


The People's Republic of China:  
A Handbook

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Map 1 People's Republic of China



# The People's Republic of China: A Handbook

edited by Harold C Hinton

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Westview Press • Boulder, Colorado

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Dawson • Folkestone, England

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## Preface

It has been several years since the last handbook on the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) was published in the United States but there are additional reasons for the publication of this one. It has long been a truism that China is an important and interesting country due to physical size, its uniquely large population, the antiquity and complexity of its culture, the massive wars and revolutions through which it has passed in modern times, and its actual or apparent potential for becoming a major world power. These considerations are as valid today as they ever were, or more so. There is today an obvious additional consideration: in 1976 the P.R.C. suffered the loss of its two most important leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, and entered a new political era in which the quest for stability and modernization appears to have replaced the earlier tendency, powerful if intermittent, toward radical upheavals.

From an American point of view, China has been an important country in various ways since the late nineteenth century and is still one today. The P.R.C. ranks second only to the Soviet Union among the Communist states with which the United States must cope, and the United States has been committed since 1972 to normalize its relations with Peking at the full diplomatic level; it succeeded in doing so at the end of 1978 in spite of the difficult obstacle created by its commitment to Taiwan.

The exploitation and even the exploration of China's natural resources have been hampered in the past by political disorder and other problems, and there has been a tendency to underestimate these resources. By now, however, it is reasonably clear that the P.R.C. is at least moderately well endowed, although some of its natural resources, including the apparently large deposits of offshore oil under the East

success Mao posed for a generation as the symbol of authority and unity for his people and because he became more radical with age his immense influence was essentially radicalizing one. Too radical in fact the Cultural Revolution was on balance a destructive interlude. Mao may turn out to be worth more dead than alive like other major historic figures he can be interpreted in various ways and the current leadership is reinterpreting him as almost moderate in a way that was not possible during his lifetime while at least implicitly attributing his excesses to the purged and disgraced Gang of Four.

The foregoing is a brief and necessarily impressionistic sketch from life. But on what authority does it rest. In other words how do we learn about China? Can we in fact really know anything at all about it for sure? These are questions that the China specialist (or China watcher) hears constantly from nonspecialists. The answer to the last question is yes but the others require a more extended discussion. The problem cannot really be solved through a perusal of the titles in the bibliographies at the end of the contributions to this handbook or even of the contents of the works listed helpful and informative though they are because the bibliographies are designed mainly as guides to further reading for the nonspecialist rather than as aids to true research.

China is neither easy nor impossible to learn about it is difficult. Most events and data relating to internal affairs must be comprehended primarily from sources emanating from within the P.R.C. meaning for the most part primary official sources. The majority of these are published either in specialized books and other publications or in more general sources like the *People's Daily* (*Jen min jih pao*) the official newspaper published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, *Red Flag* (*Hung chi*) the theoretical organ of the same body, the *Liberation Army Daily* (*Chieh fang chun pao*) which is not supposed to circulate outside the country and must usually be gotten at by reading those of its articles and editorials that are reprinted in some other source and press telecasts and radio broadcasts most of them by the New China News Agency (*Hsin hua*). This makes a formidable body of material in quantity if not in quality for the propaganda content is very high. A surprising amount of it is available in English translation (usually Peking's own) and can be found most readily in the offices of *Peking Review* in the series of Chinese press translations published by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong and in the serial *Foreign Radio Broadcasts* (published by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service). Authentic documents originating but not published in the P.R.C. are often translated and reprinted in the periodical *Issues and Studies* (*Fa-pai*). Developments relating to foreign

affairs can and should be followed from foreign sources as well; and these must therefore be assembled from the statistics published by its trading partners. All this means that a great deal of research on China can be done in primary sources, even without a knowledge of the Chinese language.

Primary, or at least official, sources are not enough, however. They are tendentious and difficult to interpret (except on the basis of considerable experience), and they leave important and often intentional gaps. The volume of secondary writings on contemporary China in various languages is great, and the quality has tended to improve over time. Secondary sources contain original information and/or significant interpretations; they should not be overlooked.

Experience (which leads to an understanding of the P.R.C.'s actual record, as distinct from the image it tries to project), plus a good command of the relevant primary and secondary sources, can yield a useful, though presumably incomplete, knowledge of contemporary China, or at least of some significant aspect of it, as well as the basis for intelligent (though of course fallible) prediction. This is the level of expertise of the contributors to this handbook.

The editor's function, apart from writing his own contribution and this Preface as he has defined it for himself, has been mainly to plan the volume and to select the contributors. By agreement with the publisher, he has kept the length down to one that he hopes will make it possible for a sizable number of people to buy and read the handbook; the formidable length and infrequent use of all too many handbooks is proverbial. The eleven topics selected as the subjects of contributions appear to the editor to embrace most of the significant problems in which a general, or even a moderately specialized, reader might be interested. The contributors were carefully chosen on the basis of their expertise and experience from a fairly wide variety of backgrounds and viewpoints and were encouraged to present their topics as they thought best; no effort was made to impose a "line" of any kind on them. Consequently, responsibility for the statements contained in each chapter of the handbook rests with the contributor in question.

The editor would like to thank Frederick A. Praeger of Westview Press and Ian Williams of Dawson Publishing for suggesting and financing the preparation of this handbook, and Mervyn Adams Seldon for invaluable editorial help in preparing the manuscript for publication.

*Harold C. Hinton*

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# I Geography

*Philip A True*

The importance of China in Asian affairs results in part from such basic factors as its central location and common borders with most Asian nations; its immense size and population; and ancient cultural ties whose imprint still persists in other Asian countries. Although their importance varies with the strength of the central government and its foreign policy initiatives, these factors remain essential to an understanding of China's historical role in Asia, and they continue today as unspoken but nonetheless recognized forces underlying Peking's relationship with neighboring states.

China's internal policies also reflect a composite of many factors among which are the character and quality of the physical environment and the size, distribution, and other characteristics of the population. The variety of and interaction among landforms, climate, soil, and vegetation provide the environmental milieu within which Chinese agricultural practices have evolved. The basic characteristics and use—and misuse—of China's land resources have presented Peking with many serious problems and hard choices. Immense efforts have been put into numerous programs over the past twenty-five years to remake nature and bring environmental problems under control.

Aside from sheer numbers, China's population is notable for its highly uneven distribution, the cultural unity of the Han (ethnic Chinese) majority of its inhabitants, and the presence of numerous ethnic minority groups whose political importance is far greater than their total numbers would suggest. Despite a population that is nearing 1 billion on a land area only marginally greater than that of the United States, much of China is sparsely populated, and large areas in the western provinces are uninhabited. About 80 percent of the people are engaged in agriculture, and rural population densities reflect generally

the suitability of environmental conditions for growing crops. Since only 11 percent of China is farmland, extremely high rural population densities occur on the limited number of alluvial plains and lowlands, primarily located in the eastern provinces.

The cultural unity of the Han Chinese (Han derived from the Han dynasty, the first great Chinese dynasty, 202 B.C.-220 A.D.) developed, spread, and was strengthened by the uninterrupted continuity of the scholar-official ruling class whose ability to communicate via a common written language transcended the linguistic fragmentation of the Chinese. Additionally, Chinese culture was able to develop and persist without major or traumatic change because of China's location and its relative isolation from other major centers of civilization. Although limited contacts did exist, the long distances coupled with deserts, high mountains, and generally inhospitable environments provided a buffer and barrier preventing any large-scale impact by alien peoples.


Despite the overwhelming numerical dominance of Han Chinese, the fifty-odd ethnolinguistic groups, termed minority nationalities by Peking and totaling perhaps 55 million or so, remain politically important because of their strategic locations—primarily in sensitive frontier areas in the western and southwestern provinces. Administrative control over these regions and their non-Han people has been an important political objective of the Chinese government. In the past two decades, improved communications have opened up these areas, and the settlement of large numbers of Han Chinese in the remote frontier provinces—particularly Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia—has assisted and given backing to Peking's control and authority.


The most important spatial patterns in China are those related to the basic east-west division of the country. A line following a roughly southwest-northeast alignment drawn from northwestern Yunnan Province along the eastern edge of the Tibet-Tsinghai plateau, across the eastern margins of the Ordos Desert, and then tracing the crest of the Greater Khingan Range north to the Amur divides China into roughly equal parts. To the east and south of this line are 95 percent of the population, nearly all of the agricultural land, most of the major industrial centers, and the bulk of the transportation facilities. In contrast, to the north and west lies largely unpopulated country with only scattered population clusters; most of the inhabitants are non-Han Chinese, economic development has barely begun, and most of the region has a political history of only sporadic and nominal central government control.

### Physical Patterns

Most of China's land surface consists of rugged uplands. Large areas are at high elevations and the major mountain ranges, as well as the major streams, trend from west to east. In general, the highest terrain is located in the west, whereas the few sizable alluvial plains and lowlands are mostly concentrated in the eastern coastal provinces. A great variety of landforms—primarily hills and low mountains, occasionally interspersed with lowlands and intermontane basins—are located between the eastern lowlands and western highlands. The practical effect of these physical characteristics is a compartmentalized landscape where lowlands, plains, and basins are separated from one another by rough uplands—often preventing easy communication between these core areas. One of the lasting achievements of China's rulers has been the ability to sinicize and maintain control of such a large and physically diverse territory.

The west to east alignment of major mountain ranges is important climatically because of the blocking effect of highlands on the movement of air masses and weather systems. In turn, climatic conditions affect vegetation, soil patterns, and how the land is used. Historically, the west-east aligned ranges have isolated key lowlands and basins and made communications between them difficult. This has been particularly true in western China, where some of the world's highest mountains are located. The Tien Shan originating in Soviet Central Asia, the Kunluns, and the Himalayas are enormously important determinants of climate and other environmental characteristics. These highlands have long isolated the basins and plateaus of western China, and it has only been in recent decades that air travel and a few highways have begun to open the recesses of Tibet and Sinkiang to one another and to the rest of China. In the eastern half of China, the Tsinling Shan and lesser mountains that extend east from the Tibetan highlands for several hundred kilometers have functioned in a similar manner. The highlands, averaging about 3,000 meters, block much of the cold, dry Asian air masses from penetrating into the Szechwan Basin to the south. The result is sharply contrasting environmental and agricultural patterns north and south of the Tsinling highlands. For example, the growing season is about 100 days longer in the Szechwan Basin than in the Wei basin immediately north of the mountains. In similar fashion, the Nan Ling, a roughly east-west aligned belt of hills and mountains at about latitude 25° N, serves as a significant physical divide. It largely





prevents the cold, continental air masses that periodically sweep across the Yangtze basin from reaching the subtropical lands of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces to the south.

A second, more subdued structural trend consists of a series of southwest-northeast oriented mountain ranges, generally relatively low (2,000 to 3,000 meters), located in the eastern third of the country. These ranges include the Wuyi Shan that isolates Fukien and southern Chekiang provinces from the middle Yangtze lowlands in Kiangsi Province; the Taihang Shan that rises abruptly along the western margins of the North China Plain; and the Khingan ranges of Northeast China. The Taihang and Khingans also serve as important climatic barriers in that their height and location largely blunt the penetration of moisture-laden maritime air masses into the interior of Asia.

All told, about one-third of China's total area is classified as mountains, one-quarter comprises plateaus, and roughly 10 percent is hills. The remaining land is divided between basins and plains, approximately 19 and 10 percent respectively. While limited areas of the hills and plateaus are cultivated, the essential point made by these rough landform percentages is that most of China consists of landforms where growing crops is difficult and the living hard, and only limited areas of China are truly favorable for agricultural purposes. Chinese accomplishments over the long span of history in evolving an intensive agricultural system from a small and environmentally fragile base are testimony to the careful husbanding of limited land resources and the administrative techniques and organizational skills that have mobilized manpower to work on national and regional projects beneficial to the public good.

The basic structural trend of the country also means that most of China's major rivers flow in generally west-to-east aligned courses. This orientation, specifically of the Huang Ho (Yellow River), Yangtze, and Hsi Chiang, is important in terms of erosion, communications, and flooding. Because of the 5,000 meter elevation of the sources of the Huang and Yangtze, there has been immense downcutting through rock and soil, and massive amounts of sediment have been collected as they flow seaward. This has affected navigability and increased the potential for flooding. The directional trend of the rivers' courses also is significant in that major storms follow a similar west-to-east track. Consequently, a major, slow-moving storm or a series of storms may parallel one of the major river systems and thus dump large amounts of rain over long sections of the river and cause severe flooding. A favorable factor,



however, is that the west-east alignment permits shipping to penetrate deep into the interior of the China mainland—a situation developed most highly on the Yangtze

### Climate

The importance of rainfall, length of the growing season, temperatures, and the impact of droughts and floods can scarcely be overstated in a country where agriculture plays so vital a role in the economic and political health of the government. The most significant climatic division in China is the west-east separation between western and semi-arid climates and the relatively humid conditions of eastern China. This climatic division is created by the high mountains and plateaus guarding the interior of China that coupled with distance prevent any significant influx of maritime air into the interior. Whereas precipitation averages only 100 to 100 millimeters in the west, between 500 and 1,500 millimeters fall annually in eastern China—sufficient in most areas to sustain forests and to permit the growing of crops without irrigation.

The variety of climatic types in China is the product of a complex interaction of factors that in simplest form begin with the input and exchange of solar energy that fuels the world's atmospheric system. The basic patterns revolve about air mass exchanges—the periodic surge and flow of the air masses that originate or are strengthened over the Asian continent and the maritime air masses whose sources are the nearby oceans. These air masses are triggered by the differential rate of heating and cooling of land and water. In the cooler half of the year, continental air dominates over almost all of China, and cold, dry air masses periodically surge south and east, bringing in their passage clear skies but little precipitation. In the warmer half of the year, continental air is displaced with moist maritime air masses that, as they periodically move inland, are lifted when they contact cooler continental air or terrain features to produce rainfall. In practice, maritime air masses are present for a significantly longer time in the south of China than in the north and northeast; the reverse is true for dry continental air masses. The result is a steady increase of annual precipitation from north to south and a very pronounced concentration of rain in the June-September period in the northern half of China, but a considerably longer rainy season in the southern provinces.

Temperatures in China for stations comparable in latitude and

Table 1.1 Selected Climatic Comparisons

Station	Latitude °N	Mean Temperature (C°)		Mean Annual Precipitation (mm)
		Jan.	July	
Harbin	45	-19.7	23.6	574
Minneapolis		-11.1	22.5	633
Peking	40	-4.2	26.7	627
Washington		3.6	25.6	1,036
Wuhan	30	4.4	29.7	1,255
New Orleans		13.1	28.9	1,354
Kwangchow (Canton)	23	13.9	28.9	1,615
Miami	26	19.4	27.8	1,522
Al-hul	50	-23.6	21.4	513
London	51	2.8	17.8	582

elevation with those in the United States and England are given in Table 1.1. Although the comparability in summer temperatures is close, winter readings in China are significantly lower—a result of the larger and colder high pressure cells that form over the Asian mainland. Despite the lower winter temperatures, the dryness of the air—particularly in north and northeast China—compensates to some extent in individual perceptions of cold. Temperatures expressed in terms of frost-free seasons show the expected lengthening from north to south, but with significant modifications caused by mountain barriers, of which the Tsinling and adjoining highlands are the most important. North of the Tsinling Shan, the frost-free season is about 225 days, but the blocking effect of the highlands allows a nearly year-round frost-free season in the Szechwan Basin immediately to the south.

The Asian air circulation patterns are modified in western China by elevation, mountain ranges, and distance from sources of maritime air. A lack of precipitation is the most significant characteristic: least amounts (100 to 250 mm) fall in the deep desert basins in Sinkiang and in the high northern plateau of Tibet. Precipitation gradually increases to the east, and 250 to 500 mm normally are received in the southeastern and eastern portions of the Tibetan Plateau, the eastward margins of Inner Mongolia, and in the higher elevations of the T'ien Shan. Grasslands have formed under such conditions and provide forage for large numbers of sheep, goats, and other animals. Temperature ranges are extreme in western China because of the great differences in elevation. In the highest portions of the Tibetan Plateau, freezing

## Map 3 Agriculture



temperatures and snow flurries occur even in mid summer while in the Turfan Depression (150 meters below sea level) temperatures may reach as high as  $45^{\circ}$  C in summer

### Regional Divisions

The major regional divisions of China are defined principally by climatic patterns and major landform features and to a lesser extent by a combination of cultural features accessibility economic patterns and development, and historical factors. Five major regions are commonly recognized. The sparsely populated western half of China contains the Tibetan highlands and Northwest China, each with about one quarter of China's area but with a combined population of no more than 5 percent of China's total. Desolate high mountains and plateaus, desert basins and grasslands are the characteristic landscapes of the west. Eastern China is subdivided into three traditional regions. Northeast

North, and South China. Each possesses distinctive environmental qualities and dimensions; culturally, the main differences in eastern China from region to region are linguistic, but the differences are less important overall than common cultural traits and bonds. Each of these regions centers on fertile river valleys and basins that provide the physical framework within which distinctive patterns of settlement and land use have evolved.

### *North China*

In many ways North China retains today its ancient historical role as the key region in China. Though small in area (about 12 or 13 percent of the mainland), much of North China is densely populated and within it live approximately a third of the Chinese population. North China normally is defined to the north and northwest by climatic factors (precipitation amounts), a good reflection of which is the positioning of the Great Wall. In general, the wall is in the zone or transitional area between semiarid steppe lands, where grazing is the principal economic activity, and land where crops can be grown with some confidence that the harvest will be adequate. The Tsinling Shan, its eastward offshoots, and the Huai River valley form the southern border of North China. While the transition between the Huang Ho drainage basin to the Szechwan Basin to the south is sharp and clear, the changes from north to south in the intensively cultivated Huai drainage basin are much more gradual. Historically, the Huai country was a mixture of forest and swamp, and it served until the ninth century or so as a recognizable barrier to north-south communication.

Within North China, two distinct major physical subdivisions are found: the North China Plain and the Loess Plateau (or uplands). The Huang Ho cuts through the Loess Plateau, collecting massive amounts of silt from its numerous tributaries before flowing onto the North China Plain. The plain is a product of the Huang Ho and its deposition of alluvial materials, and Chinese historical records note that the river has swung across the North China Plain, occupying for lengthy periods of time widely separated channels.

Chinese civilization originated, developed, was nurtured in, and expanded from the loess-covered uplands of North China. The present landscape in this portion of China is often forbidding, particularly in the uplands away from major stream valleys. Most of the hilly areas are extensively eroded and commonly slashed by deep, steep-sided ravines. Many village paths and roads are worn below the level of surrounding

fields and vegetation is largely absent, except for scattered plantings of trees and shrubs—a program pushed vigorously by Chinese authorities. The bleakness of the landscape is accentuated during winter and early spring by strong gusty winds that envelope and coat the landscape with a fine layer of yellow dust. During the past century in particular and in earlier times as well, the area has been ravaged by drought and flash floods that annually destroy crops, villages and human life.

In spite of its unpromising physical environment particularly the scanty and unreliable precipitation (about 500 to 700 millimeters annually), several natural advantages favored early settlement of the area. The wind-carried loessial deposits are of recent origin geologically speaking fertile, unusually homogeneous in texture, and porous. The soil was easily tilled by primitive wooden digging tools. Natural vegetation in much of the area apparently was grass, and the scanty rainfall appears to have developed only a comparatively sparse forest cover that presented only minor problems to early man armed with simple tools. Whatever the exact circumstances leading to early settlement, Chinese culture evolved in the loessial area of the north, in time, political institutions and administrative techniques were perfected that eventually led to a consolidation of petty states and the founding of the first dynasty about 221 B.C. (the Ch'in) that unified and controlled most of the key areas of modern day China.

The North China Plain is the largest area of compact agricultural settlement in China, accounting for 20 percent of China's farmland. Almost everywhere the land is cultivated. Exceptions include low lying coastal areas (some of which are in the process of reclamation) some poorly drained depressions in the northern section of the plain, and scattered areas elsewhere—usually where past flooding has left deposits of sand and gravel. Villages are compact, often fairly large and sited at regular intervals over the plain. The monotony of the landscape is relieved by clumps of trees around villages and trees planted along the major roads. During much of the year the plain is dry, dusty, and barren in appearance, but in spring the greening of fall sown crops like wheat and barley, joined later by various summer crops—corn, millet, sorghum, vegetables, and cotton—combine to give the plain a rich fertile appearance. The traditional uncertainty of agricultural production has been relieved to some extent in the past decade by a rapid increase in the amount of land under irrigation.

Although some areas are supplied by small impoundments and use of river water, more important has been the tapping of underground

supplies through digging wells. Around the western margins of the plain particularly, where alluvial deposits from nearby mountainous areas occur, wells provide nearly all of the water for the fields. The increased availability of water has not only meant a more dependable harvest but has allowed an increase in multiple cropping—growing two or more crops on the same plot of land during a year—and in the variety of crops grown. Rice, for example, is increasingly planted on the North China Plain because of dependable supplies of water. Finally, the plain is benefiting from large-scale water and soil conservancy projects that have been underway during the past two decades—specifically the Huang Ho and Hai Ho river projects that have reduced flooding, permanently drained and protected large tracts from waterlogging, and increased supplies of irrigation water. While the threat of flooding remains (and some localized flooding is common each year), massive, destructive floods by the Huang Ho—whose bed is elevated several meters above the plain—have thus far been avoided.

The Loess Plateau comprises the western and northwestern half of North China. The dominant character of the area is its blanket of fine yellow, loessial soil that covers the underlying landforms to depths of 50 to 100 meters. A few mountains rise above the loessial mantle, particularly in Shansi Province, but elsewhere much of the land consists of rounded hills interspersed with occasional basins and river plains. Despite the historic significance of much of this region in the development of Chinese civilization, it is today a hard land, torn and cut by countless ravines and gullies knifing through the porous soil and long stripped of its vegetative cover. A cruel climate frequently withholds even the limited amount of precipitation (300 to 500 millimeters) normally received. Bitter cold winters combined with blowing dust add to the hard-biten character of the area. Some of the most devastating famines in the world have depopulated large areas in Shensi, Shansi, and Kansu; and revolts and revolutions have often germinated in these barren hills.

Despite the hardships and climatic uncertainties, the Loess Plateau is relatively well populated, with very high population densities in fertile river plains and basins. The soil fertility is renowned, and the amount of land under irrigation is increasing. In the more favored areas, winter wheat is extensively grown; in the hilly areas and the drier northern and western portions of the subregion the major crops are corn, millet, and sorghum; there also are important cotton growing areas. In the drier,

hilly areas agricultural income is supplemented by keeping sheep and goats. Many of the loessial hillsides are terraced into narrow fields to supplement the meager amounts of level land found in the stream valleys. It is probably no coincidence that in this most difficult of agricultural environments in China is located the famed Tachai Production Brigade, the agricultural exemplar for China, and the slogan "Learn from Tachai" is reiterated in the press and emblazoned throughout the country on walls and hillsides. Self-reliance, the original slogan identified with Tachai, heralded the virtues of selfless dedication to back-breaking land improvement tasks no matter how difficult the physical obstacles.

North China is an industrially important region based on plentiful supplies of energy (coal and oil), a fairly good transportation network, and a variety of industrial crops like cotton to supply the textile industry. In addition, extensive Chinese projects over the past two decades to improve the river systems and expand irrigation provide a major market for electric pumps, irrigation/drainage equipment, and related products.

Extensive coal deposits were an important stimulant to early development of industry in North China. Although coal production continues to be important, the recent discovery of major oil deposits in North China has given the region an added energy boost. Several fields are being developed along the low-lying coastal area of Hopch from the mouth of the Huang Ho north to near Tientsin; in addition, a start has been made in exploiting offshore deposits in the shallow waters of Po Hai. Good deposits of coal are located in many areas ringing the North China Plain, in the foothills in Shantung Province, and in Shansi. Very large coal reserves are present in Shensi Province, though little coal there has yet been mined.

North China ranks high nationally in industrial production, particularly in transportation equipment, iron and steel, chemicals, and textiles. Industry developed earliest in the coastal cities of Tientsin, Tsingtao, and Tangshan. Since the Chinese Communists came to power, however, inland cities like Loyang, Chengchow, and Kaifeng, along the western margins of the North China Plain, have expanded greatly and produce a wide range of agricultural machinery and related products, plus textiles. Taiyuan, capital of Shansi Province, is a major center of heavy industry, and a wide range of industries are found in Peking and its environs.





### South China

South China twice the size of North China contains approximately half of China's population. This huge and diverse region which stretches eastward from the Tibet-Tsinghai plateau and south from the Tsingling Shan-Huai River divide encompasses densely populated lands and large areas of sparsely populated hill and mountain country. The three major regional subdivisions of South China are the middle and lower Yangtze plain, the Szechwan Basin and the Yunnan-Kweichow plateau.

The major difference between North and South China is a visible one—the long growing season in South China coupled with considerably greater rainfall gives it a green summer type landscape for most of the year. Its flooded ricefields, villages surrounded by clumps of bamboo and nearby hills with terraced lower slopes coincide with the mental picture that many people have of China. Water is present in most of South China's agricultural countryside—in small ponds and larger impoundments, in irrigation ditches facing the fields and in canals or streams that connect rural villages to provide transport links and the means to transport goods to market. The long growing season in the south is conducive to multiple cropping systems and commonly two or three crops are harvested yearly. Rice dominates almost all the various cropping combinations, about 70 percent of the rice is double-cropped. Wheat, peanuts, sweet potatoes, oilseed crops and a great variety of other crops and vegetables also are grown.

In contrast to the relatively homogeneous ethnic composition of North China, South China presents much greater ethnic and linguistic diversity—a result of repeated migrations and mixings over many centuries and much local isolation. The many southern dialects or languages like Cantonese, Wu, Min and others are incomprehensible to northern Chinese who speak one of the northern or Mandarin dialects. The Chinese Communists are attempting however to popularize a national spoken language based on northern speech. In the more rugged uplands, particularly in the southwestern provinces of Kweichow and Yunnan, live large numbers of non-Han peoples who over the centuries have been displaced from more favored agricultural areas by the pressure of Han Chinese settlers.

The historical development of South China and its political integration proceeded along considerably different lines than in the north. Although groups based in the Yangtze lowlands and elsewhere here in the south likely made significant contributions to Chinese civilization

as it evolved in North China, political development was slow in South China and hampered by the high proportion of uplands, forests, and swamps that retarded large-scale agricultural development, allowed only poor communications, and delayed regional integration. While much of the south was nominally under central government control during the Han dynasty, only a few key areas and routes leading to them were directly administered. In succeeding dynasties Han settlement of the south proceeded at a pace that slowed or quickened with political events and economic conditions in the north. Increasing population pressures in North China led to clearing of additional agricultural land—primarily in the fertile plains of the lower Yangtze area. About 600 A.D., the Grand Canal was built to transport grain and other products of the area to the Chinese capital, then located in the western margins of the North China Plain. Population in South China grew rapidly, particularly after the ninth century when invasion and warfare in the north spurred major southward population shifts. By the time of the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty in the thirteenth century, the population balance had swung decisively to South China—a regional dominance that continues.

Although South China contains China's largest industrial and commercial center, Shanghai, the region lags behind North and Northeast China industrially. Traditionally, industry was concentrated in the cities along the lower Yangtze. While industry has continued to prosper there, expansion has been greatest in the middle Yangtze area, and Wuhan and the Changsha-Hengyang area in Hunan Province are rapidly growing metallurgical and machine-building centers. Both Chungking and Chengtu in Szechwan are major industrial centers; light industry—paper, sugar, and textiles—is well developed in the Kwangchow (Canton) area. Energy supplies generally are meager in most provinces of the south, though locally important supplies of coal are scattered in the middle-lower Yangtze area and in Szechwan; very large hydroelectric resources exist in the South, however, and several major sites have been developed or are scheduled for future development. A variety of minerals and metals occurs in South China, and nationally important mines are worked supplying tin, tungsten, antimony, manganese, and mercury. Deposits of iron ore in the Yangtze valley provide the basis for a growing iron and steel industry there.


The middle and lower Yangtze plain is the key economic region of South China. Its dominance results from fertile alluvial soils, which permit an intensive agricultural economy to flourish and support very high rural population densities, and from the Yangtze waterway

network. The lowlands extend upstream about 1 000 kilometers from the mouth of the Yangtze narrowing where mountains intersect the river and widening in other areas—principally where major tributary streams join the main stream. Below Nanking the lower Yangtze widens and merges imperceptibly to the north with the Huai River plain. An important physical feature of the middle Yangtze is stable but fluctuating lakes (Poyang and Tungting, Hu) that act as natural flood reservoirs during the summer rainy season. Dikes and levees have been expanded and strengthened to protect valuable farmland and the cities adjoining the river. This region is the major rice growing area in China. North of the Yangtze the common cropping pattern is rice followed by a winter crop of wheat or barley. South of the river double-cropped rice increasingly is grown often in combination with a winter grain or vegetable.

The importance of the Yangtze waterway system which permits ocean going vessels to move upstream to the Wuhan cities to the economic growth of the Yangtze basin is difficult to overemphasize. The link to Shanghai downstream and to world shipping coupled with a fecund agricultural hinterland makes this region potentially one of the most important in all of the People's Republic of China. Shanghai, Nanking and Wuhan are the major cities and centers of industrial growth but there are numerous lesser urban centers serving the vast Yangtze hinterland. Shanghai retains its rank as the premier industrial city in China. Mineral deposits particularly iron ore deposits at Taiyeh and Maanshan provide raw materials needed for continued growth of the metallurgical industries.

The Steeply Basin (sometimes referred to as the red basin because of the color of its soil) has been integrated into the main currents of Chinese civilization and political developments since early times despite a location deep within China and an encircling belt of forbidding mountains. Economic and political ties were established early with North China principally a connection with the Chengtu plain (located in the northwestern corner of the basin) where a reliable irrigation system had been built permitting a prosperous agricultural society to develop based on growing irrigated rice. Although the Chengtu plain and a few favored river valleys elsewhere in the basin have long supported large agricultural populations most of the basin remained forested and lightly populated until about 500 years ago. Savage peasant revolts in the seventeenth century devastated and depopulated large areas and it took massive immigration from other provinces during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries spurred by

Map 5 People's Republic of China: Major Transportation Routes



tax incentives, to clear and bring under cultivation most of the land now tilled. Much of this later settlement expanded from the limited lowlands and valleys—possibly no more than 5 percent of the land surface—onto the gentle slopes of the many hills in the basin. Typically, lower terraces are irrigated and planted to rice and upper terraces are devoted to dryfield crops.

The Szechwan Basin is able to support a very high population, estimated presently at about 160 million, because of its famed agricultural productivity—an abundance based on favorable climate (hot summers, mild winters, adequate rainfall, and near year-round growing season) and fertile soil. The amount of rain received in much of the basin is a bit

less than for many areas in South China. But the topography and location of the basin are conducive to much cloudiness and high humidity levels—factors that make the Szechwan Basin a disagreeable area to visit or live but enhance precipitation effectiveness and hence agricultural output. A single crop of rice is the major crop followed by wheat, rape, or a legume. Corn and sweet potatoes are planted in irrigated fields and various other crops, fruit, and vegetables also are harvested.

The earlier isolation of Szechwan was broken during the 1950s by a railroad from North China and later other rail links were completed to provinces to the south and east. The two major cities of the Szechwan Basin, Chungking and Chengtu, are important industrial centers; both cities received industrial impetus from the moving of the Chinese Nationalist government capital to Chungking during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). The energy resources of the basin—sizeable amounts of coal and natural gas and a little oil—are being developed to further economic growth.

The Yunnan-Kweichow plateau region differs markedly from the densely settled Yangtze lowlands and the Szechwan Basin; overall population densities are relatively light; most of the area consists of rough, highly dissected uplands and a large non-Han Chinese population is scattered throughout parts of the subregion.

Administratively this region includes all of Kweichow Province and the eastern half of Yunnan plus some adjoining areas in neighboring provinces. Elevations are highest in the northwest (about 2,000 meters) and gradually lower to about 1,000 meters in the southeast. Higher mountains intersect the plateau surface; most of the higher population concentrations are in river valleys and mountain basins. In Yunnan a series of ancient lake plains with fertile soils provides the proper environment for multiple cropping practices based on growing rice. Parts of the plateau consist of karst topography—a landscape of stone pinnacles, sinkholes, underground streams, and caverns—created from belts of limestone that underlie the land surface. The uneven rate of erosion has in some places created areas so rugged and difficult that they are virtually uninhabited. Even where erosion is less severe, the porosity of the limestone subsurface creates agricultural problems—primarily in maintaining soil moisture and impounding water for irrigation.

The proportion of the non-Han Chinese population ranges from 20 to 30 percent; most of the uplands are settled by Miao, Yi, and lesser groups and various Tai-related groups inhabit many of the more isolated lowlands. (The best and more accessible lowlands and upland basins

however, usually are occupied by Han-Chinese.) Nearly all of these non-Han groups have filtered into these remote and difficult areas during the past several centuries as a result of military and political pressure exerted by Han-Chinese who dislodged them from the more fertile lands in other areas of South China.

Major economic development is limited and largely confined to provincial capitals (Kunming and Kweiyang) and a few mining centers. The completion of railroads into both provinces during the past fifteen years is an important factor for a fuller political and economic integration of this formerly backward and isolated region with the rest of China.

In Kwangtung and Kwangsi, the southernmost provinces, the Hsi Chiang (West River) and its tributaries are navigable and provide access deep into the interior. Kwangchow (Canton) is the major port and urban center, and its function is similar to that of Shanghai in terms of trade and access to the interior, though comparable urban and industrial development upstream in the hilly Kwangtung-Kwangsi area is lacking. Canton, however, was the first port opened by the Chinese to world trade; after very early contacts with Arab and other traders, the Portuguese (1516) and other Europeans followed. Canton's "window on the world" role finds expression in the old Chinese saying that "everything new begins in Canton." The remainder of South China consists primarily of a mosaic of narrow river valleys, steep-sided hills and mountains, pockets of alluvial coastal lowland, and small upland basins. In general, the landscapes become more rugged, higher, and less densely populated from east to west. Nearly all of the lowlands and basins are in crops, often with villages huddled on the edge between slopes and valley flats. The unused uplands would appear to be ideal areas for forestry, but a long history of indiscriminate cutting and burning has left few timbered areas, though some progress in reforestation has been made.

### *Northeast China*

Northeast China is a mix of old and new, of lightly populated plains and very large industrial cities, of more pronounced foreign influence than other major regions of China but with ancient cultural and political ties with the Chinese heartland. A major reason for the contrasts and apparent paradoxes of the northeast is that almost all of the settlement, economic development, and foreign influence has been crammed into a brief time frame of less than a century—essentially after

1500 Russia and Japan coveted the fertile and largely empty plains, the forested mountains, and the varied and accessible mineral resources, and both of these countries have had a significant role in the development of the northeast.

Northeast China is about the size of North China but contains less than one-quarter of its population—about 8 or 9 percent of the China mainland total. The broad physical outlines of the northeast are simple: a large northeast-southwest aligned plain where the bulk of the population lives, surrounded by a horseshoe of relatively low mountains. Although the northeast adjoins North China, a wedge of steppe and rugged uplands extending from the Mongolian Plateau to the sea limits easy access to a narrow strip of coastal plain. Administratively, the northeast consists of the three provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilungkiang, though physically the western margins of each consist of rolling steppe country, more properly part of the Mongolian Plateau region.

Throughout most of China's history the southern margins of the Northeast Plain—essentially the lowlands where the meandering Liao River empties into *Po Hai*—have been under some form of direct Chinese influence or control and Han settlement. But despite the physical proximity to North China the remainder of the northeast remained until recent times frontier territory: forbidding, sparsely populated and only nominally under Chinese dominion. The thin population of the region ranged from small groups who inhabited the forested mountains to more numerous nomadic groups who roamed the rich grasslands of the plains.

The political significance of the northeast has been historically related to locational factors. The western plains and grasslands of the northeast are physically linked to the Mongolian steppe; from this extensive base area nomadic groups frequently threatened and occasionally controlled adjacent areas of North China. The Manchus, for example, consolidated their control in the lower Liao Plain, allied themselves with various steppe and forest-based groups, and in time deposed the Ming dynasty and established the Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty in 1644. During most of the Manchu period, the northeast remained officially a Manchu preserve and a series of edicts banned Chinese settlement in much of the region until late in the nineteenth century. Some Chinese migration had in fact taken place earlier, but the lifting of settlement prohibitions resulted in a vast migration of Han Chinese in the early decades of the twentieth century. From a few million at the

turn of the century, the population increased rapidly to nearly 50 million by mid-century, and to an estimated 95 million by 1976.

The other major factor in development of Northeast China has been its pivotal location between Russia and Japan. Returning to the Amur-Ussuri frontier in the mid-nineteenth century and regaining the vast Amur basin explored and claimed earlier in the seventeenth century, Russia rapidly developed its Far Eastern territories and began to look south to the largely empty lands and rich resources of China's northeast. An initial Russian goal was to shorten the long haul of the Trans-Siberian Railroad circling the Amur-Ussuri valleys to the port of Vladivostok; hence the investment in and construction of railroads through Chinese territory to shorten this route. Japan, victorious in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), assumed an increasingly important role in development of the northeast. By 1940 the only significant industrialized area in China was in the southern portion of Northeast China centered at Shenyang (Mukden), at that time controlled and occupied by Japan and its products oriented toward Japanese needs.

The core of this region is the Northeast Plain, the largest lowland in all China, which extends north-south for nearly 1,000 kilometers and from east to west for 200 to 400 kilometers. Most of the population and agricultural land, many of the raw materials needed for industry, and the best communications are located on the plain. Although agriculture is hampered by frequent spring droughts and a short growing season, the rich black soil and the availability of land have made the northeast an important grain producer—principally corn, spring wheat, kaoliang, and soybeans. Because of the short growing season and the limitations on the type of crop grown, the amount of land required to feed a farm household is several times greater than in the more productive ricelands of South China. Although the Chinese estimate that several million hectares of additional agricultural land can be put into cultivation, a lack of rainfall deters cultivation along the western margins of the plain and poor drainage is a drawback along the northwestern and northern portions. The opening of additional land to the plow thus will be costly and require significant capital investment to provide for irrigation and drainage facilities. Because of the recent opening and expansion of farmland, the northeast is one of the few areas in China where extensive farming practices—state farms and use of heavy agricultural machinery—are practicable.

The low mountains surrounding the Northeast Plain contain the primary remaining timber reserves in the country. Much of the southeastern uplands adjacent to North Korea were cutover during the



Japanese occupation to the north however the forests of the Greater and Lesser Khingan ranges had barely been explored prior to 1949. Since then logging rail lines have been pushed into the remote mountains and much timber has been cut.

The marked contrast between the still lightly populated Northeast Plain (except for the southernmost part)—compared to other major agricultural regions—and the string of large industrial cities is one of the more striking features of the northeast. Northeast China is the most urbanized region in China—most of Liaoning Province, for example, is administratively attached to one of several large industrial cities of the province. (The Chinese incorporate sizable rural areas in their major municipalities primarily to assure food supplies to the city and to aid in industrialization of the countryside.) Though most of the cities have origins as ancient settlements and trading centers, all have mushroomed dramatically in size during the twentieth century. Their appearance is a mixture of influences. Many are well planned with tree-lined avenues and separate industrial and worker housing districts. Much urban growth occurred during the Japanese era, though the architectural legacy of the period is perhaps best forgotten. Russian influence can be seen in the occasional onion-shaped domes of Russian Orthodox churches, a few monuments, and Chinese versions of Russian names for some streets. Russian influence is most noticeable in Lita—the Dairen-Port Arthur area, developed by Russian and Japanese capital—in Harbin—the major city of the northern portion of the Northeast Plain.

Northeast China today retains its primacy as China's major industrial area and as its leading center of heavy industry. Early development of industry was made possible by large deposits of coal, development of hydroelectric power resources, and the availability of various ferroalloys and other minerals. In most cases, reserves are small, but accessibility made them highly important in the initial industrial buildup. Iron and steel, machine tools, structural steel, turbines, generators, and chemicals represent some of the industrial output of the northeast. The industrial importance of Northeast China has been bolstered by the renowned Tachting oil field, located northwest of Harbin, which began operating in the early 1960s. Tachting probably produces nearly half of China's crude oil. The economic advancement and exploits of Tachting workers have been widely publicized in China as the example for all Chinese industry.

### *Northwest China*

Northwest China, sometimes termed the Sinkiang, Mongolia region

is similar to the Tibetan highlands in its size, the low density and non-Han Chinese composition of its population, and lack of direct Chinese rule throughout much of its history. In physical terms, however, the two regions differ greatly. Northwest China includes nearly all of the deserts of China—most of them located deep in basins surrounded by arid mountains. Life in the deserts is concentrated around the rims of the basins where mountain-born streams flow down and supply precious irrigation water needed for agriculture. Exceptions to these generalizations occur in the flanks and intermontane basins of the T'ien Shan and in the eastern and southeastern border lands of the northwest (administratively, Inner Mongolia) where precipitation is sufficient for grazing animals.

The population of the northwest historically has been a mixture of non-Han Chinese peoples, though population pressures elsewhere and large-scale resettlement programs have seen millions of Han Chinese move into areas formerly dominated by minorities. The bulk of Sinkiang's non-Han population consists of Turkic groups, Islamic in religion. The majority are Uighurs, who mostly live in the oases as agriculturalists. The Kazakhs, the second most populous group, are primarily herders. Both Kazakhs and Uighurs, together with lesser numbers of other Turkic groups, are part of a large block of central Asian peoples whose traditional homelands extend across the mountain and steppe country of both China and Russia—an issue exploited in the Sino-Soviet border dispute. The Mongols, another sizable minority group, are scattered along the northern rim of China from Inner Mongolia to Sinkiang. Chinese Muslims, termed Hui, are numerically important, and many live in the province of Ningsia and in the urban centers of the northwest.

Sinkiang (properly the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region) is the key subregion of Northwest China, and it consists physically of two large basins—the Tarim and Dzungarian—separated by the high peaks of the T'ien Shan. The Tarim Basin, the larger of the two, is rimmed by oases with the larger and more productive located in the western and higher end of the basin. The Tarim River collects most of the streams from the western and northern flanks as it meanders eastward towards the lower eastern end of the basin. The Tarim terminates in Lop Nor, a shallow lake of fluctuating size and location, now noted as a site for the testing of atomic weapons. The lake has contained little water in recent years because of the increasing use of the Tarim's water upstream for irrigation. A striking feature of the Tarim Basin is the presence of old, abandoned watercourses, marked by dead or dying trees and shrubs,

which extend down into the desert heart of the basin. Some of these old stream valleys have been reclaimed in recent years as new underground water sources have been tapped and small dams and other water control facilities have been built to maximize the available surface water. Grain (wheat and corn) is the principal crop, but locally important amounts of cotton, fruit and sugar beets also are grown.

The northern (Dzungarian) basin is smaller than the Tarim and contains less desert area somewhat greater precipitation (upward of 250 mm) in the west and north supports grasslands suitable for grazing. Additionally the somewhat better resource base of Dzungaria has resulted in a much greater population growth rate than in the Tarim probably half of Sinkiang's population now lives in the north. The economic development of northern Sinkiang has been fostered by the Karamai oil field and deposits of coal. The major city, Urumchi, is the capital of the province, the only significant industrial center, and the terminus of the railroad connecting Sinkiang with the remainder of China. During the 1950s when China and the Soviet Union were close allies the trans-Sinkiang railroad was planned to meet with the Soviet rail system at the border—a connection unlikely to be made in the near future. The T'ien Shan and associated mountains that separate the two basins are shaped like a V with the broad open end—the agriculturally rich Ili Valley—facing west toward Soviet Central Asia. Because of its largely Kazakh and Uighur population and natural orientation to the west, the Ili area traditionally was (and remains today) one of the most politically sensitive border areas.

The eastern third of Northwest China also consists mainly of deserts primarily in the western half and some grasslands in the south and east. Administratively most of this subregion consists of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (where Han Chinese outnumber Mongols ten to one), the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and part of Kansu Province. The grasslands vary in their use, some of the pastured lands particularly the more remote are grazed by nomadic Mongol groups as in the past but increasingly the nomadic population has been civilized in permanent settlements where forage crops can be raised, health facilities for man and beast are available and communication links to more settled areas have been built. Cutting through the Inner Mongolian deserts is the Huang Ho and from its great northern bend the river is tapped to irrigate sizable areas of farmland settled by Han Chinese. Construction of a railroad linking Paotow, one of the earliest planned industrial bases of the Peking regime, with Lanchow to the west has stimulated additional industry and the economic growth of the

entire Yellow River corridor.

The Kansu Corridor, a narrow belt of oases and small settlements, connects the populated centers of North China and the desert basins of Sinkiang. Along this northern flank of the Nan Shan wound the ancient silk route; today the oases of the corridor are connected by road and railroad to provide quick access to China's western frontier. Much of the capital equipment and other supplies needed to upgrade the northwest economically are produced in Lanchow at the eastern entrance to the corridor—a city that has grown enormously from a sleepy frontier town several decades ago to a modern, industrial giant today sprawling for many kilometers along the Huang Ho.

Historically, the northwest has been the most important frontier of China. The Great Wall and other fortifications that date to the earliest years of the Chinese state were attempts to stabilize the frontier and to regulate movement and trade of "barbarian" groups of the inner Asian steppes—groups that periodically threatened the Chinese core area in North China. Farther west in Sinkiang, Chinese frontier policies were twofold. On the one hand there was an interest in maintaining trade links that led through central Asia and eventually to the Mediterranean world; but of even greater import was the need to secure the northwestern frontier from potential invaders. Chinese strategy was to control the grasslands of Dzungaria and to secure the passes over the eastern end of the T'ien Shan that provided egress from central Asia to the Kansu Corridor.

Northwest China presently is a fast-growing region that has witnessed considerable modernization and economic development based on a scattering of energy and mineral resources and aided by modern communications. The paucity of agricultural land and limited water resources, however, will most likely slow and restrict future growth to a more modest pace.

### *Tibetan Highlands*

The Tibetan highlands make up the most distinctive region in China: it is a huge region that comprises nearly a quarter of China's territory; elevations average 4,000 meters, and higher mountains reach heights of 6,000 to 7,000 meters and above; population density is very low, and large areas are uninhabited; communications, though improved, are still difficult and time-consuming; and the Tibetan area has had the least direct central government rule of any of China's major regions.

The Tibetan highlands which essentially comprise the Tibet-Tsinghai plateau contain some of the world's most spectacular terrain. The eastern rim of the plateau is crossed by several of the great rivers of Asia—the Huang Yangtze Salween and Mekong—which have entrenched and progressively deepened their courses as they have flowed to the southeast. In places their gorges have knifed down to the 2 000 meter level or lower while above the ridges and peaks between the rivers representing the ancient plateau surface are at 5 000 to 6 000 meter heights. Since the Yangtze Mekong and Salween flow in parallel northwest-southeast aligned valleys that are less than 50 kilometers apart in some areas, east-west communication across the grain of the topography has been extremely difficult. This belt of formidable terrain has traditionally shielded southern Tibet including the locus of Tibetan culture and political power centered at Lhasa. The northernmost and highest part of the Tibetan highlands averages some 5 000 meters in elevation. Here the terrain is gently rolling with numerous large basins dotted by brackish lakes—in many fringed with salt flats. Rocky outcrops and ridges and a few mountain masses seem relatively low in terms of the relative relief but in absolute terms peaks occasionally reach 6 000 to 6 500 meters. Only in slightly lower and more favored areas is there sufficient forage to tempt a few nomads with their flocks and herds. High winds sweep across the plateau almost daily and even in mid-summer sudden storms with hail and snow flurries are not uncommon. Winter cold is intense and temperatures as low as  $-60^{\circ}\text{C}$  have been recorded.

An initial Chinese objective after taking control of Tibet in 1951-1952 was to shorten drastically the journey to Lhasa from Chinese bases in neighboring provinces. By late 1951 two roads generally following ancient caravan trails had been hacked across the mountains and plateau enabling Chinese truck convoys to reach Lhasa in several days (instead of the previous three-month journey by pack animals). In addition the Chinese have greatly expanded the road network throughout the Tibetan highlands and most settlements can now be reached by vehicles. The maintenance and upgrading of the network remains a priority effort.

The bond of Tibetan Buddhism and the temporal and spiritual powers embodied in the Dalai Lama traditionally provided a loose form of control over all Tibetan groups though political control from Lhasa was exercised over only that territory. Now administratively the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Throughout most of its history Tibet success

fully resisted the yoke of Chinese administrative and political control. Nevertheless, some Chinese influence and presence existed at times, specifically during the eighteenth century when Lhasa's requests for military help to combat external threats or internal dissension led Peking to appoint *ambans* to Lhasa who represented the Chinese central government. Whatever Chinese authority that existed vanished with the demise of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, and from 1912-1951 Tibet was for all practical purposes a *de facto* independent state.

The bulk of the Tibetan population is concentrated in southern and southeastern Tibet in somewhat lower valleys at elevations between 3,000 and 3,800 meters. Crops grown include barley and a few hardy root crops. The Chinese have experimented with other crops and have attempted to improve farming methods. Grain production has increased; wheat and other crops are raised in increasing amounts; and improvements have been able generally to keep pace with a growing population. Despite this, however, rice and other foodstuffs are shipped to Tibet for use principally by Chinese military, administrative, and other personnel. The extensive grasslands of the Tibetan highlands produce wool, hides, and other animal products for local needs.

Only recently have the basic economic and social patterns of Tibet begun to shift. By the early 1970s communes had been introduced and traditional Tibetan institutions were being gradually modified or supplanted. Small-scale industries, established in Lhasa and a few other locations, and improved communications have introduced a growing variety of consumer goods, which will hasten the decline of the traditional self-sufficient Tibetan economy based on local resources. Some survey work in the Tibetan highlands suggests mineral resources of significance, but any large-scale exploitation awaits further improvements in communications—specifically a railroad now under construction in Tsinghai Province and scheduled to reach Lhasa in the 1985-1990 period.

### Transforming the Environment

China has exerted a peculiar fascination on Westerners. Early visitors were impressed by the tidy Chinese rural landscape, by the seeming harmony and symbiotic relationship existing between man and nature as expressed through carefully tended fields of irrigated rice and terraced hillsides. Despite impressions of a "timeless" character to the Chinese

landscape reinforced by paintings of manicured fields and peaceful villages visible through morning mists. China's environment has witnessed dramatic change at the hands of man.

Probably deforestation has been the most pervasive action induced by the works of man. By the late nineteenth century almost no stands of forest remained in the northern provinces and much of the South China uplands also were largely cut over. Population pressures caused hillides to be cleared for crops but timber needs for construction fuel and charcoal were contributing factors. The end result was serious erosion that damaged or destroyed both upland fields and lowland plots. Rivers overburdened with increased loads of sediment more frequently broke through their protective dikes causing flooding, crop losses and famine. The ancient proverb "How old will you be when the Yellow River is clear" was applicable to a large number of China's rivers.

#### *Landscape Modification Programs*

Probably no Chinese government of the past faced greater environmental challenges than did that of Mao Tse tung in 1949. Decades of civil strife and war and the breakdown or absence of governmental control had left their mark. Irrigation systems and flood control facilities were in disrepair, erosion was increasing, and no centrally coordinated planning existed to redress environmental damage. After a brief period of repair and restoration, Peking launched a variety of programs in the early 1950s designed to improve environmental conditions. Exhortations to remake and transform nature were the rallying cry to millions of Chinese peasants.

Chinese environmental programs have involved both large scale capital intensive programs and small local works requiring little state funding. Chronically troublesome rivers received initial priority. The Hwai, whose natural outlet to the sea had long been blocked by silt, was tackled first. Outlets to the sea were constructed, upstream dams built, flood control protection strengthened, and irrigation extended. Basic control of the Hwai has been achieved and agricultural benefits derived but basic problems have not been completely overcome. Repair, rebuilding, and additional water conservancy measures continue.

More publicity was generated over the 1955 Yellow River plan. Drafted with the help of Soviet advisors, this ambitious plan called for a series of dams to produce electricity, provide irrigation water, halt flooding, and improve navigability of China's most destructive river. The major achievement of two decades of work has been the most important: no major flood has taken place on the lower course.

Realization of other objectives of the plan, however, has been less successful. The key Sanmen Dam project, for example, has had serious problems caused by failure to control upstream erosion: the dam has been redesigned, only limited electricity can be generated, supplies of irrigation water are restricted, and use of the reservoir is limited. Several other upstream dams, however, particularly those near Lanchow, are in operation, and electricity produced has been a major factor spurring the immense growth of industry in the Lanchow area. Nevertheless, permanent control of the Huang Ho awaits a solution to the long-term erosion problem in the middle reaches of the river where it flows through the barren loess-mantled hills of Shansi and Shensi provinces.

A third river basin project has been control of the Hai, a short but unruly stream receiving the flow of several tributaries draining the central and northern portions of the North China Plain. Heavy flooding of the northern half of the plain in 1963 led to renewed efforts at control. During the last decade new channels and outlets to the sea have been built, and the flood discharge of the Hai system increased about six times. As with the Huai project, the magnitude of the problem has made difficult the achievement of lasting results, though conditions have improved markedly and the threat of flood damage has greatly lessened.

From the beginning, small-scale projects suitable for villages or groups of villages have been emphasized—improving existing facilities, building small impoundments, digging new irrigation canals, planting trees, and similar tasks. The results of these efforts are evident in almost all parts of China. The countless small ponds and reservoirs, when coupled with the 2,000 large and medium-sized reservoirs built with provincial and state capital, have markedly improved the amount and dependability of water for irrigation. Tree-planting campaigns have been particularly effective in urban areas and along roadsides, but less successful are reforestation efforts in the uplands. Here areas of success are mixed with evidence of limited progress or failure. Selective concentration on key areas has been less apparent than mass campaigns to involve all rural inhabitants. A major problem has been lack of follow-up after planting—watering, treatment of disease, pruning, and similar efforts.

### *Agricultural Modernization*

Peking is now packaging its multiple environmental projects within an overall program of rapid economic modernization. The publicity given over many years to "Learn from Tachai" with its emphasis on self-reliance is being downplayed and subordinated. Policy shifts



introduced during 1977-78 stress the acquisition of Western technology and finance and an emphasis on capital intensive projects that can in time make significant contributions to the agricultural sector. For example Peking planners have revised plans that would transfer surplus water from the lower Yangtze to North China: a number of medium sized and large key water control projects will be initiated on China's major rivers and there are renewed plans to reclaim large tracts of land primarily in the northeastern provinces.

In addition to these major undertakings China continues to emphasize small scale local efforts lumped under a "hundred capital construction" program that includes a variety of tasks ranging from traditional activities like reforestation irrigation and drainage to creating new fields from the hillsides (as in Tichai) enlarging and leveling old fields to permit use of mechanized equipment and increasing the productivity of existing fields. The goal of mechanizing agriculture is directed primarily at the basic problem of limited land resources. Mechanization reduces peak period labor needs in turn it permits labor to be freed to meet the greater demands of an intensified cropping system. Additional irrigation and drainage equipment will help in reducing crop losses caused by drought and flood and aid in expanding the amount of high and stable yield farmland.

China's environment has undergone noticeable change. The building of countless storage impoundments irrigation canals and new river channels and the widespread use of pumps to move water to (and from) fields have permitted significant improvements and modifications in Chinese agricultural patterns. Millions of trees planted over twenty years have made urban areas more pleasant and habitable, protected fields from wind and blowing sand damage provided for construction and fuel needs and helped in some places to control erosion. Although much waste and replanting was characteristic during the early years more attention has recently been paid to sound forestry practices. Some of the more extreme landscape modification schemes where hillsides have been torn apart and rebuilt may be questioned as to the economic end result considering the expenditure of labor. More lasting and nationally useful will be the continuation of long term programs in water and soil conservancy work with concentration on existing areas of good productivity. All of these environmental modification programs reiterate the pressing need to protect preserve and enhance China's scarce physical assets. Significant accomplishments have been made in improving China's physical environment but the task is immense and much still remains to be done.

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## 2

# Recent Population Changes in China

*Judith Banister*

### **Population and Development**

Population growth and spatial population distribution are very important factors in the development process of any country including the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.)<sup>1</sup> In the early phases of development historical mortality levels are greatly reduced but fertility levels remain high causing a period of very rapid population growth. For example it is common today for the population of a developing country to increase at a rate of 2 percent a year or more. China's population size has increased at approximately this rate since the early 1950s. A 2 percent annual population growth rate doubles a country's population size in thirty five years.<sup>2</sup> If the country has managed to double production in all sectors of the economy during the same thirty five-year period a difficult feat per capita production levels would not have increased at all. Therefore any developing country faces the challenge of increasing production levels much faster than population growth so that popular living standards may be increased and the historical poverty cycle may be broken. The P.R.C. has faced this challenge by emphasizing rapid increases in agricultural and industrial production while trying to reduce the country's rate of population growth through fertility control.

As the population of a developing country increases rapidly it is typical for the agricultural sector to be unable to provide enough employment for everyone living in the countryside. Therefore people move toward the big cities seeking work. The usual result is a phenomenon called overurbanization. Large numbers of rural dwellers migrate to the cities to live in makeshift squatters settlements and attempt to make enough income to survive. It is not unusual for 20

Map 6 China: Population Density



to 50 percent of a city's labor force in a developing country to be underemployed, doing either no paid work or extraneous tasks that bring them some food or a little money. China has vigorously attacked this process by attempting to provide employment for everyone in the countryside, by trying to prevent rural-to-urban migration, and by moving urban dwellers to border regions or to wherever they might be more fully employed.

Since 1949, the population of the P.R.C. has gone through a rapid transformation. Mortality levels declined very quickly during the 1950s, but this trend was reversed during and after the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s. Since the Great Leap period, infant as well as overall mortality levels have declined to those attained only by the more advanced countries of the developing world. Fertility in China remained

at or above traditional levels right up to 1963. Most developing countries still retain such a high birth rate. Since the early 1960s however China's rapid societal transformation combined with one of the world's most thorough family planning programs has caused a fast reduction in fertility particularly in those populous provinces that are leading in their birth rate declines. In addition China has managed to limit control and direct internal migration to avoid or reverse over-urbanization in the major cities while population growth has been unusually rapid in some of China's sparsely populated regions.

### A Brief History of China's Population

There is very little statistical information available on pre 1949 patterns of marriage fertility and mortality in China. One of the best sources of such information was a survey of rural agricultural households in many provinces of China during 1929-1931. The demographic data from this survey were recently reanalyzed by a group of demographers at Princeton University who reported the following generalizations about rural agricultural families in the China of 1929-1931: marriage was early and universal in rural Chinese society, women married at age 17.5 on the average, men at age 21.3, almost no men or women remained single. One might expect that since almost everyone married at a young age, reproduction would have begun early and resulted in very high total fertility levels for each woman. Contrary to expectation, fertility was only moderately high in these Chinese rural farm families. Each woman had, on the average, only 2.5 births in her lifetime if she lived through her reproductive years. It is unclear why fertility was not much higher in such households. One theory suggests that poor nutrition and endemic diseases resulted in sterility and subfecundity in a significant proportion of the population. Another possible explanation is that social norms or temporary economic conditions encouraged sexual abstinence or the use of primitive birth control and abortion techniques to keep down the number of births to each couple.

The Princeton analysts also concluded that mortality levels in rural Chinese society were very high during 1929-1931. They found that the expectation of life at birth was very low, only 23.7 years for females and 24.6 years for males.<sup>9</sup> Infant mortality was extraordinarily high, about 300 deaths during the first year of life per thousand live births. Such high mortality levels resulted in an estimated crude death rate of 41.5 per thousand population. This high death rate was balanced by an

estimated crude birth rate of 41.2 per thousand population.<sup>5</sup> In other words, these data suggest that the rural agricultural part of China's population in about 1930 existed in a state of traditional population equilibrium, a situation of approximately zero population growth with high mortality balancing the traditional fertility level.

The Princeton demographers speculated that these data from 1929-1931 actually give us a glimpse into China's more remote past, because rural agricultural families were the most traditional sector of China's population during this century. Indeed, this picture of early and universal marriage, moderately high fertility, and very high mortality may be typical of many periods in China's past. There were also many centuries, however, when China's population grew rapidly in size, which means that fertility levels exceeded mortality levels to a significant degree. Overall, China's total population size grew slowly and sporadically from about 40 to 50 million in 1000 A.D. to a count of 583 million in 1953. This averages out to an annual population growth rate of about 0.27 percent. Therefore the long-term trend during this millenium was not zero population growth but rather a slight excess of births over deaths.

As of 1949, when the P.R.C. was founded, China was still a traditional society with high mortality and at least moderately high fertility levels. Since then, its people have been experiencing rapid "demographic transition" from high fertility and mortality levels to low ones. In the thirty years since 1949, some of China's cities and provinces have almost completed this transition, while others have reduced mortality but retain traditional fertility practices.

China is the world's most populous country. Between one-fifth and one-fourth of the world's total population lives on the China mainland. Therefore China's rapid achievement of vastly improved mortality conditions and very marked fertility reduction is significant on a world scale. P.R.C. population policies are beginning to serve as a model for other developing countries.

### **Changing Population Policies in China**

During the earliest years of the P.R.C., Chinese leaders believed that there would be no population problem in China. They followed the Marxist theory that "overpopulation" is really a condition brought about by the exploitation of workers and the contrived unemployment common in capitalist economic systems. It was felt that the P.R.C., being a socialist system, would have no problem providing food,

employment, and other basic human needs for its population even if the country's population began increasing rapidly due to reduced mortality.

The P.R.C. government however inherited the world's most populous country. Its people were densely populated on the arable land and already pressing hard on the agricultural resource base. This realization dawned on Chinese leaders during the 1950s, as the country's death rate declined precipitously and the already huge population began increasing at a rate of more than 2 percent per year. During several years in the mid 1950s increases in agricultural production did not keep pace with increases in population and the continuing risk of food shortages during bad crop years became obvious.

In addition the best count ever made of China's population took place during 1953-1954. It was discovered once the census was completed that the P.R.C. had about 100 million more people than had been estimated by the Nationalist government prior to 1949 and by various population experts. The enormity of China's population and the prospect of its rapid increase caused a reversal of the early P.R.C. pronatalist population policy. In 1956 the country's first family planning program began. This initial attempt to reduce fertility used the media to teach about contraceptive methods and to change traditional attitudes regarding birth control. Laws that had prohibited abortion and sterilization were abolished. Factories began or expanded production of condoms, diaphragms, and spermicides while research and field trials were conducted on intrauterine devices (IUDs) and on the world's first vacuum aspiration abortion apparatus. An attempt was made to set up local and provincial committees to promote birth control.

The first family planning program was short lived however. At the beginning of the Great Leap Forward launched in 1958 Chinese leaders thought that they had found the key to overcoming bottlenecks in China's economic system. They believed that growth in all kinds of production would finally leap forward ahead of population growth and that rapid population growth would cease to be a problem. Therefore they abandoned the birth control promotion campaign and cut back on the production of contraceptives.

The Great Leap failed to attain its immediate goal of rapid increases in agricultural and other kinds of production. Population growth continued while production levels fell. A period of food shortages and economic depression resulted during 1959-1961.

In 1962, when the economy began to show signs of recovery, a new birth planning program was launched. This time province level birth control committees were set up to guide the program. The media

campaign emphasized the importance of late marriage as well as birth control. Sterilization, abortion, and IUDs were popularized in addition to the barrier birth control methods.

The second birth control campaign was visible in the P.R.C. press for four years, but family planning publicity suddenly ceased in 1966 as the Cultural Revolution escalated. After a short period of policy confusion, all factions of the government reemphasized their dedication to promoting late marriage and birth planning. As the Cultural Revolution wound down in about 1969, the family planning program was accorded the top priority status that it has retained ever since. Not even the recent deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung and the leadership shifts that followed have weakened government resolve to reduce China's rate of population growth as quickly as possible.

The current family planning campaign is guided by a national birth planning committee in Peking, in addition to provincial, county, city, and local birth planning groups. The birth control pill has been added to the list of available birth control techniques, and since about 1971 the government has provided the pill, IUDs, abortion, and sterilization free of charge. The media promote late marriage and birth control, especially by popularizing the successes of some of the leading communes, cities, prefectures, and provinces in birth control work.

### **Population Data Collection and Reporting**

The People's Republic of China has emphasized the collection and calculation of certain kinds of population data and indices. Because of the government's concern with reducing mortality to low levels, death registration is required and crude death rates are frequently calculated at local levels and periodically calculated at the provincial and national levels. Because of the desire to raise marriage ages as a means of fertility reduction, marriage age targets are set locally and the proportions marrying at or above those ages are often recorded. To monitor the effects of the vigorous family planning program, contraceptive use data are collected at the local level and contraceptive use rates by birth control method are occasionally calculated. Because of the urgency and high priority given to reducing crude birth rates and rates of natural population increase, national, provincial, and local targets are set and frequent compilations from the birth and death registration systems monitor the success or failure of family planning efforts. Finally, because of the emphasis on strict control of internal migration, local areas are required to maintain a system of permanent population



registration which is coupled with the rationing system. From these registers periodic counts of the population can be made.

The P R C government is extremely secretive about its ongoing population data collection efforts and their results. Any discussion of population matters tends to cause uneasiness among Chinese leaders because of their reversal in practice of Marxist population doctrine. Only a tiny proportion of the collected population data has been reported in the P R C press in radio broadcasts in official briefings to visiting foreign delegations and in speeches at international meetings. The data thus reported tend to come from the most advanced provinces, cities, counties and rural communes and only occasionally from more ordinary units. Nevertheless my compilation and analysis of such data has enabled me to assess the progress so far in the demographic transitions of a large number of China's provinces.

The P R C has not taken a second census since that of 1953-1954 perhaps because the task is enormous, expensive and time-consuming. The P R C government however is not known to shrink from important tasks just because they are difficult. A more likely reason for the lack of a second census is that the taking of a census would have to be publicized so that the Chinese people would know what was expected of them and after the census China's leaders would be bombarded with the question: 'Well, how many people did you count in China?' Government leaders are afraid of a large count and its implications for per capita production and consumption figures in many sectors of the economy. The government does not like to give ammunition to detractors of the new China who might use the census total to point out that per capita grain production has hardly increased at all since 1953 and that general per capita living standards are still very low.

Though no actual census count has been taken since 1953 for all of China, two registration counts have apparently been taken from the permanent population registers, both times with utmost secrecy. Throughout the late 1960s there were rumors that a national population count had been taken in 1964 which included the collection and compilation of birth and death registration data as well as population totals. Finally in 1972 Chou En lai confirmed that such a count had been taken in 1964. Similarly there are now rumors that a national count was taken about 1972 and that this count also included a compilation of birth and death registration data.<sup>6</sup> It can be predicted that within the next five or ten years some P R C leader will confirm that this count was taken. So far the government seems to have taken a count of the population about once each decade, in 1953, 1964 and 1972. These

decennial registration counts may provide the groundwork for a future true census in China every ten years.

In both 1964 and 1972, local areas were apparently required to report their total population size as of a particular day, broken down by sex, age group, nationality, and occupation, and the total number of births and deaths registered during the one-year period preceding the count. These data were successively compiled at the county and municipal level, the provincial level, and the national level. The crude birth rates, crude death rates, and natural population increase rates recorded for each political unit were then used as the base point for monitoring subsequent results of the family planning campaigns in progress. For example, during the Fourth Five-Year Plan of 1971-1975, the national government reportedly stipulated that all cities and municipalities should strive to reduce their natural population increase rates to 10 per thousand population (1.0 percent annual population increase), and all counties, communes, and provinces should aim for a natural population increase rate of 15 per thousand (1.5 percent) by 1975. Vital rates were calculated for 1972 from the registration count, and subsequent compilations were made to monitor any progress from the 1972 rates toward the 1975 target. In many provinces, annual province-wide meetings of local family planning personnel were held to assess the previous year's progress and to upgrade the persuasive skills of the birth control motivators from all the less successful units.

It is incorrect to argue that the P.R.C. government does not have any good idea, and does not care to know, how many people there are in China or what the birth and death and natural population increase rates are for the whole country and all its subunits. Such information is of vital concern at all levels of China's government and is gathered and monitored frequently. Furthermore, the government believes these data to be correct as an order of magnitude, and planning at all levels is based partly on the population data so collected. Nevertheless, it is possible to use demographic techniques on the reported population data to demonstrate that there is some underregistration of births and deaths in China, and that the Chinese government is therefore underestimating its present levels of fertility and mortality. It also appears that the P.R.C. government undercounted its population in the 1964 and 1972 counts.<sup>7</sup> Though the recorded and collected P.R.C. population data are imperfect, they are very useful for monitoring changes from one time to another. For example, even if births are always underregistered by 10

percent, recorded annual birth rate declines usually reflect a genuine decrease in the actual birth rate of a commune or city or province

### Health and Mortality

Among developing countries the P.R.C. has an unusually good preventive health care network which emphasizes the prevention of epidemics through vaccination, personal and public hygiene, control of human waste, and the interruption of disease vector cycles. This public health work was begun in earnest during the early 1950s. Periodic patriotic health campaigns exhorted everyone to take part in cleaning up the environment and killing pests like mosquitoes and flies. By about 1957, China's death rate may have been halved from pre-1949 levels.

During the Great Leap Forward and the early 1960s, however, some aspects of the preventive public health system languished for lack of funds and personnel. Some diseases, such as schistosomiasis, which had been vigorously attacked during the 1950s, staged a temporary resurgence. Most important, people's resistance to disease was lowered by malnutrition during the food shortages and economic dislocations. As a result, the death rate probably rose for a few years. The extent of the rise is unknown, perhaps even to China's government, since the country's statistical system broke down along with the economic and public health systems.

Since the early 1960s, the P.R.C.'s preventive health network has become pervasive. Vaccination programs have spread to more areas of the countryside. Remote areas that were hardly touched by the public health campaigns of the 1950s have now been incorporated into the disease prevention programs. In particular, minority group areas and sparsely populated border regions have now been included.

Tibet is the last area of China to introduce basic public health measures. As of late 1975, the Tibetan region still had a crude death rate of around 20 per thousand population, very similar to the death rate of Nepal just across the border.<sup>4</sup> A crash program to reduce Tibet's death rate was belatedly introduced in 1973, but much remains to be done. The following radio broadcast from late 1976 indicates that basic environmental sanitation and preventive health care are only now reaching beyond Lhasa in Tibet:

There are some 8,000 barefoot doctors, health workers, and midwives in Tibet. Following the establishment of cooperative medical service, some

100 cooperative medical service stations have been built in various parts of Tibet on a trial basis. A movement to control water and nightsoil, to rebuild wells, latrines, stables, and cooking stoves and to improve environmental hygiene has just begun in the countryside and pastoral areas.<sup>9</sup>

Curative medical care has become available to China's people much more slowly than public health programs. Even today, the P.R.C. still has a shortage of fully trained doctors. During the 1950s, only some urban residents had access to modern medical care, while other urban people and almost all rural residents were without doctors. As a result, city death rates declined much faster than rural mortality levels.

During the 1960s, under Mao Tse-tung's prodding, there was a radical shift in China's medical system toward meeting the needs of rural people. In 1965, he directed that highest priority for health care should be given to rural areas. Immediately thereafter, the training of "barefoot doctors" began. Now, only fourteen years later, there are 1.5 million of these paramedics in China. Their job is to provide primary medical care to all rural people.

A barefoot doctor is usually a young person who has achieved a medium educational level, such as graduation from junior middle school. These young people are trained for a short period of time, perhaps six months, in a county hospital or training center, or in the health center in their own commune. They are full members of their village production teams, where they return after this minimal training to do part-time agricultural work and part-time medical work. They receive frequent refresher courses and additional medical training, often given by visiting medical teams from the cities. The barefoot doctor is the entry point into China's rural medical system today. A sick or injured person goes to the barefoot doctor first, except in cases of dire emergency, and the barefoot doctor handles most cases and refers some patients to the commune medical center. A commune of 50,000 people may have just a few doctors who work at its hospital, so the paramedics send to these doctors only the cases needing expert medical care.

The number of rural medical personnel has also been expanded by the very minimal training of volunteer health workers who staff village or production brigade health stations. In addition, midwives have been trained in great numbers to provide safe delivery in normal childbirths and to give pre- and postnatal care.

Paramedical workers have been trained to supplement the small

number of fully trained doctors but in addition the availability of skilled medical doctors in the countryside has been expanded by several means. First the P.R.C. greatly shortened the number of years of training for doctors from seven years for all doctors during the 1950s down to two, three, or four years for doctors during the early 1970s.<sup>10</sup> Though many of China's doctors still work primarily in city hospitals the policy in effect since 1965 is that every urban hospital should have between one fourth and one third of its doctors in the countryside at any one time either on assignment to mobile medical teams or to a rural commune hospital. The urban doctors work in rural areas on a rotating basis.

The availability of curative medical care in the countryside has also been expanded by the incorporation of traditional Chinese doctors into the medical system and their training in advanced traditional and modern medical techniques. In 1958 traditional and Western medicine were decreed to have equal status. Then Mao's directive in 1965 called for the full integration of Chinese and Western medicine in part through the barefoot doctors who are trained in the use of acupuncture and herbal medicine.<sup>11</sup> When barefoot doctors refer patients to the commune hospital these patients often prefer to be treated by a traditional Chinese doctor. Practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine handle a large proportion of the total volume of medical complaints in China today.

The great majority of people in China's countryside now have some access to curative medical care. One method of evenly distributing medical care has been the development of production brigade cooperative health plans. The production brigade is an intermediate level of organization between the production team or natural village and the commune. Using this system, brigade members pay a few dollars a year for full medical care which is heavily subsidized by communally earned income from the sale of grain and other products. The following radio broadcast describes the progress made in the spread of cooperative health plans and in the training of barefoot doctors and other paramedical personnel.

A health network that includes mother and child health care centres at county, people's commune and production brigade levels and midwifery centres at production teams covers the 80% of the Chinese population that lives in the countryside. China's constitution stresses State protection of mothers and children, who account for 70% of the population. More than 82% of the production brigades have set up their own cooperative medical service today, particularly since the start of the Cultural Revolution in

1966. Of the 1,500,000 "barefoot" doctors in the countryside, one-third are women. In addition, there are 3,900,000 part-time rural medical workers and midwives. Some 1,000,000 city doctors have gone to the countryside in the past few years to help with rural medical service.<sup>12</sup>

Due to the continuing emphasis on preventive public health measures and to the slowly increasing provision of curative medical care throughout China, rates of mortality and morbidity declined during the 1960s and have certainly continued to decline in most rural areas during the 1970s. After the apparent attempt to gather nationwide data on the number of births and deaths recorded in local areas, the P.R.C. reported a 1972 national crude death rate of 7.6 per thousand population.<sup>13</sup> Though there is still some underregistration of deaths in China, particularly neonatal deaths, it is reasonable to assume that the P.R.C. has achieved a crude death rate of 10 per thousand population during the 1970s. Many other countries in Asia have attained a similarly low death rate, but these are often small countries, while the other populous Asian countries continue to have higher death rates than that of China.

### Fertility

During the 1950s, fertility rates stayed at their historical levels. In fact, it is possible that the crude birth rate, along with other fertility measures such as the period total fertility rate and the net reproduction rate, increased above traditional levels. I hypothesize that this happened, partly because China probably had a postwar baby boom after decades of war had forced the postponement of many marriages and births. Also, it is likely that the rapid improvements in health and length of life decreased sterility and subfecundity in the general population and increased the length of time that couples lived together before one of them died. In addition, social and economic changes weakened some customs that had limited fertility, such as traditional restrictions on the remarriage of widows. In some other developing countries, fertility rose as mortality declined during the early phase of the demographic transition, and China may have followed this pattern.<sup>14</sup>

Officially reported P.R.C. birth rates for the 1950s were 37 per thousand in 1952-1953 and 34 per thousand in 1957, with some vacillation during the intervening years.<sup>15</sup> The early estimate came from sample surveys, and the 1957 estimate may have come from vital registration data. These reported birth rates are far too low for the 1950s,

when China's population was still basically a noncontracepting population. It must be assumed that underregistration and underreporting of births continued to be serious throughout the decade.

There is very little evidence that the first fertility reduction campaign of 1962-1968 had any immediate impact on fertility, even in China's cities. Toward the end of the campaign, it was stated that the supply of contraceptives then available was sufficient to meet the needs of only about 22 percent of all couples in the childbearing ages.<sup>16</sup> The medical establishment waged a battle against performing abortion and sterilization operations even when these operations had been legalized. In practice, the availability of birth control services and the organization of personalized motivational work for fertility control never reached beyond a few cities during the 1950s.

During the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath, there may have been some temporary dip in the birth rate due to economic depression and malnutrition. The population retained its traditionally high fertility right up through 1963, however, according to recently reported data for a few scattered locations.<sup>17</sup> Only Shanghai city proper has reported a very significant birth rate decline by 1963. But both Peking and Tian municipalities reported crude birth rates of more than 40 per thousand for 1963. Except for one county near Canton, no suburban or rural areas had claimed tangible fertility decline by 1963.

The second fertility reduction campaign of 1962-1966, however, had a powerful impact on the birth rates of some cities, according to the reported information. Some suburban areas also reported rapid birth rate declines between 1963 and 1966. Rural areas experienced a lag time before their fertility rates began declining. Evidence from interviews of Hong Kong refugees from the P.R.C. in 1965 indicated that rural women, at least in Kwangtung Province next to Hong Kong, had been affected by the propaganda campaign for birth control.<sup>18</sup> Of the small sample of 125 refugee women, 90 percent claimed unequivocally to approve of birth planning and 60 percent knew about the IUD. But only one fourth of these women knew of any family planning services available in their own villages, and only 2 percent reported any known use of birth control in their villages. The interviewees were still producing babies at the traditional rate. As a result of this apparent rural lag between attitudinal changes and the practice of birth control, China's overall fertility level stayed fairly high at least through 1965.

During the Cultural Revolution period, there was seemingly no attempt at nationwide population data collection, so there is a big gap in

reported vital rate data between 1965-1966 and 1971-1972. But those few rural localities and whole provinces that have now reported vital rates for both before and after the Cultural Revolution all claimed a significant drop in their birth rates or natural population increase rates.<sup>19</sup> What was the cause of this apparent fertility decline in relatively progressive rural areas during the Cultural Revolution period?

The solution to this puzzle seems to lie in the rapidly expanding network of rural medical services after 1965. I suggest that the second fertility reduction campaign during 1962-1966 reached many rural areas, raising people's motivation to control their fertility and creating a receptive climate for family planning services. It was not until the expansion of the rural medical system, however, that such family planning services actually became available in the villages and production brigade clinics. This process happened gradually during the late 1960s and is continuing today in more remote areas. One of the main skills required of barefoot doctors is that they be knowledgeable about birth control techniques and able to perform at least outpatient surgical birth control procedures.

During the Cultural Revolution years, while many rural areas and even whole provinces were experiencing birth rate declines, some of the most advanced urban and suburban areas reported a slight rise in their crude birth rates from the low levels in 1965 or 1966. The apparent cause of the temporary birth rate increases was a rush to "get married early," once the extreme pressure to delay marriage experienced during 1962-1966 was relaxed. The Communist Party was unable to enforce the late marriage policy during early Cultural Revolution years because of struggles and disarray among the leadership. When postponed marriages are carried out all at once, a rush of first births soon follows, especially in the P.R.C. where it is still the custom to use no contraception between marriage and the first birth.

During the 1970s, the P.R.C. is in a state of very rapid demographic transition, characterized by a huge range of birth rates, death rates, natural population increase rates, contraceptive use rates, infant mortality rates, and ages at marriage from one geographical area to another. Therefore it is very risky to extrapolate from experiences in one part of China to the country as a whole. Reported crude birth rates (or birth rates derived from other reported rates) range from under 17 per thousand population in the most advanced provinces of Kiangsu and Hopeh up to more than 40 per thousand in Tibet. In some parts of China, the current vigorous family planning program seems to be doing



very well in encouraging late marriage and high rates of contraceptive use, resulting in rapid declines in recorded birth rates and natural increase rates.

The national government in Peking is very circumspect about reporting estimated national crude birth rates for different years during the 1970s, but data from several official briefings to foreign scholars and officials suggest the following generalization: the national government estimates that China's national crude birth rate declined from about 26 to 27 per thousand population in 1972 to a little over 20 per thousand in 1974 and 1975.<sup>20</sup> My computer projections of China's population from the 1953 census to the present indicate that China's actual crude birth rate is likely to be higher than this during the 1970s. If China's birth rate were actually this low, then the country would be heading steadily toward the achievement of replacement level fertility in about 1980.<sup>21</sup> I estimate that this projection based on official birth rate data is too optimistic given the considerable number of populous provinces in China that are reporting slow progress and many difficulties in their efforts to reduce fertility. Therefore I conclude that the P.R.C. still has a problem of underregistration of births which produces an under estimate of the birth rate calculated from vital registration data.

In spite of some underregistration of births and deaths, the general picture of China's demographic transition is clear. The country's death rate declined drastically during the 1950s, rose somewhat during about 1958-1961, and has declined to a comparatively low level at the present time. China's birth rate stayed high through 1963 and has declined in a wavelike pattern since then, beginning with the cities followed by suburban areas, then nearby rural areas, and finally more remote rural areas. Some sparsely populated border and minority regions of China continue to have traditionally high birth rates today.

### Population Growth

The growth of China's population since 1949 has been due primarily to the difference between births and deaths, because international migration has been negligible compared to the huge total size of China's population. During the 1950s, China's rate of population growth rose to more than 2 percent per year, due mostly to the rapid mortality decline during that decade. The economic and food supply problems experienced during 1958-1961 may have increased mortality levels enough to reduce the rate of population growth to less than 2 percent

annually for a year or two.

During the 1960s, the P.R.C. may have reached its peak rate of population growth. Three provinces, now some of the most advanced ones in their demographic transitions, reported natural population increase rates in the 2.5 to 2.95 percent range for about 1965.<sup>22</sup> In these leading provinces, death rates had declined after the Great Leap, but birth rates had declined significantly only in some cities by 1965, while fertility remained high in rural areas. Thereafter, birth rate declines in these provinces were extremely rapid, especially during 1972-1976. The natural increase rates of these provinces are now reported to be in the range from under 1.0 percent to 1.5 percent. In the short period of fourteen years, at least three populous provinces have essentially completed their demographic transitions from high fertility to low fertility, and more provinces are following close behind, according to the data available.

It was reported to a visiting group in 1973 that China had lowered its rate of population growth to 1.9 percent a year.<sup>23</sup> This estimate may have come from the nationwide compilation of vital registration for 1972. Since then, many populous provinces have claimed steadily declining natural population increase rates, which they have recorded in the process of monitoring annual provincial vital rates. Nevertheless, many other provinces have not reported any declines in their natural population increase rates, which should dictate caution in assuming that the P.R.C. as a whole is experiencing a current population growth rate below about 1.5 percent annually.

### Age Structure

China was and still is a developing country with a young population, in contrast to those developed countries where greater and greater proportions of the population are now in the older ages. A "young" population can attain a much lower crude death rate than an "old" population, simply because old people are more likely to die than young people, especially after infant mortality levels are greatly reduced. If a developing country with a young population provides reasonably high levels of preventive and curative medical care for the general population, it is potentially able to achieve a crude death rate as low as the 5 per thousand population regularly recorded in Taiwan. A crude death rate in the 7 to 10 per thousand range for the P.R.C. during the 1970s is not an unreasonable estimate, given China's still-young age structure and

rapidly improving rural medical system. Low crude death rates like these contribute to rapid population growth because it is very difficult if not impossible to reduce a developing country's crude birth rate to such low levels.

Detailed data on China's age structure today are almost totally unavailable except for the age structure of one district of Shanghai for 1971. It is possible however to derive a plausible current P.R.C. age structure by beginning with the reported 1953 census age structure or an adjusted one and using a computer population projection package to project the population forward every year up to the present. Many guesses and assumptions have to be made in this process because China's exact fertility and mortality conditions for every year since 1953 are not known. These data must be estimated from officially reported data for some years with interpolations in between and with the use of model schedules of age specific fertility and mortality rates.

Very interesting patterns of changing age distribution emerge from this projection. During the 1950s and early 1960s generally speaking China had high fertility but fast-declining mortality at all ages especially at young ages. Thus for about fifteen years most of the enormous numbers of children being born were continuing to live instead of dying before reaching adulthood as many of them would have done in previous decades. This produced a bulge in the age structure composed of young children. As China's overall fertility began declining after 1963 each year's new cohort of births became a smaller proportion of the population than previous birth cohorts and the bulge in the age structure receded among young children with each passing year.<sup>24</sup> Since then however the large number of people born between about 1952 and about 1962 are growing up. The oldest of these born in 1952 or 1953 began childbearing in the mid 1970s. Not until 1995 will these huge cohorts have completed their childbearing. Thus even if China attains replacement level fertility very soon the birth rate will continue to be much higher than the death rate and China's population will continue growing at a rate of about 1.4 percent a year through 1995. The only way that China can reduce its rate of population growth much below that rate except for some catastrophe that would raise the death rate is to persuade people to lower their fertility below replacement level. In other words the one child and the childless family would need to become much more popular and other life styles like nonmatriage and homosexual relationships might need to become more acceptable.

It does not seem likely that such changes will happen during the next decade, but China's government is so determined to reduce the country's population growth rate that it may begin encouraging greater tolerance of low fertility life-styles.

### **Total Population Size**

Ever since the early 1960s, the P.R.C. government has consistently used low population totals in its press reports. The disparity between China's actual population size and the rhetorical total used in its press has reached absurd levels. Usually, whenever a newspaper article or radio broadcast needs to use some number for China's total population size, the figure "800 million" is used. Yet no sensible projection of the mainland China population since the 1953 census can come up with a total population of less than 980 million for year-end 1978. To keep the total that low, one must assume a population growth rate just below a reasonable range for every year since the 1950s. It is more likely that China's population has already passed 1 billion people.

Though the P.R.C. government has not taken a true census or anything resembling a true census since 1953, it has apparently attempted a nationwide count of the population based on the permanent population registers as recently as 1972 and perhaps even more recently. Unless the population registration system is hopelessly nonfunctional, the government in Peking knows that its population now totals well over 950 million people.

Due to the unwillingness of P.R.C. leaders to overcome their ideological biases on population matters, however, they have so far been unable to deal openly and rationally with the actual size of China's population. Rather, in order to maintain the fiction that China has 100-200 million people fewer than the actual number, it has apparently been necessary to forbid provincial leaders to reveal the true population size of their provinces. Otherwise any intelligent person could add up the current provincial population totals to get a more correct current national population total.

The leaders of most of China's populous provinces regularly understate their provincial population size. Occasionally some signal seems to be given that allows provincial leaders to raise the rhetorical population totals they use publicly. For example, when Mao Tse-tung died in late 1976, the published formal condolences sent in from many

provinces revealed much higher population totals than these provinces had previously used. My theory is that provincial leaders were told as Mao's death approached that they could use that occasion to release their 1972 population counts. Many provinces did so while others have not yet released their 1972 population totals and some seem to have released their true current population totals instead. It is not clear why some provinces have released 1975 or 1976 population totals while most others have not. Incidentally the silliness of the population numbers game played by the P.R.C. government is illustrated by the fact that the provincial population totals released after Mao's death added up to over 910 million while the newspaper articles and speeches releasing these totals had titles like "800 Million People Deeply Mourn Our Great Leader and Teacher Chairperson Mao and Vow to Carry His Future Work of Proletarian Revolution Through to the End."<sup>25</sup>

### Population Distribution

Published data documenting internal migration within China are very scarce. In general the government attempts to prevent people from moving their residences unless such a move is specifically planned and organized by the government. The mechanisms for preventing internal migration are the location specific rationing of cotton cloth and some staple foods and the requirement that a person be offered a job in another place and have the permission of her or his present work unit to leave before the move will be allowed. It is so difficult to move that the P.R.C. has remained a geographically immobile society in which most people continue to live where they were born or very nearby.<sup>26</sup>

The government allows and encourages certain types of internal migration however. Ever since the early 1950s there has been some movement from densely populated areas of China to the more sparsely populated border mountainous and desert regions. This movement has not made much of a dent in the provinces that the migrants have left but has strongly affected the receiving areas. In the first place most such migrants are members of the dominant Han Chinese nationality which comprised an overwhelming 91 percent of China's population as of the 1953 census. These Han Chinese migrants go to areas where minority groups live steadily shifting the ethnic balance toward Han numerical superiority in China's border regions. In addition the migrants are usually young, educated, and dedicated to socialism so they tend to run the governments' schools, factories, and development projects in the

areas to which they move. Therefore this government-sponsored migration flow to the sparsely populated areas of China serves to consolidate government and Party control over these regions and promotes rapid social and economic development and urbanization in previously backward areas. The influx also causes resentment among the more than fifty different minority groups whose cultural identities, languages, religions, and control of their former territories are threatened.<sup>27</sup>

The other major type of migration flow in the P.R.C. has occurred within each province or to nearby provinces. There has been constant pressure from rural residents who want to move to cities, because living standards are still much better in the cities. During the 1950s, city populations mushroomed, and city governments began the policy of forcing the in-migrants to return to the countryside. This policy continues in China's biggest cities, some of which claim to have stabilized or almost stabilized their population sizes. Meanwhile, however, some rural-to-urban migration has been permitted into newer or smaller cities where factories are being built and workers are needed.

The other major intraprovincial movement has been the migration of young adults just after they finish middle school from the cities where they were born and raised to the countryside. This was an unpopular policy that was formally rescinded in January 1979. Those young adults for whom city jobs were not available were required to move to rural communes. Many of them settled down there, while others moved on, often to other towns or cities where the job market was expanding. This controlled migration flow showed very little respect for people's preferences about where they wanted to live, but it did have some positive results. Overurbanization of China's major cities has so far been largely prevented or minimized. China's population has remained spread out in the countryside, rather than becoming concentrated in cities. The movement of educated city youth to rural areas has helped to lessen the differences between the city and the countryside, because the city youth help to change local attitudes, develop the local economy, raise the educational level, and expand cultural life in the villages.

China's geographically immobile society and the recent urban-to-rural population flows have probably contributed to the reduction of rural fertility levels in China. Each people's commune and, within that, each village, is a political and geographic unit whose boundaries are usually fixed. Local leaders and local residents now know that there is little hope for reducing population pressure in the commune through

out migration. Indeed, the commune may be required to accept immigrants from the city. This knowledge may be persuading rural leaders to urgently promote late marriage and birth control in order to reduce the village's natural population growth rate.

### Conclusion

The P.R.C. is in extremely rapid demographic transition toward low mortality and low fertility levels during the 1970s according to population data massively collected in China but only spottily reported. These data are faulty as shown by province by province analysis which picks up occasional contradictions between one datum and another. There is some evidence of underregistration of neonatal deaths, overestimation of the proportions of couples contracepting, undercounting of the number of local residents, and a few cases of a minimally functioning vital registration system which records only about half of the local births and deaths. In spite of these statistical weaknesses in some geographical areas reported P.R.C. population data are in general remarkably consistent, show clear patterns of change over time, and duplicate trends found in some other developing countries. When China's leaders at any level report a birth rate, a death rate, a natural population increase rate, a list of contraceptors by type of contraceptive, marriage age data, or infant mortality rate, these officials appear to be telling the truth based on the data they have collected. They do not lie. Rather, if officials are ashamed of a particular datum, they simply do not report it. The only exception to this general rule is that the total population size of the whole country or a populous province is usually seriously underestimated, and the officials know that they are doing this. No officially reported total for China's population size or for any province's population size should be considered a current total unless it can be shown that the reported population figure is consistent with all the other reported population data on that province or the whole country.

So far China has done very well in reducing mortality levels in the countryside as well as in the cities. During the last decade the process of mortality decline was speeded up by the training and deployment of millions of paramedics and health workers to take care of primary medical care. A referral system for difficult cases channels the patients needing more expert care to the few available fully trained doctors. This system is paid for in more than 80 percent of the total production

brigades, by a cooperative medical insurance system heavily subsidized by communal income. The other 15 percent of the brigades, at last report, are still without any such cooperative medical plan, which may leave their members more vulnerable to illness because they cannot afford to pay for medical care. The urban medical system, by contrast, is more advanced than the rural system. Paramedics also work there, but the supporting network of hospitals and doctors is more extensive.

Fertility decline during the 1970s proceeded very rapidly in some provinces, slowly and haltingly in others. Some provinces still have traditional levels or higher-than-traditional levels of fertility, but in general these are border provinces with large minority group populations. Also, the total number of people living in the provinces with the highest birth rates is small, compared to China's total population size.

Two key changes contribute to the current fertility decline. One is rising proportions of married couples contracepting. All forms of birth control appear to be available and in use almost everywhere in the country, except for some minority group areas, border regions, and very sparsely populated provinces. The variety of methods available contributes to popular acceptance of one method or another. In addition, the motivation for large families seems to be changing, due to socioeconomic development, the communal rural economy, rising educational levels, women's role changes, as well as social and political pressure against high fertility. An example of a province with high rates of contraceptive use is Kwangtung, which reported for 1974 that 60 percent of married women of reproductive age were using birth control throughout the province.<sup>28</sup> Local areas of Kwangtung are using some kind of family planning accounting system that tends to exaggerate the proportion of couples currently contracepting, so this 60 percent figure is also a slight exaggeration. Nevertheless, the achievement of a contraceptive use rate of more than 50 percent in a province of about 58 million people is remarkable in the experience of currently developing countries. Kwangtung is not alone in this achievement. Several other populous provinces have reported lower birth rates or natural population increase rates than Kwangtung and therefore presumably have similarly high rates of contraceptive use.

The other means by which China has been reducing its birth rate and natural population increase rate has been a rising age at marriage for women and men. This trend is poorly documented, but in some local



areas whole cohorts of youth have been mobilized to postpone their marriages during the 1970s. Local officials sometimes refuse to issue marriage licenses to couples considered too young to marry and try to persuade the young adults to postpone their planned marriages. The target marriage ages for women and men vary from locality to locality, from as low as twenty-two for women and twenty-four for men to as high as twenty-seven for women and thirty for men. Some urban areas stipulate that the combined age of two persons planning to marry should be fifty years or more.

To the extent that the pressure to raise age at marriage has succeeded it has resulted in short term as well as long term fertility decline. Later marriage lengthens the time between generations, gives couples a longer time to lower their desired number of children, and cuts out some of the most fertile years from the reproductive period of a couple. In the short run, whole cohorts of first births are postponed when cohorts of marriages are postponed. Some local areas have reported extreme birth rate declines following mass postponement of marriages. While some of these data are faulty, the trend toward higher marriage ages and the resulting downward pressure on the birth rate is clear. Even in some minority group areas there are anecdotal reports of rising marriage ages.

Until very recently, China's population was growing at a rate of more than 2 percent per year, in some years at perhaps 2.5 percent a year. Now the country's population growth rate is probably less than 2 percent annually, and dropping to an equilibrium level of around 1.1 percent a year, which can be expected to continue through 1995, if replacement level fertility is reached and maintained. So far, the P.R.C. has had great difficulty keeping production increases in some sectors of the economy well ahead of population growth rates. Agricultural production, particularly grain production, has increased at a rate roughly equivalent to or only slightly faster than the population growth rate since 1953. Fortunately, rapid fertility decline has prevented China from experiencing a 3 percent annual population growth rate for a long period, an experience common in many developing countries. Rather, the P.R.C. now has the chance for regular modest increases in per capita production and consumption of essential items like food, in spite of its present age structure, which is unfavorable to a low birth rate and low natural population increase rate. Within the foreseeable future, after today's teenagers and young adults finish their childbearing period,

China should be capable of stabilizing its population size. Few other developing countries have such a prospect clearly in view.

## Notes

1. Parts of this chapter are excerpted from Banister (forthcoming). For this book, Dr. Banister collected officially reported data on fertility, contraceptive use, age at marriage, mortality, age structure, migration, and total population size for the People's Republic of China and all its subunits. As much as possible, she tested these data for accuracy and consistency and reasonableness, before using reported population statistics to describe recent population changes in each province and in the P.R.C. as a whole. Using a computer population projection technique, she simulated the changes that China's population had experienced since the early 1950s, and predicted a likely pattern of population growth during the next twenty-year period.

2. In contrast, developed countries generally have a population growth rate of around 1 percent a year or less, and some have achieved a situation of zero population growth.

3. Barclay et al. (1976).

4. This does not mean that everyone died before age twenty-five but that the average life span was around twenty-five years.

5. The rate of natural population increase is calculated by subtracting the crude death rate from the crude birth rate.

6. See Banister (1977):68-69, and Banister (forthcoming) for the piecemeal evidence indicating that a national population count was taken in 1972.

7. A computer population projection for China based as much as possible on official national population data produces very low levels of fertility and mortality for the 1970s, levels that are inconsistent with reported data and qualitative information from China's provinces. See Banister (1977), chapters 4-13; and Banister (forthcoming).

8. "Han Suyin Discusses Her Visit to Tibet" (Hong Kong *Wen-hui Pao* in Chinese, November 11, 1975), *U.S. Joint Publications Research Service* no. 66480 (January 2, 1976):7. (Translations on the People's Republic of China no. 334.) Also see Banister (1977):449-452, 466; and Banister (forthcoming).

9. "Tibet Holds Conference on Health Work" (Lhasa Tibet Regional Service in Mandarin, October 16, 1976), *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report—PRC* 1, no. 205 (October 21, 1976):J1.

- 10 Rogers (1974) 15 and Wolfson (1975) 7-8
- 11 Rogers (1974) 13-14
12. Medical Services (NCNA in English March 7 1977) Summary of World Broadcasts Part 3 The Far East Weekly Economic Report Second Series FE/W920/A/1 (March 16 1977) 1
- 13 Public Health (NCNA in English September 24 1973) Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3 The Far East Weekly Economic Report Second Series FE/W744 (October 3 1973) 1
- 14 See Davis (1956) 318 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1965) 5-6 and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1973) 76
- 15 Aird (1961) 46-49 Pressat (1958) 570 and Chandrasekhar (1960) 53-54
- 16 Strengthen the Work of Supplying Contraceptives *Ta Kung Pao* (Peking) February 9 1958
- 17 See Banister (1977) 268-273 and Banister (forthcoming)
- 18 Worth (n.d.) cited in Parish (1976) 7
- 19 See data from Kiangsu Hopeh Honan and Kwangtung provinces in Banister (1977) and Banister (forthcoming)
- 20 Sources for this generalization are given in Banister (1977) 151-161 and in Banister (forthcoming)
- 21 Replacement level fertility means that women in their reproductive ages have just enough daughters to replace themselves. If a country achieves replacement fertility and continues this fertility level indefinitely the population size will eventually stabilize (ignoring migration). The achievement of replacement level fertility however does not mean that the population immediately stops growing because there may be a large number of women of childbearing age in the population.
- 22 They are Kiangsu Hopeh and Kwangtung provinces.
- 23 China's Birth Rate Now Under Control *Congress Unit Told New York Times* May 6 1973 p. 5
- 24 A cohort includes all those people born in the same year.
- 25 *Jen min jih pao* September 20 1976 p. 1 and Aird (1978) 1
- 26 It is impossible to document this assertion except from the impressions of visitors to China and from interviews with refugees about their home villages or neighborhoods. For instance William Parish and Martin White estimate from refugee interviews that 90 percent of the young males in the countryside of Kwangtung Province are still in their home villages frequently living with or next door to their parents. See Parish and White (1978) 54
- 27 Orleans (1972) 93-119
- 28 Population Kwangtung (Canton City Service in Cantonese

April 23, 1975). *Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3: The Far East, Weekly Economic Report, Second Series*, FE/W824 (April 30, 1975):1; error in original translation corrected in "Population: Kwangtung," *SWB-WER* FE/W825 (May 7, 1975):1.

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### 3

## History

*Harold C. Hinton*

The People's Republic of China has already existed for more than a generation. Clearly it is more than the passing phase that Secretary John Foster Dulles once predicted. It has accumulated a historical record that is important, interesting, and basic to an understanding of all other aspects of the history of modern China and, although complex, is quite comprehensible.

### Background

Like most other traditional non-Western societies, China experienced in the nineteenth century the profoundly unsettling impact of the dynamic ideas, organization, and technology of the West. Unlike most others, China was too big and too tough to become the colony of a single Western power, although all the major powers, including Japan, acquired a degree of influence over it such that China was sometimes humbly labeled a *semicolony*. Unlike a few of the others, notably Japan, China lacked an existing political structure capable of reinvigorating, and modernizing, the country so that it could contend with the West on roughly equal footing.

Since reform on a grand scale was not possible, the alternative to subjugation or collapse had to be revolution. The necessary ideology was evolved as a curious mixture of Chinese and Western ideas, in the early twentieth century by the idealistic but naive patriot Sun Yat-sen, who labeled it the Three People's Principles. Existing Chinese models of political organization and action being inadequate to the needs of his Kuomintang (National People's Party), Sun formed in 1923 an alliance with Lenin's Comintern on a platform of imperialism and took over to a degree the authoritarian and effective Communist organizational



and functional model, known officially and somewhat euphemistically as democratic centralism. As a by-product of his alliance with the Comintern, Sun also formed one with the young (founded in 1921) but vigorous Communist Party of China (CPC).

At first this three-fold alliance was highly successful against its adversaries—the “imperialist” powers and the forces of domestic reaction (principally the “warlords”)—and in mid-1928 the Kuomintang proclaimed, somewhat unrealistically, that it had acquired legitimate power over the whole of China. In the meantime, however, the death of Sun in 1925 had removed the main cement holding the revolutionary alliance together. His successor, Chiang Kai-shek, was a military man and far more conservative. He regarded the Comintern (by then under the control of Stalin) and the CPC with profound suspicion and feared, with much justification, that they were trying to take over the Kuomintang and, through it, China. He sought to deal with this problem through two coups, one (1926) directed at limiting the Communists’ presence in the Kuomintang’s leading bodies and the other (1927) directed at annihilating their mushrooming labor and peasant organizations in the Kuomintang’s heartland, the lower Yangtze valley.

### **The Rise of the Chinese Communist Movement (1927-1949)**

At the cost of a complete disruption of the revolutionary alliance, Chiang was largely successful, except that the CPC, although rendered temporarily harmless, had not been destroyed. While the Kuomintang more or less controlled the cities, there emerged in the rural areas of central and southern China a half dozen Communist-controlled base areas (“soviets”). For a variety of reasons, including personality and luck, the most important of these turned out to be one in southern Kiangsi led by a young Hunanese named Mao Tse-tung. Using a number of appeals and techniques, including land reform (i.e., redistribution of landlord-owned land among the poorer elements of the local peasantry) and a highly politicized version of guerrilla warfare, Mao and his colleagues there and elsewhere succeeded in rendering their bases viable enough to attract much hostile attention from Chiang Kai-shek’s government in Nanking. By October 1934, heavy governmental military pressures had dislodged the Communists from their base areas and set them in motion on their famous Long March to Northwest China.

There they established a new, much poorer, base area and continued to face Nationalist military pressures, although in a less severe form. By 1931-1932 the Imperial Japanese Army had seized Manchuria (known to Chinese as the Northeast). The CPC tried to undermine the Nationalists' efforts against the Party by appealing to some elements among them, and to Chinese public opinion as a whole, to stop the civil war and unite to resist further Japanese encroachments. This line had considerable appeal and was supported, in essence, by Stalin and the Comintern. Chiang Kai shek himself came to endorse it outwardly at any rate, after being kidnapped by two of his own commanders at Si in December 1936, in turn he was accepted by the CPC, again outwardly and largely because of Stalin's insistence, as the head of the prospective nationwide anti-Japanese resistance.

Since neither side was acting in good faith and since each came to believe that Japan would be defeated eventually by other powers regardless of what happened in China and that it could therefore afford to put its own interests first, the new alliance did not long survive the outbreak of a major Sino-Japanese war in 1937. The next eight years proved to be decisive for the outcome of the struggle for power in China. The Japanese invasion created enormous disruption in eastern China which had been the Kuomintang's power base and forced the Nationalists back into remote and backward southwest China. There in spite of substantial American aid and support, they largely vegetated and deteriorated until the Japanese collapse in 1945 by which time they were too inept, corrupt and reactionary to save themselves. The Communists on the other hand, drew on their experience in rural organization and guerrilla warfare to establish about twenty base areas, some of them behind Japanese lines, and to expand the Red Army.

By V-J Day (September 2, 1945) the Communists were in both a mood and a position to again challenge the nominally stronger Nationalists. The beginning of the final round was delayed, however, by the fact that until the spring of 1946 both the United States and the Soviet Union had significant military presences in China (in the Soviet case in Manchuria) and that both wanted their clients to avoid a civil war that might involve themselves. The United States, with tacit Soviet approval, engaged in a complex effort to stave off civil war in China and through mediation to bring the Nationalists and the Communists into a political and military coalition with each other. The effort foundered on mutual hostility and suspicion, and after the spring of 1946 the irrepressible conflict began to escalate. For a variety of political and military reasons

implicit in the history of the two adversaries, as already summarized, the Kuomintang became in 1949 the first but not the last non-Communist Asian regime to fall victim to a Communist insurgency. It then moved its base to Taiwan, where it remains. The victors, acting through a nominally representative but actually handpicked and Communist-dominated body known as the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, proclaimed the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), with its capital at Peking, effective October 1, 1949.

### Consolidation and Reconstruction (1949-1952)

At the time of the Liberation of 1949, the CPC was understandably in a confident mood. As a result of its resounding victory, it was accepted by most Chinese as their new leadership and was actively supported by many, probably a majority. There was no realistic possibility, at least for the time being, of a successful challenge to its control from either inside or outside the country. The new regime was strong enough at the beginning of 1950 to allow Mao Tse-tung to work out a relationship with Stalin in which China held the role of junior partner and ally rather than satellite.

On the other hand, there were abundant problems. Decades of civil and foreign war had left the country exhausted, its modest rail network and industrial system barely functioning, and an astronomical inflation raging. There were pockets of resistance here and there, and Tibet and Taiwan remained to be "liberated."

In essence, the CPC tackled these and other problems with its tested methods of ideology and organization. The "thought" of Mao Tse-tung, a heavily sinicized version of Marxism-Leninism, was industriously propagated as the new national ideology, and Mao himself was increasingly built up in the media, school textbooks, and elsewhere as a kind of father or even emperor figure, the personal symbol of the desired new national unity and dynamism. As such he was accepted by most Chinese, including of course CPC members, who were tired of China's disunity and weakness and the troubles these had brought. On the organizational side, the CPC extended throughout the country its network of cadres, committees, bureaus, and so on, which had been perfected in North China by Liu Shao-ch'i and P'eng Chen during the anti-Japanese war. Under the supervision of the Party apparatus, a network of "people's governments," mass organizations (labor unions, peasants', women's, youth, and other organizations), and the like prolifer-

ated rapidly with CPC members in the controlling positions.

According to Mao's thought China immediately after the Liberation was not yet "building socialism" but rather was completing the new democratic stage of its revolution under the leadership of the working class and the CPC rather than the bourgeoisie (old democracy). Mao labeled his regime a people's democratic dictatorship—democracy for the people (under Communist leadership) dictatorship for the reactionaries. According to the principles of Leninism one of the most important and urgent tasks was land reform as an essential half-way house between the old feudal agrarian system and the desired socialist countryside of the future. Accordingly in the spring of 1950 the CPC inaugurated a nationwide agrarian reform campaign (except in national minority areas) modeled on similar but smaller scale agrarian reforms earlier in its history. Since one of its objects was the physical elimination of actual or potential anti-Communist elements in the countryside thousands of people who were not actually (absentee) landlords as well as others who were won over and converted and sentenced often along with their families to death or imprisonment their lands of course were confiscated and redistributed. Similar but smaller and less violent campaigns were launched at about the same time in the urban areas against non-Communist businessmen and intellectuals as well as against Communist elites accused of corruption and other evils.

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 paralleled the CPC's united liberation of Tibet and resulted in the extension of American military protection to unliberated Taiwan. China's entry into the war the following fall opened a major (although undeclared) war between it and the obviously more powerful United States. This was a dangerous situation for the CPC, which however characteristically saw it also as an opportunity. The CPC's propaganda helped to create a siege mentality in the light of which still more vigorous action at home appeared justifiable and even necessary. For about two years beginning in the last months of 1950 the CPC conducted a massive campaign against actual and alleged counter-revolutionaries—thousands of whom were executed, sent to forced labor (reform through labor) or imprisoned. A reasonable estimate of the total number of people executed at the instigation of the CPC during the three years immediately following the Liberation would be three quarters of a million.

As early as March 1949 the CPC had begun planning for the economic

rehabilitation of the country, especially its battered urban sector. Liberation brought the CPC physical control over many of China's economic assets, much more than the Kuomintang had ever possessed. This control facilitated many tasks, notably the struggle against inflation, which was brought rapidly under control by expressing prices in terms of "parity units," computed as fixed quantities of certain basic commodities, rather than money. With the aid of several thousand Japanese engineers and technicians who had remained in China after 1945, railway lines and industries, many of them originally built by the Japanese, were restored to usefulness with remarkable speed. In this way the CPC's economic timetable, announced by Mao Tse-tung in 1950 as beginning with three years of reconstruction to be followed by a series of five-year plans designed to make the P.R.C. a modern state and major industrial power by the end of the twentieth century, was kept at least approximately on schedule.

#### The "Transition to Socialism" (1953-1955)

At the beginning of 1953 the CPC announced the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan and of the P.R.C.'s "transition to socialism." The plan covered both industry and agriculture and in the former case was based on a hopeful assumption about Soviet aid. This was to a considerable extent only an assumption and, together with inadequate data and a shortage of skilled personnel, it put the plan on a decidedly shaky basis. Although during the 1950s the Soviet Union was to provide the P.R.C. with a total of about \$2 billion of (reimbursable) economic and military aid, in early 1953 the Kremlin was coping with the succession to Stalin and was in a poor position to make definite or generous commitments to Peking. Largely as a result, the plan was not put into final shape until February 1955 and was not made public until July of that year. In spite of these problems, the industrial aspect of the plan, which in the Soviet manner stressed heavy industry, performed very well. It was largely in other areas that the most serious difficulties of the period arose.

One of these was elite politics. Kao Kang, a high-ranking Politburo member, was also Chairman of the State Planning Committee and regional boss of Manchuria, which contained China's greatest concentration of heavy industry. He was too close to the post-Stalin Soviet leadership, as he had been to Stalin, for the comfort of his more nativist colleagues; he favored continued stress on Manchuria (where

Soviet influence was strong) as against the development of new industrial centers elsewhere and he supported a relatively moderate approach to agriculture (in essence mechanization before collectivization). In all these respects Kao was out of step with the mainstream of the Party leadership including Mao and his arrogant personality only exacerbated the differences.

At the end of 1953 Mao fell seriously ill for several weeks and Kao took advantage of the apparent opportunity to lobby for his policies and seek support—with little or no success—among the army leadership. In addition he allegedly formed an alliance with Jao Shu shih the regional boss of eastern China where China's major light industrial center Shanghai was located and sought the second place in the Party and state hierarchies to the possibly dying Mao. But Mao recovered by March 1954 and Kao's plot or alleged plot was foiled at about the same time. Kao was later said to have committed suicide.

Kao's fall was accompanied by the breaking up of the regional centers of power that had existed for the past few years in the three major hierarchies—the Party (the regional bureaus of the Central Committee), the government (the regional governments) and the army (the field armies). As a further measure of modernization and centralization the P.R.C. received from the CPC as the former's fifth birthday present (October 1, 1954) its first real state constitution. According to the more important and innovative of its provisions Mao Tse-tung became chairman of the P.R.C. (i.e. chief of state), a quasi-legislative body analogous to the Soviet Union's Supreme Soviet and known as the National People's Congress was created, a Ministry of Defense headed by the P.R.C.'s senior active soldier (Peng Teh huai) was established within Premier Chou En lai's State Council (cabinet) and the State Planning Committee was also subordinated to the State Council.

The agricultural aspect of the First Five-Year Plan centered on step-by-step socialization. Like most other Communist parties in power the CPC has preferred in practice the collective farm (referred to in China as the agricultural producers cooperative) in which the land is cooperatively owned and the members have residual claims on its products to the theoretically superior state farm in which the state has ownership and is the residual claimant since it has contracted to pay fixed wages to the workers on the farm. The CPC knew what disasters Stalin's brutal approach to collectivization had inflicted on agriculture and the peasants in the Soviet Union and was determined to avoid anything of the same kind. Accordingly, as it had done in parts of North

China before Liberation, it began, after land reform, with the formation of supposedly voluntary and seasonal "mutual aid teams," in which tools and labor were pooled but land titles and land use were not. The First Five-Year Plan called for the creation of lower level ("semisocialist") cooperatives, in which land use but not land titles would be "cooperativized"; these were to be followed in time by higher level ("fully socialist") cooperatives, in which land titles would be "cooperativized"—collective farms in the usual (Soviet) sense except for the presumable absence of farm machinery.

By 1954 lower-level cooperatives were being formed in sizable numbers, with some adverse but not catastrophic effects. There was something of a "blind influx" of peasants into the cities, which combined with serious Yangtze floods to produce urban food shortages by the end of 1954. All this in turn helped to evoke another campaign against counterrevolutionaries, although not on the scale of a few years earlier, and a major policy debate within the party leadership. Mao, whose impatient and imperious tendencies appeared to have grown since his illness of the year before, found himself opposed to a majority of the Politburo and the Central Committee. They, or at least some of them, wanted to slow the rate of cooperativization envisaged in the First Five-Year Plan. Mao, in opposition, wanted to accelerate it, on the doubtful theory that the peasant's temperament was much more "socialist" than his opponents supposed.

Instead of bowing to an adverse majority as a thoroughly orthodox "democratic centralist" would have done, Mao decided to get his way by means outside the Party constitution. At the end of July 1955, only a few weeks after the First Five-Year Plan had been unveiled before a session of the National People's Congress, he convened an ad hoc meeting of first secretaries of the provincial Party committees and persuaded them to accept his demand for faster rather than slower cooperativization. Mao's position was also energetically supported over the ensuing months by the party's massive propaganda machine, over which he maintained close personal control. As a result, cooperativization was indeed accelerated in the fall of 1955; in fact, once momentum had been attained, the lower level cooperatives were upgraded to upper level ones, so that by the end of 1956 most peasants had been fully cooperativized. At the same time similar, but less important and less traumatic socialization campaigns were conducted in two other sectors, private business and handicrafts. After his triumph, Mao was not likely again to accept frustration willingly at the hands of an adverse majority of his colleagues.

### The Hundred Flowers and the East Wind (1956-1957)

The cause of democratic centralism in the CPC received a powerful stimulus from the Soviet Party's Twentieth Congress in February 1956 and in particular from Khrushchev's heated denunciation of Stalin at the end of it in the famous Secret Speech. Mao although not dead like Stalin was his Chinese equivalent if only a rough one, and Mao's position was inevitably affected by Khrushchev's campaign against the memory and policies of the departed dictator. Evidently deriving some inspiration from this a few of Mao's colleagues in the Party apparatus notably Liu Shih-ch'i moved to curb his political role although in a far more tactful manner than Khrushchev's. At the CPC's Eighth Congress (September 1956) a number of innovations adverse to Mao's position and to his cult of personality were introduced into the Party constitution. By remarkable coincidence those leaders who failed to support Mao publicly during the congress were to fare badly during the Cultural Revolution a decade later.

Meanwhile Mao had begun a political campaign on his own behalf using as before the Party propaganda machine to achieve much of the effect he wanted. Determined to vindicate his leadership and statesmanship against the implied criticism of his more bureaucratically inclined colleagues and to put them and the impetuous Khrushchev down, Mao launched in the spring of 1956 the famous Hundred Flowers Movement. Its essence was an invitation to intellectuals and specialists whether members of the CPC or not to bloom and contend or in other words to speak their minds freely on matters of public interest. Mao evidently believed that the result would be an outpouring of praise and support tempered by constructive criticism for himself and the regime he had done so much to create.

The campaign got off to a slow start. Understandably the Party apparatus was not enthusiastic about it and the intellectuals were not sure they would be safe if they spoke their minds on controversial questions. The Hungarian crisis of October-November 1956 helped by suggesting to the Party apparatus the possibility that a similar explosion might occur in China unless a safety valve were provided in the form of free public discussion of public issues. Mao undertook to encourage the intellectuals to loosen their tongues through an important speech on contradictions among the people that he delivered on February 27, 1957.

The outcome was a delayed outpouring of comment and criticism in the late spring, some of it by CPC members. Once convinced that they



had been promised immunity, the critics, considered as a whole, denounced every imaginable aspect of the CPC's rule, including Mao Tse-tung's *personalismo*. This unpleasant result, which was unexpected at least to Mao, placed the CPC in an excruciating dilemma: it could either tolerate the criticism and allow it to continue, in which case (by its own totalitarian standards) it would risk the collapse of its legitimacy and control, or it could silence and punish the critics, in which case it would violate its pledge of immunity to them. It chose the second alternative, and by way of justification it published on June 18 an admittedly edited version of Mao's previously unpublished speech of February 27, after inserting in it some restrictions on freedom of speech that the critics were then accused of having ignored.

All this represented a major emotional and political crisis for the regime, and above all for Mao himself as the sponsor of the Hundred Flowers Movement. While the vacationing Mao pondered what to do, the apparent answer materialized in an unexpected quarter. During the summer the Soviet Union became the first power to test an intercontinental ballistic missile, and on October 4 the first to orbit an earth satellite. These spectaculars, and still more the sensation they created in the United States (the "missile gap"), made Mao believe, or at least claim to believe, that the "socialist camp" led by the Soviet Union was achieving an irreversible ascendancy over the "imperialist camp" led by the United States, or in his own more picturesque language that "The East wind has prevailed over the West wind." Mao evidently hoped that the impulsive Khrushchev, now that he had purged some of his more conservative (in foreign policy) colleagues including Defense Minister Zhukov, could be persuaded to put Soviet power and prestige fully at the service of a more or less worldwide politico-military offensive against "imperialism" to be designed by Mao. The main early results to be hoped for were Taiwan for the P.R.C., West Berlin for the Soviet Union (or, more accurately, for East Germany), and a badly needed boost for Mao's prestige at home and abroad. This militant strategy, to be sure, threatened to arouse not only the opposition of the supposedly decadent "West wind" but also the alarm of the neutral countries; Mao had already decided that the latter were basically "soft" on "imperialism" in any case and that their goodwill was of little practical value to the "socialist camp."

Mao began to press this line on Khrushchev when he visited Moscow in November 1957 on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution and the convening of a major international

conference of Communist parties Khrushchev who had a keener appreciation than Mao of international realities and knew very well that the missile gap actually favored or would soon favor the United States in effect declined Mao's proposal as too risky. If there was to be a great international offensive against imperialism the P.R.C. stake in it would have to be greater than Mao had originally envisioned. Already convinced that the centralized bureaucratic Soviet approach to economic development was not suited to Chinese conditions Mao now began to think of Khrushchev as revisionist (unduly moderate) in his domestic and foreign policies and as under the influence of the still more revisionist Liu who in 1958 began to denounce Mao as a threat to world peace and to the autonomy of individual Communist parties.

### The Great Leap Forward (1958-1960)

Largely in response to Mao's current mood and views the pendulum of Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy began to swing to the left in the fall of 1957. During the ensuing winter Mao succeeded in winning, at least the qualified support of the Party apparatus whose leaders were apparently unwilling to face a major debate with him so soon after the fiasco of 1957 for a galvanic effort at self-strengthening (a favorite term of nineteenth-century Chinese reformers) to be known as the Great Leap Forward.

Although it had some urban and industrial aspects the Great Leap Forward was primarily a rural and agricultural movement. Mao and his fellow radicals in the Party leadership unrealistically assumed an almost unlimited substitutability of labor for the other factors of production. More specifically the supposedly socialist Chinese peasant, if properly motivated, organized and led was considered capable of a labor output sufficient to move the country rapidly in an uninterrupted revolution to a higher plane of economic development and to the brink of, if not actually into the ultimate stage of communism which not even the Soviet Union had claimed to have entered.

The organization through which this dream was supposed to become true was known as the people's commune and it began to make its appearance in the spring of 1958. In essence it was a new headquarters superimposed on the average over a dozen of the old agricultural producers' cooperatives which were now renamed production brigades. In principle at least each commune was to be as self-sufficient as possible and was not only to plan agricultural operations over this rela-

tively large area but to operate local industries including heavy ones (the famous "backyard furnaces"), communal kitchens and nurseries (to release female labor power for other tasks), communal schools, and militia organization. The commune was given the Party leadership's official and public approval in the summer of 1958 and rapidly became universal except in national minority areas.

The Great Leap Forward, as symbolized by the commune movement, encountered serious obstacles and problems. The peasants were worked to the point of exhaustion. The small private plots that they had enjoyed until then were mostly taken away, and they were expected to be content with ideological rather than material incentives. "Close planting" and "deep plowing" of the fields made good propaganda, but they were bad for the land. The "steel" produced in the "backyard furnaces" proved to be good for almost nothing. Normal economic activity, including the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962), was seriously disrupted.

The Party leadership aggravated these problems in unnecessary ways. The talk about an imminent attainment of "communism" aroused exaggerated expectations in some quarters and profoundly irritated the Kremlin. For propaganda purposes, the leadership overstated the achievements of the Great Leap Forward and urged local cadres to do the same with respect to the results of their own efforts. The outcome, among other things, was a series of gross statistical exaggerations; the regime claimed a 1958 harvest of 375 million tons, as against 185 million tons actually produced the year before.

Parallel with its galvanic effort at home, Peking undertook an external initiative in a relatively controllable area, the Taiwan Strait, designed to foster an all-out effort in the Great Leap Forward and to compensate for what was deemed Moscow's insufficient dynamism abroad. Over obvious Soviet objections, Peking in August-October 1958 tried to blockade the Nationalist-held offshore island of Quemoy with artillery fire and air action, so as to score if possible a success against the Nationalists and their American patrons. But the other side's response was unexpectedly firm, and Soviet support being almost purely verbal, Peking felt compelled to call off the crisis and initiate contacts with the United States at the ambassadorial level at Warsaw. This episode imposed a serious strain on Sino-Soviet relations and contributed, together with Peking's general assertiveness, to Khrushchev's termination in mid-1959 of a unique program designed to help the P.R.C. to produce its own nuclear weapons and surface-to-surface (offensive) missiles that he had previously agreed to in the fall of 1957.

In the fall of 1958 the Chinese leadership began to modify the most obviously excessive features of the Great Leap Forward like the backyard furnaces. This policy was formally announced at a Central Committee meeting in December. At the same meeting it was also announced that Mao would not succeed himself as chairman of the P.R.C. when his current term expired as it was soon to do. The available evidence on the motivation for this somewhat puzzling move suggests that rather than being eased out by his colleagues Mao had voluntarily decided some time before to give this office up while retaining his more important chairmanship of the Party Central Committee partly in order to save time and energy but also because the post resembled one held by the despised revisionist Tso whom the Chinese press had begun to attack in the spring of 1958. Accordingly at a session of the National People's Congress held in April 1959 the chairmanship of the P.R.C. was assumed by Liu Shao-chi.

In March 1959 the situation in Tibet which had been serious for at least three years erupted. The warlike Khampti tribesmen were already in revolt and the Dalai Lama who had become thoroughly disenchanted with Peking had been persuaded by his countrymen to escape to India. Intensified activity by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Tibet and along the Sino-Indian border as well as increasingly repressive political measures against the Tibetan population produced a stream of refugees to India and Nepal several thousand of them being male Khamptas of military age (who in many cases acquired weapons from foreign sources and later returned to Tibet to fight). Indian sympathy for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees as well as the fact that the proper location of much of the Sino-Indian border was in dispute created something of a crisis between Peking and New Delhi in which Khrushchev clearly sympathized with the Indian side.

By this time Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai had become convinced that the Great Leap Forward was endangering the P.R.C.'s long term development and the modernization of its armed forces as well as Soviet military aid and protection. The fact that the Soviet leadership agreed with him weakened his position in Peking rather than strengthening it. In June 1959 after returning from a trip to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe he launched a challenge to the Great Leap Forward and to Mao's leadership. In this he was completely unsuccessful and in August he was purged and succeeded as Defense Minister by his rival Lin Biao who although a brilliant soldier on the record was as much a radical Maoist in outlook as Peng was a pragmatic modernizer.

At that time the Party leadership was preparing to celebrate the P.R.C.'s tenth anniversary. It decided to scale down the claim for the 1958 harvest to 250 million tons (still too high by about 50 million tons), this being the highest figure that it thought would command belief, and to readjust the targets for 1959 accordingly. This did not indicate any bearishness on Peking's part. On the contrary, believing that the mediocre harvest of 1959 would be followed and compensated for by a good one in 1960, the CPC placed heavy orders for industrial equipment in Moscow and entered its second decade in power in an optimistic mood.

Unfortunately for Peking, its optimism at home was matched by its assertiveness abroad. Fed up with what it considered Khrushchev's softness on American "imperialism," especially his visit to the United States in the summer of 1959, Peking launched a propaganda attack on him in April 1960, although without using his name in public, and began to denounce him in June at various international Communist meetings. Understandably angered, Khrushchev overreacted by cancelling the Soviet economic aid program in the P.R.C. and withdrawing the Soviet technicians (1,390 in all) in the summer of 1960. This was a serious and probably intentional blow to Peking's industrial development program.

Even worse was the fact that the 1960 harvest turned out to be still smaller than that of the year before. This problem was complicated by a considerable disruption of transport produced by the Great Leap Forward. As a result, a serious food shortage, approaching famine in some areas, developed in 1961. Peking had no choice but to call off the Great Leap Forward, in fact although unadmittedly; this it did at the end of 1960.

### Recovery and Controversy (1961-1965)

In lieu of the Great Leap Forward, Peking inaugurated a program of retrenchment and recovery at the beginning of 1961, largely under the supervision of the Party apparatus. Grain imports were initiated, although without being publicly mentioned. Heavy industrial expansion was virtually stopped, and emphasis was placed instead on industry that supported agriculture, like chemical fertilizers. Most important of all, the peasants were again permitted a reasonable level of material incentives and private plots were restored, while the communes were reduced in size.

Under this policy conditions rapidly improved one of the first clear signs of recovery being the good winter wheat harvest gathered at the beginning of 1962. Through 1965 the same pragmatic policies and relative prosperity continued to obtain always under the supervision of the Party apparatus.

This seemingly idyllic situation aroused profound concern on the part of Mao who feared a slide into revisionism and from the beginning of 1962 on urged a return to something like the Great Leap Forward. Unable to achieve this he had to settle for a succession of ineffective half measures. Later in 1962 he persuaded his colleagues to agree to the Socialist Education Movement aimed mainly at enhancing the political consciousness and performance of Party cadres in the rural areas however increasing differences developed between Mao and Liu Shao-chi as to how the campaign should be conducted. In 1963 and 1964 Mao launched some other campaigns notably one to learn from the People's Liberation Army which under Lin Biao's leadership had supposedly become a model of Maoist militancy and one to train a generation of revolutionary successors among the youth.

Recovery at home coincided with some dramatic developments abroad. In the spring of 1962 Peking found itself confronted with crises on four fronts. A flareup of fighting in Laos brought American troops to Thailand. Some 60,000 Sinkiang nomads fled to Soviet Central Asia apparently with Soviet connivance if not at actual Soviet instigation. Worse still the Nationalists appeared to be gearing for an attack across the Taiwan Strait. The evaporation of the latter threat if it ever was one in late June left Peking free to concentrate on the fourth crisis on the Sino-Indian border. Indian troops were moving into a disputed area known as Aksai Chin across which Peking had built a military road linking western Sinkiang with western Tibet. After repeated warnings failed to stop this process Peking launched a brilliantly successful offensive (October 20-November 20 1962) that pushed the Indian army well away from the road and humiliated New Delhi in the eyes of the world. Peking was shielded to a degree by the simultaneous Cuban missile crisis which focused the attention of the superpowers on the Caribbean. Chinese propaganda branded the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba as an act of betrayal by Khrushchev who in turn made his sympathy for the Indian side in the Sino-Indian border crisis reasonably clear.

Sino-Soviet relations grew still worse as a result of Khrushchev's signature in the summer of 1963 of the nuclear test ban treaty with the

United States and Great Britain. For a number of reasons, Peking regarded this as another act of betrayal by Khrushchev, and it retaliated by escalating its propaganda polemic against him and his "revisionism." By the time of his fall from power in mid-October 1964, Sino-Soviet relations were very tense indeed.

Although Khrushchev himself probably had no friends at all in Peking by that time, the same did not necessarily apply to his successors led by Brezhnev, who of course had been responsible for his ouster. Indeed, the new Soviet leadership offered the Chinese a sweeping accommodation in February 1965, while at the same time proposing "united action" in connection with the escalating war in Vietnam. There is some reason to believe that some of Mao's colleagues, probably including Liu Shao-ch'i, felt some interest in this proposal, but Mao himself wanted no part of it, since he claimed to believe that the entire Soviet leadership was ineradicably infected with "Khrushchev revisionism." He had come to believe the same about Liu Shao-ch'i, and in January 1965, he decided to get rid of Liu somehow—easier said than done.

### The Cultural Revolution (1965-1969)

As Mao indicated in an interview with Edgar Snow in January 1965, he felt a concern that was even stronger and broader than his desire to be rid of Liu Shao-ch'i and curb the "revisionism" of the Party leadership. This was his worry that the future of revolution in China might be in danger if its youth were insufficiently revolutionary. Mao evidently decided that the young people should be ideologically energized through an experience replicating insofar as possible that of himself and his colleagues, notably the heroic days of the Kiangsi soviet and the Long March. In the course of this "great upheaval" (a term used by Mao in August 1966 as the Cultural Revolution was moving into high gear), the "revisionist" elements in the Party could be "rectified" or eliminated. Mao also wanted to silence and get rid of "revisionist" elements in the country's cultural and academic life, some of whom had been criticizing him in print under thin allegorical disguises since 1961 for his "cult of personality," the Great Leap Forward, the purge of P'eng Teh-huai, and so on. There is good reason to believe that Mao was incited to launch the "great upheaval" by his wife Chiang Ch'ing, who felt a strong sense of dislike and rivalry for Liu Shao-ch'i's wife Wang Kuang-mei and wanted an opportunity to play an active role in politics.

The beginning of the Cultural Revolution was probably delayed for about six months by a crisis that focused the attention of the leadership elsewhere. This was the escalation of the war in Vietnam beginning in February 1965 and the ensuing strategic debate in Peking over its meaning for China. To the extent that the debate had an overt aspect its two main spokesmen were Peking's two most conspicuous soldiers: Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ching and Defense Minister Lin Biao. Writing in May 1965, Lo maintained that Hanoi was correct in moving its regular forces into South Vietnam, that China should give active support to the point of sending troops of its own if so requested by Hanoi, that such a strategy would create a risk of an American strategic attack on the P.R.C. and that this risk in turn required the reestablishment of a close working relationship with the Soviet Union, at least in the military field. Writing in the following September, and presumably speaking for Mao, Lin insisted on the contrary that the war in South Vietnam should be fought by the Vietcong on a self-reliant basis as possible, that by the same token China should restrict its own role in the war to a low level that would minimize its risks and costs, that if in spite of this caution an American attack on China occurred, it would take the form of a conventional invasion that could be defeated in a people's war, and that it was neither necessary nor desirable for Peking to improve its relations with the Khrushchev revisionists. Lin's formulation, which essentially governed Peking's role in the Indochina war after Lo Jui-ching's purge early in 1966, was the first open indication that Lin might be seeking to be, and might be under consideration as, Mao's heir instead of Liu Shao-chi.

There is considerable evidence that Mao did not foresee in full the course that the Cultural Revolution would take nor did he plan a strategy for managing the revolution. On the contrary, the strategy born as it unfolded, the mark of extemporization.

In September-October 1965, Mao convened a special meeting to consider the first stage: an ideological and political housecleaning within the cultural and academic communities. This idea was of particular concern to Peng Chen, the powerful municipal boss of Peking, China's main cultural center, some of Mao's intended targets were among Peng's colleagues and protégés. At the most, Peng was prepared to, and subsequently did, conduct the campaign as an exercise in improving the historical accuracy and literary quality of the intellectuals' published output, rather than as the ideological and political campaign that Mao had desired. Peng's attitude, which was



evidently shared by a considerable number of the Party leadership, angered Mao and led him to withdraw from Peking to the Yangtze valley, where he spent the next six months (November 1965–May 1966). There, and especially in Shanghai, the radicals among the leadership, and Chiang Ch'ing in particular, had established a political base since the spring of 1965. There Mao pondered how to purge P'eng Chen and tried to gather strength for that purpose while watching P'eng conduct the first stage of the Cultural Revolution in his halfhearted manner.

One of Mao's problems apparently was that he lacked at first a solid majority on the Party's key body, the seven-man Standing Committee of the Politburo (Political Bureau of the Central Committee). Chou En-lai supported him for devious reasons, chief among which was probably a desire to salvage from the impending "great upheaval" as much as possible of his State Council and the economy; he chose to give qualified cooperation to Mao, rather than risk everything through opposition. Lin Piao was sympathetic but on account of his sense of military responsibility evidently withheld his full support until after Peking concluded with the United States, in March 1966, what amounted to a tacit agreement that neither would escalate the war in Vietnam in such a way as to endanger the other. Teng Hsiao-p'ing apparently wavered, torn between his closeness to Liu Shao-ch'i and his probable rivalry with P'eng Chen, his immediate junior on the Party Secretariat. The other members of this Politburo Standing Committee, Liu in particular, were opposed to any further escalation of the Cultural Revolution. Sensing a threat to his position, Liu engaged in some clumsy and ultimately unsuccessful maneuvers to protect it, such as a trip to South and Southeast Asia in the spring of 1966 in his capacity as chairman of the P.R.C. (i.e., chief of state). Some of Mao's other targets, notably Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing, appear to have engaged in a "February plot" in 1966 against Mao, perhaps under the impression (widely shared in Peking for a time) that he was dying; if so, the plot was frustrated and the plotters purged.

Early in May 1966, Teng Hsiao-p'ing came over to Mao's side, and by the end of the month Mao had returned to Peking, and P'eng Chen had been purged in a bloodless coup executed by forces loyal to Mao and to Lin Piao. During this period there emerged at universities and secondary ("middle") schools in Peking, and later throughout the country, organizations of militant Maoist students known as Red Guards. With Mao's increasingly obvious approval, and with the active political encouragement and logistical support of the People's Liberation Army and its political arm (the General Political Department of the General Staff), the Red Guards set about denouncing and

demonstrating against the power holders in their own institutions (i.e. deans and others) and later those in the Party leadership (i.e., Mao's opponents in the Party apparatus)

This exceedingly unruly phenomenon was bound to present serious problems political as well as practical for the Party hierarchy and notably for its senior statesman Liu Shao-ch'i and its active leader Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Realizing this, Mao withdrew once more to the Yangtze valley leaving Liu and Teng to weaken their political positions by embroiling themselves in controversy with the Red Guards as they promptly proceeded to do.

At the beginning of August after Mao's return to Peking for the second time that year the Party Central Committee held a plenary session for which both sides had been guarding themselves for some months past. The hall was evidently packed most irregularly with Mao's supporters including Red Guards. Lin Piao claiming at least implicitly to speak on behalf of the armed forces gave Mao strong and perhaps decisive support. Even so there was enough in the way of countercurrents and outright opposition that the Maoist triumph was less than complete. The meeting did not formally endorse the Red Guards or purge the opposition; rather the Politburo and its Standing Committee were enlarged so as to increase, although not overwhelmingly the Maoist majority. Ch'u En-lai managed to secure the adoption of some safeguards which were to prove less than adequate for intellectuals and technicians against the full force of the Cultural Revolution and the Red Guards.

If the Red Guards were not formally sanctioned at this meeting they were soon afterward (or also in three months beginning in mid August) eight giant rallies of Red Guards, a total of about 10 million, were held in Peking so that they could see Mao, be greeted by him, and get a look at Lin Piao, who now began to be cast publicly, although still informally, in the role of Mao's heir. Many of the Red Guards had traveled to Peking from relatively remote parts of the country, often in transport provided or at least coordinated by the People's Liberation Army. While in Peking the Red Guards through turbulent demonstrations virtually put out of action the Party's allegedly revisionist Secretariat and its subordinate departments which have never since recovered their full pre-Cultural Revolution importance.

It was a different story however when in the fall the Red Guards were told in effect to perform a similar job on the power holders in the Party apparatus at the regional and provincial levels. These targets were not only tough and experienced but had close ties of long standing with the local military and police leaderships. They not only resisted

effectively but fought back, in some cases by forming their own Red Guard units to resist the onslaught of the genuine, or Maoist, ones. The only major area where the latter made any real gains at first was Shanghai, the radical headquarters. There a "commune" was proclaimed in February 1967, but it soon gave way to a more structured organization known as a Revolutionary Committee, in which power was shared by representatives of "revolutionary mass organizations" (mainly Red Guards), military personnel, and "loyal" cadres who had actually or nominally deserted the "power holders" and declared their loyalty to the Cultural Revolution.

Seeing that the Cultural Revolution was not making much progress at the local level and that the country was in some danger of sliding into anarchy, which in spite of his bombastic pronouncements about "great upheavals" and the like he did not really want, Mao in late January 1967 ordered the People's Liberation Army, his only remaining reserve, into the fray. Before agreeing, Lin Piao probably bargained to confirm his own status as Mao's heir and to ensure that the Cultural Revolution within the People's Liberation Army would be an internal affair rather than being conducted from without by the Red Guards.

The army's explicit mission was to "support the left," or in other words the Red Guards and other "revolutionaries." But it also had, or thought it had, an implicit mission to prevent chaos. The two were in conflict because the main threat to public order was the Red Guards, but Mao's "proletarian headquarters" in Peking did not acknowledge this fact fully. The Red Guards were hardly less unpopular with the local army commanders than they had been with the "power holders" of the Party apparatus. In practice, the army emphasized order and tended to repress the Red Guards, who referred to February 1967 as the month of the "adverse current." Their protests moved Peking to order the army on April 6 to ease up; when it did so, several months of serious Red Guard violence followed. Meanwhile, at about the end of March, Liu Shao-ch'i and other "revisionists" were purged, irregularly, from the Party leadership, and a propaganda campaign began in the official press against Liu, labeling him "China's Khrushchev." Because of these various problems, only six revolutionary committees (including the one for Shanghai) were formed at the provincial level through the summer of 1967.

During that summer Red Guard violence, which sometimes took the form of seizing weapons from military personnel, aroused increasing opposition from the army. Friction of this kind was particularly serious in the important industrial complex of Wuhan. When two delegates from Peking came there in July to investigate and mediate, the Wuhan

Military Region Commander Chen Tsai tao had them seized. He soon released them under threat of military action from forces loyal to Peking and became briefly the target of a major propaganda offensive. The radicals seized on the so-called Wuhan Incident to demand the launching of a campaign to drag out the power holders in the People's Liberation Army and generally radicalize the armed forces. Not only was this campaign abortive probably on account of the united opposition of the military region commanders but a number of radicals were purged including the director of the General Political Department of the General Staff.

This trend to the right was reinforced by the after effects of the temporary seizure by radicals of the Foreign Ministry on August 19 and the burning of the British mission three days later in reprisal for the imprisonment of some leftist journalists in Hong Kong. Shortly afterwards statements by Mao and Chiang Ching, the only leaders who could hope to make the Red Guards accept unwelcome directives suggested at least a qualified mandate for the army to suppress Red Guard violence. Fortified in this way the army formed and dominated eighteen provincial level revolutionary committees during the last quarter of 1967 and the first half of 1968.

As long as the Red Guards remained in existence however their violence, some of which was directed against each other continued to be a serious problem. In the summer of 1968 some of it took the form of raids on trains carrying arms to North Vietnam. With the proceeds rival Red Guard units in Kwangsi fought and killed each other probably angering Hanoi and unquestionably enraging Peking. Convinced at last that the Red Guards had outlived their usefulness and become a major problem Mao authorized their suppression at the end of July 1968. This was accomplished by the army during the next few months with the support of teams of workers. Thus the Cultural Revolution came to an end in all but name. Officially it was a great success, a great rally on September 7 celebrating the formation of the remaining provincial level revolutionary committees pronounced the entire country red and the Cultural Revolution victorious. By 1969 the Cultural Revolution had effectively ended.

### The Ascendancy and Fall of Lin Biao (1968-1971)

Lin Biao emerged from the Cultural Revolution in a strong position. To outward appearances he enjoyed the full support of Mao Tse-tung, and the radical elements of the Party leadership in his new role as Mao's

heir, and he was China's senior soldier with personal followers in many key military positions in Peking and the provinces. He was the object of a "cult of personality" second only to Mao's. He was, however, despite his own ambition, a man of very little political intelligence and great ideological dogmatism. He was in poor health and physically unimpressive, lacking Mao's imposing presence. It is possible that Mao may have been privately antagonized by Lin's drive for power. It is certain that Chou En-lai, a man far abler than Lin, regarded him as a threat to his own position and policies and as unfit to be Mao's successor.

One of Lin's most serious shortcomings was the fact that, as his pronouncements at least as far back as 1965 indicate, he was still wedded to what is sometimes called the "dual adversary strategy": advocating, for ideological reasons, simultaneous struggle against American "imperialism" and Soviet "revisionism." This demanding and dangerous outlook had arisen during the quarrel with Khrushchev but had become obsolete just as the Cultural Revolution was ending; conditions then began to indicate a return to the classic and commonsense Maoist strategy of combining tactically with the less dangerous adversary in order to cope with the more dangerous one. In August 1968 the Soviet Union unexpectedly invaded Czechoslovakia, and this crisis was rendered especially threatening in Peking's eyes by the fact that since the previous spring the Soviet press had been engaged in an unusually powerful anti-Chinese campaign. Speaking on August 23, Chou En-lai coined the term "social-imperialism" to describe Moscow's current behavior. On November 25 he proposed talks at the ambassadorial level with the incoming Nixon administration to begin on February 20 of the following year. During the winter, however, radical elements probably led by Lin Piao convinced Mao to oppose the talks, which were accordingly cancelled by the Chinese side on the eve of their scheduled commencement.

With incredibly simpleminded logic, Lin evidently prepared to match this blow at "imperialism" with one at "revisionism." He was to be formally elected Mao's heir at the forthcoming Ninth Party Congress, which after many postponements was scheduled to open in mid-March. He apparently wanted to emphasize his own role as leader of the People's Liberation Army, and that of the PLA as defender of the fatherland. This may have been partly to counter a tendency on the part of his civilian colleagues to believe that the PLA had acquired too much power and needed to be pruned back now that it had played the essential

grant killer's role of suppressing the Red Guards, the 1969 New Year's Day editorial had contained much less praise for the PLA than had similar documents during the previous several years.

It was apparently Lin who encouraged by the fact that the Soviet Union appeared to be involved in a crisis of sorts over West Berlin organized an ambush of a Soviet patrol on a disputed island (Chenpao to the Chinese, Daniansky to the Soviets) in the Ussuri River on March 2, 1969. The Soviet response was unexpectedly strong — at least to Lin. Moscow had its own domestic and external reasons for wanting to teach Peking a lesson. In addition to making a great deal of propaganda, the Soviet side struck back on the same island in greater strength and with devastating effect on March 15. Peking and the Chinese public flew into a virtual panic that lasted for several months, and the Party congress was postponed again, probably in order to remove an irritant in Soviet eyes and to give the leadership time to look for ways of coping with the new crisis. It appears that Lin's blunder on the Ussuri set in motion a slow political decline on his part; at any rate, he was relatively inconspicuous from then on, while Chou En-lai, who alone could manage the vital task of coping with Moscow on the diplomatic level, was highly conspicuous. Fortunately for Peking, Soviet counsels were also divided: in late March, Premier Kosygin, speaking for the doves, proposed talks to resolve the border issue.

While evading this proposal, which was unacceptable to the radicals, Peking drew enough encouragement from it to open the Ninth Party Congress on April 1. As usual, efforts were made to avoid giving an appearance of crisis. Lin Piao gave the major speech, in the course of which he denied that Peking actually claimed more than a modest amount of territory currently held by the Soviet Union; he was also elected sole vice chairman of the Party Central Committee and named formally as Mao's heir. This appointment was a logical extension of earlier developments, and to have done otherwise might have appeared as an undignified appeasement of Moscow, where Lin was highly unpopular.

In mid-May Chou En-lai began to normalize Peking's external relations, which had been severely damaged by the frenzy of the Cultural Revolution, by sending ambassadors back to Chinese embassies abroad and by seeking diplomatic recognition from countries that had not yet extended it on condition that they break all official ties with Taiwan. The first country to do this was Canada (October 1970); others followed in rapid succession. The biggest prize of all, the United States, of course

remained uncaught, but there was hope inasmuch as President Nixon was clearly interested in better relations with Peking. In any event, this improvement of China's external position was helpful as partial insurance against a Soviet attack, which then appeared to be a distinct possibility.

During the last three quarters of 1968, and for about three years thereafter, the Soviet Union built up its conventional and nuclear forces near the Chinese border at an alarmingly rapid rate. It also initiated a number of border clashes, presumably to remind Peking of its vulnerability and prod it in the direction of the conference table. Unwilling to tolerate indefinite evasion, Moscow on June 13, 1969, demanded border talks within two or three months. These pressures, supplemented by pleas from Hanoi and by discussions between Chou En-lai and Kosygin in Peking on September 11, convinced Mao and largely silenced the radicals; Sino-Soviet border talks began in Peking on October 20 and have continued intermittently ever since. Some progress has been made toward agreement on the proper location of the border, but very little toward easing the military confrontation across it. Peking has unsuccessfully demanded a ceasefire agreement, a mutual troop withdrawal, and a Soviet admission that the nineteenth century border treaties were "unequal," i.e., unjust. (On November 6, 1974, a Chinese statement on the border issue appeared to drop the demand for a new treaty.) Moscow has unsuccessfully proposed a nonaggression pact, as well as a general normalization of Sino-Soviet relations that would place it in the position of senior partner once more.

In view of the persistent threat from the Soviet Union, Chou En-lai continued to favor an improvement of relations with the United States. Lin Piao and the other radicals, still wedded to the dual adversary strategy, were opposed; after the American intervention in Cambodia at the end of April 1970 Mao inclined to their side, but only for a short time. The two sides clashed, on both domestic and foreign issues, at an important Central Committee meeting in August-September 1970. Lin pressed for a reversion to a radical agrarian policy similar to the Great Leap Forward but lost. The fact that Party committees began to be reestablished at the provincial level in December was only one of a number of signs that moderate policies of stabilization were essentially in the ascendant during this period.

At the same Central Committee meeting, Lin probably also expressed opposition to Chou's proposed opening to the United States; if so, he lost again. Over the next ten months, a series of Sino-American contacts

via third parties resulted in Henry Kissinger's famous secret visit to Peking in July 1971 and the extension of an invitation to President Nixon. Lin Piao and his supporters had been outmaneuvered but their views had not changed.

Domestic politics were even more important than foreign policy in bringing the Lin Piao affair to a head. Lin's ambition led him to demand installation as chief of state in succession to Mao, corresponding to his already attained position as Mao's heir in the Party leadership. Since Mao had given up the chairmanship of the P.R.C. in 1959, Lin pressed Mao to resume it and then turn it over to him at a session of the National People's Congress to be held in the near future. Chou, who had probably already decided to purge Lin and was looking for an opportunity, opposed this demand, Mao evidently did too.

What happened next is not entirely clear, but what is reasonably certain is that Peking's later official version of this episode is unlikely to be correct. The official version is that Lin, having plotted unsuccessfully to assassinate Mao, tried to flee to the Soviet Union but was killed in a flaming airplane crash in the Mongolian People's Republic. A much more likely version is that Lin, taking advantage of Mao's absence from Peking, in early September 1971, attempted a coup against his nemesis Chou En-lai that failed; he was killed by security forces; the airplane crash in Mongolia on the night of September 12-13 was probably contrived in order to blacken Lin's reputation by seeming to establish the otherwise highly implausible charge that he, alone among high-ranking Chinese Communists since 1911, had been so pro-Moscow as to try to defect to the Soviet Union.

### The Ascendancy of Chou En-lai (1971-1975)

After Lin Piao's death, Mao Tse-tung continued to play an essentially elder statesman role, and practical power—as Mao stated privately to Edgar Snow in early 15 December 1970—passed to Premier Chou En-lai, the main architect of Lin's overthrow. This was not to be for very long, however; Chou was terminally ill with liver cancer in 1972, although he remained fully active for two years after that.

Since Lin Piao had been a military man, some of the most important effects of his fall were naturally felt in the military field. His closest military supporters in Peking and in the military regions were purged. His policy, which had emphasized the opposite extremes of progress toward an expensive and provocative intercontinental ballistic missile



capability and (for ideological reasons) small-unit tactics and guerrilla warfare, was sharply modified. Instead, the emphasis was now on creating in the shortest possible time a minimum nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union, consisting of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles—there are indications that this may have been achieved as early as 1973—and on the more difficult task of modernizing the conventional forces. The threat of regional military power (“warlordism”) that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution was dealt with expeditiously in December 1973. Probably at the initiative of Chou En-lai and the recently rehabilitated Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Mao summoned the eleven military region commanders to Peking and informed the eight most powerful that they were being transferred. Although in their former regions they had also held top political posts, in their new regions their powers were to be strictly military.

Meanwhile the Party apparatus, the state system, and the armed forces, in streamlined form, were being restored to working condition after the near-chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Success in this required the rehabilitation of many cadres (including high-ranking ones) who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution. Chou did not shrink from this step, even though it was highly objectionable to the radicals and probably none too welcome to Mao. By far the most important and controversial of the rehabilitations was that of the blunt, able, and pragmatic Teng Hsiao-p’ing, who was evidently intended by Chou En-lai to succeed him as premier—Teng did in fact function informally as acting premier during much of Chou’s illness. In effect, Chou was trying with considerable success to build a broad centrist coalition that would even include the more reasonable of the radicals—the two main exceptions among the latter being Chiang Ch’ing and her protégé Yao Wen-yuan—to manage Mao and to ensure stability during the impending period of leadership succession. In addition, Chou and Teng promoted economic modernization, with emphasis on the import of foreign (including American) industrial equipment and technology and the acquisition of additional foreign exchange through increased exports of coal, petroleum, and cotton textiles. On the vital rural front, a Central Committee directive of December 26, 1971, promised the peasants that they could retain their private plots.

Probably Chou’s most spectacular success was his opening of the P.R.C. to the United States. Although he rationalized it at home to some extent as a move to cope with an allegedly resurgent Japan, it was actually intended primarily as a means of constraining the Soviet Union. With Lin Piao out of the way, the Nixon visit proceeded

smoothly in late February 1972 although the resulting Shanghai communiqué did not fully normalize Sino American relations it went a considerable distance in that direction. Full diplomatic relations could not be established because of the continuing American relationship with Taiwan but liaison offices—embassies in everything but name—were set up in Peking and Washington in the spring of 1973. Chou established full diplomatic relations with Japan in September 1972. These successes enhanced his already enormous power and prestige but he wisely refrained from taking the risky step of trying to be proclaimed Mao's heir.

Although Chou had dealt effectively with one major threat to his policies regional military power he was unable to do the same with the other—the radical minority in the Party leadership because it was supported and protected—or at least widely believed to be so—by Mao Tse tung. Indeed as Chou's program moved ahead the radicals grew increasingly vocal in opposition to it. Fortunately for the radicals enthusiasm for the newborn things of the Cultural Revolution Mao had announced in August 1966 that China needed a great upheaval every seven or eight years. Accordingly in early August 1973 shortly before the Tenth Party Congress convened virtually under the auspices of Chou En lai the radicals launched a program of what it pleased them to call going against the tide with a press campaign against Confucius who was clearly intended to symbolize Chou but was less likely to retaliate. The following month the radicals founded in Shanghai a propaganda journal entitled *Study and Criticism* in which they aired their views. Lacking a mass power base since the suppression of the Red Guards the radicals tried to construct a new one in the form of an armed urban militia under the control of the radical-dominated mass organizations (principally the labor unions). Except in Shanghai this threat was quietly but effectively fended off by the moderates and what did emerge in the way of an urban militia was only lightly armed and was controlled by the local army headquarters (again with the exception of Shanghai).

Chou En lai by no means remained on the defensive against the radicals. In February 1971 he achieved two master strokes of psychological warfare. He linked the 2000-130 Piao and the 2000 Confucius propaganda campaigns so that any one attacking the sage could be held to be criticizing Lin rather than Chou and he launched a brief campaign against Western culture especially music of which Chung Ching was widely known to be paradoxically fond. Sometime during the next year he arranged key appointments for some men he

trusted: his old military friend and colleague Yeh Chien-ying, who had been conspicuous during the Nixon visit, became defense minister. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, having already rejoined the Central Committee and the Politburo, became the first civilian chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army. The little known but obviously able Hua Kuo-feng, who had cultivated good relations with Mao while serving as a Party official in Hunan (Mao's native province) and had acquired a bureaucratic specialization in agriculture, became minister of public security (agriculture and security being a fairly common combination of specialties for leaders in Communist countries). Chou may have intended the much younger Hua (born in 1920 or 1921) to become premier after Teng (or instead of Teng in the event that radical opposition prevented Teng from succeeding Chou).

It appears that Mao had a stroke in June 1974; in any event, he left Peking and stayed away until April 1975. For his part, Chou entered a military hospital in Peking the following month (July 1974) and thereafter reemerged only rarely—though he still played a supervisory role. Increased authority inevitably devolved on Teng Hsiao-p'ing as the most influential of the vice premiers. Chiang Ch'ing, who hated both Chou and Teng, also became correspondingly more active, at least as measured by her public appearances.

The zenith of Chou's career, ill or not, was probably a long-delayed session of the National People's Congress in January 1975, preceded by a Central Committee meeting at which Teng Hsiao-p'ing was elected a vice chairman of the Central Committee and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. At the congress, Chou announced his commitment to what came to be called the "four modernizations" (of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology), which although attributed by Chou to Mao irritated the radicals for an essentially negative reason: the absence of any express interest in ideology, in "red" as against "expert." The radicals were also angered by guarantees in the new state constitution adopted by the congress that they termed "bourgeois right," like private plots for the peasants. During the spring, accordingly, major articles by two leading radicals, Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, attacked by implication the political thrust of the congress and stressed hoary themes like "proletarian dictatorship." Possibly more significant was the fact that Mao had stayed away from the congress and the preceding Central Committee meeting, probably to show disapproval rather than for reasons of health since he received some foreign visitors during the same period.

Because Teng Hsiao-p'ing was much more acerbic and even more ideologically unacceptable to the radicals than was Chou En-lai, political tensions rose rapidly during his stewardship. In the summer of 1975 he sent troops to suppress strikes and demonstrations in the Hangchow area by workers, who by definition were ideologically sacred. He clashed openly with Chiang Ch'ing at an important conference on agriculture held from mid September to mid October; Hua Kuo-feng 'summed up' the conference in at least a nominal effort to mediate. At about the same time the radicals, allegedly at Mao's initiative, launched a propaganda attack on certain characters in the famous traditional novel *Water Margin* (*Shui hu chuan*) under which guise they denounced Teng for his "capitulationism" toward revisionism" at home and abroad. He did nothing to help on this score by releasing, on December 27, with an apology, the crew of a Soviet military helicopter who had been held since March 1974 on a charge of espionage. Another propaganda campaign that began in the fall of 1975 attacked Teng for his nonideological views on education. The tension between the two sides was so great that it was impossible to hold a normal National Day (October 1) celebration in 1975 or even to publish the usual editorial on that occasion.

### The Succession (1976)

It seems that Mao was content to leave the succession question, like most others at that time largely to Chou, except that Mao apparently could not stomach Teng Hsiao-p'ing as Chou's own successor. Chou's plan evidently included the passing of Mao's title as Party chairman to a young member of the Shanghai radical group, Wang Hung-wen whom Chou had made nominally third in the Party at the Tenth Congress and whom he presumably expected to be a figurehead, with real authority devolving on Teng Hsiao-p'ing at least for a time.

Chou died on January 8, 1976. Teng delivered the eulogy a week afterward and appeared certain to succeed Chou at least as acting premier. Later in the month, however, the Politburo Standing Committee, now composed of six men apparently deadlocked on the question of whether Teng is the radicals' candidate, Vice Premier Chang Chun-ch'iao, should have the acting premiership. They accordingly reached into the regular (non-Standing Committee) Politburo membership and bestowed the acting premiership on the only vice premier who also held a political portfolio: Minister of Public Security Hua Kuo-feng.

Chou's death had made Teng vulnerable, and the radical campaign against him mounted in intensity during February and March. This campaign alarmed the moderates, who were probably willing to sacrifice Teng if absolutely necessary but not the substance of Chou's policies, with which Teng of course had been closely associated since 1973. They accordingly made a festival for the dead in early April the occasion for a demonstration in Chou's honor. On the morning of April 5, their supporters were infuriated to find that wreaths bearing inscriptions praising Chou (and sometimes criticizing Chiang Ch'ing) had been removed from the main square in Peking, T'ien An Men Square, evidently at the initiative of the radical elements of the leadership and probably of Chiang Ch'ing in particular. The result was a riot lasting several hours.

This episode strengthened the radicals, who were able to make the plausible although dubious case that the demonstration had been organized by supporters of Teng (rather than of the unassailable Chou). On April 7, accordingly, there appeared two major announcements: one proclaimed the removal of Teng from all his Party and state posts, the other the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng not only as premier (no longer acting premier) but as first vice-chairman of the Party Central Committee (a new title, and one that clearly made him heir presumptive to Mao). At the same time, an understanding was apparently reached within the leadership to the effect that, since the Party chairmanship and the premiership had never been held by the same person, when Hua inherited Mao's Party title he should turn over the premiership to Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, the ablest member of the Shanghai group.

During the next few months the radicals intensified their political campaign through propaganda, strikes, and demonstrations—not only against Teng but against the moderates as a whole, whom they labeled the "bourgeoisie in the Party." The radicals' sense of urgency was apparently enhanced by a feeling that they had little time left; it was announced in mid-June that Mao would no longer receive foreign visitors, obviously because his health was failing rapidly. There is a lack of contemporary evidence, and therefore of credibility, for later assertions that Mao had wanted for some time past to purge the leading radicals, including Chiang Ch'ing.

The radicals showed a characteristic and dangerous tendency toward the dual adversary approach in their external behavior; there was a bomb blast at the Soviet embassy in late April, and in early July there were extensive and provocative maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait. (It should be

remembered that Teng Hsiao ping was no longer chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army). In these and other ways the radicals, who were already widely unpopular, made still more enemies. Premier Hua Kuo-feng's attitude at that time is not clear, but he was probably inclining increasingly toward the moderates.

In traditional China, the approaching end of a dynasty that had lost the right to rule (the mandate of heaven) was thought to be signaled by natural disasters. This belief lent an additional dimension to a powerful earthquake (8.2 on the Richter scale) that on July 28, 1976, virtually destroyed the industrial city of Tangshan near Tientsin; perhaps as many as three quarters of a million people were killed. The radicals did their cause no good by insisting that what the situation required was still more intensive study and application of the thought of Mao Tse-tung. In reality, the massive task of earthquake relief required transport supplies, and organization that only the army could provide, and that only Premier Hua Kuo-feng could coordinate. It was probably significant that the membership of a high level earthquake relief delegation (presumably picked by Hua) that visited the stricken area at the end of July included none of the senior radicals. During the period of the earthquake and its aftermath, a powerful and determined antiradical coalition between Hua and the moderates, including the security forces and most of the military leadership, was apparently completed. The radicals had little to protect them, but their (incomplete) control over the media and the presumed support of the obviously dying Mao.

Mao's death occurred shortly after midnight on September 9 but was not announced for sixteen hours. This delay almost certainly reflected disagreements between radicals and moderates over the disposition of the body and over the proper distribution of power. The radicals very likely demanded that Hua honor the bargain of the previous spring by turning the premiership over to Ch'ing Ch'un-ch'iao before the funeral. If so, Hua, with the support of the moderates, refused. A week later radical editorials began to appear with a probably spurious quotation from Mao: "Act according to the principles laid down," which was evidently intended not only to have general application but to refer to the bargain. Hua conspicuously failed to use this quotation in his eulogy for Mao delivered on September 18. The issue was joined behind the scenes although not yet in public.

The radicals must have realized that their position was serious: they were far weaker than their opponents, and the death of their patron had exposed them to attack in much the same way that Chou's death had

exposed Teng Hsiao-p'ing. But there was an important difference: Teng, a moderate with excellent organizational ties, had not been the object of police sanctions; the leading radicals were not to be so fortunate. It is very unlikely that, as later charged, the radicals attempted to have Hua Kuo-feng, still minister of public security in addition to his other functions, assassinated on October 6. It is much more probable that Hua, with the support of the moderates in the leadership and after waiting almost until the end of the mourning period for Mao, had elements of the principal security force, the so-called 8341 unit under Wang Tung-hsing, place the "Gang of Four" (Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing, and Yao Wen-yuan), as they began to be called, under house arrest. Pockets of support for them, notably in Shanghai and Manchuria, were similarly contained or crushed by military and police power. On October 9 Hua began to be identified informally, in wall posters, as chairman of the Party Central Committee and as "head" of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission; these titles were subsequently formalized in a series of stages culminating in the Eleventh Party Congress (August 1977).

Evidently the victorious moderate coalition was prepared to accept Hua's continued retention of the premiership as well, but there was substantial support for the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and in fact some support for making him premier. On the other hand, his rehabilitation also presented some problems, especially for Hua, and it was not finally agreed on until March 1977; a Party Central Committee meeting in July, the first since Mao's death, announced Teng's restoration to all the posts he had held before April 1976, including that of chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army. At the ensuing Eleventh Party Congress, he was elected the third-ranking member of a five-man Standing Committee of the Politburo (Hua Kuo-feng, Yeh Chien-ying, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien, and Wang Tung-hsing).

The new leadership was clearly dedicated to stability, economic development, and military modernization; however, the possibility of further political turmoil could not, of course, be ruled out. The thought of Mao Tse-tung was skillfully reinterpreted to emphasize its moderate aspects and to dismiss its radical ones as aberrations somehow attributable to the Gang of Four who were blamed for everything imaginable. Hua Kuo-feng became the object of a cult of personality resembling Mao's although less intensive; it was officially insisted that Hua was Mao's legitimate successor and indeed had been appointed by

Mao The role of the security forces and the maintenance of order through police controls were stressed but not to excess. Science and technology were fostered by means that included somewhat greater freedom from political pressures and continued importation of foreign technology. Efforts were made to raise wage levels an important incentive for the labor force. It even appeared that China might be beginning to move in the direction of market socialism of the kind practiced in some East European countries.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing the most dynamic figure in the new leadership appeared to be very much an old man in a hurry as Mao had been before him. Presumably conscious that he might not have much longer to live and convinced that the P.R.C. had lost years of development on account of Mao, the other radicals and the Cultural Revolution, he moved as fast as he could to promote Chou En-lai's four modernizations. To this end he did his best to put his personal supporters in key positions rather than gradually building a broad coalition as Chou had done. It seemed probable that he was interested in even more offices for himself like premier or possibly chairman of the P.R.C. It also appeared possible although far from certain that a stop-Teng movement might form around the much younger Hua Kuo-feng.

In foreign affairs the new leadership followed in essence the policies of Chou En-lai but without his brilliantly creative touch. Peking continued to insist that the United States must abandon Taiwan if it wanted to normalize relations with the P.R.C. but the absence of normalization until 1978 did not spoil what had been achieved in Sino-American relations. Peking continued to maintain a vigorous adversary relationship with the Soviet Union neither accommodating with it nor provoking it to a dangerous degree but rather in making in a competent manner the threat from the colossus to the north. Japan was cultivated as before as China's leading trading partner and as a valuable counterweight to the Soviet Union. Peking continued to encourage anti-Soviet vigilance in Europe and to deprecate détente between the United States and the Soviet Union which might free Moscow to concentrate still more of its forces near the Sino-Soviet border. In the Third World the anti-Soviet emphasis was also foremost in order to conciliate governments. Peking reduced its support for insurgency (revolution) somewhat but not to the point of abandoning it entirely.



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## 4

# The Political System

*Harald W Jacobson*

The system of government developed in the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) is a centralized one party system a self styled dictatorship of the proletariat<sup>1</sup> in which the Communist Party of China (CPC) through an intricate network of administrative agencies exercises virtually total control over the lives of China's 950 million people. In addition to the CPC this network consists of a formal state apparatus the judicial and security organs the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and militia and an array of mass organizations that embrace in their collective functions every citizen of the P.R.C. The system as it functions today has evolved progressively over the relatively few years since the P.R.C. was formally established on October 1 1949.

The motivating force behind this system is a sinicized form of Marxism-Leninism officially referred to by the Chinese as Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought which is described as the highest form of Marxism-Leninism in the present era and is claimed by Peking's leaders to be the most orthodox form of Marxism practiced anywhere today. The major objective placed before the system at present is in the words of the late Premier Chou En-lai the building of China into a powerful modern socialist country before the end of the present century.

### **Maotist Thought on the Transformation of Chinese Society**

Well before the Communists came to power in China Mao Tse-tung foresaw China moving toward the ultimate goal of communism through two distinct revolutionary stages a democratic revolution followed by a socialist revolution<sup>2</sup> Though official commentary on the transition to a socialist society has been blurred somewhat since the

Communists came to power, the general trend of social development since 1949 has conformed closely to the scheme outlined by Mao in a series of articles written in the 1930s and 1940s.

During the democratic revolution, Mao visualized the transformation of the "semicolonial" society of China—his description of the pre-1949 status of Chinese society—into an "independent democratic society." This was not to be a "bourgeois democracy," which he considered prevailing democracies to be, but a new and special "Chinese type" of democracy, a people's democracy, or as he termed it, a "New Democracy," in which vestiges of capitalism would be tolerated and bourgeois elements willing to cooperate in the building of a new China would be invited to participate. Acceptable social classes were to be workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie (small merchants, handicraftsmen, professionals, intellectuals, and some upper peasants), and national bourgeoisie (middle capitalists and rich peasants). Only landlords, "big capitalists," and other classified as counterrevolutionaries were to be excluded. Industry and commerce would include a private, capitalist as well as a state-owned sector.

The democratic revolution was to be followed by a socialist revolution, marking the transition to socialism. During this period, residual capitalism would be phased out, remaining bourgeois elements basically eliminated, traditional culture replaced by a "new culture," and society placed on a socialist, egalitarian base. From that stage China would move eventually into a state of communism, the nature of which CPC theoreticians, like their fraternal political thinkers elsewhere, have studiously avoided discussing and a goal for which no schedule has yet been set.

In line with Mao's concept, the P.R.C. was formally established on October 1, 1949, by an assembly convened in Peking by the CPC in late September 1949, composed of delegates of the CPC, representatives of several small political parties and groups that had been active in China during and shortly after World War II, and a number of independent political figures who had opposed Kuomintang (KMT) rule in the country. This assembly took the name "Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference" (CPPCC), presumably to suggest continuity with the Political Consultative Conference that had met in Chungking in early 1946, during the abortive effort of General George C. Marshall to assist in forming a coalition government in China in the hope of averting civil war. Indeed, several of the non-Communist as well as CPC delegates to the CPPCC had also participated in the earlier forum. Such

continuity would impart legitimacy to the new regime while the exploitation of a multiparty forum would suggest a broad political base and popular support and would harmonize with Mao's concept of the New Democracy.

Although Chinese Communist theoreticians began in the mid 1950s to describe the period immediately following the establishment of the P.R.C. as a period of transition implying transition to socialism, the period from 1949 to 1953-1954 was in fact a period of political consolidation and economic rehabilitation and its social and economic characteristics were those attributed by Mao a decade earlier to the period of the New Democracy.

Consolidation and rehabilitation were essentially completed by the end of 1952 and preparations were launched for the promotion of national economic plans and the socialization of China. Thus the period of transition to socialism can be said to have commenced about 1953-1954. This period lasted approximately twenty years, or from 1953-1954 to 1973-1975.

The transition of Chinese society through the revolutionary stages is clearly reflected in the series of revisions of Party and state constitutions since 1949. Thus in 1973 and 1975 successive constitutions were adopted by the Party and state respectively in which the former inferentially and the latter specifically<sup>2</sup> acknowledged the attainment of socialism. Earlier, shortly after the inauguration of the commune program in 1958, some Chinese leaders had prematurely declared that China had entered the socialist stage and stood on the threshold of communism but such assertions had soon disappeared from CPC rhetoric.

Paralleling the reflection of the socialization process has been a step-by-step unveiling in the constitutions of the Party's changing position from that of acknowledged leader of a united front to that of undisguised dictatorship. The united front of the early 1950s was of considerable importance to the CPC for more reasons than those noted in connection with the significance of the CPPCC. Prior to 1949 the experience of the CPC had been limited largely to rural areas of China. With the acquisition in relatively short time of vast territories in 1948 and 1949 and particularly with the occupation of large urban industrial centers the Party was confronted with immense new problems requiring the attention of personnel possessing managerial and technical skills of which the CPC was either in short supply or totally lacking. It was therefore essential for the CPC to retain large numbers of such skilled

personnel already on station until they could be replaced by cadres trained under Communist guidance, or until the former skilled personnel successfully underwent programs of ideological remolding.

As Communist cadres increased in numbers and in skills, and as the capitalist sector was progressively squeezed out, the remaining bourgeoisie became decreasingly useful to the CPC and its members were gradually weeded out. They became a major target for attack during the Cultural Revolution and in the major political campaigns that followed, and, in line with Mao's warning that the bourgeoisie will continue to pose a threat to the Party and to its objectives even after the attainment of socialism, the "elimination" of the bourgeoisie came to be identified by the Party constitution as one of the "basic programs" of the Party during the period of socialism.<sup>4</sup>

### **Political Geography, Constitutions, and Elections**

To avoid repetition in the sections that follow, it is useful at this point to discuss briefly the territorial subdivisions of the P.R.C. as they relate to the functions and operations of the Party and state. Similarly, brief summaries of constitutional developments in the P.R.C., CPC theory of constitutions, and its concept of elections will obviate the need to deal with these subjects separately under Party and state.

#### *Administrative and Electoral Subdivisions*

For administrative purposes, the P.R.C. is territorially subdivided at four levels—the provincial, prefectural, county, and subcounty. Except for the prefectures (autonomous prefectures excluded), these are classified by the regime as levels of "state power" and serve as electoral units. Although there have been changes over the years in the territorial organization and in the names given to territorial subdivisions, the counties have remained relatively constant since 1949, and in most cases have remained intact since imperial times. Though most provinces have retained traditional names and many have remained unchanged in area, there has been considerable reorganization of the structures of frontier provinces through the elimination by merger of some and the shifting of the subordination of some counties back and forth from one province or autonomous region to another. Most conspicuous has been the establishment of the autonomous regions. Above the province, the CPC has experimented from time to time with larger provincial groupings for various administrative purposes, as noted below, while below the

county level the country has experienced major territorial reorganization with the promulgation of the people's communes.

At the provincial level there are at present 21 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, and 3 municipalities—Peking, Shanghai, and Tientsin—directly under the central government (one province, Taiwan, claimed by the P.R.C. is presently beyond its control). The provinces and autonomous regions are divided into counties, autonomous counties, and metropolitan cities. The municipalities under the central government and the cities under provincial authority generally include neighboring rural counties as well as the urban districts into which they are subdivided.<sup>5</sup> At the county level at the end of 1976 there were 2,136 county or county equivalent units and 186 cities subordinate to provincial level governments.<sup>6</sup>


In the early 1970s an intermediate administrative level between the province and the county was revived by the introduction of prefectures, consisting of a combination of several counties into a larger administrative unit. Created primarily for economic administration, the prefectures essentially correspond to the special districts that functioned at an earlier period of Communist control and that had roots in traditional Chinese territorial organization. At the end of 1976 there were 217 units at the prefectural level in the country,<sup>7</sup> but at the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) in early 1978 Premier Hua Kuo-feng pointedly remarked that revolutionary committees would not be established at the prefectural level, except in autonomous prefectures, inasmuch as the organ of state power at the prefectural level is an agency of the provincial authorities.

In some cases two or more ancient cities have been joined for administrative purposes. Examples are Luta, a combination of former Port Arthur and Dairen; Wuhan, a combination of Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow; and Siangfan, the merger of Hsiangyang and Fancheng in Hupeli Province.

Below the counties are some 50,000 people's communes and an indefinite number of towns. (In the 1960s there were some 70,000 communes.) The people's communes are divided into production brigades and these in turn are divided into production teams. The production team is the basic rural accounting unit, while most rural institutions are maintained at the commune and town levels; urban institutions are maintained at district and neighborhood organization levels.

The autonomous areas—regions, prefectures, and counties—are

Map 7 Administrative Map of China







geographical areas in which one or more of China's fifty-odd ethnic and cultural minorities,<sup>8</sup> numbering some 55 million, are heavily concentrated. These areas were set apart initially from basically Han-populated areas in order to induce cooperation by allowing a modicum of self-government and to take into account traditional cultures and institutions in the planning of political, economic, and social programs. The term "autonomous" does not imply political independence but rather a limited degree of self-government and the tolerance of local cultures, practices, and the use of indigenous languages while the areas are steadily directed, under Han tutelage, toward the ultimate goal of integration with the rest of the country. The distinction between the political system of the Han and that originally obtaining in the autonomous areas has been essentially abolished; consequently, the political apparatuses of the autonomous areas now correspond generally to those in Han areas, except that at the autonomous prefecture level there are political institutions that are absent in nonautonomous prefectures.

In areas of high Mongol concentration in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and in western parts of Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning provinces, "leagues" correspond to prefectures and "banners" to counties. These names derive from the traditional terms used by the Mongols in reference to units in their nomadic tribal organization.

The P.R.C. has from time to time grouped provinces in various combinations for special purposes. Immediately after the establishment of the regime, for purposes of consolidation and military control, the provinces were grouped into six large administrative areas—the northwest, north, northeast, central-south, southwest, and east China areas. These were abolished in 1954, but are now being restored under the same designations, according to Party Chairman and Premier Hua Kuo-feng, in order to facilitate the planning and administration of the ambitious modernization program to which the Party is committed.

For military administration (discussed in Chapter 10), the P.R.C. is divided into eleven large military regions. Shantung Province constitutes a military region by itself; Sinkiang Military Region is composed of Sinkiang Province and part of western Tibet; Chengtu Military Region is composed of the remainder of Tibet and Szechwan Province; the remaining eight military regions consist of two or more provinces and autonomous regions, each of which constitutes a military district. The military commands of the three municipalities are

designated as garrison commands and are attached to two of the military regions

*Structures of the major nonmilitary organizations in the P R C.—the Party, the state, and the mass organizations—*are all built on a pyramidal model generally with five or six tiers of organs ascending from the base units through administrative organs at subcounty, county, and provincial levels to the national executive-administrative body at the apex

#### *Nature and Function of Constitutions*

Party and state constitutions are promulgated by the P R C. for the purposes of defining Party policies and programs for the short term as well as the long term and of providing operational guidance and rules for Party functionaries and the public. They are therefore considered neither sacrosanct nor permanent but as documents to be altered with relative ease in accordance with the requirements of a rapidly changing society.

Each national Party congress (Party congress hereafter) that has met since the Party came to power has adopted a revised Party constitution—the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, the Ninth in 1969, the Tenth in 1973, and the Eleventh in 1977.<sup>9</sup> The 1956 constitution was a lengthy document of sixty articles grouped under nine chapter headings. It included fairly extensive discussions of Party principles and objectives, procedures for acquiring membership and membership obligations, and contained detailed information about Party structure and the powers and functions of Party organs at each level. Subsequent constitutions have all been brief, focusing on matters of primary interest and concern to the Party at the time of promulgation. In these Party structure has been dealt with only in the barest outline. The 1969 constitution, for instance, adopted after the Cultural Revolution at a time when the military were in a particularly strong position, contained a clause naming Lin Biao as Mao's successor in the Party. The 1973 constitution, produced after Lin Biao's abortive coup d'état and demise, eliminated the clause but otherwise retained much of the text of the 1969 draft. The most recent Party constitution of 1977, promulgated after a major Party purge and after a decade of internal dissension, placed emphasis on the importance of Party unity, discipline, and the practice of democratic centralism. It also reorganized the system for maintaining surveillance over the performance

and behavior of Party members.

State constitutions show a similar history. A provisional state constitution, actually consisting of three documents, namely, the "Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference," the "Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China," and the "Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference," was adopted by the CPPCC in 1949. This was replaced by a formal "Constitution of the People's Republic of China" enacted by the First National People's Congress (NPC)<sup>10</sup> in 1954, which in turn was revised at the Fourth NPC in 1975, and then supplanted by one adopted by the Fifth NPC in 1978.

As in the case of the Party constitutions, the 1954 state constitution was a lengthy document of 106 articles that dealt in detail with government organization and with the principles that were to guide the government, while the 1975 constitution was brief, noting the attainment of socialism and acknowledging the supremacy of Party over state but touching only lightly on organizational matters. Following the Ninth Party Congress and the promulgation of the Party constitution that designated Lin Piao as Mao's successor in the Party, the draft of a revised state constitution was circulated throughout the country for study and comment. This draft provided for the restoration of Mao Tse-tung as chief of state and commander of the armed forces and named Lin Piao as Mao's successor in the state apparatus. The draft, however, provoked heated dispute and was never acted upon, partly because Lin Piao's death had rendered one of the most controversial points and the central objective of the draft obsolete, but it did provide much of the rationale for the 1975 constitution. The 1978 version glorifies Mao as the founder of the P.R.C., rededicates the regime to hold high and defend the "banner" of Mao Tse-tung, and restores much of the detail about the organization of the state apparatus that had been deleted from the 1954 version.

### *The Electoral System*

An election in the Chinese Communist system, whether Party or state, national or local, is a consensus-seeking process—a process in which agreement on candidates to be elected to Party or state organs at all levels is reached through discussion and negotiations. Both Party and state constitutions<sup>11</sup> stipulate that all elections must be by secret ballot after "democratic consultations" and that they be in accordance with the "three-in-one" principle of combining "the old, the middle-aged, and the young." A communiqué released at the conclusion of the Tenth Party Congress in 1973 described the process of "democratic consultations" by

stating that the delegates to that congress had been elected after repeated deliberations and consultations about the candidates, and after solicitations of the opinions of the masses both inside and outside the Party in the areas or organizations to which they belonged.<sup>12</sup> The requirement that the three age groups be represented in all elected Party and state organs is a product of the criticism levied during and after the Cultural Revolution against the perpetuation of power monopoly by veteran revolutionaries. While an increased number of young functionaries have been elected to the large bodies of the Party and state since the Cultural Revolution, the most important permanent organs of Party and state continue to be dominated mostly by veterans and senior middle-aged personnel, with relatively few young persons in positions of real power. Application of the principle is thus a relative matter.

In 1968 Hsieh Fu-chih, minister of public security at the time, told the Twelfth Plenum of the Fifth Central Committee that delegates to the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 were the first to have been elected to a Party congress participants of preceding congresses, except the First, at which the Party was organized, had all been appointed.<sup>13</sup> The present Party constitution calls for the election of delegates to the national Party congress every five years and elections to provincial and county Party organs every three. But the Party constitution allows for both prior or delayed elections in either case. At each level of Party organization, preparations for elections are the responsibility of the Party committees at the corresponding level, and the composition of Party committees elected by Party congresses at any level is subject to the approval of committees at the next higher level.

Election of deputies to the NPC is also called for every five years, but elections to provincial and lower level state organs vary from two to five years, depending on the level. The state constitution also provides for early or postponed elections. It grants electoral units and electors the power to supervise the deputies they elect and to replace them at any time according to provisions of law.<sup>14</sup> It grants the right to vote and to stand for election to every citizen eighteen years of age, regardless of sex, who has not been legally deprived of such rights.

### *The Party*

As of August 1977 the Communist Party of China had a membership of more than 35 million,<sup>15</sup> representing an increase of 7 million over the 28 million claimed by Chou En-lai at the Tenth Party Congress in 1973. This number exceeds the total population of all but twenty-one countries in the world, excluding China, and makes the CPC the largest

political organization ever formed. The management of such an enormous entity is obviously a task of major organizational and administrative proportions.

The experiences of the Cultural Revolution and the political infighting in the post-Cultural Revolution period have caused the Party to focus new attention on matters relating to membership selection, training, and discipline. The Party constitution provides that membership is open to "any Chinese worker, poor peasant, lower-middle peasant, revolutionary soldier, or any other revolutionary" eighteen years of age who is acceptable to his peers and to Party organizations at the basic and immediately superior levels, who possesses the proper political outlook, and who successfully passes through a rigid selection process. The term "Chinese" includes the ethnic minorities as well as the Han residents of the country.

Party membership provides status, career opportunities, and personal influence and is therefore highly sought after, particularly by talented and ambitious youth. But with less than 4 percent of the population possessing Party membership, despite the size of the Party, it is a goal not readily achieved. Sources of recruitment are production units (factories, mines, and communes), schools, mass organizations, the PLA, and particularly, the Communist Youth League, in all of which aspirants have the opportunity to demonstrate talent, leadership qualities, industry, and political rectitude.

In order to preserve the revolutionary qualities of the CPC, Mao advanced five principles that must characterize "successors" to the revolution in China: (1) they must be genuine Marxist-Leninists, not revisionists like Khrushchev; (2) they must wholeheartedly serve the majority of the people of China and the whole world; (3) they must be proletarian statesmen, capable of uniting with the overwhelming majority, including those with whom they do not agree and even those who have opposed them; (4) they must be models in applying the Party's principle of democratic centralism and masters of the leadership principle of dealing with and listening to the masses; and (5) they must be modest and prudent, must guard against arrogance and impetuosity, and must be imbued with the spirit of self-criticism, having the courage to correct mistakes and shortcomings in their work.<sup>16</sup>

In line with these principles, the constitution has laid down a strict code of conduct with which Party members are expected to comply. In addition to carrying out the tasks assigned by the Party, this code calls for a commitment to the conscientious study of Marxism-Leninism-

Mao Tsetung Thought avoidance of the pursuit of private interests honesty truthfulness, and openness upholding Party discipline and unity abstention from factional activity service to the people and maintenance of close ties with the masses To insure adherence to these principles and better performance by Party members the 1977 Party Congress reemphasized the need for Party organs at all levels including those in units within the PLA to implement the standing requirement of establishing commissions for inspecting Party discipline and to vigorously enforce these inspections

Members who fail to meet standards of conduct and performance are subject to disciplinary action ranging from an initial warning to reeducation through labor and even expulsion In recent years expulsion has been resorted to even in cases of leading members of the Political Bureau—Liu Shao chi for instance who was expelled in October 1968 after more than a year of criticism for alleged counterrevolutionary activities and the Gang of Four (Wang Hung wen Chang Ch un chiao Chiang Ching and Yao Wen yuan) all Political Bureau members in July 1977 for conspiracy to seize Party and state power Liu had at one time been considered Mao's eventual successor while Wang had ranked third in the Party after being catapulted forward at the Tenth Party Congress as the leading member of a new generation of CPC leaders

### *The National Party Congress*

Theoretically the highest organ of the Party is the national Party congress Real power however rests with the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and more precisely with the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau the ultimate decision making body in the system The number of delegates to the congress is not fixed by the constitution but together with questions relating to procedures governing their election and replacement is left to the Central Committee to determine The communiqué announcing the conclusion of the Eleventh Party Congress held August 12-18 1977 stated that 1,510 delegates had attended that congress and that they had been elected by Party organizations in different areas and units—presumably meaning by the Party committees of the provinces autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government and by Party organizations at Party headquarters in Peking and at the top echelon of the PLA

Four Party congresses have been elected since the Party came to

Figure 4.1 Organization of the Communist Party of China






Table 4.1 National Party Congresses and Party Growth

Congress	Venue	Date	Delegates	Party Strength
First	Shanghai	July 1921	12	57
Second	Shanghai	June-July 1922	12	123
Third	Canton	June 1923	27	342
Fourth	Shanghai	January 1925	20	939
Fifth	Hankow	April-May 1927	80	37,900
Sixth	Moscow	July-September 1928	118	40,000
Seventh	Tenan	April 1945	752	1,210,000
Eighth	Peking	September 1956	1,024	10,724,000
Ninth	Peking	April 1969	1,512	0,000,000
Tenth	Peking	August 1973	1,249	28,000,000
Eleventh	Peking	August 1977	1,510	35,000,000

Data in this table have been drawn from several sources. The data on Party growth are mostly taken from Winberg, *China: The New Politics of Communism* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 42 and from F.R.C. sources. The figure for the Third Congress however is taken from Jacques Gaultier and *A History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1949* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 92. Considerable uncertainty exists in respect to the number of delegates present at the first six Party congresses. The figures used for the first three are those that appear to be most commonly accepted. The figure for the Fourth Congress is taken from Warren Yao, *Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party* (Social Institute of International Relations of the Republic of China, 1964), vol. 1, p. 126 for the fifth Guillermo A. Hinkley of the F.R.C. *China: The New Politics of Communism*, p. 122 and for the sixth and so forth James P. Hays, *The Great March of Power: A History of the Communist Party, 1921-1971* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 156 and 159 respectively. For the sixth Hinkley states that the congress was attended by 24 voting and 26 nonvoting delegates.

power the Eighth in 1956, Ninth in 1969, Tenth in 1973 and the Eleventh in 1977. Data pertaining to these and to previous congresses are included in Table 4.1. The Party congress is elected for a term of five years, but this period can be extended or reduced by the Central Committee, whose duty it is to convene the congress. While the 1950 Party constitution called for annual sessions of the congress, subsequent constitutions appear to contemplate only one session for each congress. Despite the earlier requirement, however, only one Party congress since 1949, the Eighth, has been convened more than once and over the thirteen years of its life that congress met only twice, in 1956 and 1958. Thirteen years elapsed between the initial meeting of the Eighth and the convening of the Ninth Party Congress, but only four years between the

Ninth and Tenth and between the Tenth and the Eleventh, indicating a possible trend toward more regular convening of the congress but nevertheless reflecting a liberal interpretation of the Central Committee's power to extend or to reduce the life of a congress.

The proceedings of the Eighth Party Congress, to which representatives of Communist parties of both Communist and non-Communist countries were invited to attend as observers, were reported extensively by the P.R.C. media during its sessions. The attendant publicity rendered that congress a valuable platform from which to publicize Party programs, policies, and achievements, and to mobilize the masses for action. Subsequent congresses, however, have been convened in secrecy, no foreign observer has been invited to attend, and though rumors and speculations that they were in session or were about to be convened have circulated on each occasion, no publicity was released until each congress had adjourned.

The Ninth Party Congress, which met for twenty-four days, held plenary sessions at the beginning and end, and in between divided the delegates into smaller groups to discuss problems and issues. The same procedure may have been adopted at the following two but official releases give no indication. The Eleventh Party Congress held a one-day preliminary meeting on the eve of its formal opening, at which a presidium of 223 delegates was elected to guide the congress sessions, an agenda adopted, and credentials of the delegates certified.

Greater attention has been given to the inclusion of women, youth, and minority representation in the election of delegates to the last three congresses—the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh. The communiqué of the Eleventh Party Congress stated that middle-aged and young Party members (bracketed in one group) made up 73.8 percent of the delegates (leaving the veteran contingent at 26.2 percent), women 19 percent, and ethnic minorities 9.3 percent; 72.4 percent of the delegates were workers, peasants, and soldiers, 6.7 percent revolutionary intellectuals, and 20.9 percent revolutionary cadres. The proportion of minority representation is considerably above the proportion of the minority in the total population (about 5.8 percent), and the representation of workers, peasants, and soldiers rose from 67 percent in 1973 to 72.4 percent in 1977, but that of women declined from 20 percent in 1973 to 19 percent in 1977. Delegates credited to Taiwan, but living elsewhere, were included for the first time at the Tenth Party Congress.

A large percentage of the revolutionary elements elected to the Ninth

Party Congress, following the Cultural Revolution, failed to gain reelection to the Tenth or the Eleventh congresses, probably due, in most cases, to association with fallen leaders. On the other hand, a number of veterans, who had come under criticism during the Cultural Revolution and who had been dropped by the Ninth Party Congress, were restored to Party congress membership at either the Tenth or Eleventh congress.

Though described by the constitution as "the highest leading body," the actual power of the Party congress is limited. The 1956 constitution assigned the Party congress four tasks: (1) to hear and examine reports of the Central Committee and other central organs; (2) to determine the Party's line and policy; (3) to revise the Party constitution, and (4) to elect the Central Committee—its most important function. The present constitution contains no article dealing with the powers and functions of the Party congress but refers to the subject obliquely in stating that the Central Committee is elected by the Party congress. No other power or function is mentioned. The congress communiqués issued after the 1969, 1973, and 1977 congresses, however, indicate that the congress continues to perform the functions granted by the earlier constitution although the performance has become essentially pro forma. While the functions may have become pro forma, the congress nevertheless serves some useful purposes. It provides the Party leadership an opportunity to deal directly with regional functionaries and activists and to instruct them on Party policy and motivate them for action. It also offers regional leaders, particularly young rising leaders, an opportunity to meet with leaders of the Party center so that they will return to their posts charged with responsibilities by the Party's highest authorities.

#### *The Central Committee and the Party Chairman*

The Central Committee is composed of two categories of personnel, members who possess voting rights and alternate members who may speak but not vote. The number of members and alternates is subject to determination by the Political Bureau in consultation with the Central Committee, and the trend has been a steady increase in each category since the Central Committee was first formed (see Table 1.2).<sup>17</sup>

The Central Committee elects its Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the chairman and an unspecified number of vice chairmen of the Central Committee. The Central Committee is the highest organ of the Party when the Party congress is not in session, which under present procedures, as noted, is

Table 4.2 Seventh to Eleventh Central Committees

Central Committee	Members	Alternates	Total
Seventh	44	33	77
Eighth-1956	97	73	170
Eighth-1958	91	89	180
Ninth	170	109	279
Tenth	195	124	319
Eleventh-1977	201	132	333
Eleventh-1978	210	132	342

from the conclusion of one congress to the convening of the next. And when the Central Committee is not in session, "its functions and powers" are exercised by the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. These functions are not defined, nor are they limited; consequently, depending on the personal influence, prestige, and power of its members, they can be absolute and unlimited.

The Central Committee elected at the Eleventh Party Congress, composed of 201 members and 132 alternates, is the largest Central Committee elected to date. Of the 333, 26 members and 2 alternates have served continuously as members or alternates of the Central Committee since the Seventh or Eighth Party congresses (two were first given Central Committee appointment at plenary sessions of the Sixth Central Committee). Thirty-six members and 3 alternates were first elected at the Eighth Party Congress but were dropped by either the Ninth or Tenth, most because of adverse criticism during the Cultural Revolution, and rehabilitated at the Tenth or Eleventh Party Congress. The bulk, however, 139 members (69 percent) and 127 alternates (96 percent), had never served on the Central Committee prior to 1969, and of these, 53 members (26 percent) and 75 alternates (57 percent) were elected to the Central Committee for the first time in 1977. At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, held in November 1978, nine new members, all Party veterans mostly in their 70s, were added to the Central Committee, five of whom had been members and two alternates of the Eighth Central Committee but subsequently dropped.

Despite the last additions, the general trend reflected by these figures is the acceleration of the rate at which veteran revolutionaries are being

replaced by a new leadership generation. Most conspicuous has been the passing, between the 1973 and 1977 Party congresses, of Mao Tse tung and Tung Pi wu, the two remaining founding members who were still associated with the CPC, and of veteran stalwarts Chu Teh, Chou En lai, Li Fu ch un and Kang Sheng and the rise to Party chairmanship of Hua Kuo-feng who first attained Central Committee status at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969.

The 201 full members of the Eleventh Central Committee include all surviving members of the Tenth Political Bureau who were not purged plus the first secretaries of all provincial level Party committees and most subordinate secretaries, chairmen of all provincial level revolutionary committees, commanders of all military regions and districts, the first political commissars of these commands, and the national and some provincial leaders of major mass organizations. Alternates of the Central Committee include additional members of national and provincial level Party organs and military figures, plus model workers, peasants and miners, and cultural and intellectual figures. (Military representation on the committee, however, declined from 52 percent on the Tenth Central Committee to less than 30 percent on the Eleventh.) In view of the obvious intention of including these categories on the Central Committee, the consultation involved in the election must, in this case, refer both to the process of familiarizing congress delegates with the identity of persons nominated by the Political Bureau for inclusion and to the exchange of views regarding models and other local figures to be honored by selection.

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, ranking alternates were elevated to full membership when vacancies occurred. This is no longer the practice. The growing tendency has been to reserve full membership for the principal Party functionaries in all organizations, both at the national and the provincial levels, and to elect as alternates rising Party and military figures and workers, peasants, soldiers, and others whose performances merit recognition.

Rank within the Party is a matter of importance. Whereas rank was determined by the number of votes received in the election of the Central Committee at the Seventh (1945) and possibly the Eighth Party Congress, it now appears to be decided by the Political Bureau. Rank is made public by the positions taken by Party members on public occasions relative to the location of the Party chairman, or it is indicated in the official rank listing of leaders attending various functions (these lists, however, may also deliberately avoid revealing rank by listing members according to the number of strokes in the Chinese character for

their family names).

The chairman of the Central Committee is the *de facto* chairman of the Party and commander of the armed forces of the P.R.C. In contrast to most other Communist parties, in which the general secretary is the most powerful figure, the chairman is the principal official in the CPC. The post of Party chairman was created at the Seventh Party Congress in the first major effort to create a cult of Mao Tse-tung.<sup>19</sup> Prior to this, Mao's power had been consolidated around his role as chairman of the Military Affairs Committee (now Military Commission) of the Central Committee, a position he gained at the expense of Chou En-lai at the Tsunyi conference in 1935.

In the early days of the CPC, the most senior position in the Party was also that of general secretary.<sup>20</sup> When Mao was elected chairman of the Military Affairs Committee at the Tsunyi conference, he was apparently not strong enough to gain the general secretaryship, which went to one of his adversaries, Chang Wen-t'ien. The Comintern, however, became disenchanted with Chang and urged that he be dropped as general secretary, whereupon Mao seized the opportunity to abolish the post.<sup>21</sup>

Not only did the creation of the office of chairman contribute to the building of the cult of Mao, but Mao's occupancy of the post from its establishment until his death made the chairmanship what it became. The role of Party chairman was institutionally strengthened when the office of chairman of the P.R.C. was abolished by the Fourth National People's Congress. The chairman of the P.R.C. had, constitutionally, been concurrently commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The latter role was formally transferred to the Party chairmanship by the 1978 state constitution.

Hua Kuo-feng was elevated to the Party chairmanship after the death of Mao, and an intensive campaign was immediately launched to make his relatively unfamiliar name known throughout the country. The campaign sought to cloak Hua with the qualities of Mao and to begin a new cult of his personality. While focus has been placed on the aging of the Chinese leadership, it should be noted that Hua Kuo-feng, a relatively newcomer to top CPC leadership, at fifty-six years of age is the third youngest head of a Communist country at present.<sup>22</sup>

The Central Committee does not sit in continuous session, nor is it required to convene with any regularity. The 1956 constitution required it to meet twice a year, but subsequent constitutions simply state that it will meet when convened by the Political Bureau. The Central Committee elected by the Seventh Party Congress held seven plenums,

the Eighth held twelve the Ninth and Tenth three each while the Eleventh had already held three plenary sessions as of December 1978. These figures however are somewhat misleading as indicators of Central Committee work inasmuch as the Central Committee has also been convened in meetings and conferences that are not included in the numbered plenum series some of which are referred to as working conferences. Some regular sessions of the Central Committee have been enlarged sessions meaning that people other than members and alternates have been invited to participate. These enlarged sessions have been convened, at times in order to bring in specialists who are able to contribute to the primary topic to be considered on other occasions they have been brought in to pad the attendance for political expediency as in the case of the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee which met in August 1966 to push through Mao Tse tung's program for the Cultural Revolution and to demote Liu Shao chi and Fung Hsiao ping (not yet to remove them from office).

### *The Political Bureau*

Because of its size and composition the Central Committee is impractical as a policymaking or legislative organ. Most of its members reside outside of Peking and have local responsibilities hence it cannot sit frequently or meet for extended periods. The important functions of forming policy and directing Party affairs fall therefore upon the Political Bureau a more manageable body most of whose members reside in Peking. In the recent past the Political Bureau has consisted of twenty to twenty seven members and three to six alternates with a Standing Committee of five to nine of its most influential members functioning as an inner cabinet (see Table 13).

Meetings of the Political Bureau are not ordinarily reported but since the autumn of 1976 decisions of the Political Bureau have been mentioned by the P.R.C. media with increasing regularity and on occasion a directive has even been reported in full. In 1977 the Political Bureau began to function again much as it did during the period of leadership harmony in the early and mid 1960s when it constituted a deliberative body in which members spoke freely and debated issues but practicing the principle of democratic centralism presented a united front on decisions taken. That consensus to whatever degree it actually obtained was later destroyed by the deep differences on policy that emerged toward the end of the 1960s and continued with varying

Table 4.3 Eighth to Eleventh Political Bureaus

Political Bureau	Year	Members	Alternates	Standing Committee
Eighth	1956	17	6	
"	1958	20	6	6
Ninth	1969	21	4	5
Tenth	1973	22	4	9
Eleventh	1977	23	3	5
Eleventh	1978	27	3	6

The figures above refer to the number elected at the Party Congress sessions and do not reflect changes made at plenary sessions of the Central Committee between congress sessions.

degrees of intensity until the winter of 1976-1977. With the fall of the "Gang of Four," a leadership more united on policy matters emerged, though important differences still remain. This new leadership is led by the Political Bureau's Standing Committee, which is composed of Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Vice-Chairmen Yeh Chien-ying, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Li Hsien-nien, Ch'en Yun, and Wang Hung-wen. The new leadership has written into the Party constitution a provision that Party committees at all levels must operate on the principle of collective leadership "with individual responsibility under a division of labor."<sup>23</sup>

The Political Bureau elected by the Eleventh Central Committee is composed of twenty-three members and three alternates, of whom twelve are serving on the Political Bureau for the first time, while only three had attained Political Bureau status prior to the Cultural Revolution (Table 4.4). Though this may suggest a fresh leadership, almost all members of the Political Bureau are veteran cadres, with an average age of 68.5 years for those for whom the date of birth is known. Six members have served on the Central Committee since 1945 and two more since 1956, while only one had never been elected to either the Central Committee or the Political Bureau as member or alternate before 1977. Four more members were added at the committee's third plenum, including Ch'en Yun, who was also named a vice-chairman, and Chou En-lai's widow, Teng Ying-ch'ao.

Decisions of the Political Bureau are issued in its name or in that of



the Central Committee take the form of resolutions directives and circulars and are commonly referred to simply as Political Bureau decisions or Central Committee documents. They are normally sent to Party committees at the provincial level for information and further dissemination when they relate to Party matters and to the State Council for action when they relate to general state affairs. Military decisions are coordinated through the Military Commission of the Central Committee. All decisions and directives however appear to be processed through one or another of the specialized Central Committee organs.

The new leaders have embarked on policies of marked change from those that prevailed until Mao's death. While continuing to wave the banner of Mao Tse tung they have in fact repudiated many of his fundamental policies and tactics and in some fields have reintroduced elitist policies highly criticized by Mao. At the core is their comprehensive policy objective of transforming China into a modern powerful socialist country by the end of this century through the modernization of and the advancement to world levels in agriculture industry national defense and science and technology. These objectives first enunciated by Chou En lai at the Fourth NPC in 1975 do not in themselves contravene aims sought by Mao but some courses of action outlined for their attainment negate or violate principles preached by Mao. This comprehensive policy is being promulgated under the slogan of a new Long March toward the four modernizations and to catch up with and surpass world levels.

#### *Organs of the Central Committee*

The constitution authorizes the Central Committee to establish a number of necessary organs which are compact and efficient to attend to the day-to-day work of the Party the government and the PLA. The work of these organs falls under the direction and supervision of the Political Bureau. The organs have varied somewhat over the years several were immobilized during the Cultural Revolution—some of these have since been reactivated others have not. They include at present a Secretariat a General Office the Military Commission a Propaganda Department Organization Department United Front Work Department International Liaison Department and several bureaus and offices connected with communications and publications matters.

Prior to the Cultural Revolution the most important of these organs was the Secretariat, which was the housekeeping organ of the Central Committee. It transmitted directives and orders of the Central Committee to the proper executive agencies was involved in developing

Table A.4. Institutional Bureau Headed by the Eleventh Central Committee<sup>1</sup>

Name	Approximate Age (60)	Political Party	Central Committee Party	Political Bureau		Standing Committee	Remarks
				Member	Member		
Chang T'ung-shan	64	Republic	ABCC	1100	1100	1100	Former National People's Army member, Air Force
Ch'ien Hsiang-shan		Republic		9/10/1100	9/10/1100		Former National People's Army member, Military Region; member, Military CG; vice president
Ch'ien Yung-kuo		Shanghai		9/10/1100	10/1100		Former National People's Army member, Vice Premier of the National People's Army
Chi Tsung-k'uan		Republic (?)	AB18	10/1100	10/1100		Former National People's Army member, Vice Premier; First Vice Premier, Military Region
Pang Li	68	Taiwan	AB/966	10/1100	1100		Former National People's Army member, Vice President, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Hsu Hsiang-shan	75	Shanghai	7/8/9/10/1100	1100	1100		Former National People's Army member, Vice Chairman, Military CG; Vice Chairman, Military Region
Hsu Shih-yu	71	Republic	ABCC	9/10/1100	9/10/1100	1100	Former National People's Army member, Chairman, Central Committee, CEC
Hsu Kuo-feng	56	Shanghai		9/10/1100	10/1100		Former National People's Army member, Chairman, Military CG; President of State Council
Yang Tsao	68	Republic		9/10/1100	1100		Former National People's Army member, Director, International Liaison Department, CQ
Li Hsiang-shan	72	Republic	7/8/9/10/1100	8/9/10/1100	8/9/10/1100	1100	Former National People's Army member, Vice Chairman, CG; Vice Premier; Economic Affairs and Finance
Li Tsung-shan		Republic		9/10/1100	10/1100	1000	Former National People's Army member, Commander, Shenyang Military Region
Li Tsung-shan	65	Republic	7/8/9/10/1100	8/9/10/1100	8/9/10/1100		Former National People's Army member, Vice Chairman, CG; Vice Premier; member, Military CG; Vice Chairman, NPC
Li Shih-ku	70	Republic		9/10/1100	1100		Former National People's Army member, Vice Chairman, CG; Vice Premier; member, NPC
Li Shih-ku	(60)	Republic	AB/1066	1100	1100		Former National People's Army member, Third Secretary, Shanghai Municipal CEC Council; Second Vice Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee
Li Shih-ku	68	Republic	ABCC	10/1100	1100		Former National People's Army member, First Vice Chairman, Navy

Name	Approximate Age	Active Period	General Committee Number	Political Movement	Standing Committee	Associations and Political Affiliations
Tung Hsiao P. (aka)	73	Switzerland	7/8-10/11CC		8-10/71PS	Executive Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Vice Chairman CC; vice chairman of the CC staff PLA
Shanfa	71	Inner Mongolia	8/7/10/11CC	ADPS	11PS	Director United Front Work Department CC vice chairman NPC Office of the CC
Wang Tung (aka)	70	Southeast	9/10/11CC	1PS	10/11PS	Vice chairman CC; 4th grade General Office of the CC
Wu Yi	63	Beiyab	9/10/11CC	10/11PS	10/11PS	1st secretary United Front Work Dept Chairman Committee for Foreign Relations Central Military Region
Yeh Ch. (aka) 7208	75	Beiyang	7 9 10/11CC	9/10/11PS	10/11PS	1st secretary Foreign Affairs NPC Chairman Foreign Office
Yeh Ch. (aka) 21	61		9/10 11CC	11PS		Vice chairman CC; vice chairman Military CC; vice chief of staff Minister of national defense Ministry of national defense Planning Commission
Chao Yen-7404			10/11CC		11PS	1st secretary Foreign Affairs NPC Chairman Foreign Office Chairman Foreign Office
Chen Yu-hua			10/11CC		11PS	1st secretary Foreign Affairs NPC Chairman Foreign Office Chairman Foreign Office
Chen Yu-hua	61	Shanghai	9 10/11CC		10/11PS	1st secretary Foreign Affairs NPC Chairman Foreign Office Chairman Foreign Office

1-10 Tung Hsiao-ping was attacked by Red Guard bulletin in early 1967 and was a counterrevolutionary by Zhang Li  
Deji. In 1948 In the interim he had ceased to appear publicly. He was discharged from all his positions by  
rehabilitated in April 1973 and retired to west of his province. He was rehabilitated and returned to all posts held in January  
for 6 or 7 days in April 1974. For a second time he was rehabilitated and returned to all posts held in January  
1975 by the Third Plenum of the Ten CC in July 1977

1-11 Wei Hsueh-shang was elected as an alternate member of the Eighth CC in 1956 and as a full member at the second  
plenary session of the Eighth CC in 1958

Abbreviations

- A Airmen
- B Bureau of Party or State
- CC Central Committee
- CCPCC Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
- F Farmer
- M Military

Military Commission

- PLA Political Bureau
- PLC Provincial Party Committee
- PEC Provincial Revolutionary Committee
- PLCC Political Committee
- Y Youth

1-12 This table does not reflect the addition of Chen Yu-hua as vice chairman and member of the standing committee or of  
Tung Hsiao-ping as its secretary and Wang Chen as Politburo members by the plenary of the Third Plenum of the Politburo  
Committee in December 1976

operational procedures, exercised a role in security matters, and maintained general surveillance over policy implementation. In carrying out its tasks, it was able to influence personnel appointments. The Secretariat disintegrated when its general secretary, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and several other members came under attack during the Cultural Revolution; it had not been referred to by P.R.C. media until January 1979, when a newly appointed member of the Political Bureau, Hu Yaopang, was identified as secretary general of the Central Committee,<sup>25</sup> a title initially held by Teng when he headed the Secretariat. In the interim, the functions of the Secretariat appeared to have been taken over by the General Office of the Central Committee, headed by Party vice-chairman Wang Tung-hsing, and first mentioned by the media in November 1966, about the time reference to the Secretariat ceased.

The Propaganda Department, like the Secretariat, was a casualty of the Cultural Revolution but was restored in October 1976. Propaganda work has been recognized from the time of the founding of the Party as an important Party function. At that time, because of the smallness of the Party, only three officers were appointed by the First Party Congress to serve as permanent Party functionaries. One was to serve as Party secretary, responsible for overall party activity, a second was to oversee organizational work, and a third was to direct propaganda activity. The Propaganda Department has responsibility for developing and supervising ideological training, for promoting the correct ideological line in the field of culture, and for the correct interpretation of the Party line in the domestic and international informational programs of the P.R.C.

The Central Military Commission, headed by the Party chairman and composed of senior PLA officers, is the organ responsible for basic military planning and development (see Chapter 10).

Relations with other Communist parties in good standing with the CPC, as distinct from government-to-government relations, are conducted through the CPC's International Liaison Department. Much of the bickering between Peking and Moscow in the early days of the Sino-Soviet controversy was conducted through this channel, but, with the further deterioration of relations between the P.R.C. and the Soviet Union, ties through the channel were severed.

The mission of the United Front Work Department is, as the name suggests, to promote national policies by securing the support and involvement of the masses in Party projects and movements. It deals with the various mass organizations, like the trade unions, the women's federation, and the peasants' and youth organizations, and with the "democratic parties" active in the CPPCC, which are now being

revitalized in connection with the modernization drive. In addition it appears to have some responsibility in the field of domestic intelligence<sup>23</sup> and directs limited activity beyond the frontiers of China particularly in neighboring Hong Kong and Macau.

A number of Central Committee bureaus and subordinate committees deal with publications and media activities. *People's Daily* (*Jen min jih pao*) and *Red Flag* (*Hung chi*), the Party's newspaper and theoretical journal respectively are published by organs that appear to function directly under the Propaganda Department. Of two committees directly subordinate to the Central Committee one is charged with collecting and publishing works of Mao Tse tung and the other with translating and publishing works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

A few recent indicators suggest that the New China News Agency (NCNA), the Central Broadcasting Administration and the *Kuangming Daily* may have been transferred from State Council to Central Committee control. NCNA collects and disseminates news at home and abroad and has primary responsibility for media content in the P.R.C., while the Central Broadcasting Administration maintains networks of radio and television broadcasting stations. Radio broadcasts reach both domestic and foreign audiences while television is limited in range to a domestic audience though its Canton broadcasts can be monitored in Hong Kong. The *Kuangming Daily*, a national newspaper which in the early days of the regime was considered to be the organ of the democratic parties, continues to carry domestic news items intended to appeal to their membership and to intellectuals in general but carries foreign news identical to that found in *People's Daily*. One of the techniques employed by the Gang of Four in its effort to gain control of Party and state was to plant its journalistic agents in the directorates of key informational organs and to remove those opposed to it. Transferring the control of these organizations to the Central Committee would presumably reduce the prospects for the recurrence of such maneuvers and would conform with other measures taken to centralize and strengthen Party controls.

#### *Local and Primary Party Organs*

Party members are distributed throughout the bureaucracy, the mass organizations, various production units, institutions, the military and security establishments and other local bodies. Each Party member is associated with a primary Party organization, usually located within the member's employment unit, and there he or she has the twofold responsibility of performing the tasks required by the employment unit

and carrying out his or her Party assignment. Basic Party units formed in factories, mines, schools, shops, offices, neighborhood organizations, agricultural production units, lower echelons of the PLA, and other establishments are classified by the CPC as "primary Party organizations"; those formed at county, autonomous prefecture, and provincial levels are referred to as "local Party organizations."

Executive bodies of primary Party organizations are of three types, namely, primary Party committees, general branch committees, and branch committees. The type established is determined by the size of the Party membership of the unit within which the committee is formed. In a unit with more than 100 members, a primary Party committee is elected either directly by the members at a general membership meeting or, if the membership is exceptionally large, indirectly at a meeting of delegates of the membership. Depending again on membership size, and on labor and residence factors, as for instance on a commune where members may be scattered in villages far apart and may be engaged in widely divergent labor activities, the primary Party committee may establish a number of general branch committees or branch committees subordinate to it. In employment units of 50 to 100 members, general branch committees are elected, as in the case of the primary Party committees, either at general membership or at delegates' meetings, while in units with fewer than 50 members, Party branch committees are elected only at general membership meetings. Only at the general membership meetings do Party members as a whole find opportunity to exercise their right to vote or to stand for election in Party affairs.

Party committees at the primary level elect their secretary or secretaries and other officials as dictated by local needs and serve as Party organs most directly in touch with the masses. The committees also elect delegates to the county Party congresses and thus serve as the basic building blocks in the Party pyramid that rises through organs at the county, the autonomous prefecture, and the provincial levels to the Central Committee at the apex.

At the county, autonomous prefecture, and provincial levels, Party congresses are theoretically convened every three years, at which they elect Party committees to serve as the permanent organs at corresponding levels. Since provincial Party congresses were initially established at different times, are elected for shorter terms than the national Party congress, and are convened irregularly, their numerical designations have no relevance to each other or to that of the national Party congress. The Party committees elect their standing committees, secretaries, and deputy secretaries. At the provincial level, a Party committee normally

consists of a first secretary, several secretaries and members. The committees of the more populous provinces may also elect a second secretary. Below the provincial level, Party committees are headed by a secretary. At each level, including the primary, Party committees also elect delegates to the Party congresses at the next higher level and all elections at a given level are subject to the approval of the Party committee at the next higher level.

Local Party committees direct the activities of several subordinate departments patterned after the structure of the Central Committee, generally including departments of organization, propaganda and united front work, and a local office of the Young Communist League. Primary Party organizations are responsible for guiding the Party members of their units in political and ideological study, for educating members on Party policy, for directing their Party work, maintaining Party discipline and recruiting new Party members. All members of the Party within a locality are expected to maintain close contact with the masses, report their views on various matters—their attitudes, complaints and reactions—and to provide leadership by example. To strengthen surveillance over Party members, the Eleventh Party Congress called on all Party committees to enforce vigorously the constitutional provision directing Party committees to set up committees to inspect Party discipline and a Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline, composed of 100 members headed by Party vice chairman Chen Yun, was appointed at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee.

### The State

The state constitution describes the People's Republic of China as a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. It is a unitary multinational state in which all nationalities are equal. All power in the state belongs to the people, who under the leadership of the Communist Party of China exercise this power through the National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at various levels.<sup>26</sup> The apparent contradiction between the concepts of people's power and Party dominance is rationalized by the declaration that the power of the people is mobilized through the agency of the Party, which, as the vanguard of the working class, provides the core of leadership for the whole Chinese people.<sup>27</sup>

The trend of constitutional development from the promulgation of the Common Program of the CPPCC and the Organic Law of the

Central People's Government of the P.R.C. in 1949 through the revision of the state constitution in 1975 had been a piecemeal acquisition by the Party of powers and functions previously granted the state. This trend was partially reversed in 1978 when the newly revised state constitution restored to the state a few of the powers and functions that it had ceded to the Party in 1975; these will be noted in the appropriate sections below. Despite these reversals, however, the general trends have been toward the increased concentration of power, initiative, and policy determination in the Party and the progressive transformation of the state apparatus into an executive, administrative agency of the Party. Strengthening of the Party role has been further enhanced by the virtual elimination of the earlier practice of assigning non-Party personnel to leadership positions in certain selected state organs, including certain ministries of the State Council.

### *The National People's Congress*

At the apex of a pyramid of people's congresses, paralleling the Party congress structure, is the National People's Congress, the "highest organ of state power."<sup>28</sup> The NPC is composed of deputies elected by the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central government, and by the PLA. Provisions in earlier constitutions for the participation in the NPC by deputies elected by Chinese residents abroad<sup>29</sup> or by specially invited "patriotic personages"<sup>30</sup> have been deleted from the 1978 state constitution.

The Organic Law of the CPPCC, adopted in September 1949, provided for the eventual election of an All-China People's Congress to serve as the supreme organ representing the people. Pending the enactment of an election law and the election of that body, the CPPCC was empowered to exercise the functions and powers delegated to the All-China People's Congress. Accordingly, until the First NPC (elected in accordance with an election law that became effective on March 1, 1953) convened on September 15, 1954, the CPPCC had served in that capacity. When the new people's congress convened, it took the name "National People's Congress," by which it was identified in the constitution adopted by that congress.

Deputies to the NPC are elected for five years, terms that may be extended under special circumstances, or shortened. Contrary to the National Party Congress, the state constitution calls for annual sessions of the NPC but allows these sessions also to be "advanced" or "postponed." Five NPCs have been held to date (see Table 4.5). While



the first two NPC's met in annual sessions except for a 1961 session missed by the Second the Third and Fourth NPC's met only once each and that despite the fact that the Third which covered the period of the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Piao affair had a life of ten years.

Slightly more than 1,200 deputies were elected to the first two NPC's while the number for the next three jumped first to about 3,000 and then to 3,500 representing an increase of roughly 250 percent—a far greater percentage than that of the interim population growth and suggesting a significant change in the proportionate representation provided for in the original election law. In addition to the accredited deputies to the Fifth NPC (the credentials of three were annulled) leading members of the Central Committee of the CPC, the State Council and the PLA who had not been elected as deputies and all members of the Fifth National Committee of the CPPCC attended that NPC as observers. They also took part in discussions but undoubtedly did not vote.

Deputies to the NPC need not be members of the CPC though the majority of those elected to recent NPC's probably have been. Indeed some of the leading members of the NPC's have been democratic personages like Soong Ching Ling, the widow of Sun Yat sen who has been a member of every NPC and who as a vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fourth NPC, became the ranking member of the Fourth NPC following the deaths of Chu Teh, chairman of the Standing Committee and Tung Pi wu, its senior vice chairman.

Constitutionally conducting the election of deputies and convening the NPC sessions are the responsibilities of the Standing Committee of the NPC. In practice however all matters relating to the NPC including its timing, the content of documents and reports to be submitted and the nominees for major state offices are previously determined by the Political Bureau and approved by the Central Committee.<sup>11</sup>

Theoretically the NPC possesses both legislative and executive powers and exercises limited functions in the judicial process. In practice however its operations are confined to the discussion and endorsement of actions initiated by the Political Bureau approved by the Central Committee in plenums convened to make final preparations for the NPC session and endorsed by the elected NPC members in preliminary meetings immediately prior to the formal opening of its session.

Specific powers granted the NPC by the constitution are to amend the state constitution, make laws, supervise the enforcement of the constitution and the law, decide on the choice of the premier

Table 4.5 The National People's Congress

Congress	Duration	Deputies	Percent Women	Minorities Representation	Officers Elected			
					P. R. C. Chairman	P. R. C. Vice Chairman	Chairman NPC Standing Committee	Premier
First	Sept. 15 - 28, 1959	1,226			Hao Yue-Lung	Chou Teh	Liu Shao-ch'i	Chou En-lai
Second	April 18 - 28, 1959	1,226	12.2	14.6 percent	Liu Shao-ch'i	Tung Pi-wu Soong Ching Ling	Chou Teh	Chou En-lai
Third	December 21, 1964 to January 4, 1965	2,040	17.8	12.27 percent	Liu Shao-ch'i	Tung Pi-wu Soong Ching Ling	Chou Teh	Chou En-lai
Fourth	Jan. 14-17, 1975	2,885	72 +	"54 minorities" Represented	Abolished	Abolished	Chou Teh	Chou En-lai
Fifth	Feb. 26-March 5, 1976	3,500	21.7	"All 54" Represented	---	---	Yeh Chien-ying	Hua Kuo-feng

(nominated by the Central Committee) and other members of the State Council (nominated by the premier) <sup>22</sup> elect the president of the Supreme People's Court and the chief procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate <sup>23</sup> approve the national economic plan the state budget and the final state accounts confirm changes in the configuration of major territorial subdivisions decide on questions of war and peace and exercise such other functions and powers as the NPC may deem necessary With power to elect the NPC is also empowered to remove from office the members of the State Council <sup>24</sup> the president of the Supreme People's Court and the chief procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate Finally the NPC elects a Standing Committee of the NPC.

The Standing Committee of the NPC is composed of a chairman a number of vice chairmen a secretary general and an unspecified number of members. Elected by the NPC, officers and members of the Standing Committee are also subject to recall by the NPC. Its powers and functions are to conduct the election of deputies to the NPC and to convene its sessions to interpret the constitution and laws and to enact decrees to supervise the work of the State Council the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate to appoint and remove members of the State Council upon the recommendation of the premier when the NPC is not in session to appoint and remove vice presidents of the Supreme People's Court and deputy chiefs of the Supreme People's Procuratorate to decide on the appointment and removal of P.R.C. plenipotentiary representatives sent abroad to decide on the ratification and abrogation of treaties concluded with foreign states to decide on the institution and conferment of titles of honor to grant pardons to decide on the proclamation of war in the event of an armed attack when the NPC is not in session and to exercise any other function or power vested in it by the NPC.

Under the new state constitution the chairman of the Standing Committee is assigned a set of specific functions which symbolically at least elevates that office above the role of simply presiding over meetings of the Standing Committee. The most conspicuous of these functions is that of receiving foreign diplomatic envoys, a function generally associated in the international community with the head of state. Though this function has been performed before by the chairman of the Standing Committee, it had not been one constitutionally assigned to that office. The chairman is also charged with the task of formally executing decisions taken by the Standing Committee on matters for

which the latter has the constitutional power to act, like formally ratifying treaties approved by the Standing Committee, dispatching and recalling P.R.C. plenipotentiary representatives abroad, and conferring state titles of honor.

The Standing Committee elected at the Fifth NPC consisted of a chairman, Party veteran Yeh Chien-ying, 20 vice-chairmen, and 175 members, of whom 3 vice-chairmen and 35 members are women.

As in the case of the Eighth Party Congress, the first three NPCs were attended with publicity before, during, and after the sessions. A background report, for instance, released by the NCNA on the eve of the Third NPC gave a brief summary of the previous two NPCs, indicating the number of delegates elected to those and to the Third NPC, and outlining the functions and powers of the NPC. Other preliminary reports listed the deputies to the Third NPC by name, grouped according to representational areas, while the sessions of the NPC were reported daily, with texts of the principal speeches, resolutions, proclamations, and orders, and with the results of the elections. The Fourth NPC met and adjourned before any reference had been made to it by the P.R.C. media.

Treatment of the Fifth NPC, however, reverted to the earlier pattern. The date for the convening of the congress was announced by national media eight days before the opening session. Pre-congress preliminary meetings of the Central Committee and of the congress deputies were reported with brief summaries of the lines the congress would take. These were followed by daily coverage of the congress sessions, though less comprehensive or detailed than reports issued during the first three congresses. An innovation, however, was the very brief television coverage of the opening and closing sessions of the NPC, and especially a three-minute film report that was transmitted to Tokyo by satellite.

### *Elimination of the Office of Head of State*

The 1954 state constitution provided for the election by the NPC of a chairman and a vice-chairman of the People's Republic of China. The chairman of the P.R.C. served as the official head of state and assumed the functions normally associated with such an office, including that of accepting the credentials of foreign ambassadors assigned to China. While the office was widely viewed as a ceremonial one, the 1954 constitution granted the chairman powers well beyond purely symbolic

functions. He was the designated commander of the armed forces and chairman of the now abolished Council of National Defense with the approval of the NPC he had the power to appoint and remove the premier, vice premiers and other members of the State Council and he had the power to convene on important affairs of state the Supreme State Conference an advisory body composed of the chairman and vice-chairman of the P.R.C. the chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, the premier of the State Council, and others whom the chairman might wish to invite (questions of the number and identity of those additionally to be invited were left entirely to the discretion of the chairman) An ambitious incumbent might well have exploited the constitutional powers of the P.R.C. chairmanship to make of that office a potential alternate focus of power to that of the Party chairmanship.

In fulfilling his constitutional obligation the first NPC elected Mao Tse tung chairman and Chu Teh vice-chairman of the P.R.C. Either for personal reasons or because he was forced to do so Mao withdrew his candidacy for the chairmanship before the Second NPC which was scheduled to meet in 1959 convened. Although the constitution did not grant the Party a role in the nomination of candidates for these offices the Party's hand in the matter was clearly reflected by the fact that when Mao decided not to stand for reelection he made his decision known at the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee which was held in Wuchang in late 1958.

With Mao's withdrawal Liu Shao chi who had been chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC was elected chairman of the P.R.C. The number of vice-chairmen was increased to two and the posts were filled by Tung Pi wu and Soong Chung Ling. Tung together with Mao was one of the two founding members still active in the CPC. Chu Teh formerly vice-chairman was elected chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC. This entire configuration was preserved at the Third NPC.

So long as Mao concurrently held the chairmanship of both the P.R.C. and the Central Committee which was obviously the intent of the framers of the 1954 constitution power rivalry between the two offices was absent. But when Mao withdrew and Liu assumed the office of state chairman a potential for conflict developed and did indeed materialize. After Liu fell from power in 1967 the P.R.C. chairmanship was left vacant for a period of time since Liu was not officially removed from his various posts until October 1968. In the interim Tung Pi wu

assumed most of the representational functions of the office and, after Liu's removal, was given the title of "acting chairman."

The chairmanship of the P.R.C. then became an issue in the Lin Piao affair. After managing to have his name inscribed in the 1969 Party constitution as Mao's designated successor, Lin moved to improve his future power position by pressing for the adoption of a new state constitution that would declare Mao to be the "chief of state" and the "supreme commander of the whole nation and the whole armed forces," presumably for life, and himself as "Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-arms and successor."<sup>35</sup> This provoked a heated controversy within the Party, which was resolved only with the death of Lin Piao and the promulgation of the 1975 state constitution, which abolished the offices of chairman and vice-chairman of the P.R.C. by the simple expedient of deleting reference to them. The question of restoring the P.R.C. chairmanship appears to have risen again prior to the convening of the Fifth NPC, but there is no public record that it was discussed at that session.

The powers formerly granted the P.R.C. chairman were divided, the appointive powers going to the NPC but requiring Central Committee or Political Bureau approval and the commandership of the armed forces going to the chairman of the Party, while the protocol functions were transferred to the chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC. The abolition of the state chairmanship rendered the Supreme State Conference obsolescent. In the heyday of its exploitation by Mao, it had been used for some highly important matters. It was at a session of the Supreme State Conference in February 1957, attended by 1,800 persons from all parts of the country, that Mao spoke on internal contradictions. A much revised version of this informal speech was published several months later under the title, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," now considered by the CPC as one of Mao's major theoretical contributions. At another Supreme State Conference in September 1958, Mao analyzed the domestic and international situations and Chou spoke on the Taiwan Strait situation. While the session was in progress, Chou issued a statement asserting the right of the P.R.C. to take military action to "liberate" Taiwan and the coastal islands held by the Kuomintang but offered to resume the ambassadorial talks with the United States, an offer that was accepted and resulted in the defusing of the Taiwan Strait crisis that had developed. The Supreme State Conference was also used by Liu Shao-ch'i periodically through 1964 but was neglected after leadership differences became deep.

### The State Council

The State Council is the central people's government.<sup>38</sup> It is the executive organ of the NPC to which it is responsible and accountable and the highest organ of state administration.<sup>39</sup> It is composed of the premier (nominated by the Central Committee) and a number of vice premiers, ministers in charge of ministries and ministers heading commissions (nominated by the premier) all confirmed by the NPC.<sup>40</sup> The functions and powers of the State Council are to formulate administrative measures, issue orders and decisions, oversee the execution of state policies, prepare the national economic plan and the state budget for submission to the NPC, propose laws and other matters for consideration by the NPC and to perform the many incidental tasks that fall to the administration of a large bureaucracy.

The executive responsibilities entail not only supervision of headquarters operations in Peking but the exercise of administrative direction over the work of the entire state apparatus from the national to local levels, including supervision of operations of PRC missions abroad. Most if not all of the ministries, commissions, bureaus and agencies attached to the State Council are represented in some or all provincial level administrative units. In many cases their operations reach down to the county and commune levels.

While the functions and powers of the State Council may appear to be exceptionally broad, its basic courses of action are largely predetermined by the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, to both of which it is closely linked by concurrent memberships, as indicated below. With the overt consolidation of power in the Party, much of the initiative originally left to the State Council has progressively eroded through practice or constitutional changes, but some of the functions and powers that were constitutionally taken away in 1975 were restored in 1978. Nevertheless, the State Council continues to be primarily an executive body to which only limited policy originating powers have been granted.

Functioning in the universal manner of bureaucracies, the State Council expanded rapidly during the 1950s and early 1960s, proliferating both in personnel and component units. By the late 1960s, according to Chou En-lai,<sup>41</sup> these units had burgeoned to 90 in number with a complement of 60,000 in central administrative organs. With the growing number of units, it had become necessary to create intermediate offices between the State Council and the ministries, commissions, bureaus and agencies to supervise their work. These intermediate

organs, referred to as "staff offices," numbered variously from 4 to 8, and each was given supervisory responsibility over a group of units, generally engaged in related activity. The staff offices were invariably headed by Political Bureau or Central Committee members.

The bureaucracy, state as well as Party, came under severe attack during the Cultural Revolution, and a number of ministries, including the ministries of education and culture, ceased to function. In the process of rebuilding the State Council after the Cultural Revolution, Chou En-lai consolidated its operations and reduced the number of its units; consequently, by 1971, the ministries had been decreased to 26 and the central government complement to 10,000.<sup>40</sup> The staff offices were no longer necessary and were abolished. Gradually, however, Parkinson's Law again took effect. By 1978, ministries under the State Council had increased from 26 in 1975 to 29 and commissions from 3 to 6, while other subordinate organs—bureaus and agencies—despite the apparent transfer of some of the Central Committee, had also increased in number.

The State Council organized at the Fifth NPC is composed of Premier Hua Kuo-feng, thirteen vice-premiers, led by Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Li Hsien-nien, twenty-six ministers heading ministries and six heading commissions, plus the president of the People's Bank of China and the director of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives. Heads of the latter two organizations were elevated to State Council status for the first time. Six of the council's members perform dual functions as concurrent vice-premiers and heads of ministries, leaving a State Council of forty-five members. Of these, three are members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, seven others are members and one is an alternate member of the Political Bureau, twenty are full and five are alternate members of the Central Committee, and only nine have no affiliation with the top organs of the CPC. The latter appear to be specialists, appointed to head ministries for their particular knowledge and skills. (For the structure of the State Council, see Figure 4.2.)

Until his death in 1976, Chou En-lai had served continuously as premier since the founding of the P.R.C. For the first decade, he had served concurrently as minister of foreign affairs. During his final illness, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Li Hsien-nien had alternated as his stand-in, but Teng was clearly the person tapped to succeed him as premier. Teng, however, lost out in the power struggle that followed Chou's death and sustained the second political fall in his career, while Hua




kuo-feng passing over several higher ranking Political Bureau and State Council members was initially named acting premier and then in April 1976 was appointed premier on Mao's urgings. Hua was reconfirmed in this position at the Fifth NPC in 1978 despite earlier rumors that he might yield the premiership to Teng who had been rehabilitated for the second time. In practice however Teng appears to be the person taking charge of day to day operations of the State Council particularly of matters relating to the modernization programs.



Ministries carried over from the previous administration deal with foreign affairs, national defense, public security, foreign trade, and other international economic relations, agriculture and forestry, water conservancy and power, railroads, communications, posts and tele-communications, finance, commerce, education, culture, public health, and a variety of specific industries. In conformity with general Communist practice, the P.R.C. has a number of machine building industries—seven in all. A development worthy of note has been the trend toward replacement of military by civilian heads in these ministries. The increase of ministries from twenty six to twenty nine, decided upon at the Fifth NPC, results from the division of the former Ministry of Petroleum and Chemical Industries into two separate ministries to deal with each of the industries, and the creation of two new ministries, a Ministry of Civil Affairs and a Ministry of Textile Industries. Being very new, the field of responsibility of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and its relations to the Ministry of Public Security and some other ministries are not yet clear.

To the three former commissions—the State Planning Commission, the State Capital Construction Commission, and the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission—have been added a State Economic Commission, State Scientific and Technological Commission, and a Nationalities Affairs Commission. The appearance of the Nationalities Affairs Commission, charged with dealing with China's fifty four ethnic and cultural minorities, represents the reemergence of a commission that went into eclipse during the Cultural Revolution.

The expansion of units under the State Council can in large measure be attributed to the regime's determination to move vigorously in pursuit of its ambitious development objectives. The additions and reorganization of subordinate organs, including the elevation of the two existing bodies to State Council level, can almost all be related to this effort. Moreover, the assignment of vice-premiers to head the four

Figure 4.2 The State (Government)





----- Participated time of meeting

----- Appointed and elected

----- Probably transferred to Central Committee

Figures enclosed for  
 people's bank's report.

commissions most directly involved—the State Planning, Capital Construction, Economic, and Scientific and Technological commissions—attests further to the importance attached to this effort, while the reactivation of the Nationalities Affairs Commission suggests the value placed on the mobilization of a large and inclusive united front.

Bureaus and agencies under the State Council deal with matters relating to civil aviation, tourism, geology, meteorology, seismology, oceanography, cartography, statistics, labor, and insurance. A State Museum and Archaeological Data Bureau, also known as the Cultural Relics Administrative Bureau, was established in 1973, probably as a result of the impressive archaeological finds during and after the Cultural Revolution. A Language Reform Committee continues to press for the standardization of the spoken language, simplification of characters, and for the promulgation of an alphabetized form of written Chinese.

Directly attached to the State Council is a General Office, which appears to be a housekeeping organ, corresponding to the Secretariat of the Central Committee. It probably handles the routine work of the State Council and coordinates the work of that office with the ministries, commissions, bureaus, agencies, and committees mentioned above. In addition to the General Office, a number of specialized offices, subordinate directly to the State Council, deal with diverse matters such as science, environmental protection, mining, birth control planning, and problems relating to the youth sent to the countryside.

A State Council Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs has been referred to recently by the P.R.C. media and appears to be a staff office. It probably takes the place of the Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs that was abolished in 1967, and the restoration of such an organization reflects a renewed interest in cultivating both returned overseas Chinese now residing in China and persons of Chinese origin living abroad, particularly scientists and technologists who can contribute to the modernization effort.

### *Local Government*

The principal organs of local government are established at the provincial, county, and commune levels. These are referred to in the state constitution as local organs of "political power."<sup>41</sup> Except in autonomous prefectures, administrative units at the prefectural level are agencies of provincial governments.<sup>42</sup>

The organs of political power at these levels are the people's

congresses and revolutionary committees, the former serving as local representative bodies and the latter as permanent executive bodies of the people's congresses and the local organs of state administration at their respective levels.

People's congresses in communes and towns and in other basic electoral areas—cities not further divided into districts and districts of municipalities directly under the central government—are elected directly by the voters and according to standard procedure by secret ballot after democratic consultations. People's congresses and revolutionary committees in these basic units of local government are considered to be organizations of political power at the grass roots level<sup>43</sup> and only in elections at this level are the masses offered the opportunity to exercise their franchise.

People's congresses elected by the communes and towns elect deputies to the people's congresses at the county level; people's congresses at the county level—including those in cities and in the municipal districts—elect deputies to people's congresses at the provincial level; and people's congresses at the provincial level—as noted in the preceding section—elect deputies to the NPC. These together with the deputies elected through the PLA electoral system compose the NPC. Organs of self-government are established in autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties which with the passage of time tend to conform more and more in structure and function with the standard institutions of local government.

People's congresses of provinces and municipalities directly under the central government which generally consist of 800 to 1,200 deputies are elected for terms of five years; those of counties, cities and municipal districts for three years; and the congresses of people's communes and towns for terms of two years. The people's congresses at all levels are convened by the revolutionary committees at the corresponding level and are expected to hold sessions at least once a year. Elections of local people's congresses are determined by the Central Committee and conducted by the Standing Committee of the NPC and are geared to the election of new NPCs. Provincial level people's congresses therefore, are uniformly numbered and carry numerical designations corresponding to that of the NPC. Local people's congresses are charged with the responsibility of enforcing the constitution and the laws; of making plans for local economic and cultural development; and of rendering decisions on matters within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law.

People's congresses at each level elect and are empowered to recall members of the revolutionary committees at the corresponding level. At the county and provincial levels they also elect and have the power to recall the president of the people's court and the chief procurator of the people's procuratorate at their respective levels. Deputies to the people's congresses at the various levels have the right to address inquiries to the revolutionary committees, the people's courts, the people's procuratorates, and the organs under the revolutionary committees at the corresponding levels, to which inquiries the addressees are under constitutional obligation to respond.

A revolutionary committee is composed of a chairman, a number of vice-chairmen, and other members. The committees have the power to establish necessary administrative bodies and to appoint and remove personnel of state organs. At the provincial level, the revolutionary committees, which normally consist of 90 to 120 members, including the chairman and 10 to 14 vice-chairmen, also have the power to establish and supervise the work of administrative offices as their agencies in their respective prefectures.

Duties and responsibilities of revolutionary committees are to ensure that orders and decisions of the people's congresses and of the organs of state administration are duly carried out. They direct the administrative work in their respective areas and exercise powers of initiative within defined limits. Revolutionary committees at all levels are responsible and accountable to the people's congresses at the corresponding level and to organs of state administration at the next higher level. They function under the centralized leadership of the State Council.

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, people's councils functioned in the place of the revolutionary committees. Local people's councils in a province were composed of a governor, deputy governor, and members of the council; in a municipality they consisted of a mayor, deputy mayor, and members of the municipal council; while in a county the council was made up of a county head, a number of deputy county heads, and other members of the county council. The size of the council depended on the population and the extent of territory under the council's supervision.

The nationwide local government structure, however, collapsed during the Cultural Revolution as local revolutionary elements, taking advantage of Mao's advocacy of revolution from the bottom, overthrew local authorities, intimidated government cadres, and launched a period of intrafactional struggles for power. By the winter of 1966-1967, chaos reigned in many parts of the country and the PLA was invited to restore

order. In January 1967 several revolutionary groups in Shanghai combined to seize power and formed an administrative body elected through a process modeled on that used to form the Paris Commune of 1871. This experiment however proved to be short lived. Meanwhile in Heilungkiang Province, revolutionary elements proclaimed on January 31 the establishment of a Red Rebels Revolutionary Committee. The committee was composed of representatives of three revolutionary groups—revolutionary elements of the provincial military command, revolutionary Party cadres and revolutionary masses. The revolutionary committee was highly praised by Party authorities and quickly became a model for other provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. By February 5 Shanghai had replaced its Paris type commune with a similarly organized revolutionary committee featuring the three way alliance of revolutionary masses, cadres and army men. The same month revolutionary committees were established in Kweichow and Shantung and by September 2, 1968 in a little more than twenty months despite factional struggles, revolutionary committees had been installed in all provinces, autonomous regions and in the municipalities under the central government.

Although revolutionary committees were initially considered to be temporary institutions they have now been written into the state constitution as a permanent element of local government. Revolutionary committees also became the standard form of administrative executive bodies not only for government at all levels below the national but also for virtually all other enterprises—factories, mines, schools, shops, hospitals, rural production teams, and even for crews of ships on the high seas. At the Fifth NPC, however, Premier Hua Guofeng announced that revolutionary committees would no longer be established in such enterprises except those factories, mines and others in which government administration is integrated with management inasmuch as they do not constitute a level of government.

The early provincial revolutionary committees were fairly evenly represented by the three constituent elements but as time passed and chaos increased the PLA assumed an increasingly active role and became more strongly represented in the revolutionary committees. By September 1968 several of the last formed were staffed almost wholly by the PLA and military personnel—the commandant of a military region or military district—presided as chairman over most revolutionary committees. This situation continued until after the fall of Lin Biao in 1971 and the massive rotation of regional PLA commanders in December 1973.

Subsequent action to reduce the role of the military in civil affairs has completely reversed the situation. Thus, as of early 1978, no military commander headed any provincial revolutionary committee, while every chairman of the twenty-nine revolutionary committees at this level was a member of the Party's Central Committee and concurrently chairman of the local Party committee. Though revolutionary committees are government organs, except for Kwangtung and Peking, no provincial-level revolutionary committee chairman was concurrently a member of the Standing Committee of the NPC.

### *The Judicial System and Law Enforcement*

The judiciary and law enforcement establishments in the P.R.C., consisting of the people's courts, people's procuratorates, and the public security organs, which have overlapping functions and responsibilities, are essentially organs of state power designed primarily to enforce Party and state policies and regulations rather than to protect individual rights; in the past few years they have been brought under closer state control and direction, under Party supervision, than obtained before the Cultural Revolution.

At the top of a three-tiered people's court structure is the Supreme People's Court, "the highest judicial organ"<sup>44</sup> in the P.R.C. Below it are the higher people's courts established at the provincial level and the lower people's courts (formerly termed "basic people's courts") at the county level. The higher and lower people's courts are collectively known as "local people's courts." A level of "intermediate people's courts" between the higher and lower people's courts, present before the Cultural Revolution, appears to have been abolished. The three-tiered courts are supplemented by a series of "special people's courts," consisting of the military, the railway, and the water transportation courts.

The constitution refers only to the method of appointment of presidents of the courts at each level. Appointment of other members presumably continues to follow the general procedure set forth in the "Organic Law of the People's Courts" of 1954, although that law has obviously required amendment to conform with changes in local government organization. The constitution provides for the election of the president of the Supreme Court by the NPC, but no mention is made of a nominating authority (in contrast to the constitutional provisions that the premier be nominated by the Central Committee and other members of the State Council by the premier).<sup>45</sup> Presidents of the higher and lower people's courts are elected and subject to recall by the people's congresses at the corresponding levels. Other members of the respective



courts are appointed according to the 1954 law by the permanent state organs at each level—by the NPC Standing Committee in the case of the Supreme People's Court and by the revolutionary committees (people's councils in the 1954 law) of the provinces and counties in the case of the local people's courts. The Supreme People's Court is responsible and accountable to the NPC and its Standing Committee while the local people's courts are responsible and accountable to local people's congresses at the corresponding level.

The Supreme People's Court serves not only as the court of last resort but is also empowered by the constitution to supervise the administration of justice by the local people's courts and the special people's courts. Higher people's courts are likewise empowered to supervise the work of lower people's courts, though the Supreme People's Court exercises overall supervision. Administration of the court system was originally the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice under the State Council but when that ministry was abolished in 1959 the function was transferred to the Supreme People's Court.

Procuratorial organs like the people's court system consist of a Supreme People's Procuratorate, higher people's procuratorates at the provincial level, and lower people's procuratorates at the county level. Special people's procuratorates function in conjunction with the special people's courts. Presiding over the entire structure is the chief procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate. Procuratorial organs conduct investigations, prepare indictments, and prosecute the cases before the courts.<sup>16</sup> They are empowered to exercise supervisory authority to ensure observance of the constitution and the laws by all organs of state, including the State Council, government officials, and citizens.<sup>17</sup> They also have the right to review and challenge judgments by the courts at their respective levels, the Supreme People's Procuratorate however being empowered to challenge the rulings of courts at all levels, including the Supreme People's Court.

The third establishment involved in the law enforcement process, the public security system, is in many respects the most important and has the greatest and most immediate impact on the people. Its ubiquitous organs function under the direction of the Ministry of Public Security, one of the principal ministries under the State Council, and its subordinate agencies in the provinces, counties, and the local communities. Public Security organs command the local police and direct policing operations, including investigation, arbitration of minor disputes and disagreements, maintenance of records of local residents, and the making of arrests; their functions overlap those of the people's procuratorate.

The courts and the procuratorate came under attack during the Cultural Revolution. While the court system survived, procuratorial organs vanished from reference in the P.R.C. media and their functions were taken over by public security. In 1975, at the Fourth NPC, they were formally transferred to public security by the simple process of omitting reference to the procuratorate in the new constitution and by assigning its former responsibilities to public security organs. At the Fifth NPC in 1978, however, the procuratorate was restored and given most of its original functions but its status was changed.

In its earlier existence, the procuratorate had been structured so as to appear to function relatively independently of state organs. While the chief procurator (so named before the title was changed to president) of the Supreme People's Procuratorate was elected and subject to recall by the NPC, as were its other members by the NPC Standing Committee, local people's procuratorates at each level in the chain were organized by and subject to their immediate superior procuratorial body, with the Supreme People's Procuratorate exercising overall administrative and supervisory control. Moreover, while the Supreme People's Procuratorate was responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee, no linkage was made between lower level procuratorial and corresponding state organs. On the contrary, the "Organic Law of the People's Procuratorate" of 1954 stated specifically that the local people's procuratorates "are independent in the exercise of their authority and are not subject to interference by local state organs."<sup>48</sup> At the same time, they were not empowered directly to annul, change, or stop the execution of directives issued by state organs even if they contravened the law.<sup>49</sup>

Before the Cultural Revolution, the procuratorate and public security organs at local levels and "political and legal committees" of local Party committees coordinated the work of the courts by bringing into their memberships the local heads of the three organizations.<sup>50</sup> Thus, under Party leadership, conflicts of function and jurisdiction could be locally resolved. This practice may have been restored, thereby giving the Party as well as the state a direct supervisory role over juridical and law enforcement activities.

Relatively little is known about court procedures or the handling of court cases. Immediately after the regime was established in 1949, the prevailing judicial system, including the legal codes in force, was abolished. Since no new code, civil or criminal, was adopted and the system of people's courts and procuratorates was not introduced until

1971, cases involving espionage support of the enemy counter-revolutionary activities theft of state property and other antisocial activities were handled in the interim either administratively by public security organs or tried publicly by ad hoc people's tribunals. After the establishment of the people's courts and procuratorates some progress was made toward the development of legal codes but the movement was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution. Toward the end of 1977 however efforts were renewed to produce both civil and criminal codes efforts that had been abandoned in the early 1960s.

### *Rights and Duties of Citizens*

The state constitution contains a lengthy catalogue of citizens' rights and duties.<sup>31</sup> Equality of all citizens regardless of race sex or culture is guaranteed. Specific freedoms citizens are entitled to enjoy include the freedom of speech correspondence the press assembly association procession and demonstration. All citizens have the right to speak out freely air their views fully hold great debates and write big-character posters.<sup>32</sup> A new freedom incorporated into the 1972 constitution at the suggestion of Mao Tse-tung according to Chang Ch'un-ch'iao<sup>33</sup> and reaffirmed in the 1978 revision is the freedom to strike. Inviolability of the person and the person's home is promised and arrest is constitutional only if carried out as a result of a decision by a people's court or with the sanction of a people's procuratorate and the arrest must be made by a public security organ.

For many of the rights guaranteed a complementary obligation is placed on the state to make the necessary provisions to enable the citizen to enjoy the rights guaranteed. For instance citizens have a right to work and the state is obliged to provide labor. Working people have a right to rest and the state must ensure that the worker can enjoy this right by among other things arranging for systems of vacations and developing facilities for rest and recuperation. Working people have a right to material assistance in old age and for their welfare and for those disabled the state must provide social assistance and health and medical services. Citizens have a right to education for which the state must expand educational and cultural institutions and popularize education. All citizens who have reached the age of eighteen have the right to vote and to stand for election as noted in preceding sections except those persons who have been deprived of these rights by law.

Aside from the general guarantee of equality for all citizens women were specifically guaranteed equal rights with men by the 1954

constitution only in respect to the right to vote and to stand for election. The 1978 constitution returns to the language of the Common Program<sup>54</sup> by assuring women equal rights with men "in all spheres of political, economic, cultural, social, and family life";<sup>55</sup> and, ostensibly in response to a well-publicized campaign by the women's federations in the mid-1970s, guarantees equal pay for equal work. The constitution also advocates and encourages family planning.

In respect to ethnic and cultural minorities, the constitutions point subtly to a shift from a deemphasis on cultural differences to an endorsement of the right to preserve local cultures, probably reflecting a transition from a post-Cultural Revolution objective of moving toward cultural uniformity to the more recent effort to mobilize a united front for a national thrust to achieve the regime's modernization goals. The 1954 constitution provided that "All the nationalities have freedom to use and foster the growth of their spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own customs and ways." In the spirit of this pledge, alphabets were devised for several minority languages for which no system of writing existed, literatures were collected and published, minority peoples in their national dress were commonly seen in parades on ceremonial occasions, and their dances and theatrical works were performed in various parts of the country to emphasize domestically and for foreign audiences the multinational character of the state. At the same time, minority peoples were subjected to pressure to conform to the rest of the country, ideologically and institutionally. The 1975 constitution retained the statement granting all nationalities the right to use their own spoken and written languages<sup>56</sup> but dropped the two important phrases allowing them "to foster the growth" of their languages and "to preserve or reform" their customs and ways. The 1978 constitution restored the reference to the preservation or reform of customs and ways but omitted the "foster the growth" clause.<sup>57</sup>

Freedom of religion was a matter of limited interest to the P.R.C. prior to the Cultural Revolution, when Peking found it useful in the conduct of its foreign relations to be able to demonstrate to foreign visitors, particularly visitors from Islamic and Buddhist countries, that such freedom did exist. During the Cultural Revolution, religion came under attack, believers were scorned, practice of religion declined, and institutionalized religion tended to wither away. Though the question of religion has not been an issue, the constitution continues to guarantee freedom of religious belief but also added the "freedom not to believe" and "to propagate atheism."

The 1977 Party constitution grants its members the right to criticize Party organs and leaders at all levels and to bypass an immediate leader and present complaints to officials at higher levels including members of the Central Committee and even the chairman of the Central Committee.<sup>58</sup> Special reference is made to the right to question decisions of Party organs. Similar rights to lodge complaints against any organ or functionary of the state for transgression of law or neglect of duty are extended to the citizenry by the 1978 state constitution.<sup>59</sup> Both constitutions forbid the suppression of criticism.

Knowledge of the guarantees and exercise of the rights are however two separate and distinct matters. In a country that has pressed vigorously for conformity, launched periodic ideological campaigns, conducted organized attacks against leaders who have expressed views approved at one time but rejected at another, and excommunicated formerly venerated leaders for incorrect outlook and alleged antisocialist activity, it is highly unlikely that many citizens will use the right to speak out freely, assemble, demonstrate or strike on their own initiative without prior assurance that such conduct is desired by the authorities.

Individual action is more likely to be guided by the obligations placed upon the citizens. The fundamental rights and duties of the citizens, the 1975 state constitution states, are to support the leadership of the Communist Party of China, support the socialist system, and abide by the constitution and laws of the People's Republic of China.<sup>60</sup> In more prosaic language, the 1978 constitution reaffirms these obligations placed upon the citizens:

In certain cases, persons convicted of serious crimes may have their rights as citizens legally removed, though the state is obliged to provide them with the opportunity to earn a living in order that they may be rehabilitated.<sup>61</sup> As for those who have responded positively to reformatory and reeducation, Yeh Chien-ying told the Fifth NPC that their rights as citizens should be restored and all pejorative labels removed.

### Political Dynamics

In large measure, the success of the CPC in consolidating the country in accomplishing what it has achieved in economic organization and development and in carrying out radical and fundamental social change can be attributed to its ability to inculcate the people with a sense of purpose, mobilize the masses for

collective action, dignify manual labor, shift individual focus from selfish motives and interests to the collective weal, and give meaning to the concept of nationhood.

### *The Role of Ideology*

The motivating force behind the Chinese Communist movement, as noted earlier, is a form of Marxism that the CPC officially refers to as Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought; it is commonly referred to in the West as Maoism.<sup>62</sup> Mao Tsetung Thought is defined as the "highest form of Marxism-Leninism in the present era"<sup>63</sup> and as the adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the situation in China. The CPC describes the epoch of Marx and Engels as the preparatory stage for the proletarian revolution, the epoch of Lenin and Stalin as the stage of the first socialist victory in a country and the epoch of the breach for the battle against imperialism, and the epoch of Mao as the one in which capitalism and imperialism were "to be sent to the tombs."<sup>64</sup>

Mao Tse-tung's political and economic concepts derive from his early experience with the bitterness and poverty of peasant life in China and his reaction to the humiliation of China by foreign powers. Information about the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia reached China during a period when Mao and other Chinese intellectuals were groping for answers to China's multitude of dilemmas. Disappointed with the West and with Western approaches, he and others became attracted to socialism as the road to take to solve China's problems. Mao, however, read no foreign language, and published material on socialism and Marxism in Chinese was very limited; consequently, his introduction to the new ideology was largely received through secondary rather than primary sources, and since he was more interested in promoting revolution than in developing theories, he was more influenced by Lenin and Stalin than by Marx.<sup>65</sup> His contributions to Marxism were therefore more in the field of the application of theory to practice than in the field of pure theory; indeed, his contributions to theory were minimal.

Mao Tsetung Thought is embodied in his massive output of pamphlets and tracts. Five volumes in a series containing selections from his most important works have been published by the Chinese Communists to date, the fifth having been released hurriedly shortly after his death. The committee under the Central Committee responsible for collecting, selecting, and publishing the works has been enjoined to expedite its work, which includes the scouring of the country for every scrap of Mao's notes, instructions, commentaries, and other written

communications. A large portion of the presently published works consists of writings in which he expounded on strategies and tactics employed in the struggles against the Japanese and the Kuomintang and of his expositions on the social order and political system to be installed after the Communists achieved victory in China.

Maoism however is not limited to the concepts set forth in his published works but is shaped also by what Communist leaders know about his unpublished works, his elaborations on policy and objectives at Party deliberations, the exegesis of his ideas by his lieutenants, and even the commentaries of those opposed to him. Mao's thought will continue to be interpreted and reinterpreted in terms of the developing situation in China. Consequently, Maoism in the future will increasingly be what Party leaders say it is and will probably resemble less and less what Mao meant it to be.

At the Seventh Party Congress in 1945, Mao Tse-tung Thought was written into the Party constitution as the guiding doctrine for the CPC. This declaration was omitted in the revised constitution adopted at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 which stated simply: "The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action. Only Marxism-Leninism correctly sets forth the laws of development of society and charts the path leading to the achievement of socialism and communism."<sup>4</sup> Deletion of the reference to Mao Tse-tung Thought was much later attributed to the pernicious machinations of Liu Shao-chi, even though Peng Teh-hun had admitted in his confession to having proposed the deletion. The thought of Mao Tse-tung was restored constitutionally to Party guidance at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 and has been reaffirmed as such by every Party and state constitution subsequently promulgated. The 1977 Party constitution states: "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought is the guiding ideology and theoretical basis of the Communist Party of China."<sup>5</sup>

Frequently quoted by Party leaders and P.R.C. media is Mao's warning: "The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything. In this case, the ideological line is the system of beliefs to which the Party subscribes and the political line is the interpretation of the ideological line as reflected in political action. The correct ideological line is Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought and the ultimate arbiter of the correctness of the line is the Party, meaning those within the Party leadership at any single moment able to exercise sufficient authority to propagate their interpretation of the line through the media and through indoctrination of the populace and to enforce a corresponding course of action. Differences in respect to action compatible with ideology have been at the heart of major intra-

Party controversies since the Party was formed. Officially, eleven major controversies are recognized as having taken place up to the present and, though these have involved a variety of issues, they have been described as "struggles between the two lines," the correct line and the incorrect line.

Ideology has served the CPC in different ways at various stages of the Chinese Communist movement. It has served to point out wrongs in traditional society that the party is determined to correct, has defined the goals to be sought and the value structure to be promulgated, and has outlined the means of attaining the goals and objectives. Ideology has also served to consolidate Party leadership, to supply common language and concepts for communication with cadres and masses, and to provide points of reference for the mobilization of the masses for action.<sup>63</sup>

### *Mobilization and Participation*

A theme persistently stressed by Mao Tse-tung in his writings, incorporated in Party and state constitutions, frequently emphasized in speeches by Party leaders, and commented upon with some regularity by the P.R.C. media is the importance of involving the masses in the revolutionary process. According to Mao, "The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history." Mao preached the superiority of man over machines and the essential goodness of the common people. Repeatedly, he asserted that 95 percent of the people or 95 percent of Party members are good and loyal and can be trusted to contribute to the revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, he encouraged revolution from the bottom as a means of attacking institutions and leadership that had gone awry, a procedure that contravened the Party principle of democratic centralism and a practice that was to present the Party with future organizational and theoretical problems. Mao's faith in the masses and in "the mass line" concept derived from his personal experience in effectively involving local peasantry in revolutionary activity during the Kiangsi and Yenan periods of the revolution.<sup>64</sup>

People are China's most abundant resource. Mao recognized that mobilizing, indoctrinating, and motivating and giving the people direction would enable disciplined masses to accomplish much that in richer and technologically more advanced countries would be done by mechanical means. Accordingly, on the eve of the Great Leap Forward he could bemoan the fact that China's massive population, rather than being a burden to the country, was too small for the labor-intensive



projects he had in mind.

Mass involvement constitutes a means for extending indoctrination and ideological guidance for popularizing the new social values espoused by the regime for educating the populace regarding policies and objectives of the CPC for political control for cultivating a sense of mutual responsibility for the behavior and attitudes of each member of the community and for the mobilization of the masses for participation in specific projects and support on particular issues.

For purposes of mobilization virtually every citizen of the P.R.C. except the very young belongs to one or more of the mass organizations or local control groups that have been formed. The most important of these are the trade unions the women's federation youth organizations and peasant associations. There are also mass organizations for those involved in sports and cultural activities for various professions. Prior to the Cultural Revolution five national religious associations—Taoist Islamic Buddhist Catholic and Protestant—were actively used to bring their adherents under the control and in line with the policies of the regime. After an eclipse these have again emerged as instruments used in the formation of a united front. For those for whom no functional organization exists there are neighborhood associations—street committees and local rural organizations—of which every resident is a member.

Major mass organizations are governed by complicated ladders of administrative organs extending from a national body down through provincial to county and local organs. The leading figures of these particularly of the trade union women's federation and Communist Youth League are Party members and are generally elected to full membership of the Central Committee. Most of the mass organizations were dismantled during the Cultural Revolution. In 1973 a drive was mounted to restore the trade union women's federation and the Communist Youth League. Though the drive appeared to have been successful a renewed effort in the summer of 1977 sought to revitalize these organizations.

Techniques employed for mass mobilization include mass campaigns education and indoctrination saturated dissemination through communications systems of messages and ideas emulation drives, and moral compulsion. Campaigns of one kind or another are virtually always under way. They are normally sparked by a summons for collective action on some issue or project (often an instruction by the chairman in Mao's day) or by a national conference or an international

development. A national conference, to which provincial leaders and activists are invited, is commonly used to launch a major campaign. This will be followed successively by similar conferences at the provincial and lower levels through which plans and guidance are transmitted eventually to local activists and to the masses. Occasionally, one campaign sparks another. Campaigns have been conducted for a wide variety of political, economic, and social purposes. They have been used to unify the public on domestic and international issues, as in the case of the "Resist America, Aid Korea" campaign during the Korean war; to remold wavering ideology, as in the series of rectification campaigns; to promote emulation of successful endeavors and enterprises, as in the Tachai and Tach'ing emulation campaigns; to denounce an opposition, as in the successive campaigns against Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao, and the Gang of Four; to improve work styles, as in the Lei Feng campaign; and to mobilize the public for collective action, as in Hua Kuo-feng's call at the Eleventh Party Congress, repeated at the Fifth NPC, to mount a nationwide campaign to strive to achieve interim targets in the long-term project of transforming China into a "powerful and modern socialist country" by the end of the twentieth century.

For emulation purposes, model workers, peasants, soldiers, and other activists are periodically called to public attention, praised, and set up as examples for others to follow. Models may be individuals or organized groups, like the Tachai agricultural brigade, the Tach'ing petroleum enterprise, or the "Good Eighth Company of Nanking Road" of the PLA. Model workers and peasants have been rewarded by promotions and by election to high office, the highest having gone to Ch'en Yung-kuei, a model peasant of the Tachai brigade, who rose through the Party secretaryship of the brigade to membership on the Political Bureau, of which he has been a full member since 1973. A female textile worker from Sian, Wu Kuei-hsien, also a model worker, was elected alternate member of the Political Bureau in 1973 but was dropped in 1977, although she retained her membership in the Central Committee. Other model workers have been elected either as members or alternate members of the Central Committee at various Party congresses. At the Fifth NPC, Hua Kuo-feng stated:

The masses have a vast reservoir of enthusiasm for socialism. Socialist labor emulation is a good and important method of bringing the initiative and creativeness of the people into full play and of achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in developing the economy.

Each and every locality, trade enterprise, establishment and rural commune and production brigade should fully mobilize the masses and bring about an upsurge in emulating learning from catching up with and overtaking the advanced units and helping the less advanced units. The main aim of the labor emulation is to increase production and practice economy.

Indoctrination begins early in the creches and schools and continues through life. Youngsters in creches are imbued with ideological concepts through simple slogans and songs and play games designed to propagate new Communist values and to include an early recognition of the duties and responsibilities of citizens. Later throughout life citizens must participate in regular political study, discussion and criticism to heighten political consciousness and eradicate misconceptions. Material for these study sessions is carried by the press and other publications, by wired and wireless broadcasting networks and by television, though still in its infancy.

The state constitution declares: "Work is an honorable duty for every citizen able to work." To encourage greater effort, the constitution endorses the policy of combining moral encouragement with material reward,<sup>76</sup> even though the policy of material rewards was strongly disapproved of by Mao Tse-tung. Motivation is also engendered by such practices mentioned above as the honoring of superior workers by naming them labor heroes, the selection of outstanding workers for participation in leadership conferences, and the granting of Party membership to those who excel in leadership qualities. Above all, however, social compulsion may be the strongest motivating factor.

Despite the tightly controlled society which discourages people from using their constitutional rights to speak out freely to criticize and to demonstrate without being directed to do so, there are openings or means for the people to express their views outside of formal discussion sessions. The most popular of these appears to be the writing of big character posters, a practice sanctioned by Mao himself at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. It is, of course, impossible to know how many of the posters are self-initiated and express genuine private views.

#### *The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference*

After an extended period of dormancy, the CPPCC was revived in 1977-1978 and transformed into an institution for the mobilization of a united front to promote domestic and international united front

activities and, most immediately, to help enlist all domestic elements in the government's ambitious modernization programs. The CPPCC was originally convened in 1949 to formally establish the P.R.C. and was authorized to exercise the functions and powers of the NPC until the latter could be convened. With the promulgation of the state constitution in 1954, CPPCC functions were transferred to the NPC and the CPPCC adopted a constitution defining its role as that of a united front institution. Three additional conferences of the CPPCC were convened before its decline in the mid-1960s. These assembled, according to the provisions of its constitution, as meetings of the National Committee of the CPPCC: the Second in December 1954, the Third in April 1959, and the Fourth in December to January, 1964-1965. The Second met approximately three months after the First NPC but the Third and Fourth held concurrent sessions with the Second and Third NPCs. On the latter two occasions, the policy reports submitted to the NPCs were also reviewed and discussed by members of the CPPCC in session, whose mission it was to return to the provinces to popularize NPC programs and decisions among the masses. When a Fifth National Committee meeting of the CPPCC was not convened at the time of the Fourth NPC in January 1975, substance was lent to a growing belief that the CPPCC had exhausted its usefulness to the CPC and was being allowed to expire through attrition (for some time through the mid-1970s, virtually the only references to the organization were in obituary notices of its deceased members. Meanwhile, other members had been disgraced during the antibourgeoisie campaigns conducted since the late 1950s).

At the Eleventh Party Congress of the CPC in August 1977, however, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng announced that the Fifth NPC would be convened "at an appropriate time" and that the Fifth National Committee of the CPPCC would "go into session simultaneously." Prior to the convening of the Fifth National Committee of the CPPCC on February 24, 1978, NCNA carried a "backgrounder" in which the CPPCC was described as "China's revolutionary united front organization," with the comment that the revolutionary united front was one of the "three magic weapons" with which the CPC had led the Chinese people to victory, the other two being armed struggle and party building.<sup>71</sup> In addition to CPC delegates, it was noted that the National Committee included representatives of other remaining political parties in the P.R.C., of the major mass organizations, and of specialists from various walks of life (see Table 4.6), and that it was a body for

Table 4.6 Composition of Fourth and Fifth CPPCC National Committees

Affiliation of Members	Number of Members	
	Fourth	Fifth
Communist Party of China	60	70
Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee	40	50
China Democratic League	40	50
China Democratic National Construction Association	40	50
Non-Party Democratic Personnel (Patriotic Personages)	20	25
Chinese Association for Promoting Democracy	20	25
'China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party	20	25
China Uih Kung Tang	8	8
Chi San Society	20	25
Taiwan Democratic Self Government League	8	12
Chinese Communist Youth League	10	12
All-China Federation of Trade Unions	38	49
Peasants	16	21
Women's Federation of the People's Republic of China	32	42
All-China Youth Federation	8	10
Cooperatives	11	-
All China Federation of Industry and Commerce	40	50
Literary and Art Circles	52	67
Scientific and Technical Circles	60	90
Social Science Circles	20	25
Educational Circles	42	63
Sports Circles	-	25
Journalist and Publications Circles	11	14
Medical and Health Circles	40	50
Organizations for Friendship with Foreign Countries	22	28
Social Relief and Welfare Organizations	13	17
Minority Nationalities	36	56
Overseas Chinese	17	-
Returned Overseas Chinese	-	31
Religious Circles	16	16
Specially Invited Personages	439	993
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,191</b>	<b>2,468</b>

consultation and proposals. On the day following the initial session of the Fifth National Committee *People's Daily* carried in its prestigious upper right hand corner a quotation from Mao Tse tung pertinent to the occasion: "We must do our best to mobilize all positive factors both inside and outside the Party both at home and abroad both direct and indirect and make China a powerful socialist country."

The Fifth National Committee of the CPPCC was composed of 1,968 members, an increase of 67 percent over the 1,191 members of the Fourth. The organizations and fields of specialization represented on the two occasions remained virtually unchanged, with the exception only of the 1978 *deletion* of a 1963 representation from cooperatives and the 1978 addition of sports representatives absent in 1963. The net increase

resulted from a moderate rise of 20 percent in most categories but a substantial 50 percent increase of scientists, technicians, educators, and minority representatives and a doubling of specially invited personages, who made up roughly one-half of the total membership (see Table 4.6). The areas of large increase reflect the regime's desire to involve elements who can contribute through proposals and consultations, as well as materially, to the modernization effort and can assist in correcting major errors committed in the past decade in the fields of education and technology.

A new CPPCC constitution, adopted at the Fifth National Committee meeting, promulgates a set of principles that calls for support of the CPC and the socialist system, upholding the line of Mao Tse-tung, adherence to the principles of the CPC, and promotion of patriotism and revolutionary vigilance. Most of these were also in the organization's 1954 constitution; new to the 1978 constitution, however, is a declaration that Taiwan "has been China's sacred territory since ancient times" and "must" be liberated. A major change was the deletion of a 1954 principle dedicating the CPPCC to contribute to the consolidation of the alliance with the U.S.S.R. and to the "unbreakable friendship" with the people's democracies and the substitution of a constitutional task requiring the CPPCC to work for the development of an international united front against hegemonism and "to struggle unremittingly against hegemonism and the war policies of the superpowers."

The new CPPCC constitution also invites the organization, on a voluntary basis, to promote the study of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought; to hold report and discussion meetings and organize investigations of various situations; to conduct activities in political, economic, cultural, educational, technical, and scientific fields in order to open avenues to new ideas and talents; to collect and compile the history of modern China; to work for the "liberation" of Taiwan; and to conduct international united front activities.

Like other major organizations, the CPPCC has a National Committee that supervises the activities of local bodies on the provincial and, where necessary, lower levels. Groups represented are not constitutionally identified, except the CPC, but have become standardized by practice, as indicated in Table 4.6. The National Committee is elected or appointed for a term of five years, the same as that for the Party congress and the NPC. The National Committee elects its chairman, a number of vice-chairmen, and a Standing Committee, whose candidates have previously been "endorsed" by the Central Committee. The

Standing Committee appoints a number of deputy secretary generals and a Secretary to conduct the routine work of the organization. The constitution calls for annual meetings of the National Committee but as in the case of other organizations in the P.R.C., the standing committee is authorized to convene the committee before its due date or to postpone the meeting.

Local CPPCC committees, patterned after the national are established in the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. They are composed of members of the CPC, other political parties, mass organizations, specially invited individuals and representatives of all walks of life. White-petition minority representatives are included. Below the provincial level CPPCC committees are established only when deemed necessary.

At the meeting of the Fifth National Committee of the CPPCC held February 21 to March 8, 1978, Teng Hsiao ping, vice chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC and vice premier of the State Council was elected chairman of the committee. Twenty three vice chairmen were elected, of whom 10 are full members of the Central Committee, including 3 full members of the Political Bureau—Wei Kuo ching, (a Chuang minority member), Peng Chung, and Ulanfu (a Mongol). Chi Yen ming was elected secretary general and a standing committee of 233 members was also elected. Teng's election continues the policy of placing the CPPCC under the direction of a senior member of the Political Bureau, as only Mao Tse tung, and Chou En lai have preceded him in that office. Mao served as chairman of the First CPPCC, and at the meeting of the Second National Committee he was elevated to a newly created honorary chairmanship, a post to which he was reelected at the Third and Fourth National Committee meetings, while Chi succeeded him as chairman, holding that office until his death. The Fifth National Committee abolished the office of honorary chairman by the characteristic policy of omitting reference to it in the new constitution. New committees of the CPPCC had been elected in the 29 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities between October 1977 and February 1978, and these elected representatives to the Fifth National Committee.

### The Cadres

A critically important functionary in the Chinese Communist system is the cadre. The term *cadre* is somewhat ambiguous in itself, as it is commonly used in reference to a wide variety of functionaries.<sup>2</sup> persons

of authority in Party and state bureaucracies; leaders in agricultural and industrial production units; officials in schools, hospitals, and other institutions; members of the PLA; and personnel who hold even minor leadership positions.<sup>73</sup> Essentially, a cadre is a person vested with authority or, according to Schurmann, "someone who holds a leadership position in an organization."<sup>74</sup>

According to Mao Tse-tung, paraphrasing Stalin, "Cadres are a decisive factor, once the political line is determined." Mao added,

The criterion the Communist Party should apply in its cadre policy is whether or not a cadre is resolute in carrying out the Party line, keeps to Party discipline, has close ties with the masses, has the ability to find his bearings independently, and is active, hard-working, and unselfish.<sup>75</sup>

Cadres may or may not be members of the CPC. Acceptance as a cadre, however, can lead to Party membership. Cadres are selected on the basis of ideological correctness, industry, acceptability to colleagues and co-workers, loyalty, and social background. They may be selected as a result of performance in a bureaucracy, or because of special talent demonstrated at school—foreign language or scientific aptitude, for example—or they may be nominated by co-workers at an employment unit on the basis of demonstrated political and leadership qualities.

Lower-level cadres are the regime's primary instrument for direct dealing with the masses. Thus the success of a program or the effectiveness of a policy depends heavily on the overall competence of the cadres. Accordingly, cadres are expected to maintain close contact with the masses, to listen to them, to accept their comments and criticisms, to be able to explain policies and official positions on issues and matters, and to be able to lead them in study, criticism, and self-criticism. They are also expected to lead by example, particularly by their own industry, willingness to participate in labor, loyalty to the Party, social consciousness, freedom from selfishness, and personal perseverance in political study. Chou En-lai cited three qualities cadres should possess: modesty, prudence, and hard work.<sup>76</sup>

Except for those who enter cadre ranks directly from educational institutions, cadre or job-oriented formal training may be slight. Indeed, for most, training appears to be essentially on-the-job training. At the Tenth and Eleventh Party congresses, however, considerable attention was given to the subject of improving the quality of cadre training, with emphasis placed on the need to improve political study and on improving cadre work styles. Following the Eleventh Party Congress,



a Central Committee directive called on Party organs at all levels to take action to restore and improve two cadre training systems—the Party schools and the May Seventh cadre schools.

The Party schools traceable to the Yen-an period and earlier were maintained by Party committees at the various levels but were suspended during the Cultural Revolution and have been tardily reopening. The Party school in Peking connected with the Central Committee did not reopen until October 9, 1977, four days after the Central Committee directive. Since then Party schools have reopened in several provinces and others can be expected to be reactivated by Party committees at each level of the Party establishment. The instructional emphasis at Party schools will be on ideological and theoretical training and the emphasis will be on independent reading under tutorial guidance rather than classroom work.

May Seventh cadre schools take their name from a call issued by Mao Tse-tung on May 7, 1966, urging the populace to study military affairs, politics, and culture and to take part in the socialist education movement. The schools, which did not come into being until late 1968, were originally conceived as reeducational or correctional institutions for those found ideologically wrong during the Cultural Revolution. Since then they have been transformed into cadre refresher schools to which cadres are sent at intervals for periods of political study combined with participation in labor. Stigma is no longer attached to an assignment to a May Seventh school. The type of labor in which the cadre will engage while at school depends on the location of the school. Those assigned to schools in urban areas work in factories, while those assigned to rural schools engage in agricultural activities. The Central Committee directive referred to above stated that May Seventh cadre schools should differ from Party schools. School authorities were urged to organize courses to run in segments, each upward, in order to permit cadres from the same establishment in rotation to alternate between normal work and school attendance while at the same time being able to complete a systematic course of study. The courses vary in length from a few weeks to several months and consist of political study and participation in labor.

Cadre morale, particularly at lower levels, suffered a serious setback during the Cultural Revolution when they, as symbols of authority, took much of the criticism and attack on the bureaucratic system. At the same time they also became the butt of criticism of higher authority when public discipline and order collapsed.

In addition to routine guidance in the form of directives and circulars, and instructional material appearing in the press, cadres are frequently invited to conferences where their work is discussed and guidance provided. Urgent conferences are sometimes convened by telephone. Occasionally, cadres are given the opportunity to attend conferences in Peking, where they come into the presence of top Party leaders. For general orientation, the cadre has access to certain limited-distribution publications, like *Reference News*, which contains brief reports and commentaries extracted from foreign newspapers and news agency files dealing with international affairs and commentaries by these sources on developments in China, even critical comments. The material is collected and published by the New China News Agency.

### Party Control and Public Order

The preceding pages have frequently referred to the horizontal and perpendicular interlocking of the Party organization with other major command structures, including mass organizations as well as the state and military apparatus (see Table 1.7). This practice of placing members of Party organs in positions of control of organs of other establishments at the corresponding levels, and superimposing upon this network a perpendicular Party investigative chain, supplementing the work of public security bodies, has resulted in the creation of one of the most pervasive control systems developed in any society.

The complete dominance of the Party in the system is best illustrated by the concurrent roles played by senior Party leaders. Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, for instance, who by virtue of that office is chairman of the Central Military Commission, has since 1976 also served as premier of the State Council and under the 1978 constitution is commander of the armed forces.<sup>77</sup> Veteran Yeh Chien-ying, of the Hakka minority and second ranking in protocol, is a vice-chairman of the Central Committee, chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, and a vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission; while Teng Hsiao-p'ing, apparently in charge of day-to-day administration of state affairs, functions as a vice-chairman of the Central Committee, vice-premier of the State Council, a vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, chief-of-staff of the PLA, and chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC. Other members of the Political Bureau hold similar across-the-board responsibilities.

At the provincial level and below, the Party suffered serious

institutional damage during the Cultural Revolution, as noted in an earlier section, and Party functions were largely taken over by the military. But it must be remembered that the senior military officers who gained initial dominance on the revolutionary committees and the newly reestablished provincial Party committees were also senior Party members. In any event, since 1971 the Party has gradually replaced the military with civilian Party personnel and separated command of the military regions and districts from leadership of provincial Party and state apparatus. Thus, in contrast to the situation that obtained in the early 1970s, when region or district military commanders headed more than two-thirds of the provincial level Party and revolutionary committees, after the reorganization of Party committees in 1977 and 1978 and the election of local revolutionary committees prior to the Fifth NPC, no commander of a military region or district remains at the senior post in a provincial level Party or revolutionary committee. Moreover, every one of the twenty-nine provincial level Party first secretaries is at present chairman of the corresponding revolutionary committee, and twenty-five of these serve concurrently as the first political commissar of the military region or district in which they function.

Such a control system, combined with intensive politicizing of the populace and cultivation of a sense of belonging, resulted in the high degree of discipline and order commented upon frequently by foreign visitors to the P.R.C. prior to the Cultural Revolution. Order, however, broke down during the Cultural Revolution and has not yet been restored to the high level that obtained in the earlier period. Occasionally in recent years, localities have been placed off limits for foreign visitors on account of local disturbances, and periodically foreign journalists have seen wall posters in various cities that listed names of people convicted of crimes, some posters also specifying the nature of the crimes committed and the punishments meted out. In addition to political offenses, crimes have covered a wide spectrum, from homicide to rape, from illegal attempts to escape from the country to the theft of state property.

At the Fifth NPC, Hu Jiaofeng charged that, under the Gang of Four, corruption, embezzlement, and pilfering had become widespread, while Ye Chuanying called attention to "new born bourgeois elements" among whom were "not a few of the embezzlers, thieves, speculators, murderers, and other criminal elements that had plighted the regime." Meanwhile, the domestic media, over a period of several months, have carried numerous articles exposing corruption and abuse

Table 4.7. Concurrent Offices Held by Members of the Political Bureau

Name	Party Positions	Government Positions	Military Positions	Other Positions
Hua Kuo-feng	Chairman, CPC/CC Member, Political Bureau SC, Political Bureau	Premier, State Council	Commander-in-Chief, PLA Chairman, MilCom, CPC/CC	
Yeh Chien-ying	VCen, CPC/CC Member, Political Bureau SC, Political Bureau	Chairman, NPC/SC	VCen, MilCom, CPC/CC	
Tong Hsiao-p'ing	VCen, CPC/CC Member, Political Bureau SC, Political Bureau	Vicepres, State Council	Chief-of-Staff, PLA VCen, MilCom, CPC/CC	Chairman, NatCom/CPC/CC
Li Hsiang-shen	VCen, CPC/CC Member, Political Bureau SC, Political Bureau	Vicepres, State Council		
Hsueh Tung-hsiang	VCen, CPC/CC Member, Political Bureau SC, Political Bureau			
Chang T'ing-fa	Member, Political Bureau	Vicepres, State Council	CO, Air Force, PLA SC, MilCom, CPC/CC CO, Peking NK	
Ch'ou Hsi-lin	Member, Political Bureau			
Ch'ou Yung-huei	Member, Political Bureau	Vicepres, State Council VCen, Shang FRAC		
Chi Teng-k'uei	Member, Political Bureau	Vicepres, State Council		
Yang Xi	Member, Political Bureau			
Hsu Hsiang-ch'iao	Member, Political Bureau	VCen, State Council Minister, National Defense		VPres, Ch'iaofu Deputy, CPC Core Group, Ch'iaofu
Hou Shih-yu	Member, Political Bureau		CO, Canton NK 1st Sec, CPC Com, Canton NK	
Kang Piao	Member, Political Bureau Dir, Intell Dept, CPC/CC			
Li To-sheng	Member, Political Bureau			
Liu Po-ch'eng	Member, Political Bureau	VCen, NPC/SC		
Shi Chia-fu	Member, Political Bureau 2nd Sec, Peking NPC 2nd Sec, Shanghai NPC	VCen, Peking NPC Int'Comm, Shanghai HRC		Active, Labor Unions



of power at high levels in both Party and state organs. In part, the public airing of this breakdown in official morality is probably intended to contribute to the campaign launched at the Eleventh Party Congress and endorsed at the Fifth NPC to intensify efforts to restore discipline within both official and public circles.

Though these campaigns to eradicate corruption and mismanagement may improve political morality, and though the effort to eliminate elements within the Party closely linked to purged former leaders may have produced an apparently united, collective leadership, divisive forces are at work and the ingredients of serious policy differences are close to the surface. Success of the ambitious modernization program to which the regime is committed will require pragmatic approaches and departures from the past that will inevitably raise the question of the future role of Maoism, whether the question is raised directly or obliquely. Differences have already surfaced on such fundamental questions as educational reform, the relative importance of redness and expertise, the degree of reliance on things foreign—particularly, at the moment, foreign technology, and conditions under which things foreign might be accepted. In a system that has no fixed procedure for leadership succession other than competition for power, ability to mute these differences will have a significant bearing on future leadership stability.

## Notes

1. Article 1, 1978 state constitution.
2. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, a founding member of the CPC, this concept of a two-stage revolution was already accepted as a line of procedure by most delegates to the First Party Congress of the CPC in 1921. See Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927* (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1971), Vol. 1, p. 145.
3. Article 1 of both the 1975 and 1978 state constitutions states that the P.R.C. is "a socialist state," while the preamble to the 1978 version adds that "China has become a socialist country with the beginning of prosperity."
4. General Program, 1977 Party constitution.
5. Peking Municipality, for instance, is composed of nine urban districts and nine counties; Shanghai of ten of each; and Tientsin of twelve districts and five counties. See U.S. Joint Publications Research

Service *Simplified Handbook on Administrative Divisions of the People's Republic of China 1977* (JPRS 71247 June 7, 1978) pp 5 and 6

6 The 2136 county and county equivalent units consist of 2013 counties (66 autonomous counties, 53 banners, 3 autonomous banners and 1 Jishi (Waiming in Yunnan)) *Ibid* p 1

7 The 211 prefectural level units include 174 prefectures, 29 autonomous prefectures, 1 administrative area (Hainan) and 7 leagues *Ibid*, p 1

8 In reports relating to representation to recent Party and state congresses the PRC media speak of China's fifty-four minorities. Peking NCA for instance February 25, 1976 said that the Fifth National People's Congress included representatives of all the fifty-four national minorities in China.

9 Revision of Party constitutions was also undertaken by several Party congresses before 1926.

10 The initials NPC have become standard in usage for the National People's Congress and not for the National Party Congress and will be used with that meaning in this chapter.

11 Unless otherwise indicated reference hereafter to the Party constitution is to the 1977 revision and reference to the state constitution is to that of 1978.

12 Press Communiqué of the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. *The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)* (Peking Foreign Language Press 1973) p 79

13 Edward L. Rice *Mao's Way* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1972) p 161

14 Recall power was exercised by the electors of Hebei and Liaoning provinces and of Peking Municipality when they annulled the credentials of one deputy from each to the Fifth NPC, in 1978 after finding that those elected had committed serious mistakes. Peking NCA February 25, 1978

15 Hua Kuo-feng *Political Report* Eleventh Party Congress August 12, 1977

16 Joint editorial *People's Daily and Red Flag* July 14, 1961. On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lesson for the World. Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in William L. Griffith ed. *Sino-Soviet Relations 1945-1965* (Cambridge: The MIT Press 1967) p 370

17 The Central Committee carries the same numerical designation as

the National Party Congress at which it was elected; thus the Eleventh Central Committee is the Central Committee elected at the Eleventh Party Congress.

18. *China News Analysis*, Number 1093/94; September 16, 1977, contains considerable additional information about the composition of the Eleventh Central Committee.

19. See James P. Harrison, *The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-72* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 258.

20. Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, Vol. 1, *Contradictions Among the People 1956-57* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 140.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Younger leaders are Fidel Castro of Cuba and Gyorgy Lazar of Hungary. In the absence of essential information, Cambodia was not taken into account in this statement.

23. Article 11, 1977 Party constitution.

24. Peking, NCNA, January 2, 1979. The office of General Secretary (*tsung shu-chi*) had been restored at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 (MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, p. 140).

25. Harold C. Hinton, *An Introduction to Chinese Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 211.

26. See articles 1 to 4 of the state constitution. Aside from changes in phraseology and the transfer of some points to other articles, there is virtually no substantive difference between the 1975 and 1978 constitutions on matters covered in this introductory paragraph.

27. Article 2, state constitution.

28. Article 20, 1978 state constitution.

29. Article 23, 1954 state constitution. Under this provision, twelve representatives of Taiwanese living abroad were elected or appointed to serve as deputies from Taiwan at the Fourth NPC (see "Press Communiqué of the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China"). At earlier NPCs, in the listing of deputies by province, under Taiwan, representation was indicated as "temporarily vacant."

30. Article 16, 1975 state constitution.

31. The Second Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee, for instance, met January 8-10, 1975, to approve all documents to be submitted to the Fourth NPC and the list of nominees for the Standing Committee and the State Council. Similarly, the Second Plenum of the



Eleventh Central Committee met February 18-23 1978 to perform the same tasks in respect to the Fifth NPC.

32 The process of election of the premier and other members of the State Council has undergone some change. The 1954 constitution provides for the election by the NPC of the premier upon the recommendation of the chairman of the PRC and of the other members of the State Council upon the recommendation of the premier. With the abolition of the office of chairman of the PRC the 1975 constitution transferred the nominating function in respect to both premier and other members of the council to the Central Committee. The 1978 constitution preserves for the Central Committee the right to nominate the premier but returns to the premier the right to nominate other members of the council.

33 While the 1978 constitution speaks only of the power of the NPC to elect the president of the Supreme People's Court and the chief procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, without reference to the nominating authority, the names of the two officials elected to these offices at the Fifth NPC had been approved at the Second Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee together with the candidate for premier and other component members of the State Council.

34 Power of dismissal appears to include the dismissal of the premier as well as of other members of the State Council, though resort to such action without Central Committee approval is inconceivable.

35 Wampler, Chai, *The New Politics of Communist China: Modernization Process of a Developing Nation* (Pacific Palisades: Coodycar 1972) p. 203.

36 Article 30 1978 state constitution.

37 *Ibid.*

38 Composition *ibid.* article 31 nomination and election *ibid.* article 22.

39 Chou En-lai in an interview with correspondents of *Pitt and Spedia* reported by *Lanju*, March 17 1971.

40 *Ibid.* The twenty-six ministries may refer to those later staffed in the Fourth NPC.

41 Article 31 state constitution.

42 Yeh Chun-ying, Report on the Revision of the Constitution delivered at the Fifth NPC, March 1 1978 and reported by NCNA Peking, March 7 1978. See also Hua Kuo-feng, Report on the Work of the Government delivered at the Fifth NPC, March 5 1978 and reported by NCNA Peking, March 6 1978, and article

33 of the state constitution.

43. Article 34, state constitution.

44. Article 42, 1978 state constitution.

45. The candidacy of the official elected at the Fifth NPC, however, had been approved by the Central Committee.

46. A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 238.

47. Article 43, 1978 state constitution.

48. Article 6, "Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates," 1954

49. *Ibid.*, article 8.

50. Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power*, p. 195

51. The guarantee of most of these rights is contained in articles 14 through 55 of the state constitution but references to others are scattered elsewhere in the document. Duties of citizens are listed in articles 56, 57, and 58

52. Article 15, 1978 state constitution. Big-character posters are described in a following section.

53. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, "Report on the Revision of the Constitution," in *Documents of the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), pp. 39-40.

54. Article 6 of the Common Program of the CPPCC. The Common Program, however, did not include the reference to family life.

55. Article 53, 1978 state constitution.

56. Article 4, 1975 state constitution.

57. Article 4, 1978 state constitution.

58. Article 12, 1977 Party constitution.

59. Article 55, 1978 state constitution.

60. Article 26, 1975 state constitution.

61. Article 18, 1978 state constitution.

62. As early as February 1942, *Liberation Daily*, an organ of the CPC in Yen-an, spoke of *Mao Tse-tung chu-i* ("Maoism," of the "doctrine of Mao"), hence, the term "Maoism" is not, as is frequently stated, a term coined in the West. See Dennis J. Doolin and Robert C. North, *The Chinese People's Republic* (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War and Peace, 1966), p. 63, n. 30. In the expression "Maxism-Lennism-Mao Tsetung Thought," CPC practice is *not* to insert a hyphen between the last two syllables in Mao's name.

63. See *Peking Review*, no. 51, December 15, 1967, p. 17

64. Derek J. Waller, quoting from the *Hunan Daily* for February 4,

1966 in *The Government and Politics of Communist China* (New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books 1971) p 32.

65 Franz Michael 'Ideology and the Cult of Mao' in Frank N. Trager and William Henderson eds. *Communist China 1949-1969, A Twenty Year Appraisal* (New York: New York University Press 1970) p 29

66 Stated in the 'General Program' section of the 1956 Party constitution

67 'General Program' Party constitution

68 For comprehensive studies of ideology and the role of ideology in the Chinese Communist system see Franz Schurmann *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* 2nd ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1972) Richard H. Solomon

'From Communism to Confucius: The Evolving Functions of Ideology in the Revolutionary Process' in Chalmers Johnson ed. *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1973) pp 11-77 and John B. Starr *Ideology and Culture: An Introduction to the Dialectics of Contemporary Chinese Politics* (New York: Harper & Row 1973) chapters 1 and 2 from which most of the first paragraph is drawn

69 For discussions of the 'mass line' policy during the Kuangsi and Yunan periods see Hsueh J. Kim *The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kuangsi under the Soviets* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1973) and Mark Selden 'The Yenan Legacy: The Mass Line' in A. Doris Barnett ed. *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* paperback ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1972) pp 99-151

70 Article 10 1978 state constitution. Article 7 of the constitution permits peasants to farm private plots and to engage in limited household sideline production and allows pastoral people to keep a limited number of livestock for personal needs while article 3 allows non-agricultural individual laborers to engage in individual labor.

These provisions continue the constitutional protection of incentives severely criticized by some in the early 1970s.

71 NCCA Peking February 25 1978

72 John W. Lewis *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 1963) pp 186 ff

73 For discussions on the subject of cadres see *ibid.* chapters 2 and 16 Schurmann *Ideology and Organization* pp 162-172, Barnett *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power* pp 38-47 and Kim *Politics of Chinese Communism* chapter 7

74. Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization*, p. 162.
75. Mao Tse-tung, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," in the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), vol. 2, p. 202 and p. 210, n. 1.
76. Chou En-lai, "Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China."
77. Article 19, 1978 state constitution.

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## 5

# Agricultural Development

*Ramon H. Myers*

The Communist government that assumed power in China in 1949 inherited a country with a long agrarian history. For more than three millennia the Chinese people had perfected the art of farming the land. They had developed unusual skills to replenish the soil's fertility and produce extraordinarily high crop yields—often higher than those in Western countries with modernized agriculture. Certain regions of the country like the Chengtu plain in Szechwan Province, the great Canton delta region of Kwangtung Province, and areas westward up the Yangtze valley through Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hunan, and Hupeh provinces had extensive canalized tracts of land providing for remarkable irrigation of crops. In all parts of the country farmers prepared compost piles to fertilize their fields. By conserving water, restoring the soil's fertility, and farming the land with a garden-like intensity and care, the Chinese had managed to produce enough food and fiber by the early twentieth century to support around 500 million people. This achievement occurred on about 107 million hectares of farm land, which represented only about 11 percent of the country's total land.

The land produced a great variety of crops ranging from fruit and tropical products in the south to miscellaneous grains and the growing root in the north. By 1936 China was the world's second largest producer of wheat and the world's largest supplier and consumer of rice. Agriculture was the largest industry, gave employment to about 80 percent of the work force, and produced roughly 60 percent of the country's gross national product.

Sometime in the late seventeenth century agriculture began to expand, population steadily grew, and more people migrated to settle in

the northwest, the southwest, and the central highlands. Landless families gradually acquired some land to farm, either as tenants or owner-cultivators. But after World War I this process was halted by the outbreak of civil war and the collapse of national and local administrative efforts, which normally provided peace and stability—necessary conditions that the agriculturalist always needs to farm with minimal certainty and security. As a result of warlordism in the 1920s, Japanese military aggression in the 1930s, and civil war in the late 1940s, villages suffered severe shocks and dislocations that increased the financial burden on farmers and reduced many families to utter ruin. Perhaps the worst two consequences of these three decades of instability were the great rise in rural unemployment and the inability of many families to retain their land to farm. As a result, by 1949 the area of cultivated land had greatly declined, rural unemployment had risen, and farm production had fallen. The new socialist government inherited very difficult problems: to revive farm production in the face of rampant inflation, to increase output to support the industrialization of the country, and to develop a distribution system to feed and clothe the country's huge population.

### Production Performance

The new government quickly restored peace and order and production began to increase. (For a map of China showing major crops and percentages of land under cultivation, see Map 3 in chapter 1.) As early as 1952 agricultural output had reached the prewar high level of the mid-1930s. We can assess the performance of agriculture between 1952 and 1976 in several ways. We can compare the growth of production of food grain and fibers with population increase to determine if the per capita availability of food and fiber grew, remained constant, or fell. Or we can compare the growth of total farm production, e.g. food grain, fibers, and special crops, with a composite series of inputs such as land, labor, and capital to determine if the productivity of all farming inputs rose, remained the same, or declined. Useful as these assessments are, however, they cannot be undertaken unless sufficient statistics are available. The present government simply has not published enough statistics by which experts can agree upon a comparison of the trend of total farm production with that of total farm inputs. We can discuss with more certainty the long-term trend of food grain and fiber production based upon official statistics and compare these to various estimates of

Table 5: Farm Production and Population Growth 1949-1976

Year	Total Grain <sup>a</sup>			Cotton <sup>b</sup>	Population (000) <sup>b</sup>	
	Area (mill ha)	Yield (kg/ha)	Production (mill tons)	Production (000 mt)	High Estimate	Median Estimate
1949	101 6	1 064	106 1	446	-	-
1950	104 8	1 190	124 7	692	-	-
1951	107 0	1 402	150 0	1 030	-	-
1952	112 3	1 375	154 4	1 304	-	-
1953	114 2	1 372	156 9	1 174	376 727	376 049
1954	118 3	1 279	160 4	1 063	389 137	388 429
1955	118 4	1 476	174 8	1 518	403 454	402 175
1956	124 3	1 468	182 5	1 443	418 421	416 735
1957	120 8	1 530	183 0	1 640	434 309	432 831
1958	121 2	1 649	200 0	1 600	450 378	443 315
1959	109 1	1 522	165 0	1 750	466 431	458 036
1960	119 0	1 260	150 0	903	482 104	472 316
1961	118 6	1 364	162 0	890	495 100	485 083
1962	118 9	1 463	174 0	1 000	705 589	695 727
1963	118 7	1 54	183 0	1 100	714 861	706 232
1964	122 8	1 642	200 0	1 507	727 823	719 109
1965	122 6	1 631	200 0	1 630	743 427	733 630
1966	124 0	1 734	213 0	1 810	754 051	749 019
1967	127 1	1 810	230 0	1 940	764 673	764 196
1968	128 0	1 680	213 0	1 810	780 480	775 283
1969	1 9 1	1 704	220 0	1 720	797 058	754 808
1970	1 70 8	1 849	240 0	2 000	813 106	810 801
1971	131 3	1 874	246 0	2 220	830 923	827 288
1972	131 5	1 825	240 0	2 125	848 498	844 308
1973	132 3	1 885	250 0	2 350	866 459	861 915
1974	134 7	1 967	265 0	2 500	884 841	880 133
1975	136 5	1 9 8	2 0 0	2 400	903 439	898 953
1976	137 5	1 963	267 0	2 350	922 837	917 045

<sup>a</sup> Economic Research Service U.S. Department of Agriculture *People & Republic of Cuba: An Economic Situation Review of 1976 and Outlook for 1977* (Washington D.C. 1977) p. 17. Total grain includes cubera converted to grain equivalent basis. Data for 1949-1957 obtained from *My Great Years* (Pan Am Foreign Languages Press 1959) data for 1958-1975 are based on official sources. Data for 1976 are preliminary estimates.

<sup>b</sup> U.S. Census Bureau

See also S. Alva, *Estimates and Projection of the Population of Nicaragua (1975-1977)* (Washington D.C. U.S. Department of Commerce 1964), Appendix B. Estimates based upon model 1 (1953-1965) and model A (1966-1976) estimates are based upon model 1 and model B for every year intervals.

population growth) to roughly estimate the changing food grain and fiber availability on a per capita basis. These data are presented in Table 5 and then discussed with some mention of prewar conditions.

Between 1949 and 1957 farm production quickly revived and continued to increase with food grain and cotton output growing at 6.2 and 18.7 percent per year respectively. Meanwhile the highest population growth estimate shows an annual growth rate of 1.9 percent for the same period. Therefore food and fiber per capita availability rose



so that living standards improved and the supply of raw materials for industrialization increased. This trend was reversed between 1958 and 1961 when production for all crops declined. This period of hardship, following upon the steady improvement in food and fiber availability, makes the overall performance since 1949 less favorable than if there had been at least some gain in supply during these years. Conditions began to improve after 1965. During the next eleven-year period food grain production increased at the annual growth rate of 2.7 percent, with cotton output growing at 3.2 percent. Again, the highest population estimate for these years is 1.9 percent. A comparison of these rates of growth strongly indicates that per capita availability of both food and fibers steadily rose. Therefore if these same conditions continue for another decade or two, living standards will steadily improve and the supply of industrial goods will be increased.

The overall performance since 1949, however, is one where food and fiber production grew just slightly faster than the highest population growth estimate. China is still a poor country. The people are adequately fed and clothed, but they do not live with abundance. This performance is still superior to that of most developing countries since World War II, which at times have suffered from political instability and inflation. It is also a performance more satisfactory than that of the majority of socialist countries, in particular the Soviet Union where living standards remained appallingly low for more than three decades after the collectivization of agriculture. On the other hand Japan, Taiwan, and most of the advanced countries of Western Europe experienced a more rapid growth of rural living standards during their transition period to industrialization than did China.

The development of agriculture after 1949 was associated with an unusually rapid increase in population. Recently the state has taken vigorous steps to reduce population growth. Should the steady modernization of farming of the past decade continue into the future with a growth of farm production of 2 percent per annum or higher, China will have achieved an agricultural revolution. During late imperial times, farm production slowly expanded to match population, probably at an annual growth rate somewhere beneath .5 to .7 percent. After the 1911 Revolution, farm production either declined or fluctuated around a trend showing neither rise or fall. Population still continued its relentless increase, so that for nearly four decades per capita food availability did not rise and at some periods it even fell. It is little wonder that during the 1920s and 1930s food grain imports rose and in certain

regions simply broke out. Therefore the post 1965 agricultural performance suggests that a break with the historical trend might be taking place.

In order to understand how this break with the past has begun to occur, it is necessary to trace some of the major reorganizations of agricultural production and distribution and then examine what role certain factors of production such as capital and technology have played in the process of growth.

### *The Reorganization of Farm Production*

#### *The Early Period of Reform 1949-1962*

Although many institutional reforms to reorganize production took place after 1949, not all of these directly contributed to the increase of land and labor productivity. The restoration of peace and order after 1949 certainly was a major factor that enabled the farming population to return to the business of tilling the soil with the certainty that crops could be harvested and marketed. But while law and order did return to the countryside, the Communist Party began to initiate a series of village reforms that in the next twelve years dramatically changed the life style of hundreds of millions of rural people.

On May 1, 1946, the Communist Party ordered its cadres to wage war against the landlords in the areas under its control. The Party sought to strip away the economic power of the local elite by transferring their land to the poor. Party leaders hoped that this move would pave the way for Party cadres to install local leaders of their own choosing so that the Communist Party at last could effectively control villages. After the defeat of the Kuomintang military armies in 1949, the policy of land reform was carried to all parts of the country. The Party revised the land reform procedures that it had used in areas that it controlled in North China because farming conditions elsewhere in the country greatly differed. Instead of depriving the bona fide, successful farmers of their land as Party cadres had successfully done in the northern provinces, the Party ruled that these farmers could retain their land to farm. Such farmers typically worked farms of scattered plots amounting to no more than a half a hectare. Although this group rarely made up more than 20 percent of the households in any single village, they normally marketed around 80 percent of what village households sold. The Party recognized that if this farming group reduced its production, rural marketing might be adversely influenced and cities would not obtain enough food.

and fiber. This conciliatory policy was extended to the rest of the country.

The lineage associations and absentee landlords, however, had to relinquish their claims to village land. These lands were transferred to the new village associations established at the behest of Party cadres to distribute land to the poorer villagers. By late 1952 the new government could report that land reform had been completed. In this momentous redistribution of property rights, the Party had smashed the power of the local elite, which had long depended upon land property as a major financial pillar for their activities. By establishing village associations to replace the old, local elite, the Party had created a new local organization that its cadres could manipulate to control village society. Not since the fifteenth century had the state in China so effectively established its control in the villages.

In late December 1951 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China published its views on how the village economy would be reorganized. On the one hand the Party stressed that more cooperation had to be established between households if production was to be increased, but on the other hand the Party contended that it wanted "to avoid any violent setbacks in production carried out in this individualistic peasant economy" so that bona fide farming families would be allowed to farm. Cooperation meant three possible courses. First, several households might form mutual aid teams to share labor, land, and farm capital during peak farming seasons. Second, several households could cooperate through the year to farm and engage in nonfarm projects. Finally, a group of households in the same village neighborhood, perhaps as few as eight or as many as fifteen, would pool their land and farm capital, farm as a team, and be rewarded according to the resources contributed by each household. Cadres were urged to persuade villagers to recognize the advantages of these forms of cooperation and to establish them voluntarily. Party leaders seem to have been convinced of the inherent superiority of cooperative farming over family farming, and they merely intended to transform rural society very slowly by making sure at each step that the farming community shared this conviction.

The progress toward cooperation advanced slowly and fitfully. By the end of 1952 cadres reported that three-fifths of all rural households still privately farmed and the remainder had joined seasonal mutual aid teams with only a very small share belonging either to permanent mutual aid teams or to agricultural production cooperatives. Most of the mutual aid teams were located in the north where Communist influence had been strong during the war against Japan and the Civil War. By

1951 the number of mutual aid teams exceeded 10 million, but there were reports that some farmers had slaughtered their livestock in open defiance of orders to cooperate with other families. Severe grain shortages in 1951 and the intensive drive to allocate more resources for industrialization had resulted in the state attempting to extract more food grain and fiber from the villages than the rural people were willing to relinquish.

Meanwhile, several distinct trends had been taking place in rural communities. On the one hand, many of the village leaders who had vigorously supported the Communist Party during land reform were tiring of Party work and were anxious to return to the normal pursuits of making a living and acquiring property. On the other hand, land reform had created conditions whereby some families had received more land than they had labor and livestock to farm, whereas other families were in the opposite circumstance. This imbalance had been corrected by families resorting to age-old practices—the supplying of wage labor for hire and the renting and leasing of land and farm capital. Communist rural surveys spotted this resurgence of household contractual exchange. Party leaders quickly became aware of this old rural penchant for property accumulation and recognized that ultimately a new rural elite based on new landed property might someday confront it in the villages. The twin problems of finding loyal, efficient, hard-working village leaders and a resurgent rural capitalism along with the acute shortage of grain in 1951 set off a major debate within the top leadership of the Party.

The debate centered on whether to continue the policy of gradually persuading the peasantry to depend more upon cooperative farming than upon private contract, or to take some other action with a view to preventing the rapid revival of a new property-owning elite in the villages while at the same time accelerating the trend toward cooperative farming. Intra-Party dispute on the peasant question was resolved in the spring of 1955 by Mao Tse-tung when he rejected gradualism, although it was the majority view at that time. Mao decided to sever the ties between farm families and their land by having the cadres establish village cooperatives. Every household would relinquish its claim to land and farm capital and would receive rewards according to the work it performed in the village cooperative team. This bold step was the most far-reaching reform of the countryside that any government in China had attempted since the seventh century—the early T'ing period, when the state had seized control of all land and given parcels of it to households on the basis of special needs—the famous *chün t'ien* system of land holding.

The drama of the next eighteen months can be appreciated only if we realize that in late spring of 1955 only one out of ten households participated in any kind of team-farming arrangement. Throughout the fall and into winter, cadres instructed village leaders to form the cooperatives. The Party allowed households to own some land if it did not exceed 5 percent of the average arable area per capita in all the county's villages. By mid-1956 the Party had managed to make six out of every ten households join village cooperatives; by the end of the year, the figure was almost nine out of ten. These cooperatives contained farming teams ranging from twenty to sixty households, depending upon village size. During early 1956, many farmers slaughtered their livestock and refused to join the production teams. In the face of such resistance, the Party retreated by returning some livestock to their former owners, allowing teams to lease land to certain households and collect rent, and reinstating veteran farmers to manage production teams. These concessions were short-lived, for in the late summer of 1958 the Central Committee published another directive ordering cadres to establish even larger village production units. This was to be done by "militarizing" village organizations.

During the next few years the Party tried many different systems of local control, until in 1962 it became clear that it had found what it was seeking. The new system, the outgrowth of considerable experiment and compromise, was structured as follows: below the county administrative level, the Party established a new organizational unit called the commune. In area, the commune roughly approximated a subunit, or district, within the county. It was essentially an old township made up of a market town, sometimes even several small towns, and its satellite villages. There were roughly 71,000 communes, each with an average of 1,600 households, throughout the country. Villages had been renamed brigades and were now referred to as "production brigades." To create them, many villages had been amalgamated into larger units. Within each large village, or brigade, were production teams made up of between twenty and sixty households, depending on the district. Households within certain sections of the village now worked the land as a team. During the nonfarming period, household members might serve on other brigade teams, work in commune industries or services, or farm the garden-size plots around their homesteads.

The period of 1958-1962 was one of great turmoil, accompanied by a frenzy and a fervor not experienced since the land reform. After the fall harvest in 1958 and through the winter of 1959 rural cadres organized the farmers into large labor brigades to construct commune structures

such as dining and sleeping quarters, build irrigation facilities, plant trees, and dig up the fields to experiment with new deep plowing methods. Farmer dissatisfaction with the new cooperative system and the huge scale use of farm labor on such projects instead of on conventional soil preparing and planting activities produced a very poor harvest throughout the country in 1960. Rather than consolidate the gains realized in recent cooperative endeavors, the Party again instructed cadres to revert to labor brigades, as in the past, with the devastating result that the 1961 harvest also was very poor. Two bad harvests in sequence for a poor country like China can only spell disaster.

Widespread food shortages became severe. A flood of refugees poured into Hong Kong in 1962 and 1963 reporting that near famine conditions prevailed in some parts of the country. Letters from relatives and friends told of acute food scarcity, and secret documents of the People's Liberation Army (*Kung Iso Tung Ihsun*) describe widespread occurrences of edema from poor diet in the Lanchow Military Region. The state had already responded to the crisis. It initiated stringent rationing and control of interprovincial grain shipments. It began to import large amounts of wheat and flour from abroad—4 million metric tons in 1961 and 1962 and 2 and 2.5 million metric tons in 1963 and 1964 respectively, compared to no such imports during the 1950s.

In 1962 and 1963 the Party also initiated many new policies to revive food production. First, it ordered cadres to disband the large labor brigades. Second, the production team became the unit for reckoning incomes, expenditures, and the disposition of farm assets—rather than the brigade as had been the case since 1958. Third, the Party permitted the reestablishment of private markets whereby farmers could sell products that they had somehow produced on their own, either in their private plots or when not participating with production teams. These concessions to the farmers restored sufficient incentives to the villages to produce and market more food grain and fiber, so that by 1965 agricultural production had again reached the high levels of 1956-1957.

In 1962 the three-tier organizational system of production team, village brigade, and commune managed the production and distribution of agricultural output in the countryside. The production team was the basic unit by which land, labor, and capital were organized to farm the land. Production teams embraced as few as twenty to as many as sixty or eighty households, and they typically were made up of households within a certain section of a village or a small village or hamlet. The brigade, which approximated the village in size and number of people

was merely an administrative unit to organize the production teams within each village. The commune—a large or small town and its cluster of fifteen to fifty satellite villages, which approximates the area once covering the local market center—became another administrative unit by which the Party now controls village life. Through this commune system the Party now as then exercises closer control over rural society than any previous Chinese state was ever able to achieve.

### *The Period 1963-1976*

In spite of the Party's success in separating the rural people from their land, the Party faction identified with Mao Tse-tung was still dissatisfied with the rural way of thinking. It therefore attempted to change rural attitudes through a new agrarian policy enacted in 1964. This new policy was aimed at making production teams work harder and accept less remuneration; at encouraging villagers to refuse state aid, and rely instead upon their own resources and skills; and at persuading rural people to make greater sacrifices for community and state, rather than for family or kin. This policy sought to kindle a new moral fervor, a new state of mind among rural people to be self-reliant, to work for the Party and state, and to share and cooperate with each other in an unselfish and nonindividualist way. The Party adopted this new agrarian policy because Mao and his supporters perceived it as the proper way to transform Chinese society so as to bring about desirable life-styles and moral behavior.

The new policy was predicated upon developments in a poor hamlet in northern Shansi named Tachai. In February 1960 the Shansi Communist Party Committee listened attentively to a speech by a peasant named Ch'en Yung-kuei, who headed the Tachai production brigade and represented the farmers from Hsiyang County. Ch'en recounted how Tachai had raised crop yields to unprecedentedly high and stable levels through a new kind of team spirit and organization. As the Tachai story unfolded, it became apparent that what Ch'en had done was to organize groups of farmers to labor without reward during the winter months. Ch'en pointed out that "constructing large embankments in deep ravines that could hold the silt was like chiseling gold slabs. There would then be no runoff of water. Water could be stored, and the village could still plant good fields." Ch'en's charismatic leadership enabled him to mobilize the farmers to build these embankments and fill in dirt behind them. In this way the village

expanded its cultivated land and still had a water supply to irrigate the many terraces. Although a five-day rainstorm destroyed the fruits of their labor in August 1963, the villagers refused state assistance and rebuilt the embankments within two years. Through these volunteer efforts Tachai had increased its production income. From this increased income the brigade had saved to buy construction materials to rebuild all household structures and even to improve the irrigation system. Thus Tachai had been able to transfer the farming technology used in the irrigated alluvial plain areas to this arid windswept foothill area. Crop yields of maize and sorghum had been pushed to unprecedented levels: in 1962 the brigade is supposed to have harvested 600 metric tons of grain per hectare compared to 180 in 1953.

This example of farmer dedication to community development rather than private or family gain convinced the Shensi Party Committee and later the Party leadership in Peking that the thinking of rural people could be changed if all rural communities could be encouraged to follow the example and leadership of the people of Tachai. Whether or not a new spirit had really emerged in Tachai is not clear. The alleged achievements clearly had been accomplished at great cost and sacrifice and later there were charges that the crop statistics had been falsified and that the state had actually subsidized Tachai's development. Nevertheless the Party scored upon this strategy as a new step to develop the rural economy. In 1964 Party cadres were instructed to meet with commune and brigade leaders to discuss how the Tachai example could be followed and duplicated. At first Party cadres insisted that production teams organize special worker brigades to labor without remuneration on projects that would increase the amount of irrigated land, reclaim more land, or develop other sources of rural income. This approach was sometimes combined with making production teams meet to reevaluate their work point reward system in order to assign fewer work points. The obvious intent here was to have production teams limit household claims to farm income earned by the team so as to increase accumulated reserves for rural investment. The Party abandoned this policy after several years in the face of vigorous opposition. By the early 1970s the "Learn from Tachai" policy still remained a cornerstone of Party agrarian thinking. But now it stressed only that production teams should adopt a transformative way of work and thinking, and develop greater motivation to increase production and income. These efforts were to be carried out through the three-tier organizational system of the commune.



### *The Period 1976-1978*

Mao's death in late 1976, Teng Hsiao-p'ing's return to power, and the Party's new commitment for economic modernization reflect the enormous change of this period. More statistical information appeared in 1978. The government announced that food grain production for that year reached 295 million metric tons. As production fell in 1976 and rose only slightly in 1977, this recent increase of 25 million metric tons over 1975 represents some recovery from the turmoil of this period. However, the annual growth rate between 1975 and 1978 was 2.9 percent, still far below the projected 4 percent annual growth rate set by the Party for agriculture between 1978 and 1984.

The Party initiated many steps in 1978 to restore incentives to production teams and ensure that this body would remain the basic decision-maker in farming. The "Learn from Tachai" movement was virtually abandoned except as a model for mechanizing agriculture. The Party placed greater emphasis upon adopting farm machinery to speed up planting and harvesting and to reduce drudgery in the fields. The government took action to raise farm prices in order to increase rural incomes. The numerous national conferences designed to promote an upgrading of science and technology and the revival of higher education may produce a new stream of agricultural technology for the rural communes in the near future.

### **The System of Team Farming**

For three thousand years Chinese rulers and their officials had attempted to promote farming and control rural life through complex organizations. It is within this context that we must view the three-tier control system of the commune and the state. This system enabled the state to intrude into the life and work of the farm family in ways never achieved by any previous government. Commune officials now effectively control population movement from and into the commune. The commune collects what amounts to a land tax and other minor taxes. It specifies that certain quantities of food, fibers, or both will be produced and sold at fixed prices to state marketing agencies. The commune can mobilize village labor at will for large projects on a scale resembling the corvée labor mobilization of the Ming period (1368-1644). Commune officials establish the procedures determining who will work in commune industries and services and what they will receive

is pay. Commune officials have considerable bureaucratic expertise, are local residents, and are among the most able and competent commune members. These leaders are in constant telephone communication with the brigades or villages; they organize numerous meetings to discuss administrative matters.

Commune officials receive an annual agricultural plan from the state and assemble brigade leaders to decide on the allocation of production targets among the brigades. The plan stipulates how much of which crops the state will buy at fixed prices. Brigade leaders meet with their production team leaders to discuss how the teams can fulfill the required production quotas. They must plan to pay the state grain tax set in 1949-1950 as a proportion of major crop yields of each locale. They discuss the capital projects to be undertaken and the funding required, as well as the amount of income for the brigades welfare fund. This fund is dispensed for charity, special family needs, and to remedy any disasters that might befall the community. Finally, there is a discussion of what steps might be taken by teams to increase the supply of farm production, and of how living standards can be improved. After these lengthy discussions, production team leaders convene team members and discuss these same matters with them.

From twenty to eighty households make up the production teams. In small villages, a team might include all households in three or four families living in the same section of the village; make up the team. It is not known for certain, but it is very likely that today's teams comprise the same cluster of families that formerly made up the *piao* or *lin* household units in traditional society, which helped local officials to collect taxes, police villages, and organize village defense. Farm tools and animals are distributed among production teams. Brigade and team leaders determine which fields and teams will be responsible for producing the crops or special products to be sold to the state. Households of each production team send members each day of the farming season to work the fields as a team. Team leaders discuss each day's work in daily meetings, and each member labors at specialized tasks: hoeing, sowing, irrigating, weeding, harvesting, and so on. After the farming season, some household members may be assigned to special teams to work on brigade projects like reclaiming land, building embankments, expanding the irrigation system, or planting orchards. Other members may be assigned to work in commune industries or services. During the slack season, families manage their own garden plots, fishponds, and livestock.

Households receive incomes and bear financial burdens in accordance with their ability to supply labor and assume part of the general financial burden. This ability depends chiefly upon the number of persons who can work. The team income available for distribution among its households is a residual determined by the claims and deductions of the state, the brigade, and the team. First, the state obtains the land tax, paid either in kind or in cash, and purchases a certain quota of food grain or other crops at low, fixed prices. Production teams deposit the receipts from these sales in branches of the state People's Bank and rarely withdraw them for distribution to member households. Second, the brigade deducts income for: (1) its administrative fund to pay the salaries of brigade cadres and secretaries; (2) the welfare fund to be used for households with little or no earning capacity (widows, wives of soldiers, the aged, invalids); and (3) the accumulation fund, which is used to finance capital projects. The production team then deducts grain and income for seed, fertilizer, farm tools, and the like; it also deducts some food grain for the brigade grain reserve. The remaining income, averaging between 40 and 60 percent of total team income, is then divided among team members according to the work points they have earned throughout the year.

Four principal work point systems have been used at different times in various sections of the country. Information is still too scanty to say which system predominates in the mid-1970s. Under the *time-rate system*, team members tabulate the exact number of work days worked by members each month. This arrangement ignores differences in labor productivity as well as differences in types of work. Under the *work-point grading system*, teams classify their members according to three grades of workers, and award points accordingly on the work time. This system had the same problems as the previous one, although it offered more incentives. Under the *labor-norm system*, teams assign work points for each agricultural task and tabulate the points accumulated by members performing these tasks. The difficulty here is to assess the quality of completed work, and to establish the relationship between jobs and work points in a way that made sense to each team member. Finally, the "*learn from Tachai*" system is for all peasants to report individually what they think their daily work performance is worth and to elicit a team consensus on how many work points he or she had truly earned. Although this system was the last to evolve, few teams practice it because of its unpopularity among farm families.

Whatever the basis for determining work points, team earnings are

distributed by dividing the total number of team work points into residual team income and determining the value per work point for that year. Two aspects of this distribution system vary in practice. Of the residual team income in cash or kind, a certain basic grain allowance is distributed to each team household, and the final amount is then allocated according to member work points. But many teams have dispensed with this basic allowance and simply distribute income according to the work points earned by each team member. It is clear that under the system described above, households with many persons able to work on the team will earn more income than other households. At the same time, the deductions by the state brigade and team represent a burden on each household that is borne disproportionately by these multiworker households, the more so the smaller the team's residual income. After all, these same households are supporting poor families in the village and also bearing a greater share of state taxes, brigade costs, and the like.

Such was the system that enabled rural communities to finance their schools, local officers, capital projects, and basic charities without funding or support channeled through financial administration at the county level and beyond. This system certainly had its roots in the past. During the Ch'ing (1644-1911) and Republican (1911-1949) periods, large-scale cooperative activities like water control or irrigation were supported by households on an ability-to-pay basis. This was determined according to the size of each household's land. Each made contributions to the project and received rewards commensurate with the amount of land it owned or managed. The village leaders who organized and managed village schools, granaries, crop-watching associations, and village defense measures assessed households on the same basis. The very poor—always a few households in every community—were supported by their kin or through the charity of other villagers. Some farmers could always be found to keep complex accounts of the charges paid by households for irrigation services. Now, when farmers keep equally complex accounts of brigade and team business, including the tabulation of work points.

The transition from family farming to the team farming system was not without difficulties (which still persist). The source of these difficulties was the conflict between family values and preferences and those the Communist Party thought desirable. Traditionally, farm families had worked and cooperated to achieve family goals: the acquisition of land and other property, the attainment of social status, the elevation of the family's rank within the community. Family rituals

and ceremonies requiring expense and dependency upon kinship relationships were part of this life-style. The Communist Party, on the other hand, tried to elicit different loyalty and sacrifice from farm families by having them work for activities that often bore no relationship to family concerns or interests. Families were supposed to always put the interest of the state and Party above their private interests. Needless to say, although the Party was able to create a new rural organization of work and reward, conflicts of interest between the farm families and the Party and government organs still exist.

To cite only a few examples, there is continuing conflict between households and team and brigade policies. In some villages, households earn virtually all their income from team activities. In others, however, as little as 80 or even 70 percent of their income may come from the production team because private sources of income are both available and expanding. Among these are raising vegetables, fish, or fruit in private gardens; working in commune industries or services; and private handicraft activities. In the latter case, households with considerable labor power and managerial skill might prefer to use their resources to exploit these nonteam sources of income. Labor absenteeism from daily team work could become a serious problem for team and brigade leaders.

Another conflict involved state agricultural policies that ran counter to the best economic interests of brigades and their production teams. It has been state policy in recent years to increase food grain production everywhere in the country. Team labor, however, has often been in a position to earn more income from products other than food grains, and its allocation to the latter has therefore been a source of economic inefficiency. To give one of many examples found in the Communist press, in 1970, cadres of Chiungyang Commune in Ch'ao County of Anhwei Province learned that production teams in Shanch'iao brigade had constructed kilns to produce bricks for sale. Team leaders had recognized that using their labor to produce bricks rather than food grain would increase team income.

The new state policy of teaching the farmers self-reliance has also clashed with traditional notions of common sense. In Hoshih Commune of Ch'angshu County in Kiangsu Province, farmers asked the commune authorities for permission to use its machinery to remove a large cesspool so that more land could be cleared for farming. Commune cadres instead ordered the farmers to remove the obstacle themselves as a lesson in community self-reliance. The farmers spent

days digging a moat 20 meters along the cesspool hand-carried water to fill the moat and then flouted the obstacle-free. Many farmers were probably shrewd enough to calculate the opportunity costs of their efforts since it was obvious to all that the cesspool could have been removed by simple machinery within a day's time.

From time to time the press exhorts the farming communities to adopt the correct Party line of thought and work. Party leaders still believe that farm families will resort to private contracts in order to maximize their income. Old beliefs and values do not disappear overnight. Even under the present system of cooperative farming, in which the state so far has successfully stabilized production and guaranteed a distribution of food grain and fiber to all households, many families chafe under the pressures and controls to conform to the new work styles and ways of thinking. Individual gain and the improvement of family status and living standards remain important to rural families. Although the overwhelming majority of them conform to the team farming system, it is problematic how many would withdraw to take advantage of other procedures, especially those of time-honored means, if the opportunity should arise.

### State Policies toward Agriculture

Prior to 1937 the Nanking government under Kuomintang rule had increased state efforts and funding to plan major water conservancy projects, expand countryside road networks, establish agricultural colleges and research institutes in different parts of the country, and promote rural banking and the creation of village cooperatives to loan to farmers and buy industrial products. These multifaceted schemes had varying success; research institutes and colleges rapidly developed to begin new seed breeding and testing, the conservancy projects scarcely developed beyond the planning level.

This mixed legacy, which the new socialist government inherited in 1949, gradually helped to promote the spread of new farming technology in the countryside. During the 1950s the new government budgeted money to encourage more test-plot and development of new seeds and fertilizers, especially for rice and wheat. Gradually new seeds resistant to major diseases made their entry into regional cropping systems, but the impact of this development seems to have taken full hold only in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Perhaps the reason for this is that during the 1950s the Party was concerned mainly with building a modern industrial complex and reorganizing the economy to establish

its control. Very few resources were allocated in state economic plans for agricultural development. Party leaders believed that initially farm production could be greatly increased merely by removing the old fetters of local elite control, which allegedly exploited the farmers, and by cooperativizing the villages. During the 1959-1962 period (see Table 5.1), it became clear to the Party that reorganization of agriculture alone had not released new forces of production.

After 1962, state policy toward agriculture underwent a decisive shift. The state began to supply more resources to the commune system in the hope of both stabilizing production during years of poor weather and increasing it greatly when excellent weather prevailed. The government began importing more chemical fertilizer and increasing its domestic supply so that total supply, which had stood slightly higher than 3 million tons in 1960, had risen to 9.8 million in 1965 and to more than 20 million in 1970. Between January 1972 and May 1974, China contracted to buy thirty chemical fertilizer plants to produce ammonia and urea at a cost of \$492 million.

In the late 1960s, research institutes introduced a new strain of rice with a small stalk, few leaves, and a higher yield than previous strains. A variety of new wheat seeds also had been introduced, so that by the late 1960s major wheat diseases like stripe rust and smut had been brought under control. The research institutes, county research stations, and communes became linked as one pipeline to rapidly test and produce supplies of new seeds for commercial production on team farming plots. As each region and province is able to be served by research institutes, seed-breeding work can be rapidly introduced to counties and communes so that within three years new seeds can replace those already in use.

The state has also encouraged communes to establish small-scale industry to produce construction materials for wells, irrigation ponds and sluices, and a variety of farm machinery. Of course, communes purchase some of these same items from companies located in major industrial centers. But the burgeoning commune industry on the one hand replaces traditional rural handicraft production—a natural transition—and on the other provides employment for rural people at all seasons of the year.

The state plans to increase the pace of agricultural mechanization in order to reduce the exhausting work of soil preparation and harvesting crops by hand. Commune leaders are not worried that such substitution of machines for hand labor will create a problem of technological unemployment. At present, when such labor is released, work teams are formed to rebuild community homes and structures to transform them

into more comfortable and healthy dwellings for rural people. More brigades than before are now reported to have plans for tearing down old straw, mud, and wood homes and replacing them with new brick apartments. These brigades will also construct new structures for schools, hospitals, and factories, as well as recreation facilities.

### The Role of Farming Inputs

Historically Chinese farmers have increased farm production by bringing new land into cultivation and farming existing land more intensively to obtain two harvests per year instead of one. By selecting the best seeds from the harvested crop, resorting to trial and error methods of soaking seeds, and planting with different fertilizer methods, farmers gradually increased crop yields. Such efforts naturally required a greater expenditure of labor, but rewards were high if productivity increased and farmers had selected the proper mix of crops to sell to the market. Households also worked out cooperative schemes to share and exchange their resources in order to construct irrigation systems and reclaim swamp and lake land for cultivating crops. As the rural population expanded, the relationship between output on the one hand and the supply of land, labor, and farm capital (like seeds, fertilizer, irrigation facilities, and tools) on the other was one of farm inputs growing at the same rate as farm output. In other words, the expansion of farm inputs accounted for the gradual growth of farm output. At the same time, Chinese farming became more labor-intensive and households gradually farmed less land on a per capita basis.

From the crop statistical data of the 1930s, it becomes clear that crop-yield variation was enormous within and even between regions. It is in areas where the most advanced farming techniques could be used upon good soils in a favorable climate, very high crop yields were obtained, but much of the countryside lacked these special attributes. Consequently, the potential was greatest for raising crop yields in backward areas to the high yield levels of areas where the best farming techniques prevailed. It is only natural, then, that the Communist Party has been most effusive to praise backward, poor rural communities like T'ichai for establishing the necessary preconditions of irrigation and land reclamation to raise crop yields to the levels of the advanced farming areas that have good soil and stable rainfall.

By establishing model brigades and communes with a proven record in irrigation construction, the Party hopes to encourage other areas to follow suit. Pace-setting brigades like T'ichai are noted for mobilizing



labor during the slack farming seasons to engage in capital projects like reclaiming land, terracing hills, levelling fields, digging wells, building canals, constructing drainage ditches, and preparing fertilizer compost. During the 1960s and 1970s, cadres vigorously encouraged these efforts so that the total irrigated land, only 34.3 million hectares in 1957, increased to an estimated high of between 41 and 47 million hectares. By 1957, 31 percent of cultivated land was irrigated, and by 1976, that figure had risen to between 38 and 44 percent.

The end of the 1960s saw the beginnings of a revolution in the crop rotation system that still continues. Formerly, in central China two crops of either rice or rice and winter wheat had been harvested each year. In the north three harvests every two years based on a combination of summer grain and fiber crops with winter wheat had been harvested. The advent of early maturing rice and winter wheat seeds combined with improved irrigation, drainage, and greater application of fertilizer of the traditional compost type had produced the following new rotations. In central China more land began having three harvests per year with two rice crops and a winter wheat crop. In the north two harvests per year became more common with a late summer harvest followed by a sowing of winter wheat and its harvest in May or early June. These new cropping cycles raised the annual cropping index and increased the total food grain yield per unit of cultivated land each year; they are being adopted in more areas as water, new seeds, and fertilizer become available.

### *Water Control*

The Chinese have a remarkable record of water conservancy achievements. Long before the eleventh century A.D., the state had established offices to manage large-scale hydraulic projects located along the Yellow and Huai rivers. The early Ming rulers initiated water control projects all over the country. The actions taken by the government after 1959 continue in the same tradition.

The state has promoted major projects like dams and reservoirs to control the Yellow and Hai rivers in North China. Between 1963 and 1973, thirty-four main canals were dug and dredged in Hopeh Province alone and 4,300 kilometers of flood control dikes were built. Heavy spring rains that once flooded the central part of this province now are carried by canals to the Gulf of Pohai or are stored in large reservoirs for irrigating fields. A second important development in the north, the most important farming area to perennially suffer drought, has been the construction of tube wells. For example, in the Hai River valley region,

which occupies virtually half of Hubei Province, nearly a half million wells were sunk in the 1960s. Every county has a water conservancy planning and coordinating office to determine how many wells communes should sink so as not to overbuild and lower the ground water table.

Another important achievement has been the construction of large canal networks to irrigate vast areas that formerly depended solely upon rainfall. A group of University of British Columbia academics had the opportunity in May 1976 to observe water conservancy developments in Hui County of northern Honan. This poor county produced mainly food grains and farming depended upon rainfall. In 1966-1967 Hui's officials began mobilizing the farmers to construct a network of canals, ponds, underground dams, wells, and pumping stations to irrigate the county's farmland. By 1976 the communes had built 31 reservoirs, 23 underground dams, 3,000 kilometers of stone and concrete water channels, 5,000 pump wells, and 111 pump stations. Moreover, these achievements had been financed mainly out of commune savings with only 17 percent of total costs funded by the state. As a result, food grain yields had risen to 5.8 metric tons per hectare per year, which nearly tripled the national food grain yield average.

The Hui River project and the Hui commune canalization schemes represent several of the more successful water conservancy achievements. The Party intends to duplicate these performances elsewhere. If officials are equally skillful in mobilizing commune work teams and can persuade communes to restrain consumption and save more for financing capital projects, other river systems can be controlled and more counties with little irrigation will begin to have an ample water supply. Within perhaps a decade or two, the state will perhaps have succeeded in irrigating roughly half of the existing farmland, which would be a record unsurpassed by any country of comparable size in the world.

### New Seeds

Seed research work has been most successful for specific crops like rice, wheat, and cotton. Annual conferences involving seed breeders and technicians are convened to discuss progress and to solve common problems. So far, the major achievements in seed research have been to develop native varieties through selection and testing over several years in order to obtain varieties resistant to major diseases, which produce high yields and have early maturing qualities. Institutes obtain rice and wheat seeds from other countries and test them in trial plots. But the

Chinese have found that most of these are unsuitable for the soil, climate, and rotation systems. Seed breeders strongly emphasize early maturing for adaptability to the new crop rotation cycles now spreading throughout North and South China.

Prior to 1966-1967, seed research work involved testing under controlled conditions to determine yield response to a variety of variables like fertilizer, heat, and water. In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, this research greatly declined, in fact virtually ended for several years. It seems to have revived slowly in the mid-1970s, but not on a comparable scale. As irrigation increases and more chemical fertilizers become available, research testing the response of new seeds to different environmental factors will play a key role in determining if crop yield in the high, stable yield farming areas can be increased substantially. Meanwhile, seed research now shifts to miscellaneous grains like corn, maize, and sorghum. The hope is that higher yields for these crops can be obtained, as well as early maturing, so that intercropping and double- and triple-cropping on a yearly basis can be introduced to all parts of the country.

### *Fertilizer*

In spite of the rapid increase in chemical fertilizer production and importation after 1962, a report by the U.S. Wheat Studies Delegation, which visited China in mid-1976, states that very small quantities of low-grade chemical fertilizer are actually in use. Considering that this delegation visited the most advanced farming areas, the fact that only 150 to 300 kilograms of low-quality chemical fertilizer were applied to a hectare of land, as compared to more than 700 kilograms on a similar basis in Taiwan, suggests that the scope for chemical fertilizer in use remains great and that many areas may receive very little chemical fertilizer at present. Chinese farmers still apply prodigious quantities of organic fertilizer to their fields in amounts reaching 100 to 150 metric tons per hectare in most cases. This fertilizer is still prepared in the traditional manner: in pits and compost piles. The combination of large quantities of organic fertilizer applied with small amounts of low-grade chemical fertilizer has raised crop yields greatly, especially in the high, stable yield farming areas, which account for nearly one-third of the total cultivated area.

By 1978 the chemical fertilizer recently purchased from foreign sources will be producing perhaps as much as 12 million metric tons of high quality chemical fertilizer. This should give China an annual supply of around 30 to 35 million metric tons of chemical fertilizer, of which a large portion could be allocated to poorer soils of the country as

they gradually become irrigated. The prospects would then become more favorable for raising crop yields in poorer farming areas closer to those of the high stable yield farming areas. This development along with more intensive research on improved seeds for the better farming areas should continue to increase yields so that the rate of growth of farm production may be sustained at around 2 percent or slightly higher.

### Future Prospects

If China can realize a long term growth rate of farm production of around 2 percent or more, will this performance be sufficient to feed and clothe the population adequately and still support the momentum of industrialization underway. Much depends upon the success of current efforts to lower the birth rate and subsequently bring population growth in the country under control. While little is precisely known about the present size and composition of China's population, the available evidence does strongly indicate that the government has been making vigorous efforts to limit population growth in a variety of ways. Discouraging early marriage, limiting family size, and educating the people to use some of the birth-control procedures available are the key strategies presently used by the state. The commune-brigade-team administrative and organizational structure certainly makes it much easier for China to initiate these strategies in the countryside, as compared to most developing countries where state control in rural areas is weak and ineffective.

If by the 1980s the population growth rate can be stabilized at 1.5 percent per annum or even slightly less, a 2 percent or higher annual growth rate of food grain and industrial crops ought to be sufficient for China to prosper and industrialize gradually for the remainder of this century. Between 1870 and 1937, Japan's population grew at around 1 percent per annum while agricultural production increased at around 1.5 to 1.7 percent annually. Japan's free market economy allowed massive migration of rural people to cities with great reliance upon foreign trade. China, on the other hand, controls population migration through the commune system, and its system of planned economy makes selective use of foreign trade as an instrument to acquire strategic materials and modern technology. China's different organizations and policies might very well produce a similar performance of rapid industrialization with modest gains in welfare for the entire population. Certainly, such an achievement among today's developing countries would indeed be remarkable.

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## 6

# Economic Development Strategy, Industry, and Trade

*Edwin F. Jones*

### An Overview

The new leaders of the People's Republic of China came to power in 1949 determined to transform China through rapid industrialization into a modernized world power by the end of the twentieth century. Between 1949 and 1976, the year of Mao's death, substantial progress was made toward this goal. During this period, industrial output rose 29 fold, farm output 2.7 fold, and gross national product (GNP) 6.3 fold. Industry expanded from a little over one-tenth to nearly one-half of the GNP, while agriculture fell from two thirds to less than one third.

These dramatic changes in the economy occurred with remarkably little shift of the labor force from the countryside to the cities. Between 1949 and 1971, the total labor force rose by 71 percent; industry increased its share from less than 5 percent to a little over 10 percent, while agriculture's share fell only from 88 percent to 71 percent. Since a significant portion of the new nonfarm labor force was located in rural areas, the urban share of the population rose from 12 percent to something less than 20 percent.

These phenomena reflect in large part the great disparity between labor productivity in agriculture and that in industry. An extreme scarcity of agricultural resources results in very low farm labor productivity and, despite major agricultural investment, has limited a rise in this productivity. In consequence, laborers have been held on the

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Statistical note: Much of the data used in this paper were drawn from the publication *China Economic Indicators*, CIA National Foreign Assessment Center, ER 77 10508, October 1977. All data not otherwise identified are from this source.

farms to support the necessary rise in farm output, limiting the growth of the nonfarm and industrial labor forces. Despite limited growth in the industrial labor force, its productivity—which exceeds farm labor productivity many fold—supports a substantial and rapid rise in total economic output.

The increasing weight of industry in total economic output has sustained economic growth despite declining rates of growth in industry and agriculture, as shown by a comparison of annual growth rates in the First and Fourth five-year plans:

	1953-1957	1971-1975
GNP	7%	7%
Industry	16%	10%
Agriculture	4%	3%

Moreover, since industrial wages, under the influence of agricultural wages, are low, profits and interest comprise a large component of industrial output and accrue to the government for construction and other expenditures. Thus, the increased share of industrial output in total output has facilitated the mobilization of savings and high levels of investment.

The history of Chinese industry since 1949 (see Table 6.1) reveals two sharply contrasting periods of growth. With ideological conviction and confidence, the P.R.C. embarked initially on an eighteen-year (1950-1967), single-minded program to build a large, modern, integrated, and autonomous heavy industrial complex. It secured agreement from the U.S.S.R. to provide 300 large plants costing about \$3 billion as the core of this program, together with substantial technical, material, and administrative assistance for transforming the economy. Soviet financial aid was limited, and the P.R.C. was committed to mobilize the slack and surpluses of a reviving economy to support the program. Though strains mounted, the Chinese leadership responded with feverish efforts and institutional change to mobilize necessary resources, firm in the belief that once the heavy industry base had been secured all other problems could be solved.

This initial period ended in the collapse of the frenetic industrial construction drive of the "Great Leap Forward" (1958-1960), as the P.R.C. overstretched and misused its resources, alienating the U.S.S.R. and terminating the Soviet commitment. Average annual industrial

Table 4.1 China's Industrial Growth Pattern

Period	Output Index (1952 = 100)	Percent of Total			Average Annual Growth (%)		
		Consumer Goods	Fields or Goods Machinery & Equip.	Total	Consumer Goods	Producer Goods	Total
1949	20	60.6	4.4	35.0	13.9	26.9	40.7
1950/52 (Rehabilitation)	48	53.6	7.5	39.1	15.8	9.7	20.1
1953/57 (1st FYP)	100	4.9	20.9	46.3	21.9	4.3	32.4
1958/60 (Great Leap)	181	27.0	15.8	37.2			
1950/80 (Heavy industry push)					2.2	17.6	29.1
1961/62 (Readjustment)					22.7	14.7	27.7
1962	111	3.1	12.1	35.8			
1963-65 (Recovery)					21.5	30.2	16.9
1965	159	39.3	14.0	46.3			
1966/70 (3rd FYP)					9.7	8.2	10.2
1970	316	36.9	20.1	43.0			
1971/75 (4th FYP)					9.7	4.3	11.3
1975	502	31.4	25.0	43.5			
1961/75 (Self reliance era)					7.0	8.1	6.6
1950/75 (Total period)					11.2	10.4	15.8
1978-85 Goal					10.0		

growth during 1949-1960 had reached a spectacular 22 percent and had provided China with a substantial modern industrial plant, including about 150 Soviet core plants. But China found itself in the midst of a man-made famine with a seriously unbalanced industry and without access to the modern technology that would permit the continuation of its former industrial drive.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1960 disaster the P.R.C. leadership drew up a new twenty-year program (1960-1980) for self-reliance which accepted the necessity for reduced industrial construction and growth to deal with other vital problems and readjustments. The lost Soviet security shield required sharply increased military expenditures to create a credible deterrent and ensure P.R.C. security. The new appreciation of the closing jaws of the Malthusian trap gave agriculture first claim on industrial resources for a comprehensive program of farm modernization. Rural industrialization and industrial dispersion consistent with the new programs and the limits of existing technology imposed requirements for substantial infrastructure investments in communications and transport. Industrial consumer goods output received relative priority both to mitigate disappointed public expectations and to mobilize resources less painfully through industrial profits.



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1975	504	21.4	25.0	43.5		11.5
1961/75 (Self reliance)					7.0	8.1
1950/75 (Coal period)					13.7	10.4
1976/83 (Oil)					10.0	

growth during 1949-1960 had reached a spectacular 22 percent and had provided China with a substantial modern industrial plant including about 150 Soviet core plants. But China found itself in the midst of a man-made famine with a seriously unbalanced industry, and without access to the modern technology that would permit the continuation of its former industrial drive.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1960 disaster the P.R.C. leadership drew up a new twenty-year program (1960-1980) for 'self-reliance', which accepted the necessity for reduced industrial construction and growth to deal with other vital problems and re-adjustments. The lost Soviet security shield required sharply increased military expenditures to create a credible deterrent and ensure P.R.C. security. The new appreciation of the closing jaws of the Malthusian trap gave agriculture first claim on industrial resources for a comprehensive program of farm modernization. Rural industrialization and industrial dispersion consistent with the new programs and the limits of existing technology imposed requirements for substantial infrastructure investments in communications and transport. Industrial consumer goods output received relative priority both to mitigate disappointed public expectations and to mobilize resources less painfully through industrial profits.

With the period of "self-reliance" now drawing to a close, we may compare its annual industrial output growth rates with those of the period of Sino-Soviet cooperation as follows:

<i>Period</i>	<i>Annual Industrial Output Growth</i>	<i>Annual Producer Goods Growth</i>	<i>Annual Consumer Goods Growth</i>
1949-60	22.2%	29.1%	13.6%
1961-75	7.0%	6.6%	8.1%

The policies of "self-reliance" appear to have been carried out as originally planned—with the major exception of the improvement of domestic technology, originally seen as a program of training, research, and adaptation, accompanied by the acquisition of foreign prototypes and technical materials through trade. Schools designed in the 1950s to staff a very rapid urban industrial growth became anachronistic after 1960. Initial changes greatly restricted enrollments at higher levels by sharply raising academic admission standards and lengthening and intensifying training to identify and cultivate the best minds to become the scientists of the future; the number of run-of-the-mill high school and college graduates was reduced. Research institutes were expanded to analyze, catalogue, and adapt foreign technologies for Chinese use; during 1963-1965, a series of single prototype plants for different products or different processes for the same product was imported from abroad to be analyzed and copied.

Mao branded this system as elitist and contrary to revolutionary politics, and swept it aside in the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Schools and colleges soon were providing only short-term vocational courses with minimum academic content or standards; they had a prime mission of glorifying the worker and the peasant and of indoctrinating the student to expect a life among them. Research institute staff were dispersed to fields and shop floors, where, under the supervision of Party cadres and peasants or workers, they would help solve immediate technical problems. Production organizations were enjoined to use revolutionary "on-the-spot" solutions to technical problems, rather than going at a "snail's pace" in waiting for foreign equipment or technology.

Despite the waning of the Cultural Revolution from 1969 on and the appearance of pragmatic policies elsewhere, Mao's strong position on technology hampered collective action. Large import orders for

industrial plants in the fertilizer, steel, and petrochemical industries appeared in 1972-1975. But these were apparently justified internally as one-time solutions to pressing bottlenecks in vital industries, an attempt to institutionalize the export of oil to finance the import of industrial plant was reportedly rebuffed in the succession politics of the day. Not until 1977, after the death of Mao and the consolidation of the succession government of Hua Kuo-feng, did the P.R.C. in effect repudiate Mao's policy (blaming it on the Gang of Four). The Hua government has repeatedly affirmed the academic integrity and mission of the schools, the necessity for scientists to have the appropriate facilities and organization to do their work without harassment or interference, and the intention to import foreign equipment and technology as required.

In early 1978 the government unveiled ambitious (but possibly attainable) and closely related eight-year plans to develop industry, agriculture, and science through 1985. The key goals are to achieve an annual increase of 4 to 5 percent in agricultural output and of 10 percent in industrial output. A grain output target of 100 million tons was set and steel production is to reach 60 million tons by 1985.

The P.R.C. announced in March 1978 that it intends, by 1985 to narrow the gap between Chinese and world levels of technology to about ten years, thus laying a solid foundation for catching up with or surpassing world levels in all branches by the year 2000. By 1976 China had checked population growth, reducing fertility almost to targeted replacement levels, although these new family and birth patterns remained to be sustained and consolidated. Farm output rose satisfactorily through expanded farm manpower and a rapid growth of industrial inputs to agriculture, but the goal of releasing farm labor to industry through a rapid growth in farm labor productivity—if in sight—had not yet been realized. Industrial output was successfully restored and expanded on the basis of domestic levels of technology, but China's industry still faced bottlenecks at critical points stemming from the lack of advanced technology or of supporting infrastructure investment.

After Mao died in 1976 renewed emphasis was placed on education, research, and development to pave the entry to a twenty-three-year modernization program during 1978-2000. The Hua Kuo-feng succession government has now focused its planning on this modernization, with an overlap period to 1985 to complete the unfinished tasks of the "self-reliance" period.

## Manpower and Employment

While available data on employment, particularly since 1960, has been fragmentary, ill-defined, and imprecise, it is sufficient to suggest some important generalizations on the growth and deployment of China's labor force. Trends in demography and economic development have been the two important influences.

China began its demographic transition—a transition from a stable, slow-growing population with high mortality and fertility to one with low mortality and fertility—with a rapid drop in its death rates. Serious effort to obtain a matching decline in fertility began after the 1959-1961 famine; in the 1960s a successful urban program secured a small drop in fertility, while in the 1970s the organization of the larger rural areas has led to a marked fertility decline.

Fertility is now approaching replacement levels, which is believed to be the Chinese target since their program is framed in the context of universal marriage and a two-child family. At replacement levels, growth would decelerate and the population would stabilize in the first several decades of the twenty-first century; stabilization is achieved first at younger ages and then progressively at older ages until the population fully matures. For example, in Dr. Aird's projection used below, between 1976 and 2000 the population aged 0-14 rises from 361 million to 375 million, showing little growth, while the productive population aged 15-64 increases from 551 million to 873 million, and the 65 and over population doubles from 38 million to 80 million.

In the demographic transition, the productive-aged population, of which the labor force is a function, will increase at different rates than the total population. This differential growth will alter the ratios of productive and dependent age groups; these ratios tend to influence labor force participation rates by the productive-aged population. These influences can be analyzed by constructing a population growth model for China, like Table 6.2. It is based on the age-sex distribution reported in the 1953 census and selects values for fertility and mortality to produce population totals in subsequent years that approximate the registered population totals reported irregularly by the Chinese.

In this model, the productive-aged population grows more slowly than the total population from 1949 to 1963, and more rapidly thereafter, producing a rise and then decline in the dependency ratio. To calculate the labor force, a rule-of-thumb 70 percent participation rate will be assumed for the productive-aged population for the years 1949-1976, but by the year 2000 the sharply reduced dependency ratio should permit a higher, 75 percent, participation rise. The participation rate is

Table 6.2 Ratio Between Productive and Dependent Population 1949-2000

Year, July 1	Population (million)			Dependent/ Productive Ratio (per 100)	Crude Birth Rate per 1,000
	Total	Dependent (under 15 over 64)	Productive (15-64)		
1949	338	215	323	67	43.4
1953	583	243	340	71	45.0
1957	640	277	363	76	41.3
1963	719	320	399	80	37.6
1970	840	365	475	77	35.7
1976	951	400	551	73	25.5
2000	1,329	456	873	52	22.0

calculated in terms of full time labor units and represents a larger number of full and part time workers.

The data are available to trace in some detail and with confidence nonfarm employment in the 1950s. During 1949-1953 nonfarm employment grew rapidly from 26 to 39 million mostly in the modern sector but with some growth in the traditional sector. During 1954-1957 with the imposition of labor controls nonfarm employment remained stable reaching 40 million in 1957 but it grew from 18 million to 24 million in the modern sector while declining from 21 million to 16 million in the traditional sector. In 1958 at the start of the Great Leap Forward nonfarm employment jumped abruptly to 57 million. Although nonfarm production continued to rise in 1959 and 1960 employment eased off to 53 million as authorities used the huge increments of 1958 more effectively.

Since 1960 there has been little information on nonfarm employment. It declined sharply in the initial years of readjustment as the authorities returned most of the workers newly hired in 1958 to the farm areas in the process of reducing the urban population from 150 million in 1959-1960 to 110 million at the beginning of 1964. Despite rapid recovery growth in industrial output to 1965 the emphasis on efficiency and on raising labor productivity limited employment growth.

During the Third and Fourth five-year plans industrial growth was substantial. However while there were indications of modest population growth in large and medium cities the labor markets in these urban locations remained weak. Strong controls over population movements inhibited rural migration to the cities while large numbers of urban school graduates were directed to rural farm employment in lieu of

urban employment in a systematic, long-term government program.

The stress on rural development in the Third and Fourth five-year plans, however, sharply expanded nonfarm employment in the rural county towns and farm areas, as recent partial data are revealing. The Chinese press reported that at the end of 1977 the small rural industries were employing 17 million workers in some one million firms. In 1975, one observer noted that employment in small rural industries was approximately equal to that of the larger modern industries in the cities. Similarly, a Ministry of Education conference on the problems of primary and secondary school teachers noted that "the number of teachers in China has come close to 10 million," a level suggesting a marked expansion in rural educational services.

Programs undertaken also indicate substantial employment growth in certain sectors over the levels of the 1950s. Full-time rural health personnel must have been expanded by a few million in the systematic program to establish small hospitals in each of the 70,000 communes in the 1960s and small clinics in each of the 1 million brigades. (This calculation excludes "barefoot" doctors, who retained the status of farm workers and were volunteer agents of the medical service in the 4 to 5 million production teams, as well as purveyors of emergency first-aid services.) Again, local reports indicate marked growth in county government administrative and planning personnel since the 1950s consonant with expanded development responsibilities. While such information does not permit precise estimates, it is perhaps sufficient to compile an approximate projection of the changes in nonfarm employment from 1957 to 1976 as shown in Table 6.3.

From the 1976 population estimates, the 1976 labor force may be estimated at 386 million. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, in a March 18, 1978, address to the National Science Conference, stated: "Several hundred million are busy producing food. . . . Average annual output of grain per farm worker is about 1,000 kilograms in China." The 1976 grain output estimates would thus indicate a farm labor force of 285 million, consistent and corroborative of the above estimate of a nonfarm labor force of 100 million.

By the year 2000 the labor force will reach 655 million, according to the population estimates (see Table 6.4). Its farm and nonfarm division will depend on the necessary growth in farm output and the accompanying growth in farm labor productivity, which will determine the manpower that can be freed from agriculture. Between 1953 and 1976, farm labor productivity rose by 7 percent annually, but Chinese officials predict a substantial rise under the new agricultural modernization practices.

Table 6.3 Changes in Nonfarm Employment 1957-1976 (in millions)

Material sectors	1957	1976
Industry	} 7.9	17
Rural industry		17
Handicrafts	6.6	7
Fishing salt collection	1.0	1
Subtotal industry categories	16.5	5
Construction water conservancy	1.3	7
Transport posts communications	4.4	8
Trade food and drink industry	7.8	13
Subtotal of material sectors	14.5	30
Government and mass organizations	2.9	6
Education cultural affairs	2.7	9
Medicine and health	1.9	6
Other	1.3	
Subtotal nonproductive (service) sectors	8.7	23
Total	19.7	100
Percent of total in industry	42	45

Note: Where specific data are unavailable 1976 estimates in the material sector have been based on judgments of output and labor productivity trends. For example, there has been a marked expansion in both construction and transport. In transport a marked increase in the efficiency of modern transport and a displacement of traditional transport has led to a more rapid growth in labor productivity and a slower growth in employment than in construction. Special factors have also been considered: handicrafts have been displaced somewhat by the growth of modern industry but also expanded in a systematic program of sub-contract work from industries to households dependents and others (so called street industry). In 1957 trade firms were under strong pressure to minimize employment and transfer workers to industry while in 1976 there is more emphasis on improving consumer services in a more complex market economy.

Should farm output increase by 5 percent annually and farm labor productivity by 2.5 percent annually the nonfarm labor force could rise by 5 percent annually and by the year 2000 *reach or surpass* the labor force of 927 million. Such a nonfarm labor force would exceed by far that of any other country and although its output would depend on its productivity its size lends plausibility to Hua hua-jeng's claim in his report to the Fifth National People's Congress that in the year 2000 Chinese output of major industrial products [as expected] to approach equal or outstrip that of the most developed capitalist countries.



Table 6.4 Labor Force Projections, 1949-2000 (in millions)

Year	Population	Labor Force	Non-farm	Farm	Nonfarm Labor	
					% of Total	Ave. Ann. Growth (%)
1949	538	226	26	200	12	
1960	682	266	53	213	20	6.7
1976	951	386	100	286	26	4.1
2000	1,329	655	327	328	50	5.0

### Technology and Education

Education is an important long-run factor in the transition from a handicraft society to a modern industrial nation and has had a major role in China's development policy. In all modern societies, education has the two-fold function of training and socialization, i.e., imparting on the one hand academic skills and on the other hand an awareness of common values, ethics, and principles of social organization to permit a cohesive, functioning adult society. The stresses of rapid growth and of attaining an appropriate balance between the goals of "red and expert" have shaped China's educational policies.

The People's Republic of China began with an ambitious goal for a society with roughly 20 percent literacy: to extend universal education first through a six-year primary curriculum and later to a nine-year primary-junior high curriculum over the course of several five-year plans. When attained, selective, highly restricted admissions on the basis of examination to senior high and higher education levels would be scaled to industrial growth and other social needs. Through the 1950s, however, expansion was rapid at all levels, and the growth at higher levels was chiefly limited by the availability of qualified applicants. In this period, enrollments multiplied nearly four-fold at the primary level, ten-fold at the secondary level, and seven-fold at the higher-education level.

After 1960, the education program shifted to a "less but finer" policy, slightly reducing enrollments and sharply increasing academic admission requirements at senior high and higher education levels. This policy was in accord with "self-reliance" austerity. It was also possible because graduates at lower levels were sufficiently numerous to permit highly competitive and restrictive admissions to higher levels based on academic standing. Primary school enrollments were approaching near-universality, and in the cities universal enrollment

through junior high was nearly obtained. The program aimed at mobilizing the best minds and at giving them intensive training to meet the technological challenges of the period.

Beginning in 1966 with the Cultural Revolution, the education system ran afoul of Mao's discontent and was dismantled and recast. Mao charged that the system had become a huge subversive state bureaucracy run by the educated and tainted with bourgeois thinking. In his view, the quest for academic excellence produced a distorted education unsuited to the lesser needs of many localities, discriminated against the rural areas in favor of the urban areas, and advanced the children of educated bourgeois families (who could pass entrance examinations) over the children of illiterate peasant and worker families.

Formal education ceased during 1966-1968, and then the system was gradually rebuilt over a number of years, moving progressively from primary to secondary to higher education. The new system sought universal education for a ten-year primary-secondary curriculum for children aged seven to sixteen. This ideal, while not attained, has been approached with marked increases in total and rural area enrollments but not in urban areas where school facilities were already well developed. Educational policy shifted markedly toward socialization at the expense of academic standards. No student was to be tested, graded, or failed, and authority of teachers was greatly restricted.

Secondary graduates in the new system were assigned to work posts; for college admissions were limited to youths with at least three years work experience. While formal instruction in the colleges ceased in 1966, the 1967-1968 enrollment of 750,000 remained attached to their respective colleges, and from 1968 to 1970 the various classes were declared graduated on schedule and the graduates assigned to work posts. With the colleges emptied at the end of the 1969-1970 year, experimentation began from 1970-1971 on with abbreviated courses ranging from six months to a maximum of three years. Local units—e.g., communes, military units, and enterprises—were assigned quotas for nomination of applicants. Such youths had to have three years work experience and at least a junior high educational level. On graduation, the students would be returned to their original work posts. Course work was short on theory, long on practice, and heavy on politics. Though enrollments have not been reported, the uncrowded condition of various campuses described by visitors suggests enrollments significantly below previous levels. Measured by school enrollments, China's educational effort progressed between 1949 and 1976 as shown in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5 School Enrollments, 1949-1976

	Primary (in millions)	Secondary	Higher Education (000)
<u>"Rapid Growth"</u>			
1949/50	24.4	1.27	117
1954/55	31.2	4.19	253
1959/60	90	12.9	810
<u>"Less but finer"</u>			
1964/65	85	12	700
<u>"Cultural Revolution"</u>			
1969/70	-- 140 <sup>a</sup>	--	0
1975/76	-- 200 <sup>a</sup>	--	500 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> From fragmentary provincial data, estimated at 70 percent of a school-age (7-16 years) population of 200 million in 1969/70 and at 85 percent of a school-age population of 235 million in 1975/76.

<sup>b</sup> A speculative estimate from descriptive information.

In 1977, the Hua Kuo-feng succession government repudiated the Cultural Revolution educational policies, charging that the Gang of Four radical faction had exaggerated the minor criticisms that Mao had made into a damaging antiintellectual crusade. The new government demanded, and asserted the urgency of, a reemphasis on academic training, although conceding, in its proposed reforms, the difficulty and long-term character of the task.

The primary-secondary system, with an estimated enrollment of 200 million and a teaching staff of nearly 10 million, is to retain its structure, with reforms consisting of restoring the dignity and authority of the teachers, upgrading the teaching staff, and updating and improving texts. With little teacher training now in progress, inputs of new professionally trained teachers will be a long time in coming, and the huge size of the present staff precludes retraining more than a very small fraction on a rotation basis. The main reliance at present must be upon on-the-job training, supplemented by spare-time and correspondence courses. The improvement of textual materials is also impeded by poor student preparation and low teacher qualifications and must proceed experimentally and gradually.

In the colleges, the present short course instruction, while not considered "college" training, has been found useful and will be continued in order to provide local employing units access to quick, specialized training. Regular college education will be reconstructed, operating in tandem. In a September 29, 1977, interview, Vice-Premier

Teng Hsiao-ping identified education as the area where the Gang of Four had created the greatest damage. They turned a whole generation of young people into intellectual cripples. Teng also indicated that the most serious problem was the scarcity of college graduates. In the twenty five through thirty five age group there are very few scientists, research experts, physicians, engineers, biologists and mathematicians. The problems of reconstructing college level education suggest that large numbers of fully qualified college graduates will not be secured until about 1983. Teng stated that, to meet the crisis, a two-tier system would be established, in which upper tier of 'special project' schools would concentrate on the most needed specialties and would receive the most gifted and talented applicants who would have the support of the best teachers and the most challenging up-to-date texts so as to proceed at a faster pace than that of the lower tier. This policy hopes to secure highly qualified graduates without waiting for the full reconstruction of higher education.

The data shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 on China's college graduates by year of graduation illustrate the handicaps China faces on entering its period of modernization. The data show that the rapid expansion of higher education in the 1950s provided more than 1 million new college graduates during 1958-1963 sharply raising their ratio to the nonfarm labor force. The graduates entered the labor market at a time of retrenchment however, and this led to a downgrading in their employment and eventually to the conditions that permitted the closure of the colleges. The subsequent growth in the nonfarm labor force and the absence of new fully qualified college graduates have however cut the ratio by half during 1965-1976 and are likely to cut it by two-thirds before a reconstructed higher education system begins turning out new graduates in about 1983.

### *Technology and Foreign Trade*

Foreign trade is perhaps one of the quickest and surest avenues for a developing nation to acquire advanced technology through the import of capital goods and technical services. Despite this fact China over the past decades has been ambivalent over the appropriate role of foreign trade in its development reflecting autarkic forces in its economic structure and in its politics.

It is an empirical fact that large countries at whatever stage of development, tend to have a small level of foreign trade relative to their

Table 6.6 College Graduates by Year of Graduation, 1913-1976

Period	Graduates by year of graduation (000)	Age in: <sup>a</sup>	
		1978	1985
1913-32	51.2	68-87	76-95
1933-47	157.3	53-67	61-75
1948-57	379	43-52	51-60
1958-65	1,067	35-42	43-50
1966-70	(750) <sup>b</sup>	30-34	38-42
1971-76	(500) <sup>c</sup>	24-29	32-37

<sup>a</sup> Assumed graduation at age 23.

<sup>b</sup> With no formal instruction during 1966-70, the 1965/66 enrollment was declared "graduated" with students having received variously from less than one to less than five years instruction in a five-year curriculum.

<sup>c</sup> A speculative estimate of graduates from short-term, substandard college courses.

gross national product. This tendency has been particularly marked in China, where in the peak year of 1959 imports approached only 3 percent of the gross national product and in most years have been less than 2 percent. Even though China has carefully husbanded its foreign exchange resources for essential imports, such ratios severely constrict possible import contents of capital construction or of industrial output, and the rapid increase in the share of these sectors in total product/expenditure over the decades has further diluted their import content.

There is a strong strain of autarky in China's politics. China has never been a large trading nation. The national myth of its experience since the Opium War—the century of humiliation—has been one of imperialist plunder through foreign trade. While its development plans acknowledge a need for trade, their aim is to end this dependence through acquiring advanced technology. The operation of China's planned economy, which has emphasized import substitution wherever possible to stretch limited foreign exchange earnings and the export of marginal surpluses when and if they occur, has tended to make China an unreliable market and supplier and has minimized domestically the importance of foreign trade. (see Tables 6.8 and 6.9).

During the initial period of the Sino-Soviet alliance (1949-1960), foreign trade flourished as an integrated part of development planning.

Table 6.7 Supply of College Graduates 1949-1976

Year	Supply of College Grads		Nonfarm Labor Force (million)	Grads per 1000 in Nonfarm Labor Force
	Total Graduates (000)	Est. Alive and Active (000)		
1949	230	180	26	7
1957	589	530	40	13
1965	1,656	1,575	50	32
1976	1,656	1,540	100	15
1985	1,656	1,500	155 <sup>a</sup>	10

<sup>a</sup> Projected at 5 percent average annual growth rate indicated for 1976-2000

By 1952 more than two thirds of China's trade was with socialist countries (over half with the Soviet Union) and annual trade plans provided for expanding industrial deliveries to China and for Soviet block markets for the exports that China could supply. Soviet purchases initially stressed minerals, then expanded to grains, oilseeds and food specialties, and finally reached peak levels with large imports of fabrics, clothing and light industry products. During this period China's total trade rose from \$1.2 billion in 1950 to a peak of \$4.8 billion in 1959.

In the 1960s, as famine and an end to the Soviet relation ushered in the self-reliance period, there were sharp alterations and fluctuations in trade. Trade was rapidly reoriented from socialist to nonsocialist countries, the latter accounting for more than three-quarters of China's trade by 1966. Trade levels fell sharply, as exports declined with the depressed economy and imports were further constrained by an accelerated repayment of the Soviet debt. With economic recovery, trade levels rose sharply during 1961-1966, nearly reaching 1959 levels. Trade levels then again declined with the disruptions and autarkic impulses of the Cultural Revolution, turning upward at the end of the decade as order was restored. In the 1970s, the Chinese economy entered a new phase requiring expanded imports and forcing an expansionary approach to foreign trade.

At the end of the 1950s, basic industries like steel, coal, electric power and transport had been overexpanded, and their 1959-1960 output peaks were not exceeded until 1971 for steel, 1970 for coal, 1968 for electric power, and 1969 for transport (million tons originated). Investment in these capital-intensive sectors had been limited in the 1960s, freeing investment resources for the growth industries of the period, such as petroleum, fertilizer and engineering industries.

Table 6.8 China's Foreign Trade (in U.S. \$, millions)

Year	Total	Exports	Imports	Balance
1950	1,210	620	590	30
1951	1,900	780	1,120	-340
1952	1,890	875	1,015	-140
1953	2,295	1,040	1,255	-215
1954	2,350	1,060	1,290	-230
1955	3,035	1,375	1,660	-285
1956	3,120	1,635	1,485	150
1957	3,055	1,615	1,440	175
1958	3,765	1,940	1,825	115
1959	4,290	2,230	2,060	170
1960	3,990	1,960	2,030	-70
1961	3,015	1,525	1,490	35
1962	2,675	1,525	1,150	375
1963	2,770	1,570	1,200	370
1964	3,220	1,750	1,470	280
1965	3,880	2,035	1,845	190
1966	4,245	2,210	2,035	175
1967	3,895	1,945	1,950	-5
1968	3,765	1,945	1,820	125
1969	3,860	2,030	1,830	200
1970	4,290	2,050	2,240	-190
1971	4,720	2,415	2,305	110
1972	5,920	3,085	2,835	250
1973	10,090	4,960	5,130	-170
1974	13,950	6,570	7,380	-810
1975	14,385	7,025	7,360	-335
1976	12,885	6,915	5,970	945

The 1970s required larger across-the-board investments and decisions on developing surpluses and bottlenecks. The spectacular growth in crude oil output after 1968 created surpluses that forced China to resort to low priority usage to dispose of them, while a similar growth in fertilizer output was still inadequate to the immense needs of the farm program, making large supplementary imports of fertilizer necessary. The steel industry was not in a position to provide quickly the large amounts of high quality steels necessary to fulfill the machinery and equipment needs of the 1970s. China did, however, complete several steel plants in the 1960s that had been partially equipped by the Soviets during the previous decade. It was able to rationalize and improve

Table 6.9 Commodity Composition of Trade (I) 1976

<u>Exports</u>		<u>Imports</u>	
Agricultural	36	Foodstuffs	9
Animals meat fish	9	Grain	5
Grain	6	Sugar	3
Fruit and vegetables	5	Other	1
Textile fibers	4		
Crude animal materials	4	Capital goods	31
Other	8	Machinery	22
		Transport equipment	8
Extractive	12	Other	1
Crude oil	9	Consumer goods	1
Other	3		
Manufacturing	52	Industrial supplies	59
Textile yarn and fabric	17	Iron and steel	24
Clothing and footwear	7	Nonferrous metals	4
Other light manufactures	13	Metal products	2
Chemicals	5	Chemicals	10
Metals and metal products	4	Textile fibers	5
Machinery and equipment	4	Rubber	3
Petroleum products	2	Other	11
Total	100	Total	100

output with limited technical innovations but did not demonstrate a strong grasp of large scale mass production. Moreover by 1973 steel output had reached a plateau at capacity levels in all sectors—raw materials transport crude steel and finishing facilities—requiring huge investments to further expand output.

While trade expanded rapidly in the 1970s trade policy was a subject of strong debate within the government affecting growth patterns. The Fourth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) drawn up in 1970 called for expanded foreign trade, greater investments in transport and basic industry and a reduction in military expenditures. The plan remained locked in a political impasse until 1972 when after the demise of Lin Biao it was approved in revised form with a stronger foreign trade emphasis. Trade growth accelerated in 1973-1974. Plans for continued growth were indicated by whole plant purchase commitments in excess of \$2 billion and by policy decisions in early 1974 to greatly expand crude oil exports.

Despite these developments the Chinese press indicated that trade policy was still a matter of controversy which became more heated by mid 1975 under the influence of succession politics the preparation of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1976-1980) and a foreign exchange crisis.



Table 6.10 Industrial Production of Selected Goods


Year	Electric Power (billion kWh)	Crude Oil (mil. tons)	Crude Steel (mil. tons)	Cotton Cloth (bil. lin. meters)
1949	4.3	1	2	1.9
1952	7.3	4	1.3	3.8
1957	19.3	1.5	5.4	5.1
1960	47.0	5.1	18.7	4.9
1962	30.0	3.7	8.0	3.3
1965	42.0	11.0	12.5	5.4
1970	72.0	28.2	17.8	5
1975	121.0	74.3	26.0	7.6
1985 target	—	—	60.0	—


output of industry rose by a phenomenal 22 percent. This policy was replaced by an interim twenty year self-sufficiency program for 1960-1980 which accepted slower industrial growth while diverting important investment resources to meet critical needs in agriculture and national defense and rationalizing industrial growth within the limits of less available technology. Industrial output grew at an average of 7 percent annually during 1960-1975.

The interim policy (through restoring economic balance and raising technological levels) sought to create conditions for renewed rapid industrial growth from 1980 to 2000. Success in expanding farm output and reducing population growth suggests that nonfarm labor force could increase its share of the labor force from a present level of about one-quarter to perhaps as much as one-half, providing substantial scope for industrial growth. The plans for technological growth in the interim period, however, were disrupted in the 1966 Cultural Revolution when research institutes were disbanded, college instruction ended, and primary and secondary education shifted from an academic to a low-level vocational track under Mao's insistence that institutions deal with current realities rather than future hopes. The succession government of Hua Kuo-feng, however, moved quickly to restore research and education and identified technological growth as a major priority for the coming 1980-2000 period.

### Industry and Agriculture

With the limited area of farmland relative to its population





0 50 100 150 200  
 KM  
 LEGENDE  
 Kotanya  
 Batas Kabupaten  
 Batas Provinsi

agriculture represents an area of scarcity in China's economy. Agricultural needs must be met internally, for China's huge food requirement precludes reliance on foreign trade for more than an insignificant share of national consumption. With the increasing pressures of population growth and development, agricultural costs have risen to secure increased crop yields and to modify poor land to make it fit for agriculture.

Between 1952 and 1976, grain and soybean output rose from 161 million tons to 285 million tons, representing a per capita increase from 283 to 300 kilograms. The current eight-year plan to 1985 has established an output goal of 400 million tons, which would raise per capita output to 372 kilograms. This target suggests planning for reserve production as well as raising living standards as incentives for modernizing production and to meet the needs of a growing nonfarm labor force. (A target for the year 2000 would probably involve no higher and possibly a lower per capita output. A 350 to 372 kilogram per capita output in the year 2000 would imply outputs of 465 to 494 million tons.)

Whether or not the 1985 target is met, it is clear that current economic planning places substantial emphasis on agricultural development. The question is, With what inputs and patterns of farm output? The experts that drew up the 1960-1968 farm development plan in the early 1960s ruled out expansion of farmland; the experience of the 1950s had shown that the land that could be reclaimed at reasonable cost was sufficient only to replace the farmland lost to roads, industrial sites, reservoirs, and other requirements of progress. The experts proposed to maximize the yields per hectare by combining modernizing industrial inputs with the labor-intensive practices of traditional agriculture. The program proposed substantial improvement in water management and great increases in fertilizer supply and mechanization, while reinvesting the growing rural labor force—and the labor economies through mechanization—in intensified cropping systems.

The program proposed initial concentration on the irrigated rice lands, which were more accessible than other crop lands and promised quick and initially large returns to modernizing inputs. In the later 1960s, the program would fan out to other farm areas capable of development, in step with a growing road infrastructure and an increased supply of inputs. At this time, a sharp drop in output returns compared to new inputs was projected, although output growth would be maintained by the rapidly rising scale of new inputs supplied. To qualify for intensive development, the various farm areas would have to

establish conditions for high stable yields for inputs could not be wasted on lands subject to frequent floods droughts, or other disasters. It was noted that a significant portion of China's farmland had inherently low unstable yields and could not be developed. Such land would eventually be retired from cultivation when conditions permitted but would be farmed while the need to maximize farm output existed.

Subsequent farm development appears to have followed this plan closely with results much as predicted. Estimates of the supply of industrial inputs and of the equipment inventories on farms (as shown in Table 6.11) reveal a massive industrial support sufficient to materially change and improve the patterns of farming.

As planned attention centered first on the 29 million hectares of irrigated rice lands located largely in the south. Much of this land was located near major urban areas with good local transport and access to surplus electric power and it was feasible to quickly install electric powered pumps to improve water management to supply chemical fertilizer to farm areas and to introduce fertilizer responsive seeds. In 1957 official data showed that with multicropping 32 million hectares were planted with a yield of 2.7 tons per hectare and an output of 87 million tons. Although official data have not been published since the start of the 1960s fragmentary press reports and statements of Chinese officials suggest that rice output had declined to about 76 million tons in the famine year of 1961 but had expanded rapidly to 99 million tons by 1965.<sup>1</sup> Rice output continued to expand as modernization was extended to the whole of the irrigated rice lands and chemical fertilizer supplies became plentiful. A detailed press review reported that in 1976 36 million hectares of rice had been planted with a yield of 3.5 tons per hectare and an output of 126 million tons.<sup>2</sup>

These are very high yields and suggest China is rapidly approaching the economic limits of known rice production technology. Two U.S. technical missions visiting China in 1974 could find little to recommend with respect to seed selection or water management to improve the state of the art.<sup>3</sup> Two countries with advanced rice technologies—Japan and Taiwan—have stabilized yields at their economic limits. Japan securing 5 tons per hectare with single crop rice and Taiwan 4 tons with double-crop rice. Since Taiwan rice culture most closely resembles that of China its rice yields are the better measure of China's achievement and of limits to further development. China's rice production appears to have entered a range of sharply diminishing returns to inputs which will stabilize yields when China decides it can no longer afford the

originate. Each year large areas of the North China Plain are visited by drought and also by waterlogging after the summer rainy season as well as by occasional floods as the rivers overrun their dikes.

The P.R.C. made major and costly development blunders in the North China Plain area during the exuberant Great Leap Forward of 1958-1960 promoting irrigation before solving the problems of siltation and drainage. The huge Sanmen Dam on the Yellow River built to impound water for power and irrigation was silted up and useless only a few years after construction while the initial efforts at irrigation without proper drainage had salinized and reduced the productivity of large areas of crop land. Output of dry land food grain crops dropped to 91 million tons in 1961 and by 1965 had only recovered to the 1957 level of output of 108 million tons.

From the mid 1960s to the early 1970s, however, the P.R.C. initiated major construction in the area to build a comprehensive drainage system which together with local land leveling has substantially mitigated drainage and waterlogging problems. This effort was closely followed by a drive to construct tube wells, the number in operation increasing thirteen fold to 1.3 million between 1965 and late 1974 when they were capable of irrigating 7.3 million hectares of farmland. The water supplied is sufficient to provide substantial protection against local drought and to permit timely planting independent of local rainfall but not to permit shifts to modern high yield crops. Peking plans a much greater extension of tube wells with its surveys indicating that half the farmland in the major North China Plain provinces of Hopeh, Shantung, and Honan can be irrigated by wells. The ultimate irrigable acreage will depend on the rate of recharge of the underground water deposits.

These developments promoted a marked rise in dry land food grain crops which between 1965 and 1976 rose 47 percent to 159 million tons with much of the increase occurring in the North China Plain. Both increased cropping and yields have played a role. Crop losses due to waterlogging and flooding have been considerably reduced while winter wheat acreage has significantly increased as drainage reduced the land under water at fall planting. In addition with the expanded rural labor force multicropping has increased with the popularization of highly labor intensive intercropping systems, in which a second crop is planted between the rows before the first crop is harvested. The widespread extent of intercropping is reflected by changes in soybean output. Soybeans, a low yield crop, were displaced to a large extent by high yield grain crops in the 1960s but their output has more than

Table 6.12 Changes in Agricultural Land Use and Productivity  
1957, 1976-2000

Food Grain Crops	Million Hectares	Output per hectare (tons)		
		1957	1976	2000
Irrigated rice land	22	4.0	5.7	7.4
Dry land grain crops				
(1) Marginal land	15	67	67	0.0
(2) Land capable of development	60	1.63	2.5	3.153
Nonfood crops	10	--	--	--
Total	107			
Kilograms grain per capita		305	300	350-372

1980-2000 period has been described as one of balanced growth that will bring China into the front rank of nations and will encompass the modernization of industry, agriculture, national defense and science and technology. This policy description, though vague, carries the implication of a redeployment of the nation's resources and manpower.

Two conditions suggest that the rapid transfer of the labor force out of agriculture into nonfarm occupations, evident in the 1950s but subsequently slowed, may now be resumed to the end of the century. First, the changing structure of the population, as total population growth slows while the growth of the productive aged population continues at a rapid rate for an extended period, will enable the farm surplus to support a greater share of nonfarm workers. Second, the extension and consolidation of the substantial beginnings toward farm mechanization and modernization should be reflected in more substantial growth in farm labor productivity and in an expanding farm surplus.

The farm program in the period of self-sufficiency relied importantly on shifts to more intensive cropping systems with heavy labor requirements. During 1960-1976 the farm labor force increased by nearly half to provide necessary labor inputs with the cultivated land per farm worker dropping from a little over one-half hectare to a little over one-third hectare. This trend, were it continued, would seem undesirable and eventually self-defeating, while the level of mechanization and supply of industrial inputs to agriculture would appear to have reached a scale in recent years that would obviate the need for further large increases in farm labor.

## 7

## Science and Technology Policy

Genevieve C. Dean

**Politics and Science**

Political changes in China have had a dramatic impact on science policy. Shortly after the fall of the Gang of Four following the death of Mao Tse tung in September 1976 the official Chinese press carried the first signs of a new priority for science and technology. The pages of *People's Daily* which had been filled with articles calling for near total self reliance now criticized views opposed to importing the advanced technologies needed to build an independent comprehensive modern industrial system. It attributed such views to the Gang (Mao's widow Chiang Ching her radical cohorts on the Party Central Committee and their followers). By the end of the year, the press was denouncing the Gang's policies for the obstructive and destructive effects they were said to have had on all aspects of China's scientific and technological development.

The campaign against the Gang and the ideas associated with them continued to gather momentum through the spring and summer of 1977. Acting on the mistaken belief that advanced technology was incompatible with Communist society the Gang of Four it was said had emphasized class struggle and political and social change to the point of jeopardizing China's economic development and national defense. The situation was summarized by the new vice president of the Academy of Sciences Fang Yi (who was subsequently appointed minister in charge of the State Scientific and Technological Commission):

Serious sabotage by the gang of four wrought havoc with China's science and education. Large numbers of universities, colleges and scientific



political study depriving research units of adequate supplies and equipment and diluting the academic training of students by injecting large doses of politics and factory or farm work into the curriculum the radicals seem to have been prepared to make these sacrifices. They defended such reforms as enabling politics to be put in command of science and technology thus ensuring that the scientists' knowledge and skills were applied in the interests of the laboring masses rather than being used behind closed doors to study problems of academic interest that were unrelated to immediate production needs.

The ideologues headed by the Gang of Four then struck back to defend the experiments of the Cultural Revolution. Their tactic was to launch an attack in the public press which they partially controlled accusing the intellectuals of seeking to restore the old social order that they had dominated. By historical analogy with the schools of Legalist and Confucian thought the radicals associated progress in science and technology with social revolution and the assumption of political control by a new class. Thus they implied that re-instituting specialization of research divorced from practice would mark retrogression to a previous social order. They argued against the view that bourgeois scientists could contribute to socialist construction even as they were being gradually remolded under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Instead the radicals insisted they must consciously submit to the philosophy of dialectical materialism before scientific and technological advance could occur.

The Fourth National People's Congress met at the end of 1974. In his address to the congress Premier Chou announced the goals of achieving a relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system by 1990 and comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology—the four modernizations—by the year 2000. Hua Kuo-feng then vice premier and later Mao's successor as Party chairman reportedly was given responsibility for reactivating scientific research institutes and restoring theoretical work. In the summer of 1975 according to subsequent accounts a symposium of scientific and technical personnel was convened under the aegis of Hua and with Mao's blessing.

Another champion of the scientists was Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping who had been dismissed during the Cultural Revolution but was reappointed in 1975. Teng's position was that political disruption of scientific research had slowed China's economic development and if allowed to continue would make it impossible to achieve the four

modernizations." Having effected key appointments in the Academy of Sciences, he commissioned a report on the status of scientific work in China, which was prepared by the academy and submitted to the State Council in September 1975.

This "Outline Report" was never published, but it is said to have been circulated without authorization by the Gang of Four, who instigated widespread criticism of it as evidence that the "bourgeoisie" was attempting to regain political power by striking through the scientists. As pieced together from the published critiques, the Outline Report apparently recommended reinstating professional administration of research institutes, with the Party secretary clearly subordinate to the institute director in scientific and technical matters. The Outline Report proposed that research be carried out by individuals or "small collectives," with the professional scientists the "core" of research groups, which would include workers and political cadres. It called for reinstatement of a system of promotion and of financial and material incentives for intellectuals. According to its critics, the Outline Report confirmed their view that the scientists had become advocates of the "theory of productive forces"; rejecting the view that class struggle was the "key link" in development, the Outline Report emphasized only the setbacks to the "production struggle" and to science and technology in China. The scientists were said to have espoused the view that class struggle had "died out" under the political dictatorship of the proletariat; that science and technology were part of the economic base of society, not the "superstructure," and therefore that dictatorship should not be exercised over science and technology; and that to do so was to implement the Party's policy on intellectuals incorrectly. Their report on the status of science, said the radicals, denied the positive accomplishments of the Cultural Revolution and instead asserted not only that there had been "no great achievements," but also that the "science and technology front" had been "a mess" since the Cultural Revolution.

The barrage of attacks against the scientists continued during the spring of 1976. In addition to criticizing the Outline Report, the radicals even managed to halt some research programs, according to charges later leveled against them, on such frivolous grounds as the claim that "the law of conservation of matter is conservative" or "the theory of relativity is a sham." While Hua Kuo-feng was acting on his brief to reintroduce academic freedom in the natural sciences, the Gang failed to distinguish between dissent on academic and political questions, "stopping academic exchange activities, stifling academic ideas, and

sharply attacking those who held differing academic views through their domination of professional journals as well as the mass media.

Following the Gang's ouster in October 1976 the new political leadership headed by Premier Hua kuo-feng promptly and unequivocally gave top priority to economic modernization, rapid industrial development and scientific research as a source of badly needed new technologies. Theoretical research, once castigated as being divorced from practice, was acknowledged to be an essential part of the scientific endeavor, with an important bearing on future technological development.

As the direction of the new policy trends became clear, prominent scientists rallied to Hua's leadership. Concomitantly, in a campaign to restore the prestige of China's scientists and educators, Mao's writings of twenty years before were cited in support of the view that the majority of intellectuals in China had been remolded—that they now accepted dictatorship by the proletariat and could be enlisted in the cause of socialist construction. Measures to proletarianize science and technology were less urgent in this view and should be balanced with efforts to bring China's research capabilities and technology up to advanced world levels. To reach state-of-the-art levels, China depended on academically trained scientists and engineers, irrespective of their class background. A proletarian outlook and ideology without professional qualifications, it was now recognized, were not enough to function at the frontiers of science and technology.

Months of mass rallies and public meetings convened throughout China to publicize the new commitment to scientific and technological development climaxed in August 1977 with the publication of a poem by Party Vice Chairman and Minister of Defense Yeh Chien ying:

*Scaling the heights of science  
Is like storming a fortified city  
Victory belongs to those who advance  
Defying difficulties!*<sup>2</sup>

Election of a new Communist Party Central Committee in August 1977 indicated that the political situation had stabilized enough so that concrete steps could be taken toward fulfilling this commitment. Some ten months had elapsed since removal of the radicals from the Central Committee. During these months, as their followers were being ousted from local Party committees, provincial and local authorities signalled resolution of the political struggle in favor of Hua and the new central

leadership by endorsing the new line on science. Criticizing the Gang of Four was called the "key link for promoting science and technology"; it might as well have been added that science and technology had become a "key link" in discrediting the Gang and their ideas. The new leadership based its claim to political legitimacy largely on the need to end policies that were said to obstruct scientific and technological development and undermine the country's economy and defense.

These political maneuvers prepared the way for a new science policy. In September, the Party leaders officially sanctioned measures that, in effect, would restore scientific institutions and structures of authority dismantled during the previous decade of radical reform. The urgency of such measures stemmed from the priority attached by these leaders to industrial development—a fundamental goal shared across the spectrum of political views in China, but less immediately pressing to the radicals than their social and ideological objectives. The new policy has to be viewed in the immediate political context, but it will also reflect previous experience in trying to make science contribute to the country's economic development and modernization. Restoration of earlier institutions may result in the revival of old problems.

As in many other countries, the problems in China seem to have had less to do with scientific research than with technological innovation—developing laboratory results into usable, economic technologies. After 1960, confronted with these shortcomings in the structures they had established in the 1950s, Chinese scientists and the political leadership at that time cooperated in trying to reform the original institutions and strengthen the links between research and production. Part of this effort was to adapt R&D institutions to changed economic conditions. In contrast to the previous decade, this was a period of retrenchment rather than expansion, of improving the operation of existing plant and equipment rather than of new construction. But research, engineering design, and education in China all were geared to rapid industrialization. Apart from adapting these institutions to new functions under different economic constraints, the new policy required complementary changes in economic planning and enterprise management.<sup>3</sup> When these were not implemented, the reform of R&D institutions was stalled.

The Cultural Revolution smashed through such obstacles after 1966, but in the end, nearly destroyed scientific research in China in trying to enhance engineering and technological innovation. Resumption of basic research, restoration of research institutions, and return of theoretical study to the curricula of schools and universities thus have

symbolic importance to the political leaders seeking to discredit radical policies of the past decade. It is still not clear whether the new policy will aim at striking a balance between research and development by picking up the reforms of the early 1960s or whether like the 1970s it will focus exclusively on building up advanced research capabilities. In this respect the past may be a guide to the future.

## The Background

### Science, Technology, and Economic Development

#### *The First Five Year Plan (1953-1957)*

The Chinese Communist leaders had come to power in 1949 committed to the goals of economic development and maintenance of the military security of their country. For both purposes they needed modern technology and more the capability to sustain technological innovation to adopt new more efficient technologies in order to enlarge their production capacity (and their military capabilities) and, by continuously innovating to remain at the forefront of advanced world levels in science and technology. With assistance from the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries in the Soviet bloc the Chinese leaders expected to establish a core sector of modern heavy industry that would eventually supply new technology in the form of modern machines and equipment to the rest of the economy. After this initial stage however technological advance was to continue self-reliantly (though this term was not used at the time) rather than importing new technologies. Chinese industry and agriculture and the military would increasingly look to domestic sources of innovation.

Though invention and innovation are inherently unpredictable the most systematic source of new inventions and ideas for new technologies is scientific research. By rationalizing the organization of research facilities in China and through centralized planning and support of research programs the new Chinese leaders expected to make the most efficient use of scientific resources to generate the technologies specified in their economic and military plans. Accordingly the Chinese Academy of Sciences was established by the new government within weeks of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Preeminent Chinese scientists were enrolled in the academy which was to be a center of excellence in research. The academy was charged with responsibility for performing basic research, the creation of scientific knowledge on which the future development of new technologies would

depend. Thus its work was intended to be relevant to the technological needs of a modern industrial economy that did not yet exist in China, but which would be constructed in accordance with a series of five-year plans for economic development.

While basic research and what is sometimes called "basic oriented research," which is not expected to have immediate applicability but is carried out with some future application in mind, were the function of the institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, applied research and engineering design and development were assigned to institutes in the industrial ministries under the State Council of the national government. These institutes supplied technology—in the form of blueprints for factories and machines—for immediate application and innovation in state-owned enterprises. During the First Five-Year Plan, under the pressure of rapid construction and with ready access to Soviet and East European technology, the ministries' research and design institutes appear to have served primarily to channel imported technologies into the key projects in the five-year plan. Design consisted largely of copying imported blueprints with, at most, minimal adaptation to local production conditions. Projections of the economic and technical performance of new plant and equipment after they were in production had to be based on Soviet and European experience under quite different conditions. Unfortunately, design procedures in China were then bureaucratized and frozen into this mode.

### *The Great Leap Forward*

The strategy underlying China's five-year plans<sup>4</sup> was to concentrate technological modernization initially in the heavy industrial sector of the economy, that is, first constructing the capacity to manufacture modern machinery and equipment. This meant that modernization of agriculture and consumer goods industries would have to be postponed; that, for the time being, growth in these sectors would come about only from more efficient use of existing means of production, rather than from investment in more productive technologies.

The limitations of this strategy were beginning to be felt even before the First Five-Year Plan was completed, and this was reflected in the greater attention paid to the nonpriority sectors in proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan. For example, the problem of generating enough capital to continue the program of industrial construction led to recommendations for building more small- and medium-scale enter-

prises which cost less and could be put into production more quickly than the large plants that had been commanding most state investment.

The Second Five Year Plan however was overtaken by the Great Leap Forward which lasted from 1958 through 1960. The Great Leap was an attempt to continue to increase production in agriculture and light industry without diverting state investment to these sectors and without redirecting research and engineering resources to technological needs in this part of the economy. For this purpose a mass innovation campaign was launched to promote the labor intensive construction of facilities like water control installations to improve the productivity of agriculture and even to resurrect traditional manufacturing techniques in order to increase the supply of tools and to mobilize scattered resources—the most notorious example being the backyard steel furnaces. The mass innovation campaign was accompanied by exhortations to overcome a superstitious belief that only scientific experts could invent new technologies, to accept that the methods of production were best understood by those who labored and produced and therefore were best qualified to improve the means of production. The function of science was merely to summarize and find the general principles underlying this body of experience.

Because of the drama and sensation of the mass innovation campaign it is often overlooked that imports of modern technology for the priority heavy industries actually increased at the start of the Great Leap Forward. The urgency of expanding production with minimal investment in agriculture and light industry stemmed from the need to pay for these imports. The political momentum of the mass campaign however eventually carried it into the modern industries where it was manifested in unauthorized modifications to equipment, operation of plant and machines at levels above the designed capacity and mass construction of new facilities, sometimes without adequate design or materials, but certainly with an excess of enthusiasm on the part of workers and political cadres.

1961-1966

The experiences of the Great Leap Forward demonstrated the limitations of technical change and new construction carried out without adequate engineering development and testing. Attempts to expand local R&D facilities, both under government auspices at the provincial and municipal levels and in regional branches of the Academy of Sciences, tended to overextend China's still limited

scientific resources. The early 1960s, therefore, saw a retrenchment to the centralized science system of the period before the Great Leap Forward. In the modern industries, technological management and control were restored to the enterprise managers and chief engineers, and "worker-innovations," now in the form of suggestions for technical improvements and adaptations, had to be submitted for review and testing by the technical department concerned before being adopted by an enterprise. Enterprises failing to show a profit were ordered closed down—which meant that many of the small enterprises and unauthorized facilities constructed during the Great Leap no longer counted in state economic plans, though some, at least, continued to exist and even to operate on the fringes of the state economy.

Three disastrous harvests, in 1959, 1960, and 1961, reduced China's capacity to continue new industrial construction and even necessitated imports of grain rather than capital goods. A major change in economic policy then ensued. Thereafter, industrial investment had to be funded mainly out of the profits of industry itself, while the surplus produced by agriculture would be reinvested in modernizing production in that sector. Taking "agriculture as the base," a larger part of industrial capacity than before would be diverted to manufacturing capital goods for agriculture and for agriculture-related industries.

Coinciding with the economic disaster that necessitated a cutback in China's imports of technology was the withdrawal of Soviet technical assistance in 1960. Soviet advisors are said to have left China abruptly, in some cases taking the blueprints for partly finished projects with them. For the next few years, therefore, comparatively little new construction was begun in China, while the designers' task was to attempt to duplicate the missing blueprints in order to complete the projects underway. The lesson of this experience for the Chinese was to maintain "self-reliance," for the flow of technology from external sources might be cut off at any time.

"Taking agriculture as the base and industry as the leading factor" meant a change in the kind of product to be made by heavy industry: the need was no longer entirely for the modern industrial machinery and equipment specified in national economic plans (and copiable from imported models), but for machines and tools adapted to local materials, to a lower level of industrial skills and experience in the work force, that would require less investment and would offer quick recovery of investment outlay. "Self-reliance" meant that new technologies would now have to come from domestic sources, that the R&D system would have to be reoriented toward the technological needs of the present.



rather than the future. But neither the research system in the Academy of Sciences and the universities, nor the industrial research and design facilities in the ministries had been set up to respond to technological demand from agriculture and small-scale industry. Under the first Five Year Plan, the R&D establishment had been an instrument for introducing modern manufacturing technologies into the capital goods industries. Consequently, product design was relatively neglected in the now heavily bureaucratized design institutes: there were no adequate procedures for investigating the conditions under which a piece of equipment would be used or where it would be manufactured, and little or no attempt to adapt a design to local requirements. As a result, it would later be claimed, the engineers kept on cranking out designs that were too expensive or too sophisticated for local governments and rural communes to build and operate.

Furthermore, the engineer's formal responsibility for his design ended when he handed over a set of blueprints to the enterprise. If the design could not be put into operation or if there were unforeseen problems with the product or process, the enterprise apparently was left with no effective recourse to the R&D establishment. Numerous cases of poor design were documented in the Chinese press during the 1960s. It was not surprising, therefore, to find a preference on the part of enterprise managers for plant and equipment that had been copied from foreign designs or, better still, for the imported machines themselves—quite the opposite of self-reliance.

The economic crisis of the early 1960s made it more essential than ever to keep investment costs as low as possible and to improve the efficiency and productivity of existing plant and equipment rather than building new facilities equipped with advanced technologies. Here again the R&D structures established during the 1950s were not appropriate for China's needs in the 1960s. Neither the industrial design institutes nor the research institutes of the Academy of Sciences were organized to devise the relatively minor technical improvements—incremental innovations—that can make the plant and equipment already in operation more productive. (As described further on, a system for contract research negotiated between the research institute and the enterprise was being developed in the 1960s. But the institute was required to show a profit on the research it undertook apart from its state-assigned projects, and the benefit to the enterprise of such minor improvements usually would not have justified a large enough fee to be profitable for the research institute.)

Such incremental innovations were made by the technicians in a

factory or workshop, and even in the 1950s there already were widespread schemes to encourage "worker innovation." What was missing, however, was a system for "feeding back" information on such technical changes to the designers so that these improvements could be incorporated into subsequent models. Consequently, machines continued to be built and factories constructed according to the original designs, without the modifications and adaptations that had already been made on existing plant. Newly built facilities, therefore, could actually be less efficient than those already in operation. This left a margin of potential production capacity above the designed level, which the enterprise could realize by making technical improvements and "worker innovations." If such technical changes were not reported to the ministry in charge of that branch of industry, the additional capacity they created did not exist, as far as the state economic plan was concerned, and the quotas assigned to the enterprise continued to be based on the lower figures of the original design.

Whatever the problems the Chinese may have been having with their industrial technology, science flourished in the mid-1960s. It was during this period, between the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, that Chinese scientists made some of their most impressive achievements in research and high technology, including the synthesis of crystalline insulin, proposal of the "straton theory" of elementary particles, theoretical work in mathematics and geophysics, test explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs, and development of guided missiles. Work was in progress which, a few years later, would lead to such achievements as the launching and recovery of earth satellites. Progress in a number of technological fields was marked by trial-production of advanced prototypes, for example, a water-cooled turbogenerator, a 1 million ops computer, and digital-controlled machine tools. In 1964, an international symposium of scientists from developing countries was convened in Peking, followed two years later by an international physics colloquium. Enjoying the apparently unreserved support of the political leadership at that time, the scientists were relatively free from political interruption and control of their professional work. Articles signed by prominent scientists appeared regularly in the Chinese press, portraying the future in terms of scientific rationality and enhancement of "big science," which they said would lead inevitably to technological modernization.

Though many of the institutional innovations of the Great Leap were dismantled and the centralized organization of scientific facilities

largely restored in the early 1960s, the need to adapt the original system to new circumstances was recognized. While the professionalization of science and technology was reasserted, it was also accepted that R&D now had to be linked more immediately and directly with production needs. A greater portion of professional science would have to be devoted to improving the technologies currently used by industry and agriculture; only in a few strategic areas could research continue on the advanced technologies China would need in the future for a modern industrialized economy.

In short, the Chinese needed to strengthen precisely the weakest part of their science system: the structures for experimental development, engineering design, testing and trial production and feedback to the R&D establishment. This was to be accomplished by developing a network of institutionalized links among industrial enterprises, research institutes and educational institutions. The intention seems to have been to create a system of contract research to cover R&D projects that were not prescribed in the central plans, to provide industry with access to research institutes for help with problems or with new ideas that had occurred in the production process. Such arrangements would also benefit the R&D and design institutes by giving them access to production facilities for pilot studies of new techniques or products under development in their laboratories. Thus the 'three in one' concept of cooperation among a factory, a specific research unit and a school that was to be widely promoted in the Cultural Revolution actually originated in the early 1960s and not, as later claimed, during the Cultural Revolution.

A major effort to revise engineering design procedures was announced at the end of 1964. The design function was redefined to extend the designer's role into the production stages. Three-in-one teams comprised of the designer, production workers and factory managers were not only to insure that local production conditions and consumer requirements were reflected in the initial design, but also to keep the designer available for troubleshooting during the development and initial operation of the new facility. Any problems encountered in these stages could then be designed out of subsequent models. Thus consultation among the designer, manufacturer and user of a product also had already been put forward as a means of strengthening the innovation process before the Cultural Revolution began.

The 'three in one' combination was meant to be a bridge between specialized institutions to carry out essential stages of the innovation

process that fell between them. It did not change the basic features of a science system that had been set up to implement long-range goals and was intentionally "divorced from" current production. Moreover, implementation of the "three-in-one" principle was often frustrated in practice for a number of specific reasons, including the respective financial obligations incurred by the participating institutions; the possibility of conflict between meeting output quotas and diverting production facilities to experimentation; entrenched methods and procedures, codified in rules and regulations difficult to change; and social structures that inhibited communication between shopfloor workers and professional engineers.

### *The Cultural Revolution (1966-1969)*

The Cultural Revolution opened the way for the "three-in-one" combination to become more effective, chiefly by overriding or ignoring such obstacles. It did not create new institutions or new forms of organization for scientific activities (for example, the August 12, 1966, communiqué of the Party Central Committee launching the Cultural Revolution specifically exempted the scientific establishment from political interference) but, rather, changed the context in which the "three-in-one" functioned.

Like the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution was preceded by a debate over economic policy. One view held that the economy had recovered to a point where industrial construction once again could be accelerated. The other view was that priority should continue to be given to agriculture, that there was still considerable unused capacity in industry that should be mobilized before any more construction was undertaken. In this case, the fear was that a new industrial program at this time would require investment that the Chinese economy could not sustain without incurring external debt. The proponents of this view argued that existing plant and equipment could be made more productive—though not as productive as new, ultramodern technologies—and the extra surplus, or profit, that resulted could then be invested in new capital goods embodying modern, highly efficient technology. This was the prevailing view when the Cultural Revolution began in 1966.

The first problem was to inventory the existing capital stock in industrial enterprises, then to bring the enterprises' production quotas into line with their actual capacity and reallocate excess equipment, materials, and manpower. The design reform campaign served this purpose by encouraging the designers to investigate on-site conditions and, as much as possible, to include existing facilities in the blueprints

for new projects.

Another drive for worker innovations was launched for the same purpose. Unlike the Great Leap Forward, this time worker innovation did not entail rejection of science or the professional engineer and the trained technician who had a definite role on the three-in-one team. In the Cultural Revolution, worker innovation seemed to refer to any technical change not specifically assigned to the enterprise in the state plan. It might consist of completing an R&D project that had stalled or been abandoned, putting a disused piece of equipment into operation or adopting a technical change that the management had previously refused to authorize. Such worker innovation, it is important to note, was never expected to lead to technological breakthroughs but merely to the kind of technical improvements that would mobilize excess capacity and make current operations more efficient.

Even such technical improvements required more engineering skill and knowledge than production workers could be expected to acquire in the normal operation of their machines. For this reason, technical departments in many state enterprises began to be reorganized and members of the technical staff were sent down to work on the shop floor. Eventually, the need for technicians to work on immediate production problems outweighed considerations of long-term technological advance, and research scientists and high-level engineers also were sent down to factories or agricultural communes to perform the kind of routine technical activities that would otherwise be carried out by technicians with very different training and experience. These problems lay behind the struggle over science policy in the mid-1970s.

### 1977: Emergence of a New Science Policy

On September 18, 1977, the newly elected Central Committee issued a Circular on Holding a National Science Conference. Apart from announcing that such a conference would meet at an unspecified date the following spring, the science circular endorsed certain ad hoc developments that had been set in motion by the political currents of the spring and summer. The Central Committee asserted as official policy to be implemented prior to the national science conference:

We must do a good job of consolidation without delay, quickly restore scientific research institutions that were disbanded as a result of interference and sabotage by the Gang of Four, and get in order those now in disorder.<sup>5</sup>

One effect of this directive was to confirm the trend toward transferring research institutes formerly under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which had been reclassified as provincial institutes during the Cultural Revolution, back to the jurisdiction of the central academy. Thus the number of academy institutes, which had stood at some 120 ten years before, was only 37 in 1975 (and of these, half were jointly administered by the academy and local authorities); but in 1977, the number had already returned to more than 60. Another result was to clarify the status as research institutions of certain units that were "in disorder," i.e., units that had in effect become production facilities under the stricture of "linking research with production."

The science circular also directed that:

All scientific research institutions must practice the system of directors' undertaking responsibility under the leadership of the Party committees.<sup>6</sup>

With this, the scientists finally succeeded in their effort, originally seen in the academy's 1975 Outline Report, to overturn one of the major institutions associated with the Cultural Revolution, the "revolutionary committee." Variousy constituted of representatives of scientists, the Party committee, and workers, or of "young, middle-aged, and old" scientists, the revolutionary committee was intended to secure more effective representation of political views in decisions that had hitherto been left to the scientists. Such committees had become the administrative bodies of research institutes. The science circular restored this authority to the scientists by calling for restoration of the system under which institutes were headed by a director—appointed on the basis of his professional qualifications—and two deputy directors. Not long after the science circular was issued, the revolutionary committees were reportedly being phased out. By the end of 1977, seven new directors and twenty deputy directors, all of whom were qualified scientists, were appointed to head academy institutes.

Restoration of the directors' authority required complementary changes in the role of the Party committee in each institute.

It is imperative to install as Party committee secretaries those cadres who understand the Party's policies and have enthusiasm for science, to select experts or near-experts to lead professional work, and to find diligent and hardworking cadres to take charge of the support work.<sup>7</sup>

The Party secretary was thus to defer to the director on professional

and technical matters. Enjoined to respect the 'special nature' of scientific work—that is its "classlessness"—the Party committees were directed to subordinate their political functions to the institutes' primary role as scientific research units. The Party committee's main responsibility in fact was to create conditions conducive to scientific research.

The science circular specified other measures for restoring the institutes' research activities:

Measures must be taken to transfer step by step to scientific or technical work those professionals who really know the work but are now in unrelated jobs. We must see to it that those scientists and technicians who have made achievements or have great talent must be assured proper working conditions and provided with necessary assistants. Titles for technical personnel should be restored. The system to assess technical proficiency should be established and technical posts must entail specific responsibility.<sup>8</sup>

The first of these instructions was a call for sorting out the employment of trained scientific manpower. A cardinal principle in the Cultural Revolution had been that science should break out of its academic ivory tower. Research personnel therefore had been required to work in factories or communes. Where this principle had been applied systematically and relatively rationally, a common practice had been to rotate one third of the staff at a time out of an institute. Ideally, the scientists and technicians thus sent down were to apply their specialized knowledge to concrete problems they found at the production site. Upon returning to their institute they would continue to do research on these problems. In practice the intellectuals frequently had been assigned to menial jobs as a form of political reeducation, and some ended up spending long periods of time away from their research jobs, employed in labor that made no use of their special training and skills.

All research had not ground to a halt, however, and one task after these practices were officially repudiated was to bring to light work that the scientists had managed to continue during the years of adversity. The science circular affirmed that research promising to be of scientific value would be supported with the necessary resources.

Abolition of academic titles during the Cultural Revolution meant that research personnel whose careers were then just starting were still in junior posts ten years later. According to the science circular, their

qualifications were to be reassessed in view of their experience and achievements during that time, as were the credentials of still younger personnel whose education and professional training, curtailed by radical "reforms," did not equip them for research positions.

Furthermore, according to the science circular, "scientific research workers must be given no less than five-sixths of their work hours each week for professional work." At a stroke, the Central Committee thus disavowed what had been one of the radicals' fundamental beliefs, that scientific advance and technological progress would lead to "revisionism" or "restoration of capitalism" unless made by "proletarian" scientists. Political activities aimed at imparting a proletarian "world outlook" to China's "bourgeois" scientists had been taking up as much as two-thirds of their time, according to critics of the Gang of Four and their ideas. Scientific theories and research had been reviewed for the taint of "metaphysical" and "idealistic" ideas—too often, apparently, with professionally unqualified political cadres deciding what was scientifically valid and what was not, and what could be published in scientific journals and taught in the schools and universities. The circular of September 18 declared science to be the preserve of specialists whose education, not their political outlook, determined their scientific capabilities. By this line of reasoning, it was not necessary to divert them from research in order to "remold" them into intellectuals who "served the proletariat." Rather, the more pressing problem, according to the science circular, was that "the number of scientists and technicians is still not large," and it was therefore imperative to maximize the research output of existing personnel.

These measures were already being enacted in some research institutes when the Central Committee issued its circular making them official policy for all scientific institutions. Grass-roots implementation of central policy was still not automatic, however, but depended on the situation in the individual institutes: the attitude of the Party committee secretary and the political acumen of the professional staff, as well as the balance of power between radicals and supporters of the new regime in the local Party and government organizations. Through the fall of 1977 and winter of 1978, as the political balance within local Party committees swung toward the new leadership, the provisions of the science circular were enforced. Where the political situation remained unresolved, resistance to the new policy continued to block implementation of some of the circular's provisions, particularly the guarantee of five-sixths of the scientists' time for research.



### Policymaking and Planning for Scientific Development

Apart from guidelines for local action to restore scientific institutions the Central Committee's circular of September 18 also provided for resumption of science policymaking at the national level and for research planning at local and central levels.

The science circular officially reestablished the State Scientific and Technological Commission. This body had been the science policymaking organ of the State Council from 1958 until the Cultural Revolution but it apparently had been abolished sometime after 1966. As central government structures began to be rebuilt in the early 1970s a Science and Education Group seems to have briefly taken over the Commission's functions. This group later described as a focal point of Gang of Four activities disappeared and the State Planning Commission appeared to inherit whatever science and technology planning functions remained in the central government. Reestablishment of the Scientific and Technological Commission in 1977 indicated both that the scope of these functions was expanding and that scientific research and long range technological development policy had regained a status separate from (though coordinated with) economic planning. Indeed, the science circular declared that no time should be lost in mapping out programs for the development of science and technology.

A process of bottom up planning was one aspect of this undertaking:

All localities and departments should draw up plans. The State Planning Commission and the State Scientific and Technological Commission should coordinate and balance out the plans made by the various departments and localities and then work out a national program for the development of science and technology as a component part of the national economic plan.<sup>1</sup>

Local science plans would be oriented toward the short and medium term technological needs projected in economic development plans. Scientific advance and expansion of research capabilities per se virtually neglected for ten years would be planned at the national level. Centralized planning of scientific development and identification of research priorities got under way almost as soon as the Central Committee published its science circular.

In October a planning conference attended by representatives of the Academy of Sciences, institutions of higher learning, and the scientific

and technical departments of ministries and commissions under the State Council and those under provincial governments met to draft an "outline national program for developing the basic sciences." The long-term goal set in this draft plan was to reach "advanced world levels" in most of the basic scientific disciplines, identified as mathematics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, earth sciences, and biology, and to "rank among the leaders" in some branches of science by the end of the century. In effect, this plan revived China's program of theoretical research, which had been unsupported—indeed, was heavily criticized as having no economic value—since the start of the Cultural Revolution. Research in the basic sciences was now defined as "a continuous search for undiscovered natural phenomena" by experimentation, for the purpose of "understanding natural laws." To this end, the plan drafted in October specified that a "complete network" of modern laboratories "in a whole range of disciplines" should be established under the Academy of Sciences and in institutions of higher learning by 1985.

Following preparation of the "outline national program for the basic sciences," the Ministry of Education sponsored a conference in Peking to map out a similar program for applied science. Representatives of universities, colleges of science and engineering, and provincial education departments met to draft plans for the research to be carried out in institutions of higher learning. The outcome of their deliberations was a plan for the development of fourteen priority fields of applied science and technology: mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, civil engineering and architecture, water conservancy and hydraulic engineering, chemical engineering, radioelectronics, computer science, semiconductors, automation, mechanics, optics, environmental science, materials science, and engineering thermophysics. These applied sciences are to be distinguished from applied research: the plan drafted for these fourteen fields emphasized "long-term basic theoretical research" as the basis for the engineering disciplines.

This expansion of the universities' research role marked a departure from earlier patterns. Before the Cultural Revolution, most basic research had been conducted in the institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Since the Cultural Revolution, most research—especially in universities and colleges—had had to be closely related to specific practical applications. The new emphasis on university research was partly related to the training function. More important, unlike the specialized academy institutes, the university, as an institution in which work goes on in several disciplines, was seen to provide a unique

opportunity for the cross fertilization and mutual collaboration between specialists in different areas that it was claimed would lead to scientific advance and emergence of new fields of study.

As recommended in the Central Committee's science circular the plans drafted for the basic and applied sciences focused on selected points of emphasis. The strategy for scientific development adopted in these plans was to concentrate on making breakthroughs in particular fields of research which were expected to trigger advance in related areas. By making suitable overall arrangements it was anticipated that the general level of science in China would rise in the wake of the first breakthroughs at critical points. This notion also underlay the draft Outline National Plan for the Development of Science and Technology 1978-1985 which was ultimately submitted to the National Science Conference in March 1978.

#### The National Science Plan for 1978-1985

The draft plan for scientific development listed eight such comprehensive scientific and technical spheres. Concentrated effort in these areas was to promote the high speed development of science and technology as a whole and of the entire national economy, according to Minister of the Scientific and Technological Commission Fang Yi. The eight fields were agriculture, energy resources, materials, electronic computers, lasers, space science and technology, high energy physics, and genetic engineering. The draft plan covered research in a total of 27 spheres and specified 108 key projects, presumably in the eight priority areas. The draft was not published but Fang's speech to the science conference indicated some of the items that would have priority in the national research program during the next eight years.

In agriculture the goal continued to be mechanization and improvement of methods of intensive cultivation. Fang identified soil science, water control, and prevention of soil erosion and sandstorms as major research priorities. Both chemical fertilizers and biological nitrogen fixation were to be developed in order to raise agricultural productivity. Research leading to development of new seed strains and new crop varieties and continued work on pest control and prevention of plant diseases were other assignments handed to China's agricultural scientists.

Commenting on energy, Fang stated that 'Every major breakthrough in science and technology concerning energy resources has led to a

revolution in production techniques." He called for continuing China's program of exploration for oil and gas and for further development of "the theories of petroleum geology"; for "active research in basic theory, mining technology, technical equipment, and safety measures" related to mechanization of coal mining, and for research on coal gasification and liquefaction and on new uses of coal; for research on "key technical problems" involved in building large hydroelectric power stations and power grids and super-high voltage transmission lines; and for acceleration of China's research and development in atomic power and unconventional sources of energy.

Steel was given top priority in research on *materials*, with the focus on improving iron ore. According to Fang, other priorities in the metallurgical field were improvement of China's exploitation of its copper and aluminum resources, increasing production of titanium and vanadium, and improving techniques for refining certain nonferrous metals. Apart from developing specified "special purpose materials," the science plan called for "basic research on the science of materials, development of new experimental techniques and testing methods," and gradual development of a materials design capability.

Chinese scientists were already working on several of these problems, and their importance to China's economic development and technological modernization is obvious. The new science plan provided support for continuation and expansion of R&D in these areas after a decade in which basic research had been neglected.

Other parts of the science plan reflected the Chinese leadership's ambition to reach the forefronts of world science and technology. Here the object was not so much to find engineering solutions to immediate production problems as to develop scientific theory and create the research infrastructure for a modernized society and economy. Again, Chinese scientists had already scored achievements in most of these fields, but with support from the national government, this research could continue with the assurance of funds, equipment, and manpower.

*Electronic computer science and technology* were important, according to Fang Yi, because "The scientific and technical level, scope of production, and extent of application of computers has become a conspicuous hallmark of the level of modernization of a country." Computers were seen to have made a tremendous impact on research, production, and defense in the advanced industrial countries. The draft science plan therefore provided for basic research in computer science and related disciplines, applied mathematics, and work on peripheral

equipment and software during the initial three years covered by the plan. This was to lead to a comparatively advanced force in research in computer science by 1985. A fair sized modern computer industry would have developed by the same time. A first task was to solve the scientific and technical problems in the industrial production of large-scale integrated circuits and to make a breakthrough in the technology of ultra large scale ICs. Computer applications (at least in civilian industry) however would still be limited to a number of key enterprises.

Other fields were selected for special attention in the science plan because research in these areas was perceived to be advancing rapidly toward major discoveries—not just in China but throughout the world. To establish itself as a significant scientific power, China would need to be in the phalanx of this advance. If this research was not immediately relevant or applicable to economic or defense needs, it was expected to have important fall out for work in related scientific areas.

Laser science and technology said Fang Yi is one of the most active branches of science and technology which began to develop in the 1960s. Its emergence which marked a new stage in man's control and utilization of light waves has effectively promoted the development of physics, chemistry and biology. Work in laser physics, laser spectroscopy and nonlinear optics during the first three years of the science plan would lay the basis for developing new types of laser devices, new wave lengths and new means of generating laser beams. The experimental applications Fang foresaw for this research included optical communications, isotope separation and laser induced nuclear fusion.

Similarly, space science and technology, according to Fang, is bringing about tremendous changes in earth science, astronomy and other disciplines. A program of research in the basic theory of space science and development of satellite exploration, skylabs and space probes would find applications in meteorology, cartography, resource survey, environmental monitoring and communications transmission and broadcasting.

High energy physics and genetic engineering, apparently, were selected as priority areas in the new science plan because they were considered especially dynamic fields of research. At present, said Fang Yi, new discoveries are making high energy physics one of the most active frontline branches of study in the development of natural science of our time. Construction of a high energy physics research center equipped

with a proton accelerator of 30 to 50 billion electron volts was a "key project" for the coming five years; construction of a larger accelerator was planned for the following five-year period.

*Genetic engineering* was described by Fang as "fast developing and highly explorative." Having developed only in the past decade, this field had "a rather weak foundation" in China. As a tool for basic research in molecular biology, molecular genetics, and cell biology, it was to be strengthened by coordinating basic research in the relevant disciplines. Specific applications mentioned by Fang were pharmaceuticals and development of new nitrogen-fixing crops.

In focusing on specific scientific disciplines and fields, the planners did not intend that China should specialize in these areas alone. On the contrary, "in the next eight years, we must create a nationwide scientific and technological research system that covers all branches of study," Fang declared at the National Science Conference. Having identified the fields in which the planners felt China had special strength, Li Chang, a vice-president of the Academy of Sciences, predicted that China would soon reach "advanced world levels" in mathematics, theoretical physics, theoretical chemistry, and "other branches of science." The planners did not hesitate to direct that "particular attention" also be paid to "strengthening research in those disciplines where the work has been weak."

To realize the goal of "approaching or reaching advanced world levels" in the designated fields of science and technology, new research facilities were to be established and additional scientific manpower would be trained, according to Fang's report on the draft national science plan. The strategy again was to concentrate initially on building up certain key institutions. These were expected to produce the research breakthroughs and the corps of highly trained professionals that would sustain China's overall scientific and technological advance.

Accordingly, the plan for 1978-1985 provided for both "a number of up-to-date centers for scientific experiment" and a "nationwide system of scientific and technological research," in Fang's words. The "key scientific research institutions" would either be under the Academy of Sciences or in the State Council's departments and ministries or at the major universities and colleges, that is, they would be national institutions under the jurisdiction of the central government. The Academy of Sciences was to be the "comprehensive national center for research in natural science," with primary responsibility for basic research in China. It was to be the pacesetter, producing the breakthroughs that would "raise the standards" of all scientific work in

China. However, the academy's work would not be entirely theoretical. It was also directed to apply new theories in the basic branches of science to vital areas of the national economy, and it would thus be responsible for the development of the most advanced technologies in China.

A number of modernized scientific experiment bases, apparently separate from the research institutes, were also to be set up for work in high energy physics, heavy ion physics, controlled thermonuclear reaction, semiconductor science, solid state physics, molecular biology, and astrophysics under terms of the national science plan. Covering some of the eight priority spheres in the plan, these centers would facilitate interdisciplinary research as well as permit joint use of equipment in the most capital intensive fields of research by scientists from different institutions.

The imposing task of planning, managing, and coordinating research in institutions under various branches of the central government was made even more daunting by the continued existence of a research network under provincial governments. The provincial research system had been augmented during the previous decade by transferring former academy institutes to the authorities where they were located physically. The new policy reversed this trend. However, local authorities were still expected to maintain research facilities.

Agricultural research institutions at the county level were confirmed in the science plan as the nuclei of networks of agro technical experiment stations extending through rural communes, production brigades, and production teams. The plan also directed large enterprises to maintain research facilities and recommended that medium and small factories do so as well, pooling their resources where necessary.

It was not clear how these local institutions were to be coordinated with national research institutes. Institutions at an intermediate level—local branches of the Academy of Sciences and provincial science academies—were to be set up only, if it is at all possible, where they are needed, according to Fang Ya, though a number of provinces had already announced plans to reactivate their science academies.<sup>10</sup> In short, scientific advance in China would be concentrated in the key institutions at the national level.

### Manpower and Education

Eight hundred thousand was the number of professional research

workers" targeted for 1985 in the national science plan. After years of egalitarianism in education, when expertise and professionalism were ideologically suspect, the task of training a "core force of scientific workers and top-notch scientists" required revamping the entire education system and reinstating the notion of "key," or elite, universities.

The Cultural Revolution had closed the doors of institutions of higher learning. They reopened as essentially vocational institutions. Students were nominated by their work units for admission and were expected to acquire skills that would be applicable to their jobs. University faculty included "workers, peasants, and soldiers," who imparted both technical knowledge acquired on the job and the proletarian viewpoint. The radicals considered students in the key universities to be an "intellectual aristocracy," a bourgeois anomaly in China's socialist society, and had tried to bring elite institutions level with ordinary schools. They seem to have been rather successful in this, judging by the impressions of foreign visitors to Chinese universities in the mid-1970s. Once political change had led to changes in policy, the Gang of Four was castigated for having caused the "loss of an entire generation" of Chinese scientists by wrecking the higher education system in China.

By the end of 1977, the Chinese University of Science and Technology, the training arm of the Academy of Sciences, had been reconstituted, and the major universities had announced that they were resuming postgraduate education. Eighty-eight institutions were designated "key universities," to which students with the highest academic qualifications were admitted. Admission to higher education and to postgraduate research training programs was based on the results of competitive entrance examinations, held throughout China in December. Applicants' political credentials were secondary to their academic performance as criteria for admission, and the period of manual labor formerly prerequisite to university entrance was no longer required.

### Outlook for the New Science Policy

The National Science Conference set the tone for China's new science policy. How long this policy will be in effect depends on politics and on whether the leaders responsible for the new policy remain in power; on the scientists and on whether they can meet the research goals and targets for scientific development and its military posture; and on whether the new policy does, in fact, deliver the "four modernizations."



It is possible to read nuances of disagreement in the speeches of individual political leaders at the National Science Conference. However, the leaders must hang together on their policy for scientific and technological development if they are not to hang separately for, as a body, they base their claim to political legitimacy on the alleged failure of previous policies to result in such development. Their own tenure at the head of the Communist Party and the government of China may depend to a large extent on the success of the new policy for science and technology.

All indications are that the scientists welcome the new policies. Centralized planning and government control of research are not alien to Chinese scientists and are not regarded as in principle curtailing academic freedom. On the contrary, the stability provided by a national plan for science and the assurance of support for research that is included in the plan are associated with periods of rapid scientific development in China. Thus it is emphasized that the main tasks in the first plan for scientific and technological development covering 1956-1967 were completed five years ahead of schedule—evidence of the beneficial effects of planning rather than a reflection of inadequate planning methodologies. A second plan came into effect in 1963, its targets revised to reflect the loss of Soviet scientific and technical assistance in 1960. After 1960, there seems to have been no overall science plan in effect, except for a number of strategic or priority areas.

Scientists had a major role in drawing up the first plan (in consultation with the Soviet Academy of Sciences) and they seem to have had an equally important part in preparing the plan for 1978-1985. Not only did they participate directly in planning, but the strategy of scientific and technological development being implemented in the plan would have required the government planners to defer to the professionals' opinions on which were the most promising fields of research and what goals were within their capability to reach by 1985.

The Chinese scientists' concern to restore basic research and improve the training of the brightest students is understandable in view of what happened during the Cultural Revolution and that at the instigation of the political and ideological radicals. Equally understandable is the current concern of China's political leaders to modernize the country's economy and its military forces after ten years of technological stagnation. Against the background of recent experience, it is not surprising to find that concern for the links between research and production is almost entirely absent from public discussion in China of

the new science policies and plans. But if anything is to be learned from China's earlier experience, it is that these links cannot be neglected. The science policy decisions made in 1977 and 1978 in what was still a highly charged political atmosphere will affect the development of science and technology in China, and it is not yet clear whether the outcome will be to restore the old system, accepting its costs as well as its benefits, or to tackle its shortcomings in new ways.

### Notes

1. Fang Yi, report on science and education to the seventh session of the Standing Committee, Fourth National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, December 27, 1977. New China News Agency (NCNA) summary in English, Peking broadcast, December 29, 1977; text in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), December 30, 1977, pp. E3-11 (this quote from page E4). The "four modernizations" are also sometimes referred to as agriculture, industry, and national defense science and technology.

2. Originally published in *People's Literature*, no. 9 (1977); republished in *People's Daily*, September 21, 1977.

3. Some sectors of the industrial system in China seem to have been much more innovative than others. See Hans Heymann, *China's Approach to Technology Acquisition* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1975).

4. Although the P.R.C. is now in its fifth plan period, only the First Five-Year Plan has been published. Various preliminary outlines and discussions of the Second Five-Year Plan were made public.

5. Text of the Central Committee's Science Circular is translated in *Peking Review*, no. 40 (September 30, 1977), pp. 6-11 (this quote p. 9).

6. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

10. Fang Yi, report to the National Science Conference, March 18, 1978. NCNA abridgement in English, Peking broadcast, March 28, 1978; in FBIS, March 29, 1978, pp. E1-22 (this quote p. E15).

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## 8

# Social Affairs

*Richard Curt Kraus*

Both Chinese and Western analysts agree that tensions within the structure of pre-Liberation Chinese society contributed to the victory of the Communist Party in 1949, although there is sharp debate about the relative importance of such contradictions vis à vis other factors. Few, however, would dispute the assertion that tensions generated by the basic cleavages that divide the Chinese people provided at least the context, and perhaps the fuel, for the revolutionary struggle that led to the establishment of the People's Republic.

This chapter will review several of these contradictions a generation after Liberation in order to assess their role in helping China's leaders to achieve their stated goal of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Seven contradictions will be considered here, by no means an exhaustive list: city and countryside, rich and poor, leaders and followers, Han and minority nationalities, male and female, old and young, and Chinese and foreign. To view Chinese society as a complex set of opposite tendencies is to emphasize the structural dimensions shared by China with other societies. To examine the ways in which these contradictions have been resolved is to draw attention to features that are more distinctly Chinese.

One of the most characteristic aspects of contemporary China is the attention paid to social tensions as forces that both propel and impede social change. The notion that the revolution should somehow have put an end to such tensions is repudiated in Peking as Soviet style revisionism.

Any kind of world and of course class society in particular, trembles with contradictions. Some say that there are contradictions to be "found" in socialist society, but I think this is a wrong way of putting it. The point is

not that there are contradictions to be found, but that it teems with contradictions (Mao, 1977, p. 516)

In accordance with Mao's assertion that socialist China "teems with contradictions," the Communist Party has assigned high priority to investigating and analyzing these tensions so as to fashion efficient policies for the revolutionary transformation of society. The purpose of this chapter is not to replicate these analyses (for which interested readers should consult the English-language weekly, *Peking Review*), but to examine some of the constraints that these contradictory relationships have placed upon the capacity of China's leaders to direct social change.

### City and Countryside

The conventional wisdom about rural-urban relations in Third World nations is that millions of peasants migrate to squalid new shantytowns in a rapid and uncontrollable process of urbanization. That this phenomenon is highly visible in so much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America makes its absence in China particularly noteworthy. Although precise statistics are not available, the ratio of rural residents to city-dwellers in China is approximately eight to two. This is the same ratio that existed in 1949, despite an intervening three decades of intense economic construction.

The contradiction between city and countryside involves more than population balance. Industrialization also typically engenders a growing material and cultural gap between urban and rural areas; Marx's observation of this process in nineteenth-century Europe underlay his insistence that a Communist society would break down the urban-rural distinction. The Chinese have certainly not accomplished this, although they retain Marx's goal and have implemented some unorthodox measures in its pursuit. Although urban residents enjoy higher incomes, more sophisticated culture, and more elaborate social services than do rural Chinese, the political cultivation of rural interests has apparently prevented these gaps from increasing as they have in most Third World societies.

There has been a concentrated effort, especially since the middle 1960s, to improve the conditions of rural life. Special attention has been paid to the expansion of primary and secondary education in the countryside (Seybolt 1973), and to the introduction of new facilities and

programs for health care (Sidel 1973). In the latter case choices have been made to create more rural clinics (instead of urban medical centers) to train more paramedical personnel (barefoot doctors instead of highly educated M.D.s) and to emphasize public health (preventive medicine instead of the treatment of comparatively exotic diseases). Nonetheless urban services remain superior although phenomena like the shortage of new investment in housing are indicative of the limits to the urban advantage.

More striking perhaps are measures to control the flow of population between city and countryside. The migration of peasants into urban areas had been regulated by the early 1960s primarily through the strict use of ration cards for a few necessities (grain cotton cooking oil). Within a few years a massive program was instituted to resettle new graduates of urban high schools in agricultural areas (Bernstein 1977). Millions of persons have now been relocated in this down to the villages policy often in distant provinces but more commonly near their cities of origin. As a consequence of these policies the urban population depleted of many of its most fertile members has become stable and a potential crisis of urban unemployment has been defused.

A second significant consequence of these policies has been to introduce into many of China's villages a group of sophisticated and ambitious young people who may add a new force for the transformation of the countryside. To be sure the skills of these young urbanites are cultural rather than agricultural and many of them have great difficulty in adapting to strenuous peasant labor. There is little doubt that the program is unpopular with many of its participants who often find themselves poorly integrated into village life. But China's leaders continue to support this program both because of demographic pressure in the cities and in the hope that dissatisfaction will inspire the young people to work to improve the quality of rural life. Another benefit is that most older urban residents now have relatives or friends in the countryside and thus may identify more strongly than before with rural problems.

Yet another important aspect of rural-urban relations is the emphasis upon the construction of rural industries (Sigurdson 1977). Small in scale these factories usually either manufacture products for agricultural use (machinery cement energy) or they turn agricultural produce into finished commodities (fruit preserves vegetable oil flour). They take advantage of the seasonality of the rural work force often ceasing production during busy harvest periods. Although rural industrializa-

tion is viewed by China's leaders as an important step in narrowing the gap between city and village, it does not mean the end of state investment in large-scale urban industrial enterprises. In fact, many of the rural industries are constructed with minimal reliance upon state aid.

Self-reliance has been a key concept in China's rural strategy. Since 1964 the entire nation has been urged to study and emulate the experience of one model unit, the Tachai production brigade of Shansi. Tachai was an area of notorious poverty prior to Liberation, and although it remains poorly endowed in resources, the rise in its standard of living has been noteworthy. Tachai's success has been credited to the decentralization that accompanies self-reliance. Through disciplined political organization and determination, the peasants of Tachai were able to tap their meager resources and abundant enthusiasm to reconstruct their community, often moving whole hills to create new terraced fields. Tachai's former Party secretary, Ch'en Yung-kuei, has become a deputy prime minister, and thousands of visitors from the entire nation pass through the village in order to study its methods.

Similar celebrity is accorded China's national model industrial unit, the Tach'ing oil field and petrochemical complex in Manchuria. Again, an important aspect of the model is self-reliance, here manifest most vividly in the unit's near self-sufficiency in food production. The vast territory of an oil field makes this more practicable than it would be in an urban industrial setting, of course, but perhaps subtly underscores the primacy of agriculture over industry in China's economic priorities.

The decentralization of self-reliance bears an additional advantage beyond the mobilization of local resources; China's national transportation system is still relatively weak, and decentralized production reduces the burdens placed upon it.

The present rural bias in Chinese social policy has its immediate origins in the Great Leap Forward of 1958. Much maligned in the West as an utter failure, the significance of this campaign was not that it achieved its goals (which it did not), but that it marked the rejection of the Soviet model for industrialization, which had prevailed since Liberation; Soviet practice centered upon the creation of large, capital-intensive industries in urban areas, whence benefits were to trickle down eventually to the countryside. Mao and his associates in the Communist Party argued that the Soviet approach was inappropriate for Chinese conditions. They regarded it as excessively centralized (thus stifling local initiative and participation) and charged that it took resources for which there was more immediate need in agriculture. They may also

have found it galling to rely upon a small army of Soviet technical experts in shaping China's future. The policies pursued since the middle of the 1960s while certainly less flamboyant than the Great Leap Forward's heaven storming attempt to transform China overnight have more effectively pursued its themes. The Chinese leadership recognizes the centrality of agriculture to the entire economy with the corollary that industry must be designed to serve agricultural needs. They also realize that China's shortage of capital is balanced by an abundance of labor which can be mobilized to increase production through a combination of political appeals and decentralized yet disciplined organization.

The roots of these policies toward city and countryside must also be traced to the character of the Chinese revolution. In the 1920s the young intellectuals who led the Communist Party looked to the small urban proletariat as the *main force for the struggle against capitalists, landlords, and imperialists*. But this urban strategy was quickly defeated and the Party spent the years between 1927 and 1949 among the peasantry first in *Kiangsi* and then in North China where thousands of new cadres of peasant origin were recruited. The cities that they entered at Liberation seemed like foreign territory to many of the cadres, as distinguished by foreign and capitalist influence as by proletarian purity. A certain ambiguity toward urban China has pervaded the attitudes of the revolutionary generation of Communist leaders, thus encouraging a willingness to experiment in radical ways with the conventional relationship between city and countryside.

### Rich and Poor

Rich and poor may not be the best terms by which to characterize the relationship between privileged and disadvantaged economic groups in contemporary China. Although China is certainly a poor country, the extremes of wealth and poverty of the pre-Liberation era have been vastly reduced.

Restrictions upon individual wealth have been straightforward. Liberation was accompanied by a movement for land reform, a sometimes violent process that heightened consciousness of rural class relationships while it destroyed old wealth by confiscating and redistributing the property of landlords and rich peasants (Hinton 1968). The collectivization of agriculture in 1955-1956 assured that new fortunes could not be fashioned from the accumulation of land. Private



property in the countryside has since been limited to such items as houses (for use, not speculation), trees, and small tools. Private capital in urban areas was severely limited with the socialization of most industry in 1956. Although individual capitalists were issued stock that continued to bear interest in the next decade, the autonomy of capitalist wealth was destroyed.

Restrictions upon poverty have been less direct, although they have been closely associated with the assault upon private property. The limitation of landlord and capitalist power removed a major impediment to the implementation of social reforms designed to broaden access to education and health care facilities. A gradual decrease in the cost of many consumer items along with a general avoidance of inflation in the economy have served the interests of the poor, as have the abolition of widespread prostitution, drug addiction, and gambling. An emphasis upon collective, rather than merely individual incentives in agriculture has helped the rural poor.

Although the tendency toward egalitarianism in the People's Republic is quite distinct in policies concerning private wealth and social welfare, it is less evident in the realm of personal income. Surprisingly large income differentials are justified on the grounds that unequal work should be rewarded by unequal pay. Thus a contradiction of interests between economically privileged and disadvantaged groups persists in China, albeit primarily within the narrow context of personal income.

Precise information about incomes is unavailable, but the general pattern of distribution is known (Whyte 1975). The highest incomes go to senior officials; the top hundred bureaucrats earn 400 jen-min-pi (\$210) per month. Another few thousand officials earn 300 jen-min-pi, which is much greater than the 60 jen-min-pi that go to a typical industrial worker (Hoffman 1977). A 1977 wage increase for the lowest paid workers may diminish this gap, but possibly at the expense of adding to the approximately two-to-one ratio between all urban incomes and those received by peasants.

The Chinese bureaucracy is an elaborate civil service system, with formal salary steps (Barnett 1967). The system of salary grades was introduced in 1956, at the height of Soviet influence, and the great distance that separates Party and state leaders from petty officials has been a source of friction. Minor reforms have lowered the highest salaries, but no one has seriously attempted to replace this system with a more egalitarian one.

Industrial workers in state enterprises are also ranked according to a formal wage scale although it has fewer gradations and smaller income differentials than the scale for bureaucrats. Somewhat higher wages exist for industrial technicians and engineers although the cleavage that separates them from ordinary workers is not nearly so great as the internal rift that divides the workers into two categories: temporary and permanent. The tasks performed by temporary workers whose transitory status is often only nominal are similar to those of the permanent work force. Although the wages of temporary workers are comparable they are not included in the system of welfare benefits (including pensions, sick leave and health insurance) that protects their permanent co-workers (White 1976). The differential treatment accorded these two categories of workers has inspired political unrest especially during the Cultural Revolution of 1965-1969. The explosive nature of the issue is contained perhaps by the fact that the living standard of temporary workers is generally quite superior to that of the peasants in the villages from which most of them have been drawn.

Peasant incomes are somewhat less formally stratified than those of urban cadres and workers. The income of peasant families combines a share of their production unit's collective harvest with private earnings from small gardens allocated to each family and from subsidiary economic activities like the raising of pigs and the weaving of baskets (Parish 1975). Incomes vary according to such factors as strength and agricultural skills which result in more work points and a larger share of the community harvest. But also crucial is the ratio of able-bodied workers to nonworking dependents. A family with too many small children or with aged parents or in which the father or mother has been disabled is not apt to be able to afford such rural status symbols as bicycles, transistor radios, watches and sewing machines.

Despite these bases for income differentiation there is greater economic homogeneity within peasant communities than before Liberation. Rural policies of self-reliance however have the side effect of permitting increasing distinctions among production units: places with resources that can easily be mobilized have a clear advantage. Villages in areas that are richly endowed with water for instance can attain higher productivity through irrigation than can mountainous communities. And villages near major cities enjoy easy access to lucrative markets for their produce often providing a standard of living comparable to that of urban workers.

Economic differences between such groups as officials, workers, and

Chinese factories while in the countryside peasants regularly elect their basic level leadership.

A second approach to the tension between leaders and followers requires managers to experience the conditions under which their subordinates work. Its general manifestation is the extended firm and investigation of local conditions by high level cadres known as equating at point. More rigorous is the system of May Seventh Cadre schools — farms established a decade ago by various bureaucratic units to which their personnel are sent regularly to experience physical labor (Chen 1978). These and other measures are intended to encourage humility toward the masses and to break down rigidly bureaucratic ways of solving practical problems. Rural cadres have been urged in recent years to adopt the model of Li Rui, while from one hundred to three hundred days of physical labor (varying according to position) are required annually.

A third way of limiting bureaucratic abuses is to encourage criticism of its more serious manifestations. This can include the often mild reputation of mutual criticism and self-criticism that has been formalized within Chinese organizations (Wylie 1973). Such criticism also incorporates the more ambitious process of open door criticism by which the shortcomings of Party members are discussed by non-Party citizens. Although many officials seek to limit this practice (they find it preferable to the most extreme institution for limiting their authority),

Although it has been invoked only once in the history of the People's Republic the Cultural Revolution of 1969-1968 was the most radical assault to date upon bureaucratic privilege and inertia. By mobilizing a coalition of students, activists, workers, and junior officials, Mao Tse Tung, and his allies in the Party leadership were able to remove large numbers of conservative officials from office including the head of state, Liu Shao-chi. Although the Cultural Revolution was more complex than a mere bureaucratic reform, it did unleash a series of anti-bureaucratic policies. Many officials regard the Cultural Revolution as a period of harmful social disruption, an analysis that is increasingly common since the death of Mao Tse Tung in 1976. Although no leader in China has publicly rejected the legitimacy of the Cultural Revolution, none, however, any threat to revive this movement is not apt to be warmly received by most senior officials.

More pitiable to these leaders is the fourth approach to the contradiction between the powerful and the weak programs to

dominant group of Han Chinese constitute 91 percent of the population. The remaining 6 percent are divided among at least fifty-four separate nationalities. There is enormous diversity among these minority nationalities which range in size from the nearly 8 million Chuang of Kwangsi to the 600 Holo of Heilungkiang and vary in cultural sophistication from the large Korean minority in Korea to the primitive Wa of Yunnan who until recently believed that their crops would not grow unless fertilized each year with a fresh Han head. (Dreyer 1976 p. 131)


For all of their mutual differences, three characteristics tend to place the minorities in opposition to the Han majority. First is the fact that this 6 percent of the population occupies between 50 and 60 percent of China's territory with a much lower population density than the intensively settled Han regions. Although many minority areas are ruggedly mountainous (Tibet, Tsinghai) or desert (Sinkiang), other regions (Mongolia, Manchuria, and the southwestern provinces) are capable of sustaining large numbers of Han immigrants. In addition, these areas are often rich in natural resources, most of which have yet to be exploited.

Minority nationalities are also spread along China's borders. Indeed, none of the country's borders was heavily populated by Han Chinese prior to this century. This gives China's leaders a great strategic interest in the territories occupied by the minorities; concern for their loyalty is enhanced by the fact that several of these peoples are distributed on both sides of the borders with Burma, Outer Mongolia, and the Soviet Union.

Finally, memories of past relationships between Han and minorities are often tinged with bitterness. Manchus and Mongols have both conquered and ruled China in past dynasties, and Han contact with Tibetans and Muslims (Hui) has often been on the battlefield. Similarly, many of the more primitive groups of southwest China are mindful of the long process by which Han settlers have occupied rich agricultural land, forcing minority peoples to retreat to mountainous areas.

In past dynasties, the Han viewed minority nationalities as barbarians, to be controlled through a combination of conquest and assimilation. Cultural arrogance pervaded imperial Chinese policies, although it did not aim at the physical destruction of minority peoples, which has been common in the West. One's status as a Han was essentially a matter of self-identification. Those barbarians who would acknowledge the brilliance of Han culture and would adopt Han ways could eventually gain acceptance into the majority. Although this policy forced the repudiation of minority cultures, it provided a source

Map 10 China's Minority Nationalities



**CHINA'S  
MINORITY NATIONALITIES**

International boundary  
 Boundary of province or autonomous region  
 Boundary of autonomous district

0 100 Miles  
 0 200 Kilometers

Source: Adapted for *Problems of Communism* by the Department of Geography, University of Texas at Austin, from a map in *China: Reconstructions* (London, November 1971), p. 22.

of continuous regeneration for an expanding Han society

China's present leaders have endeavored to deal with the traditional sources of tension between Han and minority nationalities by encouraging new attitudes by the Han majority. Because the contemptuous perception of the minorities as uncivilized wards of a greater Han culture is so deeply rooted, there has been a prolonged attack upon Han chauvinism. While this has not meant that minority interests typically prevail when they are in conflict with Han policies, it has assured that the minorities are at least treated seriously. Many reforms have been symbolic, like the restoration of the original Uighur name for Sinkiang's capital of Urumchi in place of an earlier Han designation. New concern has been shown for the dietary habits of the large Muslim minority in Ningxia and Kansu, and occasions of national celebration are now regularly marked by the colorful costumes and music of the national minorities.

Accompanying these efforts to establish at least a formal equality among nationalities have been reforms in the autonomy enjoyed by the minorities to protect their language and culture. Five of China's provincial level units—Kwangsi, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Ningxia—are known as autonomous regions, and smaller units have been established within predominantly Han provinces to recognize the special characteristics of local minorities. The Communist Party certainly does not regard such autonomy as license to resist centrally determined policies, but it does serve as a mechanism by which local languages can be used in education and in the public media, and it is also a vehicle for the cultivation of minority officials and Communist Party members. At the same time, however, anti-Han chauvinism by minorities resentful of Han domination is vigorously criticized.

Despite policies of equal treatment for all ethnic groups, the long term resolution of this contradiction seems to lie in assimilation. Extremely limited data make it difficult to assess the pace of this process, which has certainly varied among nationalities. The Mongols face strong pressures for assimilation because of the large scale migration of Han Chinese into Inner Mongolia, where the majority of the population is now Han. The Tibetans, however, have offered military resistance to the People's Liberation Army, and are poorly represented in Chinese society at large, a function of Tibet's geographical isolation and of its independent cultural tradition. Another extreme is represented by Kwangsi's Churng population, which has long been smothered in culture

and language; one Chuang, Wei Kuo-ch'ing, enjoys the distinction of serving as Communist Party secretary for the predominantly Han province of Kwangtung. Indeed, at the very top of China's political system, two minority leaders serve as members or alternate members of the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee: Wei Kuo-ch'ing and Ulanfu (a Mongol). (A third, Saifudin, a Uighur, was recently removed from the leadership positions he had held for many years.) There are only twenty-six leaders at this high level, so minorities have been represented twice as strongly as their proportion of the national population should warrant. This does not, however, compensate for underrepresentation at middle and lower levels of authority in the political system.

The question of assimilation should perhaps be placed in a broader context. While population movements and the expansion of national communications and transportation facilities do increase pressure for the sinification of minority nationalities, these same trends strengthen the homogeneity of the Han majority as well. In the past, for instance, Han unity has rested upon a common written language, as the various dialects of the Chinese language are often mutually unintelligible. Vastly increased literacy since Liberation has incorporated many peasant villages more tightly into a national community, and the spread of Mandarin among younger Han Chinese of all native dialects has had a similar effect.

The relationship between Han and other nationalities is also heavily influenced by policies toward some of the other contradictions in Chinese society. One approach to the recruitment of minority cadres, for instance, has been to select persons who have been socially prominent in the past within their ethnic communities. When national policies toward class demand that leading roles be played by the lower strata, however, the authority of minority cadres from upper class backgrounds is undermined (Chang 1966). Similarly, when national policy supports decentralization most strongly, Han-minority friction is apt to be minimized by the encouragement of self-reliance for minority communities, while trends toward the reaffirmation of central power are likely to enlarge the scope of contact (and conflict) among ethnic groups.

### Male and Female

China is a society in which millions of persons bear vivid memories

(and frequently scars) of bound feet female infanticide concubinage prostitution and widespread female illiteracy. There is no doubt that enormous progress has been made since Liberation in redressing the past imbalance between the sexes in Chinese society. The 1950 Marriage Law which for the first time established the legal rights of women to property ownership divorce and free choice in marriage was especially significant in weakening some of the ancient institutional bases of male supremacy (Mayer 1971).

While changes in the position of women may be among the most radical innovations of the Chinese revolution it is apparent that the pace of feminist advance has slowed since Liberation. One index of this is the extent of female representation at the upper levels of the Communist Party (Shen dan 1976). At present *Chen Mu hua* is the only woman among the twenty six full and alternate members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau. And the Ninth (1969) Tenth (1973) and Eleventh (1977) Central Committees had only 8.2 percent 12.9 percent and 18.8 percent female participation respectively among full and alternate members. To be sure these rates of participation compare favorably to the 3.6 percent female membership in the 1975 US Congress or with the absence of women from the top leadership of the largest American corporations. Yet the efforts of the Chinese women's movement to deal with the contradiction between the sexes have not achieved equity.

Early successes in limiting the oppression of women were enhanced by a broad base of support for measures to undermine the traditional lineage system of rural China. Prior to Liberation rural Chinese society was structured in large measure by powerful kinship groupings organized around descent from a common male ancestor and maintained by filial attitudes and economic influences. Female activists demanded the Marriage Law of 1950 because it would extend dramatically the legal independence of Chinese women. Many male Party members sought this reform as a mechanism for weakening the social control exercised by leaders of large and powerful clans. Strong lineages tended to dampen class consciousness in the countryside by emphasizing the formal kinship bonds between poor peasants and landlords. The Marriage Law complemented land reform by attacking an important basis of the rural class system. But after this reform the majority of male cadres accorded a lower priority to feminist goals than to other tasks faced by the new government. Breaking the legal bonds of female subservience was an easier task than smashing the social bonds that



accompanied them (Davin 1976).

Changes in social structure, no matter how radical, cannot transform old attitudes overnight. The Confucian heritage of male domination has been deeply etched into the consciousness of Chinese of both sexes. Thus, even after legal reforms had been introduced, many men were unenthusiastic about helping women find employment outside the home, which could safeguard female independence. Although there was considerable regional variation in female participation in nondomestic labor, in most areas it was unusual for rural women to work in the fields. Although this had changed decisively within a decade of Liberation, urban women, who had a stronger tradition of nonhome employment, found that they could still be displaced from their jobs when male unemployment rose.

None of this is intended to imply that the politics of sex and of class are necessarily at odds. Indeed, as Chinese women have in the past been ill-served by the distribution of social benefits, attacks upon inequality of all sorts are likely to be especially helpful to women (Andors 1976). Reforms in rural education and health care, for instance, have probably had a greater impact upon the lives of women than of men, who formerly received disproportionate shares of what limited services were available. But the continuing role of the family as a production unit in the countryside (Parish 1975; Salaff 1972) may be an obstacle to linking class and feminist interests more tightly. For within the rural family, women still defer to men in the making of decisions, and continuous administrative pressures for increased production tend to reinforce the family's solidarity. An additional impediment to change is the lack of adequate pension schemes for rural Chinese; China is too poor to establish a national social security system, which means that families continue to provide old-age support as they have for centuries. This is of course an inducement for rural women to bear large numbers of children, which tends further to hamper their independent economic role.

The participation of women in rural leadership positions has been harmed by a strong tradition of females moving away from their native villages when they marry. Local Party leaders are often unwilling to recommend promising young women for educational opportunities or for Party membership because this investment will be lost when the women marry and move away. A trend toward more frequent intravillage marriage may reduce this problem, but the Party has been unwilling to support a deeper change by encouraging new husbands to

take up residence in the villages of their wives

Policies of self-reliance by rural communities may inadvertently discourage faster progress in sexual equality. Although it is clear that central leaders have a firm commitment to this goal, local adherence to this public ideology often slackens in the absence of a strong hand at the center to force compliance. A perennial problem for instance has been the undervaluation of work points earned by women performing the same tasks as men.

Central authorities attempt to counter the lack of enthusiasm for equal treatment by local male cadres through the propagation of model women workers in the national media. Although the constant exposure of men to women in roles traditionally occupied by males is no doubt helpful, there are few contrary examples of men in roles associated with women, like child care or cooking. The Party has attempted to deal with these two particular issues by encouraging the creation of public facilities located outside the home. Urban day-care facilities have been successful in allowing mothers of young children to participate in production. But in analogous plan to create public dining halls in rural areas enthusiastically advocated by Mao was never popular. The public canteens that were established in 1958 were soon abandoned amid complaints that home cooking was more enjoyable. Mao never went a step further to suggest that men might share the heavy burden of preparing meals (rural China lacks not only frozen foods but running water).

### Old and Young

The association of youth with revolution and of age with conservatism is common enough in even highly stable societies that the prominence of these couplings in revolutionary China should not be surprising. While revolution cannot be reduced to generational conflict, the struggle of children against parents has been significantly interwoven with the broad pattern of social change in China at least since the May Fourth Movement of 1919, which began as a protest against Versailles Treaty provisions regarding Chinese territory. Then young radicals berated their elders for insisting upon such Confucian values as filiality and the veneration of authority. Half a century later young radicals again attacked filiality and the veneration of authority in the Cultural Revolution and in the ensuing campaign against the doctrines of Confucius. The social context had changed, but the issues

and even the terminology were remarkably similar. This should remind us that the contradiction of old and young insistently recreates itself with each generation. That the older generation of Chinese is today dominated by former young revolutionaries adds special interest to the policies they have selected for the resolution of this contradiction.

Central to this relationship have been the methods advocated by the older generation to socialize the young (Kessen 1975; Raddock 1977). The desire to bequeath radical values to a generation of "revolutionary successors" has conflicted with the need to prepare young people for roles as productive citizens in a well-ordered society. The choice is not starkly put between either teaching the young to make revolution or training them in the skills necessary for operating an increasingly complex society. In fact, China's leaders share a consensus that the young should be both "red and expert": politically conscious, yet technically competent. Controversy has arisen over the proper mix of redness and expertise.

This controversy has been felt in the institutions through which China's young people are socialized. One set of political organizations, including the Communist Youth League and the Young Pioneers, has attempted to teach youth to cherish the values of the revolution. Educational institutions have repeated this task but have also emphasized career training. In many cases, the two missions have been compatible, as in the common practice of incorporating physical labor into the school curriculum. But some leaders, led until his death by Mao Tse-tung, have feared that the disciplined atmosphere of these institutions has encouraged an attitude of "studying in order to become an official." Fearing the conservative impact of China's formal institutions for the socialization of youth, Maoists in the Cultural Revolution supported the closing of universities and high schools, and freeing young people to learn revolution by the personal experience of political struggle as Red Guards against conservative officials.

The enthusiastic response of many young people to this Maoist appeal was colored by demographic and occupational concerns as well as by feelings of political conviction. Although the Chinese economy had grown considerably between Liberation and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the number of new jobs created could not easily keep pace with a growing population of young people. The establishment of domestic peace after Liberation had encouraged a baby boom, whose products were anxious about their futures in the Cultural Revolution period. Similarly, junior officials found their career

ambitions frustrated by the longevity of the founding generation of Communist leaders. The revolutionaries who had established the People's Republic in 1949 still dominated its bureaucratic positions almost two decades later. Both students and younger officials had very personal reasons then to support a massive shake up of China's administration.

Young people of worker and peasant origin were especially concerned that children of officials enjoyed definite advantages in the contest for desirable positions. These anxieties were perhaps allayed somewhat by the abolition in the Cultural Revolution of special preparatory schools that had catered to children of leading bureaucrats. The introduction of the requirement for two years of physical labor prior to university admission was similarly intended to equalize opportunity for advanced training and desirable jobs. The down to the villages program was also a response to severe competition for jobs, in addition to its function as a system for steeling the younger generation under the guidance of the peasantry.

Many of these reforms have been resisted. A major scandal of 1974 for instance concerned a leading military official in Fukien Province who used his influence to circumvent the new procedures for university admission to get his son in through the back door. Since the death of Mao in 1976 several of the more radical innovations in education have been restricted. An even clearer change has taken place in the idealized relationship between the generations that is now propagated in the national media. The radical leaders now under attack are accused of arguing that China's officials become more conservative with age. While this was certainly an impolitic analysis it is not an unreasonable one for any society. The rebellion of youth is always sustained by its relative rootlessness which bestows upon young people a degree of flexibility often denied their elders in treating the status quo. The restriction of private property in socialist China may have increased this potential for youthful rebellion by severing a crucial link—the inheritance system—by which older generations have often imposed their values upon the young. Against the generational conflict of the past decade a new order is now being advocated. Instead of campaigns to resist authority by daring to go against the tide readers of the Chinese press now fear of efforts to restore classroom discipline and the authority of teachers and of the need to respect the elder generation of veteran revolutionaries. There is some irony that this change in official attitudes toward intergenerational relations was made

possible only by the death of the revolutionary octogenarian, Mao Tse-tung.

### Chinese and Foreign

Chinese leaders have regarded the pursuit of greater domestic social equality as intimately bound up with a struggle against foreign domination. The militant nationalism of the Chinese revolution is in large measure the heritage of a century in which imperialist powers plundered China's resources and killed its people. Japan, Britain, Germany, France, and Russia all seized Chinese territory, either placing it directly under colonial administration or establishing exclusive zones of commercial exploitation. Chinese resistance was easily suppressed through the technical superiority of Western and Japanese arms and organization. Some scholars argue that the Chinese revolution owes its success primarily to popular support for the Communist struggle against the Japanese invasion of the 1930s. Communist leaders, however, regarded imperialism as a doubly menacing force: imperialist exploitation buttressed the more reactionary elements of China's social structure, thereby intensifying the revolutionary struggle.

When Mao proclaimed in 1949 that "the Chinese people have stood up," he revealed the pride of the successful revolutionaries at limiting foreign influence in Chinese affairs. But while Western missionaries, soldiers, and businessmen were soon sent home, and capitalist methods of social organization were quickly discredited, Soviet influence rose rapidly. This was partially a reaction to the embargo on trade with China led by the United States, but it also reflected the new government's desire to learn from its "elder brother in socialism."

Although the elder brother had not been particularly supportive of the Chinese Communist Party during its long struggle for power, and although it demanded an old tsarist naval base in Manchuria and mineral rights in Sinkiang, China's industrialization effort in the early 1950s proceeded under the tutelage of thousands of Soviet experts. But Chinese leaders soon concluded that the Soviet model was excessively centralized and too urban in its orientation to meet China's needs. When an indigenous strategy for industrialization was implemented in the Great Leap Forward, Soviet outrage over this and other Chinese "heresies" in the realm of foreign policy was so great that all technical and economic assistance was suddenly withdrawn in 1960. Even blueprints for unfinished industrial plants were taken back to the Soviet

Union leaving bitter feelings among the Chinese and a new sense of double isolation from both the capitalist powers and from a Soviet bloc accused of revisionism.

China now has diplomatic and trade relations with the vast majority of the world's nations but its painful past experience has encouraged policies designed to minimize dependence upon external powers. This has not meant a rejection of all sophisticated technology of foreign origin. Rather it indicates a restoration of Ch'ing dynasty efforts to find a formula by which foreign things can be borrowed selectively to serve China (Oksenberg and Goldstein 1971). This has often resulted in dichotomous policies simultaneously attempting to equal international standards in advanced technology and to cultivate native Chinese traditions and skills. In military affairs for example, extensive resources were assembled for an independent research program to construct atomic weapons, thereby attaining high world standards in military deterrence. At the same time however, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) based much of its program upon the glorification of the simple traditions of guerrilla struggle, emphasizing an infantry-oriented military force with high political consciousness and low investment in expensive and sophisticated technology. Even the current campaign for military modernization seems unlikely to forsake the effort to combine foreign and advanced elements with native and simple ones.

Health care programs offer another example of the policy of national self-reliance (Horn 1969). Two schools of medicine coexisted in China prior to Liberation. Western medicine, introduced by medical missionaries and foreign foundations, gained adherents in areas under greatest foreign influence. As Western medicine became more popular it increasingly competed with Chinese medicine, a miscellany of ancient practices including acupuncture and herbal remedies which emphasized holistic treatment of the body rather than surgical intervention to cure diseased parts. Since Liberation there have been efforts to fashion an amalgam of the two schools, often against the resistance of the higher status Western style physicians. This policy was dictated in part by nationalistic pride in China's indigenous medicine but also by the need to rigidly expand the provision of health care to China's peasant majority. The creation of Western style hospitals throughout the countryside was impractical because of China's poverty whereas each village already contained a certain level of expertise in traditional medical practices. Institutional reforms forced the cooperation of the two schools by simultaneously sending Western physicians to

rural areas and sponsoring new paramedical roles (the "barefoot doctors"). Medical research has similarly attempted to integrate the two schools. While China has shown great pride in the synthesis of insulin, an accomplishment that received much attention from foreign medical researchers, significant effort has also been devoted to discovering new uses for traditional techniques, like the use of acupuncture in anesthesia.

There is serious disagreement within China about the proper balance between native and foreign influences. While no one argues against the ideal of self-reliance, this phrase is variously interpreted; scientists and managers of capital-intensive industries have tended to adopt a less restrictive conception than have personnel in areas where foreign inputs are less obviously useful. When the boundaries of self-reliance have been drawn narrowly, special political pressure has been felt by personnel with foreign training (most of the senior generation of Chinese scientists, for instance) and by those residents of large cities who have a fondness for Debussy or Hong Kong hairstyles.

Even those who argue most strenuously for broader contacts with other societies, however, have tended to favor those interactions that will enable China to strengthen its self-reliance in the long range. Thus the commodities imported from the United States after the limited restoration of relations during the Nixon administration have included jet aircraft for the improvement of domestic transportation and chemical fertilizer plants to permit both higher agricultural productivity and the avoidance of large-scale fertilizer imports in the future.

## Conclusion

This survey has introduced some central issues as the core of certain basic contradictory relationships within Chinese society. How does the present resolution of these relationships affect the prospects for continuing the revolution that led to the establishment of the People's Republic? Three broad generalizations seem appropriate.

1. Because no permanent resolution of any of these social tensions is possible, they will remain a dynamic source for continuing change in social life. Each of the seven relationships discussed here is a polarity, rather than a continuum along which one can locate a policy that will forever satisfy China's national needs. Instead, the contradictions are subject to shifting, temporary resolutions as new policies are introduced

to deal with the competing demands of Han and minorities, city and countryside, or old and young. Additional volatility is introduced into Chinese society by the fact that policies intended to influence one relationship often spill over to affect another. Thus the decentralization that accompanies rural policies may delay the attainment of feminist goals by minimizing central pressures within rural communities. Or the restrictions upon private property that have characterized Chinese policies toward the relationship between rich and poor may also weaken the power of older Chinese to influence the behavior of the young, inasmuch as inheritance has long been a mechanism by which parents have influenced their offspring. The fact that a generation of Chinese has been educated to analyze society as a system of contradictory relationships may in itself provide a pressure for continuing change. Consciousness of one's social position is the most obvious prerequisite for the pursuit of group interests. Some high officials may conclude that their own interests are best served by discouraging popular attention to changes in the structure of Chinese society, as this might allow them greater latitude to determine policies without constant need to mediate the claims of particular segments of society. It is to avoid such a development that the Party's official newspaper, *People's Daily*, has urged: "Major issues must be constantly discussed so that everyone pays heed to them. It is very dangerous to become engrossed in minor matters and not discuss major issues, for this inevitably leads to revisionism."

2. Against continuing pressure for change is the fact that individuals are commonly affected by more than one of the cleavages that divide Chinese from one another. To the extent that these contradictions cut across each other, consciousness of social position is obscured and motivation to demand a clear alteration in the policies governing any single relationship is diminished. A person who is advantaged in economic terms but disadvantaged by age or ethnic status is likely to have rather complex attitudes toward which social changes are most desirable. Pressure for radical social change is enhanced when social cleavages are cumulative rather than cross-cutting, as when youth, political weakness, and anxiety about economic position converged among many supporters of the Cultural Revolution.

3. The greatest impediment to continuing the revolution is probably to be found in the past successes of revolutionary change. The government that came to power in 1949 has vigorously instituted programs to ameliorate the most grievous inequalities within each of the



contradictions discussed in this chapter. While tensions remain within each of these relationships, they are not sufficiently potent to support serious counterrevolutionary activity that might endanger Communist authority. At the same time, the relative mildness of these tensions, when compared to those found in Chinese society prior to Liberation, makes it difficult for the Communist Party to sustain the revolutionary momentum that brought it to power. Worker and peasant annoyance at bureaucratic privilege and abuse, for instance, is no substitute for the deeper class feelings provoked by past exploitation by capitalists and landlords.

The successful transformation of important aspects of China's social structure has made it increasingly difficult to replicate the Party's pre-Liberation formula for revolution. During the long years of struggle against the Kuomintang and the Japanese, the Communists learned to mobilize supporters by uniting large coalitions against privileged, but socially isolated, minorities. But the Party's policies since 1949 have eroded the extremes within each of these contradictions, rendering identification of targets for revolutionary action extremely problematic in many cases. The narrowing of income inequalities in the countryside, for instance, coupled with the abolition of private land holdings, has produced a relative homogeneity in material life which undermines appeals for revolutionary social change.

None of these comments is intended to imply that the Communist Party has become a conservative, anti-revolutionary force within Chinese society. To the contrary, the Party's continued dedication to systematic and penetrating social change is noteworthy. But "revolution" in Chinese political discussion has increasingly come to signify either the protection of the social benefits won since 1949, or the continued implementation of reforms to resolve China's social problems. Only in the Cultural Revolution has "revolution" been used to denote the forceful seizure of power from those who were held to be preventing further reforms. After a generation of intensive efforts at revolutionary change, it is perhaps not surprising to discover that the People's Republic of China's social structure has been so altered that there is less cause for revolution, although still much cause for reform.

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## 9

## Education and Culture

*Ralph C. Crozier*

One element of continuity between Communist and Confucian China is the close link between education and culture (i.e. literature and the arts). In traditional China this came from the Confucian emphasis on moral cultivation as the basic purpose and ultimate justification for both formal education and artistic expression. The content of that morality has changed in the People's Republic of China but the underlying presupposition that learning and culture serve a socially useful purpose remains.

Of course there are differences in the degree to which an officially approved morality pervades all education and cultural life. Not just the pervasiveness of Communist ideology but also the imperatives of modernization in a twentieth century nation impel the state to control the lives of its citizens in ways unimaginable to the most morally sincere and imperially autocratic Confucian monarch. The drastic reduction of the private sphere is one of the basic changes brought by the Chinese revolution and it has affected both the form and spirit of all cultural and intellectual expression. In that sense the Communists are choosing or perhaps subconsciously following only one side of a posed dichotomy between private and public, personal and social morality in traditional China. The difference can be as great as that between the serenity of a traditional scholar's painting of bamboo and the exuberance of a Maoist propaganda poster. But there is enough similarity of underlying purpose behind education and culture to make Communist China as different from contemporary socialist and monarchist nations as it is from its Confucian past. This essay will examine those similarities and differences in education and the most important of the arts.

Before looking at specific developments in each of those spheres it is necessary to point out that cultural and educational policy has not been

static in the People's Republic and that in the aftermath of Mao's death and the fall of the "Gang of Four" these areas especially are in great flux. This requires a somewhat historical approach, examining the dynamics of change over the last three decades in order to understand the present situation and possible future trends. Any confidence about analyzing such trends, however, must be tempered by the realization that educational and cultural policy in the People's Republic has not progressed in an uninterrupted straight line. Rather, there have been drastic swings or zigzags in the line. These have been in large part reflections of political struggles within the Communist Party and shifts in general Party line. But they also stem from uncertainties about how in these important areas the Chinese people can realize the long-range goals of the revolution and, even more important, resolve tensions between different goals.

Western analysts are fond of using the Chinese Communist term "red and expert" to express these tensions. In Chinese usage the two are supposed to go together and reinforce each other. "Redness," proper ideology and commitment to building the new society, makes sure that technical expertise or cultural knowledge is devoted to the right ends and motivates the individual to acquire that expertise. Yet in many areas "red and expert" has seemed more contradictory than complementary. Nowhere has this been more obvious than in education where questions of relative emphasis on political-moral indoctrination versus academic content, or on egalitarian leveling versus high standards, have acquired explosive significance. It can also be found, somewhat modified, in the arts where at times Mao's injunction that all art and literature must serve the masses makes popularization the overwhelming objective, but at other times his simultaneous injunction that this work should have a high artistic content brings effusive praise and patronage for China's most famous artists.

It will be worthwhile keeping this "red"-"expert" dichotomy in mind for each area in education and culture, but there are other equally useful terms or concepts for analyzing the tensions in these fields. One could even take the Cultural Revolution's celebrated struggle between the socialist road of Chairman Mao and the capitalist road of the much maligned Liu Shao-ch'i as expressing something similar to "red and expert." The former puts emphasis on equality, moral-ideological zeal, and political training in education; the latter stresses high academic standards, formal study, and technical expertise. In culture the former lends itself to art both for and by the masses with emphasis on amateur

actors peasant painters and worker poets the latter has regard for a more sophisticated and varied art appealing to and satisfying the intellectual elite which is deemed necessary to build a modern socialist state and economy

Yet not everything in China's intellectual or cultural life can be explained in terms of socialist roaders and capitalist roaders. Perhaps it is more meaningful to see a continuing tension between the goals of China's two simultaneous but distinct revolutions—the national revolution for achieving China's independence unity and modernization and the socialist revolution for achieving a collectivist economy an egalitarian social order and a new socialist morality. The telescoping of these two revolutions which Marx saw as two chronologically distinct stages has created more than theoretical problems. It means that the impulse to realize ultimate social and moral goals has frequently clashed with the stubborn realities of an underdeveloped economy a poorly educated population and strong surviving personal values from the old society. Moreover impatience to achieve these goals can conflict with imperatives of the national revolution such as national unity and rapid scientific-economic modernization. The Great Leap Forward in 1958 and the Red Guard surge of the Cultural Revolution in 1966-1967 are the most obvious examples. Thus the swings between egalitarianism and educational elitism between total politicization and preserving national cultural traditions in the arts can also be seen as a product of the competing demands of these two revolutions and differences between the political leaders who incline to one or the other.

The arts and in fact the whole cultural sphere manifest one more tension or contradiction. Again it can be found in a catch phrase or slogan: national in form socialist in content. In practice this slogan too hides more problems than it solves. For instance national form which appeals to patriotism and is readily recognizable by the masses has not always easily accommodated socialist political content. It has not been easy to pour the new wine of socialist content into the very old bottles of Chinese culture without either spoiling the wine or shattering the bottles. New socialist art forms frequently lose most of their national flavor and with it risk losing their national appeal. Old national art forms often have little socialist content and pose the danger of reinforcing traditional values that the revolution wants to change. *Even enough time the dilemma is not unsolvable but the few of the new China have been impatient and in the last three decades they*

have not yet resolved this contradiction. By their own admission they have not yet created an art that is simultaneously popular and aesthetically powerful, distinctively Chinese, and unmistakably socialist. So long as so many contradictions remain—whether we call them red versus expert, socialist versus capitalist roaders, the socialist versus the national revolution, political content versus national form—no such art is likely to emerge. Nor is there likely to be much stability in either educational or cultural policy.

### Education

There is an old Chinese proverb (very Confucian in its emphasis on the long-range importance of education) to the effect that if you are planning for one year you plant grain, if you are planning for ten years you plant trees, but if you are planning for 1,000 years you “plant” (i.e., educate and morally nurture) men. The leaders of the new China are planning, and planting, for the long run.

Certainly education, particularly mass literacy and high-level scientific training, is a top priority for any modernizing nation. This is particularly true for Communist countries with their ambitious plans for rapid economic development and social transformation. But in China the extremely high value traditionally placed on learning, reinforced by the continued belief in its socially moral function, attaches even more importance to education. The formal education system must also be seen as part of the overall emphasis that Chinese Communism puts on transforming human consciousness as the prerequisite for transforming material conditions. Whether this strong “subjective” strain in Chinese Marxism (as opposed to economic determinism) comes from traditionally Chinese assumptions about man and society, as argued brilliantly and persuasively in Donald Munro’s book, *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China*, or from the challenge of making revolution in an economically backward country, it has put an enormous burden on the educational system. The schools are expected to teach the academic or technical skills necessary for building a modern economy, while at the same time inculcating in the young the moral values appropriate to the new socialist society. Academic training and childhood socialization are not tasks unique to the Chinese school system. But the Chinese have put more demands and higher expectations on their schools to do this than most other societies

This has led to extreme swings in educational policy as the tensions between red and expert, and between socialist and national revolution

have worked themselves out. It will be necessary to follow the sometimes erratic course of educational policy over the last three decades before attempting even a tentative assessment of how well the Chinese educational system has performed its twin tasks of national and social transformation.

### *The Soviet Experiment*

When the Chinese Communists came into power in 1949 they inherited more immediate legacies from the recent past than the general traditional assumptions about education discussed above. On the one hand there was the educational system built up by their Nationalist predecessors which despite the damage inflicted by foreign invasion and civil war had some notable if limited achievements. On the other hand there was the Communists' own experience with mass education among the peasants and with ideological reeducation of intellectuals who had joined the Party during the Yenan years. Both were relevant to their early attempts to build a new national system of education, neither was adequate for the scope of their ambitions and the complexity of the problems they faced.

The Nationalists had attempted to build a mass education system but limitations of time, money, and degree of control over the countryside had severely circumscribed the efforts of Nanking's educational planners. At the lower levels most of their plans remained on paper, especially outside the major cities. At the upper level China had some outstanding universities and specialized institutes like the Peking Union Medical College, but the number of university-trained specialists was woefully inadequate for China's enormous needs, especially in scientific-technical fields. Clearly mass education had to be given a high priority by any new government in China, but the Communists wanted to do more than extend formal schooling to a larger proportion of the population. They also wanted to remake the moral or ideological content of education in accord with the values of the new society. Their experience in the Yenan period (1935-1945) incorporating a strong political content and an emphasis on down-to-earth practicality that aligned formal education with the daily lives of the masses was relevant. They also learned how to bring basic education to the peasants without an expensive educational infrastructure. Still, what was adequate for the guerrilla war period was not adequate for the period of national reconstruction. Even though political organization and ideological zeal could go a long way toward solving material shortages in popularizing education, they could not implement the high levels of formal academic



training necessary to provide the large core of educated personnel required by China's rapid economic modernization. For that, expertise of a different kind, and a different model for education, seemed necessary.

A foreign model was nothing new for China's educational planners. From the late nineteenth century on, Western missionary schools had been pioneers in bringing new education to China and under both the Republican and Nationalist governments foreign experience (American, European, and Japanese) had been eagerly sought. After the revolution of 1949 these foreign models were rejected and surviving foreign-run schools were nationalized. The sole remaining foreign model, in education as in everything else, was the Soviet Union.

In some ways the Soviet model did not sit well on China from the start. It had brought mass education to the U.S.S.R. and had trained the technocratic elite for Stalin's forced-draft industrialization. But since the abandonment of experiments in "progressive" and collectivist education in the late 1920s, it had emphasized formal academic training and individual intellectual achievement more than Communist social goals. In that sense, it was more suited to China's national revolution than to its socialist revolution. It also, ironically, reinforced the elitist Mandarin tendency in Chinese educational thought, which the Communist revolution was supposed to destroy, while ignoring the deep-rooted Chinese feeling that education should also be social and moral in its purposes. Finally, the Soviet emphasis on high-quality urban institutions was no better suited to the needs of China's much more numerous and much poorer rural masses than the strongly rejected plans of Western educators.

So long as the Sino-Soviet alliance remained intact and Russian influence predominated in most economic, military, and scientific affairs, the Chinese education system bore a strong Soviet imprint. Even after the Sino-Soviet split this influence remained because the new system was producing some of the results needed for building the nation economically and militarily. Yet, even at the height of the Russian influence, there were countervailing currents stemming from national pride, China's unique needs and possibilities, and the Chinese Communists' own experiences and outlook. Thus, tensions remained in the Chinese educational world throughout "the Soviet experiment" of the 1950s and would lead to drastically new departures in the next decade.

Up until 1966, however, the main outline of the Chinese educational

system resembled that of the Soviet Union more than any other. To begin with it was sharply pyramidal in structure with only a tiny percentage of those in elementary school continuing on to university or other postsecondary education. If figures given on the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic are reliable, as of 1958 elementary school enrollments (the first six years of formal schooling) were 86 1/2 million, secondary school enrollments (three years junior secondary and three years senior) 10 million, and higher education (universities and post-secondary technical schools) 660 000.<sup>1</sup> In other words there were 131 elementary school students for each university student or perhaps more relevant, less than 1 out of 15 high school students could expect to go on to university.

The reasons for this pattern are obvious. Basic education, no matter how limited, had to be provided to a vast, poor population among whom estimates of illiteracy ran as high as 85 percent before 1949. Given shortages of trained teachers, financial exigencies, and emphasis on maintaining standards at the higher levels, it was difficult to expand higher education as quickly as primary schooling. It was also hard to absorb huge numbers of highly educated young people into the labor force at work suitable to their training unless industrial growth was very rapid. After 1958 there were problems in the economy, so both the funds for expanding higher education and the demand for its graduates dwindled. Under such circumstances it was logical to continue building a broad base while concentrating more on quality at the top.

The emphasis on quality—high academic standards, individual intellectual achievement, strict discipline, authority of the teachers, competitive entrance examinations at higher levels—fit in well with the Soviet example. From all accounts, Chinese secondary schools and higher institutions were well run, although not very innovative in teaching methods. Chinese students studied hard and learned a lot, although imagination and creativity were not encouraged, and teachers tended to retain the authority given them by Chinese tradition and Soviet example.

One way of reconciling the elitism inherent in this pyramidal structure with the egalitarian values of the revolution was to create part-time schools for those already in the work force. Particularly during the Great Leap Forward in 1958 the number of schools of various kinds was greatly enlarged. They included factory organized schools to raise workers' technical and general educational level, correspondence programs, rural elementary and secondary schools for peasants, and

vocational training institutions, somewhat similar to the Soviet polytechnical schools, which served high school graduates who had not got into universities. By 1960 there were allegedly 25 million students in such schools. This was in addition to the vast numbers reached by mass movements like the basic literacy campaigns.

These statistics, impressive even if the figures are inflated, can be misleading if they are interpreted to mean that scarce educational resources were being spread evenly. One of the advantages of the part-time schools was that they were relatively inexpensive to run and did not remove students from productive labor. Ideological considerations about combining labor with study aside, this was not an inconsiderable factor. Most lower-level and part-time schools could be run on the principle of maximal local self-reliance while the Ministry of Education (at times there was also a separate Ministry of Higher Education) concentrated funds and attention on the higher levels and on certain key schools. Chou En-lai himself defended an elite school system for the most able students by telling the National People's Congress in April 1959: "We must devote more energy to perfecting a number of 'key' schools. We will then be able to train specialist personnel of higher quality for the state and bring about a rapid rise in our country's scientific and cultural level."<sup>2</sup>

The system was democratic in form—based on intellectual ability and accomplishment—but not very egalitarian in practice. The poorer sections of the population, especially the peasants, found access to the higher rungs of the educational ladder rather difficult. Apart from surviving fees and other costs to the parents, differences in cultural background and quality of available elementary schools between city and countryside and between upper and lower classes made equal educational opportunity more a myth than a reality. There were also allegedly many outright abuses by those in power, like favoring their own children for admission to the best schools. Yet it was more than the abuses that denied the egalitarian goals of the revolution. In its emphasis on quality, the very system itself favored inequality. Designed to draw a highly trained elite from a mass base, an elite that would spearhead scientific and cultural development, the new education system echoed the philosophy of Soviet education and more distantly, the idea behind the imperial civil service examinations of China's own past.

These tendencies did not go unchallenged. Among the top Party leadership, Mao was probably the most disturbed by the social, ideological, and political implications of such a policy. But when his

more mass based voluntaristic effort at rapid social and economic transformation in the Great Leap Forward broke down after 1958 it could only reinforce the elitist tendencies in educational policy. With economic planners and technocrats back in ascendancy by the early 1960s the specialist personnel of high quality that Chou En lai had called for seemed all the more precious. Ma Yin-chu the feisty and outspoken president of National Peking University put the purpose of universities even more bluntly—to train advanced technical personnel and principal cadres for national construction.<sup>1</sup> Apparently the Sino-Soviet split had not changed the basic technocratic and elitist character of Chinese educational policy. It would take an internal political upheaval to do that.

### *Educational Reforms of the Cultural Revolution*

The role of students (the Red Guards) in the Cultural Revolution is well known. Starting at the universities but spreading down to high schools and even elementary schools they provided the shock troops with which Mao attacked the capitalist roaders within the Party who were allegedly betraying the ideals of socialism. Their motives for flocking so enthusiastically to Mao's banner may have come from youthful idealism, Mao's charismatic leadership or general dissatisfaction with the established Party leadership. But they also came from causes within the educational system. The severely competitive nature of the system and the high attrition rate at each level certainly must have ranked high among them. Yet it was not those who had failed in the entrance-examination that riled but those who had done best—students at the elite institutions of Tsinghua and Peking National universities—who started the Red Guard movement. From the content of their charges against school and Party administrators it seems that they took the Marxist ideals of an egalitarian, selfless and ideologically purified society very seriously. The emphasis on academic knowledge and grades over political ideology and moral character, the elitist admissions policies that favored those with the best educational opportunities over workers and peasants, the sin of bourgeois careerism—is the goal of higher education—the separation of students from the laboring masses—all of these were condemned and those who had implemented such policies were driven out of power and subjected to ruthless verbal criticism or sometimes even worse.

The revolution within the revolution may have been called a Cultural Revolution because it was supposed to eradicate surviving

bourgeois influences within the cultural superstructure. It could just as accurately have been called an educational revolution because its purpose was to reeducate people to appreciate the superiority of collectivist, egalitarian, socialist virtues. The cultural and educational spheres were seen as indissolubly linked—in fact, almost identical. Education's prime purpose was to inculcate new values; all cultural creations should express and teach those values. Morality and social purpose are again the connecting links.

As a "revolution," albeit one called for from above, the Cultural Revolution had its destructive side, smashing the existing educational system so that something better could be built on its ruins. It is clear from Mao's later directives in the Cultural Revolution that the destruction went on longer and perhaps farther than he had originally desired. Schools were closed for almost two years from summer 1966 to 1968. And only when leadership of the Cultural Revolution was taken away from student Red Guards and given to army-backed Mao Tsetung Thought propaganda teams could any semblance of order be restored in the schools. Even then it seems that academic education restarted very slowly, as it was easier to denounce the bourgeois line in education than to fill in the details of the new socialist line. Nevertheless, by the early 1970s universities were beginning to enroll new students, secondary and elementary schools were fully reopened, and the major reforms of the Cultural Revolution in education were becoming clear.

At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in August 1966, a Central Committee directive called for "education serving proletarian politics and education combined with productive labor." This emphasis on politics and productive labor would be at the core of the new system with the central purpose of education redefined from training "advanced technical personnel and principal cadres for national construction" to instilling in youth the moral values that would make both national and socialist construction possible. It was to be value-oriented education first, academic or technical education second.

The values to be incorporated in the new system can be summed up as equality, practicality, and morality. Equality meant no intellectual elite, separated from the masses, that enjoyed material and status privileges. Practicality meant linking formal education with productive labor, especially manual labor, both as a means of eliminating status differences and developing a practical work ethic suitable for economic construction in a backward country. Along with this went a depreciation of theory and abstract knowledge divorced from practical

problems of production. The old Mencian dictum about those who worked with their minds ruling over those who worked with their hands was to be eliminated by the creation of a proletarian intelligentsia who worked with both. Thus practicality was intimately related to the stress on equality. It also was part of the new socialist morality. The common terms for this morality were class consciousness, ideology, or even politics, but they amounted to a moral code emphasizing personal selflessness (especially denial of bourgeois careerism through education) and a missionary-like zeal for realizing the new social order through political activism. The new educated youth was to have dirt on its hands but no dirty bourgeois ideas in its mind. Education would make a new socialist man, not a new ruling elite.

The concrete reforms to realize these principles took some time to implement. First the discredited Party authorities and educational administrators had to be replaced initially by rampaging Red Guards who swept away the old system but proved incapable of creating any new order. That order was established after 1968 when Mao Tse-tung Thought propaganda teams took over administration of all schools. They were to implement the working class leadership in education that Mao had called for in his August 1968 directive on education. In fact they had a large component of People's Liberation Army (PLA) cadres, although they also introduced worker and peasant activists into the running of schools.

The impact of these reforms was probably greatest at the university level. The entire system of admissions was changed to open up the universities to workers, peasants, and PLA veterans. This meant scrapping the competitive entrance examinations. Instead university students would be taken, not fresh out of high school, but through recommendation from basic production units. All would have had at least two years working in a factory or in commerce before being eligible for this recommendation, which would be based on their political attitude and integration with the masses (i.e. their moral qualities) more than on their intellectual abilities. Naturally, this created a different student body at the universities, older with direct experience in production labor, more heavily drawn from worker and peasant class backgrounds, not so well prepared academically but more active politically.

It also led to drastic changes in the content of university education. Courses were shortened; the former four- or five-year program was reduced to two or three years. Cultural subjects like history or literature

were reduced and heavily politicized. Scientific and technical subjects like chemistry or engineering were simplified and made more practical. Examinations and grades were downplayed or completely eliminated. Students would not "flunk out" for academic reasons. Individual competitiveness was discouraged. And, in accordance with the principle of combining study and labor, a good deal of time was spent in productive labor either in workshops attached to the universities, in factories and farms during breaks in the school year, or as part of the regular course work. It was also expected that most of the students recommended for university education by specific production units would return to those units after graduation, thus giving the factories and communes a direct interest in higher education and breaking down the separation between schools and society. University students were constantly urged not to forget their class background and duty to serve the masses; they were to become not intellectuals but educated workers or peasants.

The changes in the high schools were only slightly less drastic. Entrance exams were abolished to open them to workers and peasants. The elite residential high schools, which had enrolled many children from the Party and technocratic elite, were converted into community schools, thus democratizing the composition of the student body at this level too. Workers were admitted to the administration of the schools through the Mao Tsetung Thought propaganda teams and the "revolutionary committees" that succeeded them. Workers and peasants also did part of the teaching, particularly of practical labor courses and of ideological courses teaching about the class struggle and "the bitterness" of the old society. There was, in fact, the same stress on moral-political values and on practical labor-related education as found at the universities, with a consequent deemphasis on formal academic subjects and academic discipline. Examinations, grades, and individual competition were particularly discouraged. The curriculum was simplified, politicized, and shortened. Junior and senior high school became a four-year program (two and two) instead of the former three years each.

These general reforms also applied to the much more numerous primary schools. Emphasis was to be placed on all-around development, not just academics. As the original Party directive on educational reforms of August 1966 said, students should "develop morally, intellectually, and physically." The order is not accidental. Moral, or political, development was to have priority. At this level, too, education

was to be spread more widely with greater stress on the countryside. It was to be more decentralized both in control of curriculum and in greater reliance on local financing. It was also shorter (five years instead of six) and more practical in its content.

Thus the entire regular school system was restructured in accord with the ideals of the Cultural Revolution. These reforms also tended to blur the distinction between full time and part time education as both types of schools now featured close integration of labor with study. One of the notable innovations of the Cultural Revolution was the creation of part time institutions of higher learning attached to productive units. Perhaps most important were the July 21 workers universities, the prototype of which was set up by the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in 1968. Its students were workers averaging twelve years of labor experience and junior high level schooling who took a two and-a-half year program while continuing to work in the factory. The content was technically oriented so as to create educated worker technicians. Similar institutions in the countryside were called May Seventh Universities (not to be confused with the May Seventh schools for reeducation of political cadres). Their function and management are not so clear. Apparently they too were designed to produce technicians without separating them from productive labor and their local unit. Although most of these would not be recognized as universities in the usual sense, this was also true of much of the work at the regular institutions of higher education after 1966. The Cultural Revolution's massive effort at social engineering through education had a marked leveling effect on the whole educational system.

One more education related policy with enormous social and political consequences should be mentioned. That is the justification of educated youth — the relocation of urban high school graduates in the countryside. It was an economic, social and political policy but it attempted to serve educational purposes as well. Primarily it promoted (or forced) the integration of students with the masses that was a cornerstone of Cultural Revolution educational policy. It also addressed the problem of vocational placement for the large number of urban high school graduates who could not easily be absorbed into the urban sector of the economy. Such students could hope to be recommended by their commune to go on to university after proving themselves in rural labor but statistically the chances for this were rather small.

Reeducation (*hsia hsiang* — down to the villages — not to be confused with the often punitive *hsia fang* "down to a local place" assigned to



cadres and intellectuals) has been a basic policy and a basic fact of life for China's high-school students. It is estimated that since 1969 perhaps 20 million youth have participated in this program.

The Cultural Revolution, therefore, completely restructured the educational system and the lives of Chinese students. The changes made for a much tighter system politically, with massive infusions of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung," but a much looser one administratively, with more room for pedagogical experimentation and adaptation to local conditions. The Ministry of Education had ceased to function after 1966 and was replaced by a looser group on education in the Party's Central Committee. Ideological control, not bureaucratic regulation, was their main concern. After 1968, China's schools were more integrated with society, and both schools and society were saturated with political-moral education. Heroic efforts had been made to overcome the perceived problems of elitism, impracticality, and indifference to politics. But swinging so far to one side of the "red and expert" dichotomy did not solve all the problems inherent in the tension between them.

#### *Struggles over the Cultural Revolution's "New Born Things" in Education*

Problems showed up in several different areas but the common denominator was that the nation's needs for educated manpower for scientific and economic development were not being met. The emphasis on social goals in education (the socialist revolution) was interfering with the attainment of economic goals (the national revolution). For example, the new enrollment policies in the universities brought more students from the right class backgrounds and presumably proper political ideology but many of them were not prepared, or perhaps not intellectually able, to do university-level work. Moreover, the two-year gap between high-school graduation and university entrance led to serious memory losses, especially in scientific subjects and foreign languages. Much of the work at universities had to be remedial or review of forgotten high-school subject matter. Educators and economic planners were concerned at the drop in the level of academic work at the universities and by the amount of intellectual talent discarded by the stress on social and political values in the selection system.

The Cultural Revolution's assault on "bourgeois intellectuals" also made it difficult to restore academic discipline and the authority of the

teachers. That this had a serious effect on teachers' morale is shown by the widespread saying "To be a teacher is dangerous and has no future." By the early 1970s numerous admonitions had appeared in the press about restoring respect for study and for teachers. Apparently these problems of lower standards, lack of academic motivation, poor teachers' morale, and lax student discipline were most severe at the universities which by the mid 1970s had not reached their pre-Cultural Revolution levels of enrollment and were much inferior in terms of academic content.

In 1975 the new minister of education Chou Jung-hsin made a series of scathing off-the-record comments on the quality of education in the universities which were publicized after his dismissal in 1976. He attacked the neglect of standards and poor preparation of entrants, called for more respect for intellectuals and intellectual work, and insisted on more attention to scientific theory. His dismal picture of higher education was summed up in one line: "In the universities now, no more culture, no more theory, no more scientific research." This bleak picture was perhaps exaggerated, but it is confirmed by the impressions of many Western visitors in these years (including the author) and it reflected the concern of the Party moderates that China's national development was being impeded by unrealistic social experiments in education.

However, it was difficult to reverse the course of educational policy so long as Mao was alive and the Cultural Revolution radicals, his wife Chiang Ching prominent among them, were still powerful in cultural, educational, and especially mass media fields. At the first post-Cultural Revolution National Conference on Education in 1971, the radicals had pushed through their two assessments of the state of education. According to the first, during the seventeen years up to 1966, in the main, education had not followed Mao's line. The second was that the majority of teachers were bourgeois intellectuals who required correction and could not lead education work. For the next five years there was a tug and pull quality in Chinese education, as in Chinese politics in general, with the moderate administrators quietly trying to undo or modify what they regarded as the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the radicals noisily defending its new-born things.

Thus when by 1973 universities were using examinations to test the qualifications of recommended applicants, the radicals built up the protest of a student worker who refused to take the exams into a nationwide publicity campaign against restoring bourgeois academic

standards for university admission. Later in the year they launched another campaign based on a letter from a fifth-grade Peking student complaining against the authoritarian manner of his teacher. With the media and politically powerful leaders inveighing against "the absolute authority of the teacher," it was difficult to restore normal discipline and academic standards in the schools.

The battle in the educational field reached its peak two years later after Teng Hsiao-p'ing, with Chou En-lai's blessing, tried to push a national plan for scientific-technological development that would have required a change of educational policy. With Chou En-lai on his deathbed, and Mao apparently unwilling to enter the controversy, by December 1975 the radicals had launched a vigorous counterattack against this "right deviationist wind." In education they defended recruitment of workers and peasants into universities, running "open-to-society" schools that combined labor and study, and the principle of working class leadership with laymen guiding specialists in scientific fields. Soon afterwards Minister of Education Chou Jung-hsin was purged; he was followed shortly afterwards by Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The Cultural Revolution's "new born things" in education were safe for the moment.

#### *After the Gang of Four: Reverse Course in Education*

That moment did not last long. When Mao died in September 1976 and his successor, Hua Kuo-feng, struck quickly to eliminate the radicals, not only was political protection removed for the Cultural Revolution's educational reforms, but everything associated with the now infamous Gang of Four was suspect. Yet it was not simple to undo all that had happened in education since 1966. Since the new rulers were eager to cloak themselves in Mao's mantle and in the educational reforms that had been closely associated with the venerated late chairman, they had to proceed with some caution. The Cultural Revolution itself could not be denounced, only the perversions of it by the Gang of Four.

As early as December 1976, the Gang was accused of lowering educational standards and of demigrating the authority of the teacher as part of their plot to keep the proletariat ignorant in order to facilitate usurpation of supreme political power. Their egalitarian and popularizing educational policies had been one more instance of "waving the red flag to oppose the red flag." With this trick exposed, academic standards could be raised and discipline tightened.

Nevertheless, it was only after Teng Hsiao-p'ing's full rehabilitation

in July 1977 that the tempo picked up in criticizing existing educational practices and in blaming all shortcomings on the Gang of Four. In August a major article in the leading theoretical journal *Red Flag* called for measures exactly opposite to those advocated in the same journal a year earlier. More stress on theory, higher academic standards and the need for experts—these were the new watchwords in education. If they sounded like the pre 1966 policies of the discredited capitalist road, no one in China commented on the similarity. Instead throughout the rest of 1977 the chorus swelled on how students must study hard, teachers and intellectuals should be respected, scientific research should be stimulated and intellectual talent should be sought out and cultivated.

Teng Hsiao ping, now firmly ensconced as China's number two man with prime responsibility for technological and industrial development, confided in an interview with Han Su yin published in *Der Spiegel* that education had lagged badly in the last decade especially in scientific research and theory. The emphasis would now be on raising quality in education and training scientific personnel. For this he expected the length of schooling to be increased to five years in high school and four or, if need be more, in universities. Postgraduate education would also be stressed.

Recent events have confirmed his prediction. Most notably the university enrollment system has been drastically overhauled with recommendations from the masses apparently becoming little more than a formality and high school education the prerequisite for taking competitive entrance examinations. In late 1977 a special nationwide exam was announced open to all those whose educational careers had been interrupted by the tumult of the previous ten years. Moreover 20 to 30 percent of the entering university class would be selected directly from high school without a prerequisite of two years of manual labor. Coupled with praise for hard study and intellectual achievement this seemed to confirm that the educational pendulum had swung back to its pre 1966 position.

Such a verdict may be premature. The tensions in China between red and expert and socialist and national revolutions have not been resolved. It is doubtful that Hua Kuo-feng or even Teng Hsiao-ping wants to breed a new class of mandarins in China's universities. They have not repudiated the principle of combining academic study with productive labor and political moral training although they have shifted the emphasis. They continue to talk about measures to encourage a higher proportion of worker-peasant children in higher

education. Part-time and work-study schools are still being promoted.

It is still too early to tell how much of this is verbal deference to Mao's ghost and how many of the reforms of the Cultural Revolution will really stick. The history of education in China has taken too many sharp turns before to make it certain how far the present course will go. China may be in for a long period of educational, as well as political, stability, but most foreign observers thought the same thing in the early 1960s.

## Culture

Chinese emperors were both patrons of culture and guardians of its moral effects. The classical poet and omnipresent calligrapher Mao Tse-tung continued and expanded upon this role. Perhaps more meaningful, the entire mandarin state of imperial China simultaneously possessed political and cultural authority and saw the two as inextricably linked. Here, too, the Chinese Communist Party has inherited Chinese habits as well as Stalinist ideas about controlling the arts and literature. The causal importance that Chinese Communism attaches to the cultural superstructure may reflect more than a quirk of Mao's interpretation of Marxism or the exigencies of the Party's twentieth-century historical circumstances. Traditional Confucian assumptions are not necessarily incompatible with a militant anti-Confucianism.

In the People's Republic all pronouncements on cultural policy refer back to Mao Tse-tung's "Talks at the Yen-an Forum on Art and Literature" in 1942. There, speaking to writers and artists who had come to serve in the liberated areas during the anti-Japanese war, he laid down the general guidelines for Party cultural policy. In main outline they were clear enough and have remained constant, but they were given in very different circumstances than would prevail after 1949 and were vague enough to permit quite different interpretations. Therefore, it is not surprising that there have been swings in Party cultural policy comparable to those in education. It might not be quite so easy to summarize them under a convenient phrase like "red and expert," but similar tensions have been at work. Still, the tensions and fluctuations of line should not obscure several overall trends in artistic, cultural, and intellectual life, which go back to 1949 or, for the Communist Party, to 1942.

The first general trend is politicization. Mao claimed in the Yen-an talks that all art serves a class interest. Whether that should be

exclusively the proletariat (the socialist revolution) or all progressive classes (in the national revolution or "New Democracy" that Mao originally called for) has indeed fluctuated. But the principle of art serving politics has remained and with it a strong emphasis on the didactic function of all artistic and intellectual expression. At its most extreme the arts are gears and wheels of the revolution; literature is a powerful weapon for class struggle, and history is a tool for exposing feudal and bourgeois oppression.

The second trend is popularization. This includes mass participation in the creation and performance of culture, not just its consumption: thirty million amateur actors since the Cultural Revolution, 300 million poems collected in farms and factories during the Great Leap Forward, 3,000 peasant painters in one rural district. In culture as in politics, no one should remain passive. Besides popular participation, the arts should also be designed to appeal to the tastes of the broad masses. Therefore, ever since the Yan'an talks, professional writers and artists have been urged to aim at a mass audience—the workers, peasants, and People's Liberation Army fighters—not just at a handful of bourgeois intellectuals and aesthetes. Mass culture for the masses required a certain leveling out, a vulgarization (to use a pejorative term). It does not particularly encourage diversity or creativity, although Party cultural authorities continually urge artists to be creative, because the artist must appeal to established popular tastes. Politicization and popularization may therefore lead to a certain uniformity and dullness in artistic and cultural production; this was one of the complaints even in China about the culture of the Cultural Revolution period.

In culture as in education, the road toward politicization, popularization, and possibly standardization has not been straight or smooth. An overview of cultural trends since 1949 will show the main turns and bumps.

#### *National Tradition and Socialist Transformation in Culture 1949-1965*

In the first few years after 1949 the Chinese cultural, artistic, and intellectual world was saturated with Soviet borrowings. This was part of the general campaign to remold the thinking of non-Communist intellectuals by weaning them away from the bourgeois culture of the capitalist West and the feudal culture of the nation's past. Huo Mo-jo, Mao's favorite spokesman on such matters, exhorted his fellow intellectuals at the First National Conference of Writers and Artists: "We must sweep away the remaining forces of the old semi-colonial and