


LEFT-DEVIATION
WITHIN THE PARTY



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The Proletarian Line Publication

SUPPLEMENT

**"LEFT - DEVIATION
WITHIN
THE PARTY"**

FOREWORD

This is a document written with the purpose of continuing the struggle against 'left' opportunism existing among communist revolutionaries who were organised in Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee. The background of this document is given in its beginning. Suffice it to say that it brings forth all the important differences existing at the time and draws a line between the 'left' opportunist leadership that had never accepted their mistakes, except a few by way of omissions and commissions. Therefore it had to be fought to the bitter end. Subsequent documents show how this was done.

The group which represented this variety of 'left' opportunism, had subsequently merged in the other group led by S.N. Singh, forming into one group. The leadership continued to follow their wrong line, now with 'left' opportunism, now with right opportunism, all these years. Of late, they have been campaigning (for some time in the past) that while they have corrected their earlier mistakes i.e. of 'left' opportunism, it is we who took to their wrong line of 'left' opportunism. The occasion was our opposition to hobnobbing with Janata government in which they indulged. Now a section of the group says that such hobnobbing was wrong. We cannot go into their differences because it is not relevant to our subject.

Suffice it to say that if some had understood our correct line from 'left' opportunist angle, others understood it from right opportunism.

Therefore both are 'criticising' us. The period during which Janata party was in power, right opportunism has been a dominant feature because it was opposed to Congress (I) with a policy of marginal independence and democratic rights. Such a situation created illusions among them, because of their opportunism. There are no indications that they are correcting themselves ever since. Now that there is a Congress (I) regime, there is every possibility of change in the form or variety of opportunism which they are following.

Therefore, the struggle will continue. Our friends and wellwishers may ask: how long this struggle will continue? Is there no end to it? When are we going to achieve the Unity? Our reply is we are born in the struggle; we are growing in the struggle; we are uniting in the struggle. Therefore the struggle we are carrying is not for disruption but for unity. And we are having it. The groups will continue to exist for a long time to come. But they cannot provide correct guidance to the Indian Revolution. Therefore their existence has a secondary importance or no importance at all; as revolution is concerned.

With a correct line and a correct understanding, we are able to provide guidance to Indian revolution. We are confident that it takes no time the party which bases itself on this line is formed. It will be another turning point in the advancing revolution of our country.

Dated : 20.2.1980.

LEFT-DEVIATION WITHIN THE PARTY

We, the Communist Revolutionaries, whose task is to build a revolutionary movement and a revolutionary party, guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought, carry on a ceaseless struggle against all trends opposed to it. As the revisionism is the main danger, we should carry on a ceaseless ideological and political struggle against the revisionist parties. As the line followed by the C.P.I.(M.L.) is a "Left" line, we should also carry on a struggle against it. Besides we should grasp the wrong trends as and when they raise their heads within our Party and carry on inner-party struggle against all such trends. Only then can our party, solving the problems facing it, become ideologically, politically and organisationally fully united and consolidated. In absence of such an inner-party struggle, the party would become lifeless. It would, failing to grasp and solve the problems facing the Indian revolution, become incapable of leading the revolution.

In our struggle against neo-revisionism, we had based ourselves on the documents of C.P.C. published in connection with its struggle against the Krushchev-Breznev brand of revisionism. We exposed as to how under the guise of Marxist-Leninist phraseology the neo-revisionism is being propagated and practiced by neo-revisionists. Thus, our endeavour has greatly helped party cadres, the members and the sympathisers to free themselves from neo-revisionism and join together in an organisation guided by Mao's Thought.

It would not however be correct to say that by this we have succeeded in correctly applying Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought to the Indian conditions or to say that we have in so applying achieved complete unity within the party. We have, in our "Political-Organisational Report" pointed out some of the shortcomings in our understanding. The articles of the P.C. published in "Janasakti" and other media as well as its resolutions adopted on various occasions from the time of the formation of the State Co-ordination

Committee to the time of State Convention have to be further examined fully and self-critically. The "Left" influence of the Charu Mazumdar group which was heading AICCCR formed at Calcutta had also manifested itself as a trend among the Andhra revolutionaries. It was mainly the students, the youth and a section of the leadership that represented this trend.

Following this, some of them forming themselves into groups and establishing contacts with the followers of the AICCCR, had been carrying on their disruptive activities. Some of them had been carrying on their activities independent of the District Committees. They carried on a campaign that the armed struggle should be launched immediately throughout the Andhra and that the State Co-ordination Committee was opposed to it and hence the leadership of the All India Co-ordination Committee should be accepted. The Charu Mazumdar group had encouraged these disruptive activities at all levels.

The State Co-ordination Committee had to simultaneously face the revisionist line of neo-revisionists on one side and the "Left" line of the Charu Mazumdar group on the other. Refuting the neo-revisionist arguments that there was no revolutionary up surge and that there was no favourable conditions for armed struggle in India, we published an article in "Janasakti" (1968 Nov. Spl. issue). Basing ourselves on the experiences of Telangana armed struggle (1946-51) we had, in this article shown as to how, by providing leadership to the peoples, struggles with the strength of the existing organisation and the mass movement, it would be possible for advancing the revolutionary movement gradually to reach a higher stage and take the form of armed struggle. For the cadre, who were thinking as to how the armed struggle would be possible at this stage when the party and mass movement were weak, this article gave an understanding and self-confidence. To overcome the "Left" influence of the Charu Mazumdar group and to turn the cadre towards the mass movement, we

had sent the circular, "Lay the foundation for a struggle oriented mass movement" to the lower units. Keeping the organisational needs of the revolutionary movement in view, we had in this circular, dealt with the importance of different regions of the Andhra Pradesh and put forward the tactics for the revolutionary peasant movement as well as for the urban mass movement. A programme was put forward to free the mass movement from the Quagmire of the revisionism and to develop it as a struggle oriented mass movement. As against the Charu-Mazumdar's line of so called armed struggle which has nothing to do with the revolutionary mass movement, it laid down the primary tasks to be fulfilled in order to prepare the people for the people's armed struggle.

We based ourselves on the experiences of the Telangana armed struggle (1943-46) in preparing this circular. Had the District Committees discussed this circular, worked out a programme and carried it out, the mass movement in the districts would have not only advanced a step forward but also our struggle against the politics of the Charu Mazumdar group would have become easier. We could have turned away a considerable section of the cadre from the "Left" adventurist politics and won them over to our politics.

Why because, it would not be enough to simply carry on an ideological struggle against the "Left" adventurist politics of the Charu Mazumdar group. (besides, the "Left" adventurist ideology and politics were not yet so clear). Only when we apply Mao's thought in our practice and prepare the mass movement for the armed struggle, would our ideological struggle both against revisionism and left adventurism become easy, and a clear-cut and correct line would emerge. Any ideological struggle different from this would be vague and unrelated to practice. It is with this realisation that the P.C. had along with the ideological struggle, given importance to the building up of the revolutionary movement. Hence the circular "Lay the foundations for a struggle-oriented mass movement."

What is the programme worked out on the basis of this circular? How far this has been implemented? How far this has not been implemented? What are the results? How far

the D.C.'s are responsible in not implementing these questions should be examined. But we got good results in the plain areas of Nalgonda, Warangal and Khammam as well as in the forest areas of Warangal, Khammam and East Godavari where the circular was implemented. The mass movement has advanced. Our cadre, gaining confidence in the revolutionary movement, could stay with the masses without being swept away by the politics of Charu Mazumdar.

Prior to the State Convention, there arose some differences in the State Co-ordination Committee on certain questions. They are as follows.

1. The Charu Mazumdar group through its papers (Liberation and Deshabharti) and the committees affiliated to it had launched a campaign that there were serious differences between AICC (All India Co-ordination Committee) and the State Co-ordination Committee and that the State Co-ordination Committee was following opportunist and revisionist politics. In this situation there arose two opinions on the question of joining the A.I.C.C. One opinion was for the State Co-ordination Committee joining the A.I.C.C. in spite of this situation. The other opinion was for joining AICC after fully discussing the differences and working out the basis for a common programme of action. Since the majority of the members were of the former opinion, it was resolved to unconditionally join the A.I.C.C. In a situation where there was no common basis for working with the Charu Mazumdar group which was following a "Left" adventurist line, the State Co-ordination Committee had to soon break away from the A.I.C.C. (we joined in one meeting and broke away in the next.)

2. At a time when the State Co-ordination Committee had to concentrate all its energies on the preparations for armed struggle in the Sreekakulam District, it gave a call for "Telangana Movement Revival Week" (Oct.1968). Though, because of this the masses were mobilised and some good results were achieved in Telangana, Circar and Rayalaseema Districts this led the Sreekakulam comrades to doubt the attitude of the State Co-ordination Committee. This led to

an opinion among them that we were bringing up and counterposing the 1946-51 Telangana armed struggle to the Sreekakulam armed struggle and diverting the attention of the people of Andhra from the Sreekakulam struggle. Taking advantage of this, the Charu Mazumdar group tried to split the district committee from the state committee. Though it was their left adventurist politics that were mainly responsible for this split, these factors had also contributed to this.

3. There had been a strong trend in the State Co-ordination Committee that the Separate Telangana Movement was an anti-government movement, that we should support it and that we should become a part of the anti-government current. The writings in 'Janasakti' and the majority resolution of the State Co-ordination Committee were of this trend. There was another trend opposed to it. According to this trend this was a movement launched by a reactionary section of the ruling classes, in order to achieve their own ends by making use of the discontentment among the urban people and the students of Telangana. We should, without joining this movement, concentrate on the main enemy with our own independent slogans and programme while at the same time making it clear that the problems facing the people of Telangana could not be solved by formation of separate Telangana but could be solved only in a People's State. As we did not take this stand, our cadres and sympathisers were thrown into a helpless position. Many of them joined the separate Telangana movement.

4. There had already been differences on the question of our comrades seizing weapons from the American Missionary in the Manthana forest area of Karimnagar district. They were evident mainly in the local discussions (we would discuss this in detail later).

Though, along with it there were also differences on some more issues, it had however become clear during the discussions of the State Convention that there was unanimity on the "Immediate Programme" which was meant for preparing the people for armed struggle and on the main points of the Programme of People's Democratic Revolution.

Here one thing should be made clear about the "Immediate Programme". The draft on the Immediate Programme was drawn by the month of 'Jan' 1969. Owing to the crisis in the State Committee created by the disruptive activities of the Charu Mazumdar group, it was not discussed in the State Committee. The State Convention also could not be convened immediately. However, it was only basing on this that the programme was given to comrades working in the forest areas. Instead of sending circulars, this programme was given to them through the comrades attending the centre after discussing with them and ascertaining the level of the consciousness of the people as and when these comrades attend the centre. By that time, the circular, "Lay the foundations for a struggle oriented mass movement" had already reached all the districts.

Immediately after the State Convention, the armed actions were launched in Khammam district against the decisions of the State Convention and without the concern of the P.C. and with these armed actions it has become clear that not only there was no unanimity but also there were serious differences on the question of armed struggle in the party. The P.C. thoroughly discussed these differences in its July 1969 meeting. It was only on the basis of these discussions that the document "Some Problems facing the Khammam area revolutionary movement" was drafted.

The State leadership was arrested in the month of December 1969. The comrades outside the jail formed as P. C. centre and R. C.'s in April 1970 and began to work. From P. C. centre some documents were published in the name of P.C. A criticism on the document, "The Present Situation-Our Tasks" was also received from the P.C. centre. Lastly, as a "Reply" to the document, "Some Problems facing the Khammam area revolutionary mass movement" we received a criticism. An examination of this document would make it clear that there are differences in the party not only on the question of armed struggle, but also on important ideological, political and organisational questions and that the trend manifested in these is different from Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought. It is the aim of this document to discuss the main questions raised in these documents, to show as to how

the trend manifested in them is different from Marxism-Leninism Mao's Thought. It is the aim of this document to discuss the main questions raised in these documents, to show as to how the trend manifested in them is different from Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought and harmful to the very existence of the party itself.

1. FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTIONS.

In the Pamphlet, "The Armed Struggle in India - Some important aspects", that the P.C. centre published in the name of P.C., some aspects of the contemporary contradictions operative in the Indian Society are explained. While examining these contradictions we generally apply the contradictions formulated in the "General Line" ways as follows about the fundamental contradictions.

"The contradiction between socialist camp and the imperialist camp;

The contradiction between the Proletariat and the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries;

The contradiction between oppressed nations and imperialism; and The contradiction among the imperialist countries and among the monopoly capitalist groups"

("General Line of the International Communist Movement") Page:6

This understanding of fundamental contradictions is applicable even today. But with the transformation of Soviet Union into a social imperialist country, with the restoration of capitalism in most of the East European countries under the leadership of the revisionist parties, these countries have gone out of the socialist system. The Soviet Union has gone over to imperialist system. Therefore all these fundamental contradictions are also there in the Soviet Social system.

By the time of Second World War, Soviet Union had under the leadership of Stalin, developed into a big industrial country. Though during the Second World War the Soviet Union suffered heavy losses in terms of both man power and industry, it could, by carrying out reconstruction programmes, rapidly recover from the unprecedented losses in the industrial field and emerge as a great industrial country. It emerged

in the world as second only to America. It led socialist countries and the socialist system. After the death of Stalin and with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, first under the leadership of Khrushchev and then under the leadership of Brezhnev, betraying the Marxism-Leninism and going over to revisionism, the restoration of capitalism had first taken place in the Soviet Union. It has gradually developed into social imperialism.

As a result, there emerged a fundamental contradiction between Soviet social imperialist system and the socialist system. Joining the world imperialist strategy of military encirclement of the Socialist China, the China, which, under the leadership of Com. Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, is safeguarding Marxism-Leninism, the China which is the vanguard and the foundation of the socialist system, the social imperialists have concentrated their armed forces on the Sino-Russian borders. As against China, the Soviet Social imperialists have liberally supplied the military equipment to the reactionary Indian Government. They brought pressure economically, politically and in so many other ways to bear on China. They have also adopted the same attitude towards socialist Albania. These clashes and inimical attitude is only due to the fundamental contradiction between Soviet Social imperialism and socialist system. This is but a part of the fundamental contradiction between imperialism and the socialist system.

With the restoration of capitalist system in the Soviet Union a new type of bureaucratic monopoly capitalist class has come into power. In order to extract maximum profits and to safeguard its reactionary rule, this class is exploiting and oppressing the Soviet Working Class and Soviet people. Thus in the Soviet Union, there has arisen a fundamental contradiction between the bureaucratic monopoly capitalist class which is the ruling class on the one side and the working class and the people on the other. This contradiction is the same as the contradiction between the capitalist class and the working class of the capitalist countries.

The Bureaucratic monopoly capital is not only exploiting and oppressing only the working class

and the people of that country alone. They are also exploiting the people of other countries. They are safeguarding and maintaining the governments that are aiding and abetting this exploitation and oppression of the people. Thus there developed a contradiction between Soviet Social imperialism and the oppressed nations. The east European countries - Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany - under the leadership of the revisionist parties, are but the nations exploited and oppressed by the Soviet Social imperialism. There are fundamental contradictions between the people of these countries and the Soviet Social imperialism. Similarly the Social imperialism, in the name of aid and trade is exploiting a number of semi-colonial countries. (These are also called the developing countries). There is a fundamental contradiction between the Soviet Social imperialism and these nations.

There is a fundamental contradiction between revisionism and Maxism-Leninism. But there is not any fundamental contradiction within the revisionism. The differences between two revisionist groups of one and the same country, or the differences between the revisionist groups and cliques of two or more countries are not born of fundamental contradictions.

The path that Krushchev pursued and the path that Breznev has been pursuing after him in the Soviet Union is nothing but the path of revisionism. There isn't any fundamental contradiction between these two. At the time of the transfer of power from Krushchev to the Breznev clique, the question before them was whether Krushchev could carry on the Social imperialist path that safe-guards the bureaucratic monopoly capitalist class and deceive the people of Soviet Union better or the Breznev clique better. The change from Krushchev to Breznev was effected only with the view that Breznev could do it better than the former. It is wrong to view it as a contradiction between the revisionist cliques of the given country. But the difference and disputes about the revisionist policies and the method of their implementation are possible. The emergence of cliques and groups with fundamental contradictions is also possible in future.

Similarly, the working class struggles that recently raged in Poland were born of the fundamental contradiction between bureaucratic capitalist class and the working class. But Gomulka's going out of power and Sirimative clique's coming into power was not due to fundamental contradiction between these two groups. The question involved was as to which group can more effectively implement the revisionist policies and deceive the people. This can also be considered as a dispute or a difference of opinion.

The Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia was born of the fundamental contradiction between Soviet Social Imperialism and the people of Czech nation. But the ouster of Dubchek clique and emergence of Swaboda clique into power was not due to fundamental contradiction. The question involved was as to who were carrying on pro Soviet Social Imperialist policies more effectively.

With the replacement of the dictatorship of the Proletariat by the dictatorship of bureaucratic monopoly capitalist class and with the transformation of Soviet Union into social imperialism, the Soviet Union is in contradiction with the other imperialists not as a socialist country but as a social imperialist country. The West Asia can be taken as an example to show that this contradiction is getting accounted. The Soviet Union and America taking sides with Arab countries and Israel respectively and supporting them with arms, the Arab-Israel war, the continuation of Israel aggression till today - all this is only due to the contradiction between the Soviet Social Imperialism and American Imperialism.

Similarly, if we explain the bureaucratic monopoly capitalist class which is in power in the Soviet Union, it becomes clear that this is a new type of capitalist class. At present there is only one Party in Power. It is not yet clear if the split have already taken place in the bureaucratic monopoly capitalist class and cliques and groups have emerged in the Party also. But it cannot be definitely said that they would not emerge in future. When the splits occur, these splits would only be the reflection of the splits within the bureaucratic monopoly capitalist class which is the class basis of the Soviet Social imperialism.

Since the Bureaucratic monopoly capitalist class, the class basis of the social imperialism, is a new type of capitalist class, since it is pursuing its social imperialist policies in the name of socialism and internationalism, and since it is pushing the contradictions between the social imperialism and American imperialism and other imperialist as anti-American and anti-imperialist, the illusion among the people of the Soviet Union, East European countries and other countries would continue to remain for some time more. Ceaseless ideological struggle, building up of revolutionary mass movement, developing the armed struggles, strictly adhering to Marxism-Leninism-Mao's thought at all times and in all situations it is by this and this alone that we can carry on the struggle against these illusions and fulfil the task of exposing and isolating the social imperialism. Instead, viewing the accentuation of contradictions within the Soviet Social imperialism in a mechanical and artificial way - even though the accentuation of the contradictions is true from a long range perspective and formulating that internationally it is already enmeshed in a crisis will not only be a hasty step on our part but also it would not be of any immediate advantage for the Indian revolution.

2. CONTRADICTIONS THAT OPERATE IN THE COURSE OF OUR REVOLUTION :

Com. Mao suggests the following method for studying the contradictions in the contemporary society of a given country. Let us examine and apply it to the condition of our country.

Com. Mao says that:

"There are many contradictions in the course of development of any major thing. For instance, in the course of China's bourgeois democratic revolution, where the conditions are exceedingly complex, there exist the contradiction between all the oppressed classes in Chinese Society and imperialism, the contradiction between the great masses of people and feudalism, the contradiction between the Proletariat and bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie on the one hand and the bourgeoisie on the

other the contradiction between the various reactionary ruling groups, and so on."

(On contradiction; S. W. P. 667.)

The contradictions that comrade Mao has cited here are the contradictions that come up in the course of the bourgeois democratic revolution. It means that contradictions operating in the course of socialist revolution would be different. There is possibility for some more of such contradictions.

If we apply this formulation in the contemporary society of India, it would be found that our country is also in the stage of People's democratic revolution of a bourgeois democratic character. Hiding behind the big bourgeoisie and feudalism, the imperialists and the social imperialists are plundering our country also. For this reason, these contradictions exist in our society also in the course of People's democratic revolution of our country. The definite form of these contradictions is as follows :

i) THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN IMPERIALISM AND THE OPPRESSED CLASSES

These oppressed classes would include not only working class, the peasantry and the urban middle classes but also national bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie is also a part of the people in the stage of People's democratic revolution. Similarly, we should understand that the imperialism means not only American imperialism but also Soviet social imperialism, British imperialism as well as the Japanese and West German imperialism which, are of late gaining dominance in our country. Only then would it be possible for us to understand the role of various imperialist countries in the politics of our country, competition among them in plundering our country as well as the form and the level of this competition.

ii) THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE FEUDALISM AND VAST MASSES OF PEOPLE:

The feudalism in India is not similar to the feudalism in China. In China, besides the worst kind of feudalism, there used to be feudal lords and war lords. In vast areas of our country,

the feudal system with strong feudal relations is obtaining. Some changes have taken place in the feudal system first under the rule of British imperialists and there after under the rule of big bourgeoisie and feudal classes. As a result, the big landlord class has emerged. This class is trying to transform their agricultural holdings into capitalist agricultural holdings with the aid of the government budgets on one hand and the foreign aid on the other. Thus in our country there is a contradiction between the vast masses of the people on the one hand and the big landlord classes and the feudalism that gets foreign aid and makes use of the power for their class interests on the other.

iii) THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE BOURGEOISIE CLASS AND THE WORKING CLASS :

The big bourgeoisie class is the main in this bourgeoisie class. The big bourgeoisie class means a combination of comprador bourgeoisie, bureaucratic bourgeoisie and feudal bourgeoisie classes.

Prior to 1947, the Indian Comprador bourgeoisie class used to be the agent of the British and other imperialists. During the past 40 years there has also been a change in the comprador form and character. In the beginning they used to sell the British goods and become millionaires with the commission earned on it. Gradually they have, with the economic and technical aid and the help of raw-materials, spare parts and import, export facilities from the British, American and other imperialists, established industries in the country, became minor partners in the Imperialist exploitation and are acting as their agents. It is advantageous for the foreign imperialists to carry on their exploitation through the Indian agents. The Indian Comprador bourgeoisie class has got the advantage of getting atleast a small share of the profits earned on the foreign investments without themselves having any capital or with nominal capital. In India, a semi-colonial country, the Comprador bourgeoisie class can only exist in this form. It is wrong to compare this with the bourgeoisie class of the developed capitalist countries (This type of aid and co-operation

would be found even in the developed capitalist countries) and to formulate that the relation between the foreign capitalists and the Indian comprador bourgeoisie class is similar to this. (The Marxist Party advanced such a formulation).

In India this comprador bourgeoisie class is also getting the aid of bureaucratic capital. Getting ever so many concessions from the government, and looting the government budgets in ever so many ways, this class is increasing its capital and profits. As a part of this, the comprador bourgeoisie class is getting the aid directly or indirectly through the public sector.

In this country, the Princes, big and small and the big landlords have by investing a part of their wealth earned through their feudal exploitation, in the industries of the comprador bourgeoisie, joined with their masters, the imperialists and with the imperialists agents, the comprador bourgeoisie class.

Thus with the aid of the bureaucratic capital, the comprador and feudal bourgeoisie classes are linked with imperialism.

The concrete form of this combination itself is the big bourgeoisie class.

The bourgeoisie class means the whole of the bourgeoisie class including big bourgeoisie class. This also includes the national bourgeoisie class. While the big bourgeoisie class, joining with the imperialism and the big landlords class, becomes one of the targets to be overthrown by the peoples democratic revolution, the national bourgeoisie class, as an ally of working class joins the united front in the People's democratic revolution. The course of the revolution would decide as to which section of the bourgeoisie class is the nation's bourgeoisie.

4. THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE BOURGEOISIE CLASS ON THE ONE SIDE AND THE PEASANTRY AND URBAN MIDDLE CLASS ON THE OTHER :

Here the peasantry means the whole of the Peasantry including the rich peasantry. Since ours is a semi-colonial country, and since the

feudal relations are strong, a dominant rich peasantry, with strong feudal tails has developed. Similarly there is also a rich peasantry with capitalist relations. The role of these two types of rich peasantry would be different in the revolution. Yet the whole of the rich peasantry, including the rich peasantry is being exploited by the bourgeoisie. There is a contradiction between these two classes.

5. THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN DIFFERENT GROUPS OF REACTIONARY RULING CLASSES:

The big bourgeoisie class, the landlord class and other reactionary forces are the ruling classes in India. They are behind the parties holding power in the centre and states. Though the absence of the single party rule in the centre and states, and the presence of the rule of more than one party in the states is only an indication of the efforts of the ruling classes to make use of any party that can be made use of in order to safeguard their power, the emergence of groups among the ruling classes and existence of contradictions between them is not natural.

Apart from this the problem of nationalities is an important question in India. India is a country of many nationalities. The big-bourgeoisie big landlord classes in the country are oppressing these nationalities without allowing them to develop. Thus there is a contradiction between the imperialism, big bourgeoisie and big landlord classes on the one side and these nationalities on the other. There are also contradictions among different nationalities themselves.

III HAVE THE TWO GROUPS OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE--THE PRO-AMERICAN GROUP AND THE PRO-RUSSIAN GROUP -- EMERGED ?

Applying the theory of contradictions to the present conditions of India they have, in view keeping the 1969 congress split, written in the pamphlet "The Armed Struggle - Some Important aspects", that:

"The growing competitions and contradictions among various imperialist countries, maj-

nly between American imperialists and Soviet Social imperialists are bound to reflect in India. They try and are trying to gain dominance over political, economic and military affairs of India by grouping up comprador bourgeoisie classes who are under their influence.

It is only because of this that the two groups of comprador bourgeoisie - pro - American and Pro-Russian have emerged and started struggling for power. In the days to come this will get further sharpened."

In another context they stated that there is one group mainly dependent on American and another group mainly on the Soviet Union."

It is necessary to examine this aspect.

It is clear that the principal contradiction at the present stage of the people's democratic revolution is the contradiction between feudalism and the vast masses of the people. At this stage the imperialism (including the social imperialism) safe-guards its interests indirectly through the Indian big bourgeoisie and big landlord classes and not directly. When the people's democratic revolution reaches the stage of national liberation and when the Indian big bourgeoisie big landlord classes cannot safe guard the interests of imperialism any more, the imperialists would directly enter the field.

In the present situation it is not comprador bourgeoisie alone that safe-guards imperialist interests in the country, it is the entire big bourgeoisie class including the comprador bourgeoisie and the big landlord classes. It is clear that it is because of ignoring this aspect that the imperialism is staged above as depending on the comprador bourgeoisie class alone for their existence.

It is correct to say that in our country there is contention between the American imperialists and the social imperialists, they are trying to establish their domination on political, economic and military affairs of our country. But it would be hasty to conclude that as a reflection of this, there have already emerged the groups of comprador bourgeoisie class leaning towards imperialism and the social imperialism. The experience has also proved this.

The two groups that have emerged due to the 1969 congress split are not such that they represent two different comprador bourgeois groups. It is true that the Indira group has been leaning towards Soviet Union while the Nijalingappa group has been leaning towards America. Thus the Nijalingappa and their company tried for the help of the American imperialists before and after the elections. But the American imperialism, though a bit hesitant at first soon came to the conclusion that the Indira group alone can safeguard its interests and has been supporting the Indira group itself. Thus, the Indira group, alone with the support of the Soviet Social imperialism, has also been having the support of the American imperialism. The news paper comments and the reports from America are only confirming this.

In India, the American capital is mainly in the private sector. The public sector is also being useful only for the private sector. Indira group is representing both of them.

In view of this, it is incorrect to say that the Indian ruling classes are split into pro-Soviet and pro-American comprador bourgeois groups. It is contrary to the actual fact. While leaning more towards the Soviet social imperialism, the Indira group is representing both of them. It does not however mean that this situation would remain like this for ever. There is a possibility for the split at any time in future. Such splits may become possible especially when country-wide mass movement, or the mass movement in some states reaches a higher stage and when internationally the inter-imperialist contradictions get accentuated.

Lately, other type of conflicts have come up in the state. A number of local movements are rising on the plea that those from other states, dominating their states have got hold of the jobs and other resources or on the plea that the developed regions are dominating the backward regions of one and the same state. Though generally these are only anti-government movements, they are also an indication of the contradictions among the ruling classes. These contradictions would only further get accentuated in future but not subside.

In such a situation it would be harmful to the revolutionary party and to the existence of the revolutionary movement to go tailing behind some anti-government section in the name of either anti-government movements or split among the ruling classes. In such a situation, while, with our own independent programme and action, carrying on the struggle against one section of the classes and neutralising the other section, we should divide and strike at the enemy. Only then would the revolutionary movement march forward. To treat all the groups of the ruling classes alike and try to strike all of them at the same time is not only not correct but also there is the danger of ourselves getting isolated and suffering defeat.

CENTRE AND STATE GOVERNMENTS- STABILITY AND INSTABILITY.

These comrades are formulating that "the split in the congress party, the permanent instability of the ruling classes is a new aspect, that has come up after we have launched the armed "struggle". This formulation, besides being opposed to the actual situation, is born of subjective outlook. These comrades are betraying their subjective outlook by not only showing the instability which is due to the economic and political crisis in the country as having resulted due to the armed struggle which was in fact launched here and there in the country after this instability had actually set in but also by over estimating this instability more than the actual.

This formulation of these comrades has been proved incorrect by the recent political development in our country.

There is no doubt that with the weakening of the congress party in the 1967 elections and with the emergence of U.F. governments in different states the instability had set in the country. It is also correct to say that this instability had actually begun with the formulation of Communist government in Kerala in 1959. By 1967 the armed struggle had not been launched in the country. It was only after the formulation of the U.F. government in Bengal following the 1967 elections that the Naxalbari armed struggle had been launched.

The split in congress occurred in year 1968. Many felt that with it a permanent instability had set in the country. The Sreekekulam armed struggle was launched in Andhra in the end of 1968. Yet, not only a stable government continues to rule Andhra Pradesh from that date, but also the ruling classes are trying for stability in the centre and states and have even succeeded to a very large extent. The U.F. government formed with the support of ruling congress under the leadership of revisionists in Kerala in 1969, is more stable than the U.F. governments that preceded it. After two years rule of President and the C.R.P., both the congress and the revisionist parties have emerged strong in the 1971 elections in Bengal. As in Kerala, here also the formation and functioning of non-marxist government became a possibility.

Of all, the most important development is the emergence of ruling congress with a big majority in the centre and its forming a stable government. With this it is clear that the "instability" of 1969, has transformed into stability. This development has not stopped there. Even in the states where the congress is not in power, the situation is developing in favour of the ruling congress. There would be nothing to wonder if the power in majority of states fall into the hands of the ruling congress in the 1972 elections.

These experiences prove that the theory of "permanent instability" is wrong. Then what are shortcomings in the understanding of these comrades?

Our country, which is a part and parcel of the capitalist system is also enmeshed in a permanent crisis. There is economic and political crisis in the country. There isn't any doubt that the emergence of unstable government is a reflection of the political crisis. But it is however not correct to conclude that permanent instability has set in once the unstable government or governments are formed. Only when an organised and powerful revolutionary movement is on the advance would the instability among the ruling classes be transformed into a permanent instability.

The ruling classes would be making a ceaseless effort to overcome this instability and to restore stability. For this they would be taking a number of measures. The fact that the ruling classes would also be taking concrete steps to extricate themselves from the economic crisis is not a new thing for us. The Indira Gandhi Government's Bank nationalisation is only a step to extricate themselves from the economic crisis. On the assurance that it alone can establish a stable government in the country and save the imperialism and the social imperialism, and the big bourgeoisie big landlord classes from the revolution, the Indira congress group has not only mustered the support and the solidarity of Soviet Union, but also it has mustered the support and solidarity of the American imperialism, and the big bourgeoisie-big landlord classes. With left slogans such as socialism, social changes etc., it has won the support of the middle classes and working class. In this way it has achieved stability with a big majority in the midterm elections.

Had there been a revolutionary Communist Party in the country which could take advantage of the crisis of the ruling classes and deal a death blow to them, and had there been a revolutionary movement and armed struggle in a wide area, the steps taken by the ruling classes in order to extricate themselves from the crisis would have proved futile. Like the crisis, the instability would have become permanent.

But no such conditions are obtaining in India. Though there is a revolutionary situation, there isn't an organised revolutionary movement, in a wide-area. The armed struggle is being carried on locally in one area with a number of limitations. Under the circumstances the steps taken by the ruling classes to extricate themselves from the crisis have temporarily paid off.

Failing to grasp this, unable to examine the relative strength of the enemy and ourselves and mistaking the temporary instability for a permanent instability the comrades of the P. C. centre have tried to link the instability with the armed struggle.

However, it would be wrong to think that the present stability would be permanent. This is only temporary stability. There would be nothing to wonder if again there develops instability in the near future.

W. THE ELECTION RESULTS AS SEEN BY THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS.

The Soviet Social imperialists and the revisionists in India, interpreting it as a historic victory, as a victory for the Left democratic forces, are jubilant over the victory of Indira congress group. Had this been true, the American imperialists should have expressed themselves against the victory of the Indira congress. But nothing of the sort has happened. On the contrary, the American imperialists and their representatives have only expressed satisfaction at Indira's victory.

The following extract from the report dated 26th March 1971 of the Washington correspondent of Times of India Mr. M. V. Kamath, are noteworthy.

"The first and appropriately major impact of Mrs. Gandhi's electoral successes in the U. S. has been on the industrial and financial community. Inquiries with the Indian investment centre at New York go to suggest that congratulatory calls have mostly come from large American corporations which were understandably apprehensive about the election results. The 300 and more U. S. corporations which have invested in India, have profitable operations and almost everyone of them are seeking ways and means of expanding in spite of the restrictive rules which look rather formidable on paper".

The American monopoly capitalists haven't expressed anger at the victory of Indira Gandhi. They have only expressed their happiness and approval.

"The profit record of a large percentage of U. S. investors has been impressively consistent and high. The earning ratio of American manufacturing units in India was 14.7 percent in 1969, a figure much higher than those for Canada (8.6%), Latin America (10.7%), and even Europe (12%). Mrs. Gandhi's victory

has further improved the prospects of American investments" (Times of India, M. V. KAMATH, 26.3.71).

~ If it is only the representative of the pro-Soviet social imperialist comprador that have won, how would the opportunities for the American investments improve? Would America so easily give up India, which earns them such a huge rate of profits, to Soviet Union?

"The reaction of the Nixon administration has been relatively slow in coming but with reason. Since 1967, the U. S. had come to regard India's capabilities with a certain degree of polite scepticism. The elections that year which returned the congress with diminished strength and popularity, began the process of disillusionment here. The split within the party furthered it and added to the bewilderment of Indian watchers. Was Mrs. Gandhi strong enough to hold the country together? What was the likelihood of her erstwhile colleagues-turned-political opponents toppling her administration" (Times of India, M V. Kamath, D: 26.3. '71).

What does it mean? It is true that after the 1967 elections, and the congress split, there was vacillation among the American imperialists. It was not because the Indira Congress group was the agent of the Soviet Union. It was only because they were doubtful if the Indira government could be a stable one. But the current as well as the ex-ambassadors of India had tried to clear these doubts that day itself.

"Even the assessment of so seasoned a diplomat as Mr. Chester Bowles that Mrs. Gandhi was a "better politician than Roosevelt" largely went unheeded Mr. Keatings shrewd judgement, that the leaders of old congress were on the run also, made little dent on the thinking of White House advisers" (Times of India, M. V. Kamath, 26.3. '71).

But the imperialist representatives have clearly understood that the Indira Gandhi alone could safe-guard their interests, that at this task she would excel Roosevelt himself and that the old congress leaders were on the run. But it took time for them to make the American

monopoly capitalists convinced of this. The mid-term elections have done that job.

Thus, at one stage did there arise the question of American monopoly capitalists choosing the old congress as the representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie class. The problem they were faced with was as to how far the Indira Government could be stable. Now that problem is solved.

It was probably because of the leaning towards the Soviet Union the expression of doubts if India would remain under the American hold.

"The unchallenged thesis in the past here has been that while democracy is good at home, dictatorship abroad is better because it provides stability. This fondly held belief has been exploded in Pakistan, as it has been Turkey. It is this which has made India suddenly an object of admiration and a symbol of hope. It may not have won India friends, but it has stopped its distractors in their tracks". (Times of India, M. V. Kamath, 26.3.71)

With this it is clear that the American imperialists were convinced that in India the "democracy" could safeguard their interests. Thus it becomes clear from the above that the Indira Congress group is acting not only as the agent of social imperialism but also as the agent of American imperialism.

The truth, is, in India the contradiction between the Soviet Social imperialism and the American imperialism is not so accentuated as to SPLIT THEIR AGENT INTO TWO GROUPS. In the international arena these two imperialisms continue to pursue the policy of collusion and contention with each other. In this contention, some times, the Soviet Social imperialism is gaining upper-hand while some times the American imperialism is gaining upperhand. For instance, the Soviet social imperialism has gained upper hand in supplying the defence equipment and granting loans for the public sector in India while the American imperialism has gained upper hand in granting loans for the private sector. Thus these two are only contending

with each other. But this contention has not yet reached its culmination. The Indira Congress group is acting as a representative, as a comprador and as a sales agent for both of them.

Besides having upper hand in granting loans for the public sector and defence, the Soviet Social imperialism is occupying the second place next only to America. Yet, the Indira Congress is leaning towards Soviet Union. Thus in the contradictions between the American imperialism and the Soviet Social imperialism; the Indira Congress Government is leaning more towards the Soviet Union. In view of this, it is clear that the Indira government is able to make use of these contradictions in a very limited way.

It does not however mean that this same situation would continue to prevail for a long time. It is possible that these contradictions would gradually get accentuated and give rise to a situation where the Indira Congress would once again split into two. We should carefully watch as to when and in what form this situation arises in future.

The developments in West Asia are different from this. The ruling classes of United Arab Republic (now the ruling classes of Siria, Sudan and Libia have also joined with them) are acting as the agents of the Soviet Social imperialism while the ruling classes of Israel are acting as the agents of American imperialism. In this region the contradictions between these two imperialisms got accentuated and reached to a breaking point. This situation or a situation more or less similar to this has not yet developed in India.

6. THE MISTAKES OCCURED IN THE PAST IN THE UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE SPLITS IN THE INDIAN BOURGEOISIE CLASSES.

The comprador bourgeoisie class has been having its influence on the national movement from the very beginning in India. In the national movement, Gandhi worked as the representative of the comprador bourgeoisie. Nehru and other leaders of the congress high command had also been working as the representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie. As the anti-

imperialist upsurge gathered momentum in the country, they had, advancing the slogan of non-violence on one side and capitalising on the anti-imperialist upsurge on the other, tried to firmly establish their leadership upon the masses. This is only an element of anti-imperialism, but not a fulfilled anti-imperialism.

Either before or after 1948, the bourgeoisie class in India had never been split into pre-imperialist comprador bourgeoisie and anti-imperialist national bourgeoisie classes. The representatives of comprador bourgeoisie class, that got hold of the congress leadership could with anti-imperialist slogans keep the anti-imperialist national bourgeoisie under its influence. Basing themselves on the counter-revolution and utilising the might of the national movement to their advantage, they were bargaining. Among the bourgeoisie leadership, it was only Subhas Chandra Bose and his followers (they include many leftists) that opposed this bargaining in the year 1938. Afterwards some of them broke away from the congress party. There had not been even such a split before 1938.

Like Sun Yet-Sen in China, no representative of anti-imperialist and revolutionary bourgeoisie class has emerged in India. This was because, in India, the bourgeoisie class had not played a revolutionary role at any stage. Not a single section of the bourgeoisie had played such a revolutionary role. Had the national revolution advanced under the leadership of the Communist Party, the bourgeoisie class could have played such a revolutionary role.

The characterisation made at that time that Nehru was a representative of the anti-imperialist national bourgeoisie class and that rest of the Leadership-Gandhi, Patel and others were the representatives of the pro-imperialist bourgeoisie class was wrong. The then leadership of the Communist Party gave a mechanical and incorrect interpretation to the guidance from the then international leadership. The truth is that the whole lot of the congress leadership were only the representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie class. While some of them (like

Gandhi) rallied the reactionary forces and backward sections with orthodox slogans, some of them (like Nehru) could divert the Left forces from the revolutionary path to the constitutional lines with left slogans. Thus in so far as pro-imperialism and counter-revolution are concerned, all of them are one and the same. It was only a matter of division of work among them. This leadership used to wish for a compromise on a bit better and more favourable terms than were acceptable to the British imperialists. It can be said that there was an anti-imperialist element to this extent. But this is not a fulfilled anti-imperialism.

After 1939 and during the entire period of anti-fascist war, the congress leadership on the basis of supporting the war were prepared for a compromise on better terms than were offered by the British imperialists. But it would be wrong to say that they were divided into pro-Fascist and anti-Fascist camps. Only Nehru used to express clear-cut anti-imperialist views. But there isn't any doubt that they would have compromised even with Fascism had the Fascism gained upper hand in India. In this respect even some of the imperialists stood up and fought against Fascism. Even after the 1947 transfer of power, a mechanical division was sought to be made to the effect that Nehru was the representative of the anti-imperialist bourgeoisie class and others are not so.

The 1951 Programme defined that in India the comprador bourgeoisie class was only nominal, that almost all the bourgeoisie was not only national bourgeoisie, but also it was not a puppet in the hands of the imperialists and that it had the social foundation. Thus the programme concluded it away that the Nehru government was not a representative of the comprador bourgeoisie class. This is totally wrong. The truth is, while continuing to be the comprador of British imperialism, the Nehru government tried to make use of its influence among the people, its position, the contradictions between Britain and America as well as the contradiction between America and Soviet Union. It maintained pro-Soviet and a limited anti-American stance. Everybody knows that it was only Nehru that opened the doors for

the flow of American capital into India. Even this position has changed after 1960 and it has become comradely of both American imperialism and the Soviet Social imperialism (1962-63). This continues to be the situation even today.

In this connection we should note that the birth of the Swatantra Party and the characterisation made by the then Party Leadership about this. The characterisation that the Swatantra Party was a Pro-American Party and that the congress party was an anti-American Party was by itself a mechanical one. In order to safe-guard their own interests, the American imperialist have been relying only on Nehru, Shastry and Indira's governments successively but never have they relied on the Swatantra Party. At best they have made use of the Swatantra Party to carry on a pro-American propaganda.

It is exactly such a mechanical definition that the comrades of P.C. Centre have now advanced on the 1969 congress split. The sum and substance of this definition is that two groups representing pro-Soviet Social Imperialist and pro-American imperialist comradely bourgeois groups have emerged with this split itself. The recent developments proved this definition to be incorrect, mechanical and contrary to the actual fact. For having advanced such a definition, it should be said of these comrades that they are once again following the same old line of thinking.

II. ARMED STRUGGLE.

One of the fundamental differences between the neo-revisionists and ourselves at the time of the split from them and there after has been the question of whether the objective conditions to launch an armed struggle are obtaining in the country. The neo-revisionists argue that such conditions are not obtaining in the country. We assert that such conditions are obtaining. The armed struggle of Naxalbari and Sreeakulam have testified to the correctness of our assessment.

In our party there had never been any differences until the convention or in the convention on the question of whether armed

struggle should be launched. The adoption of the "Immediate Programme" with minor amendments by the State convention itself is a proof of this. It doesn't however mean that by that time there had already evolved a common understanding in the party about the armed struggle. An examination of post-convention period would reveal that such an understanding was not obtained in our party.

Without preparing the people for armed struggle on the basis of the "Immediate Programme", our comrades in the forest areas had immediately after the convention launched some armed actions. The P.C. had in its July 1969 meetings reviewed these armed actions and decided as to what should be the clear-cut understanding of the armed struggle. It also decided to prepare a document explaining this understanding, the various points that came in the course of the discussion and the different questions that came up before the committee and to send it to the lower units.

In the name of a reply to this document, the Khammam area committee had prepared another document. In this the area Committee put forward a number of formulations questioning the very foundations of armed struggle. It declared that we had overestimated the revolutionary upsurge. It also declared that to say that armed struggle should be launched on the basis of the agrarian revolution and only when consciousness of the people reaches the level of armed struggle, is incorrect. It formulated that the armed struggle in self-defence, irrelevant of consciousness of the people is a stage of the armed struggle. Thus it advanced a number of arguments different from the understanding of armed struggle. It has therefore become imperative to examine these formulations and arguments relating to the armed struggle, and to arm the party with a clear cut and correct understanding about the armed struggle.

1. THE DECISIVE ROLE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MASS MOVEMENTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN INDIA

In Russia, the working class seized power through insurrection in 1917. In China, the

people's democratic revolutionary forces under the leadership of the working class could seize power through protracted war i.e. the people's war which went on from 1926-1948. All the revolutions during and after the Second World War went on and are still going on in the form of protracted war. Algeria, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos—all these revolutions are only of this type.

The revisionists and the neo-revisionists refuse to take lessons from these revolutions. The revisionists are following the same old revisionist ideology which preaches that the social changes can be brought about through parliamentary means without armed revolution. On the pretext that the revolutionary situation is not yet ripe in the country, the neo-revisionists are also following the parliamentary path. Thus these types of revisionists have become the followers of the parliamentary path. Rejecting these politics, we have asserted that the armed struggle is the main form of struggle in the present situation and we should take up the task of preparing the masses for the armed struggle.

By the time the armed struggle was launched in China, there was already 40 thousand People's Army in the battle field under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. We don't have such an army. The problem before the revolutionaries is as to how should this army develop.

The revolutionary people's army would be born of the revolutionary movement itself. Through the revolutionary movement, the consciousness of the people would reach the stage of taking the form of armed struggle. The people's army would be formed of the countless militants that come forward at this stage of the revolutionary mass movement, and the People's army would under the leadership of the Communist revolutionaries and with the support and solidarity of the masses, complete the people's democratic revolution.

The People's democratic revolution is an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution. This revolution would go on under the leadership of the working class. To-day we are in the stage

of agrarian revolution. For this reason, peasant agrarian revolutionary movement would form the main part and the content of the revolutionary movement. Mainly this is because the agrarian revolution is the content of the People's democratic revolution.

Thus the armed struggle that is carried on according to our understanding, is a people's armed struggle. This is a struggle which is carried on at a stage when the peasant revolutionary movement reaches the stage of armed struggle. This is an armed struggle which should be carried on fully relying upon the armed struggle consciousness of the people, especially the peasantry.

In India, as in all other countries, the armed struggle would be a protracted war. It would be an armed struggle born of the revolutionary mass movement.

Through the armed struggle thus launched, the revolutionary armies would, under the leadership of the Communist revolutionaries, withstand the armed attacks of the enemy and gradually establish the liberated areas. By establishing the liberated areas throughout the country, first by liberating the villages and then liberating the cities; thereafter they would establish the People's democratic state. Thus through the protracted war, the people's democratic revolution would become victorious.

This is the path of armed struggle which is to be or should be adopted by the revolutionaries in India.

The 1968 circular, "Lay foundations for a struggle-oriented mass movement", issued by the State co-ordination Committee and the "Immediate Programme" adopted by the state convention are meant for organising revolutionary mass movement and preparing the masses for the armed struggle. The aim of these documents is only to lay the necessary foundation of revolutionary movement for the armed struggle.

The Charu Mazumdar group that heads the CPI (ML), has been following a different path from the above. On the plea that there is a revolutionary situation in the country, they are rejecting the importance of building the revolutionary movement. They are arguing that the

armed struggle can and should be launched and carried on irrelevant of the level of the people's consciousness and the revolutionary movement of the armed struggle areas and without its reaching the stage of the armed struggle. In this way, the revolutionaries might be able to carry out some armed actions, but a protracted people's armed struggle shall not go on in this way. The people would remain mere spectators. Unable to withstand the attack of the enemy, the struggle would wake away. For this reason, this path is not a revolutionary path. This is not the path which we should adopt in India. Hence we reject this path. (we have put forward our criticism of the ideological, armed struggle and organisational outlook of the Charu Mazumdar group, in our document, "The Left trend among the Indian revolutionaries".)

Just because we have rejected the line of thinking and practice of the Charu Mazumdar group, we cannot say that our part is completely rid off of their influence. The trends of this group are predominantly evident in the documents of the P.C. centre as well as the document issued in the name of Khammam area committee. Only when we carry on a struggle against these wrong trends and root them out, would we be able to build a revolutionary movement. Only then, would we be able to carry on a protracted war.

2. THE ARMED STRUGGLE WHICH RELIES UPON THE REVOLUTIONARY MASS MOVEMENT CAN ALONE FACE THE RULING CLASSES.

We are in the stage in which world imperialism and Soviet social imperialism are enmeshed in the crisis and in which the world revolutionary forces are marching forward. After the second world war - the birth of People's China, the liberation struggles of Indo Chinese people, the liberation struggles of Africa and Latin America, the People's China, as the centre of world revolution, is lending invaluable support and strength to these world revolutionary forces. The imperialist and social imperialists, suffering defeat after defeat, are unable to extricate themselves from this crisis. This is a very favourable situation for Indian revolution. We will have to take these main trends prevailing in the international field as the basis to assert that imperialism is

bound to be defeated and the Indian revolutionary is bound to succeed.

This is a favourable situation for organising a revolutionary movement. If the revolutionary movement, we build, should march forward, and if it should take a country-wide armed struggle form, we should have a clear-cut understanding of the unfavourable conditions we should face. Only then would we be able to adopt a proper policy of action to overcome the unfavourable conditions.

What are the unfavourable conditions we should overcome? The inter-imperialist contradiction and the contradictions between American imperialism and Soviet Social Imperialism have not yet reached a breaking point in India. The imperialists and social imperialists - all are supporting Indira congress group, wishing for a stable government in the center and states and are working towards this end.

Though the big bourgeoisie, big landlord classes, the ruling classes of India were divided into different parties in the centre and the states till yesterday, they are again uniting under the leadership of the Indira congress group. The emergence of Indira congress with a stable majority in the centre, emergence of governments of the Indira congress group, or the pro-Indira congress group governments in the states where this group is not in power has become a feature. Thus the contradictions between the groups of the ruling classes have also not reached a breaking point yet. They are getting adjusted to a large extent without remaining at the stage they had earlier reached.

Everthough the contradictions among the ruling classes which have so far broken out here and there on inter-state problems, on disputes between the developed regions and backward regions of one and the same state, etc. they had only been useful to divert the revolutionary movement. The revolutionaries could only utilise them to a very limited extent.

All this is but temporary. The contradictions between the imperialists and social imperialists might reach a breaking point at

any time. While building a revolutionary mass movement and a revolutionary Communist Party on firm foundations, revolutionaries should at the same time be fully prepared to take advantage of these contradictions as and when they reach a breaking point.

There is economic crisis in the country. The rate of growth of the industrial production is very slow. Inflation and spiralling prices has become a common feature. The unemployment is on the increase. A number of such features of the crisis are evident. In order to extricate themselves from this crisis, the ruling classes have nationalised some big banks. They are expanding public sector. The unprofitable heavy industries might be managed by the government. By such measures, the government on the one hand is satisfying upper classes and on the other it is ruthlessly suppressing the struggles of workers, peasants and other broad masses of the people. Yet not relying solely on the repression, the government in order to passify as well as to divert the peoples' struggle on basic problems, is adopting certain measures in the name of reforms. The government is not solely relying on repression without resorting to this kind of measures.

Today the nation-wide struggles of the workers, peasants and other sections of the people are going on generally for economic demands and against the police repression. The revolutionary political consciousness to overthrow the government is not evident in these struggles.

The social imperialist nature of the Soviet Union in the country is not yet exposed to the people. The anti-imperialist, anti-Western imperialist, and pro-Soviet Social imperialist trends are more or less intermingled. Even though some of the supporters of America, have, due to their anti-Sovietism, propagated its imperialist nature, it is only the revolutionaries who broke away from the neo-revisionists that for the first time exposed the social imperialist nature of the Soviet Union. The people are yet to become aware of the fact that while carrying on its exploitation, Soviet Social imperialism is endeavouring to safe-

guard and strengthen the counter-revolutionary Indira congress government in the country in ever so many ways.

It is wrong to say that the situation prevailing today is more favourable than the situation prevailing at the time of the 1947-51 Telangana armed struggle.

There is no doubt that consciousness of the people to day is higher than the people at that time. Yet during the past 20 years of parliamentary system, the ruling classes have in ever so many ways corrupted the vocal sections of the working masses. Twenty years back the military and police organisation of the ruling classes were very weak. To-day this organisation is indiscriminately expanded and strengthened. As there are transport and communication facilities in most of the parts of the country, the ruling classes are in a position to send the armed forces at any time and to any place in the country.

India is the largest country left for the imperialist and social imperialist to plunder the people. In order to keep it in their hold, they would not go back in the least to suppress the revolution. In view of this it becomes imperative for our revolutionary activities, our revolutionary movement and the armed struggle to face ruthless counter revolutionary with terror of the ruling classes.

Above all we should realise that the important thing is the Communist revolutionaries are not united in a single revolutionary party. Due to this weakness of the revolutionary forces, we are unable to channelise the discontentment of the people against the ruling classes into a revolutionary movement.

We should have a clear cut understanding of the strong as well as weak points of the enemy. Similarly we should have a correct grasp of the weak points as well as the strong points of the mass movement. Only then would we be able to formulate a correct policy of action.

In view of this, our revolutionary movement at the outset as well as in the course of its development will have face a number of

obstacles and ups and downs. The problem is not solved by merely and formally recognising them. We should, according to this formulate a policy of action.

Comrade Mao directs that "strategically we should despise all our enemies, but tactically we should take them all seriously".

But the comrades of P.C. centre in their document, "Armed struggle in India-Some important aspects", only pointed out the strategically weak points of the enemy. They have, by not pointing out, hidden the strong points of the enemy. They have tried to give a minimised picture of the weak points of the revolutionary movement. To show this is only to underestimate the enemy tactically. This line of thinking is opposed to Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought. It is indisputable that tactically the ruling classes are many times stronger than us; the people's revolutionary movement alone has the power to face such a powerful ruling classes and advance in the face of their on-slaughter. The revolutionary movement would advance only when we organise it adopting tactics in accordance with the relative strength of the ruling classes and revolutionary forces. Only then would the revolutionary movement reach the stage of the armed struggle.

We are aware of the fact that the Charu Mazumdar group has given up Mao's Thought, tactically underestimated the enemy. It is clear that the comrades of the P. C. centre are also following the same line of thinking.

3. SOME IMPORTANT REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE MASS MOVEMENT TO REACH THE STAGE OF ARMED STRUGGLE.

Referring to the mistakes of the P.C., the document, "Khammam area Committees' reply" reads that "here, one of the three mistakes concerning the level of the movement, level of the consciousness of the people and organisational position is the mistake of overestimating the movement".

It further reads that;

"Our own experience makes it clear as to how unrealistic is our assesment, the assesment

we made at the time of the state convention that by June 1969 we would be able to prepare people for the distribution of the land of the landlords. Even till today, the people are not prepared for it means, it makes it clear as to how exaggerated was our assesment of that day". (Page. 5).

The comrades of the P.C. centre have, in their, "Letter" stated that the P.C. is giving an exaggerated assesment of the forest area. With this, the question of whether at the time we thought of the armed struggle, there were favourable conditions for it in our country and the state, comes up as a question to be examined.

These comrades have, in their "Khammam Area Committee's Reply" and the "Letter", clearly stated the fact that even till today the people are not prepared for the land distribution and the armed struggle. How far our "Over estimation" is responsible for this situation? How far this has happened due to our failure to carry out our tasks? We would examine all these aspects.

There are a number of spontaneous peasant revolts and insurrections in the history. They went on against feudalism and the feudal landlords, for land and against feudal exploitation. The armed forces of the ruling classes were able to suppress them. Only the organised peasant armed struggle could continue to the end and conclude victoriously.

We are not thinking of spontaneous peasant struggles as far as our country is concerned. If it is such struggles, the leaders of those struggles might launch them based on certain calculations. Such struggles might be suppressed before these calculations are proved correct or because of the repression of the enemy contrary to these calculations. Or these struggles might continue. It is natural for such a leadership to think that their calculations have gone wrong. Often these calculations go wrong due to the absence of an ideological conception in the leadership, lack of tactics and organisational work and the absence of necessary objective conditions to carry on the struggle usually.

such struggles would be rising and getting suppressed.

What we have thought of in our country and the state is not such a spontaneous insurrection. What we have thought of is a protracted peoples armed struggle, i.e., the People's War. We have already explained that in the Indian conditions the peoples armed struggle would be born of the revolutionary mass movement. Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought is the ideological foundation of this people's way. Based on this principle we build the revolutionary movement and prepare for the armed struggle. We launch the armed struggle as soon as proper conditions are secured.

In view of this, the question of whether there were the necessary objective conditions for us to think of peoples armed struggle comes up as a question to be examined. It is our opinion that such conditions were present at that time.

In the Naxalbari area of West Bengal, the armed struggle began in 1967 itself. In Sreekalum of Andhra Pradesh it was launched in the end of 1968.

In Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the peasant revolutionary movements went on during the period of 1968-69.

In the Telangana Districts of Andhra, the peasant revolutionary struggles were conducted on the food problem and against the landlords during 1968. The tide of these struggles, especially in Jangaon taluq rivalled with the 1946 tide of struggles.

Keeping this mass upsurge in view, the task of organising the revolutionary movement in the forest areas was taken up in the first half of 1968 itself. In the beginning, the work went on around Mulugu. Gradually it expanded to neighbouring areas. Due to our efforts the mass movement had reached higher stage in these areas. The following passage from the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply" testifies to it:

There is no doubt what so ever that due to the mass activities carried on upto December 1968, there developed a new

consciousness among the people in the surrounding areas of Mulugu and that in this area proper objective basis for developing the armed struggle was secured."

When "the proper objective basis for developing the armed struggle" could be secured by the implementation of mass programme for some months would "the level of the movement, the level of consciousness of the people and the organisational position" of that area have reached the stage of armed struggle, had we for another six months concentrated and implemented the mass programme? Had we provided the correct leadership once the people moved into struggles, would the struggles not have reached the higher stage and taken the form of armed struggle? Are we not aware of the fact that the period of six months from December to June is favourable period for struggle and that it is a preparatory period for struggle on land issue?

Though during this period efforts were made to some extent to implement the mass programme to advance the movement to a higher stage in Mulugu areas, there cropped up the problems that divert the movement into wrong path. These following three are main among them.

1. Manthena action:- Pushing back the programme of building the revolutionary movement, they brought up the question of self-defence and carried on discussions on it. Afterwards this has come forward as a line.

2. Sex Problems:- If we see the May 1969 resolution of the Mulugu Area Committee it would become clear from this as to how polluted the atmosphere in this area has become due to these problems. They have led to inner-party problems and organisational problems and help disorganise the party.

3. Pagideru actions:- With these actions the programme of building the revolutionary movement was totally pushed back. The programme of "armed struggle" unrelated to the mass movement began. (We would further explain this issue).

These developments had largely become responsible for diverting the revolutionaries from the task of organising the revolutionary movement as a preparatory step to the armed struggle. To set aside this task, and to say, that people should by themselves reach the stage of the armed struggle by June 1969, is nothing but a "spontaneous" outlook. It is nothing but disregarding and under-estimating the task of making conscious effort and the leading role of the party.

On the question of unevenness of the movement the "Political Organisational Review" reads that:

"The movement of the Khammam and Warangal districts is in a position to reach the armed struggle".

In Mulugu taluq the movement has got a sound base in an area of 2,400 sq. miles. Though there are landlords here and there, they are not strong enough to directly face our movement. Therefore they have locally surrounded to our cadres". In Manthana, Nugur and Burgampad taluqs the movement has newly developed and spread in an area of about 1,275 sq. miles. As it is newly developed movement, the local landlords are seriously trying to suppress it by means of police repression. In this area the movement has to develop facing the resistance of the exploitation forces at every step".

In the Palavantha taluq the movement has spread in an area of 1,500 sq. miles. This is an old movement. Only here the problem of the landlords' land is mainly taken up. But the concentrated work is going on only in one centre. The movement has to be still expanded on this question".

Taken together the movement is in three stages. In some areas the exploitation of forest officers, Patel, patwaris has been ended. (In some areas) the occupation of forest lands has been wide spread... In some areas agitational propaganda programme is now being taken up on the above issues". What does this mean?"

1) To say that the movement of Khammam and Warangal districts has reached

the stage of armed struggle is nothing but exaggeration. The truth is, as the "Khammam A.C. Reply" reads, "the movement, around Mulugu, had reached a certain stage". Had we, ever since, continued our work the people throughout this area would have become prepared for armed struggle.

2) There was unevenness in the movement. The movement was also uneven in the above mentioned three areas. The main task before the party then was to adopt a programme in accordance with the level of the movement of different areas and to take this whole movement to the stage of armed struggle.

3) The Illandú area of Khammam district was not included in the above areas. There was by that time itself mass movement in an area of this taluq. Excepting this there was no mass movement in the rest of the forest area. The party cadres were just visiting the village now and then. But the masses were yet to be mobilised on issues.

This was the situation in February 1969. There was enough time to take the movement to a higher stage in the rainy season. Whether it would have by that time reached the stage of armed struggle, would have become clear only by the implementation of agrarian revolutionary programme. On what issues the people were moving? On what issues the people were not moving? What was the attitude of the ruling classes and how was the mood of the masses in these struggles? All such questions would have become clear only by the implementation of the American revolutionary programme. But without implementing any such programme, it would be wrong to say that the P.C. had overestimated the preparedness of the people for armed struggle.

The "Khammam A.C's Reply" admits that the people are not prepared for armed struggle even today. It alleges that this is solely due to the overestimation of the P.C. "The Khammam A.C's Reply" has failed to go deep into and examine the reasons for it. It has failed to grasp the role of the activities that were carried

on setting aside the task of organising the revolutionary movement. Those activities are:

1) As the armed actions have been launched before the people were prepared for armed struggle, the participation of the people has become absent. Even today, after such a long time, the consciousness of the people has failed to reach the stage of the armed struggle.

2) Even though some struggles have been carried on for partial demands they have been confined to economism. The party has failed to create the consciousness among the masses, that they should achieve their own emancipation. It has failed to make use of the experiences of these struggles for this purpose. Vague and intelligible propaganda of the politics of armed struggle has failed to develop this consciousness.

3) The people, instead of achieving the gains through their own anti-government and anti-feudal struggles, are achieving them through the squads. With this the role of the people wanes away and armed struggle consciousness fails to develop.

4) The squad actions against the landlords and the individuals have also contributed to this. Due to the indiscriminate squad actions both against the police informers and the despotic individuals that are not police informers (if they are any) the people have come to feel that their sufferings would come to an end and that there would be no need of carrying on the struggle themselves, if only the squads take action against the despotic individual. This feeling among the masses has caused much damage to the advancement of the revolutionary movement. (The comrades have recently realised this and rectified the mistake.)

5) Without confining to certain areas and concentrating on their work among the people, our comrades have been roaming from one area to another area. Because of this the movement has only "expanded", but the agrarian revolutionary movement has failed to develop and reach the stage of land

distribution. Ever since Pagideru actions the concentrated work has become totally absent.

All this means only one thing: In order to launch the armed struggle in this area, we did not rely upon the building up of the revolutionary movement. We have substituted the revolutionary movement with the self-defence which is going on in the name of armed struggle. It is only due to this that the people could not become prepared for armed struggle even after such a long time.

This is not the programme that we have adopted in the state convention. The Immediate Programme directs that we should, while implementing the agrarian revolutionary movement, prepare the people for the armed struggle and thus launch the armed struggle only when the people are prepared for it. But what is implemented is a programme which is different from it.

The failure of the people to become prepared for armed struggle is not due to the over-estimation by the P.C. But, as the above explanation makes it clear, it is only due to the failure of fulfilling the tasks as directed in the "Immediate Programme".

4. AGRARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE ARMED STRUGGLE.

The comrades of Khammam area committee say that "to link the armed struggle with the land distribution and to give the understanding that the armed struggle should be launched only with the land distribution" is another of our mistakes. How is it correct?

We have already made it clear in the Immediate Programme that the ordained and that the land issue is the main issue in the agrarian revolutionary programme. It is not only theoretically correct, but our experiences of the revolutionary struggles also confirm the correctness of it.

We have already explained that at the present stage of the Indian revolution the principal contradiction is the contradiction between feudalism and the vast masses of the people and that this contradiction would be resolved

only by the completion of the agrarian revolution. Comrade Mao, in his "New Democracy," says about the importance of the agrarian revolution that :

"Stalin has said that in essence the national question is a peasant question". This means that the Chinese revolution is essentially peasant revolution and that the resistance in Japan now going on is essentially peasant resistance. Essentially, the politics of New Democracy means giving the peasants their rights. The new and genuine Three Peoples' Principles are essentially the principles of a peasant revolution. Essentially, mass culture means raising the cultural levels of the peasants, The anti-Japanese War is essentially a peasant war". (Selected writings P. 81-82)

If the agrarian revolution was so important at a time (1940) when all the anti-Japanese national forces were to be mobilised into the United Front, its importance for us, today when the principal contradiction should be resolved through the completion of the agrarian revolution cannot be overemphasised.

About the inter-relation of the agrarian revolution and the armed struggle Comrade Mao, in his article, "An introduction to the Communist" writes that "Armed struggle by the Chinese Communist Party takes the form of peasantry war under proletarian leadership..... And this armed struggle was the agrarian revolution under the leadership of the proletariat." (Selected Writings: P.490-491)

Thus all through the history of the Chinese revolution, the agrarian revolution and the armed struggle had been inter-linked.

When the Chinese Communist Party itself, which had enough of armed forces at its command to safe-guard and expand the revolutionary gains and to establish, defend and expand the base areas, had given so much of importance to the agrarian revolutionary programme, it is needless to emphasise as to the importance of the agrarian revolution for us.

The Communist revolutionaries and the people of India, don't have armed forces of their

own. We can, out of the revolutionary mass movement, create and develop the revolutionary armed forces. Such a revolutionary mass movement would be nothing but the revolutionary peasant movement. Defying the authority of the ruling classes, when the peasantry come forward to distribute the lands and grain of the landlords, and when they come forward to constitute the revolutionary peasant committees for the implementation of this programme, the peasant movement acquires the revolutionary character. The peasant acquires the revolutionary consciousness only in the course of building the agrarian revolutionary movement. The peasant struggle which is based on this revolutionary consciousness would alone continue as a protracted war; as a peoples' war.

Our experiences of the revolutionary peasant struggles also confirm the inter-relation of the agrarian revolution and armed struggle.

When we carried on the struggle against the feudal landlordism in the Nalgonda district of Telangana (1946-51), we adopted the form of armed struggle only when the struggle reached the stage of land distribution.

In 1945, the land issue came up in Mundrai village of Janagaon taluq. Trying to solve it within the legal limitations, we had temporarily failed.

In the year 1946, the issue once again came up in the Palakurthi village of the same taluq. We had to face the landlord goonda gangs on this issue. It had become necessary for the people to form in to volunteer squads and defend the land.

In the end of 1946, the peasantry moved on on the land issue in four taluqs of the same district. In all the villages where the people moved on this issue, the people came forward to form themselves into volunteer squads and defend the land and other revolutionary gains.

In the year 1947, the land issue was not taken up at first when the armed struggle was launched against the Nizam. With this there arose a situation where in the mass movement, unable to withstand the attacks of the Nizam's

armed forces and Razakars, had begun to wane away. Then we had taken up and implemented the programme of distribution of the land of the landlords who were acting as the agents of the Nizam. With this the armed struggle gained a firm base and gradually advanced. With the intensification of the land distribution, the armed struggle got intensified. With the intensification of the armed struggle, the land distribution also got intensified. Thus the armed struggle in the plains went on unhindered upto the police action.

If there is any lesson that the Telangana armed struggle has taught us, it is only the inter-relation of the land distribution and the armed struggle. At a time when we have begun to build the revolutionary movement after 20 years, these experiences apply more than ever.

Our experiences of the revolutionary movement in Kodamodalu area of East Godavari district have also confirmed the inter-relation of land distribution and the armed struggle. On the basis of the P.C. circular, "Lay foundations for a struggle oriented mass movement", comrades of this area began their work among the masses in the month of Jan' 1969. They achieved considerable success, in a short time. They organised militant mass resistance against the landlords and the police. At a time when they, working according to the Immediate Programme organised struggle for land distribution by June 1969 and were striving to organise a regular guerilla squad for carrying on resistance against armed police and to take it forward, the movement suffered a temporary set back due to the demoralisation of a section of the leadership and arrest of rest of the leadership due to the mistakes of the other comrades.

In this area the peasant movement has not only reached the stage of land distribution in a very short time, but also at the same time there was participation of the people on all occasions, in all peasant struggles as well as the resistance. It becomes clear from this that there was revolutionary upsurge among the masses by which the mass movement could advance to the stage of land distribution, and by which there could be peoples' participation in the resistance. By this

it also becomes clear that the reasons for the absence of such a mass upsurge in the struggle areas of Khammam and Warangal was because of organising the movements there not in accordance with the line adopted by P.C. but in accordance with the alternate line introduced with the Pagideru actions. The Mulugu area comrades who worked on mass issues prior to the state convention, had also finally adopted the alternate line.

The Khammam area comrades admit that the Pagideru actions are wrong, but they are unable to point out the short-comings of their understanding. These comrades who are getting swept away by the the Charu Mazumdar line, are not only not able to grasp the inter-relation of the land distribution and the armed struggle, but also they are not able to grasp the fundamental differences between the self-defence of the cadres and the self-defence of the people.

If the theory advanced by these comrades is correct, can we not launch the Pagideru type of armed actions in any area, including the plains areas? How can the Pagideru actions be incorrect then?

5. SELF-DEFENCE—FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SELF-DEFENCE OF THE CADRES AND THE SELF-DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE:

Arguing that it is wrong to link the armed struggle with the land distribution, the Khammam A.C. comrades are explaining the process of preparing the people for armed struggle as follows:

"When we launch mass agitation in the forest areas on issues such as banjars, cooly rates, forced labour, exploitation by the forest officers, usury, nagu etc. and when we combine this mass agitation with the political line and the political propaganda, the government would not sit with folded arms. It would not simply sit and observe until the people reach the stage of land distribution. With the mobilisation of people on mass issues, the landlords and government would launch repression to suppress the movement. In such a situation it would be inevitable for our cadres to form themselves into

squads and work for the defence of the movement and the defence of the cadres. It would be inevitable to carry on self-defence struggle. While forming into squads and carrying self-defence struggle on one side, we should on the other work for the mobilisation of the people on mass issues as the main issue. In that process, the struggle consciousness of the people would grow and they would become prepared for the land distribution and the armed struggle. Only then would emerge the necessary basis for protracted war. Our practice and experience itself has proved it correct". (Khammam A. C.'s reply).

The objective reality, as these comrades themselves are writing in the very next page, is that the people are not prepared for armed struggle even till today. When the "practice and experience" has proved otherwise, is it not subjective outlook to think that their own contention is correct?

Still, let us examine the practice and experience of these comrades at some length.

It is indisputable that when the propaganda of the politics of people's war is combined with the mass agitations on partial demands, the government and the landlords would launch the repression. But the repression would also be in the plain areas as well as in the forest areas. Further there is no doubt that the government and the landlords would be out to suppress this movement from reaching the higher stage of land distribution. How should we face the repression? For this there are two lines before us: one is the line advanced by the Khammam A. C. According to this our cadres should form themselves into squads and carry on self-defence struggle - with this the people would remain mere spectators without taking part in the programme of self-defence. The people would not gain the experience of forming into volunteer squads and defending themselves. Thus their consciousness would not develop and reach the higher stage. Thus losing their self-confidence, and falling in a state of inactivity, the people would come to depend upon the squads for each and everything. Thus creating the armed struggle consciousness among the masses would become an impossible task.

The second line is the line advanced in the "Immediate Programme". This line directs that:

"With the mobilisation of the people on the boycott of elections, on food problem, and the problems of forest areas, the problems of peoples' self-defence would arise. For this we should build the volunteer squads. In the forest areas where the people have already been mobilised into struggles, the volunteer squads should be organised on a large scale. All the youth of the villages should be the member of these squads. One squad if it is a small village and as many squads as necessary depending upon the feasibility of work if it is a large village, can be organised. Each of these squads should have a commander and an assistant commander. They should be politically conscious and disciplined. They should be elected to the posts. For the purpose of self-defence the ordinary volunteers can use any weapon that is locally available. They can use even sticks, in case if they cannot secure any other weapon".

This is in short what is the organisation and instruments of the peoples' self-defence. In this the peoples' self-defence is only to defend against the repression let loose by the government and the landlords. The question of self-defence does not arise when there is no repression at all. By means of this self-defence, as directed in the "Immediate Programme", all the people would, through their own volunteers participate in the self-defence. By this the people would become conscious. They would become prepared for the land distribution and take the higher form of struggle i. e., form of armed struggle.

Thus, as against the line of peoples' self-defence directed in the Immediate programme, the comrades of the Khammam A. C. are advocating and practicing an alternate line, a line of cadres self-defence unrelated to the people.

Here we should make one thing clear. We are never against the self-defence of our cadres. Our cadres should always defend themselves. For self-defence our cadres may carry on their work individually or they may form and work in

groups and squads. This should depend upon the concentration of the enemy and his tactics of attack. Similarly it would be wrong to think that the self-defence is impossible without a gun: We can and should utilise any weapon that can be utilised for self-defence.

As far as our cadres are concerned, we always carry on this type of self-defence. When the landlord goondas are running amuck, when the government's armed forces are launching attacks, and when the comrades are working illegally, the self-defence is highly essential for us. When there is a mass movement, mass mobilisation and people's self-defence, there would be the cadres' self-defence. When all these are not there, there would be only the problem of cadres' self-defence. We would carry on self-defence of cadres under all circumstances and in all situations. This would be essential not only in the forest areas but also in plain areas. The extent of our self-defence depends upon the extent of the enemy repression against us.

But by this, the self-defence of cadres cannot become the self-defence of the people. It would be wrong to think that the people forming themselves into volunteer squads and carrying on the self-defence would happen only at the stage of land distribution. It can be and should be carried on even at the stage of partial struggles. Without the formation of volunteer squads, no struggle would take a militant form: it would not take an organised form. The level of the consciousness of the people would not grow. For this reason, the people's village committee and the volunteer squad are highly essential.

In any peoples' struggles, repression by the enemy, however serious it might be, would only be corresponding to the level of the people's struggles. When the actions are carried out above the level of the people's struggles, the repression would also be at a higher level and we would not be in a position to face it with the then existing strength of the people's struggles. Often the movement suffers defeat on such occasions.

Same is the case with regard to the repression in Warangal and Khammam districts. Here with the launching of offensive actions

before the people are prepared for armed struggles, the offensive actions which are to be commenced with the launching of armed struggles, the enemy launched repression in this area deploying the armed force in strength necessary to suppress the armed struggle. The mass movement was not in a position to defend itself and advance in the face of this repression. As a result our cadres were isolated from the people. The organisation disappeared. Thus after Pagideru actions, we suffered serious losses in Khammam area. Suffering total setback, we had to start building from ABC. The area of our activities has shrunk. It is only due to this that the people are unable to prepare themselves for self-defence.

Even in the plains we have areas where the movement has reached a certain level. In all these areas, as soon as the peoples' struggles, especially the peasant struggles begin, the government's repression and atrocities of the landlord goondas also would begin, depending upon the intensity of the movement, local situation and general policies of the government. These areas being the plains, areas is the only difference between these areas and those areas with forests and hills. In terms of the level of the movement, the level of the movement in some of these plain areas is only higher than that of the forest areas but not less. According to the contention of the Khammam area committee, should we not launch the "Self-Defence" in such of these areas also? When the struggle for the self-defence of the cadres is formulated as a form of struggle, why don't they extend it to the plains areas? When this is extended to these areas, what would become of the people's self-defence? We say that our cadres should defend themselves even in the plain areas against the attacks of the enemy. This self-defence should be corresponding to the enemy repression. But this can by no means substitute the people's self-defence. In any struggle, big or small it should be our policy to prepare the people for self-defence. Only when the people's revolutionary struggles are co-ordinated with the people's self-defence and the politics of armed struggle, would the people become prepared for the people's protracted armed struggle.

Similarly it is very strange to argue that for the defence of the movement we should carry on cadres self-defence struggle. According to this it is clear that our cadres forming themselves into squads would take the responsibility of defending the movement. The people's enemies, seeing the squads, arms in their hands might temporarily leave the people alone. To think that these are the gains and this is the defence of the movement is the worst type of self-deception. Such gains and such defence of the movement would crumble like house of cards, the movement the enemy's armed forces launch attack or the movement the people's enemies come to have the help of the enemy's armed forces. Only when the people themselves are prepared to defend their own movement would the mass movement gain the stability and acquire the revolutionary character. It is precisely here that the party's work is needed. It is precisely here that the party needs unshakable faith in the mass line. The basic principle of mass line is that the people themselves should strive for their own emancipation. It is only at this stage of the movement, when the people, under the leadership of the party, form themselves into volunteer squads and the people's committees, implement the struggle programme and defend their own movement and their own gains would we consider that the mass line is being implemented.

From this stand point, only the people taking up their own defence would become a stage on the preliminary stage of the armed struggle but the cadres' physical self-defence would never become a stage of the armed struggle. The self-defence that the people carry on at the stage of partial struggles can be considered as armed struggle in its embryonic form. The struggle for self-defence at the stage of land distribution becomes the primary stage of the armed struggle. It is only at this stage that the offensive actions are launched against the enemy and the enemy's armed forces. It is only at this stage that the people would gain the consciousness that their emancipation is possible only through the overthrow of the government. It is only then that the people, forming themselves into volunteer squads as well as joining the local and regular squads, would come forward for the

defence of the movement and the revolutionary gains as well as for the overthrow of the government. It is only then that the protracted war would begin.

For the comrades of the Khammam area committee, cadres struggle for self-defence is the first stage of the protracted war. It is a part of the protracted war. The basis for this protracted war is secured through this. The people become prepared for the protracted war. They have been implementing this programme for the past two years. What does this experience show? The experience shows that even after two years the people are not prepared for the protracted war. This is what, as these comrades are claiming, has proved this line to be "correct through experience and through practice". The Charu Mazumdar group advocated the "Programme of annihilation of class enemy" as the first stage of the armed struggle, and implemented the conception that through this the people could be mobilised into the struggle. Thus there is no difference between the line of thinking of the Charu Mazumdar group and the line of thinking of the Khammam area committee. The only difference is that the area Committee Comrades advocate defensive actions, while the Charu Mazumdar group advocates the offensive actions. This might appear to be a short cut but it is not and cannot be a correct line. It is not a line that can be relied upon. We cannot prepare the people for the protracted war through this line.

The line advocated by the "Immediate Programme" is totally different from this. This includes the line of self-defence by the people. This is based on mass line. Even though this path is full of difficulties, this is the only correct and reliable path. This is the only path which prepares the people for protracted struggle. The Khammam area comrades are rejecting this.

These comrades are advocating the self-defence struggle as the first stage of the armed struggle. They are claiming it to be a new line. But this is not in any way new in the history of revolutionary struggles of our country. In 1948 the ruling classes launched severe repression against the people of Circar and Rayalseema

districts that were in support and solidarity of the Telangana armed struggle, and began to shoot and kill our cadres every where. The then leadership of the party decided to launch armed struggle against this repression and had taken the programme for the extension of Telangana armed struggle to the Círcar and the Rayalseema districts. With this, it waned away before the programme of armed struggle was implemented for any length of time. Here it is correct for our comrades to defend themselves in any way possible against the fascist repression of the ruling classes. But it is incorrect to characterise it as armed struggle before the people are prepared and to extend the Telangana armed struggle to Círcar and Rayalseema districts.

As far as we are concerned, the P.C. realising the need for self-defence, has been from the beginning taking necessary decisions in this regard. In case of Sreekakulam district a mistake was committed in not taking such a decision in the beginning. But in March and June 1968, necessary decisions were taken and arrangements were made in this regard. In Warangal district the decision in this regard was taken even before the state convention itself. In East Godavari arrangements for self-defence were made after the State Convention. In Kondamodalu area of East Godavari the people were mobilised for self-defence.

The P.C. had never at any stage underestimated the importance of self-defence. Its importance was recognised even in the circular, "Lay foundations for a struggle-oriented mass movement," issued as far back as September 1968. In the 'Immediate Programme', the need for organising people for self-defence is stressed and programme for it is given. This is what we have explained in the document, "Some Problems Facing Revolutionary Mass Movement of Khammam Area", keeping in view the arguments that have come up with the Pagideru actions and the experiences that we have gained by that time. On this question, the entire explanation and programme given in these documents stands correct even to this day. This is strictly in accord with the 'Immediate Programme' and the Mass Line. There is no need what so ever to change this programme, or to formulate an alternate programme.

In this connection, the charges of the P.C. centre that the P.C. had underestimated the need for self-defence in Kondamodalu area of East Godavari district and that it was only due to this that the entire leadership was arrested, is baseless. The P.C. admits that it should have rendered more help, especially, proper financial help and that some losses occurred for not having done so. But immediately after the state convention, arrangement for self-defence was made in the entire agency area of this district. The squads were organised in some areas. The review of the movement of this area makes it clear that these arrests are due to lack of a well-knit secret organisation and inexperience and mistakes of the leadership.

As soon as we, the revolutionaries, begin our work among the masses, naturally severe repression also would begin. As the movement reaches higher stage, the repression would also grow more severe. It is not only possible but also necessary to face this repression with the unit of the mass movement.

As the armed struggle was launched without any relation to the preparedness of the people as the concentration of the enemy grew heavy, some additional problems concerning the self-defence have cropped up in the districts of Warangal, Khammam and Karimnagar. These problems would not be so serious during the periods of ordinary struggles. Why should we in all other areas launch armed struggle before the people are prepared and commit the same mistakes as we have committed in Warangal, Khammam and Karimnagar districts?

6. MOBILISATION OF THE MASSES.

The comrades of Khammam A.C. say, that "on one side forming into squads and carrying on struggle for self-defence, we should on the other side work for the mobilisation of the masses on mass issues as the main issues". We have already explained that the struggle for self-defence, these comrades are talking about, has got nothing to do with the peoples self-defence. Let us now see what do they really mean by their talk of the "mobilisation of the masses on mass issues".

It is clear from the reports that in the forest areas the partial struggles are being carried on

against the exploitation in the forest areas and that the people are achieving some gains such as increase of cool rates etc., it should be examined as to what is the extent of the area in which these gains have been achieved, what is the extent of the area influenced by these gains, and what is the extent of area which has not yet been influenced by the struggle. Evidently, the gains achieved due to the existence of squads are more than the gains achieved by the people through their own struggles. The lapse of the movement into a state, where the people look for the squads for each and every thing, is leading or has already led by this time to inactivity among the people. Thus the existence of squads is only proving helpful to passify the peoples struggles and not helping their intensification,

The people might carry on struggles on partial demands for some more time as they do now. But it would be wrong to think that just because of this they would develop revolutionary consciousness and the people become prepared for armed struggle. It is not a fact that people have not till today realised to, at this government should be overthrown through armed struggle and that they should participate in the armed struggle? What is the reason for it?

Evidently there are four reasons:

- 1) Our comrades are leading struggles to the extent they lead the struggles with the outlook of economism. With slight increase in cool rates etc., the people have come to think that they are able to gain them due to the presence of our comrades as well as the existence of the squads. They would also be grateful to our comrades. By this, it would be wrong if we think that the party has gained influence among the people and that they are rendering help to our armed struggle. The government has, especially in forest areas, implemented many economic reforms in a way to solve the peoples partial demands. These reforms have even had lulling effect on the people. This is happening due to the lack of sufficient political consciousness among the people and due to the economic consciousness alone being the main. As long as the situation remains unchanged, it is theoretically wrong to say that in the course of these economic struggles, "gradually the struggle

consciousness would grow among the people and that the necessary basis for the land distribution and the armed struggle would be secured". It is impossible in practice. It is also not proved through experience.

The fact is that, the people would not become prepared for armed struggle by economic struggles and by the propaganda of the politics of armed struggle alone. We should carry on not only the peoples economic struggles but also political struggles. Explaining to the people the experiences of economic struggles we lead, we should make them realise that the gains achieved are only temporary, that their basic problems would not be solved until and unless the government is overthrown and the peoples state is established. Only when the people realise this, would the reforms announced by the government cease to influence the people. The heavy concentration of the enemy and the number of our squads being few might be one of the reasons for this situation having not developed. But the outlook of economism in our comrades is the main reason for it.

Mobilising the masses into struggles, conducting these struggles militantly, forming the peoples volunteer squads and making arrangements for the self-defence of the people as far as possible, creating the revolutionary consciousness - this is the way to secure the necessary basis for the armed struggle.

By combining political propaganda with the experiences of the people's struggles we should raise the political consciousness of the people. This is most important of all. Without the political consciousness the people cannot participate in the armed struggles and they cannot make it victorious. To think that the political consciousness would develop on its own is nothing but "spontaneous outlook". It is our Party and our Party alone which should create the political consciousness and the revolutionary political consciousness among the people, that revolutionary consciousness would itself form the basis for the protracted war.

The Khammam A. C. comrades are unable to grasp this aspect. In the reports of the A. C. as well as in the documents of the State and Regional Committees, there isn't any evidence of

any effort having been made on this fundamental aspect. This happens only when the comrades fail to grasp the need of a conscious political revolutionary movement.

2) When the squads themselves do everything and fail to mobilise the masses to any degree, the inactivity among the masses would remain as ever and even the "economic consciousness" would not develop among them. They would remain content with whatever little they get from the gains achieved by the people of other areas. Consequently they would remain spectators for ever. The documents of these comrades as well as some reports show that those comrades have realised and rectified this mistake. Let us wait for the results.

3) There are people and a wide area with which our squads and the party are not in contact. Since we are not in contact with the people of these areas and since the enemy is in contact with them, it is possible that due to the minor reforms announced by the government these people might temporarily stay away from us. Also due to the occasional mistakes of our comrades, the people of a village or some villages might even go against us. This situation is due to lack of contacts with the people.

4) The revolutionary political consciousness is not developing among the people since our cadres are not carrying on concentrated work in any one area. It is with our concentrated work that the people would participate in struggles on various issues and various forms and become conscious. Their preparedness would grow so that they can take higher form of struggle. It is because of our concentrated work alone that the people of Kondamodalu area of East Godavari became prepared for land distribution within a short period of six months. This policy has not been implemented in the struggle areas of Khammam and Warangal, where the Party Line is not followed. The people have not come forward for land distribution.

Only when we, according to the Party Line carry on our work in a conscious and organised way, would we be able to build the agrarian revolutionary movement.

When we decide to mobilise the masses it was not with an outlook of economism. What we want is a revolutionary mass mobilisation. The mobilisation which would be useful for the building up of revolutionary mass movement and the agrarian revolutionary movement. Even after two years of mobilisation with the economic outlook, the revolutionary movement hasn't begun atleast in a single area. Where has this mobilisation with economic outlook been proved correct through practice and through experience?

It is only the peoples struggles for self-defence that forms a stage, a preliminary stage of the armed struggle, but the struggle for self-defence carried on by the cadre does not by itself form a stage of armed struggle nor does it form the primary stage of the armed struggle. Likewise it is only the revolutionary struggle which forms the basis for the protracted war, but the mobilisation with an economic outlook can never form a basis for the armed struggle nor does it form a stage of the revolutionary movement. Rejecting the experiences of revolutionary struggles, the Khammam area comrades are introducing a theory which is not based on the revolutionary movement.

7. MANTHENA ACTION

In course of the mass movement and as the consciousness of the people develops, the people, adopting new forms of struggle, would finally adopt the form of armed struggle. Thus the armed struggle would be the higher form of the peoples struggle.

As long as the legal illusions continue to remain among the people, the people would want to adopt the legal forms of struggle. As the legal illusions clear away, they would be coming forward to join the militant struggle. This is a higher stage than the legal struggles. In these militant struggles, the people will have to make use of whatever weapons available in order to defend themselves from the goondas of the landlords and the peoples enemies. This is a higher stage than the militant struggles. After this stage the people will have to defend themselves against the governments armed forces.

Gradually they will have to launch offensive actions. This is what is peoples armed struggle. This is what is the higher form of people struggle.

If the mass upsurge is deep and intent, the peoples struggle would rapidly advance from one stage to another stage. The peoples struggles might not advance so rapidly, if the mass upsurge happens to be weak or if there happens to be any external causes such as government's reforms, conciliatory attitude of the exploiters etc., that ull the mass upsurge. The revolutionaries should carefully watch as to how the mass movement is developing from one stage to the other and should change the tactics accordingly.

We have already explained as how in course of the peoples struggles, the people will have to be organised for armed self-defence against armed attacks of the peoples enemies. We have also explained as to how in various situations we will have to prepare for the self-defence of the cadres. For the present we will only examine the Khammam A.C.'s understanding about Manthana action.

"The Khammam A.C.'s Reply" explains the Manthana Actions and the developments that led to it as following:-

"With the expansion of our movement, in Manthana and Nugur taluqs, with the people coming forward for achieving peoples issues, with landlords resorting to the atrocities and with our resistance, the police repression increased. This situation developed by Jan 1969 itself. In this situation the comrades of Manthana and Nugur brought before the Mulugu A.C. their need of arms for self-defence. We have told them that we would report the matter to the P.C. and arrange the supply of weapons. Peddanna and P.R. reported this to the P.C. Secretary. Then it was decided to give two weapons, we had with us to the two areas. Before this was implemented, the Manthana area comrades had on their own initiative confiscated two weapons from an American hunter. They held meetings and explained to the people as to why the weapons were confiscated. With this action the police repression in Manthana and Nugur taluqs became severe. In Manthana we had for the first time confiscated the weapons from a private individual

With this a new aspect had entered in our movement. The self-defence of the cadres and problem of weapons came up on the agenda for the first time. The P. C. leadership had failed in thinking about the importance of the question and the questions that arise in the movement with it".

If we see this lengthy extract, the following aspects would become clear:

1. Our comrades began to mobilise the people on peoples issues in Manthana and Nugur taluqs. The people also moved into struggles.

2. In order to suppress these struggles, the landlords started atrocities. The peoples resistance was not organised against these atrocities. It was "our resistance" that was put up.

3. With "our resistance" the police repression increased. When we could not organise peoples resistance against the landlord repression, how could we organise resistance against the police repression? In that position giving up the task of preparing people for the resistance, our comrades began to think of the question of self-defence alone.

4. When this question was brought up before the responsible comrades of P.C. (till then he was neither P.C. Secretary nor was he acting as such), it was decided that we should make arrangements for self-defence simultaneously with the building of revolutionary movement. "The Khammam Area Committee's Reply" is also admitting this fact. But the leadership of Manthana area failing to grasp the adverse effects of confiscating the weapons from the enemy before the people are prepared, had confiscated the weapons from an American missionary. They explained the fact that they are going to launch the armed struggle not only to the people but also to the American missionary. Through him we had informed it to the government. Thus the government was warned of the fact that not only we are working with the aim of launching the armed struggle, but also we were about to launch the armed struggle immediately. With this the government repression became severe.

5. When the consciousness of the people develops and when they are preparing for a higher form of struggle, there would certainly enter a new aspect in the movement. The P. C. has to then discuss it and decide upon suitable tactics. But nothing of the sort had happened upto Manthena action. Manthena action was not even an action in which the people themselves had seized the weapons from the enemy.

6. Manthena action was a spontaneous action. The local leadership had not in advance discussed and planned this action. However there had already entered a trend in the party and gradually gained strength, according to which the cadres self-defence is counterposed to the mass movement and mass resistance, and showing not the armed struggle as the higher form of the struggle of the revolutionary movement but the self-defence as the form of armed struggle.

If there was any new aspect that entered our movement with Manthena action, it was this "Left" trend itself. Though it was temporarily lying low due to the A.C. decisions adopted afterwards, this has once again raised its head in the Manthena area after State Convention. In Khammam area this was working even from before the convention (we would discuss this later).

Claiming that the Mulugu A. C. had defended the Manthena action, the Khammam A.C. has quoted a passage from the resolution of Mulugu A.C. But if we examine the entire position of this resolution relating to this question we would find nothing to say that it had defended this action. Those extracts are cited here under :

"On listening to this report the extended meeting of the A. C. expressed the opinion that under the circumstances the action was correctly carried out. While discussing the members were of unanimous opinion that this action would confuse the enemy, that he cannot immediately think it as having been carried out according to the committee's decision, that if another action takes place he could come to a definite understanding, that keeping this especially in view we should not resort to such actions, and that since beed leaf problem and food problem

are the immediate problems before the people, we should not lose the favourable time to mobilise the people into field."

It is a fact that the Manthena action is cited here as having been "correctly" carried out. When we asked the then A.C. Secretary to explain this aspect, this is what he said: The cadre that led Manthena action "ate" new a to the movement. This is a spontaneous action. If we decide that this action is wrong, that would lead to their discouragement and the Party activities would suffer. We have taken this decision in order not to discourage them and at the same time to prevent such actions in future by giving them necessary understanding. We would only concentrate on the mass programme in future.

Some of the wrong assessments made by the Area Committee are also reflected in the above passage. Having confiscated the weapons and having explained to the people, it would be wrong to think that the Government would not come to know of this.

Throughout the discussion on the question, importance was given to the implementation of the mass programme. It was also correctly decided that such actions should not be carried out. If the above action is correct, why should such a decision become necessary? It is necessary to see the following extract of the same resolution:

"We were of the unanimous opinion that if we immediately form into squads and start squad actions, we would lose the opportunity to move closer to the people, that we should carefully and politically utilise this good opportunity, that we should keep the enemy in the dark, that it would be very useful to begin squad actions in the end of beedi leaf season and in the beginning of rainy season and that before reaching that higher stage, we would be able to expand the mass base to the mass mobilisation."

If this para means anything, it is only the Manthena action is completely wrong. Unable to state it clearly, the Area Committee had explained this aspect in this way:

It is probably because of passing a resolution to this effect that the Manthena action was correct. Com. Peddanna (Kumar) proposed to carry on such actions which the Area Committee had rejected in this way :

"In the course of discussion Com. Kumar said like this : He suggested that some arms can be collected when we come across one or two individual police personal, Com.P.R. suggested that, "if we do like that for one or two arms, the enemy will get alerted, that we cannot seize weapons on a large scale from the landlords, and that whatever decision we take we should take it in such a way so that the whole thing can be carried out at a time". With this the Committee including Com. Kumar came to unanimous opinion that while continuing to work on beedi leaf movement as the main, we would plan and decide in the next Area Committee".

"Without as much as a formal difference, all finalised the programme unanimously

"Even the P. C. secretariat member (Kumar) who conducted the discussions related to the implementation of the programme, has not expressed even formal difference with this decision."

What does this mean? Even though none of them was having a clear cut understanding on the basic questions such as preparedness of the masses etc., when Com. Kumar expressed the opinion that actions like Manthena action could be carried on, all of them rejected it. Finally Com. Kumar also agreed to it. But it became evident from the later actions that this agreement was only formal and superficial.

In Mulugu area upto the end of April 1969 they went forward with mass activities without resorting to squad actions. During this period the self-defence was not a major problem for them. They carried along with them, whatever weapon they had. While preparing the masses for struggles, if we remain among the masses, the masses would prove to be our best shield.

Eventhough the Mulugu Area Committee hesitated to clearly state that the Manthena actions were wrong, as it rejected squad actions

and gave importance to the mass programme our movement had advanced. The P. C. leadership felt that this problem was solved. If there was any aspect that the P. C. leadership had failed to see, it was only aspect that a wrong trend by which the task of building the agrarian revolutionary movement was given up and the squad actions alone are given importance was working among the P. C. leadership itself and that it might at any time manifest itself openly and harm the movement.

8. EXCEPTION CANNOT BE A RULE :

We and the people carry on actions against the peoples enemies, the landlords and their agents under the following circumstances :

1. The people, moving enmasse, carry on raids on the houses of landlords and such other who carry on grain landing (Nagulu), in connection with the confiscation and distribution of food grains. This programme should be carried out strictly confining to the purpose for which actions are meant.

2. The people, moving enmasse, try atrocious landlords in peoples Courts, and punish them suitably. If it is felt necessary, the people and peoples courts grant them pardon.

3. In order to carry on armed struggle, the people, the cadres and the squads conduct actions against the police agents and punish them suitably.

4. When the revolutionary mass movement advances to a higher stage and reach the stage of launching the armed struggle, we disarm the landlords and the peoples enemies and confiscate their arms by conducting raids on their houses or in some other way. This is very essential in order to launch and carry on armed struggle. The people may carry out these actions, or the militants, forming themselves into volunteer squads may carry out or cadres forming themselves into squads may carry out. Here all that is required is the mass movement should have reached the stage of taking the form of armed struggle. The actions that we carry on against the enemy classes (not the enemy's armed forces) would be in this form.

At certain extraordinary times certain extraordinary situations would arise. They may be due to our mistakes. When our comrades are suffering from hunger and illhealth due to famine and other natural calamities in the entire or some parts of the country and when there is danger that some or all of them are perishing away due to it, we take certain extraordinary measures in order to save the physical existence of our cadres and safeguard the existence of our cadres and the Party. If the leadership fails to take such timely measures, the entire or majority of the cadres and the Party would perish. Afterwards there would be none left to work for the revolution. In such extraordinary situations, as an exception to the general principles we take extraordinary measures.

We would find such an instance in the history of Russian revolution: When the Party centre led by Com. Lenin was in financial crisis when it became impossible to carry on its work Com. Stalin arranged for a raid against a Bank or a Government Treasury and sent necessary funds to Com. Lenin.

We take such extraordinary measures only in extraordinary situations. If we understand them correctly and make the people understand them correctly, they would prove helpful for the existence of the revolutionary Party and the advance of the revolution. If we incorrectly understand them, as general measures and misuse them, they would prove harmful to the revolutionary Party and the revolutionary movement.

For working in the forest areas of Khammam District, the then district committee mobilised some cadres and militants from the forest and plains areas and began their work (the details of which can be seen in the Political - organisational report of the Convention). Unable to maintain the cadres they asked the P.C. for help. Though the P. C. itself was in financial crisis, it borrowed funds and helped the district committee. The Mulugu A.C. has also helped to some extent. Thus it was managed upto the State Convention.

This situation was solely due to the failure of the district leadership to rely upon the masses and the mass movement for necessary financial resources and due to their building a top heavy organisation that the mass movement could not bear.

By the time of State Convention, nearly 15 Comrades went back to their homes due to financial difficulties. The district leadership expressed that if no financial help was given, the others also would go away to their homes and there would be none left to carry on work among the masses. The district leadership made the seriousness of the situation clear to the State Convention. After the convention, when the P.C. members, A.P.C. secretariat member work in the forest area and P.C. secretary met and discussed, they came to a clear understanding on the following points:

1. At a time when we had to prepare the people of Khammam area for armed struggle, in view of the future of the armed struggle, it would not be correct to send the cadres to their homes due to financial reasons.

2. Even though the P.C. was itself in financial difficulties, it could help till then. But it was not in a position to help further. It was a period when the P.C. centre was carrying on its work borrowing funds every day.

3. In Pagideru as well as in all other areas where the masses were to be prepared for armed struggle, we should concentrate our work solely on the mass programme. We should mobilise the masses mainly for the distribution of food grains of the landlords. We should prepare the masses for land distribution.

4. To safe-guard the existence of the remaining cadres, it would become necessary to carryout an action somewhere. For this purpose we should not carry out an action in any of the above mentioned areas. If we do, it would prove very harmful to the movement of these areas. It would become impossible to develop the armed struggle in these areas. Under the circumstances, we carry out such an action in some remote village where there are no opportunities to develop the armed struggle in the near

future. With the funds thus acquired, we should safe-guard the existence of our cadres, carry on the revolutionary mass programme and prepare the masses for the armed struggle. Even though the government launches repression, it would not in any way harm the movement, since whatever the movement is there it is in a state of inactivity. Even if it causes some harm, we can be prepared for this small loss in view of the greater task of preparing the masses for armed struggle in a wide area. It was only with this understanding that the programme for an action in a remote village of Palvancha taluq was agreed to.

The following para from Mulugu A.C. report is also confirming the same understanding:

.....on 13th and 14th April, the members of Khammam and Mulugu Area Committee, P.C. members gave detailed reports of the movement to the P.C. secretary. After the discussions it was decided that without carrying out squad actions in any area of Warangal and Khammam including Burgampad where there is girijan movement, we should mobilise the masses into beedi leaf movement and at the same time we should lead the people on food problem if there is preparedness among the masses. It was an exception permitted to carry out an action for the purpose of funds in a remote area which is far away and would not have any impact on this movement. Nobody differed with this decision taken on 14th.

According to the understanding of the Mulugu A.C. leadership in the discussions as well as in the 14th decision the importance was given to the implementation of the revolutionary mass programme in the entire forest areas. There is no scope for understanding and implementing it otherwise. The comrades that participated in the discussion agreed for an action in a remote area for funds according to the above understanding and only for the purpose of safe-guarding the physical existence of the cadres.

The Khammam district comrades had not discussed and implemented this decision; the district leadership met (the P.C. Secretariat member [Kunâr] attended this meeting) and decided to carry out squad actions exactly in the same

area where it was decided that revolutionary mass programme should be implemented and that no squad actions should be carried out.

If we examine the following extracts from the "Khammam A.C.'s reply", it would become clear as to how they are confusing the facts:

Due to this decision there formed a wrong understanding among our Comrades. There developed an understanding that unrelated to the peoples demands and the mobilisation of the people, we could, for the needs of the Party, carry out actions, on our own initiative itself. They formed an opinion that this had the approval of the P.C.

Our district committee met on the same night that the Palvancha action was decided upon. The Comrades there had informed that action might not be possible in Palvancha. Our district committee has unanimously decided that if it was not possible in Palvancha, in Pagideru the money also could be confiscated along with the food grains. This is the consequence of the decision of the P.C. leadership that the action should be carried out in Palvancha for funds.

The Mulugu Area comrades had not understood the Palvancha decision in the way the Khammam district leadership understood it. The Mulugu area comrades understood it as an extraordinary decision. They stood by the understanding that we should concentrate only on the revolutionary mass programme in the entire forest area. Then what was the need for Khammam district leadership to understand it other wise? When there was a P.C. Secretariat member with Khammam district leadership, to properly explain and implement the P.C. decisions, should the mistakes occur even if there happens to be shortcomings in the understanding of the district leadership? In view of this, there was no basis what so ever to think that their incorrect understanding and incorrect practice would have the approval of the P.C.

If the action was not possible in Palvancha the district leadership should have given it up. Instead, what was the necessity to decide for carrying out action for money in the same area

where the revolutionary mass programme was to be implemented?

The mass movement of Pagideru area had not reached the stage of grain distribution by then. Then at that time how could the decision for the grain distribution be correct? In an area where the mass movement has not reached the stage of grain distribution how could a decision to carry out an action for funds be correct? How could the decision of the district committee, even if it was adopted unanimously, become correct if its activities go against the policies and decisions of the party?

These Comrades are questioning as to what is the difference between the decision of the P.C. comrades and the actions of the C.P.(ML). In fact there is no difference between the actions of the C.P.(ML) and Pagideru actions. But this was not the aim of the P.C. comrades. The nature of that decision is quite different. How can there be a similarity between our action aimed at safe-guarding the physical existence of our cadres in an extraordinary situation and the actions of the C.P.(ML) carried out as part of their programme of annihilation of class enemy?

The fact is, before the State Convention itself, certain important comrades including the P.C. secretariat member had taken a decision to carry out actions in Pagideru area. On the plea that in the district the financial problem is serious, and that the very existence of cadre was in danger, they tried to get the approval of the P.C. secretary for action in this area. When it did not become possible, as against the programme of State Convention, they implemented their own programme as they had earlier decided. When the results were adverse, instead of reviewing their incorrect programme and taking proper lessons from it they are shifting the responsibility to the P.C.

9. THE PRE-PLANNED PAGIDERU ACTIONS:

The Programme formulated in the State Convention is a programme of agrarian revolution meant for implementation among the masses prior to launching of armed struggle, a programme meant for preparing the masses for armed struggle. From beginning to end, only the prob-

lems pertaining to it are explained in it. How to launch armed struggle? What steps should be taken at the time of launching the armed struggle? And what programme should be implemented after the launching of armed struggle? All such questions are not explained in it. The programme of launching of armed struggle was not explained in it, with a view to hold meeting as and when necessary before the armed struggle is launched, to review the struggle position, to take a decision for launching the armed struggle and to decide the programmes and when the situation ripens. Any one who studied the "Immediate Programme", and any one who participated in the discussions of the State Convention can understand this. Yet the then leadership in Pagideru area had taken a decision to launch armed struggle, and actually implemented it without preparing the people for armed struggle, without the mass movement reaching the stage of taking the form of armed struggle and without the situation becoming ripe for armed struggle. Since the Khammam A.C. is admitting that it was wrong to have launched a armed struggle in this way, there is for the present no dispute. But it is essential to examine the developments which, as they claim, have led to this decision. Let us first examine the following extracts from the Khammam A.C.'s Reply

"In the meeting of local cadres and the Z.C. members held at Pagideru on 16th April 1969, Peddanna and Ravi reported the Vijayawada decisions. It was decided to mobilise the masses against the grain hoardings of the landlords. The work division as to the responsibilities of each was also decided upon. Afterwards, with information to the effect that the police were going to be deployed on a large scale, and the police camps are going to be established, this decision was turned upside down. The local comrades, the available Z.C. members and Ravi met separately and took a decision that as the police camps are going to be established, they could not carry out the action for food grains, that all the existing cadre should form themselves into a squad and work within the forest and that it was therefore necessary to carry out actions against the landlords on that night and confiscate the arms. When this decision was reported to Peddanna, Peddanna opposed this

decision. He said that it was against the Vijayawada decision. Then Com. Ravi argued that "we had already taken up arms in Manthana. How can it be wrong if we take up arms here? The State Convention decided for armed struggle in the month of June. We are launching only 1½ month earlier, is not it? We could not expect in Vijayawada that in Pagideru there would be such a heavy concentration so early. At present the problem of self-defence of the cadres has come up before us. For this, it is inevitable to take up arms". Peddanna could not convince Ravi.

"The Khammam A. C.'s Reply" is citing them here as to the developments that led to launching of armed struggle by our comrades in the Pagideru area of Khammam district, before the situation is ripe, and before the people are prepared for armed struggle.

Some other facts are missing in these facts. The answers for certain questions are not to be found here.

1. It is a fact that all the Pagideru actions were carried out with the help of the squad from the Nuguru area of Mulugu taluq. On the same day the important comrades reached the Pagideru area from the State Convention, this squad also reached there. If these actions were not planned before the convention, how was it possible for that squad to reach that place on the very same day, the important comrades reached there?

2. It is a fact that in the first meeting held on April 16th itself the important comrades proposed that actions for arms, funds and foodgrains should be carried out on 18th and got it accepted by the comrades attending the meeting. After receiving the information that the police would arrive and establish camps, they only changed the earlier decision to carry out the actions on 18th and decided to carryout the actions for funds and arms on the same day(16th). But it is not a fact to say that they decided to carry out the actions for arms only after receiving the information about the police. (This is learnt from reliable sources).

3. It is a fact that in the meeting held on the morning of 16th, the important comrades who

attended the State Convention, had not explained to the cadres the main points adopted by the convention. In the meeting they explained the so-called Vijayawada decisions only (the D.C. meeting was held on 14th). These were not the decisions taken according to the State Convention programme, after discussing it. These were not the measures taken to implement the decisions adopted in consultation of the P.C. Secretary. They were the decisions and actions that were different from it.

4. It is a fact that the P.C. Secretariat member had not spoken anything about the Party programme and the need of building the revolutionary movement, to the cadres and the important comrades attending the meeting. This comrade left the decisions to the comrades attending the meeting and allowed the decisions to go on the wrong lines. Instead of being on the mass programme which was to be implemented immediately, all the discussions centred around "gun" which was beyond the level of the local movement.

5. No programme pertaining to mobilisation of the masses for grain distribution was implemented by then in that area. There was not any mass movement in that area. The decision to mobilise the masses on 18th for the distribution of food grains, was not a decision adopted to implement. They conveyed this decision to the cadres only to show them that they were only carrying out the programme of the State Convention.

Thus the Pagideru actions were carried out according to a plan decided upon before the State Convention itself. There is not any connection between these actions and the Manthana action or these actions and the decision of Palvancha action.

If we notice the manner of discussions of the 16th meeting (according to "Khammam A. C.'s Reply"), we would find that any party unit or any Party cadre should launch the armed struggle according to the Party programme, would never carry on the discussions in that trend.

They brought Manthana action into discussion irrelevantly. Even though the Mulugu A.C., in

its resolution formally accepted the Manthena action as correct; those comrades realised its incorrectness, decided against the repetition of such actions and had been implementing that decision. Had this aspect been understood, the leadership could have taken steps to prevent occurrence of actions such as Manthena action in Khammam area as well. As the Mulugu area comrades had concentrated their attention on mass programme the Khammam area comrades also could have done.

Likewise there is not any similarity with the decision of Palvancha actions. Based upon the reports of the leadership that there existed an extraordinary situation, this decision was taken to safe-guard the physical existence of cadres. Further a programme to prepare the mass for armed struggle in Pagideru area was also given. The fact that without implementing any of this programme the comrades here had directly launched the squad actions, makes it clear that their very outlook itself was different.

The argument that we should take up arms since the police would come, and that we should carry out actions for arms since we should take up arms, is very weak. It was but born of emotion and not one that would help formulate a programme in accordance with the consciousness of the people. The aspects that all of us should realise are that:

1. Only when the gun is in the hands of the people, leaving the consciousness of armed struggle, can this gun become a means for the resolution of peoples revolutionary questions, but not before.

2. The gun is not the only means of self-defence. There are a number of weapons locally available to the cadres and the people. While getting skilled in the use of these weapons, the people and the cadre should prepare themselves for higher stage of struggle. When the people are prepared for the offensive against the enemy, it would be possible to seize the arms from the enemy himself and wage the struggle against him.

3. The fact that the information received about the impending arrival of police to Pagideru proved false indicates the position of our organisation. A Party which is not closely linked with

the masses would always get perturbed with such wild rumours.

When we had any way decided to launch the armed struggle in the month of June, what would be wrong if we launched it 1½ months earlier? This is an other wrong argument. We decided to launch the struggle only by implementing the agrarian revolutionary programme formulated in the Immediate Programme, by revolutionary mobilisation of the masses and by advancing the revolutionary movement to a higher stage and not without implementing any of this. If there is no need of implementing any of this, why only 1½ months earlier, we can launch it even six months earlier. Our decision is not a decision of time alone. It is a decision, that suggests the period of time needed to launch armed struggle through giving importance to agrarian revolutionary programme

Thus the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply" makes it clear that the arguments advanced at the time of discussions of the important comrades of the district were not in line with the level of the movement of that area or their experiences. They went on the wrong lines and the leadership that was present in the meeting did not in the least try to correct them. Thus these arguments and discussions proved useful only to strengthen the decision to launch armed struggle in that area, taken before the State Convention itself but not to implement the programme adopted by the State Convention. The movement went on the lines different from and opposed to the line adopted by the State Convention.

For our part it is wrong to say that armed struggle should be launched in the month of June and to write that it should begin in the beginning of the rainy season.

This mistake is due to the following reasons:

- 1) The leadership was lacking in the understanding that the Charu Mazumdar trend was strong in our Party. Because we could formulate the immediate programme, we hoped that we could build the revolutionary movement by implementing it and launch the armed struggle when it reaches the stage of armed struggle.

2) While facing the vilification campaign that the Charu Mazumdar group was carrying on against the P. C. leadership, we felt that it would help create confidence among the ordinary cadres if we, while saying that we were striving hard to launch the armed struggle, also say that we could launch the armed struggle in the beginning of rainy season.

Even though there were reports that the movements in some areas had reached the higher stage, even though the convention directed that the time should be decided within a certain period and that within that period preparations should be completed, it was wrong to decide the time far in advance of launching of the armed struggle and to publicly announce this decision. Due to this the enemy could have the opportunity for making preparations to strike at us. And it helped the "Left" trends in the Party to begin hasty actions.

There was possibility for the P.C. to meet in the beginning of the rainy season, to review the position of the movement, to examine if the movement had reached the stage of taking the form of armed struggle or not, to take proper decisions and rectify the mistake committed in fixing the time. But the actions were started in Khammam and Warangal districts without any concern of P.C. With this rectifications of the mistakes has become impossible.

With this mistake of ours, to say that it is wrong to fix the time itself (In the language of the A.C. it is fixing "muhurtam"), and to say that it is correct for anyone and everyone to decide and carryout actions on their own, would only be going again to the other extreme. As soon as the mass movement reaches the stage of armed struggle, if we fix the time for launching of the armed struggle, if we keep it secret and if we launch the armed struggle in a wide area, the initiative would be in our hands for some time. We would get the arms of the enemy. We would have time to mobilise and prepare the masses in a way to withstand the repression of the enemy. It would be helpful for the advance of the armed struggle.

Citing a letter from the P.C.'s secretary to the Mulugu A. C., "the Khammam A. C.'s

Reply" criticises that the Party Secretary had only written that we could not get from the enemy as many arms as we should have got, as we launched the armed struggle earlier than we decided and that did not as much as touch in it either the preparedness of the people or the main points of the State Convention. This is wrong. In his letter to Com. Kumar (Peddanna), the secretary wrote that detailed Party letter would also be sent. Besides he mentioned all the main points in his letter to Com. Kumar (Peddanna). All the discussions in the July 1969 P.C. meeting were only in accordance with the Programme of the State Convention. It is this very same programme which we explained in the document "Some problems facing the Revolutionary Mass Movement of Khammam Area".

10. SOME MORE POINTS EXPLAINED

From this point of view, all the points of the State Convention Programme the Immediate Programme excepting the point relating to the fixing of time, are correct. Likewise, the criticism that it is incorrect to launch the armed struggle before the situation is ripe, containing in the document "Some Problems facing the Revolutionary Mass Movement of Khammam Area", is also correct. Contrary to this, the announcement, in the document, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", where in the armed struggle launched before the situation was ripe was expressed as correct, is wrong. On the one hand, we rectify, through criticism and self-criticism, the wrong understanding that led to the launching of armed struggle before the situation is ripe and strive, adopting a correct policy to take the revolutionary mass movement to the stage of armed struggle. On the other hand, we publicly defend it. We should not confuse these two. After launching of armed actions, we, on the one hand, conduct criticism and self-criticism about the wrong understanding inside our party. On the other hand, we defend the armed struggle through a statement of the P.C. in the document, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", the armed struggle was simply defended without criticism and self-criticism. This is incorrect.

Similarly, in this document we assessed that the people, in order to defend the revolutionary gains, are participating in the armed struggles.

This also is over estimation. In consequence, we have formulated this as a stage in which the people are carrying on armed struggle in defence of the movement. This formulation is also above the level of the movement. The fact is; the people of Khammam and Warangal districts are not participating in the armed struggle. Our cadres, forming themselves into squads, are defending themselves. This is not a stage nor any stage of the peoples armed struggle. (We have already explained this aspect).

In this document, it is stated that, "When the enemy, launching severe repression, is subjecting people to tortures and when the people are anxious to launch actions against the enemy, we should, depending upon our strength and opportunities, prepare for actions against the enemy. We should in such a situation give importance to ambushes". This is undoubtedly a tactic pertaining to the stage in which the people are prepared to participate in the armed struggle. Today, the mass movement of Khammam and Warangal districts is not of that level. It was our opinion that it might sooner or later reach the level and then such tactic should be adopted. But it does not however mean that we should carry on actions just because some people ask for them."

Com. Mao, in his, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", writes about the importance of defensive position that :

"With the slogan of defending the revolutionary base areas and defending China, we can rally overwhelming majority of the people to fight with one heart and one mind, because we are the oppressed and the victims of aggression. It was by using the form of the defensive that Red army of the Soviet Union defeated its enemies during the Civil War. When the imperialist countries organised the Whites for attack, the war was waged under the slogan of defending the Soviets. Even when the October uprising was being prepared, the military mobilisation was carried out under the slogan of defending the capital. In every Just War the defensive not only has a belling effect on the politically alien elements, it also makes possible rallying of the

backward sections of the masses to join the war." (Selected writings P. No. 198).

Here the self-defence and the defence are not one and the same. The self-defence is mainly aimed at the protection of cadres. The defence is aimed at the safe-guarding of the movement, the base areas and the country. In the Soviet Union and China, the liberation armies have been built and the great leaders, Lenin, Stalin and Mao themselves had taken up defensive slogan for the victory of the revolution in the country and for the emancipation from imperialism and achieved victory.

Waging the War with help of the liberation armies, when Lenin Stalin and Mao had themselves made use of the defensive position, whose revolutionary movement itself is in its primary stage, should never declare that we are carrying on offensive struggle. Even when there is participation of the people in the armed struggle, we should persist in declaring that we are carrying on the struggle in defence of revolutionary gains. The slogan would help mobilise the broad democratic masses.

In the present position, when there is no participation of the masses in the armed struggle, it is not only a fact for us to declare that we are carrying on the struggle for the self-defence of our cadres, but also it will help mobilise the broad democratic masses. Even from this stand point, it is correct to declare that we are carrying the struggle in self-defence.

In India today the peoples democratic revolution is in the stage of agrarian revolution. This would be in the form of a civil war. At the stage the imperialism directly intervenes, this would transform it-self into a revolution for national liberation. Thus our revolution might go on in two stages. Or depending upon the changes in the inter state revolution, the liberation may be in more than two stages. In any case it is inevitable that this revolution should go on as a civil war or as a national liberation struggle. Based on the situation, we advance the revolution either with the slogan of agrarian revolution or the slogan on national liberation war.

11. P.C.'s DIRECTIVES TO KEEP THE MOVEMENT OF STRUGGLE AREAS ON CORRECT LINES

From the very beginning, the mass movement has been uneven in the forest areas of Khammam and Warangal districts. Immediately after the State Convention, when the people were not in any way prepared for armed struggle and when the mass movement was still in the primary stage, the armed actions were launched in Pagideru area Khammam district without any decision from the P.C. With this the Mulugu area comrades carried out actions knowing well that they were going against the P.C.'s decision.

To report their resolutions, the Mulugu A.C. Secretary and the P.C. member attended the P.C. in the month of May 1969 and had discussions. The P.C. member explained that the mass movement in their areas was well-developed, that they had waited upto June and concentrated on the building of mass movement, the movement could have got strengthened and a very favourable situation for launching of armed struggle would have developed. But that after Pagideru actions, we felt that we would loose the initiative if we do not launch the armed actions and that in that area the movement was sufficiently advanced by that time. As they had by then begun to implement the A.C.'s resolutions it became impossible to stop them. Since they reported that more than the other areas the movement of this area had developed to the level of reaching the stage of armed struggle, we came to the opinion that it would be proper to wait and see. The resolution of the Mulugu A.C. adopted in this connection clearly states that "Today, in Mulugu, Manthana and Nuguru areas, the giron movement has reached the state of armed struggle. It is only due to the work we carried out following Mao's Thought ever since we differed with and launched struggle against the neorevisionists on the path of people's was that we have reached this stage".

From the above passage it is clear that the Mulugu A.C. had not launched the armed struggle because they were unable to withstand the pressure from the cadres or because of the police repression. They launched the armed struggle only with the clear-cut understanding that the level

of the movement in their area had reached the stage of armed struggle. In the programme they adopted in this connection, they included actions against the police by way of ambush. It is but usual to carryout such actions in the armed struggle. In that situations it was not possible for us to ask them not to carry on such actions. Yet we made it clear to them that either in the beginning of the Telangana armed struggle (1946-51) or even after it advanced to a stage, none of the actions against the police stations were successful. There was nothing that we could do about these decisions that were already adopted.

In the P.C. Meeting of July 1969, we thoroughly discussed the Pagideru actions and decided that we should take up the programme of self defence and concentrate on the building of mass movement. The programme of self-defence was not included in the resolution adopted by the Joint meeting of Khammam and Warangal area comrades in the month of May. Only the offensive programme was included in it. As the mass movement in Khammam area was in a very primary stage, it was suggested that the offensive programme should not be implemented and that the mass movement should be taken forward while carrying on the self-defence.

Admitting these points in this self-criticism, Com. Kumar (Peddanna) writes that :

"The Secretary's letter on the Pagideru actions, the resolutions sent by the Mulugu A.C., the P.C. discussion on 5th, 6th and 7th of July, the shortcomings in my understanding- I am making a serious effort to deeply examine all these things."

"Mainly mass mobilisation, squad activities and resistance-co-ordinating these three, mobilising the masses on mass issues and various stages of the resistance basically agree with the Secretary's explanation on all of them."

Though there appears to be some reservations in saying here 'basically', he however writes as having rectified his understanding through the Secretary's letter, P.C. discussions, and the Mulugu A.C. resolution. Similarly 10 point programme was adopted after Gondigudem incident. In that actions against police by way of ambush were

not included. There it was only stated that 'the actions should be carried out against the people's enemies who came in the way of this "10 point" programme. "In his letter he promised that "with the understanding you have given, I will try to further sharpen it."

While this is actually the position, it is baseless to say that the P. C. had sent nothing about the 10 point programme.

In the end of July 1969, the P.C. Secretary discussed with some important comrades from Mulugu and acquainted himself with the position of the movement there. Then it became clear that even in the Mulugu area the people's participation was poor and that there was also the task of developing the movement is still unfinished. It was on the basis of this that in the document, "Some Problems facing the Revolutionary Mass Movement of Khammam Area", it was written that the criticism against the Khammam area would also apply to Mulugu area.

From the very beginning there has been unevenness in the level of the movement of the Mulugu and Khammam areas. Due to this we could not in the beginning itself ask not to carry out the offensive actions in the Mulugu area. We have been directing Khammam area from the very beginning not to carry out offensive actions but to try for self-defence.

Similarly it is incorrect to say that the P.C. has not provided leadership on any of the main problems. The following extracts of the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply" and of the "Letter" of the P.C. centre, make things clear about the leadership provided by the P.C.

1) When it was reported that the army were needed for self-defence, the P.C. had taken a decision agreeing to it. "The Khammam A.C.'s Reply" makes this clear as follows:

"Under the circumstances, the Mathena and Nugur comrades brought before the Mulugu A.C. that they need arms for self-defence. We informed that we would report this to the P.C. and send them the arms needed. Peddanna and P.R. reported this to the P.C. Secretary. Then it was decided that the two arms we had with us should

be given to the comrades of those two areas". (two areas: Manthana, Nugur).

2) In the 1969 July P.C. meeting we thoroughly discussed the Pagideru actions and the programme to be implemented. Earlier the P.C. Secretary had written a letter about this to P.C. Secretariat member. He has also admitted this fact in his letter of self-criticism.

3) In September 1969 when Com. Kumara (Peddanna) himself once again suggested, from Khammam area that the action should be launched against police, the P.C. had rejected this suggestion.

In a letter from the P.C. centre, the P.C. centre comrades write that:

"Last year, when opinion of some comrades that the offensive actions should be launched against the police in Khammam area, was reported to the P.C., the P.C. correctly rejected it.

What was reported to us was not as the opinion of some comrades of A.C. but as the opinion of the A.C. comrades themselves.

4) Since some time there had been a trend among the Area comrades, which could not make a distinction between the class enemies, who should be faced by means of people struggles and the police agents who should be faced by means of military actions. The P.C. made efforts to rectify this trend. Admitting this the P.C. centre comrades write that:

"Your suggestions, especially with regards to the forest area movement we treat their informants as a part of armed forces. This is only due to this that we take retaliatory measures against them in self-defence. We force the enemy to surrender", becomes very essential for our movement at this stage. Our committees, our squads including we ourselves do not clearly see this difference between these two types of the enemies. Your suggestion would rectify the shortcomings in our outlook. Based upon this we would educate our squads and committees"

This utterly wrong understanding existing not only in the committees and squads but also in the leadership itself is nothing but the remnants of individual terrorism.

The P.C. has rectified this important mistake

As long as the important comrades of the A.C. were within the reach, the P.C. had been meeting and discussing with them always following the position of the movement and giving necessary suggestions. At the time of discussions with the P.C. Secretariat member, the P.C. made it clear to him that the armed struggle should be launched only when the people are prepared for the armed struggle, that we should allow the enemy to fire the first shot, that by this we would have the advantage thereafter and that in the Srikakulam armed struggle the revolutionaries had this advantage.

In September 1963 itself through the circular "Lay Foundations for a Struggle-Oriented Mass Movement". We gave the programme to reorganise and develop the mass movement on the fighting lines in the forest and plain areas. It was in accordance with this that the movement of the forest area advanced.

Even though it was in the State convention that the Immediate Programme was adopted, it was actually worked out by January 1969 itself. It was only according to this programme that then onwards we were giving the instructions and help to the forest areas. At a time when they should have implemented this programme with utmost persistence and develop the agrarian revolution, the Area Comrades resorted to armed actions.

Though in this Programme there were some shortcomings here and there, they were not above rectification. We could have rectified and marched forward. But this Programme had not come for implementation. Since the trends which were not in accord with the understanding of this programme were working among the comrades responsible for the area, whatever be the extent to which it was not comprehensive. As a result of this, the movement could not advance and we have fallen into a position of self-defence.

We are not under estimating the efforts made by the comrades working in the forest areas, in the building the mass movement of the forest areas and in the struggle for self-defence. It would be but wrong to claim that this movement

has developed without having anything to do with the State Co-Ordination Committee and the P.C.

12. OTHER FORMS OF STRUGGLE—OTHER SLOGANS OF STRUGGLE—THEIR IMPORTANCE.

When we adopt the armed struggle as the main form of struggle, we adopt the necessary forms of struggle as secondary forms of struggle. We formulate the slogans of struggles in accordance with them. These forms of struggle and these slogans of struggle would be in accordance with the level of the consciousness of the people of the respective areas.

The level of the movement is uneven not only through our country but also in the Andhra Pradesh itself. This would remain so even in future. Under the circumstances, we should, depending upon the level of the movement of the respective areas, adopt the forms and the slogans of struggles. Even though for this entire stage we have adopted the armed struggles the main form of struggle and the overthrow of the government as the main slogan of struggle, when the level of the consciousness of the people is not corresponding to it, the other forms and other slogans would be of much importance.

Ours is a specific situation. We have launched the armed struggle before the people and the movement of any area have reached the stage of taking the form of armed struggle. Realising that the level of the consciousness of the people is not corresponding to it, we are carrying on self-defence. Even though the situation is like this, there came up a question before us whether we should publicly declare it as an armed struggle or not? Then it was decided that on the one hand we should strive to rectify our mistakes and to gradually advance the mass movement to the stage of taking the form of struggle and that on the other hand we should in the while declare it as an armed struggle for the defence of the gains of the movement and the defence of the cadres. Keeping the entire revolutionary movement in view, in the announcement we made in this connection, we declared this armed struggle as the struggle to change the social system and as a liberation struggle. Based on the theoretical principle that in any armed struggle it would be useful for us to emphasise the defensive posi-

tion, it would prove useful for the advance of the movement to emphasize the defensive position. This also happened to be the fact.

In the specific situation, that too when the level of the consciousness of the people is not corresponding to the level of reaching the form of armed struggle, for us to reject other forms of struggle only amounts to binding ourselves hand and foot.

Today in the struggle areas as well as in the plains areas where we are carrying on self-defence, we have taken up the programme for leading partial struggles on partial demands. It means that while on the one hand saying that we are adopting the form of armed struggle and the slogan to overthrow the Government, we are on the other hand implementing very preliminary forms and slogans of struggle. In such a situation, even though the slogan of civil rights and the struggle for civil rights are very primary, it would be a slogan and a form of struggle within the reach of the consciousness of the people. It would be of immense importance especially in the plains areas.

Our Peoples Democratic Revolution is a revolution with bourgeois democratic character. Though nominally there exists a parliamentary system in the country, the peoples struggle and the mass movements are being subjected to despotism and repression by the ruling classes. As far as the revolutionary movements and revolutionary struggles it is needless to say anything. Even though it is a fact that this despotism and repression would completely and only when the ruling classes are overthrown, till then it would however be necessary for us to agitate against it. It would be our revolutionary duty to carry on a struggle against the repression let loose not only against us but also against the others.

Since ours is a revolutionary movement and since we are carrying on the self-defence struggle, the repression let loose against us is all the more severe. It would also continue to be so in future. We should have a legal organisation and clear-cut slogans in order to carry on agitation against it. The civil rights organisation and the slogans for civil rights would be in accord with it.

Even though we carry on our activities, based upon the Secret Party Organisation, we need legal mass organisation to make use of the legal opportunities, among them, along with the class organisations, the non class organisations, such as civil rights organisation would also be very useful. Making use of this platform, we can through a ceaseless agitation expose the endless repression of the Government and make the people politically conscious to some extent.

Though we have been, of late carrying on some political propaganda, the economic outlook still remains in our activities. The fact that our activities are often confined only to partial struggle is a proof for this. Rectifying this outlook we should give importance to the creation of revolutionary political consciousness among the people. We should adopt the forms of struggle, slogan of organisation corresponding to it. The agitation for civil rights is one of them. Besides this we should formulate other political slogans.

The following area from the criticism that the P.C. centre put forward rejecting the P. C.'s suggestion to organise the agitation for civil rights is noteworthy:

"On one side carrying on armed struggle and carrying on the liberation struggle according to the decision of the previous P.C., we are unable to imagine as to how can we, on the other side, make the civil rights agitation as the main agitational issue. On one side carrying on actions against landlord enemies, we are unable as to how can we, on the other side, make the release of the leaders, withdrawal of the police camps and the withdrawal of the conspiracy cases as the issues to be agitated upon ceaselessly. It is not even two years since we launched armed struggle. While on the one side making serious efforts to intensify the armed struggle, it would not only be impracticable to bring up the issue of the release of the leaders as the main issue, especially in the plains areas, but also it would give scope for the people to doubt that we are bringing up the civil rights issue and the issue of the release of the leaders and the first step towards abandoning of the armed struggle. Our political enemies would also try to create such doubts."

We have already explained about the inter-relationship between the armed struggle and the

slogan of overthrow of the Government on one side and the other forms and slogans of struggle on the other side. We have made it clear that in our specific situation, the level of the consciousness of the people has not reached the stage in which we should adopt the form of armed struggle. Under the circumstances, we have also explained the need for primary forms and slogans of struggle. While such being the consciousness of the people, there is no possibility of people doubting if we carry on the civil rights agitation. To attribute our own doubts to the people and to pose as though pleading on behalf of the people is nothing but a legacy of revisionism. While they themselves are not prepared to lead the struggles, the revisionist blame the people saying that they are not prepared for struggles. This is not new for us. Same is the case with the civil rights issue.

Our political enemies make it their business to carry on a vilification campaign against us. If we take a correct stand ideologically and if we adopt a programme which is within the reach of the people's consciousness, their vilification campaign cannot simply touch us. They would fail to create any doubts among the people.

As far as the question whether the agitation is practicable or not, the Guntur district comrades have, through experience and through practice proved it to be practicable. The Guntur Civil Rights Convention, the building of civil rights organisation would only strengthen but not weaken our self-defence struggle. Thus the efforts of the Guntur district comrades are not only commendable but also prove how utterly baseless is the criticism by the P.C. centre comrades.

The question of who should be in the civil rights organisation need not be a point of dispute. All those who are interested in the question of civil rights might be there in it. This is not a United Front of the political parties. This is a platform of all those who express concern on the question of civil rights. In this the individuals from the reactionary and the counter-revolutionary parties belonging to the above category might also join in their individual capacities. In the past we recognised such individuals. Such individuals are also there in

the Guntur Civil Rights Organisation. Therefore it is fully defendable to make use of this organisation as a platform to condemn the Government repression, and to agitate in defence of the civil rights. It is essential that we should make use of this platform as long as possible.

Thus we should grasp that we can take the revolutionary movement forward only when we co-ordinate the self-defence struggle with the forms of struggle.

13. SIMILARITY WITH THE CHARU MAZUMDAR LINE.

We have so far examined the wrongline of thinking of the comrades of Khammam A.C. and the P.C. centre on the fundamental questions concerning the armed struggle. If we deeply examine this line of thinking, it would become clear that there is a similarity between this line and the line of Charu Mazumdar.

Eventhough the document of Khammam A.C. admits that it was wrong to launch the armed struggle before the people are prepared for the armed struggle, this document has completely failed in examining the reasons for this mistake (Pagideru actions) and in coming to correct conclusions. Further they are theorising the same wrong line of thinking under the influence of which the armed struggle was launched in Khammam and Warangal districts before the people were prepared for armed struggle and demanding that the cadres' physical self-defence should be taken as first stage of the armed struggle.

Thus they are formulating that in the armed struggle there would be a stage which is unrelated to the consciousness of the people.

In accordance with Marxism-Leninism Mao's Thought, only when the people adopt the armed struggle as a form of struggle would the armed struggle become a peoples armed struggle. We do not recognise any other artificial forms of armed struggle except the peoples armed struggle. In the specific conditions of India the people would adopt the form of armed struggle only in course of building of revolutionary movement.

The armed struggle would begin in the form of guerilla warfare. Continuing as a protracted war the guerilla warfare would gradually develop into a mobile warfare and then into a positional warfare. First the villages would be liberated. And then gradually the cities would be liberated. This would be the course of development of peoples war in India.

8 We do not accept any other line of thinking opposed to it. The form of struggle which the people do not consciously adopt is not and cannot be a form of struggle. The very thought that there can exist such a form of struggle is opposed to Marxism-Leninism Mao's Thought. To formulate that the self-defence, carried on by the cadres for safe-guarding their physical existence, as the first stage of the armed struggle is also opposed to Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought.

Charu Mazumdar says that "programme of annihilation of class enemy", carried out by some cadres and militants unrelated to the revolutionary mass movement and the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, is an armed struggle. The P.C. centre and the Khammam A.C. say that the self-defence programme carried out by some cadres and militants unrelated to the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary consciousness of the people is an armed struggle. If there is any difference between the two, it is only that the former is an offensive action while the latter is defensive action. In rejecting the revolutionary mass movement, and the level of the peoples consciousness, both these lines of thinking are one and the same.

It is only in accordance with this line of thinking that the Khammam A.C. comrades, rejecting the importance of adopting the other forms of struggle before the people adopted the form of armed struggle, introduced "self-defence" in their place. Thus giving up all the forms of people struggles (including the militant forms of struggle) they introduced the cadres self-defence as an alternative to them. Charu Mazumdar says that the armed struggle is the only form of struggle. Basically there is no difference between these two.

The Khammam A.C. comrades call the ordinary and partial struggle as well as the struggles carried on with an economic outlook as the mobilization of people. They are arguing that the self-defence armed struggle is needed for this mass mobilisation. Charu Mazumdar argues that "the actions of annihilation of class enemy" are needed to rouse and mobilise the masses. Both these lines of thinking ignore the revolutionary role of the masses. They are ignoring the fundamental point that in the course of the building of the revolutionary mass movement, people, while becoming conscious, would not only adopt the forms of struggle corresponding to their consciousness but also they would implement the slogans as well.

The Khammam A.C. comrades argue that it is wrong to "link" the armed struggle with the agrarian revolution. Charu Mazumdar argues that the agrarian revolutionary programme should be implemented only after the base areas are established in a given area. Thus the comrades of these two lines of thinking are unable to grasp the inter-relation between the main issue of the agrarian revolution and the armed struggle. The people, especially the peasantry, would become conscious while implementing the agrarian revolutionary programme and in the course of building of the revolutionary movement. At the time of implementing the programme of land distribution they would adopt the form of armed struggle, as a form of struggle. As the distribution of landlord's land is a revolutionary action, they would be prepared for armed struggle in order to defend the land. Failing to grasp this fundamental aspect of the armed struggle, the Khammam A.C. comrades are slipping into the line of Charu Mazumdar.

By rejecting the inter-relation between the revolutionary programme of land distribution and the armed struggle, the Khammam area comrades are rejecting the experiences of the Telangana armed struggle (1946-51) Paying the service to the Telangana armed struggle as a heroic struggle, Charu Mazumdar refused to utilise the experiences of this struggle and has taken up the "Programme of annihilation of class enemy". It is solely due to this wrong trend, that the comrades of Charu Mazumdar

group have failed to successfully lead the Srikakulam armed struggle which had reached the stage of agrarian revolution. Thus, those of the two lines of thinking reject the fundamental aspect of the Telangana armed struggle. Of late, the Charu Mazumdar group is even calling Telangana armed struggle as a spontaneous movement. It is exactly the same argument that in 1948, the then opponents of the armed struggle put forth for the withdrawal of armed struggle (all those are the revisionists of today).

From this stand point, there is a similarity in the understanding of the P.C. centre, the Khammam A.C. and the Charu Mazumdar group on the fundamental issues of armed struggle. Our party which is born in the struggle against the "Left" politics of Charu Mazumdar and the neorevisionist politics of the Marxist party cannot accept this line of thinking.

14. THE MASS LINE ALONE IS OUR LINE

Following Marxism-Leninism Mao's thought the armed struggles are going on in various countries. Striving to apply Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought to the concrete conditions of our country, we have started to build the revolutionary movement. The Immediate Programme and its implementation is only the result of this effort. Lacking a correct understanding of the Immediate Programme and being under the influence of Charu Mazumdar's line of armed struggle, our comrades have launched armed struggle in Khammam before the people had taken up the armed struggle as a form of struggle. We have already made it clear that these comrades have not yet come to a correct understanding and the problem cannot be solved by formally admitting that the launching of armed struggle is wrong. Now these comrades are advancing another argument. They argue that they are not committing any mistake since they are, while carrying on self-defence, implementing mass programme.

We have already made it clear that we are not opposed to self-defence both in principle and in practice and that self-defence is essential. We are once again making it clear. But to say that this self-defence is an armed struggle or

the first stage of the armed struggle is against Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought. It is because of this wrong line of thinking that our comrades are misleading the people and the cadre by characterising this self-defence as an armed struggle. Whatever they might be saying about the importance of building of the revolutionary movement, they are giving it up in actual practice. As long as this situation continues it would be impossible for the people to reach the stage of armed struggle. There would be possibility for a number of wrong tactics and policies.

We have put this bitter truth before the Party Units, the squads, the Party sympathisers and the people. Besides, it would be our task that :

..... For the defence of our cadres, we should carry on self-defence to the extent necessary.

..... Leading militant struggles on issues, we should build a revolutionary mass movement and the agrarian revolutionary movement in such a way that the people would take up the form of armed struggle.

..... We should take up the task of building a Party which is capable of preparing the people for armed struggle by applying Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought to the Indian conditions.

In short, on the one hand carrying the self-defence to the extent necessary, we should on the other implement all the main points of the "Immediate Programme".

Only then would the people become prepared for the armed struggle. For this we should strive as long as it is necessary. There is no alternative to it.

iii. ORGANISATIONAL PROBLEMS.

We have so far discussed the differences on the questions of theory and armed struggle that have emerged within our Party. While rectifying the shortcomings in the understanding of the P.C., we have at the same time explained as to where the comrades of the P.C. Centre and the Khammam A.C. are deviating from Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought. Now we would endeavour to point out the incorrect understanding

and incorrect practice of these comrades on the question of organisation.

Immediately after breaking away from the C.P.I. (M), we formed ourselves into a co-ordination committee. Based upon the General Line and the Nine Comments that the Communist Party of China, under the leadership of Com. Mao, published for waging a successful ideological struggle against modern revisionism, we explained the general and ideological questions. We rallied a considerable number of cadres and the ordinary members around the co-ordination committee. Yet we could not, in the light of these ideological documents, analyse and formulate the Programme and the tactical line. We could not formulate specific immediate tasks. We have marched forward taking decisions as and when they arise.

On the organisational front we have not prepared the draft constitution. We have not even drafted the norms for the day to day functioning. Even though from State Committee down to all the lower committees were named as co-ordination committees, they have been, in actual practice functioning as only Party Committees. The Charu Mazumdar group had been arguing that the necessary conditions for the building of the Party could emerge only in the course of armed struggle and that till then we should only function as co-ordination committees. We had been of the opinion that a strong Party alone can lead the armed struggle and that the co-ordination committees cannot provide such a leadership. In the state convention, we decided to take necessary steps for the formation of the Party. By way of adopting the "Immediate Programme" we decided upon the 11 point programme and the agrarian revolutionary programme. Thence forward this programme has been the guide line for our day to day activities.

When we decided to constitute ourselves into a Party, our aim was not only to constitute into an Andhra Party but also as an all India Party. In order to achieve this we have to fulfill the following tasks :

- 1) We should prepare and release the Draft Programme and the Tactical line for discussion.
- 2) We should discuss with the groups of the revolutionaries of different States that agree with us, bring them all into one single organisation and gradually form into a Party.
- 3) We should carry on an ideological struggle against the Charu Mazumdar group, the leadership of the revolutionaries that first formed into All India Co-ordination Committee and later into the C.P. (ML) and bring into our organisation such of the revolutionaries from among this group that agree with us.

We have prepared and discussed the Draft Programme and the tactical line. They have to be given final shape. In order to discuss with the groups of revolutionaries of different states that agree with us, and to bring them into single All India Organisation, we have decided to convene an all India convention. As a first step towards the ideological discussions with the Charu Mazumdar group, we have, in reply to the criticism of this group against our "Immediate Programme", published the document, "Some Problems of the Peoples War". Afterwards discussing the difference between the Marxist-Leninists and ourselves and exposing their 'Left' trend, we have published the "Left trend among the Indian Revolutionaries".

With the arrest of the majority of the P.C. leadership in the month of December 1969, the main part of the above tasks are left unfulfilled. A number of organisational problems have come up. How the P.C. centre has understood them and how it has solved them is now the point for discussion.

1. WE WANT PRINCIPLED UNITY. WE REJECT OPPORTUNIST UNITY

If we examine our relations with Charu Mazumdar group, the leadership of the CP(ML), the following aspects would become clear :

- 1) Underestimating the seriousness of the differences between the Charu Mazumdar group

ourselves, we have failed to conduct proper ideological struggle.

Failing to publish our documents of Burdwan Plenum, and publishing the one document with their criticism, the Charu Mazumdar group with its "Left" line launched an attack against us. They only intensified this, their attack, gradually and not restrained it. Gradually the differences and all the questions between them and ourselves have been becoming clear. Analysing them and simultaneously rectifying our short comings, we could not start ideological struggle against their left line at the right time. What is more, we have on various occasions presented a minimised picture of these differences. For instance, on the question of armed struggle there were already differences between them and ourselves by the time our committee had joined the All India Co-ordination Committee. But we consoled ourselves on the plea that there were no differences on the question of launching of the armed struggle. But on the question of how to conduct the armed struggle, if we closely examine, there were already differences by that time itself. It was only with the document on Srikakulam which was put forward in our State Convention, that we began to publish these differences and criticise wrong understanding. Two more important documents have been published after the State Convention.

2. We have been underestimating the disruptive activities of Charu Mazumdar group at all India level, at state level and within our own organisation from the time they established themselves at all India level.

They have been from the very beginning trying to isolate us and win over our ranks. For this purpose they have not only adopted "left" slogans, but also by forming groups and factions everywhere and utilising them, they tried to disrupt the organisation from within. They did not go back even to make use of opportunist elements for this purpose. Notwithstanding the pressure from the genuine revolutionaries, it is only for the reason of utilising the merger as a tactic to continue their disruptive policy that they agreed for our merger with the All India Co-ordination Committee. We have been from

the very outset underestimating these disruptive activities.

From the beginning the Charu Mazumdar group had been arguing that a revolutionary party would only emerge in the course of the armed struggle, and expressing themselves against the revolutionaries forming themselves into a party. But on the very day that the Andhra Committee was expelled from the A.I. C.C., they decided constituting themselves into an all India Party. We have failed to correctly estimate this development.

3. It is only to passify the forces from among them who wanted unity that they declared, at the time of expelling us from the A.I. C.C., that our differences would continue to be non-antagonistic. But in fact even from before and after expelling us from the A.I.C.C. they have been encouraging revolt against us in Andhra. Yet we announced that there were not any strong reasons that could have led to our expulsion. As a matter of fact they had by that time itself adopted "left" and disruptionist policies in regard to armed struggle and organisation. The situation in which we could be together co-ordination committees was not obtaining. We have underestimated even this aspect.

For all this to have happened, the main reason, besides our deep wish for unity at all India level as well as the state level, is the recognition they have from the Communist Party of China. It is indisputable that they have rather been misusing to a great extent this recognition from the C.P.C. for the purpose of implementing their "left" line as well as to carry on their disruptive activities.

During the recent period the "left" line of the Charu Mazumdar group has suffered a serious set back. As the leadership of this group claims, the armed struggles have not developed throughout the country. They had even failed to rouse the people for armed struggle, let alone establishing the base areas through the "annihilation of class enemy programme" carried out during recent period. In Calcutta has not helped the urban and rural mass movements, it has turned into a horrible

massacre and led to the running amuck of the anti-people forces. With this the building of revolutionary mass movement has suffered a serious set back. As a result irreparable damage is done to their Party and the mass movement.

There are reports that some units and some comrades who have realised, are recognising atleast to some extent that the "left" line pursued by their leadership is wrong and that they are re-examining this policy. No doubt this is a good development. But just because of this it would be a wrong estimation to think that the unity will be achieved between them and ourselves. It would be possible to examine as to what is the nature of the differences between them and ourselves and how far there are possibilities for unity, only when we study the documents that reflect their new line of thinking.

The P.C. centre, in a pamphlet published in the name of "Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee", has shown the fundamental differences between to Charu Mazumdar group and ourselves as minor differences on the question of interpretation Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought and given a call for discussions and unity. It is the same old line of underestimating the actual situation with subjective outlook for unity.

Stating that "all the Communist Revolutionaries are in agreement on the following basic points concerning our liberation struggle", they have in that pamphlet mentioned some of them as follows :

—the path of peoples war is the only path for the liberation of our country. And the parliamentary path should be rejected.

—our revolutionary movement can grow only as a part of the World revolutionary movement.

—Today the great Socialist China is the centre of World revolution.

—Mao's Thought is the Marxism-Leninism of this era.

—Mao's thought is the ideology of the Communist Revolutionaries.

—Modern Revisionism led by the Soviet Social-imperialists is acting as the enemy of the World revolutionary movement. The Soviet Social-imperialists are acting in collaboration with U.S. imperialist, against the great Socialist China and against the World revolutionary forces and to create their own spheres of Influence". (Some problems concerning the path of Peoples War in India, P.3-4).

These are indisputable as far as the Communist Revolutionaries are concerned. Anybody who does not accept them cannot break away from neo-revisionism. But the fundamental questions have arisen at the time of applying Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought to the Indian conditions and beginning of revolutionary practice. We have, in our document, "Left trend among the Indian revolutionaries", discussed some of the important questions. It is nothing but self-deception to think that these are not fundamental, that they are on the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought and that they are only minor. There are fundamental differences on main questions such as the principal contradiction in the Indian society, the path of armed struggle, the problem of nationalities, the unity among the revolutionaries etc., We have only recently started open polemics on these questions. We have to take them forward. By waging ideological struggle we have to defeat not only the revisionism but also "leftism". It is harmful to equate "leftism" with revolutionism.

While this is the fact, it is nothing but underestimating the nature of differences to say that we can remove the differences among the Communist Revolutionaries through "mutual, comradely discussions." We can remove the differences among the Communist Revolutionaries but mutual and comradely discussions, but we cannot in this way remove the differences between the Charu Mazumdar group and the Communist Revolutionaries. It is through a serious ideological struggle along that they can be removed and unity among the revolutionaries can be achieved.

The Charu Mazumdar group is not only at the leadership level but also at all levels. Anto-

ganism towards Communist Revolutionaries is an important aspect of the policies of this group. In their view the very application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought to the Indian conditions is itself revisionism. The chanting of Mao's quotations alone is revolutionism for them. The unity with such a group is neither possible nor is it necessary. Our task should only be to isolate this group through ideological struggle. At the same time our criticism should be such that it should give a clear cut understanding to such of those comrades who are rethinking. For this we should analyse their documents and write criticism on the important aspects.

We should not forget that the Marxist-Leninists have formed themselves into a party. The loyalty to the party would also be a main obstacle for uniting with us. Unity achieved through a serious ideological struggle would be a stable unity. If we artificially minimise the fundamental differences and achieve opportunist unity, that unity, would at any moment crash down like a house of cards. If there is any lesson that we should learn from our merger with the A.I.C.C. it is this and this alone.

2. THE P.C. THAT IMPLEMENTS, INTERPRETS AND DEVELOPS THE OFFICIAL LINE ALONE IS THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE :

In the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply" the P.C. elected in the State convention is referred to as an "Old P.C.". In the letters from the P.C. centre, the committee of three formed to look after the responsibilities of the present P.C. centre is not only stated as an "authoritative committee" but also they are trying to act as such. It is clear that on the plea that the majority of the P.C. leadership is in the jail, they are trying to usurp the place of elected official P.C. leadership.

The organisation is only for implementing the Party's political line. If there is not any party organisation, the Party's political line would not come up for implementation. It would not be possible to prepare the people for the revolution. Every party organisation would have its leadership. It would be a political and

organisational leadership. It would be implementing the Party's political line and establishing unity and discipline in the Party, take the revolutionary movement forward. Thus the Party leadership would only be subordinate to and not above the Party's political organisational line. The Party leadership which cannot implement or refuses to implement the Party's political line either should step down on its own accord or should be removed by the Party.

The P.C. elected in the State Convention is devoted to implement the political and organisational line formulated in the Immediate Programme. All the members of the P.C. had not only agreed to but also pledged to implement this programme. Thus the P.C. elected in the State Convention, has only been an official committee formed in order to implement the programme formulated in the State Convention, but it had never been above this programme. Only the Committee which, besides being elected democratically, implement the Party's official programme and policy would be the official Committee, but the committees which do not have the faith in or which do not implement the official programme and policy cannot be the official committees.

The P.C. has been from the very beginning striving to work by adhering to the Party's official line. Even though some of the P.C. members had acted against this official line and launched the armed struggle before the people are prepared for armed struggle, the P.C. by adhering to the official line, has been striving to lead the Party on this line. It is not our aim to say that no mistakes have been committed in these efforts. The P.C. has been striving to examine and to rectify whatever mistakes had occurred.

Even though the P.C. members who had acted against the official line, had in the beginning accepted their mistakes, if we examine their activities from then onwards it would become clear that they had only accepted their mistakes formally. We have comprehensively discussed this question in the document. "Some Problems Facing the Revolutionary Mass Movement of the Khammam Area" and the present document. When the line they have been pursuing from that day to day has been examined,

it has become clear that it is only another form of the Charu Mazumdar's line which has failed. With the arrest of the majority of the leadership, the comrades who had launched the armed struggle against the Party's official line, had taken up the responsibilities of the P.C. centre.

One of the comrades who was not a member of the P.C. at the time of the arrest of the P.C. leadership is a member of the P.C. centre now. It is known to us that this comrade had by that time no faith in the Immediate Programme. Even though there is a degree of difference, the comrades, running the P.C. centre are not implementing the political line adopted by the State convention but an alternative line. Thus this has ceased to be a Committee that is implementing the official line. This has remained to be an unofficial committee which implements the Charu Mazumdar line.

The Committee constituted into a P.C. centre consists of three members. This is only a Committee constituted with mutual agreement, but not a committee constituted in a broad based meeting of the District representatives. This is not a committee constituted after discussing and resolving the political-organisational problems that have emerged before it was constituted.

In the conditions prevalent at the time of the arrest of the P.C. leadership the Party had not taken a full fledged form. The Party had no Central Committee. The programme, and the Tactical line was not formulated. Formulating only the main points relating to it in the Immediate Programme, were marching forward. At such time there would not be any guidance as such to the other committee working outside. There is no party machinery and basic documents to rectify the wrong lines pursued by them. In such a situation where all these are not obtaining the committees working outside can take independent decisions only on the day to day issues but not on the basic questions nor on the policy questions. When such changes are to be made they have to obtain the approval of comrades in Jail.

The P.C. leadership in Jail is a leadership elected by the State Convention. This is a

leadership elected in order to follow and implement a definite political line: Just because it is arrested by the ruling classes, this leadership does not lose the authority bestowed upon it by the State Convention. Mainly in a situation when our Party has not taken a full fledged form, it is very essential to use this authority.

It is a fact that we had, after the arrests of the P.C. leadership, felt that there should be a committee outside, which could take decisions on the day to day issues and carry on work. It is also a correct one. We had also made certain suggestions that the number of the members of this committee should be broad based. But the comrades of the P.C. centre had not followed those suggestions. With mutual agreement they constituted themselves into a small Committee. Instead of carrying out the tasks of taking decisions on day to day issues, within the confines of the Party's policies, they are following entirely new policies different from the Party policies. In view of this it is not true to say that this committee is constituted in accordance with the suggestions of the P.C. The P.C. centre comrades are claiming that they had obtained the approval of the district committees to function as an official committee. It is possible that the district committees might have accepted the confused state of situation prevailing when the P.C. leadership is under arrest and when they were not in a position to know political - organisational policies of the P.C. centre comrades. But we are sure that they would refuse to recognise the authority of this committee after realising the danger from the political - organisational line and activities of the P.C. Centre.

The experiences have proved that the confidence this committee had created among the cadres in the beginning is only temporary. The comments of the District Committees on the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply" that this P.C. centre had circulated, are a proof for this.

"At a time when we got the news that the squads of Mulugu area, decided to join the Charu Mazumdar group, and when we were disturbed and vacillating, the reply of Peddanna", as cited by the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply" is note worthy:

"I still definitely feel that the entire programme that Charu Mazumdar has taken is wrong. It is my firm conviction that the general line our State Convention has adopted is basically correct. It was not any one's decision to oppose the wrong policies of the Charu Mazumdar group and carry on a struggle for correct political line. It is a collective decision taken by all of us. The comrades responsible for that decision are now in jails. Without their permission and their acceptance I would not under any circumstances agree to change the Party policy. Even if every one changes, even if I am left alone, I would at least propagate to the resolutions and the programme of the State Convention, But I would never change. In case if the jail comrades change their opinions in future and ask me if I would come with the majority or not, even then I would think as to what should I do."

Com. Peddanna expressed some truly magnificent feelings in this passage. As a senior member of the P.C. centre, this comrade had, during the period that followed, enormous opportunity to transform these feelings into practice. But after the formation of the P.C. centre, Com. Peddanna and other members set aside this stand. They pursued a line different from the line of the State Convention without the concern of P.C.

This comrade says that the general line of the State Convention is "basically" correct. After 1953 it has become tradition to say that a line is "basically" correct and to exhibit views "basically" different from that line. We generally understand that when one says that it is basically correct, it means that one is reserving the opportunities to differ on the points concerning the details. But against this, this comrade is differing even on the fundamental questions. In the various documents published by the P.C. centre, especially in the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply" circulated by the P.C. centre, this comrade has exhibited differences on fundamental questions. It is what is meant by "basically correct"?

In the above passage Com. Peddanna has not only said that he would abide by the general

line of the State Convention, but also he had unequivocally accepted the authority of the P.C. But immediately after the formation of the P.C. centre, they are declaring themselves as the official committee. This is the difference between the words and deeds of these comrades.

3. DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM AND FACTUALISM

In our country, the Telangana armed struggle (1946-51), the Naxalbari struggle (1968) and the Sreekakulam struggle (1969) are important among the armed struggles that the People carried on with the armed struggle consciousness. In 1969 we launched armed struggle in Khammam and Warangal districts before the people reached the stage of armed struggle consciousness.

We gained innumerable experiences in the Telangana armed struggles. We discussed some of the important experiences in the documents of that period and took the lessons. These are the experiences that have proved useful for us to decide as to what should be the strategy and tactics that we should adopt in the Indian revolution. The then leadership of the Party had not assimilated these experiences. It failed to accept the experiences of the Chinese revolution and Mao Thought as a guiding principle. Gradually giving up the path of armed struggle, it had taken up the parliamentary path and degenerated to revisionism. While pursuing the parliamentary path, the present neo-revisionist party has only been capitalising on their own connections with the Telangana armed struggle for strengthening their influence in the party, but they have never made any efforts to give the struggle experiences to the Party and to lead the Party on the path of struggle.

The Naxalbari struggle besides making it clear that the conditions are ripe for the revolution in India, has confirmed the experiences of Telangana armed struggle that the agrarian revolution would be in the form of armed struggle. The Charu Mazumdar group has not accepted the experiences of the Telangana armed struggle and had not made efforts to successfully lead the Naxalbari armed struggle with the help of these experiences. But only capitali-

ded on that armed struggle in order to enhance their influence in the Party, especially in the then A.I.C.C. In this respect they had succeeded to some extent. They had completely failed in leading the Naxalbari armed struggle.

The Charu Mazumdar group also adopted the same attitude towards Srikakulam armed struggle. They have striven to capitalise on the influence that the A.I.C.C. has got by the recognition from China and the Naxalbari armed struggle. They could split the Srikakulam unit from the Andhra Co-ordination Committee. They had, capitalising on the influence of the Srikakulam armed struggle, tried to split the Andhra revolutionaries and to strengthen their own group. Instead of taking lessons from Sreekakulam armed struggle and leading the armed struggle successfully, they have failed in leading this struggle. In spite of having a strong mass base, in spite of the existence of an organised Party, the Srikakulam armed struggle has, due to the wrong policies pursued by the party leadership suffered a complete set back within a short time. This means, it should be said, that this is the proof of the irresponsible attitude of the Charu Mazumdar group towards this struggle.

We had, in the Khammam and Warangal districts, launched armed struggle in a different situation. We have the background of Telangana armed struggle experiences. We decided to launch the armed struggle based upon the armed struggle consciousness of the people. In accordance with this we formulated a programme and implemented it to some extent in some areas. We had the necessary understanding and the political-organisational position to march forward on the Mass Line. We marched forward with the understanding that we should, while implementing the agrarian revolutionary programme, launch the armed struggle at the stage of the land distribution when the armed struggle consciousness as is created among the masses. Yet this effort of ours had suffered a setback. We launched the armed struggle to Khammam district before the armed struggle. Consciousness is created among the masses and before the conditions are ripe for the armed struggle and extended it to the Warangal and Karimnagar districts.

With this we have failed to gain the experiences which we would have otherwise gained at the time of implementing the agrarian revolutionary programme as well as at the time of preparing the masses for armed struggle. Had we gained these experiences they would have proved very valuable for us. They would have not only confirmed the correctness of the experiences of Telangana armed struggle. But also they would have improved them. But this has not happened. With setback to the developing revolutionary mass movement, we had to take lessons from negative results. This lesson is that we should not launch the armed struggle when the people are not having the armed struggle consciousness. There is not any need for it. The line that we were pursuing till the time we launched the armed struggle is a proof for this.

When Mao said that, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", He said ironically, figuratively, but not to apply mechanically. The content of this is that the gun would be a means for the people to seize the political power into their hands when, following Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought, the people are made conscious so that they can take the form of armed struggle. Now a days, it has become common to this, and some individuals or some militants holding arms, resorting to armed actions either individually or forming themselves into squads and call it armed struggle. It is the Charu Mazumdar group, and his followers in different states as well as in this state that have encouraged, propagated and implemented this line of thinking opposed to Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought. Today there is a situation where in our cadres and militants, fed up with the revisionism and the parliamentary path are mistaking the armed actions unrelated to the consciousness of the people as the armed struggle and are being attracted by them. It is in the same way that the Charu Mazumdar group has attracted the youth.

Our Party is not far from this situation. The method of carrying out some armed actions even though the people are not prepared for the armed struggle, portraying it as armed struggle and thus creating the illusions among the cadres

and the people that the armed struggle has begun, has not also started in our Party with the launching of armed actions in Khammam and Warangal districts. The following passage makes it clear that the authors of this method have got the motive of realising some inner party interests :

"Com. Kumar had said with com-Chandanna and Kallanna that carrying on these actions is his line. He said to them that, "this is my line, this should be implemented - Go ahead". He had also said that they had rejected his suggestion unanimously in the Narlapuram meeting, that since a long time there had been two lines in the Party, that you may follow whichever line you like; that if you like, you can carry on similar actions in your area also, and that informing Ramanarsaiah, the district committee Secretary and the P. C. member, you proceed even if he stops". (Mulugu A.C. Resolution: 6th June '69).

In the same resolution, even though Com. Kumar had refused to accept as having said this, the committee had not believed his refusal. They had mentioned some more points in this resolution which confirm these words.

Neither the Khammam A.C., nor Com. Kumar has not till today, replied such a serious allegation. From the above talk it is clearly evident that he tried to enhance his influence not only on the Khammam area Party, but also on the Mulugu area Party through these actions. There is no wonder in his thinking that it would influence the party in the plains areas as well.

Thus not only due to the shortcomings in the understanding, but also to establish his hold on the party Com Kumar launched the armed actions against the decisions of the State Convention, without the concern of the P.C. and unrelated to the consciousness and the preparedness of the people and tried to present them as armed struggle. What is the difference between this and the Charu Mazumdar's organisational line?

4. THE DOCUMENT, "SOME PROBLEMS FACING THE REVOLUTIONARY MASS MOVEMENT OF KHAMMAM AREA."

After the armed actions were carried out in Khammam area, the P.C. met in the month of July, 1969 and thoroughly discussed these actions. Com. Peddanna (Kumar) had participated in the discussions. During these discussions all the comrades expressed the opinion that the comrades had not only worked with an understanding opposed to the Immediate Programme formulated in the State Convention, but also they had gone against the party discipline. In the same meeting and in the presence of Com. Peddanna it was decided to write a party letter on this question and circulate it to the lower committees in the party. During the discussions of this meeting, the resolutions of Mulugu A.C. were brought to the notice of Com. Peddanna. But he did not give any proper reply to these resolutions. He said that they were very bitter.

To explain various points of this document, we had only used the passages from the self-critical reports of Com. Peddanna and his letters. We limited to the points that we had discussed and came to a decision in the P.C. meeting.

In the P.C. meeting we had not come to a clear-cut understanding on the question of whether it was correct to launch armed actions in Mulugu area. According to the Mulugu A.C. resolution it was clear that in that area people were prepared to takeup the form of armed struggle. The P.C. did not feel it correct to say that it was wrong to launch at such a time. After some days, the P.C. Secretary discussed with the important comrades of Mulugu area in the last week of July 1969 and acquainted himself with the position of the people there. Even though there was some difference in the report they gave and the peoples position, and even though the movement in different areas of Khammam and Warangal districts was varying from area to area, it became clear that in the Mulugu area, the situation for armed struggle had not developed. It is only for this reason that we have written in this document that the criticism contained in this document would also apply to Mulugu area. As far as the armed struggle was concerned nothing more was said.

The points concerning the discipline were also the same points that were discussed in the P.C. meeting. In this document, we had explained as to how the acts of asking for permission to launch actions against the police contrary to the P.C. decisions, and informing the P.C. that they would launch actions if the decision is not communicated within the specified date would go counter to the democratic centralism and lead to the emergence of rival centre.

When Com. Peddanna and Radha wrote a joint letter that they would like to marry and when Com. Peddanna tried to take her to the area against the decision taken in the P.C. meeting on the sex problem that it was wrong for Peddanna and Radha to have sex-relations and that Radha should not be sent to the area, it was decided in the September 1969 secretariat meeting that the sex problem should also be included in the party letter and that the area should be informed not to carry on offensive actions against the police. In the July 1969 P.C. meeting, it was decided that the sex problem should be reported upto the District Committee level in the plains areas and upto the squads and village units level in the forest area.

The document, "Some problems facing the Revolutionary Mass movement of Khammam Area", was only drafted on the basis and according to the discussions and decisions of the P.C. Secretariat. Com. Peddanna has also attended and participated in the P.C. meeting. In this meeting it was decided that Com. Krishna (P.C. Secretary) should draft this document and send it to the lower units. As per this decision, Com. Krishna drafted it a bit late, sent it to the P.C. members, especially to the P.C. members of Telangana districts with the intention of taking their opinions and finalising it himself. At the time when this document reached P.C. member of Nalgonda district felt that according to the P.C. decision this could be discussed in the D.C. meeting and agreed for reading this document in the D.C. The comrades of that D.C. did not express any basic difference. The P.C. member did not propose any changes. Com. Krishna sent this document to the P.C. member in Mulugu area. But there was no intimation from there.

He sent it to Com. Peddanna, in Khammam area. But it was informed that it had not reached him. Whether the opinions from P.C. members were received or not, Com. Krishna had complete authority to send the document to the lower units. This is only in accordance with the P.C. decision. There is not any need for a charge-sheet or explanation when Com. Peddanna attended the P.C. meeting and admitted his mistakes on the same question. On this question Com. Krishna has not in any way acted against the principles of democratic centralism.

Mulugu A.C. passed a resolution that the disciplinary action should be taken against Peddanna and he should be removed from all responsibilities. Even in the P.C. it became clear that there was a strong opinion that such action should be taken. Com. Peddanna himself not only admitted his mistakes but also wished to be removed from all the responsibilities. Yet, based on the organisational principle that once a comrade admits his mistakes, he should not be removed from the responsibilities and he should be given the opportunity to rectify his mistakes, the P.C. asked him to carry on the responsibilities as usual. But ever since he went back from the P.C. meeting, he has been acting against the P.C. decisions. While it was the P.C. decision to carry on self-defence he had not only suggested that offensive actions should be launched against the police, but also served an ultimatum that if the P.C. does not intimate the decision within a set date, they would themselves launch the actions and see the results.

Contrary to the P.C. decision, he tried to take Radha to the area. Discussing all this, the Secretariat came to the opinion that Com. Peddanna was refusing to rectify his mistakes. It was decided to suggest to the P.C. that he should be removed from all the responsibilities. Only after the P.C. discussing this suggestion, would the charge-sheet have been served and the explanation taken. The P.C. leadership was arrested before any of this had been done.

The P.C. had also decided that Com. Krishna should go to the area and explain the P.C. decisions to the cadre. This decision was informed to Mulugu A.C. There was not any written reply from there. But it was learnt through a comrade

who came from the A.C. centre, that the A.C. comrades were of the opinion that the arrangements were not possible since the repression was severe. Due to this, it had not become possible for Com. Krishna to go to the area.

Even on these questions, depending upon the possibilities and impossibilities in the conditions of repression, Com. Krishna acted only according to the decisions of the P.C. and the P.C. Secretariat. There is nothing that he has done against the party methods.

"The Khammam A.C.'s Reply" says that this document includes the criticism on the mistakes occurred in the Khammam area alone, that it does not criticise the mistakes occurred in Mulugu area and the Kondamodal Agency area of East Godavari and that this is nothing but discrimination. There is a fundamental difference between the mistakes occurred in these areas and the Khammam area. The mistakes in the Khammam area are that here initiative was taken to implement the Charu Mazumdar line as against the line laid down by the party and therefore it became necessary to seriously criticise them and those responsible for them. This was not the situation with the Mulugu area. From the beginning there had been an assessment that level of the movement there is above the level of these areas. The A.C. has also passed a resolution that the people were prepared for armed struggle. In view of this situation, there was nothing wrong in thinking that was necessary to wait and observe. Following the Party line the comrades in Kodamodal area of East Godavari district had succeeded in developing the agrarian revolution into a peoples armed struggle. The losses there were due to the mistakes of some of the leadership. All these questions were still to be examined on the day this document was drafted. In view of this it is clear that these comrades are failing to see the basic difference in the nature of the mistakes committed by these comrades and others.

Except in one or two places, we have also not mentioned the name of Khammam A.C. in our document. For the action committed under the leadership of Com. Peddanna, we have made him alone responsible for them and not the A.C. The A.C. was named only when the A.C.'s

resolution regarding Radha was quoted. Here and there we used the term "Area Comrades"

The document, "Khammam A.C.'s Reply" is not merely a reply to the document, "Some problems facing the Revolutionary Mass Movement of Khammam Area". These comrades have failed to explain from their view point any of the points discussed in this. When they failed to do this, the only thing left in them was to abuse and level serious allegations against the P.C. and the P.C. Secretary and what they have done is exactly the same.

We are of the opinion that all the points discussed and the conclusions arrived at in the document, "Some Problems facing the Revolutionary Mass Movement of Khammam Area", are still correct. We have in that document formally said that Com. Peddanna is following the Charu Mazumdar's line of armed struggle and that he is working to establish a rival centre. The experience itself has proved the correctness of what we have said.

5. SOME FACTIONAL METHODS :

From the beginning the State Co-ordination Committee has been carrying on a struggle against the Charu Mazumdar's politics and organisational methods. Even though this struggle had a number of limitations it was in the course of this struggle that the State Co-ordination Committee convened the State Convention and formed into P.C. Being the member of the P.C. Secretariat, Com. Peddanna had never put forth his policies that are in accordance with the Charu Mazumdar line for discussion in the P.C. But it is clear from the Mulugu A.C. reports that he had been telling that there are "two lines" in the Party and that his was one line. Until the Pagideru actions we were not sure that he was having a different understanding.

Pagideru actions were carried out under the leadership of Nugur squad. Pagideru area is not in the Mulugu Area Organisation. (Nugur is in the Mulugu area organisation). Yet, when we see Khammam Area Comrades and Peddanna going to Pagideru area from the State convention, Nugur squad coming there, and carrying out

actions for arms, it becomes clear that the decision to carry out actions for arms was not taken after the State Convention. It was taken before the State Convention itself. In order to carry it out arrangements were made in advance for Nugur squad to reach Pagideru area on a set date. To implement the mass programme in pagideru area, it was not necessary for a squad to come from another area. The comrades of that area can implement it. As per their arrangement the Nugur squad had to reach on the evening of 14th (April 1969). But it had not reached. Due to this important leaders including Com. Peddanna who have come from the State Convention were disappointed. Only after the arrival of the squad in the evening of 15th that they once again prepared to carry out the actions. The meeting of the cadres was held on the morning of April 16th. In that meeting party leaders reported that the actions should be carried out for food grains, money as well as arms and that it was the decision of the Party. They said that this action should be carried out on 18th. On the evening of the same day they changed this date and informed them that the actions should be carried out on that day itself. In the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply" it is said that the decision to carry out actions on the 18th for money and food grains was taken in the morning meeting, and that when the information about the police camps was received by that afternoon, action for money and arms were carried out on the same day (16th) giving up the programme of food grains distribution. We have reliably learnt that this is not a fact and that the action for the arms was announced in the morning meeting itself. Thus the Khammam A.C. is, through its wrong report, concealing the conspiracy behind the actions which in accordance with the plan of Com. Peddanna, were decided upon before the State Convention and carried out after it.

On the report of Com. Peddanna the P.C. Secretariat, in its August 1969 meeting, decided that the offensive actions should not be carried out against the police. One of the Secretariat members informed this to Com. Peddanna before he left for the area. Not only that the P.C. Secretary also sent this decision to the

set place by Oct 1st, as was asked by Com. Peddanna. These facts are not shown in the Khammam A.C.'s Reply". "The Khammam A.C.'s Reply" portrays as though only after the return of Com. Peddanna it was decided in the A.C. meeting that the offensive actions should not be carried out, and that all this was done only because of Com. Peddanna. If this is true why should they write that they would wait for P.C. directives upto October 1st? why should the A.C. take the decision before it was received? In a letter the P.C. centre comrades had not written that the directive of the P.C. was not received in time, Stating that it had "correctly rejected" the suggestion of the Area comrades, they expressed their agreement with them. "The Khammam A.C.'s Reply" does not portray these aspects factually.

It is one of Party's fundamental principles to place the facts before the party. In order to conceal the conspiracy against the party programme, and to belittle the role of the P.C., Com. Peddanna and Khammam A.C. comrades are following it as a method to cook up and propagate the lies.

"The Khammam A.C.'s Reply" reads that on 16th April only the A.C. comrades had taken the decision to carry out the actions and that at the time of taking this decision Com. Peddanna was not present in the meeting. Similarly, Com. Peddanna had also been stating in his reports that this decision was taken without his concern. At another place the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply", reads that Com. Peddanna had also not attended the A.C. meeting which discussed about the offensive actions against the police. Thus it is clear that he followed the method of himself formally not attending the discussions against the policies and decisions and claiming that he was not responsible for such decisions. Otherwise how could it happen that Com. Peddanna had not attended the meetings of the important comrades of the Area and A.C. in which it was decided to carry out actions for confiscating arms? It should be remembered that the meeting of the cadres of the Pagideru Area held in Khammam district on the evening of 16th April, was only meant to change the date of the actions from 13th to 16th.

6. ESTABLISHING A RIVAL CENTRE - AND ITS FUNCTIONING :

We have, by quoting his own words in "Some Problems Facing the Revolutionary Mass Movement of Khammam Area", shown as to how Com. Peddanna's line of thinking and method of work leads to the emergence of Rival Centre. As it did in the case of all other questions, the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply", has evaded to reply this questions also. It is not all. The very method in which the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply" is prepared and-circulated makes it clear that the rival centre is established and functioning.

It is Com. Peddanna who has drafted the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply". He is the member of the P.C. centre which is being claimed as official committee. The document, which he himself has drafted, should have been put for discussion by him, in his respective committee. But without doing like this, it is strange to write under some other name.

To write this document, as though it is written by A.C. which is a lower committee, is nothing but using the A.C. for his factional activities. Thus it is clear that the A.C. is being used as a rival centre.

If it is a "reply" of the A.C. (in this reply there are a number of things that are not known to the A.C. But, known to Com. Peddanna as a member of the P.C.) the P.C. centres should have discussed this and asked us to explain the different questions and allegations put forward in it. But they have not done anything like that. The P.C. centre has sent it to the D.C.'s for discussion. It has simply sent a copy of it to us. Thus the P.C. centre has become an agent of Com. Peddanna's rival centre. This method would only help to split the Party into and not a healthy internal discussions. This rival center is making use of repression in the State for strengthening its hold. When the P.C. leadership is in jail, taking advantage of this situation, it is not only striving to consolidate itself organisationally but also carrying on its policies as official line. Com. Peddanna's rival centre has travelled very far in this direction.

This rival centre has got its own politics. To advocate that the armed struggle should be carried on without any relation to the consciousness of the people and to advocate the cadres physical self-defence as a stage of such armed struggle, is the sum and substance of these politics. This is nothing but another form of Charu Mazumdar's politics.

At present Khammam A.C. is working as the organisational centre for this rival centre. Due to a number of weaknesses we have already explained, the P.C. centre is being useful for this rival centre. It will not take long for the P.C. centre to fall into the hands of the rival centre.

In view of this situation it is very essential to raise the revolutionary vigilance in the Party and intensify inner-Party struggle.

7. THE MAIN REASONS THAT LED TO THE ARRESTS OF THE STATE AND DISTRICT LEADERSHIP :

In the document, "The Present Situation and our Tasks", we have explained some main reasons for the arrests and how the P.C. is responsible for them. Some more can be added to the list of these reasons. The P.C. members, individually and collectively are taking responsibility for these losses. There is not any doubt that especially the responsibility of the P.C. Secretary would be very much. Yet without examining the main reasons for it, we cannot come to a correct understanding about this. We would explain them here.

1. We rallied to our side majority of the Party members, Taluq and district committee members from Neo-revisionist party. All of them have come towards us listening to the speeches of the leadership on the ideological differences in the general body meetings and because of their faith in the C.P.C. Some of them joined with the Charu Mazumdar group. The rest of them are with us. It can be said that all of them are with us ideologically.

It had to be examined as to who are fit for a secret party and who are not and on the basis of it they had to be divided and the party

reorganised. Similarly, a majority of the party members had to be treated as sympathisers. All this cannot be done by simply passing a resolution or in a single day. Some time is needed. During the period between our split from the Neo-revisionists and the State Convention we had been giving importance to the general legal activities.

A part of the P.C. leadership and a majority of district leadership, being accustomed to the legal functioning, they themselves were not prepared for illegal functioning and illegal organisation.

For this situation, even though those comrades are individually responsible, the entire P.C. leadership who were in charge of the P.C. centre have to shoulder the responsibility upto State Convention. In this connection all should take note of the fact that the circulars sent for the secret Party Organisation from the P.C. centre had not been of any use.

2. Within 4 days of State Convention, the armed actions began and gradually expanded in the forest areas. With this we completely lost the initiative and the initiative went into the hands of the enemy. If the armed struggle is launched when the people are prepared for armed struggle, the enemy gets disorganised and loses initiative. We would seize the initiative into our hands. If the armed actions are launched when the people are not prepared, even though locally, the enemy gets temporarily disorganised, by resorting to severe repression he can make us disorganised, and seize initiative into his hands. In a situation there was severe repression not only due to the Srikakulam armed struggle but also due to the terrorist actions carried by Charu Mazumdar group in the plain areas, the enemy took the initiative into his hands due to our launching armed actions in the forest areas. We lost the initiative.

Due to our armed actions, severe police hunt increased not only in the forest areas but also in the plain areas. These actions worked as hammer blows on the revolutionary movement in the forest areas and due to them there was not time left for secret organisation in the plain areas. The work of transforming a

legal party into an illegal party is not a job that can be done in a matter of days. The comrades who launched armed struggle before the situation is ripe are only formally recognising their mistakes but they are failing to examine as to how serious a damage was done to the revolutionary movement of the forest areas and how serious and in what form the damage was done in the plain areas. These comrades not being in a position to criticise themselves and take the responsibility, are shifting the responsibility on to others.

3. From the very beginning there had been a government agent in the P.C. If we examine his history, we have to doubt that he had been working as a government agent, as an informant even in the Marxist party. Even though he had made use of a concubine to pass on the information to the government, it has become clear from the investigation since the arrest of the P.C. leadership that he himself is the main informant. Except for three or four months after the State convention he (Vajravelu) had been from the beginning to the end contributed to be the member and participating in the meetings. The reason for his not being elected to the P.C. in the state convention was only to give opportunity to the youth and new members on the committee and not because his behaviour was suspicious. None of the important comrades who were working in the P.C. centre before the state convention, and who were close to him could suspect him. After the state convention P.C. members had been asking for his co-option into the P.C. Thus for having not suspected him and for having kept him as a P.C. member, all the P.C. Members should as a whole take the responsibility.

With the government agent in the P.C., the government was in a position to arrest the P.C. leadership whenever it chose. Whatever might be the secret organisation we developed, these arrests would not have been prevented. It would have depended on the decision of the government as to when they should be made.

The members of P.C. centre are completely neglecting the role of this government agent in the arrests of the P.C. leadership. This will not help the furtherance of the Party interests.

4. In the P.C. leadership and the entire Party we were swept away behind the spontaneous incidents. We could not be prepared for the underground from the beginning itself. We all know the fact that the important comrades were moving publicly even after the State Convention. It is also known to us that comrades were moving publicly thinking that there would not be repression since there were not any struggles in their areas and also the fact that even the important comrades working in the forest areas were moving legally in the plains and cities thinking that there would be none who would identify them. This "spontaneity" is also one of the main reasons for our failure to develop secret organisation.

As an alternative to "Janasakti" we had not thought of a secret paper. The efforts of organising the technical machinery had only remained on the paper. The P.C. centre had confined only to the P.C. Secretary. Instead of using "Janasakti's" legal office within legal limitations, we used it beyond legal limitations. All this is only the result of spontaneity.

In our criticism and self-criticism we should keep these main points in view. If we concentrate on minor issues, we fail to grasp the main points. In order to pollute the inner-party atmosphere, the disruptive elements try to make use of these failures. The comrades should be vigilant about this.

During the recent period, the Party (tech.) machinery is built and it is producing and circulating secret literature. There is no doubt, that this is a good effort. We should not be content with it. We should grasp the main thing that this effort does not suffice for the task of building our Party's revolutionary movement. For this we should recognise the importance of the politics. Only when we go among the masses to implement the main points of the "Immediate Programme", would we be able to build the revolutionary movement. Our Party should as a whole make efforts to take this turn.

8. THE QUESTIONS OF MORALITY ;

In our Party the problems arising from the

sexual weaknesses have been coming up before the Party since a long time. We have been somehow solving them. As long as sex problems, are confined to sex problems, it would be possible to resolve them. But once they develop into organisational problems, it would not only be possible to solve them, but also they would help create and develop splits within the Party.

In order to explain the Marxist-Leninist view point on the "moral code", the P.C. centre issued a circular. This circular would only legalise sex anarchism, but would not help to solve the problems, we have decided to write a separate comprehensive criticism on it.

"The Khammam A.C.'s Reply" formally admits that it is wrong for Peddanna to indulge in sex-relations with Radha without knowledge of the P.C., but it does not admit that to indulge in such sex-relations itself is wrong. What is more it is alleging that the P.C. Secretary had not tried to set right this problem. This is baseless.

Even before the State Convention itself, a comrade who was working in the P.C. centre and who was close to comrade Peddanna, finding the relations of these two suspicious, warned Com. Peddanna. He flatly denied that he had any such relations with her.

As the relations of these two were going on openly by the time of State Convention itself, the comrades of Mulugu Area Committee brought the problem to the notice of the P.C. Secretary. Then the P.C. Secretary reprimanded Com. Peddanna.

When in the July 1969 P.C. meeting the Mulugu A.C. resolution was discussed and he (Com. Peddanna) was criticised by all the P.C. members, he admitted the mistake saying that his position was "undefendable". Thinking that he has admitted the mistake the P.C. had not taken the disciplinary action against him.

Here it is noteworthy that the Mulugu A.C. passed a resolution that he should be removed from all the responsibilities. He himself asked for the same. For having not taken action against him, a P.C. member had sent a lengthy dissent note to the P.C.

Thus the P.C. had made much effort to rectify the moral conduct of Com. Peddanna. But he has misused this effort. Even after all this, he wrote a letter to the P.C. that both of them would get married. Taking the cover of the Khammam A.C.'s resolution he tried to take her to the area where he was, against the decision of the P.C.

The sex problem of Com. Peddanna and Radha had not remained to be merely a sex problem. This developed into a serious organisational problem. The 'Khammam A.C.'s Reply' is completely neglecting this aspect.

Stating a fact in the 'Khammam A.C.'s Reply' that the Mulugu and Khammam A.C.'s and P.C. members working in these were not having contacts from May 69 to April '71, they evaded the question as to why they were without contacts. Only Com. Peddanna's behaviour and the Mulugu A.C.'s resolution on it was responsible for this split. This split might not have occurred had the Mulugu A.C. also, like the Khammam A.C., defended Peddanna's behaviour. For Com. Peddanna's shifting his camp from Mulugu Area to Khammam Area, the Mulugu A.C.'s reluctance to defend his sex relations is also a reason, besides his aim of implementing his own political line.

In the forest area, by the time they two were having sex relations, three members of her family (Radha's) - her younger brother, younger sister and brother-in-law were in responsible positions. It is clear that they did not think as to what would be the effect of their relations on them and what would be its impact on the Party organisation. Eventhough all of them are betrayers today they were not betrayers at that time.

The above two aspects make it clear that they gave importance to their sex relations rather than the interests of the Party.

"The Khammam A.C.'s Reply", said that the P.C. had not taken action against Pandu who has conspired to kill Peddanna, but it took action when he conspired to kill Peddanna and P.R. and this is a discrimination. The fact is, we had no reports either from Mulugu area or

from Khammam area to the effect that Pandu conspired or was conspiring to kill Peddanna. Nor the A.C.'s had sent such reports. We came to learn as a rumour that enraged by the sex relations, of Peddanna and Radha, Pandu as having said in a fit of anger that he would shoot Peddanna. Even if it is true can it be proper to take action for what he said in a fit of anger? Afterwards when the P.C. leadership was in Jail, there came a report that joining with the Charu Mazumdar group, Pandu was conspiring to murder Com. Peddanna and P.R. We decided that it was political and we should immediately take action. Not only failing to grasp the difference between the two, but also in the Committee's circular it has not mentioned this aspect excepting the word "conspiracy" means, we can understand with what seriousness the Committee has taken it.

They are alleging that we have encouraged vilification propaganda about their sex relations. This is completely baseless. It is an open secret that they were having sex relations not only in the forest area but also in the plain areas, especially when they happened to visit cities and reside in the houses of sympathisers. Then how can it be possible for the people to remain without talking about this?

Their sex relations are in no way a problem related to the armed struggle. Their relations began when they were in Vijayawada and became public soon after they went to the forest area. In the present situation when the peoples' armed struggle has not commenced, it is beyond our imagination as to how these problems would come up as the problems of armed struggle. When such an illegitimate relations come up as a problem in the party, the party has been solving them in a proper way. The P.C. has no need what so ever to defend and theorise as soon as it is learnt that such relations have developed. Since such a defence has come from the P.C. centre, we would put forth proper criticism.

We would sympathetically examine and correct the weakness among the party members. But towards the weakness among the leadership and when they cause damage to the party they should be viewed seriously.

Sex weakness of one of the party leadership had led to his degeneration into a government agent and caused irreparable damage to the party. A sex relation of another of the leadership has led to the disruption of the party. It is harmful to ignore it and to view the sex weakness separate from the party organisation.

Thus leaving alone its failure to consolidate the party organisation the P.C. centre has, with its factional activities weakened the party. It is being useful to implement the "left" line which is another form of Charu Mazumdar line and to strengthen the rival centre. Due to this the party would never get organisationally united. It would get disrupted. These disruptive manifestations have already begun to appear.

CONCLUSION

It is three years since our split from neo-revisionists. In the first year (1968) we strove to achieve an ideological break from neorevisionism. It was during this period itself that the affiliation as well as disaffiliation with the Charu Mazumdar group had occurred. We began the struggle against the "left" opportunist ideology, politics and the disruptive activities of this group. But there appeared in this struggle the weaknesses such as presenting a minimised picture of the differences etc., It was also during the same period that we began to work adopting a Mass Line.

In 1969 we formulated a mass programme and intensified its implementation. We began to carry on a serious ideological struggle against the Charu Mazumdar group. Besides, it became clear that there is a "left" opportunist ideological outlook and practice in a part of our party. The organisational activities that help this practice have caused a set back to the efforts of organisational consolidation of the Party.

In 1970, the "left" opportunist trend gained upper hand in the Party with the arrest of the P.C. leadership. This line is utilising the P.C. centre to bring different committees under its political line and strengthen its rival centre. Another side the struggle has begun against this trend.

Under the circumstances we have, in this document discussed the form and content of the "left" opportunist line inside the Party. The sum and substance of these discussions is this.

1. In India the contradictions between the American imperialism and the Soviet Social imperialism have not reached a breaking point. Therefore two comprador bourgeois political groups working as agents, separately for these two imperialisms have not emerged. These two imperialisms are following a policy of contention and collusion. The Indira Congress group, while representing the policy, is leaning towards the Soviet union.

2. In India as well as in Andhra Pradesh there is necessary revolutionary upsurge to develop the armed struggle. All that is needed is to adopt a mass line and to develop this revolutionary upsurge into a revolutionary movement. This would be possible only when the party adopts agrarian revolutionary programme and organises the agrarian revolutionary movement.

3. It is correct to launch the armed struggle only when there is armed struggle consciousness among the people. The revolutionary consciousness among the peasantry to distribute the landlords' land among themselves is the consciousness at which the peasantry adopts the armed struggle as a form of struggle. Thus the programme of land distribution and armed struggle are inter-related. To reject this is nothing but rejecting the role of the people in the armed struggle.

4. At time of implementation of the agrarian revolutionary programme, it would become necessary to organise the masses for self-defence in a revolutionary manner. It is highly essential for the people to adopt the form of armed struggle, the highest form of struggle. This should not be confused with the self-defence that the cadre carry on in order to safeguard their physical existence. The people's self-defence struggle in different degrees, would become the first stage of the armed struggle. But the cadres' self-defence is not the first stage of the armed struggle.

5. Mass mobilisation based on economic outlook and building of revolutionary movement

is not one and the same. By implementing the agrarian revolutionary programme in a revolutionary manner, it would become possible to build the agrarian revolutionary movement. Only such a revolutionary movement can take the form of armed struggle.

6. The Pagideru actions were carried out according to a plan worked out prior to the State Convention itself. In order to defend this plan and to obtain the approval of the cadres, the authors of this plan made use of the spontaneous Manthena actions and Palvancha decision taken in an extraordinary situation.

7. The main reason for the people of struggle areas not being prepared to adopt the form of armed struggle today is the leadership's carrying on the armed struggle with a wrong line of thinking. It is only due to giving importance to squad actions in the name of self-defence instead of building the revolutionary movement adopting the Immediate Programme, and giving importance to reformist mobilisation in the name of mass mobilisation. The people are unable to adopt the form of armed struggle even after two years of launching of armed struggle.

8. When the people adopt the form of armed struggle, we would also adopt the other forms of struggle, strengthen the armed struggle and the peoples revolutionary movement. In the present situation when there is no armed struggle consciousness among the people, the other forms and slogans of struggle would be of special significance. The issue of civil rights is one of them.

9. To formulate that the cadres taking up the arms for self-defence without the armed struggle consciousness among the people as the first stage of the armed struggle, is opposed

to Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought. This is an another form of Charu Mazumdar's politics.

10. The Charu Mazumdar group has given up Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought. We have to only intensify the ideological struggle with this group. But to say that the differences are only on the question of interpretation of Mao's Thought, to change the nature of the differences and to minimise them is nothing but opportunism. To compromise with this group is nothing but an opportunist compromise.

11. The P.C. centre constituted after the arrests of the P.C. leadership has failed to implement the official line adopted by the State Convention. Instead it is implementing a "left" line.

12. The rival centre is formed and is functioning. The P.C. centre is not only defending the activities of the rival centre, but also it is being useful to it. Under the circumstances the P.C. centre cannot be an official committee.

13. It is our task to carry on self-defence to the extent necessary, to build the revolutionary movement in accordance with the "Immediate Programme", and to develop the Party organisation needed for it.

Comrades,

We have in this document discussed some important points of the documents published by the comrades of P.C. centre and the "Khammam A.C.'s Reply". We hope that these discussions would help solve the problems facing the Party with correct understanding for the development of the party into revolutionary Party.

WITH REVOLUTIONARY GREETINGS

Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist
9-6-1971 Committee

