

China Policy Study Group BROADSHEET

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EDITORIAL

Revolution Disavowed

Before the recent international 'communist' conference opened, the London 'Times' correspondent in Moscow wrote: 'What began as a Soviet plan to excommunicate China from the world communist movement has ended as an embarrassing formality which has to be carried off because it cannot decently be abandoned.'

The conference's failure to indict China did not obscure the fact that hostility to the Chinese revolutionary line was the only policy uniting the parties represented at the conference. For all their fine words about the need for unity against imperialism, they are united only in their disavowal of revolutionary struggle to overthrow it. Even the 'Times' could conclude acidly that

'the reason why the western world is not shrivelled up with apprehension at the trumpet calls to world revolution . . . from this conference is that it knows very well that revolutionary cars are no longer attuned to Moscow at all.'

The real attitude of the U.S.S.R. and its closest friends is revealed in the ludicrous, but systematic, attempt in all their propaganda to separate Mao Tse-tung and all his works, which they abhor, from the Chinese people, whom they profess to love. This attitude is expressed, in practice, in such ways as increased contacts with the U.S. puppet regime in Taiwan and menacing concentrations of arms against China. The Soviet leaders, casting around for common ground with the United States against China, now even suggest (Brezhnev) that 'the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia'. This would be a logical development of the U.S. policy of 'containing' China, to which the U.S.S.R. is already contributing in India, Indonesia, and the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, as articles in this issue of BROADSHEET show in various ways, China continues on her revolutionary and self-reliant way, undeterred by threats, but prepared—not (as Brezhnev and his like falsely assert) to 'make' war, but to resist it. 'We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack.' (Mao Tse-tung).

THE PEOPLES' REPRESENTATIVES

The Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in Peking in April, concluded a long policy struggle within the Party which had rapidly intensified over the past decade and culminated in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

By 1958, nine years after the establishment of the People's Republic, basic collectivisation of industry, trade and agriculture had been achieved. Mao Tse-tung's General Line for Socialist Construction, the People's Communes and the Great Leap Forward, which became known as the Party's 'three red banners', were designed to guarantee China's economic independence and to end any hopes for a private sector to develop. These policies were fiercely attacked by the right-wing within the Communist Party, and at the Eighth Plenary Session of the Central Committee (the Lushan Conference) in 1959 this wing attempted to seize the leadership. Mao won a vote of confidence from the Conference. He resigned as Head of State in order to concentrate, as Party Chairman, on exposing the character of modern revisionism. Liu Shao-chi, who became Head of State, utilised difficulties caused by flood and drought and retraction of Soviet aid to attack the 'three red banners' and to entrench an extensive bureaucratic machine within Party and State administration. At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in the autumn of 1962, Mao began the counter-attack, urging 'Never forget the class struggle!' This heralded the first stage of ideological preparation of the people for the Cultural Revolution.

Curtain Up

By 1968 the Cultural Revolution had reached the stage of the establishment of Revolutionary Committees in all provinces except Taiwan. The Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee (enlarged) confirmed the revolutionary policies and nature of the Cultural Revolution, and called for the holding of the Ninth Congress and election of a new Central Committee in 1969. These decisions were transmitted to Party organisations and Revolutionary Committees, provincial Party congresses were held and, after consultation with non-Party masses, delegates to the national congress were selected.

From the opening communique of the Congress and the names of the presidium, the Chinese people knew that the line of this Congress would be Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary line. The closing election of the new Central Committee confirmed it. Among the names were those of the cadres—including many members of the Eighth Central Committee—who had led the struggle and now held responsible posts in provincial and city Revolutionary Committees. Before the Cultural Revolution some of these had been punished for defending Mao's revolutionary policies against the Liu Shao-chi Party machine.

Grass Roots

One newly elected member is Pan Fu-sheng, who in 1958 had been detained as a 'right deviationist'. As First Party Secretary in Honan Province, he had fought the ultra-'left' line which was wrecking communes. During the Cultural Revolution he reappeared as leading cadre (First Secretary) in Heilungkiang Province. This was one of the early power seizures, the experience of which led Mao to promote 'three-in-one' (Party, army, mass organisations) alliances as the basis for Revolutionary Committees. Keng Chi-chang, a Honan regional cadre attacked with Pan Fu-sheng in 1958, has been elected an alternate member of the Central Committee. Chi Teng-kui, also well-known for his role in the Honan rebellion, is alternate on the Politbureau, as well as a Central Committee member. Another Central Committee member is Liu Chieh-ting, a regional Party Secretary. With his wife, Chang Hsi-ting, a city Party Secretary and now alternate member of the Central Committee, he spent several years in a Szechuan guardhouse; they are now on the provincial Revolutionary Committee which they helped to form.

China's peasants are represented by such people as Chen Yung-kuei, Party Secretary of Tachai Brigade, who in defiance of rural capitalist sympathisers and the Liu opposition, inspired and organised his fellow villagers to create with their bare hands out of the rocky hillside an advanced collective with high-producing terraced fields. In the Cultural Revolution he led peasants in an early overthrow of county bureaucrats and is now a leading cadre on the Shansi Pro-

vincial Committee. Another is Wang Kuo-fan, who organised the 'beggars' co-operative', as richer farmers sneeringly called it, which Mao praised as a model early in the co-operative movement. Li Shun-ta pioneered co-operation through a mutual aid team in a liberated area of Shansi as early as 1942, during the resistance to Japanese invasion.

Among industrial workers are 'Iron Man' Wang Chin-hsi, veteran oil worker and member of Kansu Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and Wei Feng-ying, forced to live by begging and scavenging until she was liberated at 15. She went to work in a Shenyang (Mukden) factory in 1953 and soon began working out mechanical innovations. During the next 13 years, encouraged by the Party and older workers, she organised an innovations section and was personally responsible for more than 170 innovations. In the Cultural Revolution she was a leading rebel; she is now a member of the Shenyang City Revolutionary Committee. Li Su-wen, a Shenyang grocer's assistant, won national recognition for her devoted service to the people. She even went after work to the homes of customers to nurse their sick children.

The Chairman of Peking's Red Guard Congress, Tang Chishan, is a member, and one of the alternates is teacher Nieh Yuan-tzu, who signed the first Marxist-Leninist *dazibao* which exposed Liu's machine in Peking University and took part in fierce struggles alongside rebel students; she is now a leading member of Peking City's Revolutionary Committee. These are only a few among many members of the new Central Committee who were active in the struggles of the Cultural Revolution.

Out of Debt

Those interested in industry and money matters, like many others, have in recent months again found that they cannot ignore China. One reason is that, having cleared off the last of their external debts at the beginning of 1965, the Chinese are now able to announce that all internal debt has been repaid as well. The external debts were owed mainly to the Soviet Union, in the form of credits for purchase of equipment during the 1950's and for military and medical supplies in connection with the Korean War.

'Our country is now a socialist country without internal or external debts', proclaimed a recent article (Peking Review, No. 21, 23 May, 1969). This represents a big step forward in implementing the principle enunciated by Mao Tse-tung, of 'maintaining independence, keeping the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts.'

The question of how People's China came to contract these debts in the first place is also dealt with. As now, most of the funds needed for socialist construction were derived from the income of state-owned enterprises, but at that time supplementary measures were resorted to as a temporary expedient. Between 1950 and 1958, six issues of national bonds were authorised, canalising into beneficial investment some £560 million of idle money in private hands. Soviet loans also totalled nearly £560 million. At the end of 1964 Premier Chou En-lai announced that repayment of the Soviet loans was being completed a year ahead of schedule. Repayment of the bonds was completed by the end of last year.

Thus at no time after 1949 did China allow herself to become encumbered with a large national debt comparable to that of Britain, the U.S.S.R., the U.S. or India, and at no time did she compromise the principle of relying mainly on her own efforts.

This fact is not unconnected with the second reason for the business world's renewed interest. For some years China has exerted a growing influence in world commodity markets. She has done this partly as a seller of various animal, vegetable and mineral primary products and partly as a major buyer of other

This was not, as some have said, a 'rubber stamp' congress; argument was lively.

Some old revolutionaries who had carried out a revisionist line in high places opposed the Cultural Revolution for a time. But in the showdown they came out firmly for Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary line and made full self-criticism at the Congress. Some comrades, under the influence of conservative anti-mass ideology, at first opposed and suppressed the revolution but later gave it full support. Some conducted the revolution with merit for a time but later made policy errors. Factional, extremist and anti-disciplinarian influences among the masses were bound to be reflected among delegates. Some contradictions certainly existed among the 1,512 delegates representing widely different regions, strata and organisations. Unity was achieved in putting Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary line foremost and subordinating individual interest to general needs, and a programme to consolidate the proletarian dictatorship and win 'still greater victories throughout the country' was worked out.

This Congress cleared the way for reconstruction of the Chinese Communist Party, removing the dross and drawing in from the masses people who have demonstrated their quality in the Cultural Revolution. They will re-establish Party leadership at all levels, not as parallel supervision but (following mass opinion and Mao's statements on Revolutionary Committees) through leading Communists working within administrative organs.

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primary products (e.g. copper, platinum, wheat, rubber). In the trade of the British Commonwealth overseas, if one excludes the special case of India, China is consequently rather more important than the Soviet Union. The present trend in Chinese industrial policy is accentuating the situation, for instead of importing new plant—which to some extent obliges any economy to follow in the footsteps of others—the Chinese are importing large quantities of raw materials and semi-products to feed their factories, while designing the new plant themselves. As one would expect in China, this is not a cast-iron rule, but just tends to be the case. Nothing could better illustrate the difference between the Chinese policy of self-reliance, and a rigid doctrine of autarky or economic isolation.

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CHINA'S ECONOMY, by Nicholas Brunner. Anglo-Chinese Educational Institute, London, 1969, 2s.

The fact that China under socialism is solvent, in a way that Britain is not, emerges unobtrusively from this, the first of a new series of pamphlets on modern China. The author is among the few Western scholars able to see the logic of self-reliance, and communicate it. One somewhat dated sentence, however, has found its way into the text: 'If China is to be able to import the increasing amount of advanced technological equipment she needs, which she either cannot make at all yet or only at great cost, then her exports will have to be expanded.' The fact is that the Chinese have shown more than once that they can already find exports enough to pay for whatever they want to import. At one time China was importing industrial plant from the Soviet Union and paying for it with textiles and clothing, meat and vegetables, rice, oilseeds and ores. When the Soviet Union ceased to be a willing supplier, China used her exports to buy certain types of plant elsewhere. Now she uses them primarily to buy raw materials from capitalist countries while her own main effort in industry is directed to developing a technology that corresponds to Chinese conditions.

But this is only half the story. Technical innovation in both small operations and large-scale processes is generated un-

ceasingly in field and factory by the extraordinary stimulus of the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese workers, now assuming leadership everywhere, are demonstrating the creative initiative and power that Mao maintained they would. The Western concepts of 'economic development' and the ideas of the Chinese revolution simply don't mix. In point of fact, there is nothing peculiarly Chinese, or even peculiarly Asian, about these ideas. What is seen in China today was seen on a smaller scale in the first decades of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, though it is not much approved of there today. China's economy is not just allowed to 'develop' but is constantly spurred ahead and boosted by nation-wide campaigns focussed on political achievements which each stage of economic development signalises.

Anything savouring of Great Leaps, communes, collective interest replacing self-interest, or of top men being humbled by dissatisfied rank-and-file, is pretty much out of fashion in other countries, including the Soviet Union. But it is precisely this—the command of economics by proletarian politics—that has enabled China to continue moving ahead in spite of all obstacles, and to avoid pitfalls that brought others down.

To condense into less than 30 pages a review of the progress of the Chinese economy from its feudal state in 1949 to its rapidly-expanding socialist state today is no mean achievement. If this has led to glossing over the means by which the transformation has been brought about, it has also eliminated a lot of the non-essentials that distort other accounts. One essential that has got lost, however, is the Chinese Government's own published assessment (known to be an understatement of their real evaluation) of the overall increase in production in several recent years.

In his report to the Third National People's Congress at the end of 1964 Premier Chou En-lai said that industrial output had increased by 15% during the year in value terms and was planned to rise a further 11% in 1965; the achievement of this target was confirmed in January. In 1967 a further increase in gross industrial output of over 20% in 1966 was announced in a New Year review.

As regards agriculture, the target publicly proclaimed by Chou En-lai for 1965 was a 5% increase, subsequently confirmed as based on the rate of increase in 1964. Although the increase finally recorded in 1965 is not known, there seems little doubt that it was substantial in 1966, when China announced her largest ever grain crop. An average rate of increase of 15% per annum in industry and 5% in agriculture would be a moderate estimate for the three years preceding the launching of the Third Five Year Plan in 1966.

The Chinese give more detail than this, mainly in the form of percentage increases for individual items. Only occasionally do they give absolute figures, but it does not follow that 'estimates of overall industrial progress are of small value'. China's estimates are very measured and, since 1960 at least, have established their claim, against all outside challenge, to be taken at face value.

These criticisms do not alter the fact that China's Economy gives a balanced and stimulating account of its subject.

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THE BROADSHEET, 62 Parliament Hill, London, N.W.3



'What do you say we find a cache of West German arms about here?'

Daily Telegraph, 13 June, 1969.

'There is an unspoken but definite agreement between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. to contain China politically, economically and militarily. . . . Such a policy is probably unwise, unworkable and perhaps of tragic consequence to the Soviet Union and the United States.'

Commentator, National Education Television, Voice of America, 16 March, 1969.

'The cracks in the Communist movement have been papered over for the time being. The critical voices which were prompted by the invasion of Czechoslovakia have been silenced, and order has been restored in Eastern Europe. The Moscow meeting was full of extraordinary paradoxes. . . . Mr. Brezhnev gave the impression that the enemy Russia fears is not America but China.'

Daily Telegraph, 20 June, 1969.

'Soviet representatives are now openly developing the theme of an Asian security system which Mr. Brezhnev, the party leader, slipped into his 13,500-word speech to the international communist conference in Moscow on 7 June, when he said: "We are of the opinion that the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia" . . . Soviet diplomats now argue that what the Asian countries need is really moral and economic support, backed by military aid from outside, if requested.'

The Times (London), 27 June, 1969.

' . . . indicators of a coming showdown include:
 ● 'The closing down of the Trans-Siberian Railway to private travellers on 21 June and the fact that some sections of this vital supply link are still banned.
 ● 'The presence of 28 Soviet divisions along the 4,000-mile frontier with China, backed up by artillery and rockets.
 'No comparable troop movements have been made by Peking. . . .

'Russia has now quietly called her ambassadors home from several Asian capitals for consultations.

'The purpose of this move is believed to be to discuss what Soviet party secretary Leonid Brezhnev has called "a system of collective security in Asia."

"John Foster Dulles might turn over in his grave" said Mr. William Frye, a veteran foreign affairs analyst, "but this sounds very much as if Russia were trying to set up an anti-Chinese alliance similar, in its own way, to the South East Asia Treaty Organisation which was created by the Western powers to contain China."

Evening Standard, 23 June, 1969.

NEW LOOK IN SCHOOL AND FACTORY

Recently in Kwangchow (Canton) I visited a lower middle school, now linked to a metal-working plant. The former deputy head, now chairman of the school's Revolutionary Committee, was introduced to us by the factory chief representative as 'old Gao', just as if he was their fellow worker. He had come to the school in 1965 and told us that the 1,600 former students had now gone on, 400 to upper middle schools, 40 to the factory and the rest to communes throughout the Province. In their place were 2,500 new students from the five primary schools in the surrounding industrial district. They are divided into 48 classes, with a teaching staff of 72, who together with 16 non-teachers make up the school cadre group. A fresh group of thirty workers come to the school from the factory every three months. There are seven 45-minute classes a day, and teachers take 14-16 classes a week. Classes are quite large, 50-52 in each. Parents take part in the school meetings.

In March 1967, P.L.A. representatives came to the school to help conduct a study of Mao Tse-tung's works and criticise the anti-revolutionary line. Then in February 1968, the Revolutionary Committee was set up, with representatives from school, cadres and army. The struggle between the two lines went on until July, when the first team of workers came in; by October they had helped to expose the trouble-makers and bring back order.

Many of the opposition said indignantly, 'The workers know so little! How can they possibly lead a big school like this?' The reply came: 'Who is the school for? Who supports it? What kind of young people does it aim to turn out?' in fact, 95% of students are from working class homes, and their future is either in industry or in agriculture.

The coming of the workers was welcomed by the great majority of both staff and students. They brought in a new spirit, breaking down the old teacher-student tradition under which students were likely to believe anything the teachers pontificated. Now teachers and students could quite naturally criticise each other, without hard feelings. Students began to go to work regularly in the factory, and when they went into the countryside, workers went with them.

When workers began to teach some classes, and successfully held the attention of the students, teachers began to realise that a new day had dawned. Some formerly lazy and un-cooperative students got a completely new view of lessons. With their practical experience, workers can make industrial general knowledge come to life, and they know the class struggle; they are a good, down-to-earth influence.

Old textbooks have been discarded in favour of newly-prepared lesson sheets which students help to edit and are exchanged with other schools. Subjects include: (1) Politics, including the Thought of Mao Tse-tung and the Analytical Method; (2) Chinese Language; (3) Mathematics; (4) General Knowledge of Industry and Agriculture; (5) Revolutionary History; (6) Military and Physical Drill; (7) Singing; (8) General Knowledge of History and Geography.

The school year has two terms. Seventy per cent of the time goes on class work, 30 per cent in factory or communes. There are no winter or summer holidays except a few days off for the Spring Festival. Fees are low, and in cases of difficulty, are remitted; living allowances are paid if needed. Students whose parents are working are provided with midday meals.

The school has a 'four good' movement. The first 'good' is to be proficient in understanding the thought of Mao Tse-tung; the second, to be an activist in all progressive work; the third, to complete every duty assigned; the fourth, to observe school discipline.

The educational system of China today is exploring an uncharted sea, and great discoveries lie ahead. It is a brave thing

to do, yet the only one, if progress is to be made. Many around the world will watch the voyage with sympathetic interest, and many too will learn from it.

A few days later I also paid a visit to the Kwangchow Truck Building Plant whose workers, besides taking over direction of the 55th Middle School (2,000 students) in the city, had sent a team into the big Teachers' Training College nearby. In this plant a start is being made on lorry-building, in addition to its regular line of small locomotives for mines and narrow-gauge forest railways. The workers go to the middle school in teams which change over at regular intervals, and 100 students at a time come into the plant for a six-week period of learning and practice.

This particular plant started as a simple workshop which, in 1949, consisted of a group of eight workers in the city, who repaired bicycles and pedi-cabs. After liberation its equipment of one motor and two old lathes on a total floor space of 60 square metres was enlarged, and more workers came in. The capitalist manager, who would sometimes ask workers to do an additional six hours on top of a 12-hour day, and then present them with two bananas each for the extra overtime, went out into limbo. New machines were constructed, some for sugar mills, some, including cranes, for wharves. By the time the Great Leap Forward started in 1958, the work force had grown to 600, and the idea of concentrating on two lines had evolved. These were the small locomotive and the lorry. A government loan was secured, a big piece of waste land down in the Whampoa district taken, and a start was made on moving the factory.

Then, however, came the Liu Shao-chi revisionist line. The Leap Forward was a failure, he said. This plant had better just change back into a general repair works. If lorries were needed, for the time being they could be imported easily enough, it was said. But the workers were sure that they could make lorries if only given the chance. With the aid of loans, they entered into various new machine-building contracts, cutting costs so that they could carry on. By 1964, the whole works had moved to the new site and they were able to meet the demand for their mine and forestry locomotives. In May 1966, they finally started to construct their first lorry, a 3.5 ton model designed for city use. It was finished in late September of that year, a present for National Day on 1st October. During the struggles of 1967, no more work was done on lorry making. It began again in 1968 when eight trial models were made. One 'expert' took a look at the product and gave his judgement: it might get as far as Kwangchow city, but it would never make the trip back. The workers' reply was to drive it to Peking and back — well over seven thousand kilometres.

In 1969 they will make 200. Then with streamlining, and some of the automation which new workshops now being built will allow, they will begin to meet the demand for their product in Kwangtung Province. In the first struggles, it has not been easy going. For instance, one part, the joint below the steering rod, needed a special machine to produce. The factory put the problem to the engineers of the local Industrial Research Institute, but these experts could not solve it. Then the workers themselves tackled it and, after much discussion and experiment, constructed a machine that does the job perfectly.

One was struck too with the patience shown by the workers in helping their middle school charges to learn more, as well as do useful jobs. For their part, the students are learning that to be a worker is to be an important person in the general scheme of things. One fact stands out particularly clearly. In the new stage China is now entering, it is the drive from the main working force rather than any 'expertise' that will carry industry forward to reach new production levels. REWI ALLEY