1947* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003).
- ¹¹⁹ Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 48-54.
- ¹²⁰ Pohl, *Kommunistische Partei Japans*, 45-47.
- ¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 56.
- ¹²² *Ibid.*, 84. See a detailed description of this period in Scalapino, *Japanese Communist Movement*, 78-96.
- ¹²³