

— On Some Problems Connected
with Srikakulam Girisijan Movement

— Some Facts Relating to
the Revolutionary Girisijan
Movement of Srikakulam

REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST COMMITTEE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

FOREWORD

Comrades,

Today in Srikakulam district armed struggle is going on. There are discussions taking place amongst revolutionary ranks on some problems connected with this. Our State Committee desired to give explanations on some problems connected with that movement and hence this report. We hope comrades will study this report and reach clear understanding.

With revolutionary greetings,

Vijayawada,

**REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST COMMITTEE
OF ANDHRA PRADESH**

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(in-charge)

ON SOME PROBLEMS CONNECTED

WITH

Srikakulam Girijan Movement

In the girijan areas of Srikakulam district, under the leadership of communist revolutionaries, Girijan armed struggle began in the last week of November (24-11-68) and is continuing

The Srikakulam district committee persistently propagates that the State Co-ordination Committee leadership opposed armed struggle and so they established direct contacts with the All India Co-ordination Committee. It is needless to say that this propaganda is fully ill-motivated. We are placing this report before comrades to explain the situation that prevailed till the starting of the armed struggle, the problems that face the movement and the attitudes taken by the District and State Committee.

PRE-1969 SITUATION

Srikakulam District is situated at the end of Andhra Pradesh on the borders of Orissa. In about 800 sq. miles in the Dt., there is a Girijan population of about 2 lakhs. Though there are plains in between, all this area is adjoining the Girijan areas of Orissa. In these hilly tracts there are a few roads. In the regions adjoining plains, non-Girijans live along with Girijans.

Those who came from the plains and settled in hilly tracts merchants and through money lending became landlords and big sahu-kars, and are exploiting the Girijans. Along with these exploiters, village officers, forest officers, Girijan Welfare Department Officers-all those who had opportunities, became exploiters and are exploiting the Girijans.

The exploitation of Girijans is in the following forms:

- 1. Money lending:** To clear the debts, Girijans had to sell grain, other crops and forest produce at lower rates to those money lenders.
- 2. Occupation of Girijan lands:** Those who could not clear debts had to mortgage

and sell away to the money lenders their lands.

- 3. Exploiting the agricultural labourers:** In lands thus lost to the landlords, Girijans had to work as paleru (annually paid workers) and daily labour for nominal wages.
- 4. Purchase of forest produce:** Corporation officers, sahu-kars, money lenders purchased forest produce from Girijans at nominal rates and sold them outside for huge profits.
- 5. Exploitation by forest officers:** These forest officers obstructed the Girijans from cultivating Podu in forests and from getting forest produce. Then they demanded bribes, mamuls and forced labour (Vetti).

The Big Bourgeoisie landlord Government, serving the interests of imperialism, protects the exploiters. This government walking in the footsteps of the British rulers, helped only to intensify the kind of exploitation prevalent in those times. It did not exterminate such exploitation. For example we may note such exploitation is even against 1917 regulations which are in vogue even today.

Against such exploitation, Girijans rose in revolt now and then before 1959. In 1900 in Salur agency, there was a revolt against the British Government which suppressed it. In 1946 in Parvatipuram agency area, there was some agitation under Ranga group (a section of congress men) leadership. When finally the Girijans occupied lands, the leadership betrayed and left them to the mercy of the Govt. officials and police. The Govt. acted in favour of landlords, filed several cases against Girijans, dragged them to courts and gradually suppressed the struggle.

Girijan Movement under the Leadership of the Communist Revolutionaries

(From 1959 to 1967)

From 1959, the communists built a broad-based Girijan Sangham and under its leadership it conducted several struggles against all sorts of exploitation (as referred to already), violence and irregularities and the Girijans achieved gains. These struggles were conducted based on the following ten demands.

1. In the agency, all lands seized illegally from the Girijans by non-Girijans should be returned to Girijans.

2. Distribute Banjar (Waste) lands to Girijans immediately.

3. All debts, which increased daily in all sorts of illegal methods should be abolished. Facilities for supply of capital should be given.

4. Agricultural implements and cattle should be supplied to Girijans to carry on agricultural operations.

5. Forest produce should be purchased from Girijans at reasonable rates. Consumer goods should be supplied to them at fair prices.

6. Those who extract free labour from the Girijans should be severely punished.

7. Salaries to Palerlu and wage rates for agricultural workers should be fixed in consonance with the cost of living.

8. There should be no restriction on the use of forest timber by Girijans for their house construction and daily needs.

9. In the new atmosphere that will be created when the above programme is implemented, educational and cultural programmes should be organised on a large scale.

10. Girijan areas should be declared as autonomous regions and its administration should be handed over to the representatives of girijans.

When we take up these items one by one, the Girijans gained the following through their struggles :

1. From 1959 itself Girijans gradually re-occupied lands which were illegally seized by non-Girijans, sahumars and landlords from them. Also they began to cultivate such lands. Till 1967, about 600 to 700 acres were thus occupied.

2. Upto 1967, about 1500 acres of forest waste lands were occupied and cultivated by Girijans.

3. Upto 1967, they refused to clear debts to the tune of about Rupees 2 Lakhs.

4. They got free timber for their agricultural use.

5. Even in the beginning, they sold their forest produce at weekly markets and got reasonable rates from private merchants and government corporation.

6. Free labour has been completely abolished.

7. The nominal rates for palerlu and daily labour were increased. The rates for palerlu increased from 6 bags per annum to 14-15 bags. Similarly the daily wage rates increased upto 12 times.

8. Forest timber has been taken freely for house construction and daily needs.

9. There was mass upsurge while implementing the above programme. The cadre utilised this situation to increase the political consciousness of the Girijans through cultural programmes, night schools and reading to them the party journals regularly.

Only when New Democratic Revolution starts, the Girijans would get their autonomous

region. The aim of the present armed struggle is the victory of such a revolution.

Communist revolutionaries took up these issues, built up Girijan Sanghams on a broad basis and took the lead in the Girijan movement. They carried on the political propaganda that important problems like land and constitution of Autonomous region will be solved only with the establishment of peoples rule (New Democratic State) in the place of the present big Bourgeoisie State.

On the organisational front, Girijan Committees and party units were constituted. Because of the continuous efforts made by Girijan cadre and those from the plains, there was mass mobilisation on all the above issues.

As part of their political education, Girijan cadre as part of the district cadre, were given lessons on the Telangana armed struggle and its experiences. There was a lapse during this period: No widespread propaganda about the need to carry on armed struggle to capture power by the people.

DURING 1967 AND AFTER

As the beginning of the 1967 rainy season, Girijan movement reached a new stage. Girijans who had already reoccupied some of their lands, occupied 800 more acres in the possession of landlords and began cultivation, 2500 acres of forest waste land were also cultivated. Because there was acute food shortage, the people prevented the landlords and sahuakars from exporting their grain to outside the area with a view to realise high rates. Sufficient grains were stocked in the Girijan areas. Even the rates were decreased and merchants were made to sell rice at 2 seers per rupee. Thus they even solved the food problems.

In this manner, land distribution and grain distribution, which are important items in the programme of Agrarian revolution, were implemented and this led to intensified mass upsurge. In these activities people began to participate on a big scale. The Girijan struggle reached a higher stage.

The landlords were frightened at the mass upsurge. On 31 October, 1967, the land-

lords and their goondas waylaid some delegates to the taluk Girijan conference and beat them brutally. The victims included women also. When people came in support of beaten delegates, the landlords opened fire and murdered two Girijan activists - Manganna and Koranna. All this took place in a village named Levidi. This firing is an example to show that the struggle has reached a higher stage.

Eventhough there was temporary frustration and disappointment as a result of this firing amongst the Girijans, the masses once again moved when there was a public rally to pay homage to the martyrs. Similarly all over the Girijan area several meetings were held to pay homage to the martyrs. During these meetings big rallies were held on a large scale. This rallying did not stop here. Some more items of our programme which were till then only in propaganda stage, were implemented now.

Alongwith the crops cultivated by Girijans in their lands, they also took possession of the crops ready for harvest in the land still remaining with the landlords. They brought such harvest crops to their own houses. Girijans refused to pay and cancelled debts payable to landlords and sahuakars. Such cancelled debts come to about Rs. 3 lakhs. (There is another version that the amount is 8 lakhs; Ed.) They took possession of the cattle and goats belonging to the landlords and distributed them amongst themselves. Thus, along with the distribution of land, the programme for the cancellation of debts also came into effect.

It became common for the masses to carry their big axes, bows and arrows and country-made guns wherever they went for demonstrations.

This situation continued upto February 20, landlords responsible for murder escaped temporarily. There were no additional police camps. There were no raids by the armed police. Utilising this opportunity, people implemented the revolutionary programme to the extent possible. They felt their Raj has come. Girijan Sangam supervised all the village matters. All decisions of the party and Girijan Sangham were being implemented.

This was the actual situation. But Liberation wrote: 'Even after the landlords deliberately killed two activists of the Girijan Sangham in October 1967, when the anger of the masses against the class enemy was at its height, the masses were not allowed to proceed against their enemies' (Liberation Dec. 68, P. 30). The District committee also wrote similarly in its reports.

The meaning of this is clear; when the people were advancing, the leadership pulled them back. But this is not true. There is not one incident when the leadership—either local or at higher level—dragged the people back when they were advancing. Comrades lead wherever people took action. People occupied landlords lands. They took possession of their crops. They demonstrated with fire arms. In the clash with the police on 4-3-68 people used firearms. When such are the realities it is only a baseless charge to say that the leadership did not allow masses to advance. This is not a genuine criticism.

From February 20 police activities began with the establishment of special armed camps. They gave a warning on 24th to surrender the arms. Though the SAP was moving about the area, there were no raids till the end of February.

In this situation, the DC met on 24-2-68. This meeting took note of the coming police raids. The meeting decided that arms, especially the fire arms should not be surrendered, people should prevent any arrests and if arrested, people should rescue the arrested persons.

On 3rd March, police began large scale raids. On that day there was a raid on Burjaguda (Seethampet). By early hours, the armed police surrounded the village, arrested most of the villagers, raped some women, looted houses and carried away fowls, goats and other movables. The armed police adopted the same technique in all the subsequent raids.

On 4th March, there was a raid on Pedakarja (Parvathipuram agency). People vacated the village and went to the nearby hill. Police fired on the people. People replied the firing. But because people had only country-made guns police were not hurt. But two Girijans died due to police firing.

After this firing incident, the people were demoralised.

Here we have to take note on a point: Though there were large scale armed police raids and serious repression, if organisationally we were prepared, there could have been some more resistance. When we were not prepared, the police raids began, we were confused and there was no self defence and protection of immovable properties. These incidents only prove, when there is Govt. armed repression, there should be armed counter resistance as far as possible.

The State Co-ordination Committee was formed at the time of the State Committee (Marxist) meeting held from March 9th to 11th. The meeting felt the resistance problems in the agency area should be decided after discussing with the District Committee.

As per this, the DC met at the end of March (from 29th) and discussed the problems facing the movement. By then, except in a few areas, in the rest of the region armed police raids were continuing seriously. All important leaders came out of the agency SAP and goondas looted all grain and movables of people and no supply of salt, grains and cloth became a serious problem. The police and goondas looted all the forest produce gathered by the people intended for sale. Now the people had nothing to sell, thus they lost all the cash necessary to eke out their living for the rest of the year.

In this situation, the question of organising peoples resistance did not come before the meeting as an important one. But the issue of supply of salt, foodgrains, clothes and agricultural implements came before that meeting as an important one. On the advice of the State committee representatives the DC decided to make arrangements for the supply of the above articles, to re-establish contacts by the cadre with the masses, to safeguard remaining arms and to make arrangements for giving guerilla training to all leading cadres.

In this meeting we discussed problems connected with guerilla struggles. All these decisions were taken with this understanding; that we should organise squads, give training and be ready so that when the masses moved again, we could begin the struggle. Because

it was end of March, the training had to be completed by April and May. As soon as rains started in June, we could begin struggles for seizing lands of the landlords and our armed squads could resist the repressive SAP and the goondas. This way we could co-ordinate the land problem of the agrarian revolution with guerilla struggle. Our understanding was that in such a situation, we could carry on stable and protracted armed guerilla struggle. So, the issue whether guerilla struggle is to be carried on or not, did not as such arise between the State Co-ordination committee and the Srikakulam District committee. On that issue there were no differences at all.

But during the discussion, two issues came forward. First: Whether minimum military training was necessary to begin guerilla struggles? Secondly: Whether guerilla struggles could be started even when there was no move among the masses?

These issues were discussed. We came to the conclusion that minimum military training was necessary to begin guerilla struggles and there should be people move to the required extent to participate in the guerilla struggle. After the discussion, we came to the conclusion it was wrong to feel that the people would move only after the guerilla struggle started.

It is not correct to say, as the District committee propagates, that the State Committee did not give the training locally but took them to distant places. Such propaganda is also completely false. In the beginning arrangements were made to give the training locally. But the DC leaders themselves came to the conclusion that it was not possible because of the concentration of the enemy in the area. With no other alternative, they were taken to distant places.

Now the DC says that what was learnt in the training was not useful. It is a different matter if they refuse to utilise that because of their opposition to the State Co-ordination committee. The issue before us is how to utilise the experiences of the Telangana struggle. They will not be useful for those who refuse to utilise them. For revolutionaries who utilise them, experiences in every struggle would be

useful. Even today it is necessary for the DC to try to utilise them.

In the same meeting, we made another decision. Even the combined Seethampet and Parvathi puram agency areas are very limited. It is all surrounded by roads. When severe raids take place, it would be impossible for all the squads to remain in the region (especially in summer). So we had to extend the movement to the other agency areas in the district and also to the agency areas of Orissa.

As per these decisions, leading comrades again went amidst masses, maintained contacts with them and began work amongst them. They went to some Girijan areas and worked for the extension of the movement. But the decision regarding guerilla training was not implemented immediately. The DC did not make the necessary arrangements on its behalf. So the State Committee had to intervene and there was some delay in completing all arrangements.

Burdwan Plenum was held at the beginning of April. In Andhra the Communist revolutionaries revolted against the Party (Marxist) leadership in the second week of June and came out of it. Immediately the Srikakulam DC met from 16th.

In this meeting, some comrades in the DC criticised the State leadership for not coming out of the Party immediately after the Burdwan plenum and for delaying till June. There was one opinion that comrades should have resigned and come out individually instead of the leadership giving a call for revolt, which would undermine discipline in the party to be formed by us. Another opinion was expressed that all these developments were like old wine in new bottles." But the State Committee representative made it clear that there was some delay in rallying all the revolutionaries in the party and so could not come out immediately after the Burdwan Plenum; their formal attitude about discipline was wrong; in the process of building a new party through revolutionary movements revolutionary discipline would be established; it was wrong to say all this as 'old wine in new bottles' and all that would be proved in practice.

Comrades gave reports about the situation of the masses in the Girijan areas. They explained that people had not yet overcome their frustration, there was not yet any possibility to move on the issues of cultivation of landlords' land and the police were also making raids wherever we moved.

On the advice of the State representative, the DC decided to complete the arrangements for guerilla training for all those to lead the guerilla struggles, to keep the local militants—men and women—ready to use hand bombs, bows & arrows, spears and other country made weapons and to give directions to Girijans to use them in resistance and self defence during SAP and goonda raids, loot and violence. The State representative made it clear that some move in the masses was necessary to begin regular guerilla struggle and it was necessary to wait till the masses move on issues like land, crops etc. When that materialised DC was asked to inform the State Coordination Committee which would take a decision in the matter. On this, it was decided on the one hand to resort to armed resistance and on the other to prepare for higher forms of regular guerilla struggle.

As per these decisions, a batch of important activists were given guerilla training. To complete the training for the second batch, due to unavoidable reasons there was some delay. Some material was collected for local armed resistance. But arrangements for resistance were not made.

When the realities are such, the propaganda carried on by the DC that the State Committee was against armed resistance, is nothing but false. The State Committee on the one hand gave a programme for immediate resistance and on the other hand made preparations for immediate starting of protracted guerilla war. Just to deny this, the DC resorts to propagate lies and untruths.

Also, in their attempt to criticise the State Committee leadership, they went to defame the very movement and its nature. See the following sentence which they wrote in the same issue of Liberation: "On the whole, the

movement did not proceed beyond its democratic content".

This is incorrect. To seize the lands from the landlords and cultivate them, large scale armed demonstrations, using arms in one or two cases of resistance—all, these describe the revolutionary nature of the movement and not its democratic content. On another occasion, they compare this struggle with that of Human peasants revolt, and say that the movement here did not advance beyond democratic nature—is this not defaming the movement?

They have also written as follows:

"In the face of the attacks of landlords and the police the neo-revisionists had always suggested that our policy should be one of exposing the ruling classes and extending the areas of struggle. Before and after the large scale military type operations, that attitude was not basically changed. Confusion and vacillation, though for a temporary period."

Everybody knows that the neo-revisionists pointed out to the non-extension of the movement as a pretext to postpone the armed struggle. But it is baseless to accuse the State Co-ordination Committee of having tread the same path. Only in May the State Committee began to deal with the DC directly. By then, most of the raids were over. From that day it was making preparations for armed struggle. Only as per such preparations it wanted to extension of the movement. We got good results to the extent we implemented, these decisions. To the extent they were not implemented we did not get results.

This false propaganda was carried on not only in Liberation but also in the report published by the DC.

Ordinarily any party unit has to overcome many difficulties to make these arrangements. Because we were starting armed struggle for the first time, we had to overcome some more difficulties. At a time when these difficulties had to be overcome by District and State Comrades working together with mutual co-operation and get ready for armed resistance and regular guerilla struggles, District Comrades did not concentrate on this but established

direct relations with the All India Co-ordination Committee. Even by then, a comrade and leader of a cultural squad from this district wherever he went for cultural performances carried on propaganda against the State Co-ordination Committee. He contacted and worked with Venkatarathnam group, who had a centre in Guntur District, with groups in various districts, which was working against State Co-ordination Committee in the name of Solidarity Committee for Naxalbari Peasants Liberation struggle.

In this context it is also necessary to point out to comrades about one more point. As soon as it was formed the State Co-ordination Committee did not join the All India Co-ordination Committee. The AICCCR published one of the documents which the State leadership placed for discussion at the Burdwan Plenum and put up a note pointing out some basic differences on it. This they published openly. We wanted to know their motives for doing so before joining them. With this in view, the State Co-ordination Committee opened direct talks concluded, a representative of the AICCCR visited Guntur and informed Venkatarathnam group of the details of the discussions with the State Co-ordination Committee and gave them instructions to coordinate the work of the revolutionaries in the State. With this, they carried on large scale propaganda against the State Co-ordination Committee all over the state. The essence of their propaganda was that there was no difference between the politics of the neo-revisionist and the politics practised by the State leadership.

In this serious situation, the DC met during the third week of September. At this meeting some DC leaders stated that primarily the State Co-ordination Committee leadership was following the neo-revisionist path and opposed armed struggle; and they went to the extent of saying these were our political motives for not starting armed struggle in Girijan areas of Srikakulam and not joining the AICCCR. The reply given by the State representative who attended that meeting to their criticisms did not satisfy them. At the end, the DC passed the following resolutions on armed struggle and joining the AICCCR.

On Armed Struggle: "Police have again begun raids. After the SAP was withdra-

wn in June, these began from the second week of August. In the interval, our cadre came into contact with the masses and explained the situation. They exposed the deceitful promises of the Government. People were enthused. They made it clear this time they should fight and they were ready for it. But they feel that our leadership (squad) should be in their midst. Even the cadre are also enthusiastic. They are of the strong opinion to get ready for struggle this time.

"Our cadre went to the people to explain. In this enthusiastic atmosphere police raids again began. Landlords, goondas with the aid of those who have surrendered to the police are carrying on these raids. It has become normal to loot, beat the people and compel them to reveal the whereabouts of the activists.

In this situation, the people are expressing their readiness to resist these raids. But they feel this time the resistance should be armed one. In the first raids we retreated. At that time we told the people and cadre that we were preparing for a higher form of struggle and would soon resist. Similar raids have begun. But we are unable to begin resistance as promised earlier. With this the people and cadre are losing confidence on us. If we delay further, there is a danger of our isolation from the people. The cadre are very demoralised. So our DC requests for the decision to start armed struggle immediately.

"For the present, we can use hand bombs, country-made guns and bows and arrows. We think of using hand bombs during police raids and to give these hand bombs to milian. The squad should assist the people.

"From 3 'propaganda squads' for the present we have formed one squad with 8 persons. Apart from these there are 36 militants, Squads could be formed with them.

"It is necessary for the PC to give technical assistance. We request that this should be done quickly."

(The above resolution was adopted unanimously)

It was not clear during the DC discussion, as was made out in the resolution, that

the people were in action. Further they stated that it would take two more years for the masses to move, by then the general elections would come, and only with a view to participate in them, the State Committee shows the pretext of masses being not in action to postpone armed struggle. If we just turn back, it would be clear how baseless are such charges by these comrades. If we implement the decision taken at the last DC meeting (held in June) there was no necessity to pass this resolution now. There is already a decision to resist the police with hand bombs and arrows. They ought to have reviewed how far they implemented it. As though no such decision was taken previously, they passed this resolution now. This won't help the armed struggle. In the last DC meeting, it was made clear that if the masses began to move on any issue, we would decide for regular guerilla struggle and the previous armed resistance with country bombs and bows and arrows would only help this regular struggle. There was no need for much time to start regular guerilla struggle with guerilla squads, if armed resistance had been organised before. It is totally unreal to say that the State Committee banned the use of fire arms and allowed; "if only necessary," the use of Country bombs and bows & arrows etc. The DC had agreed to the advice of the State representative for the programme of continuous armed resistance with Country bombs & arrows and bows. Use of fire arms is an important part of military training. So, as soon as it was completed, we could use them. But there was no ban placed on its use.

SECOND RESOLUTION :

On Joining the all India Co-ordination Committee : "In the country Naxalbari comrades stood in the fore front and carried on the inner party ideological struggle. They exposed betrayal of the neo-revisionists before the people. They first raised the flag of revolt, applied Mao's Thought and blazed the way for all revolutionaries. Addressing the comrades still with the neo-revisionists, they stated in December "We call upon the revolutionary comrades still within the Communist Party of India (Marxist) to repudiate openly the neo-revisionist leading cliques and politics and openly join hands with us who are striving to build a

genuine Communist party in our country.

"Again in May, revolutionaries from different States formed themselves into "All India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries" and requested the comrades still with the neo-revisionist clique and comrades in separate groups to join the AICCCR. They made it clear that all revolutionaries should realise the harm done to the Indian revolutionary movement by the existence of separate groups. As a result of these two public calls, many State Co-ordination Committees of Communist Revolutionaries joined the AICCCR. But our Andhra Co-ordination Committee did not join them. The DC feels that this is a very regrettable Position.

"This DC approves the calls given by the AICCCR during December-May and agrees to join AICCCR. We hope the State Committee will approve the calls given by the AICCCR and join it. There was an amendment to delete the sentence: "It (DC) agrees to join the AICCCR, as it implied to do so directly with the AICCCR without continuing to be a part of State Co-ordination Committee and as it was not a correct procedure. This amendment was lost by 4 to 3 votes.

In this manner, the cause for delay in joining the AICCCR has been made clear through their writings and actions as basic differences on ideological and organisational matters between the AICCCR and Andhra CC. On this, the State Committee felt the cause of unity amongst revolutionaries would be advanced only through direct talks and expressing the mutual stand points and then join the AICCCR. The State Committee continued the discussions with the AICCCR. On this matter, we reported to the Srikakulam Committee.

It is not correct to say by the time the District Committee passed that resolution, all the revolutionaries in all States had joined the AICCCR. In Bengal itself 5 groups were outside. In Kerala, Kosalram and K. P. R. Gopalan's groups were outside. In Tamilnad one group was outside. Even Kashmir group did not have contacts with it. All these comrades are working on the basis of Mao's Thought. They are trying to understand each other and carry dis-

cussions with the AICCCR to come together. It is now clear: not only Andhra CC but there are others also in other States, comrades who want to come to a clear understanding on problems through discussion with a view to join the AICCCR.

Not only that. In this resolution the DC did not mention anywhere that they wanted to join the AICCCR because the Andhra Committee opposed armed struggle. They expressed regret for the Andhra CC not joining the AICCCR and stated they were joining the AICCCR after approving the call of the AICCCR.

Similarly, though they did June resolution in favour of armed resistance, the DC Committee asked for permission to start armed struggle. Joining the AICCCR and asking permission for armed struggle are mutually contradictory approaches. Nor it wanted permission and technical assistance from the State Committee which decided accordingly. Then when did we oppose armed struggle? The DC through their decision made it clear about their action 'to agree to join the AICCCR'. They also immediately joined them. This was confirmed by "Liberation" later on. In December 1968 "Liberation" wrote as follows:

"Very recently they (revolutionaries of Srikakulam: Sc) have joined the AICCCR and thus they have now access to the rich experiences of the revolutionaries throughout India".

The DC decision and the subsequent endorsement by the AICCCR make it very clear that the DC rejected the leadership of the State Committee in September 1968 i.e., long before the starting of the armed struggle. The AICCCR had also approved it. Establishing direct links with the leadership of Venkatarathnam group who worked against the State Committee, was part of their activities.

The DC in its resolution wanted the State Committee to join the AICCCR. But this was only formal. Because even after the State Committee joined the AICCCR, the DC was acting independently. It never recognised the State Committee leadership. Eventhough the DC thus resolved and is working directly after joining the AICCCR, arrangements were completed for giving guerilla training to the remain-

ing leading cadre in the Dist. The State Committee met and decided to join the AICCCR. In the resolution passed by DC on armed struggle, though there were lapses (as already pointed out), the State Committee agreed for the starting of the armed struggle.

In this situation, in the beginning of October (8th) important leaders of DC met at Eluru. In the meeting, the State representatives explained the above resolutions of the State Committee. But the DC rejected them and refused to receive guerilla training. As a result of this all arrangements made towards that had to be cancelled. After the meeting, the leading cadre of DC went to Krishna, Guntur, W. Godavari Districts, directly contacted important activists there and tried to detach them from the State Co-ordination Committee. They established direct contacts with various groups working with Venkatarathnam group and carried on their activities. Venkatarathnam group, even by then, had contacts with some local units of Srikakulam Dt. (Boddepadu etc.).

The State representatives attended the AICCCR meeting held in October 1968. After discussions with leaders, it became clear there were no basic differences between them regarding following: Owing allegiance to Mao's Thought characterising the Soviet revisionist leadership as adopting and pushing imperialist policies, rejection of parliamentary path and recognition of armed struggle as the immediate problem. It was also made clear to the AICCCR the views expressed by some State representatives on the question of elections were not that of the committee and even the State Committee felt that they had over-emphasised the matter. It was also made clear the main reason for not coming out of the Marxist party after the Burdwan Plenum was not the desire to carry on the inner party struggle from within the Marxist Party but to be of help to the ordinary comrades by giving our alternate line so as to enable them to decide which side to take; and towards this end, we violated the party discipline at every step finally gave a call for revolt and came out. So it was wrong to call all this as opportunistic which was against reality. All these were reported by the AICCCR leaders to representatives of the Srikakulam district who were present there on the invitation of the AICCCR itself.

On behalf of the State Co-ordination Committee, we pointed out to the Dt. Committee meeting held in November (by then the December issue of Liberation has not come out) with a view to prepare the people to carry on immediate armed struggle in different parts of the State, it would be useful if the Srikakulam district unit, which was in the struggle area, worked with the State Co-ordination Committee on the basis of democratic Centralism and it would be good to observe the highest form of discipline through democratic centralism to carry on the highest form of struggle i.e., armed struggle. But the DC did not accept this suggestion, they made it clear they would work with the State Committee only on the basis of Co-ordination, they would implement such decisions which they accept and in respect of others they would act according to their own independent decisions.

After this meeting, they rallied people belonging to Venkatarathnam group in Krishna and Guntur districts and took them to Srikakulam Dt. Their leaders made it a particular point to slander the State leadership and create dissatisfaction among the comrades. Among those who went, there were some honest revolutionaries who desired to go and work among the people. There were some undesirables also.

In December two State Committee Secretariat members discussed with the Secretary of the Srikakulam Dt. Committee about tactics and measures to be taken after the armed struggle started and gave some suggestions. These were accepted by them. Along with this, they made it clear to the DC secretary that it would not be worth co-ordination if they established direct links with other districts and recruiting people who worked against the State Committee. Yet these DC comrades gradually took direction off establishing a rival centre. These developments would naturally cause distress when the need of the hour was to rally support and cooperation from all revolutionaries in the State behind the armed struggle going on now in Srikakulam Dist.

All this would make it clear that the propaganda against the State Committee that it opposes armed struggle is improper, incorrect and not genuine.

They also carried on another mispropaganda that the State Co-ordination Committee banned the distribution of the pamphlets issued by the Dt. Committee. The DC distributed all its pamphlets through its own group. They did not distribute through State or District Committees. As such the question of banning did not arise. This is nothing but an attempt made to justify their action of distribution of pamphlets through their own group.

Thus, all attempts by the State Committee, working under heavy odds, to improve relations between the State Committee and the District ended in failure. Yet the State Committee is trying its best to help the armed struggle.

CLARIFICATIONS OF SOME ISSUES :

In view of the above explanations, it would be very clear how baseless it is to say that the State Committee was against armed struggle in the Srikakulam Girijan areas. On the other hand, it desired to start armed struggles as soon as possible. It worked to that end. It agrees that there are some short comings in this effort. The main shortcomings are: Failure to make preparations for armed resistance even before the police raids began in the beginning of March 1968, failure to make necessary arrangements to quickly complete guerilla training, failure to allot one comrade on behalf of the centre to check up the preparations. The last two failures reflect only the organisational weaknesses of the centre and not its under-standing. As for the first, the State Committee was not even constituted by the time the police raids began. The State Committee was constituted only after the raids started. Till then, State leaders used to carry on their previous responsibilities in the various areas.

Though these are the difficulties yet objectively these were failures. To correct the position, even now it becomes necessary to make organisational arrangements.

But there was unanimity among DC comrades as to when and how the struggle should start. If we examine the various opinions expressed during discussions, it would be clear there were some differences.

ARMED STRUGGLE — LAND PROBLEM :

Some comrades in the DC and outside are

of the following opinion: The struggle we are conducting now is liberation struggle. This has no immediate relation to the land problem or the system of exploitation by landlords. This would remain as a problem to be resolved after liberation was achieved. Build peoples army, liberate the rural areas and liberate the cities. For this we have to establish base areas.

Today, all the peasant armed struggles bursting out in various regions of our country are liberation struggles i.e., for seizure of power. Even the struggles which have not reached the stage of armed struggle, if developed with this understanding and taken to higher forms, they would also develop as armed struggles and liberation struggles. At this time, when in the country there is a revolutionary situation, all the peasant struggles will have the class character. But the starting, developing, consolidating and extension of all these struggles will have to be based on agrarian revolutionary programme only. Liberation for the peasant means liberation from landlord - imperialist system. Though complete liberation is attained only after the establishment of base areas after seizure of power throughout India and after establishment of New Democratic Govt. liberation begins with the starting of the class struggles, with the starting of the class struggles, with the starting of anti-landlord struggles, with the starting of the Agrarian Revolutionary programme.

The experience of the Srikakulam Dist. also prove the same. From 1959 we built a broad-based mass movement of Girijans rallying them against exploitation by feudal landlord, Govt. officers. With the occupation of lands in the possession of landlords, taking possession of crops, cancellation of debts, the movement reached a higher stage and the situation is ripe for armed struggle.

Peasants fight not only against imperialism but against feudalism also. So before and after starting armed struggle, we have to advance basing on agrarian revolutionary programme. So to protect the gains of the struggles, to extend them, we will combine armed struggle and will carry on the struggle.

But it would be wrong to confine this armed struggle to land problem or problems

connected with feudal exploitation only. Armed struggle should be carried on with the ultimate aim of seizing power. We must create this consciousness in the people. In regions under feudal exploitation, the peasantry will gain this consciousness in the course of struggle against such exploitation.

This question arises before us: Is it absolutely necessary to continue this anti-feudal struggle in all places and occasions for a number of years, before we could reach the stage of armed struggle? To this we may reply: It is not necessary. Today the presence of a revolutionary situation the influence of armed struggle that began in various regions, a revolutionary leadership owing allegiance to Mao's Thought, which inculcate the required consciousness to seize power all those thus create a situation in which, without the necessity to continue a long drawn struggle and within a short time there are opportunities to reach the stage of armed struggle. Revolutionaries should use these opportunities fully and develop armed struggle.

Where there is no naked feudal exploitation, where it is not so intensive or where it is absolutely nonexistent, the problem arises, how are we to combine armed struggle? In those places there would be other forms of exploitation which depend on Govt. Officers, imperialists or others. We have to carry on struggles against such exploitation. On all occasions capture of power would be main criterion. So the problem does not depend on the seriousness of exploitation. The struggle against exploitation will be utilised to reach quickly the stage of struggle for seizure of power. So we have to make use of it to the extent possible.

If we attempt to continue armed struggle leaving aside the agrarian revolutionary programme or the gains during the struggle, participation of rural folk in the armed struggle would be weakened. Gradually it would be on the decrease. Thus the very armed struggle would be weakened with the danger of collapse.

For the rural folk, liberation from feudalism means giving land to the tiller; any liberation struggle not related to this would be abstract for them.

Armed Struggle and the Role of the Masses.

Guerilla struggle is the peoples armed struggle. Without the participation of the people, no guerilla struggle would succeed. Similarly, to begin guerilla struggle, participation by the masses becomes necessary.

When agrarian revolution begins, the Govt. would send armed forces to suppress it and brutal repression would be unleashed against the masses. In such a situation, the mass upsurge which would have been there before the raids, would not bethere after that. Activity would decrease. In many places there may be temporary lull. The revolutionaries often face such a problem. Could we start guerilla struggle during such lull periods? Or not? Some comrades argue that even at such times, we could begin.

According to our experiences of mass movements, in the present circumstances, such a lull would be only temporary. During such a lull, revolutionaries should revive their links with the masses, carry on political propoganda, move them as far as possible on mass issues and prepare for the ensuing struggle. Then it will not be long for the people to move into struggle. But this time the mass upsurge may not be so extensive. But this mass upsurge would increase many times the hatred against the enemy and the armed forces and incrate stronger determination to fight against them through to the end. This would immensely help to increase the fighting mettle of the masses and the guerilla squads. This would also create a broad mass base for Guerilla struggles. This advantage would not be there for guerilla struggles that begin without mass participation. Also there is a possibility of people exhibiting weaknesses while facing enemy armed raids.

This does not mean it would be wrong to resist in any form the enemy raids during such lull periods. Only by resisting enemy raids even during such times we could prepare the masses and militants for the ensuing guerilla struggles. Forms of resistance could be decided according to the level of consciousness of the movement. Primarily we should carry on our resistance with whatever arms available with the people. Through such organised resistance masses and militants would learn the first lessons of guerilla warfare.

Even the experiences of Srikakulam make this clear. After the armed police carried on raids from March to May 68, masses were temporarily terrorised. But revolutionaries stood firmly in the midst of the masses and so there was some mass move by the time of harvest. Even after that, as a result of the continued activity of the cadre, the masses were prepared for the higher form of struggle going on now. We must recognise that the trend which says during a lull period, it is not possible for masses and militants to resist with whatever locally available arms, is wrong.

GUERILLA STRUGGLE - TRAINING :

To the question whether minimum military training was necessary or not before starting struggle, the correct answer would be in the affirmative only.

Our basic principle is that guerillas learn guerilla tactics during guerilla struggles only. yet when these exploiting classes banned the use of fire arms-let along giving military training for the masses it is necessary for the guerillas and guerilla leaders to have minimum military training.

If the guerillas had to enter the struggle straight away this minimum had to be given to him in the front itself. Ordinarily it is better to begin after giving. minimum training. Even this training should not be on the model of rules lasting for months. It is better to complete it in a few days time depending upon place and circumstances.

To protect oneself and destroy the enemy- this is [the general principle of war. We have to apply this in the guerilla warfare also through minimum training. We though weak, learn to beat the stronger enemy, skill can be attained in the front. In the beginning we would incur some losses. Only to avoid such losses to guerillas and leaders, it is necessary to have minimum military training.

PROBLEM OF COMMAND

Armed struggle is going on in Srikakulam Dist. We are attempting to develop armed struggle in other parts of the State. At an appropriate time the struggle will start in these areas. It is necessary to carry on these struggles under one command. Then only there

would be an opportunity to develop these armed struggles according to one plan.

In guerrilla struggles, the leadership would not be completely centralised. Similarly there would not be complete decentralisation. As far as strategy is concerned, there would be a centralised leadership. In relation to wars and battles there would be decentralisation.

Within these limits, there should be relations between the leadership both at local and higher levels. Complete centralisation, as in military wars, is wrong. Similarly in guerrilla war, complete decentralisation is wrong. By this, it would not be possible to effectively face the enemy forces. Mao, while explaining the principles of guerrilla warfare, has given due importance to this.

In the name of co-ordination, we revolutionaries are working on individual basis. At this time, it is but natural for trends of decentralisation to raise their heads. We must fight against this. We must see that in any area, struggles are carried on under one command.

UNITED FRONT:

For the victory of the armed struggle which we carry on, United Front is one of the important weapons used by the party. We should never give up our idea of UF organisation in our propaganda and activity. Which class will lead this UF? what are the basic classes? Which classes will be brought into UF? We must have clarity on these issues. Similarly we should know our enemies. If we lack this clarity, enemies may escape from our attacks. Persons, who are not our enemies, may be attacked unnecessarily by us. If we are to avoid such a situation, we must have a correct understanding of the United Front.

The pamphlet published by the Srikulam committee completely lack this understanding. They correctly wrote: All peasantry in the district are exploited by landlords, money lenders, bureaucratic officials and are like living corpses. They wrote: In the future, students, teachers and N. G. O. and other associations will move on a larger scale, because in future their position would deteriorate. Though there are many limitations for Associations under

reactionary and reformist leadership, in coming into struggles, there is a possibility of middle classes coming into struggles in future on an increased scale.

These points have been stated correctly. But they have not even touched about the working class which should lead the united front and about national bourgeoisie, which could join the UF and for whose joining there are possibilities. Similarly, it did not even give an outline of the agrarian revolutionary programme, which has to be implemented to abolish feudalism.

We must build a United Front for the overthrow of imperialism, comprador bourgeoisie and feudalism, under the leadership of working class, with worker-peasant alliance as basis and including middle class and national bourgeoisie. Our revolutionary war will be Peoples War. This is Peoples Democratic Revolution.

The said pamphlet lacks this perspective. It creates an impression that power could be seized without any necessity of united front and by overthrowing the ruling classes through armed struggles.

By this, we must note, there is a possibility of creating some confusion in sections which co-operate with us or remain neutral.

The inseparable relation between the party, armed struggle and United Front was well explained by Chairman Mao in the following lines:

"Our eighteen years of experience show that the United Front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The United Front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle. And the party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy's positions. This is how the three are related to each other." Vol II P. 295

These lines by Com. Mao Tse-tung must be implicitly followed not only in the far off future but while implementing our immediate programme.

Comrades,

Here we have explained the developments that came about in the course of revolutionary struggle of the Girijan areas of Srikakulam Dist. Also the problems that arose in that connection and the attitude we should have towards it. After this explanation, if any body says that State Co-ordination Committee was against continuation of armed struggle or tried to weaken it all that would be completely baseless and slanderous. If the above given points are examined, the State Committee was never against armed struggle whether armed resistance or regular guerilla struggle. Also in 1968 June itself, it gave the Srikakulam committee a clear programme for armed struggle without any reservations. It began necessary preparation for starting regular guerilla struggle. If all these efforts have not come to fruition, the responsibility is entirely on the DC which attempted to establish a rival centre against the State Committee.

But there were differences between the State Committee and the DC in relation to various issues. Briefly they are as follows:

1. The DC denies the necessity for ordinary armed resistance which is the beginning stage for regular guerilla struggles. During repression, the State Committee feels it necessary for such armed resistance.

2. The DC feels no necessity for minimum training for regular training. The State Committee feels it necessary.

3. The DC feels there was no need of mass participation. They feel masses will move by themselves, when once we start armed struggle. State Committee feels the guerilla struggle must begin with mass participation.

4. The DC feels that armed struggle could be carried without any relation to issues like land in the agrarian revolution. They say this itself is liberation struggle. But the State Committee feels that there is inseparable relationship between agrarian revolution and armed struggle.

5. In the view of the State Committee when armed struggle is carried on we should have a perspective of United Front. The DC lacks such perspective.

6. The State Committee feels, for proper conducting of armed struggle there should be unity between State and District Committees based on principle of democratic centralism; and the armed struggle should be carried on with centralised leadership. But the path taken by the DC is to create a rival centre and disunity among the revolutionaries and the revolutionary movement.

All these differences come to the surface even in the beginning of the armed struggle itself. We have to wait and see how these will develop as the movement advances.

We have not received any authentic details about the armed raids carried on from the beginning of armed struggle. Yet there is news that generally masses are participating in them. This is commendable. They may argue that it was the result of starting armed struggle. But this is not correct. There was an indication of this development even in August and September 68. Then we had not started armed struggle. These changes (of mass participation) are the result of waiting till the masses moved.

There is a good future for the Srikakulam armed struggle started on the basis of a deep and concrete revolutionary peasant movement. We wish this struggle to advance. The advance of this struggle, would be helpful to the advancement of the struggles in other areas. If the District leadership adopts correct tactics with correct perspective and carries on the armed struggle, it would best back the armed attacks of the ruling classes and would be able to advance. We must carefully study the experience of the Srikakulam struggle.

Now, we pay our homage to martyrs who laid their lives in the Srikakulam Girijan struggle. Let us pledge to carry forward their objectives. In our country let us destroy imperialism, comprador bourgeoisie, bureaucratic capitalism and feudalism, and establish New Democracy. For this let us build up rural revolutionary bases and carry forward the armed struggle.

This is possible in the present national and international situation under the banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought. Let us go forward for the victory of Revolution.

; VICTORY IS OURS ;

Some facts relating to the revolutionary Girijan movement of Srikakulam

[The Girijan movement in Srikakulam was reaching a higher level towards the end of 1966. The then congress government started severe repression by deploying armed police to suppress the movement. The month of march '68 saw a severe wave of repression starting with two major raids on March 3 and 4 in which women were raped and two girijans were killed by police bullets in addition to committing atrocities on the girijans on a mass scale. The people put up resistance to the police attacks.

Various groups have commented on the developments connected with the Srikakulam struggle to suit their wrong politics. As a result, certain important facts have not seen the light of the day. We are giving here some relevant extracts from a review of the activities of the communist revolutionaries (1967-75) a draft prepared by comrade DV in 1977 for discussions in the then AP state committee of UCCRI (ML). -Ed]

Srikakulam District committee (DC), leading the mass movement in general and girijan Peasant movement in particular, had no correct perspective as to the direction (path) in which the future struggle had to be developed. But it was firm that it was to take the form of armed struggle at one time or other. When the P.C. itself had neither understanding of the subject nor the perspective of developing the area into that of armed struggle, there is nothing extraordinary if the D.C. was put in such a situation. Notwithstanding this, the D. C.'s firmness expressed itself in utilising an extended D. C. meeting held in the last quarter of 1966, attended by comrade DV for the first time, to have a preliminary understanding of revolution *or* party organisation as well as *Tejangan* struggle, for which another class was organised

1. This refers to the Provincial Committee of the period before the split from CPM.

subsequently. The big rally of girijans at Sitampet organised on the occasion indicated the revolutionary mood of the people. It was clear enough to say that the girijan movement was taking the direction of Telangana Armed struggle. It was also announced as such.

The immediate next occasion was to have Comrade DV's classes on Telangana armed struggle and its important aspects together with its strength and weakness so that the comrades may have a clear understanding of the zig zags of the armed struggle when the party has to start and guide it. The comrades were highly receptive to the experiences and the lessons and a note of self confidence was found in them. It has worked as a correct background which forms a part of preparation for the armed struggle. At the same time, there was no clear perspective as to what to do when the movement actually takes the form of armed struggle, as far as PC is concerned ideological confusion can be attributed to this state of affairs. Consequently it could not take up to practical preparations. Objectively PC was limiting it to the legal forms of struggle.

There was a P.C. meeting held immediately after the elections were over. The review was on a beaten track. There was no indication of taking a departure from the past. In view of this Comrade DV advanced a proposal: let us concentrate our main energy, i.e., men and material resources in the backward and tribal areas of all the districts where feudal relations are strong and there is severe oppression so that we may develop a mass revolutionary movement of a higher level within a span of comparatively short period. These are the areas which are going to be centres of future struggles of a higher order. We are praising the Srikakulam movement, especially the girijan movement for its speedy growth. But we are not drawing any lessons from it to apply them in other places so that our mass peasant movement may rapidly advance. This was the proposal. There was no response to it from any quarter of the P.C. excepting one who suggested that P.C. should take note of the suggestion seriously. P.C. dropped the proposal without taking any decision.

In this connection, it is pertinent to reveal the contents of a discussion between the trend from which the above proposal had come out and a few important comrades, namely Sundarayya and Basavapunnayya who are still holding the highest posts in the CPI (M). When it was proposed by Com. DV that we should concentrate our efforts in building up peasant revolutionary movement in tribal areas which have a favourable terrain for developing armed struggle, the contention from the other side was that the tribal population is smaller in number when compared to the area, scattered, living in smallest possible groups who can not give us an adequate protection. The massacres of tribal population will be unlimited to the point of extermination of the tribe which is fighting. They cited the example of Telangana where the massacres have taken place rather on a large scale together with applying other tortures and cruel methods. Obviously it is a defeatist trend. It had made its appearance during Telangana Armed Struggle, when it took a turning point immediately after "Police Action" (September 1948) when developing guerilla zones were overwhelmed by the Union Government's military. And it had raised its head again when armed struggle was on the agenda in the Srikakulam District and when the movement was to be developed with a perspective of developing it to higher levels. The subject came in for discussion in the CC meeting held before Burdwan Plenum.

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There is a shortcoming in our leadership in the form of certain failures regarding taking proper steps in proper time. We have accepted them in the following terms as long back as in April 1969:

"It (State Committee) agrees that there are certain shortcomings in this effort. The main shortcomings are: Failure to make preparations for armed resistance even before the police raids began in the beginning of March 1968, failure to make necessary arrangements to quickly complete guerilla training, failure to allot one comrade on behalf of the centre to check up the preparations. The last two failures reflect only the organisational

weaknesses of the centre and not its understanding. As for the first, the State Committee was not even constituted by the time the police raids began. The State Committee was constituted only after the raids started. Till then State leaders used to carry on their previous responsibilities in the various areas. Though these are the difficulties, yet objectively these were failures." Some problems connected with Srikakulam Grijjan movement; See chapter, 'Clarification of some issues'.)

This is how the State Committee had recognised its failures in unequivocal terms. Even then we have to go deep into the matter to find out the root cause. It is a fact that the State (Coordination) Committee was formed (in the second week of March '68, though it took some process and time before it was formed) after the Police raids in Srikakulam had begun. Was it not possible for the comrades who were at the helm of affairs to take stock of the situation and decide the tasks accordingly? Yes, it was. The fact of the matter was there were two trends among the leadership. One² was 'We must give priority to ideological struggle while conducting the Srikakulam struggle as usual. The other trend³ was that both are inseparable and should be coordinated in such a way as to strengthen and advance each other. The former did not realise that it had reached a level wherein it was taking the form of armed struggle; unless the leadership prepares for and organises it from the very beginning, it could not be a success especially in the face of the armed might of the state which was sure to come into the picture. The other trend⁴ was in a minority. Therefore it could not take initiative in taking the matter directly to the Srikakulam D.C. (District committee). It had confined itself to developing another area (Warangal), which was a prospective resistance area in the immediate future. Even in the first meeting of the formally constituted State Coordination Committee, this trend⁴ appeared in the form of advocating "passive resistance".

2. C. Pulla Reddy was one of those who represented this majority trend.
3. Comrade DV represented this trend.
4. the majority.

though it had not asserted itself in spite of being in majority. The Committee had empowered one of its members⁵ to take all necessary steps which were necessary to defend and advance the movement. The timing of actual forming of the Committee, and its coming into the open formally, was different from each other, and there was a gap of about 3 months, which should be taken into account. The armed resistance programme, with the help of country bombs, bows and arrows, axes etc., was decided before Burdwan Plenum itself, though it was late by about 20 days or a month⁶ by the time the actual police raids had begun. The actual and concerned dates are as following:

March 3, 1968:	Large-scale police raids have commenced.
March 4, 1968:	Police firings and death of grijjan.
March 9-11, 1968:	Formation and first meeting of the State Coordination Committee.
March 29, 1968:	Srikakulam D. C. meeting
April 1st week:	Burdwan plenum
June 1st week, '68:	Meeting of the comrades from districts and State Coordination Committee comes into the open.
June 16, 1968:	D. C. meeting of Srikakulam.

The above dates show that there was a time gap of 6 days between the beginning of police

5. Comrade DV
6. Comrade DV was ready to start to the struggle-area as soon as the meeting of the State Coordination Committee was over (March 11) to help the district committee to organise resistance. But the State Committee Member who was also the Srikakulam District Committee Secretary (V. Ramalinga Chari) prevented him by saying that it was not possible to take Com. DV there in view of repression, and that he will make necessary arrangements after going there. Since the place was new to Com. DV, he could not go there on his own. This resulted in the above-mentioned delay which assumed importance in the crucial period.

raids and the formation of the State Coordination Committee etc. The responsibility of the comrades who were functioning as an informal committee was such that a decision should have been taken when the police camps were being set up. The sweep of the mass upsurge which was witnessed earlier demands from the leadership a foresight and a timely decision.

Failing this, it becomes necessary on the part of the local leadership to take an on-the-spot decision to put up resistance in spite of the organisational consequences we had to face. Nothing untoward would have happened even if the leadership took such a decision. Or it could have contacted the centre immediately to take some tentative decisions to be implemented there and then, pending adoption of a comprehensive programme by the respective committees.

It was not that we did not have means to overcome difficulties we were facing technically or otherwise. It was because the majority trend was giving priority to the ideological struggle as if armed struggle will come into conflict with the former. On the contrary both will strengthen each other. Instead of realising this, it was wrong and opportunistic on the part of a section of leadership (C. Pulla Reddy in the Convention 1969) to say that since it had no objective report from the district, the leadership could not take a timely decision. Assuming it was so, what was the obstacle for the leadership to go over to the district, get the first hand report and then take a correct and timely decision? Therefore it is wrong to accuse the concerned comrades of not providing the correct information to the leadership. It serves the purpose of only evading the responsibility. We leave it for the district leadership to self-critically examine what they should have done in the given situation.

But when we go further into the question, certain other factors need to be examined. The P.C. (State Coordination Committee), after a thorough-going discussion with the District Committee, took the belated decision for armed resistance (active and not passive) even before the Burdwan

plenum (1st week of April, 1968), and the necessary arrangements were made to this effect. But they could not materialise, not because of the P.C. leadership's political failure, but because of other reasons. As far as the P.C. leadership is concerned, it had failed to provide the necessary money and material barring the bare minimum and it was the majority trend which is to be held responsible for this betrayal.

How did it happen?

There was no clarity among the majority of the leadership as to the application of Mao Tsetung thought not only to the Indian situation in general, but also to specific issues facing the people in a given situation. Srikakulam girljan struggle was one such issue, which was basic, and which decided whether the leadership possessed the required understanding to take the revolutionary movement a step ahead.

Besides this, there was a contending trend, i.e., left-adventurism, which was growing every passing day. It was influencing the revolutionary movement and communist revolutionaries all over India. The movement and the organisation including the Srikakulam was no exception to it. This trend has appeared elsewhere in Andhra also. The majority in the P.C. leadership was showing a conciliatory attitude towards this trend, when even the question of carrying on a struggle against it had come up for discussion. This trend, while taking a conciliatory attitude towards the left-adventurist elements inside and outside our organisation, could not realise what would be its adverse effects on the Srikakulam mass movement, organisation and the leadership. This attitude should be understood within the framework of its wrong strategy of giving priority to the ideological struggle, which was inseparable from the class struggle if it were to be real ideological struggle. The latter struggle was supposed to be against neo-revisionism, which never took a concrete shape excepting propagating about its parliamentary path and anti-CPC stand.

This trend made its appearance in Nalgonda District leadership in the form of individual assassination. It was not a new incident of its kind

7. From February 20, 1968 onwards.

because such incidents occurred even earlier. When it was pointed out that it was a wrong step, the District Committee seemed to have accepted its mistake. But subsequent events have shown that it had adhered to the wrong trend to the last.

What then was the understanding of the minority trend and its struggle against the majority?

There are no written documents which go to show that there was such a struggle because there was no confrontation as such inside the committee meetings. It seemed as though a common understanding was reached after the discussion was over on the concerned point. When the practice showed otherwise, it was explained away as an individual mistake or was underplayed of its significance. On the contrary, the minority trend had rather clear understanding of the stage of the revolution, strategy, programme and path. It was also clear in its mind that a principled ideological struggle linked with class struggle was necessary to establish a correct line which was yet to be evolved. It had its own area of practice, which was to be developed as an area of armed struggle in the near future besides that of Srikakulam. Starting of armed struggle was not possible simultaneously because of the unwholeness of the level of mass movement. Beginning and development of mass movement was planned and the necessary spade-work was done accordingly.

All these factors, taken in their totality, have weakened our vigilance and preparedness for meeting the requirements of developing Srikakulam struggle which was fast taking the form of armed struggle.

Simultaneously with the circulation of this document, the Provincial Committee took a decision to organise a mass campaign in which

heroic Telangana armed struggle (1946-51) was highlighted. It was implemented with all the seriousness it deserves because of the importance of armed struggle of Telangana and the need for activating the party and the masses. An inspiring book called "Heroic Armed Struggle of Telangana People" was written by one of the PCMs. The book was based on notes by the Comrades who had participated in the struggle directly, together with a detailed notes of the classes on the subject. He had tried to introduce in it, his own ideas which are the roots for his theory of premature armed actions and modified individual terrorism. But they have been removed after repeated efforts. Even then one can notice that it does not contain any lessons which are worth mentioning. Incidentally he was the comrade who was conciliatory to left adventurism, but unreconciled to Charu Majumdar personally.

Though there was a simultaneous Solidarity Campaign for Srikakulam Struggle and against government's repression (as was decided in the P. C.), the Telangana campaign overshadowed the latter. This had raised doubts in the minds of the district leaders about the sincerity of purpose and seriousness of the Provincial leadership as far as the armed struggle in the district was concerned. The P.C. leadership knew full well that they had gone a long way in drifting towards left adventurism.

There were three tendencies which were expressed in this connection. There was a tendency which was the main force behind the initialing this campaign to misuse the unique place which the Telangana armed struggle had in the minds of people, ranks and cadres, so as to tone down the importance and significance of Srikakulam peasant revolutionary movement especially when it was on the agenda of the party and when the division between P.C. and

8. The reference is to "Lay Foundations for a Struggle-Oriented Mass Movement". It is included in the book, "Agrarian Revolution and Our Tasks" by Com. DV.

9. C. Pulla Reddy

10. by Com. DV

11. by Com. DV who was bed-ridden at the time with an attack of typhoid.

12. It was led by C. Pulla Reddy

D.C. was widening every passing day. There was another tendency which did not realise this danger and fell a victim to it by supporting the former's line. But there was yet another tendency which realised this danger.¹³ At the same time, it was too weak¹⁴ to prevent the campaign taking a diversionist direction in the given situation. Here it should be remembered that the P.C., while making its efforts to win over the Srikakulam D.C. leadership, had decided to limit itself to the rest of the forest areas, especially Warangal, Khammam, Karacmnagar, East and West Godavari districts which were within the fold of its organisation. The step was in no way meant to belittle the significance of Srikakulam revolutionary movement, or to organise parallel, rather rival, movement to that of Srikakulam. On the contrary its sole purpose was to develop an agrarian revolutionary movement step by step so as to take the form of armed struggle, which will be a part of our efforts to build a base area in the whole of the

region in course of time. Obviously such an effort would have a positive and helpful impact not only on the Srikakulam armed struggle but also on the rest of the country especially in surrounding areas. We (the revolutionary trend) were also clear that Srikakulam armed struggle had to bear the main brunt of severest counter-revolutionary armed repression till the guerilla zones are developed in the surrounding areas as well as in other parts of the country. (We had made this point clear to the Srikakulam District Committee in its meeting held in the month of March '68 before the Burdwan plenum. Of course it was possible to sustain and continue the armed struggle only if it were conducted on correct lines.)

Notwithstanding these serious shortcomings, the rank and file and the people were mobilised in the "rejuvenation" campaign, as it was called. It could have served as a starting point to build a struggle-oriented mass movement in the vast areas where the political campaign was already completed. But there was no follow up action in accordance with the guidelines provided in the document except in areas mentioned above, i.e., Mulugu area of Warangal and Konda Modalu area of East Godavari Dt. It was implemented in some parts of the plains of Warangal district also.

13. represented by Com. DV.

14. Com. DV was not present in the committee meeting which took this decision as he was bed-ridden with typhoid. After he came to know of it, he warned the responsible members of the danger. But by that time the campaign was already on.
