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CHINA IN REVOLT



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Introduction.

The struggle in China is in the foreground of events today. The Chinese masses are in revolt against the age long oppression by foreign usurpers. And the battleships of these foreign usurpers, of English, American, French, etc. imperialists, are steaming full speed toward China to keep the Chinese masses in subjection.

We must protect American lives and property, says our secretary of state. What hypocrisy! For a century the property of the Chinese people was ravaged by foreign imperialists. The Chinese were killed by the thousand on any arbitrary pretext. Now these masses revolt. They defend their property and resist the mass murders perpetrated upon them for so long.

A feeling of shame must overcome every one who reads the hypocritical statements of our statesmen about the protection of life and property and compares them with the acts of wanton destruction of life and property committed on the order of the same statesmen. August 22 an English steamer ran into two Chinese boats on the Yangtze river. 58 Chinese soldiers on one of the boats drowned and all goods on the boat were lost. Thereupon the Chinese authorities took over the English steamer. As a result of this act the English admiralty gave orders to bombard the city of Wanshien. The bombardment destroyed completely whole sections of the city and killed and maimed 5,000 Chinese men, women, and children. A massacre of innocents, a wholesale destruction of property. Where do these statesmen get the nerve to face the world with their phrase of protecting life and property?

The Chinese revolt is of world importance. It effects the struggle of the oppressed and exploited the world

over. The nationalist army in China fights for these masses. And they must fight for the Chinese. They must organize so that their will, their action, may prevent their respective imperialist masters to mobilize their forces against the Chinese revolution.

In the following pages the problems and the meaning of the Chinese nationalist revolution are dealt with exhaustively. This is a reprint of some of the speeches made during the consideration of the Chinese question by the Executive Committee of the Comintern at its seventh plenary session. A study of these pages will give a comprehensive understanding of the question.

THE PROSPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA.

Speech Delivered by Comrade Stalin in the
Chinese Commission of the Enlarged
E. C. C. I. on Nov. 30, 1926.

BEFORE I enter into the question, I consider it necessary to say that I have not had at my disposal exhaustive material on the Chinese question such as would be necessary to unfold a complete picture of the Chinese revolution. I am, therefore, compelled to confine myself to a few general remarks of a fundamental nature which are directly connected with the question as to the main trend of the Chinese revolution. The theses of Comrade Petrov, the theses of Comrade Mif, two reports of Comrade Tang-Ping-Shan and the remarks of Comrades Rafes on the Chinese question are in my possession. In spite of their excellence, all these documents have in my opinion, the great defect that they evade a number of the fundamental questions of the revolution in China. I think that our attention should be above all directed to these defects, and for this reason my remarks will at the same time be of a polemical character.

1- The Character of the Revolution in China.

Lenin said that the Chinese would soon have their 1905. Some comrades took this as meaning that exactly what took place with us in Russia in 1905 would necessarily repeat itself in China. This is wrong. Lenin certainly did not say that the Chinese revolution would be a copy of the Russian revolution in 1905; he merely said that the Chinese would have their 1905. This means that, apart from the features which the Chinese

revolution would have in common with the revolution in 1905, it would have its own peculiarities, which would stamp its special features on the whole revolution in China.

What are these peculiarities?

The first peculiarity is that the Chinese revolution as a bourgeois-democratic one is also a revolution for national freedom directed against the rule of foreign imperialism in China. This is the chief feature which distinguishes it from the revolution in Russia in 1905. The position is that the rule of imperialism in China expresses itself not only in military power but above all in that the imperialists have the power of disposal over the main threads of industry in China, the railways, the factories, the mines, the banks, etc. The result is that the questions of the struggle against foreign imperialism and its Chinese agents play a predominant part in the Chinese revolution. This is exactly what links the Chinese revolution directly with the revolutions of the proletarians of all countries against imperialism.

Another peculiarity of the Chinese revolution arises out of this peculiarity and that is that the national large bourgeoisie in China is extremely weak, much weaker than was the Russian bourgeoisie at the time of 1905. This is easy to understand. If the main threads of industry are gathered in the hands of foreign imperialists, the national large bourgeoisie of China cannot but be weak and backward. In this respect Comrade Mif is quite in the right when he remarks that the weakness of the national bourgeoisie in China is a characteristic symptom of the Chinese revolution. From this results that the part of initiator and guide of the Chinese revolution, the part of leader of the Chinese peasantry must inevitably get into the hands of the Chinese proletariat, which is better organized and more active than the Chinese bourgeoisie.

Neither should the third peculiarity of the Chinese revolution be overlooked; it is that, in addition to

China, the Soviet Unions exists and is developing, the revolutionary experience and help of which cannot but facilitate the fight of the Chinese proletariat against imperialism and against the feudal-mediaeval remains in China.

These are the fundamental peculiarities of the Chinese revolution which determine its character and its trend.

2. Imperialism and Imperialist Intervention in China.

The first defect of the theses before us is that they avoid or underestimate the question of imperialist intervention in China. If we read the theses correctly, we might imagine that there is at present in China no actual imperialist intervention, that there is nothing but a struggle of the North against the South or of one group of generals against another group of generals. We are apt to understand under intervention a condition in which foreign troops march into Chinese territory and, if this does not take place, then there is no intervention. This is a serious error, comrades, intervention is by no means exhausted by the entry of troops, and the entry of troops is by no means an essential characteristic of intervention. In the present circumstances of the revolutionary movement in capitalistic countries, where the direct entry of foreign troops might rouse a number of protests and stir up conflict, intervention has assumed a more elastic character and a more masked form. In the present circumstances, imperialism prefers to intervene against the revolution by organizing civil war within the dependent country, by financing the counter-revolutionary forces against the revolution, by moral and financial support of its Chinese agents. The imperialists tried to represent the fights of Denekin and Kolschak, Yudenitch and Wrangel against the revolution in Russia as an exclusively internal struggle. But we all knew, and not we alone but the whole world knew,

that these counter-revolutionary generals were backed by the imperialists of England and America, France and Japan, without whose support a serious civil war would have been quite impossible in Russia. The same applies to China. The fight of Wu Pei-Fu and Sun Tchuang-Fang, Chang Tso Lin and Chang Tsun Chan against the revolution in China would be quite impossible were it not that the imperialists of all countries had inspired these counter-revolutionary generals and had supplied them with money, arms, instructors, "advisors," etc. How is the power of the Canton troops to be explained? By their having an ideal, a passionate enthusiasm, by their being inspired in their fight for liberation from imperialism, by their wanting to give China her freedom. How is the power of the counter-revolutionary generals to be explained? In that they are backed by the imperialists of all countries, the owners of all possible railways, concessions, factories, banks and business houses in China. For this reason it does not depend alone, it does not even demand to any large extent on whether foreign troops enter the country, but on the support given by the imperialists of all countries to the Chinese counter-revolution. Intervention by using other people—that is the kernel of imperialist intervention at present.

For these reasons imperialist intervention in China is an undoubted fact against which the point of the Chinese revolution is directed.

Anyone who eludes or undervalues imperialist intervention in China eludes or undervalues that which is most important and most essential.

It is said that the Japanese imperialists show a certain amount of "good-will" towards the Cantonese and towards the Chinese revolution as a whole. It is said that in this respect the American imperialists are in no way behind the Japanese. This is self-deception, comrades. We must know how to discern the true nature of the policy of the imperialists, including the Japanese and American imperialists behind their mask.

Lenin used to say that it was difficult to win over revolutionaries with a stick, with fists, but that at times it is very easy to win them by kindness. This truth, spoken by Lenin, should never be forgotten, comrades. In any case, it is clear that the Japano-American imperialists have pretty well understood the significance of this truth. For this reason we must make a definite distinction between friendliness and compliments addressed to the Canton people and the fact that the imperialists, who distribute their friendliness most liberally, cling most desperately to "their" concessions and railways in China, from which they do not wish to be "liberated" at any price.

3. The Revolutionary Army in China.

The second mark in connection with the theses before us concerns the question of the revolutionary armies in China. The point is that the question of the army is evaded or undervalued in the theses. This is their second defect. The advance of the Cantonese towards the North is generally regarded not as the growth of the Chinese revolution, but as a fight of the Canton generals against Wu Pei-Fu and Sun Chuan Fang, as a fight for supremacy of one group of generals against another group of generals. This is a great mistake, comrades. The revolutionary armies in China are the most important factor in the fight of the Chinese workers and peasants for their liberation. Is it then a mere coincidence that until May or June of this year the situation in China was regarded as the rule of the reaction which had set in after the defeat of Feng Yu Hsiang's army, but that in the summer of this year it was only necessary for the victorious Canton troops to advance northwards and occupy Hupe in order to change the picture fundamentally in favor of the revolution? No, it was not a coincidence; for the advance of the Canton troops meant a blow aimed at imperialism, a blow aimed at its agents in China, it meant the freedom of assembly, freedom to strike,

freedom of the press, freedom of coalition for all the revolutionary elements in China in general and for the workers in particular. In this lies the peculiarity and the greatest importance of the revolutionary army in China.

In former times, in the 18th and 19th century, revolutions began in such a way that usually the people rose, for the greater part unarmed or badly armed, and encountered the army of the old regime. They made every effort to break up this army or at least to win it over as far as possible to their side. This was the typical form of the revolutionary explosions of the past. The same thing occurred with us in Russia in 1905. In China things developed on different lines. In China, it is not the unarmed people against the troops of their own government, but the armed people in the form of its revolutionary army. In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the peculiarities and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution. This also explains the special significance of the revolutionary army in China.

It is therefore a reprehensible defect of the theses before us that they underestimate the revolutionary armies.

In consequence of this, however, the Chinese Communists ought to devote special attention to work in the army.

First of all the Chinese Communists must use every means in their power to intensify political work in the army and must succeed in making the army a real and model support of the ideas of the Chinese revolution. This is particularly necessary at the present moment because the Canton troops are being joined by all kinds of generals who have nothing in common with the Kuomintang, who join it as a force which overthrows the enemies of the Chinese people and who, by joining the Canton troops, introduce disintegration into the army. It is only possible to neutralize such "allies"

or to turn them into genuine adherents of the Kuomintang by intensifying the political work and by organizing revolutionary control over them. Unless this is done, the army may get into a most difficult position.

Secondly, the Chinese revolutionaries, including the Communists, must make a special study of things military, they must not regard military questions as something of secondary importance, for military questions in China are at present the most important factor in the Chinese revolution. The Communists must, with this object in view, study militarism in order to advance gradually and to be able to occupy some leading post or other in the revolutionary army. This will guarantee that the revolutionary army of China will follow the right path, will keep its eye steadily fixed on its aim. Unless this is carried out, it is inevitable that there should be vacillations in the army.

These are the tasks which the Chinese Communist Party has to fulfill with regard to the question of the revolutionary army.

4. The Character of the Future Power in China.

The third remark concerns the fact that, in the theses, the question as to the character of the future revolutionary power in China is hardly dealt with at all or altogether disregarded. Comrade Mif, to his credit, has closely approached this question in his thesis. But, when he was on the threshold of it, he failed to carry it out to the end, as though he had been frightened and did not dare to go farther. Comrade Mif believes that the future revolutionary power in China will be a power of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie under the leadership of the proletariat. What does this mean? At the time of the February revolution in 1917, the Mensheviki and social revolutionaries were also petty bourgeois parties and to a certain extent revolutionaries. Does this mean that the future revolutionary power in China will be a social revolutionary Menshevist power? No, it does not mean this.

Why? Because the social-revolutionary Menshevist power was an imperialist power, while the future revolutionary power in China must be an anti-imperialist power. This is the fundamental difference. The MacDonald government was actually a "labor" power but it was at the same time imperialist, for it was based on the maintenance of England's imperialist power, for instance in India and Egypt. As compared with the MacDonald government, the future revolutionary power in China will have the advantage that it will be an anti-imperialist power. What is important is not the bourgeois-democratic character of the Canton government which forms the nucleus of the future pan-Chinese revolutionary power; the most important thing is that this power is an anti-imperialist power and can be nothing else, that every advance of this power is a blow aimed at world-imperialism and is therefore a stroke in favor of the revolutionary world movement. Lenin was right when he said that, if in former times, before the beginning of the epoch of the world revolution, national movements for freedom were part of the general democratic movement, now, after the victory of the Soviet revolution in Russia, and since the beginning of the epoch of world revolution, national movements for freedom are part of the proletarian world revolution.

This peculiarity was not taken into consideration by Comrade Mif.

I believe that the future revolutionary power in China will, in its character, resemble the power which was spoken of in our country in 1905, i. e., a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but with the distinguishing feature that it will be predominantly an anti-imperialist power. It will be a power of transition to a non-capitalist, or, to be more exact, to a socialist development in China.

This is the direction in which the revolution in China is likely to develop. This path of development which the revolution will follow, will be facilitated by three

circumstances; firstly in that the point of the revolution in China, as a national revolution for freedom will be directed against imperialism and its agents in China, secondly in that the large bourgeoisie in China is weak, weaker than the national bourgeoisie was in Russia in 1905, which facilitates the hegemony of the proletariat, the leadership of the proletarian party as against the Chinese peasantry; thirdly, in that the revolution in China will develop in circumstances which make it possible to make use of the experience and the aid of the victorious revolution in the Soviet Union.

Whether this method will with certainty lead to victory, depends on many circumstances. One thing is clear, that it is the chief duty of the Chinese Communists to fight to prepare the way for the development of the Chinese revolution.

From this we may conclude what is the chief task of the Chinese Communists in the question of their relations to the Kuomintang and to the future revolutionary power in China. It is said that the Chinese Communists ought to secede from the Kuomintang. This is pure folly, comrades. It would be the greatest mistake for the Chinese Communists to leave the Kuomintang. The whole course of the Chinese revolution, its character, its prospects, undoubtedly indicate that the Chinese Communists ought to remain in the Kuomintang and intensify their work in it. But can the Chinese Communist Party take part in the future revolutionary government? It not only can, it must. The course of the revolution in China, its character, its prospects, speak eloquently in favor of the Chinese Communist Party taking part in the future revolutionary government of China. This is one of the necessary guarantees for the hegemony of the Chinese proletariat becoming a concrete reality.

5. The Peasant Question in China.

The fourth remark concerns the question of the

peasantry in China. Comrade Mif believes that we ought at once to issue the slogan of the formation of soviets, of peasant soviets, in the open country. I believe that this is a mistake. Comrade Mif is in too great a hurry. It is out of the question to form soviets in the country and to leave out the industrial centers in China. The question of organizing soviets in the Chinese industrial centers, however, has not yet been raised. Furthermore, we must not forget that the soviets cannot be considered independently of their connection with the whole situation. It would only be possible to organize soviets, let us say peasant soviets, if China were passing through a period of a flourishing peasant movement which would break down the old power and create a new one, under the assumption that the industrial centers of China had already broken down the barrier and entered on the phase of forming a soviet power. Can it be said that the Chinese peasantry or the Chinese revolution as a whole has already entered on this phase? No, it cannot be said. It is therefore trying to outpace evolution to speak of soviets at the present time. At the present moment, we must not raise the question of soviets, but of the formation of peasant committees; I mean committees, elected by the peasants, which are capable of formulating the fundamental demands of the peasantry and of taking all the necessary measures for realizing these demands by revolutionary methods. These peasant committees should form the axis round which the revolution in the village can unfold.

I know that there are people amongst the adherents of the Kuomintang and even among the Chinese Communists who do not consider it possible to let loose the revolution in the village lest the enlistment of the peasantry in the revolution should disrupt the united front against imperialism. This is the greatest error. The anti-imperialist front in China will be all the stronger and more powerful the more quickly and thoroughly the Chinese peasantry is persuaded to join

in the revolution. The authors of the theses, especially Comrades Tan-Ping-Shan and Rafee are perfectly right when they maintain that the immediate satisfaction of a number of the most urgent demands of the peasantry is an essential preliminary for the victory of the Chinese revolution. In my opinion, it is high time to do away with the indifference and "neutrality" towards the peasantry which is noticeable in the activity of certain elements of the Kuomintang. I think that both the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang, including the Canton government ought, without delay, to pass from words to deeds and immediately to raise the question of satisfying the most vital demands of the peasantry. What prospects open up in this respect and up to what limits an advance can and should be made—that depends on the course of the revolution. I think that it should finally be carried as far as the nationalization of the land. In any case we cannot dispense with the slogan of the nationalization of the land.

What path should be pursued by the Chinese revolutionaries in order to mobilize for the revolution of the peasantry of China which numbers many millions?

I think that in present circumstances there are only three alternatives.

The first way is that of forming peasant committees and of introducing Chinese revolutionaries into them in order to influence the peasantry. (Interjection: "And the peasant leagues?") I believe that the peasant leagues will group themselves round the peasant committees or that the peasant leagues will turn into peasant committees possessing this or that competence which is necessary in order to carry through the demands of the peasants. This way has already been discussed, but this way is not enough. It would be ridiculous to suppose that the number of revolutionaries is sufficient to carry this out. The population of China is roughly 400 millions. Of these 350 millions are Chinese, and more than nine-tenths of them are

peasants. It is a great mistake to assume that a few tens of thousands of Chinese revolutionaries are enough to permeate this ocean of the peasantry. Well then, we must seek other ways.

The second way is that of influencing the peasantry through the apparatus of the new national revolutionary power. It cannot be doubted that in the newly liberated provinces a new power will arise after the pattern of the Canton government. It cannot be doubted that this power and the apparatus of this power will have to satisfy the most urgent demands of the peasantry, if it wishes to advance the revolution. The task of the Communists and of the revolutionaries in China altogether is to penetrate into the apparatus of this new power, to bring this apparatus nearer to the masses of peasants and to help the peasant masses to satisfy their most urgent demands by means of this apparatus, whether it be by expropriating the landowners of their land, or by reducing taxation and rents—whatever the circumstances demand.

The third way is that of influencing the peasantry through the revolutionary army. I have already spoken of the extraordinary importance of the revolutionary army in the Chinese revolution. The revolutionary army of China is the force which first penetrates into the new provinces, which first becomes known amongst the bulk of the peasantry, and by which the peasant forms his opinion of the new power, of its good or bad qualities. The attitude of the peasantry towards the new power, towards the Kuomintang and towards the revolution in China as a whole, depends in the first place on the behavior of the revolutionary army, on its behavior towards the peasantry and towards the landowners, on its readiness to help the peasants. If we bear in mind that there are doubtful elements in plenty which have joined the revolutionary army in China, that these elements may alter the aspect of the army for the worse, we shall understand the great importance of the political aspect of the army and,

so to speak, of its peasant policy in the eyes of the peasants. For this reason the Communists and the Chinese revolutionaries as a whole must take all possible measures to neutralize the elements in the army which are hostile to the peasants, to preserve the revolutionary spirit in the army and to direct things in such a way that the army helps the peasants and mobilizes them for the revolution. It is said that the revolutionary army in China is welcomed with open arms, but that later, after it has established itself, there is certain disillusionment. The same thing happened with us in the Soviet Union during the civil war. This is explained by the fact that the army, when it has liberated new provinces and established itself in them, is compelled to maintain itself in some way or other at the expense of the population of the district. We Soviet revolutionaries, usually succeeded in making up for these disadvantages by endeavoring to help the peasants against the landowners by means of the army. It is essential that the Chinese revolutionaries should also learn to make up for these disadvantages by carrying out a correct peasant policy with the help of the army.

These are the methods and the points of contact through which it will be possible to carry out a correct peasant policy in China.

6. The Proletariat and the Hegemony of the Proletariat in China.

The fifth remark concerns the question of the Chinese proletariat. It seems to me that in the theses sufficient emphasis has not been laid on the role of the Chinese working class and its importance. Comrade Rafes asks: Towards whom should the Chinese Communists orientate—towards the left or the center of the Kuomintang? A strange question. I believe that the Chinese Communists should orientate themselves according to the proletariat and to those who are active in the freedom movement in China and in

the end according to the revolution. Only then will the question be put in the right way. I know that among the Chinese Communists there are comrades who do not approve of strikes of workers for improving their material and legal position, and who dissuade the workers from striking. (Interruption: That happened in Canton and Shanghai). This was a great mistake, comrades; it was a serious underestimate of the role and of the specific gravity of the proletariat in China. This should be recorded in the theses as a decidedly negative phenomenon. It would be a great mistake should the Chinese Communists not take advantage of the present favorable situation to help the workers to improve their material and legal position, even though it be through strikes. Why in all conscience, have we a revolution in China? A proletariat which allows its members to be beaten and illtreated by the agents of imperialism when they are on strike, cannot be a leader. This medieval abuse must be abolished so that the sense of power and the sense of its own dignity may be strengthened amongst the Chinese proletariat and that it may thus be made fit to hold the hegemony in the revolution. Unless this takes place, a victory of the revolution in China is not to be thought of. For this reason the economic and legal demands of the working class in China, which aim at a serious improvement of its situation, must be given the place they deserve in the theses. (Comrade Mif: they are spoken of in the theses). Yes indeed, they are spoken of in the theses, but unfortunately these demands are not sufficiently emphasized.

7. The Question of the Young People in China.

The sixth remark concerns the question of the young people in China. Strange that this question is not considered in the theses, for the question of the young people is at present of first-class importance. This question is, it is true, referred to in a part of Tan-Ping-Shan's report, but unfortunately it is not suf-

ficiently emphasized. The question of the young people is at present of first-class importance in China. The young people at the universities (revolutionary students), the young workers, the young peasants—all of them form a force which might drive the revolution forward with giant strides, if the young people were brought under the ideological and political influence of the Kuomintang. It must be borne in mind that there are none who experience the oppression of imperialism so deeply and so vitally, none who feel so sharply and so painfully the necessity of fighting against oppression, as the young people in China. This circumstance should be taken into consideration in every respect by the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese revolutionaries in order to bring about an intensification of work among the young people throughout the country. Youth must also have its place in the theses on the Chinese question.

8. A Few Final Conclusions.

I should like to draw two final conclusions—with regard to the fight against imperialism in China and with regard to the peasant question.

There can be no doubt that the Chinese Communists will now no longer confine themselves to demanding the abolition of the unequal treaties. Even a counter-revolutionary like Chan Suen Lyan now advocates this demand. It is obvious that the Chinese Communist Party must go farther. It must make the question of the nationalization of the railways its aim. This is necessary, and things must be directed towards that end. A further aim must be that of the nationalization of the most important factories. This raises above all the question of the nationalization of those undertakings whose owners have distinguished themselves by special hostility and special aggressiveness towards the Chinese people.

Further, the peasant question must be promoted by combining it with the prospect of the revolution in

China. In my opinion, the final aim of the whole matter must be the nationalization of the land.

Everything else is a matter of course.

THE SITUATION IN CHINA.

A Speech Delivered by Tan-Ping-Shan in the Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

A written report has already been submitted to the Plenum. But since too little light has been thrown upon the Chinese question I consider it desirable that the situation in China be characterized briefly, in such a manner as to bring into relief the principal questions.

The entire period prior to the Shanghai events in May of last year can be divided into three stages:

1. From the Shanghai events to the mutiny of Kwo-Sung-Lin against Chang Tso-lin. This was a period of full revolutionary offensive against the imperialists.

2. From the defeat of Kwo-Sun-Min up to the time of the northern expedition of the Canton troops. This period might be described as the counter-attack of the Imperialists against the Revolution.

3. From the northern expedition of the Canton troops down to the present, during which the revolutionary forces are resuming the offensive against the Imperialists.

It is not necessary to discuss the first and second of these stages—these are already sufficiently well known.

With the third stage the Chinese Revolution has entered upon a new period in its development. Many

important changes in the situation are to be noted, among them being:

1. The occupation of Wuchang and Hankow by Cantonese troops, whereby the revolutionary forces have spread out in Central China.

2. Consolidation of the Left wing of the Kuomintang. Thanks to mass pressure, the C. C. of the Kuomintang has adopted a resolution calling upon Wang Ting-Wei to resume his position.

3. A leftward turn of the Kuomintang centrists as a result of which there is the chance that this wing can work together with the Left.

4. The movement for the re-admission of the expelled Kuomintang members who formed a group, a fraction, last year in Szechuan, near Peking.

5. The official organizational relationship between the People's Armies of Feng-Yu-hsiang and the Canton Government.

6. The victories of the II, III and V People's Armies and the occupation of Kiangsi province and its capital Sianfu.

7. The broadening of the organization of the Communist Party of China.

8. The new boom in the labor movement of Hankow and the new strikes in Shanghai, etc.

9. The rapid development of the peasant movement in the provinces of Kwantung and Honan.

10. The disorders and uprisings of the well-known "League of Red Spears" in the provinces of Honan, Shantung, and Chihli.

11. Formation of organizations of intermediate and small merchants in the towns of Shanghai, Hankow, Canton, etc.

12. The sympathy of the bourgeoisie in Shanghai for the Canton revolutionary government.

13. The differentiation within the military cliques in the provinces of Szechuan, Kweichow, Honan, Chekiang, etc.

14. Differentiation in the nationalist organizations and among the so-called Sun-Yat-Senists.

These facts are to be accounted for by the revolutionary clan and the military victories of the Canton troops.

To summarize we may say that, firstly, the revolutionary movement is more and more finding support and confidence among the masses; secondly, that a gradual concentration of revolutionary forces is in process. If this broadening, spreading, and concentration of revolutionary forces goes further, we may, to some extent say, that there is a very good chance of a revolutionary unification. We know, however, that the Chinese Revolutionary movement is only in its opening stages. There cannot yet be any talk of a completion of the revolution. Anyone who maintains that the Chinese Revolution is already accomplished, that the mission of 1911 is already fulfilled, is entirely wrong. We can only say at this time that there is the greatest possibility of a revolutionary unification.

How do matters stand in the other camp, in the camp of our enemy in China? We can see this from the following facts:

1. Conflicts between the British and American, between the British and Japanese, and between the Japanese and American imperialists.

2. The disintegration of the semi-feudal military camps, the disintegration of the troops of Wu-Pei-Fu and of Sun-Chuan-Fang; and finally, the conflict between Chang-Tso-Lin and Chang-Zuen-Chang in the Mukden camp.

3. The mutiny of Hsia Chow against Chuan.

4. The beginning of disintegration in the armed forces in the provinces of Honan and Anhwei.

5. The movement against Sun-Chuan-Fang by the governors in Shanghai;

6. The anti-militarist movement of the merchants in

Peking, Tientstin, etc., because of the unbearable tax burdens.

7. The movement against foreign stocks and bonds in Harbin.

8. The uprisings of the League of Red Spears against the rule of the reactionary militarists.

These facts show that on the one hand the militarists are going through a process of disintegration, that the strongholds of the imperialists are shaken and weakened, and that on the other hand, the oppressed and exploited are embarking upon the revolutionary road more consciously than heretofore. The statement, therefore, that the Chinese Revolution has the greatest chance to unite China, is not exaggerated.

Lenin once said:

"A basic revolutionary law, which has been confirmed by all revolutions and particularly by the three Russian Revolutions of the 20th century, consists in the following: it will not suffice for a revolution that the exploited and enslaved masses realize the impossibility of continuing to live in the old way, and in that they demand a change; what is necessary for the revolution is that the exploiters can no longer live and govern in the old way. Only if the "lower strata" no longer intend to live as they have been living, and the "upper strata" no longer can live in the old manner, only then can the revolution be victorious."

The correctness of this thesis was also confirmed by the Chinese Revolution. The oppressed masses of China have in fact become conscious that they cannot continue to live in this way, and likewise the contradictions and differences among the rulers are beginning to intervene in a period in which they cannot continue their rule along the old lines.

The Chinese Revolution will be victorious. It has already won a partial victory. But we should not for-

get, firstly, that revolutionists should not lose their heads, either because of victories or of difficulties, secondly, that they must consolidate victories already won so that they may maintain their power; thirdly, that the enemy must be destroyed because they have thus far been defeated, but are still far from being obliterated. Comrade Lenin uttered these words in 1907 at the London Party Congress. I believe that these words will help the comrades who are much too optimistic about the Chinese Revolution. The Chinese Revolution has only made its first step. The foe is not yet beaten, and there can be no talk whatever of his having been already destroyed. How, then, can we be altogether too optimistic? A great Chinese strategist of old once said that victories can be won only if one knows oneself and the foe perfectly. In order to maintain our victory, and in order to win new success, we must be clear as to our own weaknesses and as to how we can consolidate our victories.

We have many weaknesses:

1. Our military forces are not yet fully concentrated.
2. The development of military power is outstripping the development of the power exerted by the masses of the people.
3. Our material support is inadequate.
4. The mass organizations are still weak and the masses which live under the military rule are not yet in position to form, organizationally and systematically, organizations for the uprisings.
5. The policy that the present Canton Government has put into effect by no means meets the demands and requirements of the masses.

Many critical points can still be felt within the Chinese Revolutionary movement.

1. The military intervention and imperialist intrigues, i. g. when last year Japan sent its forces to Mukden and Taku, when England concentrated its

fleet, its cruisers, in the Pacific Ocean. The imperialists intend to maintain their privileges in China, and hence we have such happenings.

2. A disintegration of the revolutionary forces is also to be feared, as well as a degeneration in the revolutionary camps.

A further danger consists in the possibility that the imperialists and militarists will again combine against the Canton groups.

In order to consolidate our already won victories, we must:

1. Develop the peasant movement broadly and lead it to a direct participation in the actual struggles.

2. Establish a united battle front of all classes for the national revolution, which includes the proletariat, peasantry, and the urban petty and middle bourgeoisie. Under certain conditions we can also work together with that big bourgeoisie which has thus far had no relations with the imperialists, in connection with which we must, by all means, relentlessly expose its treacherous, compromising character.

3. Have the support of the West European proletariat which must prevent a free hand for the imperialists in suppressing and destroying the Chinese Revolution. A united revolutionary battlefront without the active support of the proletariat in the advanced countries, without the struggle of these proletariats against their own imperialisms, is hopeless. This is the kernel of Leninism on the national question, and is simultaneously one of the chief premises for the consolidation of the victory of the Chinese Revolution.

I shall now take up the chief aim of the Chinese Revolution and the relations between the Chinese Revolution and capitalist stabilization. At the present time the Chinese Revolution must set for itself the following aims:

1. Consequent emancipation from imperialism.
2. Complete destruction of the semi-feudal military

system, and the establishment of a united revolutionary government.

3. Democratization of politics.

We must fight under the following practical slogans:

a) A movement for the annulment of the unequal treaties. This movement has already called forth, since the Shanghai events of last year, mass movements even in far-distant villages. We must demand: self-administration of customs, withdrawal of foreign military forces, restitution of leaseholds and abolition of extra-territoriality.

We must fight for the slogan of the national assembly. This slogan concretizes the so-called democratization of politics. Organizations supporting and fostering this movement are spreading throughout the whole of China. The masses demand not only one uniform national assembly that will cover the whole country, but they also demand the democratization of local political power. They demand Provincial country meetings, etc.

With regard to the annulment of the unequal treaties we must first shatter the prestige of the foreigners, and then, after a certain time in which we are sufficiently entrenched, we must tear these treaties into shreds. The imperialists, particularly the British, have already partially lost their prestige, especially in Kwantung where the Canton Government has put into effect its own customs tariffs, and also in Peking, where the Government which is dominated by the reactionary militarists, was forced by mass pressure to declare invalid the Belgo-Chinese Treaties. These facts have inspired great fear, especially among the British imperialists. They believe that China has already adopted the Bolshevik theory of repudiating all foreign loans and unequal treaties.

As far as the stabilization of capitalism is concerned, we must note that the Chinese Revolution has delivered a heavy blow to imperialism in that it is beginning to cut down the market for commodity capital.

It further intensifies the conflicts between the imperialist groups, and arouses and strengthens the liberation struggle of colonial countries such as Indonesia, India, Korea, etc., which undoubtedly still further undermines the labile capitalist stabilization.

We realize that two possibilities are characteristic of the present Chinese Revolution: either the Chinese proletariat, with the support of the world proletariat, will succeed in carrying out a consequent national revolution, or else the new Chinese bourgeoisie will be in position to take into its hands the leadership of the Chinese Revolution, and by means of the imperialists' support, develop a Chinese capitalism or slowly liquidate the Chinese Revolution by means of compromises.

Since the Shanghai events, the Chinese proletariat has proven its political importance. Especially in the strikes in Shanghai, Hongkong and Canton, the latter lasting over a year, broad anti-imperialist movements were instigated, and the Canton Government was consolidated. The peasant masses in Kwantung also followed the propaganda and slogans of the Communist Party of China. Under the initiative of the Communist Party of China, the peasant movement in other provinces is growing more and more, and is developing further and further under the leadership of our Party.

These facts prove that the Chinese proletariat really has a chance to capture the hegemony of the national revolution. The Chinese bourgeoisie also, which suffers under the political and economic oppression of the imperialists, is spurred on by the general revolutionary mood and is beginning gradually to participate in the national revolutionary movement. It has already tried, and continues to try to seize the leadership of the revolution. In May of last year, the Shanghai bourgeoisie deserted the 17 demands of the Union of Workers, Merchants and Students and formulated a set of 13 demands of its own. The formation of Dai-Tsi-Taoism and the March affair this year in Canton,

are attempts on the part of the bourgeoisie to take the leadership of the revolution away from the proletariat. Hence there are two possibilities, two tendencies in the Chinese Revolution. The leading position of the Chinese proletariat in the national revolution is not sufficiently secure. The Chinese proletariat is still in a period in which it must fight the bourgeoisie for the leadership of the national revolution. In order to capture the leadership of the Chinese revolution, the proletariat must:

1. Win the broad peasant masses and the support of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, while preventing the rightward swing of the bourgeoisie. Only then will it be possible for the proletariat to organize a united battlefront under its leadership.

2. The proletariat must consolidate and extend the trade union movement, in the course of which it must work for the organization of all industrial workers, handicraftsmen and agricultural laborers. The Communist Party must do everything possible in order to lead these elements directly into the revolutionary struggle. And, finally, the Chinese proletariat must get the support of the entire international proletariat.

The Kuomintang is precisely a united organization of the revolutionary forces of all classes. We must do everything possible in order to develop the Kuomintang further, and with its aid carry out consequently the national revolution. If it is maintained that the Communists should withdraw from the Kuomintang, or that they should organize a third party in the place of Kuomintang, then this would mean the splitting of the united battlefront. Through our own initiative, we must develop and consolidate the power of the Left wing in the Kuomintang, while at the same time not forgetting to prevent the further rightward swings of the Kuomintang's right wing.

What is the Status of the Chinese peasantry in this national revolution? The landowning class forms the basis of the Chinese military system. In order com-

pletely to put an end to the semi-feudal system of the militarists, we must solve the agrarian question, we must smash the weapons by which the big landowning class oppresses the peasant masses. Only thereby can the bases of the militarists be shattered. Under the rule of the Canton National Government we must win the support and sympathy of the broad masses of peasantry in order to maintain the victories we have won. We must enrol the peasantry in the united revolutionary battlefront.

We now come to the question of the Chinese labor movement and of the development and importance of the Communist Party of China. The Chinese proletariat will not only be the driving force of the future proletarian revolution, it is also the directing power in the present national revolution. Without a mighty labor movement the national struggle cannot develop further. The ups and downs of the labor movement in China at the same time mark the trend of the national movement as a whole. In the three stages of the Chinese labor movement, from the sailors' strike in 1922 up to the railwaymen's strike of 1923, from this to the Shanghai events, and from the Shanghai events to the present time, the Chinese working class has shown its fighting ability and its valour in the front ranks of the revolution. The whole Shanghai movement rallied around the strikes in Shanghai and Hankow. The Canton Government could wipe out the counter-revolutionary troops only with the support of the masses of workers and peasants. And now also, after the occupation of Hankow and Wuchang by the Canton troops, the victory can be maintained only if the labor movement is consolidated and strengthened.

The influence of the reformists in the Chinese labor movement must also be thwarted. The reformist movement can find no place among the Chinese laboring masses who suffer under a double oppression and exploitation by their own and by the foreign capitalists. The Asiatic Workers' Congress, which was called last

year, was already a sign that the international reformists have made efforts to extend their influence among the Chinese laboring masses. While it is true that the Chinese working class has a low cultural level, in a revolutionary sense one can say that it is most revolutionary.

The Chinese Communist Party is thus far still weak, but of late it has grown very rapidly and consolidated itself. In the course of one year, it increased its membership four-fold. The Communist organizations in Canton, Shanghai, and in O-Ku-Han province, have already become mass organizations. The Chinese Communist Party is the vanguard of the national revolution. In the unification of Fontung Province during the war against Mukden, against Wu-Pei-Fu, and during the present Northern expedition of the Canton troops, it has further consolidated its influence in the masses, and it has accomplished a great deal. The working class has a constantly growing confidence in our Party. The peasants, petty-bourgeoisie, and democratic elements also follow us to some extent.

Our organization still has many shortcomings. It does not by far, extend over the whole country. The lower cadres are too weak. The organization is not altogether healthy. While the basic organizations consist of factory nuclei, yet because the comrades have insufficient experience and training, these organizations are not strong enough, the Party is weak in theory and also suffers from a lack of international experiences.

We must concentrate our work and forces upon the consolidation of the victories which the Chinese Revolution has already won, upon the consequent extension of the national revolution, and upon aiding the Kuomintang to broaden the united battlefront in order to complete the national revolution of China.

CHINA AND THE CAPITALIST WORLD.

A Speech Delivered by Comrade Manuilsky.

I should like to direct the attention of the whole Comintern upon the Pacific problem as a whole, viz., upon the conflicts which develop where the paths of three Continents, America, Asia and Europe, cross one another. Three imperialist powers stand face to face there: The United States of North America, Japan and Great Britain.

The armed clash which may break out there in the future, will be of unimaginable violence and serious consequences. If prior to this fateful moment, no decisive battle has taken place between proletariat and bourgeoisie in England or the United States, if, until then the victorious Chinese national revolution does not change international relations on the shores of the Pacific, we may witness a war which, with respect to its grimness and the extent of its losses, will put the great imperialist war of 1914-18 in the shade. The British military writer, Bywater, defines the importance of the Pacific Ocean in the coming imperialist wars as follows:

“When, on November 21st, 1918, the German war fleet surrendered unconditionally to the victors, this meant the close of a brief but fateful chapter in the history of the struggle for the seas (the author had in mind the struggle in the North Sea between the German and British fleets). The next chapter begins in August 1919 when the newly created Pacific fleet of the United States passed through the Panama Canal on its way to its naval base in San Francisco.”

And not only Bywater, but also a number of other military writers in America, Japan and Great Britain, are of the opinion that after the world war, which bled Europe white, after the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, the epoch of Pacific imperialism has dawned.

In the United States a law has been passed against Japanese immigration which arouses the deepest indignation of the Japanese people. One need only follow up the Japanese press, or give heed to the expressions of Japanese military circles, in order to become aware of the full reality of the menace of a Pacific war. This is evidenced by last year's naval maneuvers off the Hawaiian Islands, which taught that this American naval base could be captured by Japan in the fight for the Pacific. The United States and Great Britain, are watching with great uneasiness the process of Japanese colonization on the shores of the Pacific.

Japan, a nation of 60 million inhabitants, tightly crowded upon the limited area of its islands (Nippon, Sikok and Kui-Siu) has a natural pressure towards the Philippines, towards the Malay Archipelago, towards the innumerable little islands scattered over the immeasurable surface of the Pacific Ocean. The British Dominion, Australia, is busy stirring up the nationalist passions of the white race, through its capitalist press reports on the "yellow peril". In order to justify the military fortification of Singapore, the British press exploits Japanese naval armaments and war preparations, by describing in detail the capacity of the Japanese guns, and by representing the launching of every new Japanese torpedo boat as a sign of the coming Japanese offensive against the old countries of capitalist culture. And in fact the naval program of 1923, which is to be completed in 1928, gives reason for some concern. Despite the restriction of the Washington Conference it has been possible for Japan to build a new fleet of 25 light cruisers, 90 destroyers, and 70 submarines.

In Japan itself, an active nationalist agitation is be-

ing carried on, directed primarily against the United States, as the power which stands in the way of Japan's further development, and which condemns it to colonial enslavement. In Japan the threatened war in the Pacific is discussed openly and unconcealed; speeches are made about it, whole books are written, plans are worked out for supplying Japan with raw materials in case of a blockade, etc. To be sure, this war factions sometimes veiled over by modern trade and financial relations which appear in the "peaceful guise" of an economic collaboration.

It is well-known e. g. that Japan is greatly interested in the American market for its export of silk and tea. Aside from this, Japan, as a result of its serious losses during the 1923 earthquake, was in need of American credit. The United States exploited this circumstance and penetrated more and more into Japan. Yet even if we discount a good part of the exaggeration inherent in this militarist agitation, the tremendous importance of the Pacific problem nevertheless remains an undeniable fact.

The Comintern, however, has devoted too little attention to this problem in the past: we were too much a European International. We were inclined to look all problems of world politics and of the international labor movement through the prism of European relations. Parties directly involved in the Pacific problem, such as the American and British, are also devoting but inadequate attention to it. Only after the outbreak of the Chinese national revolution did the question of conflicts in the Far East arouse our interest, and we looked attentively into the crystallizing grouping of forces on the Pacific. Yet the Chinese Revolution we have also thus far considered from the viewpoint of its perspectives of internal development; and we lay too little weight upon its significance as a factor which revolutionizes Pacific relationships as a whole.

The struggle in China, which raged for decades before the world war, 1914—1918, was a struggle for the partition of Asia. Here there met the imperialist paths of czarist Russia, Japan and Great Britain. In 1904 and 1905 the struggle between czarist Russia and Japan took place here, and from it Japan emerged firmly entrenched. Until recently, China was one of the objects of the struggle on the Pacific. By China's appearance as the subject of an active national revolutionary policy in Asia, it completely overturns "all analysis" and prophecies which military and Pacific experts have made concerning the probable grouping of forces. All these people proceeded from the premise of a split-up China, rendered powerless by internal conflicts, a country whose inescapable fate it is to be divided up into spheres of influence. They took as their starting point the ratio system between the United States, Japan and Great Britain, established by the Washington conference, without taking into consideration the new, potentially powerful factor of future Chinese policy.

The Chinese revolution can under certain conditions, first, hasten the armed clash of Big Powers on the Pacific—"a possibility that bourgeois experts on the Pacific problem" put off for a number of years; second, it will exert a revolutionizing influence on the movement of all Asia, especially India, whose national-revolutionary movement seems to have been ebbing somewhat in recent years. This is likewise a point in the sharpening of antagonisms on the Pacific. That this view of the role of the Chinese Revolution is entirely justified is proven by the Indonesian uprising. This uprising also (side by side with the Chinese Revolution) moves the Pacific problem into the foreground.

There is ferment also in the Philippines. This summer Calvin Coolidge, the president of the United States, sent a certain Colonel Thompson on an inves-

tigation tour of the Philippines where agitation had been aroused among the population over the American plans to establish rubber plantations there. The honorable colonel returned with an extraordinarily optimistic report that the population of the Philippines had no strivings for independence but instead entertained a passionate desire to plant rubber for Mr. Firestone. At the same time, he was compelled to admit, however, that "the propaganda of certain politicians for the independence of the Philippines was finding response among the less-cultured strata."

At the present time there can be no great colonial movement that fails to cut deeply into the diplomatic web of international relations of the big capitalist bandits. Such a movement radically changes the relation of forces between them, sharpens their struggles, and stimulates their appetite. The Chinese Revolution and the colonial revolutionary movements have prospects of success because they occur at a time in which antagonisms on the Pacific are not lessening, but sharpening. A third circumstance that plays a certain role in the sharpening of the rivalry in the Pacific is the question of the British dominions. The struggle between Great Britain and the United States over such dominions as Canada, Australia, etc., is well-known. Under the pressure of extraordinary political and economic difficulties, England is more and more forced to orientate itself towards its colonies and dominions. Voices are already being heard in the British press asking whether it would not be better for Great Britain "to turn its back to Europe" and to direct its whole forces to the maintenance, regulation and establishment of closer economic relations with all the far-flung parts of the Empire scattered over land and sea. If England should actually embark upon this course, it would in a certain sense signify the victory of the policy of Pacific orientation.

Finally, the actuality of the Pacific problem is increased by changes within world economy. The whole

post-war development was characterized by the shifting, slowly but uninterruptedly, of the center of gravity of world economy to the overseas countries. The tremendous development of capitalism in the United States goes hand in hand with a similar development in a whole series of "virgin countries"—Argentine, Brazil, Canada, Australia, etc. If a great economic crisis does not lead to an economic collapse here, then only an armed struggle on the Pacific Coast can create an immediate revolutionary situation in these overseas countries.

The great importance to world economy of the Asiatic and Pacific colonies must also be taken into consideration. If we take e. g. the share of Asia and of Europe in world trade, we find that Asia's share has risen considerably from the beginning of the world war to 1923. Thus in 1913 Europe's share in world trade amounted to 64,2%, while Asia's share amounted to only 10,1%. But in 1923 Europe's share was 51,9%, while that of Asia was 14,2%.

This phenomena as a whole forces us to enter more deeply into the antagonisms in the Pacific. From the beginning they are to be considered under a dual viewpoint:

1. as to the object of an investigation concerning a possible war in this section of the capitalist front so far removed from Europe;

2. as an investigation of the perspectives of the Chinese revolution in the light of the ripening antagonisms on the Pacific.

Before going into these, I should like to remark on this latter point that the whole constellation of forces on the Pacific, and primarily the relation of forces between the United States and Japan, gives us the possibility of predicting the victory of the Canton Government with some certainty. We have not the slightest occasion for pessimism. If the Canton Government, while simultaneously consolidating its internal situation by means of a closer alliance with the peasantry,

will be able to exploit these contradictions skilfully, then it will undoubtedly emerge victorious from the Chinese toiling masses' present heroic struggle for their national liberation.

American Imperialism in the Fight for the Pacific.

The objective role of attacker on the Pacific will in the future be played by the United States of North America, while the objective role of defenders falls to Great Britain and Japan. American imperialism is intricately bound up with the struggle for world hegemony. In the coming world war, if the fate of humanity is not previously fundamentally remodelled by the proletarian revolution, American imperialism will play the leading role. America is already arming now for this war on the Pacific; there is already an extensive literature which discusses this question in detail; and even the very time (1931-33) is set; plans of operations are described; in brief, the picture which we had several years before the war in Europe, is beginning to resurrect itself. At that time, prior to the world war, one could find in military literature detailed drafts of the German attack upon Belgium, which were later, in the first days of August 1914, carried into effect with photographic fidelity.

The whole development of American imperialism in the last 25 years testifies that this relentlessly approaching struggle on the Pacific is in no sense a creation of fantasy. The ruling classes also recognize this. Prof. Holl, of Sydney University, one of the most prominent experts on Pacific problems, expressed himself in the situation in the Pacific as follows:

"In studying the situation which has arisen on the Pacific," he said three months ago, "one cannot avoid a deep concern. This talk of the Pacific taking the place of the Atlantic as the international arena, must not be taken lightly. Precisely on the Pacific the apparatus for the settlement of international conflicts is weaker than anywhere."

And the same Holl complains with lyrical sorrow, that no such institution as the League of Nations prevails in the Pacific:

"The League of Nations, despite its shortcomings, is a body that tries to be of service in international questions (!). Yet it is impossible to turn to the League of Nations in any more important conflict because the United States is not a member."

It is, of course, an entirely debatable question as to how far the League of Nations can be an instrument "for settlement of international conflicts". Yet it is extraordinarily symptomatic of the entire international situation that it is just the Pacific Ocean which is not subject to the influence of even so powerless an institution like the European League of Nations.

The notorious Washington Conference (1921) gave rise to certain pacifist illusions, because it put a check on the growth of naval armaments. Yet it eliminated neither the cause nor the chances of the conflict, it merely deferred them. Prior to this conference, American imperialism worked tirelessly and persistently on the strengthening of its military-strategical positions in the fight for the Pacific, for the markets of the Far East. In 1898, as a result of the Spanish-American war, the Americans took Cuba from the Spaniards, an Island near the shores of Central America and the key to the Atlantic side of the future Panama Canal. At the same time, the United States annexed also another Island, Porto Rico, which is of great importance in guarding the entrance of the Panama Canal.

An additional result of the Spanish-American war was the annexation of the Philippines at the entrance of the South China Sea, on the Asiatic shores of the Pacific Ocean. The Philippines can be compared to a revolver, the muzzle of which is pointed at Japan. The revolver is dangerous, because at the very opening of

the war it could be captured by Japan, since the Philippines lie opposite the Japanese naval base of Formosa. Yet the Philippines have economic importance also for the United States. It is well-known that the United States are absolutely dependent upon Britain for their supply of rubber. Investigations undertaken recently have shown that climatic and soil conditions are favorable for the raising of rubber in the Southern part of the islands. On the island of Mindanao and the small islands adjacent there can be accommodated at least 1,500,000 rubber trees which will produce approximately 200,000 tons of rubber, enough to supply the world market.

In the same year, 1898, the United States, by skilful utilization of the revolutionary movement in the Hawaiian Islands (on the way between the American Pacific coast and the Philippines), annexed also these islands and transformed them into one of the chief links in the chain of naval bases on the Pacific Ocean. In order to comprehend the importance of these islands in the struggle for the Pacific, one must take into consideration the fact that not a single ship can sail across the Pacific and back without at least running into one of their harbors. Aside from the Hawaiian Islands there is not another point on the Pacific where ships can supply themselves with coal and fresh water. Thanks to this importance the Hawaiian Islands might to a certain extent be reckoned as the Gibraltar of the Pacific Ocean. Here upon these islands at Pearl Harbor the American navy concentrates its aeroplane fleet consisting of 150 aeroplanes. A fleet of submarines alternative with torpedo boats. The dry dock can accommodate simultaneously a dreadnought and a cruiser. The range of the radio station in Hawaii includes China, Australia, and New York. In concrete barracks there is infantry equipped for gas warfare, mine throwers, etc. This is the switch-yard of the coming war in the Pacific Ocean. Only very recently the

United States assigned 20 million dollars for further fortifications on Hawaii.

All these annexations were only the prelude to a step that is of dominant importance for the imperialist offensive of the United States on the Pacific—the building of the Panama Canal which was completed in August 1914. The cannons' roar of the imperialist war drowned out this event that signified a new Pacific epoch of American foreign policy, so that as a result it failed to receive the attention it deserved. But only after the opening of the Panama Canal which saved the American fleet 8—10,000 miles and the hazardous trip around Tiera del Fuego and through the Magellan Straits, could American imperialism write upon its banners Roosevelt's words: "In the history of mankind there begins a Pacific era," and "the domination of the Pacific must belong to the United States." At the same time it must also be noted that the Washington Conference, (which naive pacifist sheets designated as the beginning of a "peaceful" period in the development of Pacific relations), was nothing other than the carrying out of American plans of advance in the Pacific. At this very conference, the United States succeeded in isolating Japan and in breaking off the latter's alliance with Great Britain. A war by America, against the combined Anglo-Japanese fleet would have been an extremely difficult task. Japan, thanks to its military-strategic position, and its system of coastal fortifications, is almost impregnable against attack from the sea. It could be overcome only by a blockade extending over a period of years. But such a blockade is impossible for the American fleet if at the same time it must fight the British navy with its two strong bases on the Asiatic coast, in Hongkong and Singapore. From this standpoint the Washington Conference has strengthened the diplomatic position of the United States, while the possibility of a war between Japan and America is by no means eliminated, but on

the contrary, it is increased. This military-strategic preparation on the part of America was in conformity also with its economic expansion.

The Essence of American "Pacifism".

In its economic program of expansion, American pacifism has passed through three stages:

Firstly, the Monroe Doctrine. The origin of this doctrine, "America for the Americans," coincided in point of time with that period in the development of the United States in which the markets of North and South America were the highest goal of the American bourgeoisie.

Secondly, at the end of the 19th century, when capitalism in the United States, as a result of its turbulent development, felt itself restricted within these confines, when the American bourgeoisie for the first time turned its eyes to the Pacific and to the Chinese markets, American capitalism unfurled a new banner upon which was blazoned the program of the "Open Door." The "Open Door" is the policy of every rising young imperialism that comes into the world somewhat belated, i. e. when the world is already divided among other capitalist rivals. When the United States made its appearance in China, it found that country under the practically unrestricted influence of Japan and Great Britain. Great Britain was the first capitalist country which had gained a foothold in China. With the aid of Hongkong, its frontier posts in the Far East, which had been occupied in 1842 under the terms of the Nanking Treaty, England had been working for decades in consolidating and extending its strongholds in China. On the other hand, however, the geographical situation of Japan made it easier for this young Japanese capitalism, which at the beginning of the 20th century was already considerably developed, to penetrate into China. The virile Japanese imperialism crowded England out of its strongholds step by step. Even though Japanese capital was still weak in

Japan itself, it penetrated industry, stock companies, and participated as largest shareholder in the banks. It requires only a glance at the curve of Chinese imports from Japan and Great Britain to convince us of the rapid tempo of advance of Japanese capital in China. Thus in 1870 British imports constituted 37% of the total, Japanese about 2%. In 1923 British imports declined to 13%, Japanese rose to 23%. Thus matters stood when the United States appeared on the scene. In 1910, American imports in China amounted to about 5%, while in 1923 it had already outstripped Great Britain and amounted to 16%. The unsuccessful tariff conference of this year indicates the differences of interest that exist between the United States and Great Britain. Thus e. g. American exports to Asia prior to the war, amounted to only 4.6% of the total, while they rose to 12%, and thereby became a powerful competitor against English trade, which, in addition had been injured by the boycott. What else is there for American imperialism in China, than a policy of the "Open Door"?

The third phase of development of American imperialism begins after the world war of 1914-18, after the economic collapse of Europe which followed this war. The Dawes Plan is a program of the enslavement of European industrial countries by the far stronger American imperialism. American imperialism no longer contents itself with the countries of Asia, but it invades Europe. In addition to Germany, it also "cleaned up" Austria, it prepares "sanitation plans" for French finances, slinks unobserved into Italy, etc.

Each of these three periods of development of American imperialism also found its expression in the foreign policy of the United States. In view of the three expansion trends of the United States—America, Asia, Europe—this foreign policy is extremely complicated. In the struggle for the American continent the United

States comes into sharp conflict with the annexation desires of British imperialism. In Canada as well as in Mexico and Brazil, and also in Chile and other smaller nations of the American continent, a stubborn battle for influence over these countries has been in progress for some years between the United States and Great Britain. This antagonism is extremely sharpened by the struggle of these strongest imperialist states over oil and rubber resources (America controls more than 70% of the total oil production, while England has practically a monopoly of the rubber supply).

The rubber war which we have witnessed for more than a year, has given renewed indication of the original sources of these antagonisms between the United States and Great Britain. With no less clarity however, they appear also on the Asiatic Continent, where an economic rivalry is going on over the Chinese markets between American and English imperialism. This is the first factor which determines the policy of American imperialism, it is pushing America into an armed conflict on the Pacific with Great Britain. In the same manner in which the world war of 1914 was in the main determined by the British-German competition, the future world war will be a struggle between the United States and Great Britain for the position of world leadership. Only under two premises would this perspective be vitiated: if the proletarian revolution were to break out in these countries before the armed clash between them comes to a head, or else, if the disintegration of the British Empire takes on a more rapid tempo than heretofore, and if Great Britain were to be crowded out and forced to vacate its dominant position.

Much more complicated is the "European" policy of American imperialism. The distance between the United States and Europe is too great to permit the former to exert, today, any direct intervention in

European affairs. Even in Asia, in the fight with Japan, the U. S. A. tries to shove forward a third power. All the more so does it avoid a direct mixing into European affairs. American imperialism intends to play, in our century, the same role that Great Britain played in the 19th century with respect to the Continent. The U. S. A. will exploit European antagonisms and make use of first one and then another of the bourgeois states or groups as the instruments of its policy. Thus far England has to a certain extent been the instrument of American policy. Yet it is by no means excluded that the present rapprochement between France and Germany will be utilized by the U. S. A. against England. Yet precisely this need of America for some big power to serve as its tool is the cause of the prevalent "Anglo-American collaboration." This was the second, "European," face of American imperialist policy. This comrades, as e. g. Comrade Radek, who put this phase of Anglo-American relations into the foreground, make the mistake of "Europeanizing" this phenomenon too much. It is obvious that this "collaboration" of American and British capital in Europe could not be without effect upon Anglo-American relations also in other parts of the world. But anyone who draws from this the conclusion of a lasting collaboration, who sees in this the decisive point of Anglo-American relations, embarks upon the road of vulgar pacifism. The "European pacifism" of the U. S. A. is a transitory policy determined by the fact that America is not prepared for direct intervention in European affairs. This "Pacifism," which for the time being contents itself with economic expansion, is no new phenomenon, for the history of diplomacy gives a plentitude of simalar expressions of "love of peace."

American Policy in China.

That American imperialism is by no means peace-

able is clear from the whole history of its preparations for war on the Pacific. But even here the offensive of American imperialism takes on special forms. The military-strategic situation, the naval forces, and the coast defenses of the United States are for the time being still such as to serve only a defensive war. On the Pacific coast, all the way from the most important naval base in Puget Sound down to the border fortress at San Diego, a whole series of important points of naval importance are fortified, including the important harbor of San Francisco. These forts and naval bases guard the United States from attacks that might be made upon it from the Pacific.

The American navy is worse off, however, when it comes to offensive operations. Modern naval warfare demands, for successful operations on the seas, that naval bases be not more than 500 miles apart. Nevertheless America has points of naval support on the Pacific, such as the Philippines, Pearl Harbor, etc., which because of the vast distances separating them from one another cannot insure the fighting efficiency of the American fleet. Sufficient to point out that the Philippines lie 7000 miles away from San Francisco, and Pearl Harbor 2100 miles from San Francisco and 4800 miles from the Philippines. In addition Japan would probably take possession of the Philippines, so close to the Asiatic coast, immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. Everybody knows this—that the capture of the Philippines will be the first task of the Japanese fleet. On this question America entertains no illusions whatever. Japan is furthermore irresistible on its strategic naval front, from the northern entrance to the Sea of Japan down to the southern section of the East China Sea.

Japan is much worse off on its flanks. In America there is being considered a project whereby, simultaneously with naval operations, a land army is to in-

vade the shores of Japan. Theoretically such an attack could be executed by thrusts from two directions: 1) from the North, from Alaska, by way of Kamchatka in the southern Arctic Ocean down to northern Manchuria; b) from the South, through a landing on the coast of the South China Sea, (French Indo-China), and then into South and Central China. But both of these plans are bound up with tremendous hazards that the troops, transport, etc. may be sunk—and this contradiction between the economically aggressive role of American imperialism, and its military-strategic possibilities, determines the attitude of the United States towards China.

The United States has an interest in the rising of a more or less powerful State in eastern Asia, capable of challenging Japan for the domination of the Asiatic peoples of the Far East. Hence the "neutral" watchful-waiting attitude of the United States towards the military struggles now taking place in China. If the worst comes to the worst the United States is even ready to make a settlement with a victorious Canton Government, since the practical Yankees weigh the perspectives of the Chinese revolution from a business standpoint.

When the armed struggle is ended and the unification of China accomplished, and there enters the phase of economic construction, then the U. S. S. R. will be the only State honestly ready to support the economic resurrection of China. Yet the Americans assume that the U. S. S. R. will for a long time be unable to come to the aid of the Chinese working masses on the economic field. The American imperialists are of the opinion that then their hour will have come. The workers and peasants of China will be compelled by force of circumstances to introduce the "American NEP.", and then it will be easy for the United States to make itself master of China. But once American imperialism has taken economic root in China, it will

not be difficult for it to break the Japanese rule and to reject Japan's claims for mastery over the Eastern shore of the Pacific Ocean.

Only through such an economic enslavement can China become the arena of the struggle between the United States and Japan. For the same reason American imperialism considers it wise, in contrast to the brutal unadaptable British policy, to appear in China in white gloves. It prefers to apply the contributions which China must pay for the Boxer uprising, for "cultural" purposes for the Chinese. In the mission societies, American imperialism has an army to propagate its influence. It seeks to entice the Chinese bourgeois into American universities because it realizes that in the future they can be utilized as agents of American expansion in China. All these things are only an advance payment on a profitable business. The interest will have to be paid in the future by the toiling masses of China. This is the essence of American policy. There seems to be little use in discussing these questions with American jingoes.

The question once raised by Lenin for the Russian revolution "Who—and for whom?" is certainly no idle question for the Chinese toiling masses. Great dangers await the great Chinese revolution on the day after its victory. They lie also at present in the web of international interests surrounding China. American imperialism is now the most dangerous, the most cunning, the strongest enemy of the toiling Chinese masses. If the national revolution were to pass into bourgeois channels it would have the "bourgeois democracy" in its wake. But the American imperialists are going to miscalculate, they are bound to miscalculate because they overlook the historical role which China is called upon to play in Asia and on the Pacific. That unclear Pan-Asiatic movement which Japan has thus far endeavored to master, which it has been trying to give the character of a race movement in order

to turn it into a tool of its imperialist policy, will unquestionably take on a new face through the victory of the Chinese workers' and peasants' revolution. It will turn into a vast movement of the Asiatic countries oppressed by world imperialism, for their liberation from the imperialist yoke. Japan, which jointly with the white imperialists played an active role in the suppression of the Boxer uprising in 1900, will not fulfil this mission. Only revolutionary China is qualified for this task, and this movement of the Asiatic peoples will be directed against Japanese imperialism as well as that of England and America.

At the same time liberated China will become the magnet for all the peoples of the yellow race, who inhabit the Philippines, Indonesia, and the numerous islands of the Pacific. China will become a major power on the Pacific; it will become a menacing threat for the capitalist world of three continents. China must inevitably clash with American imperialism because the problem of spreading its gigantic population out over the Pacific confronts it even more intensely than it does Japan. China will fulfil this task among the island inhabitants of the Pacific, not with fire and sword, but bound up with the process of the revolutionization of the native population. Yet this is not the most important task of the moment. The Kuomintang Party is now confronted with the chief problem of how it can exploit the antagonisms between the powers that encircle China in order to foster the cause of the revolution. America's position makes possible greater maneuvering. The plans of American imperialism constitute a terrifying economic and military-strategic menace to Japan.

Japan's Policy in China.

American advances in China involve the very existence of Japanese imperialism. For Japan it is a question of—to be or not to be. This very danger may contribute to the hastening of the armed clash upon

the Pacific between the U. S. A. and Japan. For Japan, China is a vast reservoir of raw material; it is to China that Japanese capital is exported. Manchuria is an especially important field into which Japanese capital is penetrating. Japan has no iron, its whole war industry to a large extent depends upon China. Japan contains only 0,1% of the world's iron supply. It receives about 40% of the iron required for industry from China, the balance from the U. S. A. and Great Britain. Japan has a powerful navy, and excellent imperialist army, yet if it is cut off from China, this means the loss of iron and steel supplies and a still greater dependence upon the capitalist countries against which it must wage war in the future. Therefore Japanese capitalism is to an increased extent concerned simultaneously with the import of iron from China, in penetrating into the centres of the metal industry itself, especially in the provinces of Shantung and particularly Hankow, in order to grab the overwhelming majority of metal works.

In the summer of this year the "New York American" published a sensational document. It was a secret document of the Japanese General Staff on the question of preparatory measures to be taken by Japan in case of a war with the United States. This document appeared in the American press on June 6 and would be worthy of publication in full, were I not prevented by the narrow limits of my report. This document discloses the importance of China, particularly Manchuria, as a base of supplies during the war. The contents of the document can be summarized under four points: a) only the exploitation of the rich natural wealth of Manchuria and in parts also of Korea (iron, coal, oil, food supplies) will enable Japan properly to organize its defense; b) the necessity to establish an extensive net work of railways throughout Manchuria and Korea for the transport of these products; c) the guarantee of free sea passages across the Korean

Straits and sea of Japan; d) the advisability of of a "policy of friendship" on the part of Japan towards China in order to assure the realization of the Japanese program of exploitation.

Important for Japan is also China's role with respect to coal exports. Thus of the total Japanese imports of coal, 80% come from China and Shantung. The same also applies to cotton, if Japan desires to free its textile industry from dependence upon America. Yet in China itself, Japan has concentrated more than a third of the textile industry in its hands, whereas British capital has captured only 5% of the textile factories. These figures alone do not give an exact picture, because Japan has used the crisis in the Chinese textile industry to buy up a part of the Chinese textile industry which outwardly continues to appear as "Chinese" enterprises. Japanese railway capital now holds first place. Even though Japan has no such banks as the Hongkong-Shanghai Bank which in practice handles all currency questions, it has nevertheless 31 smaller banks. And in recent times, especially after the Hongkonk events, Japan has made still further headway in China. It is sufficient to point out that Japan's favorable balance of trade with China during the first quarter of this year has doubled in comparison with the same period last year. Thanks to low wages in China, the profit of the Japanese capitalists in the textile industry takes on literally terrific dimensions. Thus, e. g., certain Japanese textile enterprises in China pay their stockholders 150% dividends. The military-strategic and the economic interests of Japan are too deeply anchored in China to tolerate a realization of the American plan. From this the laboring masses of China can draw three different conclusions: a) it must be taken into consideration already now that further American advance in China will compel Japan to launch a preventive war sooner than the American and Japanese war literature predicts, pro-

vided Japan succeeds in assuring British neutrality in this war. b) It must be considered that if this war on the Pacific breaks out before the unification of China, Japan will make a predatory attempt to occupy China in order to make herself master of the vital arteries required for its defense and for its industry. c) Of most practical importance for the present foreign policy of the Kuomintang is the circumstance that Japan is interested in preserving friendly relations with China precisely with an eye on future wars in the Pacific.

It may be predicted that if the Canton government succeeds by means of the Northern expedition not only in extending but also consolidating its basis, Japan will go over to a certain "defensive policy" and prefer to keep Northern China in its hands with the aid of Chang-Tso-lin rather than plunge into a dangerous adventure and thereby mobilize still broader masses of the Chinese people against itself. That such a perspective is by no means impossible is shown by the latest note of the Japanese government to Canton containing the four well-known questions as to whether the Canton government has the intention of extending the revolution into other countries, of establishing a Communist order in China, etc. Such questions would only give evidence of a more or less astounding naivete of Japanese diplomacy if they did not simultaneously serve the purpose of cloaking Japan's change from its former policy in China. Already since the Hongkong strike the Japanese have really dissociated themselves from the brutal British policy of conquest in China, thereby leaving the British alone to receive the blows of the national revolutionary movement. Japan's policy of an actual recognition of the Canton government is based upon the hope, on the basis of race relationship, to find sympathy with the Right Wing of the Kuomintang for a new alliance. Furthermore the Japanese cannot disregard the fact that an

economic revival of China offers big possibilities to the marketing of Japanese industrial products. First of all the Chinese market is closest to Japan, secondly, the Japanese merchants have better knowledge of the market than have the others, and thirdly, the Japanese goods are, quality for quality, cheaper and more fit to meet the low purchasing power of the Chinese population.

But what is the promise of such a Japanese policy to British imperialism? Its complete isolation. The attempt of the British, after the massacre in Wanh-sien, to bring about a joint intervention of all three Pacific powers, resulted in a failure. This failure reminded British imperialism that the times of Boxer uprising suppressions are gone for ever. Those methods with which the brazen British colonizers ruled in China, those unequal treaties like the treaty of Nankin, of Tsientsin in 1856, of Peking 1860, with the aid of which Britain created a privileged position for itself and burdened China with contributions—those methods must take their place in the archives of the British Museum. If Great Britain does not want to lose the positions it has conquered in the Far East, it must keep up with the times. This appears to be dawning even upon such conservative newspapers as the "Morning Post." Of late voices are heard more and more in England demanding a change of policy in China. British imperialism in China already looks like a whipped dog who has his tail between his legs and looks around in all directions for some way in which to carry off safely what he has stolen. It is the task of the Chinese revolution to give this dangerous thieving cur its death blow.

British imperialism is the deadly, most implacable foe of the Chinese revolution. America and Japan have not yet ruled in Asia, they are first making their imperialist bid for mastery. England is already an Asiatic State which must be driven from the strong-

holds it has build upon the Asiatic continent. And this struggle of the toiling masses of Asia against the British robbers is likewise one of the factors that may accelerate the bloody solution on the Pacific. Capitalist England, which in China is already being held in an iron ring by America and Japan, looks uneasily upon the possibility of a coming American expansion to China, and is making desperate efforts to launch a war to be fought by others. The fortification of the Singapore naval base which took place after England had signed the Washington treaty, proved that the British Admiralty by no means considers impossible such a solution of the present struggle for Asia, for China and for the Pacific. The British government intends to spend about 9½ million pounds for the building of this naval base. If we are to credit the "Times" vast preparations are already in progress for the building of this base; dredges are at work, buildings are springing up like mushrooms, branch railway lines are being built, a gigantic naphtha station is being established.

Whither will the mouths of the guns of this naval base be pointed? Primarily against Japan, but what is even more important, is that these guns will also be directed against revolutionary China. It seems to me that we are underestimating the importance of this latter fact. The Communist press of all countries, and especially the British comrades, would otherwise have made some stir about it. This is not as yet to be observed. But the British Admiralty does not content itself with the naval base at Singapore. The British Admiralty has long had the intention to establish a naval base at Port Darwin, on the Northern coast of Australia for the protection of that dominion and New Zealand. Furthermore, there also crops up, after the seizure by England of the German colony "Bismarck Archipelago" after the war, the question of creating a new naval base in the German built town of Rabole,

on Blanche Bay. The location of this naval base would be so central that neither Port Darwin nor any other Australian base could be compared with it. The naval base in Blanche Bay would be a new Malta in the heart of the Pacific. The Washington Conference forbade the British the establishment of this base, but the Washington treaty expires in 1931.

The future will show how these systematic preparations for war on the Pacific will end. It is difficult to make any predictions because of the complicated relations on the Pacific coasts. Yet two phases in the development of the Pacific conflict can be predicted with tolerable certainty. The first phase is the struggle of the United States against Japan. While England did tear up its treaty with Japan at the Washington Conference, it made no alliance with the United States. It kept its hands free and only made the reservation that in case of complications on the Pacific a preliminary conference would be called of the four powers which signed the Washington treaty. This position enables England, in case of a war, to maneuver and to orientate itself in accordance with the situation. On the one hand it takes over the role of an arbitrator who sells his neutrality at the highest possible price, on the other hand, it is the one that eggs on others into war in order, when the foes clash, to seize the fruits of victory for itself. And the Washington treaty gives England the chance, in case of a war between the United States and Japan, of either remaining neutral or else participating in the war either on the side of Japan or the United States.

The present grouping of forces makes the second possibility at least likely. It is now clear that England's intervention on the side of Japan would have the immediate result of its losing Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Japanese mastery of the Pacific subjects these dominions to a constant threat of attack. And if Canada, Australia or New Zealand feel them-

selves mutually bound up with the metropolis, this is only because the latter protects them from foreign attacks. The question of the Dominions, in the present phase of antagonisms on the shores of the Pacific, is the point that impels Great Britain, in case of a Japanese-American war, to an alliance with the United States. Hence the prospect of a joint attack by England and the United States against Japan seems more likely. England is interested no less than the U. S. A. in the elimination of Japanese competition in the Far East, primarily in China. England could combine with Japan for a joint struggle only if the separation process of the Dominions was already so far advanced as to call into question the continued existence of the Empire. Nothing further would be left for British imperialism than to stake all on a single card, in order to save its continued existence.

Absolute clarity prevails in the United States on this situation of Great Britain. In America the Singapore naval base is considered a point of support for a future joint campaign of the Anglo-American fleet against Japan. The strategic necessity of England to guard its possessions in the Pacific makes it very little likely that England will go into action. Every clash, even with France or Holland, threatens British possessions in the Pacific. England needs the freedom of the South China Sea which is a main highway to India. For this purpose England has established a protectorate over the north western portion of Borneo. England will never consent to Japanese occupation of the Philippines or of Indo-China, because this means a deadly danger to its naval base, Singapore. Furthermore, England is interested in maintaining the domination of the southern seas which in a certain sense form a corridor between two rows of islands which connect England and New Zealand. Japanese expansion becomes an immediate menace to Australia, New Zealand and the whole oceanic Archipelago. England would

thereby be driven from the Pacific. Still more likely appears British neutrality during the first phase of the Pacific conflict, especially at the beginning of the campaign. England will prefer not to mix in the struggle from the first day in order to get herself into a position similar to that occupied by America in the European war from 1914 to 1918. The difficulties of the British government also speak in favor of this attitude. England is the country primarily threatened with a social revolution. The ruling classes of England would therefore have to give this serious consideration before embarking upon a war adventure.

The struggle for the dividing up of the Japanese spoils, and the struggle between England and the United States for spheres of influence in Asia and the dominions, will be the second center of the armed conflicts. Will the capitalist world venture to plunge into this new blood bath? Will it not shrink back from the mood of the toiling masses, in whom still lives the remembrance of the devastation of the great imperialist war? There can be no doubt that fear of revolutionary upheavals holds the present capitalist governments within bounds. Yet the Pacific conflict, especially in its first phase, is dangerous for the Communist precisely because it takes place on a front so far distant from Europe. Its participants will be two countries which suffered least during the imperialist war of 1914-1918. The 50,000 American soldiers who fell on the French front are but a very small number in comparison with the sacrifices made by the European peoples. America and Japan were affected but lightly by the war, they saw only its victorious side.

And this danger the Comintern must foresee. We are a world party which does not close its eyes to its own weaknesses and its own mistakes. The British strike already showed our weak spots. If the European proletariat did not react sufficiently to such an event as the British General Strike, or to the miners' strug-

gle, the question arises whether, in the face of a new war, when the situation becomes all the more complicated and difficult for a mass action, whether we are prepared for resistance. A specially responsible task confronts our Young Communist Parties of the Far East at this time, particularly the Chinese comrades. They must even now foresee all the tricks that the imperialist cliques will play upon them in the course of the victorious march of the Chinese revolution.

You will win, comrades, the whole international situation assures us of this. Yet even after you succeed in uniting China—you must not lose sight of this—the imperialist bands will continue the struggle through agents in your country, within your boundaries. Before the capitalist world sinks beneath the depths of the Pacific Ocean, it will probably make an attempt to fight in China. The victorious Canton government, at the head of the peasant masses, will have to be a barrier to these efforts also in the future.

Revolutionary China, which has become an active factor in Far Eastern politics, can become, in alliance with the U. S. S. R., the greatest world factor in the Far East. Your 400 millioned Hinterland in the Pacific Ocean, and its position in these wars, weighs in the scales so heavily that the imperialist governments cannot leave it out of reckoning when counting up their chances in an armed struggle. What the II. International failed to do during the imperialist war of 1914, the organized national workers' and peasants' State of the Chinese toiling masses will fulfil. And in the fulfilment of this historical mission, the awakening, rising China combines the greatness of the Chinese revolution, the greatness of its fate with the October revolution of our toiling masses, on the road to a workers' and peasants' alliance.

In alliance with the world proletariat, with its vanguard—the Communist world Party, China shall and

will become the guardian of peace, the fighter against imperialist wars on the Pacific.

THE PREREQUISITES AND TASKS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION.

A Speech Delivered by Comrade Bucharin
at the Russian Party Conference.

I should now like to say a few words on China and the Chinese revolution, and must once more apologize for being compelled to quote a few figures, though for the last time in this report. This small crime can, however, scarcely be avoided in this case; it is objectively necessary. In the first place I must say that the fact of the Chinese revolution, and the present victorious advance of the united revolutionary troops, are in themselves factors of international importance. We all recollect very well how Comrade Lenin, in his last articles, prophesied that the broad masses of the Eastern peoples, and especially of China, would be drawn into the revolutionary stream. Our Party, and the Communist International, have long since discussed the principles upon which we are to meet such an eventuality. Taking the question in its most general form, I may recall to your memories Comrade Lenin's speech at the Second Congress of the Communist International, in which he pointed out the possibility that these countries, in the course of their general de-

velopment, might strike out a unique path for themselves. I need only remind you that Comrade Lenin, when discussing the whole question of colonial revolutions and of the revolutions in semi-colonial countries, laid down a thesis of extreme importance, one which we shall one day have to consider from the standpoint of practical politics. He laid down the thesis that, under certain historical conditions, a number of countries might pass through various stages of development at an accelerated speed. It need not be said that this is an entirely general and far distant prospect. But none the less we must hold it in view. I put the question in a general form, as a distant possibility.

We must admit that we possess comparatively little information about the whole of the East, about the colonial movement, and even about such a mighty movement as the present national revolution in China. This revolution deals a heavy blow at the whole fabric of international capitalist stabilization. It is of historical importance for the whole world, the more that it is taking place in a country in which there exists the proletarian dictatorship.

Whilst we are so familiar with the principles of both the economics and politics of the countries of Western Europe that we even know the leading personalities of the bourgeoisie, of the social-democrats, and of the Communist Parties, we are, on the other hand so little informed on the Eastern countries that we are not even fully acquainted with the fundamental outlines of their economic and political structure. And without this knowledge it is extremely difficult to find a line of policy in any way likely to be correct. I should first like to say a few words on the economic structure of China. Concrete data are difficult to obtain, but such as are available clearly show the recent development and growth of capitalist conditions in this country, although this capitalist development has not yet advanced so far as to be of paramount importance for

the estimation of the general situation in China. I have but very scanty data on hand, supplied me by Comrades who have devoted much attention to the Chinese question.

If we take the big industries for example, we find that these increased gradually between 1918-23. Thus, for instance, the number of spindles in work in the textile industry amounted to 478,000 in 1918, 1,749,000 in 1921, and 1,802,000 in 1923. It must further be observed that the big industrialist owners are of the following nationalities:

In 1924 the Chinese textile factories formed 61 per cent of the total number, Japanese 34 per cent, and British 5 per cent.

The output of coal also shows an increase, though not a very rapid one. The output was 18 million tons in 1918, 22,6 million tons in 1923.

The nationalities of the mineowners are as follows (the number of mines is not given here, the amount of capital invested is taken as a standard): Fifty million dollars are in the hands of Chinese coal owners, 22 million dollars belong to the English, 27 million dollars to the Japanese, and 250,000 dollars to the German. The capital is thus in the hands of Chinese owners to about the amount of one half, the other half being in the possession of non-Chinese.

An inquiry into the social power represented by the working class is extremely difficult, the data referring to the number of the industrial proletariat are exceedingly contradictory, and reliable figures are not obtainable. It may be assumed that there are about 5 million industrial proletarians in China (agricultural labor thus not being included).

The question of the structure of the agrarian conditions in China is of much greater interest. You are aware that in a country like China, and in such a revolution as the present one, the peasantry is bound by the logic of events to play a leading part, and the

peasant question is bound to be closely bound up with the agrarian question, that is, the land question. The extent to which these questions are interwoven with one another, and their relations to one another, are extremely difficult to ascertain. I shall therefore draw your attention, comrades, to only one comprehensive table, thus avoiding the necessity of quoting to you the whole of the figures for the separate provinces, which I am afraid would cause you to send me to China to gather more exact statistical information. (Laughter).

49,5 per cent of all farming undertakings consists of plots varying from 1 to 20 Mu in area. (If I am not mistaken, 1 Mu corresponds to a sixteenth of our desjatine. The desjatine is 2,5 acres.) These diminutive farms represent 15 to 16% of the total arable land. One half of the peasant population thus cultivates only about 16% of the total land. The Chinese regard pieces of land of 20 to 40 Mu as small farms; and such farms are owned by 23% of the peasant families, their land amounting to about 22% of the total area of the country. 15% of the families possess land to the extent of 40 to 75 Mu and 25% of the total land. 11% of the families own large farms of over 75 Mu, and thus possess 35,9%, in round figures 36%, of the total area. This characterizes the differentiation in the position of the peasants. In order to complete this survey, I must state that although China, taken on the whole, is a country of small farms, still there is a considerable quantity of land in the hands of large owners; and the conditions here obtaining are characteristically those of large land ownership. Large tracts of country are in the hands of the remnants of the one-time feudal landowning official bureaucrats, or in the hands of the present Generals. There are about 200 landowners each owning an area of more than ten thousand Mu. It may be assumed that there are about 30,000 landowners each owning more than one thousand Mu. You must understand, comrades, that when

we speak of such a small dimensional unit as a Mu, we must not compare the economic value of this unit with our desjatine, since the Chinese cultivate their land by the most intensive methods, and a smaller area thus possesses a correspondingly greater economic value. As early as the time of the French revolution the Chinese methods of agriculture were recognized by economists as being the most intensive form of land cultivation.

Some of the Chinese provinces are to a great extent in the hands of large landowners. It must be emphasized that precisely the province in which Canton and Kwantung are situated is more divided up into large estates than the other provinces of China. 85 per cent of the total land in the northern, western, and eastern Yangtse valley belongs to large landowners. In the province of Hunan, in the Tschiante district, one third of the whole district belongs to the family of Yuang Schi Kai. I need not enumerate all these great land-owning families, but I may tell you that there are categories of landowners whose domestic servants alone, in the private service of the family, number more than a thousand persons. There are other tracts of land in the possession of the church, and the extent of this territory frequently exceeds that of the largest farming estates.

You will thus see that the peasant question is inevitably bound up with the agrarian. Thus we cannot say that in China there is no land question at present, and that this question may be struck out of the agenda of the Chinese revolution, since China is a land of small holders. This attitude would be entirely wrong.

The second question, closely affecting broad strata of the Chinese population, is the taxation question. At the present time the chief burden of taxation is borne by the broad masses of the workers, that is by the peasantry and artisans. I may here mention the fact that with respect to taxation China beats the record

over any other country. The taxation differs in the various provinces, but nevertheless there are 18 different categories of taxes to be paid by the peasants.

Another characteristic fact is that different provinces, and various categories of peasantry, have to bear the burdens of the wars waged by the militarists. In some cases taxation has reached such a point that in several provinces the generals have had the taxes collected for 86 years in advance. (Voices: Oh and laughter.) Even the revolutionary governments have collected the taxes for some years in advance, though to a much less extent than the militarists.

There are some American writers who are of the opinion that the recent economic, political and other crises in China have devastated agriculture to the extent of about 40%. It is entirely impossible to test the accuracy of this assertion, but one thing is certain and incontestable: the result of the land poverty of the peasantry, of the enormous burden of taxation, and of the unexampled oppression of the population at the hands of foreigners, who have seized the ports, the duties, and the most important taxes, is that the peasantry is being impoverished at a rapid rate. This impoverishment is so appalling that the country is overrun with millions of declassed unfortunates, who form into bands, or wander about the country. In Peking itself the number of these declassed elements is exceedingly great, and though they demand nothing of life but its barest necessities, they are literally condemned to death by starvation. Thus they are readily enlisted by any militarist, and go over from one government to another, without feeling themselves socially bound in any way. This process is a symptom of a certain disintegration of the whole economy of the country, and is the expression of the frightful impoverishment of the Chinese peasantry.

And now, comrades, in view of this situation, what are the chief difficulties and main problems presented

by the Chinese revolution in its present stage of development. The difficulties are the following: on the one hand it is perfectly clear that the striking force of the Chinese people, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, must direct its main blows against the foreign imperialists.

This is the main task: the struggle for the independent existence of China, the struggle for the national emancipation of the country. For the accomplishment of this task it is necessary to maintain the national revolutionary united front, which now consists not only of peasants, of workers, of artisans, nor only of the democratic and radical intelligentsia, but at the same time of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, of merchants and industrialists. It need not be said that not every merchant and every industrialist is joining in the struggle, but solely those who are not connected directly with foreign capital, those who are not to be counted among the compradores, or intermediaries between foreign capital and China. That section of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie which is now playing an objectively revolutionary part, and with whom it is necessary to form a bloc at the present stage of development if the greatest possible combined force is to be directed against the foreign imperialists—this section of the bourgeoisie is connected, through the government, with the semi-nobility and the big peasant elements in the villages.

It must be observed that in China the system of underleasing is still greatly in vogue. Large joint stock companies take a lease of land and then sub-lease it. The new tenant sub-leases it again, and so the process goes on. If this land ownership is disturbed the wave thus set vibrating runs at once up to the commercial and industrial circles. It is characteristic that in the province of Kwantung, this main stronghold of the Canton government, a large section of the land is owned by large landowners, these being

connected with the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie supporting the Canton government. One touch suffices to set the whole in motion.

This is one of the greatest difficulties in the way of the Chinese revolution. The relation of forces within the Kuomintang are such that there are three wings: a right wing, a centre wing, and a left wing. The right wing of the Kuomintang relies upon this bourgeoisie, even upon its most Right inclined elements, and represents its class interests. On the other hand, the development of the revolution unavoidably demands the inclusion of the peasantry. It is not possible to govern against the peasantry and to win them at the same time, and the forces of the revolution cannot be organized without creating a peasant basis for this revolution.

These are the main difficulties of the present situation in China, and herein lies the greatest problem facing the Chinese revolution at the present juncture. Under the given circumstances it is imperatively necessary for the Communist Party of China to take up the struggle for agrarian reform with increased energy. Although the chief task continues to be the elimination of the foreign imperialists, and although it is of the utmost importance to maintain the national revolutionary united front, still the agrarian reform must be carried out, and the organization of the peasantry taken in hand. The interests of the Chinese revolution most urgently demand that these enormous reserves of the peasantry should be organized on its side, and these reserves are just beginning to realize the class struggle. And this of course, will bring with it unpleasant things in the shape of further vacillation on the part of the right wing of the Kuomintang. The danger is also incurred of certain Left infantile diseases, tendencies towards a premature upheaval, towards a premature split in the whole national bloc. This danger must be faced and fought.

The situation is extremely complicated, and may be formulated as follows: Although we are fighting against foreign imperialists with the aid of a national revolutionary united front, an immediate agrarian reform must be carried out and the Chinese revolution placed on a broad peasant basis. It is not difficult to forecast the results of such a combination of forces. I shall not deal with this here. I need only observe that, should the Canton troops continue their victorious advance, and should further progress be made in the alliance of the national revolutionary forces in China, then it is not Utopian to assert that the victorious Chinese revolution will awaken a mighty echo in a great number of neighboring colonial countries—India, Indonesia, the Dutch Indies, where even now actual civil war is going on under exceedingly complicated conditions. All this makes China a magnetic centre of attraction to its colonial environment, and we must by no means fall into the error of under-estimating the immense importance of the movement in China, for it is one of the most important movements in the history of the world, and will strike a mighty blow at all capitalist stabilization.

This, comrades, is practically all I wished to say about the Chinese revolution, I had the intention of discussing a number of other problems, but it is impossible to do so in the time at my disposal.

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