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LACK PAPER

**FACTS & EVIDENCES OF THE ACTS
OF AGGRESSION AND ANNEXATION
OF VIETNAM AGAINST KAMPUCHEA**

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OF VIETNAM AGAINST KAMPUCHEA

Department of Press and Information of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Democratic Kampuchea
September 1978

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INTRODUCTION

“Democratic Kampuchea, full of goodwill, is firmly determined to maintain close and friendly relations with all countries having common borders with her, and with all countries, near or far, throughout the world on the strict basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.” (Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, Chapter XVI, Article 21.)

That is the sincere aspiration of the Kampuchea's people and the basis of the foreign policy of Democratic Kampuchea. But Vietnam¹, which has always had the ambition to annex and swallow Kampuchea, and to exterminate the nation of Kampuchea through its sinister strategy of “Indochina Federation”, has carried out the most perfidious activities for many decades aiming at achieving its objective:

- 1930 - 1945: The Vietnamese¹ proceeded through the Indochinese Communist Party of Ho Chi Minh.
- 1945 - 1954: The Vietnamese carried out their activities under the banner of the struggle against French colonialism.
- 1954 - 1970: Under the Geneva Agreements (July 20, 1954) the Vietnamese were forced to withdraw from Kampuchea and return to their country. But they never forgot their strategy of “Indochina Federation”. They constantly opposed the political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea since its founding in 1960, and they carried out successive undermining activities to destroy Kampuchea's revolution. They intensified these criminal activities since 1965, the date on which they asked for and obtained the authorization to come and take refuge in Kampuchea while being chased by the US imperialists and the Saigon's clique, when they had no more terri-

Introduction

tories in South Vietnam to install themselves.

- 1970 - 1975: The Kampuchea's revolution rescued the Vietnamese from defeat. But being still more ungrateful than crocodiles, the Vietnamese continued to more feverishly carry out their activities of sabotage against the Kampuchea's revolution aiming at swallowing Kampuchea.

- 1975 - 1978: The Vietnamese, in collusion with the US imperialists, carried out subversive activities and attempts at coups d'etat to overthrow Democratic Kampuchea. As their criminal activities always failed, they mobilized 14 divisions at the end of 1977 to invade and aggress Democratic Kampuchea in order to take possession of her at one go, following their strategy of "Lightning attack, lightning victory".

Vietnam has thus for a very long time carried out its plan of annexing and swallowing Kampuchea. For nearly 20 years, the Kampuchea's people under the correct and clear-sighted leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Comrade Secretary Pol Pot, smashed all subversive and undermining acts, all attempts at coups d'etat and all acts of military invasion and aggression of the Vietnamese.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Government of Democratic Kampuchea waited until December 31, 1977 to inform the world of the truth about the criminal acts of Vietnam against Kampuchea. They did not do so before this date, for they wanted to safeguard friendship with Vietnam. Based on this wise and mature position, they have always endeavoured to peacefully solve the problem. From 1970 to 1976, Kampuchea entered into about a hundred of negotiations with Vietnam at the level of the Central Committee of both Parties, about fifty of them have been led by Comrade Secretary Pol Pot. Apart from these high level negotiations, there were innumerable negotiations at the level of zones, regions and districts. But all these negotiations failed, for Vietnam has never abandoned its nature of aggressor, annexationist and swallower of territories.

This Black Paper is not the result of any research or a thesis, but a document gathering together all the actual facts and events during the successive struggles.

1. In the following pages the words "Vietnam", and "Vietnamese" indicate indifferently the Communist Party of Vietnam (at that time the Workers' Party of Vietnam), the Government of Hanoi or the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the "Vietminh", the "Vietcongs". The clique of Ngo Dinh Diem or Thieu-Ky or others are nothing but lackeys of the US imperialists.

1. THE ANNEXATIONIST NATURE OF VIETNAM

1. The Acts of Aggression, Expansion and Annexation of Vietnam in the Past

The acts of aggression and annexation of territory perpetrated by the Vietnamese in the past as well as at present, have clearly shown the true nature of the Vietnamese and Vietnam, that is a nature of aggressor, annexationist and swallower of other countries' territories. The annexations of Champa and Kampuchea Krom by the Vietnamese have demonstrated it.

a. Champa

Champa was founded in the second century, at the epoch of Nokor Phnom in Kampuchea. Its territory covered the Central part of the present Vietnam. Its people were called Cham. Champa had an old and brilliant civilization in Southeast Asia, as demonstrated by the My Son monuments. The Vietnamese had unceasingly perpetrated acts of aggression and annexation against Champa.

- In 1471, the Vietnamese took over the capital of Champa, Vijaya, and called it Binh Dinh. From this date, Champa began to decline and progressively disappeared as a nation. The Vietnamese afterwards "swallowed" the whole territory of Champa and absorbed the Cham people who lived in the South of the capital Vijaya.

- In 1611, the Vietnamese annexed the region of Phu Yen in the South of Qui Nhon.

- In 1653, they annexed the region of Khanh Hoa, (Kantara in Cham language), near Nha Trang and Phan Rang (Panduranga in Cham language).

- In 1693, the Vietnamese "swallowed" the whole Champa by annexing the region of Phan Thiet.

The cham race was totally exterminated by the Vietnamese. In a

parallel direction with their conquest of Champa, the Vietnamese also enforced their colonial yoke over Laos.

After the take over of Champa, the Vietnamese went on stepping up their expansion in the direction of Kampuchea Krom (Southern Kampuchea in Khmer language).

b. Kampuchea Krom

It is the part of territory of the present South Vietnam including the western region of Donai's river and the Mekong's delta. France called it "Cochinchine"¹. This territory had been an integral part of Kampuchea for more than 2,000 years. The Vietnamese began to encroach on this territory at the beginning of the 17th century.

In 1623, they obtained the authorization to come and trade at Prey Nokor, which they afterwards named Saigon. They took this occasion to send several tens of thousands of their people to live there.

The Vietnamese requested the authorization to carry on business in Prey Nokor (Saigon)² only for five years. But at the end of that period, they refused to leave. In 1645, Kampuchea claimed the restitution of Prey Nokor (Saigon), but the Vietnamese refused. In 1653, Kampuchea demanded once again the return of Prey Nokor (Saigon) to the motherland. The Vietnamese promised to do so. But these were only fallacious promises for in fact, they further settled several tens of thousands of their compatriots in Prey Nokor. Using this place as a spring-board, the Vietnamese have carried on their expansion and annexation.

The below-mentioned dates, given by way of guidance, show the penetration of the Vietnamese into Kampuchea's territory. But they do not mean that the Vietnamese took possession of these territories at these dates, for the whole nation and people of Kampuchea have always fought against the Vietnamese invasion and annexation.

- In 1699, the Vietnamese occupied the provinces of Ba Ria (Phuoc Le), Kampong Sraka Trei (Bien Hoa) and Prey Nokor (Saigon).

- In 1715, without the knowledge of the Khmer authorities, the Vietnamese through their adventurers practically controlled the provinces of Peam Banteay Meas (Ha Tien) and Kramuon Sar (Rach Gia).

- In 1732, the Vietnamese occupied the provinces of Peam Me Sar (My Tho) and Long Hor (Vinh Long).

1. about the meaning of the name, see page 5.

2. The names in parentheses are those given by the Vietnamese to the Khmer cities and provinces after having annexed them.

- in 1757, the Vietnamese tried to implant the border at Moat Chrouk (Chau Doc).

- In 1758, the Vietnamese took possession of Preah Trapeang province (Tra Vinh) and Khleang province (Soc Trang).

The Kampuchea's people have waged an unceasing struggle against the Vietnamese penetration in order to recover the territories belonging to them. Let us quote the main events:

- In 1731, the people of Ba Phnom province (Eastern Kampuchea) rose up to drive out the Vietnamese.

- In 1738, the Kampuchea's army expelled all the Vietnamese out of Peam Banteay Meas (Ha Tien).

- In 1743, the people of Khleang province (Soc Trang) revolted and expelled all the Vietnamese. In 1748, they prevented the Vietnamese from coming back. The Kampuchea's army crushed the Vietnamese army at Sap Angkam, Pursat province.

- In 1776, the people of Peam Me Sar (My Tho) and Long Hor (Vinh Long) provinces revolted and the Kampuchea's army liberated the two provinces.

- In 1835-47, the people of Preah Trapeang (Tra Vinh) province rose up against the Vietnamese. In 1845, the whole Kampuchea's people rose up to crush the Vietnamese.

- In 1858, the people of Moat Chrouk province (Chau Doc) liberated their territory and rejoined it to Kampuchea again. Kampuchea's army drove the Vietnamese out of the provinces of Khleang (Soc Trang), Preah Trapeang (Tra Vinh) and Kramuon Sar (Rach Gia).

Under the French colonial rule (1863-1954), the Vietnamese took possession of other Kampuchea's territories. They were in collusion with the French colonialists who had taken possession of the region of Prey Nokor (Saigon) in 1859. During this colonial period Kampuchea lost the following territories:

- In 1870-1873: Raung Damrei (Tay Ninh) province, the region located along the two Vaico rivers, the territories of Peam Banteay Meas (Ha Tien), Moat Chrouk (Chau Doc) and Prasat Dap (Dong Thap).

- 1890-1914: Choeung Preah province (Song Be).

- 1929. the French colonialists annexed the region of Darlac (Dac Lac) and gave it to the Vietnamese.

- In 1939: the French colonialists administratively attached the islands of Koh Tral (Phu Quoc) and Koh Russei (Hon Doc) and a number of other islands to Cochinchina, and consequently to Vietnam.

Up to the second World War, the Vietnamese annexed 65,000 square kilometres of Kampuchea Krom's territory, absorbed more than one million of Kampuchea's people (the present number of the Kampuchea Krom's people called "Khmers Krom" is nearly 4 million).

These are the acts of aggression and annexation perpetrated by the Vietnamese in the past. At present, the Vietnamese continue to act in the same manner. Like a python, they are progressively swallowing some country, both territory and population. But at the same time, they launch large-scale attacks of aggression against Kampuchea aiming at "swallowing" her.

So, whether in the feudalist era, in the French colonialists' period, in the U.S. imperialists' period or in the Ho Chi Minh's period (that is the present period), the Vietnamese have not changed their true nature, that is the nature of the aggressor, annexationist and swallower of other countries' territories.

2. The Manoeuvres and Methods Used by the Vietnamese To Annex and Swallow the Kampuchea's Territory in the Past

a. The sordid use of Vietnamese girls

The French called Kampuchea Krom "Cochinchine". This name is made up of the Vietnamese words Co-Chin-Xin. "Co" means "Miss", "Chin" is the name of a girl, and "Xin" means "ask for". Thus, "Co-Chin-Xin" means "Miss Chin asks for". History has revealed that in the 17th century, the king of Annam at the court of Hue married his daughter to the Khmer king Chey Chetha II (1618-1628). In return, in 1623, the king of Annam asked for the authorization to open trade counters and to administrate the custom-service in the region of Prey Nokor (Saigon). At the intervention of his Annamese wife, Chey Chetha II agreed. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese nationals then came and settled themselves in that region, and took possession of the territories of the region of Prey Nokor (Saigon), Ba Ria (Phuoc Le) and Kampong Sraka Trey (Bien Hoa). They expelled the Khmer people living there and forced them to move to the more remote regions. In 1699, the Vietnamese army took possession of these three provinces.

The Vietnamese have often resorted to these sordid methods consisting of selling their girls in order to achieve their annexationist ambitions. Today they still do not hesitate to carry out the same repugnant methods to swallow the other country's territories.

b. The Vietnamese processes of encroachment on the territory along the borders

As we have already seen, the Vietnamese, in collusion with the French colonialists, have annexed a lot of Kampuchea's territories. Among others, they have taken possession of the provinces of Raung Damrei (Tay Ninh) and Choeung Preah (Song Be). They have nibbled at Kampuchea's territory in this region so much that nowadays it has the form of a "Parrot Beak". In these provinces, hundreds of thousands of people of Khmer nationality are still living. They are

Khmers of origin, like those living in the North of Siemreap. In Choeung Preah Province (Song Be), there are still many Khmer villages the names of which are preceded by the word "Srok" or "Soc". "Srok" means village. For example, Srok Svay, Srok Daung, Srok Rong, etc. In Raung Damrei province (Tay Ninh) and along the Vaico rivers, there are also a lot of Khmer villages the names of which cannot be written correctly by the Vietnamese because of their pronunciation. For example the word "Thnot" in Khmer has become "Ta Not" in Vietnamese; "Dang Tung" has become "Long Tung", "Ktum". "Ka Tum", "Kampong Rokar": "Lago", "Kampong Kdei": "Samyoeur", etc.

The processes used by the Vietnamese consisted of nibbling at the territories, encroaching upon the borders and merely and simply establishing geographical maps by themselves. Indeed, all the agents of the cadastral department were Vietnamese. The French only had to sign.

In 1966, the authorities of Hanoi and the Vietcongs set up a plan to send more Vietnamese nationals into Kampuchea and to increase their number from 600,000 to one million. In 1967, they planned to send in 200,000 more Vietnamese nationals. At that time, the strategic hamlets of the Thieu-Ky's clique were set up all over South Vietnam. The man who was in charge of carrying out this plan is called Hay So¹. The Vietnamese authorities sent their nationals to live along the banks of the Mekong and Bassac rivers. The Vietnamese nationals went by boats up to Kampong Chhnang and Pursat and reached as far as the Great Lakes of Tonle Sap. The province of Pursat was chosen as a main base of their settlement. Before the 1970's coup d'etat, in Peam Chor district (Prey Veng province, East zone), 90 per cent of the population were Vietnamese. In 1971, their numbers increased to 99 per cent. Along the Mekong and Bassac rivers, in Saang and Koh Thom districts, the Vietnamese were first living in their boats. Later on, some settled down on the river banks, some continued to live in their boats while the others were unceasingly arriving from South Vietnam. Once they had settled themselves on the river banks, they carried out at the same time fishing and retail dealing and drove the Khmer people away towards the countryside.

If measures had not been taken, they would have totally annexed the districts of Saang and Koh Thom.

It was the same in Takeo province. The districts of Angkor Borei and Koh Andet were crowded with Vietnamese. In Kampot province, they were nibbling at lands in the districts of Kampong Trach,

1. Member of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese party involved in the plot of coup d'etat in the East zone of Kampuchea at the end of May 1978 (see Chapter 6, 3, page 79.)

Ton Hon and Tuk Meas. The laws and regulations of Kampuchea, under the former administration as well as under the present one, have never authorized any foreigner to own lands. But the Vietnamese have been very impudent. In the old society they sent in their men to get Kampuchea's lands through corruption especially in the border areas. They could then nibble more territories.

c. The use of the banner of revolution to take possession of territories

From 1946 to 1954, under the cover of "revolutionary solidarity" against French colonialism, the Vietnamese attempted to take possession of Kampuchea's territory. Under the banner of revolution, the Vietnamese came into Kampuchea and set up cells of the Indochinese Communist Party in order to grasp Kampuchea's people. They organized a party, an army and a State power. They used this expedient in order to try to take possession of Kampuchea.

The Vietnamese methods were more oppressive than those of the French colonialists. During their domination over Kampuchea from 1863 to 1954, the French nationals living in Kampuchea were no more than 10,000. To ensure their domination, they had a "Resident superieur" in Phnom Penh, "Residents" in the provinces and chiefs of departments. Besides, there were no effective soldiers who formed the "colonial infantry" and only some French nationals in the "native guards". In the rubber plantations, there were only about ten French nationals. The French ruled the country through the "natives" intermediaries.

But from 1946 to 1954, the Vietnamese occupied all the offices, from chief of village and chief of commune up. They directly controlled the economy of the villages and communes. They created a committee for leading the committee of the puppet party they had set up in Kampuchea. The Vietnamese were 50,000 to 100,000 in Kampuchea¹. But they did not yet have a big force. And since they came in to take possession of Kampuchea's territory, they did not enjoy the people's support.

At that time, the Khmers who waged the struggle in Kampuchea did not yet have an independent position. They were totally reliant on the Vietnamese. They did not well understand for whom and for what purpose they were making revolution. That is why the Vietnamese could easily enter Kampuchea. They divided Kampuchea into zones: East zone, Southwest zone and Northwest zone. They could install there whoever they wanted. They did everything at the place and acted at their will.

Thus, whether in the period of the feudalists, the time when they were colonized, or at present, the Vietnamese have always sought

1. The Vietnamese residents in Kampuchea are not included.

by all means to take possession of Kampuchea's territory.

Kampuchea's people, being victims of the acts of aggression and annexation of the Vietnamese and having successively lost an important part of their Kampuchea Krom's territory, foster a deep national hatred against the Vietnamese aggressors, annexationists and swallows of Kampuchea's territory. Kampuchea's people are perfectly aware of the Vietnamese treacherous acts, subterfuges and hypocrisy. They have always seethed with a deep rancour.

In order to maintain their vigilance, Kampuchea's people have kept alive two phrases in their mind. The first one says: "Be careful not to spill the master's tea!". It recalls the barbarous crime committed by the "Yuons"¹ in 1813 during the digging of Vinh Te canal. The Yuons buried alive the Khmer people up to their necks and used the latter's heads as a stand for a wood stove to boil water for their master's tea. As they burned and suffered, the victims shook their heads. At that moment, the Yuon torturers said to them: "Be careful not to spill the master's tea!".

The second phrase is the nickname "Coconut floss" given to the Yuons. It recalls the trick used by a Yuon who, chased by Kampuchea's people who were angry with his barbarous crimes, threw himself into the water and tried to escape by hiding his face out of water under a coconut floss. But he was discovered by the people. This phrase upholds the vigilance of Kampuchea's people against the dupery and treacherous acts of the Yuons.

All these bitter and painful experiences acquired by Kampuchea's people have taught them to clearly discern the insatiable expansionist and annexationist ambition of the Vietnamese as well as their political, military, diplomatic and seduction manoeuvres.

3. The Factors Which Have Induced the Vietnamese To Carry Out A Policy of Expansion and Annexation

a. Economic factor

Economically, Vietnam is a poor country. Annam, that is Central Vietnam, occupies an area of about 148,000 square kilometres but it has only small sandy plains along the seacosts. Away from the sea, there are only rocks and then the mountains along the border with Laos. Thus, this region is very poor. During the colonization period, the French could buy one whole family for only 20 to 30 piastres and brought them by train into the rubber plantations in Cochinchina or Kampuchea. This example underlines the great poverty of this region of Vietnam.

1. Yuon is the name given by Kampuchea's people to the Vietnamese since the epoch of Angkor and it means "savage". The word "Vietnam" and "Vietnamese" are very recent and not often used by Kampuchea's people.

Tonkin or North Vietnam has an area of more than 100,000 square kilometres. It is also very poor. There are some plains along the Red River and in its delta, but the area is small in comparison with the population. Besides, North Vietnam has to face natural calamities such as floods, droughts and typhoons. The soil is not fertile either. It needs a great quantity of fertilizers. The Ho Chi Minh regime has not been able to solve the disasters caused by floods. And 15 years after the departure of the French, only one or two provinces can achieve an annual paddy yield of seven tons per hectare. As for draught-animals, on average, there is only one ox or one buffalo for 4 families.

For this reason, the Vietnamese seek to take possession of other countries' territories. To the North they have to face a country stronger than them. To the West, they meet with mountains. Therefore, they headed Southward. After having "swallowed" Champa, they reached Kampuchea Krom. After "swallowing" Kampuchea Krom, they headed for the Northwest, that is towards Kampuchea, in the provinces of Kratie, Kampong Cham, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kandal, Takeo and Kampot up to Kampong Chhnang, Pursat and the Great Lakes of Tonle Sap.

b. Political factor

This factor has existed in the Vietnamese history since the feudalist epoch, but it has become more important today. As they had made the revolution, the Vietnamese enjoyed some prestige in Southeast Asia. At that time, the international community gave them aids and supports. Europe supported them. China helped and supported them. The Vietnamese have taken advantage of this support and used it as political support in order to carry out their scheme of expansion and annexation. They wanted to make themselves the "Father" if not the "Big brother" of "Indochina". At home, the Vietnamese forced everybody, at all ages, to call Ho Chi Minh, "Uncle Ho". In Kampuchea they initiated the people into also calling him "Uncle Ho". In 1965, the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea called Ho Chi Minh "Comrade Chairman Ho Chi Minh". Ho Chi Minh himself, and his circle, turned crimson with rage. The Vietnamese wanted everybody to call him "Uncle Ho", for this appellation has a meaning close to their ambition of being "Father" of "Indochina". On the other hand, the Vietnamese were enraged by calling Ho Chi Minh "Comrade Chairman Ho Chi Minh", the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea showed the national position of independence and sovereignty of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in the relations between parties.

This little fact underlines that at the Ho Chi Minh epoch, the Vietnamese ambition aiming at dominating Kampuchea was still more obstinate than that at the feudalist epoch. The Vietnamese

want to take possession of Kampuchea in order to use her as a spring-board for their expansion in Southeast Asia. They have declared that after they have liberated Kampuchea and Laos, they would also liberate Southeast Asia. This devouring ambition has been inculcated to all the Vietnamese, whether they are ranking officers, soldiers or citizens, so that they speak the same language, in the most ordinary way. The Vietnamese seek progressively to satisfy their ambition, for they have their nationals at one and the same time in Kampuchea, Lao and Thailand. They want to swallow Laos and Kampuchea in order to become a big power and then extend their influence over Southeast Asia. They try to create favourable conditions in order to dominate these countries through the parties they have created and through the control they have exerted on the armed forces.

c. Military factor

This factor proceeds from the economic and political factors. The Vietnamese want to have a powerful military base in "Indochina" which they could rely on to achieve their ambition in Southeast Asia. They have progressively organized and built up their forces and military bases in order to satisfy their economic and political ambitions. One might allege that the Vietnamese have no possibility of building up military bases, for they are not as rich as the US imperialists. The past experiences have shown that the Vietnamese, while directly penetrating in the concerned countries, have carried out their political and spying activities and founded their own armies in these countries. In Kampuchea for instance, between 1946 and 1954, they had several times created separately an army composed of Khmers in their pay in order to use them as a tool of their policy of annexation. And when they came back to Kampuchea in 1964, they resumed their activities in the same objective. They have proceeded like that not only in Kampuchea, but also in other countries where they have their nationals and where they could draw the sympathy of the local people. Their objective is to create an armed organization devoted to them. With such an armed organization in these countries, they can progressively develop their activities and then introduce their own forces from outside in accordance with the favourable circumstances. The Vietnamese had proceeded like that at the time of Ho Chi Minh. At present, they go on using the same process.




From 1946 to 1954, the Vietnamese did not come to Kampuchea as advisers. They came to rule as secretaries of the party in all fields, political, economic and military. They were secretaries of the provincial committees and commanders of the military units. Their mouths watered when they saw Kampuchea's territory and quarreled among themselves about assuming functions in Kampuchea. They

VIETNAMESE EXPANSION

from 15th to 20th century



legend

-  champa : 15th-17th century
-  Kampuchea Krom : 17th-20th century
-  Present limits

have been educated in this way for so many generations that it has become a reflex.

It is only after having well discerned these factors that one can understand that the cause of the conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam is not an ordinary border problem. The root of this conflict lies in the policy of expansion and annexation systematically carried out by the Vietnamese who have used all kinds of methods: seduction and peaceful method by grasping the party, the army and the State power, and cruel and barbarous military method, like those they are carrying out at present in Kampuchea.

2. THE STRATEGY OF "INDOCHINA FEDERATION" OF THE INDOCHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY OF HI CHI MINH

1. The Indochinese Communist Party And Its Political Programme

The Vietnamese Party was founded in 1930, by the name of "Indochinese Communist Party".

First, the name "Indochinese Communist Party" clearly and sufficiently means that it is a Party for the three countries of "Indochina". The choice of the name of a Party has its political significance. Lenin, an eminent internationalist leader did not give his party the name of "European Communist Party". Thus, the name given to the Vietnamese Party means that this party is at one and the same time for Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The choice of such a name reveals that the objective of this Party is to dominate the three countries.

Secondly, the Statute of the Indochinese Communist Party has stipulated that this party must build up a "totally independent Indochina". The slogan of this party is to wage a struggle for an independent Indochina in order to create an "Indochina Federation". Consequently the strategic political programme of the Vietnamese Party is the "Indochina Federation". This party has a mission to lead Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam in their struggle against French colonialism to liberate the three countries, build up a federation

having an entity in the political, economic and military fields and in other fields. An entity under the leadership of only one party, the "Indochinese Communist Party", which means only one country, one people and one army. Since 1930, in order to achieve this strategic political programme, the Vietnamese have prepared their forces and trained their cadres to successively send them to work in Laos and Kampuchea.

2. The Carrying Out of the Vietnamese Strategy of "Indochina Federation" in Kampuchea and The Concrete Situation from 1930 to 1970

a. The Period of 1930 to 1945

During this period of 15 years, the Vietnamese carried out activities in Kampuchea and Laos, but they had a lot of weak points. On the one hand, their cadres were very few and besides they were engaged at home. On the other hand, their country was not united. It was divided into three parts: Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina. The Indochinese Communist Party was the sole and only Vietnamese organization and each of the three parts had a different role. The Vietnamese cadres were then busy with their tasks at home. Furthermore their important centre of activities was in the North and especially in Canton (China). In these circumstances they did not have enough cadres to carry out activities in Laos and Kampuchea. It is one of the reasons why their activities during this period achieved no result. Besides, Kampuchea's people as a whole had no idea about communism and they hated the Vietnamese. Consequently, the Vietnamese did not succeed in infiltrating into Kampuchea. There were indeed Vietnamese nationals in Kampuchea, but they were not influenced by communism either. In brief, their subjective forces were weak and Kampuchea's people were not receptive to their propaganda.

b. The period of 1945 to 1954

In 1940 - 1941, the Vietnamese launched their armed struggle near the border with China and they founded the Vietminh front.

On March 9, 1945, the Japanese perpetrated a coup d'état to overthrow the French colonialists. The Vietnamese took this opportunity to increase their influence among their compatriots and they mobilized forces to join the Vietminh. On August 19, 1945, the Vietnamese took advantage of the Japanese defeat to make the "August Revolution" before the return of the French colonialists. Later on, they sent a number of cadres to Cochinchina and Kampuchea.

The Vietminh agents came and militated among the Khmer nationals belonging to the well-to-do and rich classes in Kampuchea

Krom. They made contact with Pach Chhoeun, Chau Sen Cocsal, Chhim Tum, You Chhan, Chea Uom . . . who fled Kampuchea to take refuge in Kampuchea Krom after the Japanese defeat and when Son Ngoc Thanh, prime minister at that time and tool of the Japanese militarists was arrested by the French colonialists.

The Vietminh created a committee of struggle among these Khmers, but later on, the latter came back to Kampuchea and they surrendered themselves to the French colonialists.

Facing this situation, the Vietnamese strove to make contacts with other Khmers in Kampuchea Krom and their nationals living in Kampuchea. Besides, in the Southwestern and Eastern parts of Kampuchea, they kidnapped many Khmer nationals, trained and used them in order to serve their strategy of "indochina Federation" in Kampuchea.

But the French colonialists also had their policy. They infiltrated their men, intelligence agents, policemen, soldiers into the Vietminh ranks.

Consequently, the first cadres trained by the Vietminh were on the one hand, the people it had kidnapped and on the other hand, the agents infiltrated by the French colonialists into its ranks.

In 1947, the Vietnamese had more and more people with them and their activities progressively spread over the Northwestern part of Kampuchea where they gathered altogether the people left over by the gangs of Dap Chhuon, Keo Tak, Houll Vong Anoupheap and Chhim Tum.¹

Later on, in order to carry out their activities inside Kampuchea, the Vietnamese organized Kampuchea into territorial zones, including three important zones, namely Southwest, Northwest and East zones. In the Northeastern part, the Vietnamese came and installed their political and military bases in the Eastern part of Stung Treng province, near Bokeo, for in their own country they had neither territory nor base.

Afterwards, the Vietnamese divided the zones into provinces, districts and communes. They controlled everything. They had their committee to lead and rule Kampuchea, with Nguyen Thanh Son as chairman. This Vietnamese committee controlled and led a Khmer committee called "Moutkeaha". As for the armed forces,

1. Dap Chhuon was a highwayman, agent of the French colonialists and the CIA. He succeeded in being appointed governor of Siemreap province and was killed during the coup d'etat he had attempted at the beginning of 1959 with the CIA and Ngo Dinh Diem to overthrow the neutral Kampuchea. Kao Tak and Houll Vong Anoupheap were highwaymen, agents of the CIA. Chhim Tum was one of Dap Chhuon's captains who, later on, surrendered himself to the French colonialists.

even in May-June 1954, that is to say, one month before the Geneva Agreements, they were almost exclusively composed of Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese did and ordered everything. They grasped in their hands the State power and the army. The names of the organs were Khmer but the component elements were Vietnamese. Thus, from 1945 to 1954, the first Khmer cadres were made up of the people kidnapped by the Vietnamese. The latter had educated and used them to develop their forces.

c. The period of 1954 to 1970

After the Geneva Accords, the revolutionaries of Kampuchea launched a national movement for independence and neutrality against the SEATO's military pact and mobilized the people's masses to support the 5 principles of peaceful co-existence or Pancha Sila. In Vietnam, Ngo Din Diem slaughtered a big number of the party's members and revolutionaries who had been eliminated at 70 per cent in 1957-1958. The committee of the Vietnamese party for South Vietnam was annihilated. After being restored, it was once again annihilated. The Vietnamese revolution lost its control of the situation and was constantly in a defense position. Many Vietnamese revolutionaries then came and took refuge in Kampuchea. The neutral Kampuchea became for the Vietnamese a rear base they used as shelter to hide themselves and also as a place of transit for Hong Kong and Canton in China.

In 1957, Le Duan, the present first secretary of the Vietnamese party also came and took refuge in Phnom Penh and was in transit through Kampuchea. All members of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese party in South Vietnam were arrested except one who came and took refuge in Phnom Penh at Tuol Tapoung district. It was Nguyen Van Linh called Muoi Cuc, native of North Vietnam. He is presently a member of the Political bureau of the Vietnamese party. Hay So also came and took refuge in Kampuchea. In the neutral and stable Kampuchea, the Vietnamese could live in security.

Facing their catastrophic situation and in order to escape from their total annihilation, the Vietnamese decided in 1960 to wage armed struggle again. They came to settle along Kampuchea's border, from Kampong Trach (Svay Rieng province) up to Snuol (Kratie province). When they met with difficulties, they took refuge in Kampuchea. In 1961 they started to infiltrate into Kampuchea. In 1962 and 1963, they extended more and more their penetration, using corruption if necessary. The Vietcongs had been able to freely and at will travel throughout Kampuchea. It was on the one hand because they corrupted the security agents, policemen and civil servants of the former administration, and on the other hand, because the people considered the Vietnamese as revolution-

aries. In 1965, there were 150,000 Vietnamese (Vietcongs) settled in Kampuchea at 2 to 5 kilometres deep from the borders since Romeas Hek (Svay Rieng province) up to Ratanakiri, in the region called "Naga's tail" in the Far Northeastern part of Kampuchea. In 1966, this number was up to 200,000 and it still increased in 1967. At that time, the Vietnamese uttered lies everywhere to make the world over believe that they had achieved "brilliant victories". In reality, they took refuge in the Kampuchea's territory. Those who did not know this reality, thought that the Vietcongs had come and helped the Kampuchea's revolution. In fact, they had no more territory at home, in South Vietnam, because of the Ngo Din Diem's policy of strategic hamlets, for Robert Thompson, basing on his acquired experiences in other countries, set up strategic hamlets all over the territory of South Vietnam so that the Vietcongs had neither land nor population.

The Vietnamese political line on this subject was wrong. It consisted of "waging the struggle on the spot", of "controlling the population and keeping them on the spot". For this purpose, the Vietnamese organized big demonstrations from 1960 to 1965. But from 1965, their forces were heavily loose because the enemy controlled the population, spread vicious customs and habits among the population, corrupted and depraved them. In the Southern part of Vietnam, the members of the Vietnamese party who lived in the strategic hamlets, were all enlisted in the army of the Thieu's clique. 70 to 80 per cent of the youngsters, members of the Vietnamese party's organizations, were enlisted in the enemy's army. The remaining 20 to 30 per cent complied with the enemy and gave up their struggle. There was nobody to lead the struggle of the population who, as a whole, were under the control of the US imperialists and Thieu's clique.

From 1961 to 1963, the defence belt of Saigon ran to about Gia Dinh. In 1964, it became larger and stretched further beyond Gia Dinh. In 1965-1966, it reached as far as the Kampuchea-Vietnam border. The Vietcongs came then into Kampuchea to seek refuge and set up their various services, armed forces, hospitals, artistic groups, transports, commissariat, all their leading organs from the central committee up to provincial and district committees. For instance, the provincial committee of Quang Duc was set up at Koh Nhek, in Mondulkiri province, Kampuchea. In 1970, the figures of the Vietcongs settling in Kampuchea varied between 1.5 and 2 million. There were 80,000 wounded fighters receiving care in the hospitals built up in Kampuchea's territory.

The Kampuchean revolution and people have been the benefactors of the Vietnamese. They have always granted aid and support to the Vietcongs, given them hiding places and shelters, supplied them with rice and food. They have granted them aid and support since

1955, that is at the time when Ngo Dinh Diem was launching the most violent repression against them. They have granted the Vietnamese aid and support since 1960 at the time when the latter took up the armed struggle. Kampuchea's revolution and people acted like that, for they considered the Vietnamese as friends and revolutionaries. However, the Vietnamese, once in Kampuchea, have not forgotten their strategy of swallowing Kampuchea.

Their slogans were "Solidarity among the three countries", "Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam are inseparable sworn friends fighting against the common enemy". Kampuchea's people and revolution believed that they were sincere. Actually, the Vietnamese used these slogans of solidarity in order to cover their activities of division and sabotage and to infiltrate in Kampuchea's revolutionary movement. They worked up the friendship of Kampuchea's cadres and population to afterwards introduce them in their organizations. They organized those who had carried out the struggle against the French colonialists and reinstate them into the Indochinese Communist Party¹. Wherever they went they created troubles and disorders and carried out sabotage and spying activities. From 1967, the people and cadres vigorously opposed all these Vietnamese activities, but the leaders of Kampuchea's revolution always recommended them to develop solidarity and mutual help with the Vietnamese. As for them, the Vietnamese used that formal solidarity to carry out their strategy of "Indochina Federation" in order to annex and swallow Kampuchea. Thus, in spite of the difficult situation they were facing at that time, the Vietnamese did not give up this strategy.

Through their contacts, the Vietnamese tried to see whether there was unity or not with the armed struggle policy of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They dragged towards them all those who had no firm position. They secretly organized and set up a parallel State power. They attacked and ran down the Communist Party of Kampuchea by saying that its policy was wrong, Leftist, adventurous etc. To the Kampuchea nationals who studied in North Vietnam, they handed out: "Leftism, infantile disease of communism" by Lenin. They intensified their attacks against the Communist Party of Kampuchea when the armed struggle in Kampuchea broke out in 1968. At the same time, they established contacts at the adminis-

1. The Indochinese Communist Party was dissolved in 1951, but only in a formal way. In fact, this party continues to exist. At the moment of official dissolution of the Indochinese Communist Party, the Vietnamese have created one party for each country. But in Kampuchea, the "Revolutionary People's Party" existed only by name.

trative zones' level in order to spread discord and division within the Communist Party of Kampuchea. At the same time, they sabotaged Kampuchea's economy. On the one hand, they took to smuggling through black market and on the other hand, they stole food from the population: farm products, pigs, poultry, etc.

All these experiences were very bitter to Kampuchea's people and revolution. From 1965, the struggle between Kampuchea's revolutionaries and the Vietcongs became very arduous and sharp. The Vietnamese came to Kampuchea not only to seek refuges, but also to work for annexing and swallowing her. Although they were in the most difficult situation, the Vietnamese continued to prepare their strategic forces everywhere to overthrow Kampuchea's revolutionary power at the propitious moment.

In the Northeastern part of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese had difficulties in carrying on their strategy because of the presence of the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They tried to get support from the population, but they failed. As the latter were closely united under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese feared them. They strove to please Kampuchea's revolution. They came and asked for the preliminary authorization of the Communist Party of Kampuchea before establishing their camps, for if ever they had a bone to pick with the population, they would be punished by the latter. If they ran into the population, they would then lose all political and economic advantages. Besides, the region was covered with forests crossed by narrow paths which were perfectly known only to the population. And with traps and other deadly snares set by the population along those paths, the Vietnamese would not be able to run away. The Northeastern population are scarce (30,000 to 40,000 inhabitants) but the Vietnamese feared them very much for this population are very faithful to Kampuchea's revolution.

In the flat open regions, the Vietnamese succeeded in duping some elements among the population and cadres. They got them by corruption, material baits or through "Indochinese Communist Party"

In 1970, the figure of Vietcongs in Kampuchea reached 1,500,000 to 2,000,000. In the Northeastern region, they were from 200,000 to 300,000. The members of the central committee of the Vietnamese party among them Vo Chi Cong, deputy secretary for South Vietnam and secretary of the central zone of South Vietnam, that is the 5th Vietnamese zone, were living in that Northeast zone of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese army of the 5th zone was dwelling there, too. As for the Vietnamese committee for South Vietnam, it was also installed in Memot, East zone of Kampuchea. The members of this committee were Nguyen Thi Thanh, Pham Hung, Nguyen Van Linh called Muoi Cuc, Tran Nam Trung, Hay So, Hay Van and

Vang Van Thai. Nguyen Chi Thanh, responsible for the army, was an important personality who would probably have replaced Le Duan if he did not die later on.

By coming and settling in Kampuchea like that, what were the role and the situation of the Vietnamese? And what were those of Kampuchea?

Kampuchea's territory became with Laos, the shelter for the Vietnamese. Kampuchea thus supplied the Vietnamese revolution with aids and supports more than any other country in the world. In Laos, the Vietnamese found only shelter. However, in Kampuchea, they enjoyed:

- shelters, including that for the committee in charge of the leadership of the revolution in South Vietnam.

- economic bases: the Vietnamese totally relied on Kampuchea. They were living thanks to the help given them by the population and the purchases they made through local administration. But moreover, they looted the goods and food of the population.

- roads in Northeastern and Eastern regions of Kampuchea linked to those from Laos and Kampong Som seaport. The transports carried from Kampong Som seaport in a month were tantamount to the transport carried by the Laotian paths during three years.

The blessings given to the Vietnamese by Kampuchea's revolution were immense. Those who have some sense of justice are perfectly aware of this. The Communist Party of Kampuchea has never informed the world of that. But, on the contrary, the Vietnamese have deceived the public world opinion by pretending to have helped Kampuchea in everything.

In brief, from 1930 to 1970, during each period, under any circumstances, the Vietnamese obstinately and constantly carried out activities aiming at annexing and swallowing Kampuchea through their strategy of "Indochina Federation". From 1930 to 1945 they gained no result. From 1945 to 1954 and up to 1970, thanks to the elements they had infiltrated into the ranks of Kampuchea's revolution, they succeeded in undertaking some activities in some fields. But in the whole, their schemes fell through, for Kampuchea's revolution went on strengthening unceasingly its position of independence and sovereignty in political, ideological and organizational fields. Furthermore, Kampuchea's revolution enjoyed a better position than the Vietnamese revolution which had neither territory nor population, nor economy.

From 1955, Kampuchea's revolution unceasingly went on consolidating its independence thanks to subjective and objective conditions. The objective condition was that, thanks to the Geneva Agreements, the Vietnamese were forced to pull back. They could come back to Kampuchea only secretly to take refuge. The subjective condition was that Kampuchea's revolution was led by Kam-

puchea's revolutionaries themselves, in full independence. So, the revolution could gather together numerous experiences and powerfully develop its capacity and competence. In 1966, the Communist Party of Kampuchea consolidated and strengthened its position of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance, and clearly discerned the true nature of the Vietnamese.

3. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN KAMPUCHEA AND VIETNAM ON THE ISSUE OF THE POLITICAL LINE FROM 1954 TO 1970

During the period from 1945 to 1954, the revolutionaries of Kampuchea who were then struggling against the French colonialists were not independent.

From 1954 to 1970, the struggle opposed the political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, a line of independence, sovereignty, self-reliance and of determining by itself its own destiny, to the political line of expansion and annexation of the Vietnamese party. That was a dogged and stubborn struggle. It can be divided into two periods.

1. Period from 1954 to 1960

During this period the revolutionaries of Kampuchea didn't yet have a party with a clearly defined political line. But they led by themselves their revolutionary movement, the open and underground struggles in the cities as well as in the countryside. During this period, the revolutionary movement of Kampuchea tempered itself in the struggle, which allowed the revolutionaries of Kampuchea to progressively forge their position of being independent, sovereign, of relying on their own forces and determining their own destiny as well as their confidence in their own forces and capability of making by themselves their own revolution. It is on the basis of

these actual experiences between 1954 and 1960 that the revolutionaries of Kampuchea organized a Congress in order to found the Communist Party of Kampuchea on September 30, 1960, to determine the strategical and tactical line, to adopt the Statute of the Party and to elect the Central Committee of the Party. The revolutionaries of Kampuchea have then clearly laid down their political line and their way.

When they knew that the Communist Party of Kampuchea had been definitively set up, the Vietnamese started to launch systematic attacks against the Kampuchea's revolution. To this end they used several procedures and especially the two following ones:

a. They secretly organized another organ of leadership, another party¹, without the knowledge of the revolutionaries of Kampuchea. It was at the moment when the revolutionary movement of Kampuchea made great strides, but it was also at the moment when the enemy's repression was in full swing. The men they placed in position were the old cadres they had trained before the 1954 Geneva Agreements and that afterwards belonged to the Pracheachon group²

Some elements of this group openly attacked the Communist Party of Kampuchea, when the others carried out manoeuvres of seduction. And they launched continuous attacks at the time when our Party had not yet achieved its unity in the whole country. Such were the activities organized by the Vietnamese against the Communist Party of Kampuchea inside the Party itself.

b. The Vietnamese attacked by themselves the policy of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They entirely opposed the Communist Party of Kampuchea since 1960.

- They were against the analysis of the Communist Party of Kampuchea concerning the division of Kampuchea's society into classes. They pretended that Kampuchea did not yet gather together the conditions of a society divided into classes. They asserted that Kampuchea's society had the same characteristics as those in Laos. By rejecting the analysis of classes of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, it was clear that the Vietnamese were opposed to the whole line of the Party.

- They were against the line of independence and sovereignty of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

1. The Revolutionary People's Party which has existed only by name (see reference (1) page 19).

2. After the Geneva Agreements, those who had fought against the French colonialists laid down their weapons and created a political association to participate in the elections. Most members of this association were trained by the Vietnamese during the struggle before the 1954 Geneva Agreements.

- They also opposed the line consisting of waging at the same time the armed struggle and the political struggle.

To support their arguments, the Vietnamese referred to the resolution of the 81 parties adopted in Moscow in 1960, which considered the defence of the world peace as a priority task.

2. Period from 1961 to 1970

In 1961, the Vietnamese continued to attack the political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They worked out a political line for the Communist Party of Kampuchea and handed over this document in Vietnamese language to the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. This document mentioned neither the struggle against US imperialism nor class struggle. It was a political line which was conspicuous for its confusion.

From 1962 to 1964, the Vietnamese intensified their attacks. They wanted to nip in the bud the movement for carrying out the Communist Party of Kampuchea's line, for this movement did not yet make great strides. But in 1964, as the people's movement started to develop vigorously, the Vietnamese broke out against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They accused it of being adventurist and leftist. In fact, they were frightened by the soaring of Kampuchea's revolutionary movement, by the continuous development and strengthening of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the revolutionary forces of Kampuchea. Faced with this situation, they concentrated their attacks against the line of the Party by coordinating their own attacks with those of the group they had organized before. These attacks were waged inside the organs of leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea itself by leading cadres who were agents infiltrated into the Party by the Vietnamese.

In 1965, the Communist Party of Kampuchea sent a delegation abroad. It was the first delegation to pay a visit abroad. It was led by Comrade Secretary Pol Pot. The journey was made on foot from the revolutionary base in Kampuchea up to Hanoi.

The delegation of the Communist Party of Vietnam was led by Le Duan.

The talks lasted for a very long time, for the Vietnamese dragged on the discussions aiming at deviating the political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. As a matter of fact, the Communist Party of Kampuchea has had a political line of its own and thanks to this line, Kampuchea's revolutionary movement has made great strides. This made the Vietnamese worried for if Kampuchea's revolution went on, that would affect their collaboration with the ruling classes in Phnom Penh. What was worse, if Kampuchea's revolution developed and strengthened in full independence, the Vietnamese would not be able to control it. That was why they had to absolutely deviate this line.

With this objective in view, the Vietnamese had gathered together their points of view in a document for Kampuchea's side. Le Duan had spent a lot of his time drafting this document. He had looked over and corrected it several times. The Political Bureau of the Vietnamese Party had also examined and corrected it. This document, written in Vietnamese language mentioned neither class struggle nor struggle against the US imperialists. In this document, it was written that when Vietnam achieves victory, it would come to liberate Kampuchea.

In this document, the Vietnamese carried out a stand-up attack against the revolutionary concept and position of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, so that it would abandon the revolutionary struggle and wait until the Vietnamese achieve their victory which would automatically bring about the victory to Kampuchea.

During the talks, the Vietnamese knew perfectly that the Communist Party of Kampuchea firmly abided by the position of independence and sovereignty. That is why they concentrated their attacks against this position. Le Duan affirmed that in the world it is impossible to abide by the position of independence and sovereignty. One has to rely on others. It is also true for Vietnam. As for the three countries, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, they have to support each other.

This struggle on the issue of the political line was very keen. But Kampuchea's side was always patient and serene, and did nothing that could give offense to the Vietnamese side. After the departure of Comrade Secretary Pol Pot to Kampuchea, the Vietnamese knew that the Communist Party of Kampuchea would continue to carry out its line which was to wage armed struggle in combination with political struggle.

They then intensified their activities against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. In the East and Southwest revolutionary bases, the Vietnamese carried out activities aiming at creating confusion and division in the ranks of Kampuchea's revolution. They acted by themselves and also made to act the Khmer elements they had organized for a long time and infiltrated into the ranks of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Abroad, they carried out many activities of division. They distributed: "Leftism, the infantile disease of Communism" by Lenin, so that the Khmers in Hanoi intensified their attacks against the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

In February 1967 an armed uprising broke out in Samlaut, Battambang province. The Vietnamese were panic stricken and intensified their attacks against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. When shortly after, there was a certain lull, they were delighted and felt a bit relieved.

But in 1968, when the armed struggle movement was launched in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese once again opposed it.

In the armed struggle from 1968 to the beginning of 1970, the Vietnamese did not help Kampuchea's revolution at all, even though their organs of leadership were settled everywhere in Kampuchea. The reason was that the two lines, that of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and that of the Vietnamese Party were entirely different. So, the Vietnamese had to fight against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Besides, the Vietnamese had to deal tactfully with the ruling classes in Kampuchea in order to enjoy their help.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea asked nothing from the Vietnamese, but that they kept quiet and abstained from carrying out activities against Kampuchea's revolution and people. But the Vietnamese secretly incited the cadres of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to oppose their Party and continued to set up secret networks.

The political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was correct. If the Party had not led the armed struggle, Kampuchea's revolution would have been condemned to disappear sooner or later. If it had led only the political struggle, the enemy would certainly have destroyed all its revolutionary bases.

The Vietnamese came and installed themselves in Kampuchea's territory and they attacked Kampuchea's revolution. That was the highest point of repugnance and ingratitude! Kampuchea's people, cadres and fighters who have been victims of the Vietnamese doings bear bitterly a profound hatred.

In 1969, the struggle between Kampuchea and Vietnam reached its highest pitch. "Friendship" and "solidarity" were only empty words. As for Kampuchea's side, a permanent vigilance was indispensable. The Communist Party of Kampuchea has never let the Vietnamese know the place where its leaders were living.

All these struggles, waged during the period from 1954 to 1970, to make its political line win victory, have allowed Kampuchea's revolution to progressively consolidate its line of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance. If there had not been this period, there would not have been the following period, that is to say, the period of independence. The 1954-1970's period has allowed the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Kampuchea's people to very deeply temper themselves in the sharp and bitter struggles against the Vietnamese. For each year, the differences between Kampuchea and Vietnam on important problems of political line were innumerable. They allowed the Communist Party of Kampuchea to progressively draw rich experiences.

During this period, the Vietnamese placed in position their devices aiming at destroying Kampuchea's revolution:

1. by secretly organizing anti-party groups which acted openly against the Communist Party of Kampuchea;
2. by organizing secret networks within the ranks of the Com-

munist Party of Kampuchea for their future activities;

3. by directly attacking by themselves the Communist Party of Kampuchea;

4. by stirring up the people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea to oppose the Communist Party of Kampuchea aiming at creating difficulties to it for the present and launching strategic attacks against it in the future.

But Kampuchea's revolution, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, has crushed all these Vietnamese devices, thanks to:

1. the correct political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, a line of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance, of deciding by oneself one's own destiny;

2. the organization's line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, which is also an independent and sovereign line.

The Party has given proof of a great vigilance and safeguarded its forces to the maximum. The agents infiltrated by the Vietnamese dared not act against the Party, for the overwhelming majority of the Party's members were determined to carry out the Party's line. The people and the army were united and stood by the Party's side. The forces organized by the Communist Party of Kampuchea were genuinely national, in the Party as well as in the army and the people, for the experience had shown that they did not have to think of relying on the Vietnamese. As early as 1966, the Communist Party of Kampuchea judged that it could have only State relations and other official relations with Vietnam, for there was a fundamental contradiction between Kampuchea's revolution and the Vietnamese revolution. The Vietnamese wanted to put Kampuchea's revolution under their thumb.

In 1970 after the coup d'etat, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea drew further lessons from the 1954 Geneva Agreements: Kampuchea's revolution had obtained nothing, for it was not independent. The Central Committee spread this lesson to all members of the Party. If it had not done so, Kampuchea's revolution would have still relied on the Vietnamese and the latter in return would have taken the advantage by suppressing it.

3. About the People Trained and Organized by the Vietnamese

After the Second World War, the Vietnamese came to Kampuchea and kidnapped Kampuchea's nationals in order to train them, organize them, and use them as cores for progressively developing their forces¹. From 1946 to 1954, these people were under the total leadership of the Vietnamese and relied entirely on them. They could

1. See Chapter 2, 2 b. Period from 1945 to 1954, page 15.

do nothing and understood nothing by themselves. The Vietnamese decided and ordered everything in their place. That is why when they were forsaken by the Vietnamese after the Geneva Agreements, they could do nothing. As they were puppets, they knew nothing about politics, they were incompetent to do anything and had no revolutionary position. After the Geneva Agreements, when the mission of leading the revolution fell on them, they were not able to assume it. At that time, the Vietnamese set up a provisional committee of leadership. But it was only in 1957 that some revolutionaries were informed of it.

After Geneva, left alone, this provisional committee of leadership collapsed by itself, like a house of cards at the slightest puff of air, without being touched by anybody.

Therefore there were real Kampuchean revolutionaries who faced the situation. They went on accomplishing their revolutionary tasks. Some of them took the responsibility of activities in the capital and prepared the 1955 elections. In order to fulfill these preparations successfully, there were revolutionaries who came from the countryside and got in touch with those in the capital. These contacts allowed those responsible in Phnom Penh to make acquaintance with the cadres in the whole country. Through these contacts and acquaintances, the responsible revolutionaries of Phnom Penh played by that very fact the role of liaison committee for the whole country.

After the 1955 election, the enemy started their repression. The people trained by the Vietnamese were scattered. Some of them abandoned the struggle and some others betrayed and served the enemy. This situation did nothing but promote the development of the activities of the committee of Phnom Penh throughout the country. That explains why Kampuchea's real revolutionaries have been able to continue to wage the struggle.

It is quite normal that puppets are inactive as soon as their masters no longer pull the strings. The Vietnamese had no intention to forsake them at all, but they were forced to do so by historical circumstances. The Communist Party of Kampuchea and the whole people of Kampuchea have drawn this lesson: when one is a puppet, one has no life at all as soon as the master stops pulling the strings. To live again, a new master has to be found. Only independence permits one to live on, whatever circumstances may be.

The people trained and organized by the Vietnamese gave up the revolution. Nevertheless, in 1963 - 1964 some joined the maquis and placed themselves under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. But, when the Vietnamese came back to Kampuchea in 1970, they picked them up again and reintegrated them into their networks which have been somewhat developed. But these renegades were not able to succeed in their criminal activities, for the Party has been very strongly organized. However the

Vietnamese have always maintained these networks and have secretly carried on the activities against Kampuchea's revolution. They used these renegades in their several attempts to destroy Kampuchea's revolution in 1973, 1975 and afterwards. But they always failed.

In consideration of all these events, the Communist Party of Kampuchea has declared that:

- the glorious victory of April 17, 1975 has allowed Kampuchea's people to gain back their national soul. It is an achievement of a very important and deep significance. Indeed under the domination of the colonialists and imperialists, one part of Kampuchea's revolutionaries have undergone a rather strong influence of these latter, but another part of the revolutionaries have received the Vietnamese influence. Consequently their national position has been perverted and shaken. With the glorious victory of April 17, 1975, they have well discerned that this victory has been won by themselves and their Party. That is how the national pride, the national position, the national honour and dignity, the national consciousness and the national soul were born in them.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea has constantly educated our people to reinforce and develop all these revolutionary virtues, so that the objective external factors cannot carry them away, as was the case of the Vietnamese puppets during the armed struggle against French colonialists after the Geneva Agreements, when their Vietnamese masters abandoned them or also when these latter came back to Kampuchea in 1970. The Communist Party of Kampuchea was born in an independent revolutionary movement, and it was only by relying on its own independent revolutionary movement that it has been able to have its own experiences, whether right or wrong, bitter or stimulating.

4. THE VIETNAMESE ATTEMPTS AT SMASHING THE INDEPENDENT POLITICAL LINE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA FROM 1970 TO 1975

1. The Situation of Kampuchea Before the Coup D'etat: Vietnam Violently Opposed the Political Line Of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

In 1969 the situation in Kampuchea was getting more and more tense. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea grasped the situation well and perfectly knew that the U.S. and Lon Nol were going to make a coup d'etat. It thought that if the U.S. carried out the coup d'etat, this would drive new forces to the revolution's side. Thus, it was necessary to get ourselves ready to receive these forces. The coup d'etat would be nothing but positive for the revolution. That is why the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea elaborated a document about the Party's line on the National United Front. It criticized the statements of the intellectuals who had joined the maquis and attacked Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. It considered that those statements ran counter to the Party's line on the National United Front, for they should rather have attacked the U.S. imperialists and the traitor Lon Nol. The Party rectified these mistakes and mobilized all forces capable to be mobilized to fight and isolate the enemy.

By the end of 1969, a delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea went to Hanoi for talks with the Vietnamese Party. The delegation led by Comrade Secretary Pol Pot, made the journey on foot. The Vietnamese delegation was composed of Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh.

The Vietnamese were not pleased and opposed the struggle waged by the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The situation in Kampuchea became worse and was not favourable for the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese delegation was quite irritated. In spite of its efforts to preserve diplomatic courtesy, it could neither bridle its violent hostility towards the Kampuchea's revolution nor control its fury against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Although he was underhanded and deceitful, Le Duan could not control himself. The talks took place in a very tense atmosphere, for the Communist Party of Kampuchea adopted a position of offensive and armed struggle, having in mind that Kampuchea's revolution would be destroyed if it did not abide by this position. As for the Vietnamese, they wanted the Communist Party of Kampuchea to give up the armed struggle and lay down its arms. Consequently the contradiction between the two positions was irreducible.

The reasons for which the Vietnamese wanted the Communist Party of Kampuchea to lay down its arms were, on the one hand those of strategical order for they feared that the Communist Party of Kampuchea would acquire political and military forces and experiences in armed struggle, and on the other hand they feared that the revolutionary forces of Kampuchea could be developed and strengthened in all fields. On the other hand, the Vietnamese had to cooperate with Lon Nol who was then in power in Kampuchea and they were afraid of jeopardizing this cooperation if Kampuchea's revolution waged armed struggle. However, the first reason was more important. Le Duan said: "According to the Vietnamese experience, the armed struggle is to be avoided. Kampuchea's comrades should rather wait until Vietnam wins victory. At that moment, we will strike one single blow and we will liberate Phnom Penh." The aim of the Vietnamese manoeuvres was clear. They wanted:

1. to lure the Communist Party of Kampuchea to have confidence in the Vietnamese forces, to rely on them and to be dependent on them;

2. to make the Communist Party of Kampuchea give up the armed struggle. And if the Communist Party of Kampuchea gave it up, the revolutionary forces of Kampuchea would be destroyed. The Vietnamese would then get an open field. In their assessment, the Vietnamese believed that if the Communist Party of Kampuchea followed their advice, it would adopt an irresolute leadership, pending between the armed struggle and the wait-and-see policy. The forces of the Communist Party of Kampuchea would be assaulted by the

enemy at one and the same time, both in military and political fields, and would then be destroyed. The Vietnamese could then reproach the Communist Party of Kampuchea for being unable to lead and say that it should now let them lead and reorganize the revolutionary forces.

Indeed, the Vietnamese had already installed some of their forces. One part of which were in Kampuchea and another one outside. If ever the inside forces were destroyed by the enemy's repression, they would then use the outside ones.

The reasons brought up by the Vietnamese delegation to convince the Communist Party of Kampuchea of giving up the armed struggle were numerous. They were asking the Communist Party of Kampuchea:

- where and how could the Communist Party of Kampuchea be supplied with weapons, ammunitions and other materials?
- how could it get doctors and medicine?
- where and how could it find the necessary finances?

The delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea did not take into account the objections raised up by the Vietnamese, for the Communist Party of Kampuchea had to wage the armed struggle because the concrete situation did not allow it to do otherwise. If it did not wage the armed struggle, it would be condemned to vanish. But if it persisted in this struggle, its existence would be assured.

During the stay of the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in Hanoi, Le Duan wanted to induce the Communist Party of Kampuchea to establish relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He reported that the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi would like to meet the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to invite it to pay a visit to Moscow.

The delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea told Le Duan that the Communist Party of Kampuchea did not oppose the Soviet Union. Its tasks consisted only of achieving its objective which was to lead Kampuchea's revolution to victory. It did not want to interfere in the China-Soviet difference. But the Soviet Union has shown its hostility towards the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Indeed, in 1964, the Soviet Embassy in Phnom Penh strove to set up in Kampuchea another communist party and charged the Communist Party of Kampuchea with being an inefficient Party and of having an absurd line. The communist party that the Soviet Union wanted to set up should have been made of on the one hand the renegades at the time of the struggle against the French colonialists, such as Siv Heng and Pen Youth who became intelligence agents in the Lon Nol clique's pay and on the other hand the students from the Khmero-Sovietique Technical Institute in Phnom Penh. But in the end, that party could not come to life for lack of people's

support. Concerning the meeting that the Soviet Ambassador was asking for, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea answered that it would be better to postpone it.

Before going to Hanoi, the Communist Party of Kampuchea had asserted that in the talks with the Vietnamese, it had to be in a strong position. Of course, at that period, the Vietnamese could spend thousands of dollars to corrupt the army and police of the Lon Nol clique, but they took refuge in the territories which were revolutionary bases controlled by the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They then needed help from Kampuchea's revolution. If ever they created any difficulties for Kampuchea's revolution, they would not have any territory for their refuge.

The Vietnamese used open threats against the Communist Party of Kampuchea and all the members of the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea were unanimous in saying that the Vietnamese were furious and were capable of suppressing them. They could easily resort to assassination. Indeed, the delegation was practically in their hands, in their country, and for their journeys there and back, they had to cover long distances on foot. But the Vietnamese had an imperative requirement of help and assistance from the Communist Party of Kampuchea which controlled immense areas of Kampuchea's territory. And they feared the violent reactions of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and of Kampuchea's revolutionaries in case the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and namely its Secretary were assassinated by them. The atmosphere of the talks and stay in Vietnam was so tense that some members of the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, who were not used to such tests, were greatly shaken.

2. The March 18, 1970 Coup D'etat: Vietnam Praises the Political Line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Implores Aid and Assistance of the Communist Party of Kampuchea

Until the March 18, 1970 coup d'etat, the relations between the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Vietnamese party had been very tense.

Before the coup d'etat, the Vietcongs could not take refuge in their country simply because they had not liberated the slightest plot of territory. The 3rd defence belt of Saigon set up by the U.S. and the Thieu clique was stretching as far as up to Kampuchea's border. It was from Kampuchea's territory that the Vietcongs went out fighting the U.S. and Thieu's clique. That was a fact known to everybody.

On March 18, 1970, the coup d'etat broke out in Kampuchea. Later on, the U.S. invaded Kampuchea to 20 kilometres deep. This

belt of territory was then transformed into a battlefield. The U.S. and Thieu's clique set up the 4th defence belt of Saigon inside Kampuchea. Ten thousand Vietcongs more took refuge in Kampuchea.



Afterwards, the U.S. and the troops of Thieu's clique were advancing up to the Mekong River and the National Road No. 4 linking Phnom Penh with Kompong Som. In Kampong Cham province, they broke in as far as the locality of Troeung. One could say that their 5th defence belt reached the Mekong river, turning the Vietcongs out to the very inside of the territory of Kampuchea.

The Central Committee of the Vietnamese party for South Vietnam came and took refuge in the North of Stung Trang, on the western bank of the Mekong river, at the boundary of Prek Prasap's district, in Kratie province. The Vietcongs then launched their military operations against the U.S. and Thieu's troops from Prek Prasap.

After the talks with the Vietnamese in Hanoi, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea went to China for talks with the Chinese Communist Party. When the coup d'etat broke out in Kampuchea, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was then in Peking. As for Prince Norodom Sihanouk, he had left Paris, paid an official visit to Moscow and arrived in Peking on March 19, 1970. At that moment, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was carrying on its talks with the Chinese Communist Party. Pham Van Dong arrived in Peking some days later to meet respectively Prime Minister Chou En-lai, Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk adopted a definite position against Lon Nol since his arrival in Peking. But in the first two days, he adopted a defensive position. Comrade Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea made clear to Prime Minister Chou En-lai that politically Prince Sihanouk should be in the offensive position and not in the defensive one. From the third day, Prince Norodom Sihanouk switched over to the offensive. He drafted a solemn declaration proclaiming the dissolution of Lon Nol's government and assembly, the founding of the National United Front, the Government of National Union and the National Liberation Army, the socialist and even communist construction in Kampuchea. The delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea examined and modified the political programme of the National United Front drawn up by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Through comrade Chinese leaders, Comrade Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea let Prince Norodom Sihanouk¹ be informed that he should firstly, constantly

1. Prince Norodom Sihanouk was not aware that the Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was at that moment in Peking.



Vietnamese maps and documents captured by the revolutionary army of Kampuchea, showing the prearranged plan for the invasion of Kampuchea.

The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line of C.P.K.

stand in the offensive position and secondly stand in the framework of the National United Front in order to gather the national forces, for the democratic forces were already under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

That was why the March 23, 1970 declaration denouncing and condemning the coup d'état of national treason, proclaimed the dissolution of the government and assembly traitors to the nation, and the founding of the National United Front, the Government of National Union and the National Liberation Army. There was no question of socialism or communism in that document.

As soon as he arrived in Peking, Pham Van Dong met Prime Minister Cho En-lai. He was already aware of the position of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, when he came and met the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. There was nothing but friendship and solidarity. But his main objective was to have the Communist Party of Kampuchea help and defend the Vietnamese forces in difficulties. He said that the U.S. imperialists had already created serious difficulties and inflicted considerable losses in men and materials on the Vietcong troops who had no more territory in South Vietnam to take refuge. Now, the U.S. imperialists and Lon Nol had staged the coup d'état. It was as if they stabbed the Vietnamese in the back.


The Vietnamese were then in the following situation:

- ahead, the U.S. imperialists and the army of Thieu's clique had wiped out the Vietcong forces from South Vietnam. Now, the U.S. and the troops of Lon Nol's clique hit them from the rear. The U.S. carried out deadly bombing on Kampuchea's territory, all along the border zones, bringing down the Vietcong bases. At the same time they dropped troops with prefabricated blockhaus behind the Vietcongs. In a word, the Vietnamese recorded a fundamental setback. During the talks with the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in Hanoi, some time before the coup d'état, Le Duan told Comrade Secretary Pol Pot that the Vietnamese had met with serious difficulties. They had no territory in South Vietnam to take refuge, no economic base, no foodstuffs, no population. When the troops from North Vietnam came to South Vietnam, only 20 per cent were in a fit state to fight. As for the wounded soldiers in the hospitals installed in Kampuchea's territory, there were 80,000. When the coup d'état broke out in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese were in a more critical situation.

Such was the gloomy situation of the Vietnamese. For this reason, when Pham Van Dong met the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in Peking after the coup, he was pouring out friendly words and embraces with the Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. What a difference with the meeting in Hanoi! It was a sudden change at 180°.




Vietnamese tank destroyed by the R.A.K. on the Svay Rieng front (April 1978).



Trench and command post of a Vietnamese unit in the province of Svay Rieng (Parrot's Beak) destroyed by the R.A.K. (January 1978)



Vietnamese tanks destroyed by the R.A.K. on National Route 7, Eastern Zone (March 1978).



Arms, war material and rice pillaged in Kampuchea, abandoned by the Vietnamese army in the province of Takeo (January 1978).

The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line of C.P.K.

For the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the coup d'état, as it was said above, could not be but positive to the revolution of Kampuchea. The Communist Party of Kampuchea was not worried about it and was already preparing itself to this eventuality for more than six months. It had foreseen that right from the breaking out of the coup, it would immediately switch over to the offensive to take over the power in the countryside by military actions and armed insurrections.

Facing these events, all the Party was ready for fighting and united as one man on the political line as well as on the concrete actions.

As for the Vietnamese, they were very anxious and anguished because before the coup, they had violently opposed the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the talks with the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea had been extremely tense. So, they were afraid that the Communist Party of Kampuchea would refuse help and assistance to them. The Vietnamese situation was already so critical that without the help and assistance of Kampuchea's revolution, it would be fatal.

The Vietnamese were actually "genial" politicians! Before the coup d'état, there were for the Vietnamese the following four forces:

1. the Communist Party of Kampuchea,
2. the khmers in Vietnam under the Vietnamese control,
3. the khmers inside Kampuchea and in the Vietnam's pay,
4. the Vietnamese forces themselves.

The Vietnamese have used the three latter forces to fight against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They have fought by themselves the Communist Party of Kampuchea and rallied on the forces of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and especially on those of Lon Nol¹.


Therefore, before the coup d'état, the Vietnamese had the following cards:

1. Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Lon Nol,

1. In 1967, after the armed uprising in Samlaut, Battambang province, in the northwestern part of Kampuchea, The Vietnamese sent Nguyen Van Linh called Muoi Cuc and a general, Tran Nam Trung called Hay Hauv, to meet the Communist Party of Kampuchea in order to persuade it to give up the armed struggle. Kampuchea's side answered that it had to fight against Lon Nol, the U.S. imperialists' lackey, because he was waging a campaign of total repression against Kampuchea's revolution. The Vietnamese affirmed that Lon Nol was a man of the French not the U.S. According to their information, Lon Nol had no money in the banks abroad. He could not thus be regarded as a reactionary. Besides, Lon Nol has rendered many services to the Vietnamese revolution. But as for Kampuchea's side, one thing was sure: Lon Nol was dead set against the communists and the revolution. He represented the ultra-militarists, the ultra-feudalists and the ultra-reactionaries. After 10 days of talks, both sides parted with their respective positions.



Some officers and soldiers captured by the R.A.K. during their aggression in the territory of Democratic Kampuchea.



Vietnamese spies captured while carrying on their intelligence activities in Democratic Kampuchea.

The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line of C.P.K.

2. their men and secret networks infiltrated in the ranks of Kampuchea's revolution,

3. their men outside Kampuchea.

When the U.S. and the Lon Nol clique overthrew Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and together with Thieu's clique, fought against the Viet-congs, the Vietnamese had no more cards to play.

1. The Lon Nol card went out of their hands definitively, while Prince Norodom Sihanouk turned over to the Communist Party of Kampuchea. So, the Vietnamese lost the first card.

2. As for the second card, that is their secret infiltrated men and networks in the ranks of the revolution of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese could not use it, for they could not control the situation of Kampuchea in war.

3. At last, concerning the third card, that is that of their men outside Kampuchea, circumstances did not allow them to use it either.

After the coup, the situation radically changed. The world public opinion supported Kampuchea's revolution. The Vietnamese had only one card to play: it was to turn towards the Communist Party of Kampuchea and ask for help and assistance from it. They had no scruples about coming and embracing the Communist Party of Kampuchea, after having shamelessly insulted and fought against it.

If the Vietnamese made an about face towards the Communist Party of Kampuchea, it was only because the Communist Party of Kampuchea had forces which were progressively being built up in full independence and sovereignty. If the Communist Party of Kampuchea had only a political line and no forces, it would have been paralyzed and condemned to vanish. If there had been no Communist Party of Kampuchea or if the revolutionary bases in Kampuchea had been destroyed, the Vietnamese would not have escaped from annihilation. If the Lon Nol Clique had succeeded in hanging on to power and if the revolution of Kampuchea had been wiped out, the Vietnamese would have been led to destruction.

Therefore, the services and aid granted to the Vietnamese by the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Kampuchea's people were incommensurable. At the moment when they were condemned to annihilation, the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Kampuchea's people had saved them. However the Communist Party of Kampuchea has never talked about that. On the contrary, the Vietnamese have spent their time hiding the truth and deceiving the world public opinion, the Vietnamese people and army by making them believe that they have given considerable aids to Kampuchea. But nobody can falsify deeds. The role played by Kampuchea's revolution was priceless. By the aid granted to the Vietnamese, it has brought about an important and active contribution to the revolutionary movements in Asia and throughout the world.









Before, one used to say that the key problem was in Vietnam.




A village in the Eastern Zone of Democratic Kampuchea, entirely destroyed by the Vietnamese army of aggression in December 1977.

The Vietnamese attempt at creating the Ho Chi Minh Line of C.I.A.
 2. Their men and secret networks infiltrated to the ranks of Kam



-  Vietcongs' sanctuaries in Kampuchea's territory in 1965
-  Vietcongs' sanctuaries in Kampuchea's territory in 1970
-  Q/SV Vietcong's QG in May 1970
-  559 Center of the Vietnamese Committee No. 559 in Kampuchea, in charge of transport through Laos and Kampuchea
-  5R Center of the Vietcongs' command of the 5th Region of South Vietnam
-  QD Vietcong administrative center of Quang Duc Province
-  SB Vietcong administrative center of Song Be province
-  SW Command center of the Vietcong's units taking refuge in the Southwest zone of Kampuchea
- 5D-7D-9D Sanctuaries of the Vietnamese divisions No. 5, 7 and 9



Map showing the large-scale aggressive attacks of the invasion launched by 14 divisions of the Vietnamese army against Democratic Kampuchea in November and December of 1977 and January 1978.

But the March 18, 1970 coup d'etat revealed the role of Kampuchea's revolution. In 1970, when the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was in Peking, the Chinese comrades told it that Pham Van Dong had told them about the serious difficulties met with by the Vietnamese and that he had asked them to intercede with the Communist Party of Kampuchea so that the latter would agree to help them. The Chinese comrades themselves were perplexed, for they had always heard that the Vietnamese helped Kampuchea. The delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea told them about the actual situation: the Vietnamese had no territory at home and took refuge in Kampuchea. They installed there their organs of leadership and command, their troops' quarters, their hospitals, etc. . . .

The Chinese comrades found out the truth for the first time, for the Vietnamese had until then hid it from them. The Chinese comrades have highly appreciated the attitude of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and paid greater attention to Prince Norodom Sihanouk. They did it also in the spirit of solidarity with the Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese had an urgent need for the help of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Kampuchea's revolution was their savior. So, when the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea arrived in Hanoi on its way home after the visit to China, it was greeted by them all with a delirious joy and extremely warm embraces. At the banquet, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was highly praised by its hosts from the beginning to the end. Before the coup, everything done by the Communist Party of Kampuchea was condemned by the Vietnamese. Now, anything the Communist Party of Kampuchea did was correct and praiseworthy. Before, when Comrade Khieu Samphan joined the maquis, the Vietnamese reproached the Communist Party of Kampuchea for making an erroneous decision. Now that he was in the National Union Government, they congratulated the Communist Party of Kampuchea for having made a judicious decision and for having got ready well in advance.

So, the Vietnamese had an urgent need for the friendship, and assistance of Kampuchea. Pham Van Dong talked profusely. So did Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, Vo Nguyen Giap and the others. But in their embraces, Vo Nguyen Giap, always boorish and not very courteous, let out his reflexion: "It is a historic occasion that allows our three parties to unite once again."

These words reflected well the policy of the Vietnamese who had not given up their plan of placing Kampuchea under their domination. Therefore, the Vietnamese were not only satisfied with the help and assistance of Kampuchea for their survival, but they already thought that, once out of danger, they would swallow Kampuchea.

The Vietnamese have never given up their ambition to annex and swallow Kampuchea. Even at the moment when they had to face their greatest difficulties, they persisted in concocting all kinds of manoeuvres to sate this ambition.

When it arrived in Hanoi, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea prepared its journey back to Kampuchea. At that time, the Vietnamese put their manoeuvres into shape in two directions: the first one outside Kampuchea when the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea still stayed in Vietnam, the second one inside Kampuchea.

3. The Vietnamese Manoeuvres towards the Delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea on its Passing Through In the Vietnamese Territory

For the Vietnamese leaders, the problem of the liberation of South Vietnam was not their big concern. For them, the problem of Kampuchea was far more important. Indeed, for 15 years, Kampuchea went off from their control. They need at all costs to take again control of Kampuchea, even if South Vietnam was temporarily to be sacrificed. They believed that once Kampuchea fell into their hands, they would be certain to win the victory in South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese thought that they could attain their end by seduction. The Vietnamese leaders asked for a meeting with Comrade Secretary Pol Pot to discuss secret military problems. At the talks,

1. they proposed the creation of mixed commands Vietnam-Kampuchea,
2. they proposed to give 5,000 rifles to the Communist Party of Kampuchea,
3. they asked the Communist Party of Kampuchea to help them in the following fields: installation of shelters in Kampuchea, facilities for the use of communication roads in Kampuchea's territory in order to link with Laos, economic aid and food supply.
4. they proposed common activities on the international arena, to oppose U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.

It was Le Duan himself who made all those proposals. Le Duc Tho stressed the point that the Vietnamese troops needed to be supplied on the spot, for the means of transportation were not sufficient even just to get the troops and military equipment moved to South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese already profited by Kampuchea's aids in economic fields as well as in foodstuffs and refuges, but they asked that these aids should be increased. Before the coup, they relied on Lon Nol's clique and the former regime's officials they had bribed. But after the coup d'etat, the Vietnamese had to ask for the agreement

of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Concerning the 5,000 rifles, the Vietnamese used them as a bait to ease the talks, especially to get some political concessions from the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Indeed, what the Vietnamese were longing for more than anything else was the creation of the mixed commands which would be mixed only by name, but in fact they would be Vietnamese. They hoped to control everything through those organs.

Comrade Secretary Pol Pot replied to the Vietnamese that the Communist Party of Kampuchea conceived a friendship based upon the principle of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, of non-interference in each other's internal affairs, of equality and reciprocal benefits¹. As for the 5,000 rifles, the Communist Party of Kampuchea was ready to accept them according to the Vietnamese possibilities. Furthermore, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was not entitled to decide the creation of the mixed commands, for it had left Kampuchea before the coup d'état and the Central Committee had only entrusted it with the mission of talking about friendly relations between the two parties. So, no decision on this problem would be made without the advice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. However, Comrade Secretary Pol Pot added that in his opinion, the creation of the mixed commands would meet with numerous difficulties. Indeed:

1. in the political field, the people and the National United Front would not have confidence in Kampuchea's revolution and in Vietnam. They would see that Kampuchea's revolution was not independent. In these conditions, it would not be possible to mobilize forces. Neither the people, nor Prince Norodom Sihanouk, nor Samdech Penn Nouth would accept that.

2. in the technical field, those mixed commands would be a source of complications, for they would inevitably bring about conflicts. According to the experiences of the past struggles, there were numerous conflicts in the mixed units. So, it would be better that each side kept up its own organizations and that the cooperation be made on this basis.

The talks lasted three hours and the Vietnamese left quite unhappy with the results.

Let us notice that on his way back from Peking, the very day of

1. In his speech delivered in 1965 on the occasion of his first visit to Hanoi, Comrade Secretary Pol Pot already had the opportunity to state the principles on which the Communist Party of Kampuchea conceived friendship. All the Vietnamese leaders, including Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, were irritated, for never had a "young brother" or a "son" had so far dared to give such a speech before his "elder brother" or his "father".

his arrival in Hanoi, the Vietnamese handed in to Comrade Secretary Pol Pot a telegram from Comrade Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea. It was also the day before the meeting with Le Duan. But the Vietnamese had given only the second half of the text of the telegram. In this part of the text, Comrade Deputy Secretary informed them that he had held talks with the Vietnamese and that both sides had agreed on the solidarity and cooperation for fighting against the U.S. imperialists.

Comrade Secretary Pol Pot at once understood what was about, for the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea had already discussed and set up together the framework of this solidarity and cooperation with the Vietnamese. Besides, the fact that only a part of the text was handed to him proved that the Vietnamese deliberately hid all the content of the telegram in order to mislead the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Indeed, they took care to give only the part of the text where it was a question of agreements between the two sides. But, during the talks, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea firmly abided by the fundamental principles adopted by the Party and not by the telegram. It was only in the evening of the day after, that is after the talks, that the Vietnamese handed the first half of the text of the telegram to Comrade Secretary Pol Pot. That part of the text dealt with different positive aspects and difficulties on the question of independence and sovereignty as well as solidarity. All these facts show that the Vietnamese had no scruples about censoring words or phrases in the telegram, provided that it could serve their interests and ambitions.

The delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea believed that in Hanoi, the Vietnamese would not yet dare suppress the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to achieve their aims, because they needed Kampuchea's revolution. Besides, they feared not to be able to get out of the mess in which they were in and they feared the reactions and repressions which could be disastrous to them. Had they not needed the help of Kampuchea's revolution, the Vietnamese would have used all means to prevent the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea from going back to Kampuchea. But they needed the presence of Comrade Secretary Pol Pot in Kampuchea to face the situation, not in the interest of Kampuchea's revolution but in their own. The U.S. imperialists, Thieu's clique and all the reactionary forces have gathered in Kampuchea. So, the Vietnamese had to mobilize the maximum forces to face the situation. Otherwise, they would have then suppressed the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

4. The Vietnamese Manoeuvres in Kampuchea Aiming at Taking Over the State Power

a. The Vietnamese wanted to set up mixed commands and mixed organs of power.

While the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was still abroad, the Vietnamese increased their contacts with all the zones' committees in Kampuchea, particularly with those of the Northeast and East. At that time, Comrades Ieng Sary and Son Sen were responsible for the Northeast zone. The Vietnamese General, Minh, responsible for the Central Vietnam zone, came and met with the two comrades and told them that Comrade Secretary Pol Pot and the Central Committee of the Vietnamese party had agreed to create mixed commands. To this end, the Vietnamese decided to place at Kampuchea's disposal 200 beds and all medical staff, cooks included. (The Vietnamese wanted even to teach Kampuchea how to cook rice!)

The meeting was held in a very tense atmosphere, and did not come to any result, for Kampuchea's side abided by a position of independence and sovereignty whereas the Vietnamese wanted to swallow Kampuchea. That General Minh was very tenacious. Despite that he was told by Comrades Ieng Sary and Son Sen that Kampuchea needed nothing and that they had received no directives from Comrade Pol Pot on this matter, he obstinately refused to leave, pretending shamelessly that Comrade Secretary Pol Pot already came to an agreement with this matter. But by that time (it was in the beginning of May 1970) the U.S. and Thieu's troops massively invaded the region. The B-52's bombed and heavy artillery pounded intensively and helicopters landed troops with blockhaus. The Vietnamese, including first of all General Minh got frightened and ran away.

Such were the manoeuvres of the Vietnamese in the military field. In the parallel direction with those manoeuvres, Vo Chi Cong, secretary of the Vietnamese 5th zone, responsible for the High Lands in South Vietnam, came and negotiated with the responsables of the Northeast zone of Kampuchea. He proposed cooperation between Kampuchea and Vietnam in the State power organs. Vietnam would supply cadres at the level of districts, communes and villages as well as cadres and technicians for setting up the State power organs. Vo Chi Cong was eager to make it clear that on the Vietnamese side, everything was kept ready. Only the agreement from Kampuchea was being awaited.

Comrades Ieng Sary and Son Sen replied that Kampuchea is master of the situation and she is all by herself capable of assuming the function of the State power. As far as Vietnam was concerned, it was up to the Vietnamese to take necessary measures. Comrade Ieng

Sary was bent on adding that during the time of fighting against the French colonialists, the Vietnamese monopolized everything, and from this fact the Khmers knew nothing.

In spite of their failure, the Vietnamese did not throw in their hand. They went to Attopeu to meet Comrade Secretary Pol Pot who, on his way home, arrived at Se Sou, East of Attopeu, in Laos. In their report to Comrade Secretary Pol Pot, they deliberately told lies according to which Comrade Ieng Sary has already come to an agreement with the Vietnamese proposals and that he was only waiting for the decision of Comrade Secretary. The latter perfectly understood that the Vietnamese were lying, for according to the method of work and direction of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, any decision should be collectively taken. Besides, in Hanoi, the Vietnamese already tried to play him a nasty trick.

Comrade Secretary Pol Pot answered them that he had not yet received the report on that matter and asked them to patiently wait until he arrived in Kampuchea. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese refused to get off and went on insisting on their claims. But a Vietnamese colonel, native of South Vietnam and responsible for the escort unit, understood the reasonable speech of Comrade Secretary Pol Pot and criticized the behavior of the Vietnamese envoys, charging them with discourtesy and with preventing Secretary Pol Pot from taking any rest after such a long journey. He then turned them out.

When he arrived in Kampuchea's territory, Comrade Secretary Pol Pot first stayed in the Vietnamese shelter. The Vietnamese envoys followed him and overtook him. Comrade Ieng Sary who came to greet him was also present.

The Vietnamese envoys took the opportunity once again to renew all their proposals in more pressing terms: mixed commands, Vietnamese cadres for the villages, communes and districts, technicians, hospitals, etc. But Comrade Secretary Pol Pot told them that he had to wait for the decisions of the Central Committee.

The Vietnamese were very unsatisfied. And when Comrade Secretary left their shelter for that of Kampuchea's side, the Vietnamese did not move to accompany him.

In the East zone, the Vietnamese tried to carry out the same manoeuvres. They proposed to set up organizations in all fields for Kampuchea. Even for women's works, the Vietnamese women Nguyen Thi Dinh offered to come and educate Kampuchea's women, to teach them how to work. In fact, that Nguyen Thi Dinh did not know how to do anything, either housework, or mass political work, nor military work. Actually the Vietnamese wanted to control Kampuchea's people like they did during the fighting against the French colonialists.

b. The Vietnamese secretly organized a parallel State power in Kampuchea.

After the coup d'état in March 18, 1970, the Vietnamese organized the Vietnamese nationals dwelling in Kampuchea, armed them and used them as particularly ferocious tools of oppressing against Kampuchea's people. Kampuchea's people hated them and gave them the nickname of "Vietnamese of local make". These Vietnamese nationals proved themselves to be more cruel in their repression than their compatriots coming from North Vietnam, for they knew the Khmer language and the inhabitants. They persecuted the population for nearly one year, that is until 1971.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea launched a struggle against those Vietnamese nationals at one and the same time by raising strong official protests and mobilizing mass people to organize widespread demonstrations against them. The revolutionary power disarmed them and those who refused to lay down their arms were arrested.

In the parallel direction with the activities of those "Vietnamese of local make", the Vietnamese secretly organized a parallel State power in Kampuchea, particularly in the East Zone where they could achieve some implantations, for they had their agents there. In the Southwest they also tried to do it, but did not achieve any significant result. It was only in early 1971 that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea knew the existence of that parallel State power. It asked the Vietnamese to dissolve it.

c. The Vietnamese secretly organized a parallel army in Kampuchea

The Communist Party of Kampuchea never received a single rifle of the 5,000 promised from the Vietnamese. The latter used those rifles to arm adventurers, bandits, delinquents, former soldiers or policemen dismissed by Lon Nol's regime. The Vietnamese gathered those men and organized them in battalions, companies, platoons, etc. to set up a parallel army in which soldiers were Kampuchea nationals and cadres were Vietnamese. In the East zone, they succeeded in setting up two battalions, that is about 600 men. It was the same in the Southwest zone.

When the Communist Party of Kampuchea knew the existence of this parallel army, it demanded that the Vietnamese hand them over to it. As they feared that the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Kampuchea's people would not supply them if they refused to comply with this demand, the Vietnamese handed over one part of the troops to the Communist Party of Kampuchea. But they secretly kept another part by continuing to secretly enlist new men as a reserve force able to be further used against the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Kampuchea's revolution.

d. The Vietnamese secretly organized military training and medical training schools in Kampuchea.

In the Northeast zone, the Vietnamese wanted to open a military training school for Kampuchea. But the Committee of this zone refused.

In the East zone in 1970, the Vietnamese secretly opened a military training school. They gathered some Kampuchea nationals from some regions of this zone to carry out some lessons on military techniques at the level of chiefs of platoon or company. Always in secret, they also opened medical training schools for medical staff, lectured on radio-telegraphy and administration of State power organs. At the beginning, the Communist Party of Kampuchea was not aware of those activities because in the East zone, there were several hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese and also some Khmer elements belonging to the Indochinese Communist Party who carried out clandestine activities. It was only in the middle of 1971 that the Central Committee had been aware of those activities.

The Central Committee then gave directives to all zones to close down those schools created by the Vietnamese. Indeed, the Party had already opened military training and medical training schools for the whole country. Those schools spent as much time in political education as in technical training.

Implementing the directives of the Central Committee, the East zone closed down the Vietnamese schools. But the Vietnamese already succeeded in turning out two promotions of military training and one promotion of medical training. Those, who have been trained in the Vietnamese schools had a conception quite different from that of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, as much in the political line as in the organizational and fighting lines.

5. The Vietnamese Wanted to Annihilate the Leadership Of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in November 1970

In June 1970, Comrade Secretary Pol Pot came back to Ratanakiri, Northeast zone. By mid-September 1970 after having organized the preparations for the mission of Comrade Ieng Sary abroad, he went down to the South of the country and arrived in the commune of Boeng Lovea, district of Santuk, Kampong Thom province. In October 1970, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea held a full session to take stock of the general situation in the country in order to wage the national liberation war. From 1960 to 1970, the Central Committee was endowed with a solid unity of conceptions and positions. The full session in October 1970 further strengthened this unity in the pursuit of the struggle. It was unanimous so that:

- the Party, the United Front, the Army and the Government

had to firmly abide by the position of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance and of deciding by themselves their own destiny, in all fields;

- the foreign policy had also to be in the position of independence and sovereignty in order to mobilize all forces and keep up good relations with all friends,
- with Vietnam, solidarity would be made by abiding by the position of independence, sovereignty and by being always vigilant, for the Vietnamese were used to constantly wage activities of sabotage and destruction against Kampuchea's revolution.

In November 1970, the Vietnamese asked for talks with the Communist Party of Kampuchea on the problem of the development of solidarity and cooperation. It was official negotiations. On the Vietnamese side, there were Nguyen Van Linh called Muoi Cuc, secretary of the South Vietnam zone, and Tran Nam Trung.

On Kampuchea's side, there were Comrade Secretary Pol Pot and Comrade Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea.

The meeting was held at a bend of Stung Chinit river, moving from North to West, that is at 30 kilometres from the refuge of Comrade Secretary Pol Pot and 40 kilometres from the refuge of the Vietnamese central committee.

At that time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea knew that the Vietnamese were very perfidious. However, it had not been aware of their secret plan aiming at assassinating the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. It was only in 1976 that it was aware of it.

During the talks, the Vietnamese once again put forward the same problems: mixed organs of State power, military and technical training schools, etc. They also renewed their demands for aids already mentioned by Le Duan in Hanoi in April 1970, that is sanctuaries, facilities of communication, foodstuffs, etc.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea agreed to their demands, but asked them to make no attempts at carrying out undermining activities among the people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, Kampuchea's side politely let them understand that she was totally self-sufficient as much in the State power as in the army. At that time, the Communist Party of Kampuchea already got a fairly great quantity of armaments at its disposal, and in every zone, it already had several battalions.

The negotiations lasted one week. On that occasion, Muoi Cuc did not have his meals twice. He pretended to have eaten enough fruits. He slept less, too. In fact he was thinking a lot. As representative of his party, he had to adopt a definite position regarding the decisions of Kampuchea. That was for him a turning point which he had to carefully turn over in his mind. It was at that moment that

he came to the conclusion that he ought to eliminate the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

After the negotiations, the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea had perfectly been aware of that. However the analysis was not yet complete. In fact, the Vietnamese decided to eliminate the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea ever since the latter had turned down their proposals put forward in the Northeast and East zones¹. At the talks in November 1970, the Vietnamese tried to have Comrade Secretary Pol Pot and Comrade Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea poisoned by their agents infiltrated inside the Communist Party of Kampuchea. So, the Vietnamese attempts at assassinating the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea dated from 1970.

The talks were held in the North zone, called zone 304. It was the secretary of this zone, Koy Thuon² who organized the talks and it was his wife who cooked on that occasion.

When he was arrested in 1976, Koy Thuon revealed the plot: Men San³ ordered him to carry out this odious work and handed to him the poison that he had received from Tran Nam Trung. The latter was commissioned to spy and sabotage Kampuchea's revolution.

As the Communist Party had taken strict measures of vigilance and had at the kitchen comrades faithful to the Party, this Vietnamese heinous crime failed.

Therefore, in November 1970, the Vietnamese tried to annihilate the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, for they could not win it over to their cause. From that date, they did not refrain from carrying out activities to destroy the Communist Party of Kampuchea. It was a new turning point for them because they had no more possibilities, neither to destroy Kampuchea's revolution, nor to swallow Kampuchea by legal or organizational means, and they had to resort to other methods and means.

The attempts at coups d'état they set forth, their acts of aggression and invasion against Kampuchea were not much surprising. The

1. See Chapter 4 4 page 54 and so on

2. Koy Thuon was a CIA agent since 1958, who infiltrated in the Communist Party of Kampuchea in 1960.

3. Men San was kidnapped by the Vietnamese in 1946 and changed his name to Ney Sarann. After the 1954 Geneva Agreements, the Vietnamese forsook him. He became the CIA's agent in 1955. In 1960 he infiltrated in the Communist Party of Kampuchea. When he joined the maquis, the Vietcongs, agents of the CIA, contacted him again. As a double agent, he was at the same time at the service of the CIA and the Vietnamese. In the CIA's network, he occupied a higher position than that of Koy Thuon. It was him who commanded Koy Thuon.

Vietnamese have carried out and are carrying out all kinds of criminal activities aiming obstinately at annexing and swallowing Kampuchea.

6. The Criminal and Fascist Acts of the Vietnamese Against Kampuchea's People

In a parallel direction with their acts aiming at assassinating the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and their activities aiming at setting up a puppet army and a puppet State power, the Vietnamese have carried out extremely fascist criminal acts against Kampuchea's people.

Kampuchea's people fed and sheltered the Vietnamese who had penetrated into Kampuchea's territory. But in return, the Vietnamese, cadres and fighters, imposed upon the hospitality of Kampuchea's people and acted as a big power, colonialists, feudalists and masters of Kampuchea. They despised Kampuchea's people. They raped young girls, arrested and shot down cadres of the villages and communes of Kampuchea. They got in all housings and occupied them at their will. The responsables of each locality told them to call for the responsible organizations and to abide by the decisions of the latter. In Kampuchea, the Vietnamese acted as masters, even worse than the French colonialists. Here is an example. In the East zone, the Vietnamese settled in a house of the inhabitants of a village. They were served a meal with chicken soup. In the countryside, chicken is only served on exceptional occasions, not often in ordinary meals. However, the Vietnamese refused to eat and clamoured for another dish of meat. They were told that there was nothing else and that in killing the chicken, the utmost efforts had already been made. The Vietnamese went angry and threw to the ground all the food, the chicken soup included.

The population of Kampuchea seethed with deep hatred towards the Vietnamese so that it was not necessary to conduct campaigns to arouse it. The Vietnamese who raped girls were punished. They kept on creating incidents. The high levels of the Communist Party of Kampuchea have always strived to smoothe things over as much with the Vietnamese as with the population.

After the Paris Agreements, from February to August 1973, the U.S. imperialists were launching a savage air war against Kampuchea's revolution carrying out intensive bombing, days and nights, against Kampuchea. The Vietnamese took the opportunity to create additional difficulties for the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

In July 1973, in Southwest zone, the Vietnamese behaved barbarously in a former revolutionary base of Kampuchea, in Sre Knong village, district of Chhouk, Kampot province. They arrested the

chairman of the committee of the village and when the inhabitants were demonstrating to demand his release, they beat the inhabitants. They arrested monks, women and children, kept them in a single house with the chairman of the committee of the village and set fire to the house. They threatened the population with their rifles to prevent them from coming close. They had then burned alive six people.

In that zone, the Communist Party of Kampuchea did not have important armed forces. On the contrary, the Vietnamese had two regiments set up along road No. 4, from road No. 3 to Kampot. Their headquarters was at Amleang where their liaison Committee with the Committee of the Southwest zone of Kampuchea was.

Having been aware that the Vietnamese had burned alive the inhabitants, the guerilla units of the village and the population of this area counter-attacked them. The population and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea from other localities learned of the crimes of the Vietnamese, attacked them everywhere and even in Amleang, until the Vietnamese fled to Kampong Trach, in Kampot province. They fled at the same time from the U.S. air bombings, the Lon Nol Clique's army and the Red Khmers! In spite of their modern weapons, they met with heavy defeats inflicted on them by Kampuchea's people who relieved one another to drive them out. The Vietnamese lost about 500 men. Kampuchea's side lost about 100 men.

The central committee of the Vietnamese party then asked the Communist Party of Kampuchea to help them to remedy the situation. Comrade Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea received a letter from Hay So in which he stated that he implored with tearful eyes the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to help him to solve the problem, even if he had to suffer all punishments. The Communist Party of Kampuchea sent in the secretary of the Southwest zone to remedy the situation.

The expulsion of the two Vietnamese regiments from Amleang fully satisfied the population. It was helpful to Kampuchea's revolution, more especially as the Communist Party of Kampuchea had shown maganimity in sending in on the spot the secretary of the Southwest zone to solve the problem and in allowing the Vietnamese to gather themselves in Kampong Trach as they had asked for. The Vietnamese suffered an ignominious defeat. Before, they could live in peace and tranquility up to Kampong Chhnang, now after the incidents they had provoked, they were driven out to Kampong Trach. And having no territory to take refuge, they had to implore for help from the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

Abroad, the Vietnamese slandered and denigrated Kampuchea's revolution aiming at isolating it. Pham Van Dong even complained before the Chinese comrades that Kampuchea did not want to be in

solidarity with Vietnam, that she has abolished all the armed forces set up by Vietnam for her and refused any Vietnamese technical assistance.

The Chinese comrades reported those Vietnamese complaints to the representative of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in making it clear that this problem would depend only on Kampuchea. The representative of the Communist Party of Kampuchea told the Chinese comrades that Kampuchea's revolution is independent and sovereign but that if Kampuchea's revolution has bound itself with Vietnam, it would not be able to wage the struggle, because even in the bosom of the Party, there would not be unanimity. All the more among the people who hated the Vietnamese!

7. The Vietnamese Plan to Overthrow the Revolutionary Power of Kampuchea and to Set Up a New Communist Party

a. In 1973, the Vietnamese planned to overthrow once again the revolutionary power of Kampuchea. To this end, they were relying on:

1. their infiltrated agents in Kampuchea,
2. their agents living in Hanoi, kept in reserve for further needs, in case the first ones would be all eliminated.

Their agents inside Kampuchea participated in the State power and in the army, especially:

1. some members of the Indochinese Communist Party particularly in the East zone,
2. the East zone army in which they succeeded in infiltrating the elements trained in their military schools.

The Vietnamese thought that the U.S. imperialists air war against Kampuchea was for the most part powerful and that the Kampuchea's revolutionary forces too would be certainly destroyed. Consequently, they created a party and an army to join their own army in order to attack the Communist Party of Kampuchea and seize the power in the whole country. They called this party by the name of "Workers' Party". They created a central committee for this party which included their agents living in Kampuchea and those living in Hanoi.¹

But this Vietnamese plan failed, because:

1. the U.S. imperialists air war against Kampuchea's revolution did not bring in the results they had hoped for. Even if the U.S. imperialists had carried on this war, they would not have achieved any better results. The U.S. planes did not succeed in causing big

1. At that time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was not aware of this Vietnamese plan. It had been informed only later on.

damages to the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, for the latter was constantly on the move,

2. the Vietnamese did not have enough forces (their own forces and those of their infiltrated agents in Kampuchea as much in the Party and in the Army as among the people).

On the contrary, the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Kampuchea's people were united in a single block. The determinant factor is the people.

b. In 1975, the Vietnamese wanted once again to overthrow the revolutionary power in Kampuchea. In 1974 the Vietnamese received information according to which the Communist Party of Kampuchea was getting itself ready to launch the final offensive to liberate Phnom Penh and the whole country.

That was the reason why the Vietnamese had set up their plan as follows:

1. They were strengthening and developing their forces to get themselves ready for the action. They set too much hope on their agents in the East zone.

2. As soon as they have liberated Saigon, they would launch many dozens of their divisions to attack the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Kampuchea's revolution and set up in Kampuchea their own State power. They made arrangements to liberate Saigon in the 1976's dry season, that is in late 1976 – early 1977¹, and according to their assessment, they thought they would liberate Saigon before the Communist Party of Kampuchea could liberate Phnom Penh. They did not believe that the Communist Party of Kampuchea was going to liberate Phnom Penh in 1975.

On January 1, 1975, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea launched their ultimate offensive. This offensive was carried out without a stop during January and February. But the U.S. imperialists and the Lon Nol clique thought that the Red Khmers could not afford to keep up their offensive any longer than three months for lack of ammunition. The Vietnamese thought the same way, for the ammunition was in their hands and they did not want to carry it for Kampuchea's revolution. Besides, they thought that the U.S. imperialists big power would not let the small Kampuchea inflict defeat on it.

But on February 26, 1975, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea completely cut off the Mekong river. From that time, the Vietnamese began to be really worried. Late March 1975, their central committee asked for a meeting with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. One of the reasons that pre-

1. At the time of the presidential elections in the United States of America.

vented the Vietnamese from attacking Saigon was their fear of the U.S. interventions. That was the reason why they wanted to know whether or not the U.S. imperialists would intervene, once Phnom Penh is liberated. The Communist Party of Kampuchea told the Vietnamese that, according to its evaluation of the situation, the U.S. imperialists would not dare to intervene, for their forces have been already crushed. In the United States, the American people were struggling to claim back the remains of the American soldiers. If the U.S. imperialists sent 10,000 more men to intervene in Kampuchea, the U.S. government would have had to search back for at least 1,000 new American bodies.

Based on this evaluation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese mobilized then all their forces in North Vietnam to launch attacks in South Vietnam. But, without the victory of Kampuchea, it would be difficult for them to liberate Saigon.

The Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea liberated Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975. The radio of the United Front in Phnom Penh broadcast the news on the same day at noon, announcing that Phnom Penh had been liberated at 9:30 a.m.

In Hanoi, the Vietnamese did not believe their ears. Comrade Ieng Sary himself who was at that time in Hanoi, told them that Phnom Penh had been liberated, but they still did not believe it. The Vietnamese did not want to believe it for on the one hand, the liberation of Phnom Penh before that of Saigon deprived them of any hope to achieve their plan of taking possession of Kampuchea, and on the other hand, this was a very painful strike to their honour and prestige. The Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi at that time had their face cadaverous and was livid with rage, for:

1. Kampuchea won victory before Vietnam,
2. their plan to take possession of Kampuchea automatically fell in.

8. The Ungrateful Nature of the Vietnamese Towards the Communist Party of Kampuchea which had rescued Them From Total Collapse from 1970 to 1975

During the period 1970 to 1975, Kampuchea's revolution saved the Vietnamese who were like drowning men engaged in sinking. Kampuchea's revolution successfully defended the soil of Kampuchea, offered sanctuaries to the Vietnamese and supplied them with food, so that they could recover their forces and go back to fight on their own soil. But the Vietnamese are still more ungrateful than crocodiles.

At the very moment when Kampuchea's revolution was saving them from collapse, they wanted to knock it down in order to take possession of Kampuchea. From 1970 to 1975, not only did the

Vietnamese help Kampuchea in nothing, but they still came and carried out sabotage, and attempted to systematically destroy Kampuchea's revolution. In 1970 in the Northeast zone, the Vietnamese secretly destroyed the war booties of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, sabotaged the heavy artillery's pieces, broached drums full of gasoline, destroyed medicine, etc. At that time, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea was short of everything and the Vietnamese did everything they could to restrain the move forward by Kampuchea's revolution. They opposed anything that could make Kampuchea's revolution independent. That was the reason why on the battlefields, there were often fights between the revolutionary Army of Kampuchea and the Vietnamese. Our fighters could no longer bear with them, in spite of the constant recommendations made by the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to preserve the solidarity with the Vietnamese.

5. THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE VIETNAMESE ATTEMPTS AT DESTROYING KAMPUCHEA'S REVOLUTION

tion, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea progressively captured them from the enemy.

b. The Vietnamese talked about Saigon's defence belts established by the U.S. and Thieu's clique. After the coup d'etat, this Saigon defence belt penetrated into Kampuchea's territory and then reached up to the Mekong river. Thieu's clique came up to Neak Luong. In the Southwest of Kampuchea, they reached up to National Road No. 4. The Vietnamese said that their situation was not good. The Communist Party of Kampuchea's position and analysis were different: in aggressing Kampuchea, the U.S. imperialists and Thieu's clique relied on Lon Nol's forces, that is on the "Khmerization of the war". Their forces coming from outside were not the permanent ones. They could only launch some big operations from time to time. That was a reality. Concretely, the route of the military operation "Chenla 2" was also the route of the "Khmerization of the war". After their strategic forces had been decimated, the enemy could not launch big military operations anymore. And neither the "Vietnamization" nor the "Americanization" of the war has succeeded.

c. The Vietnamese expressed their thanks to the Communist Party of Kampuchea, especially for the sanctuaries, the facilities in using communication lines, food, etc. given to them by the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They said that they had so many troops that it would be impossible to supply them from Hanoi. Consequently, they needed all that Kampuchea had. The Vietnamese expressed their thanks in words, but indeed they did not give up their underhanded and perfidious activities and manoeuvres.

2. The Paris Negotiations Between the Vietnamese and the U.S. and the Vietnamese Manoeuvres Aiming at Destroying Kampuchea's Revolution

a. The situation in mid-1972

When the 1970 coup d'etat broke out in Kampuchea, the negotiations held since 1968 between Vietnam and the United States were going on in Paris. In 1971, the Vietnamese and the U.S. were out of breath. So, from 1972 the Vietnamese started to exert pressure on the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They also carried on activities on the international arena to this end.

In 1972, during the talks between the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Vietnamese, the latter raised a lot of problems. But the fundamental problem was that of the negotiations to stop the war. At the beginning, they made it clear several times that Kampuchea had to negotiate. In mid-1972, their pressures became stronger. At the talks, Nguyen Van Linh called Muoi Cuc was replaced by Pham Hung. The latter came as secretary of the committee of the

1. The Contents of the Talks Between the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Vietnamese in 1970 - 1971

During their numerous talks, the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Vietnamese exchanged their views on their respective situations.

a. The Vietnamese often talked about the new effectives enlisted by Lon Nol's army, the air and naval forces and the artillery pieces, etc. of the latter. The Vietnamese wanted on the one hand, to point out to the Communist Party of Kampuchea that according to their estimation based on technical data, the enemy was powerful, and on the other hand, to frighten the Communist Party of Kampuchea so that the latter would ask for Vietnamese help and assistance. That was their main objective.

But the Vietnamese manoeuvres were ineffective, for the Communist Party of Kampuchea analyzed the situation differently. From mid-1970 to the end of 1971, the people living in the area under the Communist Party of Kampuchea's control increased from 70 per cent to 80 per cent of the whole population (and this number grew unceasingly the years after). At the same time, the Communist Party of Kampuchea was controlling the countryside and consequently, the economy as well. As for the armament and ammuni-

Vietnamese party in South Vietnam and at the same time as responsible for the army. The Vietnamese sent Pham Hung, for they thought that their former representatives did not have enough ability to negotiate with the Communist Party of Kampuchea. At that time, in Paris, the negotiations between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger reached a general agreement on a cease-fire. The Central Committee of the Vietnamese party entrusted Pham Hung with negotiating with the Communist Party of Kampuchea and forcing it to cease fire.

During the talks with Kampuchea's side, Pham Hung said that Vietnam could not carry on any longer the war which already lasted 30 years. It had to stop the war. Le Duan had already said the same thing to Comrade Secretary Pol Pot in 1970. The Vietnamese were driven into a situation where they thought they had to snap up the baits launched by the U.S. imperialists, that is:

1. cease-fire and elections
 2. U.S. aid of more than 3,000 million dollars.
- But Kampuchea was the obstacle.

b. The Vietnamese threats and pressures forcing the Communist Party of Kampuchea to negotiate

The Vietnamese agreed to negotiate with the U.S. imperialists and to cease-fire, for they could no longer carry on the war and were enticed by the U.S. baits. But at the same time, they did not forget their strategy of swallowing Kampuchea's territory: they wanted to force Kampuchea to negotiate so that she would become their satellite. They did not want Kampuchea to carry on the struggle, if not, Kampuchea would win victory and become independent, and they would then not be able to control her anymore. In 1954, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea were altogether at the Geneva negotiations. In 1972, the Vietnamese wanted that it would be the same at the Paris negotiations.

Thus, the Vietnamese exerted pressures on Kampuchea so that she would accept negotiation. They tried to do their utmost so that the situation in Kampuchea became at least as unfavourable as their situation. The most important thing for them was that Kampuchea would not be able to escape from their control. They would accept to lose all together with Kampuchea if they had to, provided that they could be in a dominating position with regard to Kampuchea.

From mid-1972 up, talks between Kampuchea and Vietnam took place every month. As Kampuchea's delegation always kept silent about the Paris negotiations, after 2 or 3 meetings, the Vietnamese asked for its opinion. The Communist Party of Kampuchea's delegation put back this question in return: "Whom to negotiate with?". "Would we have to negotiate with the Lon Nol clique? But the latter was already dying. The people were striking powerful blows at

him. In 1972, the "Khmerization" and the "Vietnamization" of the war in Kampuchea had already been smashed. The Communist Party of Kampuchea was already planning the great strategic offensive. In such a situation, there was no advantage at all to negotiate with Lon Nol. Would we have to negotiate with the U.S.? Kampuchea's revolution did not have to negotiate with the aggressors of Kampuchea. They had to stop their aggression and to withdraw from Kampuchea. Besides, the Communist Party of Kampuchea had nobody to carry out negotiations.

The Vietnamese replied: "In our opinion, Kampuchea's comrades must negotiate. If Kampuchea's comrades have no cadres to carry out negotiations with the U.S., we can do it in their place.

The Vietnamese impudence is boundless!

In October 1972, the Vietnamese pressures became more imperious. In fact, the U.S. and the Vietnamese had already put the broad outline of the draft of Paris Agreements into shape. Pham Hung and Hay So asked to meet once again with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The talks lasted 4 days instead of the initially scheduled 2 days. During the talks, the Vietnamese have shown their rare insolence and were in a towering rage. Both sides expressed once again their points of view and each side kept abiding by its position. The Communist Party of Kampuchea yielded nothing under the Vietnamese pressures.

Therefore, the reason for which Kissinger refused to sign the Paris Agreements in October 1972 was the refusal of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to yield under the Vietnamese pressures.

In January 1973, Pham Hung asked to meet Comrade Secretary Pol Pot. During the talks which were held from January 24 to 26, Pham Hung said that according to the information he received from his central committee, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had reached a definitive agreement. The Agreement text was already initialed and waited only for the signatures. Pham Hung gave a copy of it in Vietnamese language to Comrade Secretary Pol Pot and he made some commentaries on the terms and conditions of the elections scheduled to be held after the signature of the Agreements and on the U.S. aid to Vietnam. He added that after the elections the Vietnamese party was sure to win over the South Vietnamese people to its side.

Kampuchea's side pointed out to him that the same argument was held at the moment of the Geneva Agreements in 1954. In spite of all the support given by Kampuchea's people to it Kampuchea's revolution had obtained nothing at the elections. Kampuchea's side did not mention anything about the problems concerning Vietnam. The Vietnamese became more and more threatening, which made the talks very tense. But as the talks took place in Kampuchea's territory, they had to be cautious.

Comrade Secretary Pol Pot replied to Pham Hung: "We will re-

spect what the Vietnamese comrades will decide concerning their affairs. As for us, we will not cease fire. We will carry on the fighting and we are sure to win victory.”

At the end of the talks, the Vietnamese had obtained nothing. Pham Hung was very angry. He raised two problems:

1. He said that he would leave in Kampuchea the whole Vietnamese army taking refuge there, including the military installations, the Commissariat and transports. The Vietnamese behavior was worse than that of the colonialists! They did not at all ask advice of the Communist Party of Kampuchea about their proposal to let their army stay in Kampuchea's territory. They said that they would leave them stay in Kampuchea! When Kampuchea's side replied to them that Kampuchea already had enough armed forces at her disposal, the Vietnamese became crimson with rage. If the talks had taken place in Vietnamese territory, Pham Hung would surely have banged on the table!

2. At the moment when he was about to go back home, Pham Hung said that he had been entrusted by the Vietnamese party to inform the Communist Party of Kampuchea that on the day of their meeting to finish off the text of the Agreements, Kissinger asked Le Duc Tho to inform Kampuchea's side that if Kampuchea did not cease fire, the U.S. strategic and tactical planes would destroy Kampuchea within 72 hours. That was an open threat uttered to the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

On January 27, 1973, the Vietnamese and the U.S. signed the Paris Agreements. The Communist Party of Kampuchea had already taken all steps to face the situation. The whole Communist Party of Kampuchea, the whole Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea had studied this situation and got ready to face all eventualities.

When Comrade Secretary Pol Pot came back home, he received a letter from the central committee of the Vietnamese party in South Vietnam and addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. This letter only confirmed Kissinger's threats underlining that if Kampuchea did not cease fire, he would totally destroy Kampuchea's revolution within 72 hours. The Vietnamese asked the Communist Party of Kampuchea to more carefully consider the problem. Did Kissinger really talk like this? Probably. But anyway, the Vietnamese were involved in this affair.

In the evening of January 26, 1978, the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea held a meeting to prepare a brief statement saying that Kampuchea would carry on the struggle to conquer its independence.

c. The position of the Communist Party of Kampuchea on the problem of negotiations and cease-fire.

As it has been mentioned above, the Communist Party of Kam-

puchea did not know with whom to negotiate, for Lon Nol was already dying. As for the U.S., they were the aggressors. They had to stop their aggression. During the talks in October 1972, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, Pol Pot, said to the Vietnamese: “If the Communist Party of Kampuchea ceased fire, even only just for one day, Lon Nol's clique would have time to recover its breath. If the Communist Party of Kampuchea carried on the fighting, the U.S. and Lon Nol's clique would be able to carry only 20 to 30 per cent of their needs in armaments and food. But if the Communist Party of Kampuchea accepted the cease-fire, the enemy would be able to carry each month hundreds of thousands of tons to supply their army. Besides, a cease-fire would spread confusion in the determination of the people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea in waging their struggle”.

On the other hand, at the end of 1972, the political situation of the whole Southeast Asia showed that it was in Kampuchea where the revolutionary situation was the best. South Vietnam, on the whole, was under the Thieu clique's control. It was the same in Laos which, except some regions, was controlled by the administration of Vientiane. As for Kampuchea, Kampuchea's revolution, on the whole, grasped the situation well in hand and controlled the country. If the map was coloured, black colour would be in every place, except in Kampuchea where red colour would dominate. The objective of the U.S. imperialists was to take this red place and turn it into black colour. If they succeeded in Kampuchea, they would surely reinforce their domination over the black places. Kampuchea played then a key role. If Kampuchea's revolution accepted the cease-fire, it would collapse. As a matter of fact, the U.S. imperialists and Lon Nol's clique could then extend the areas under their control, get more people, develop their economy and continue to further extend themselves, until the collapse of the revolution. If Kampuchea's revolution failed, Vietnam's revolution would also fail. It would be the same for the other revolutions in South East Asian countries. But if Kampuchea's revolution carried on its struggle and its move forward, whatever the situation, it would be able to play its part in developing the revolutionary situation in Southeast Asia.

That was why Kampuchea refused to negotiate and cease-fire in spite of the Vietnamese pressures, threats and provocations, in spite of their attempts at murdering Kampuchea's leaders and their coup d'etat plots. Kampuchea's refusal greatly frightened the Vietnamese. In October 1972, Le Duc Tho was very anxious, for the U.S. intensified their pressures on the Vietnamese. Why did the U.S. exert such pressures? The Communist Party of Kampuchea was not aware at all of the development of the negotiations between the U.S. and the Vietnamese. The Communist Party of Kampuchea had adopted

such a position of struggle with neither compromise nor cease-fire only to defend the interests of Kampuchea's revolution. It did not want to interfere in Vietnam's affairs. But in the negotiations with the U.S., it was the Vietnamese themselves who became entangled among their own manoeuvres. The Vietnamese had told the U.S. not to be worried about Kampuchea, for it was them, the Vietnamese who controlled Kampuchea. Let the U.S. accept the Vietnamese proposals and Vietnam would be in charge of solving the problem with Kampuchea. That was what the Vietnamese had told the U.S. and they had spread over the world that Kampuchea's revolution could fight only thanks to the armaments carried by them. The U.S. believed them, for although they have been aware that the Communist Party of Kampuchea had contradictions with Vietnam, they were not aware of the importance of these contradictions. So, when the Vietnamese informed the U.S. that they had failed in forcing Kampuchea to negotiate and cease-fire, the U.S. was very mad and decided to send their B-52's to bomb Hanoi in December 1972, until the Vietnamese implored them to stop bombing and to resume the negotiations.

6. THE ACTIVITIES OF VIETNAM FOR ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVE AIMING AT ANNEXING AND SWALLOWING KAMPUCHEA FROM 1975 UP TO NOW

1. From April 17, 1975 Up To the First Semester of 1977

Kampuchea was totally and definitively liberated on April 17, 1975. South Vietnam was liberated on April 30, 1975. The Vietnamese had to leave Kampuchea and go back home. The Communist Party of Kampuchea requested the Vietnamese to withdraw before the end of May 1975 and at the latest, at the end of June 1975. But in fact, only one part of the Vietnamese withdrew from Kampuchea. Another part remained, including the Vietnamese soldiers who were living to everybody's knowledge, and the Vietnamese nationals secretly infiltrated into Kampuchea and who were living in hiding themselves among the population. They were however much less numerous than before. They were scattered in the remote regions of Kampuchea, at Snuol (in Kratie province) and in the provinces of Mondulkiri and Ratanakiri.

It was in Ratanakiri province where they were the most numerous remained in Kampuchea's territory. There were more than 1,000 scattered here and there in many places in groups of 10 to 100, especially in the North of Andaung Meas and Voeunsay, near O Ta Pork and O Kampha, about 20 kilometres from the border.

By keeping its forces to stay in Kampuchea's territory, Vietnam

wanted to control Kampuchea, the Party and Kampuchea's people, and to organize the people in order to create difficulties for Kampuchea's revolution. It also wanted to create bases for its future aggression.

In Ratanakiri, Kampuchea's regional forces requested them to withdraw. The Vietnamese replied that the territories located in the North of Andaung Meas and Voeunsay were Vietnamese territories. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea protested by making them know that these territories are the ones on which they asked the Communist Party of Kampuchea for permission to install their sanctuaries. Although they could not deny the facts, they obstinately refused to withdraw. The responsible of Kampuchea's regional troops patiently did his utmost to make them understand that they had to withdraw. But the Vietnamese violently pushed him away and threatened to kill him. Actually, they fired at Kampuchea's troops. After this incident occurred, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea sent its regional forces to drive them out. Kampuchea then recovered her territories in Ratanakiri province.

In Mondulkiri province, the Vietnamese troops also refused to withdraw. They finally withdrew only under the threat of the provincial Secretary to drive them out by force.

At Snuol (Kratie province), the Vietnamese accepted to withdraw, for they were aware of the measures taken in Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri provinces.

But along the borders, the Vietnamese border troops, by units of 20 to 30 soldiers, continuously launched attacks against the troops of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea and unceasingly provoked incidents. Furthermore, Vietnam sent its nationals to settle in Kampuchea's territory, along the borders. In some places, the Vietnamese houses were built with some columns in the Vietnamese territory and some other in Kampuchea's territory. At Peam Chor, Prey Veng province, the Vietnamese also came and settled in Kampuchea's territory. At Kaam Samna, Kandal province, the Vietnamese attacked Kampuchea's troops the day after April 17, 1975. It took one month to solve the conflict.

From Kampot province up to Ratanakiri province, along the borders, the Vietnamese unceasingly carried out provocations. Moreover, they launched their aggressions against Kampuchea's islands trying to take possession of Koh Ses, Koh Thmey and Koh Takiev islands located in front of Ream, on which they sent commandos to land during the night. At the end of May 1975, they attacked and took possession of Koh Way islands. Thus, the Vietnamese attacked Kampuchea immediately the day after her liberation.

In spite of this situation, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea decided to go and negotiate once again

with Vietnam. At that time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea still regarded Vietnam as a friendly country with which Kampuchea had differences, for it was not yet aware of Vietnam's secret plan aiming at eliminating the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea thought then that Kampuchea and Vietnam being liberated, the differences then could be solved. In June 1975, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea sent a top ranking delegation to Hanoi. There were Comrade Secretary Pol Pot, Comrade Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea and Comrade Ieng Sary, member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee as well as other members of the Central Committee. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea knew that there were complicated problems to solve, but did not think that the Vietnamese would dare to try to kill the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. That was why although it had taken into account the security problem for its leaders, it had nevertheless decided that Comrade Secretary Pol Pot would lead the delegation.

During the negotiations with Vietnam, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea proposed to sign between the two parties and two States, Kampuchea-Vietnam, a friendship and non-aggression treaty based on mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, of non-interference in each other's internal affairs and reciprocal benefit. Such a treaty could lead to solve other problems. But the Vietnamese side did not respond to the proposal of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

The delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea also raised the borders' problem on the basis of the solemn statements made by the Central Committee of the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam and by the Government of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam in 1967, which recognized Kampuchea's present borders and bind themselves to respect them. But the Vietnamese side did not talk anything about this borders problem.

The negotiations did not lead to any result. They only contributed to ease the atmosphere of the bilateral relations.

Concerning Koh Way islands, if Kampuchea had not fought, not only would she not have taken them back but furthermore Vietnam would have taken possession of other islands, for it knew that, immediately after liberation, Kampuchea had a lot of weak points concerning territorial sea defence.

Why did the Vietnamese launch attacks and create incidents along the borders, and why did they take possession of Kampuchea's islands?

The Vietnamese agents who had infiltrated into the ranks of Kampuchea's revolution and were arrested in 1976 pointed out that

the Vietnamese exerted pressures along the borders in order to:

1. prevent the Communist Party of Kampuchea from consolidating the revolutionary power,
2. prevent Kampuchea from defending herself and in order to create favourable conditions allowing them to progressively take possession of other parts of Kampuchea's territory,
3. encourage their agents infiltrated into the ranks of Kampuchea's revolution.

Therefore immediately after the liberation of Phnom Penh, Vietnam attacked Kampuchea. The situation was still more complex than that during the national liberation war under the bombings of the U.S. imperialists' B52's. The Vietnamese acted with the object of allowing their agents to take over the revolutionary power in Kampuchea. And, according to their plan, after their agents had succeeded in taking over the power, they would have sent as many troops as they wanted into Kampuchea. Thus, in 1975, the Vietnamese objective was not yet to take possession of Kampuchea from outside.

In July 1975, at the ceremony of the founding of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea throughout the country, that is the ceremony when each zone handed over their armed forces to the Central Committee, the enemy plotted to assassinate the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They succeeded in infiltrating a fighter belonging to a unit of the North zone, into the group of fighters armed with guns and in charge of security in the hall where the ceremony was taking place, so that he could fire at the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. According to the enemy's plan, this fighter had to carry out his heinous crime at nine o'clock. But the plot failed, for all the guns had been emptied of their cartridges before entering the ceremony hall. This enemy plot has been unmasked only one year after, in 1976.

In September 1975, the enemy plotted once again to assassinate the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They organized 3 to 4 fighters of a unit of the East zone of Kampuchea to carry out the plot, but these fighters did not know the leaders and consequently did not know whom to fire at. Their chiefs knew the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, but they dared not to carry out this heinous crime by themselves, for fear of being arrested.

In 1976, the enemy were ready to renew once again their murdering attempt but they failed to do so. In April 1976, the revolutionary power dismantled progressively the enemy's networks. This dismantlement revealed that the Vietnamese planned to launch attacks from outside in order to encourage their agents inside Kampuchea. Notably, they had to attack the East zone of Kampuchea in liaison with a man of the name Cha Krey, a chief of the units quartered in the South of Prey Veng province. Cha Krey and his followers were

in charge of assassinating the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese had the Soviets on their side. They had to provide their agents with weapons, material, medicine, etc. The Vietnamese thought that they would succeed in having the leaders of Kampuchea's revolution assassinated and thus to sow confusion of which they would have taken advantage to launch attacks from the outside.

2. From Mid-1977 to Mid-1978

Therefore, the Vietnamese had failed in their successive criminal activities: they failed in their attempts at poisoning, at murdering by firing and at attacking from outside. That is why in mid-1977, they set up a plan of large-scale attack. They had carried out important military preparations and they had also carried out many activities in the international arena aiming at preparing the world public opinion.

In December 1977, the Vietnamese launched large-scale attacks of invasion and aggression against Democratic Kampuchea. For this purpose, they used 14 divisions including 5 crack divisions. They thought that if they succeeded in taking possession of Kampuchea at one go, the world public opinion would not fight back, for they would have already set up a new State power and one would think then that it was an internal affair of Kampuchea. Here, the Vietnamese have made a subjective evaluation. Indeed they thought that as Cuba had succeeded in Africa, they would surely succeed in Kampuchea, for they are stronger than Cuba.

They sent 3 to 4 divisions to attack the Southwestern part of Kampuchea and 8 to 9 divisions to attack the Eastern part of Kampuchea. They used the remaining forces for attacking other places, like Snuol where they sent one division.

In the Southwest, the Vietnamese knew that the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea were powerful. So, they launched attacks against this region only in order to neutralize the troops of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, without however giving up their objective of taking possession as much as possible of Kampuchea's territory.

It was in the Eastern part of Kampuchea that the Vietnamese concentrated their main attacks. They launched their spearhead of attack along national road No. 22, attacking the district of Krek and going up along national road No. 7 towards Tonle Bet on the Eastern bank of the Mekong river. They reached Khnar, East of the district of Suong. They could quickly advance thanks to their agents inside of Kampuchea. In Khnar, their column was divided into, one headed Northwards and the other, Southwards. Their plan was to take Tonle Bet and then, the Northern part of the East zone of

Kampuchea.

Another spearhead of attack was launched along national road No. 1 towards the district of Prasaut, Svay Rieng provincial capital and Neak Luong district. If they succeeded in occupying Neak Luong they would take possession of the Southern part of the East zone of Kampuchea.

After having taken possession of the whole East zone, the Vietnamese would immediately attack Phnom Penh. Phnom Penh has no economic importance, but it is the political capital. And a Vietnamese attack against Phnom Penh would force the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea to move one part of their forces towards the capital. The Vietnamese would then intensify their attacks against the Southwestern part of Kampuchea. Besides, after having taken possession of Tonle Bet, the Vietnamese troops would go across the Mekong river, in front of the provincial capital of Kampong Cham on the western bank of the Mekong river and another Vietnamese column would head from Snuol towards the Northeast zone of Kampuchea.

The Vietnamese responsables for this plan were Le Duc Tho, Pham Hung, Van Tien Dung and Vo Chi Cong.

With their 14 divisions, the Vietnamese thought they could quickly win victory and immediately after set up in Kampuchea a State power, puppet of Vietnam. They wanted to achieve their strategy "lightning attack, lightning victory". Their attacks were very powerful. The Soviets participated in these attacks. The Vietnamese had assured them that victory was certain, for they had used their crack divisions, such as division No. 330, a North Vietnamese crack division, division No. 320 placed under the direct command of Van Tien Dung, and division No. 9, a South Vietnamese crack division. The Soviets were certain of the victory and participated in the attack as commanders of the units and members of tank crews.

At that moment, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea were not ready for fighting. They had indeed taken measures to defend the borders, but they did not think that the Vietnamese would launch such large-scale attacks. It was only when the Vietnamese reached to Khnar, East of Suong, and from there, launched attacks in several directions that Kampuchea's armed forces under the direct command of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea arrived and stopped the Vietnamese at Suong. They launched attacks on the flanks and at the rear of the Vietnamese columns. After three days, they crushed them and inflicted heavy casualties on them.

But it was in the Southwest zone that the Vietnamese casualties had been the most important. In this region in Takeo province, the Vietnamese troops quietly reached the districts of Prak Sandek and Kirivong, in Phnom Den village at about 20 kilometres from the

border. But before they could install their positions, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea powerfully counter-attacked them and after a few days, they put them into pieces, inflicting on them very heavy losses in men and materials.

3. The Coup D'Etat Attempt Staged by Vietnam in May 1978

At the end of May 1978, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, successfully annihilated once again the plan of the coup d'etat fomented by the Vietnamese Party and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam aiming at overthrowing Democratic Kampuchea.

This time, the plan of coup d'etat had been prepared by the Political Bureau of the Vietnamese party and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam themselves, after their heavy defeats they had suffered during their military attacks of invasion and aggression perpetrated against Democratic Kampuchea in November and December 1977 and their successive attacks of invasion and aggression perpetrated during the first semester of 1978.

This last attempt at coup d'etat fomented by Vietnam aimed at overthrowing Democratic Kampuchea. But in case it did not succeed in overthrowing Democratic Kampuchea, Vietnam would strive to take possession of the East zone, to separate this zone from the rest of Kampuchea, to declare there a separate State power and a party, puppets of Vietnam. They would then use the East zone as a springboard to launch military attack and take possession of all the territories situated in the East of the Mekong river and of the other parts of Kampuchea, until they would take possession of the whole Kampuchea.

Among the Vietnamese who directly received the order from the Political Bureau of the Vietnamese party to penetrate into Kampuchea, to establish contacts there and to lead personally the coup d'etat and who came and personally carried out activities of subversion against Kampuchea, were the following:

1. Hay So, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam,
2. Pham Trung Hieu called Ba Hai, assistant of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, former counsellor at the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in Phnom Penh,
3. Nguyen Gia Dang called Tu Cam, assistant of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam,
4. Ba Ha, assistant of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam,
5. Bai Mab, assistant of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam,



Commander Tran Van Thuong, 34 years old, assistant chief of the General Staff of the Vietnamese 9th Division, captured in the territorial waters of Kampuchea, January 18, 1978.



Colonel Nguyen Van Chen (called Nguyen Binh Chinh) age 47, assistant to the General Staff of the Vietnamese 9th Division, captured in the territorial waters of Kampuchea, January 19, 1978.

6. Mai Viet, assistant of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

The above-mentioned six Vietnamese with a number of other Vietnamese, secretly penetrated several times into the territory of Kampuchea to establish contacts and hold meetings in the East zone with the agents infiltrated and organized for a long time by Vietnam, in order to carry out the plan of coup d'etat and personally lead this coup d'etat.

The main secret meetings for preparing this coup d'etat were held in the Eastern part of Kampong Cham province, in the area of the National Road No. 7, and in Svay Rieng province, in the East zone. These secret meetings were frequently held, especially in February, March, April and in the beginning of May 1978 in order to carry out the plan of coup d'etat and to launch successive attacks of invasion against Kampuchea in February, March, April, May and June.

Like the previous times, the Vietnamese set up their plan of coup d'etat and attacks of invasion against Kampuchea with their supporters and in collaboration with the C.I.A. But this Vietnamese plan of coup d'etat and attacks of invasion against Kampuchea once again suffered the most ignominious and heaviest defeat.

This last plan of coup d'etat has more clearly shown the genuine nature of aggressor and annexationist of Vietnam which has always interfered in other's internal affairs and unceasingly carried out subversive activities and whose hands are stained with the blood of Kampuchea's people. It has more clearly shown the strategical objective of Vietnam attempt at taking possession of Kampuchea in order to force her to Vietnam and to integrate her at once into Vietnam.

In words, Vietnam continues to utter lies and claims that it wants "to negotiate with Kampuchea to peacefully solve the problem", that "Vietnam has no aim at forcing Kampuchea to join the Indochina Federation", that "Vietnam respects the independence and sovereignty of Democratic Kampuchea", etc. But in deeds, Vietnam is ferishly carrying on its acts of subversion, interference, violation and aggression against Democratic Kampuchea. It is attempting to find any means in order to annex Democratic Kampuchea and to foment coups d'etat for overthrowing Democratic Kampuchea and forcing her to join the "Indochina Federation", a puppet of Vietnam, and then, to swallow Kampuchea in a definite period of time.

4. The Defeats of the Vietnamese Strategy "Lightning Attack, Lightning Victory"

The Vietnamese have carried out the strategy of "lightning attack, lightning victory" in order not to have so many casualties in their armed forces and not to lose too much influence on the inter-

national arena. But this strategy failed and the Vietnamese are now driven into a protracted war, that is the strategy of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. This last strategy is to wage a protracted struggle, to progressively develop and strengthen oneself in the military, political and economic fields, and to wear out the enemy forces little by little until their destruction. Driven into a strategy of protracted war, the Vietnamese have to face a lot of military, political and economic difficulties. In the diplomatical field, in December 1977, the world public opinion did not yet understand the Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea. But now, it understands. So, the Vietnamese strategy of "lightning attack, lightning victory" has failed both in Kampuchea and on the international arena. Indeed, the true nature of Vietnam aggressor, annexationist and swallower of territories has been unmasked in front of the whole world.

Vietnam has been heavily defeated in the military and political fields as well as at home. If Vietnam had succeeded in its aggression against Kampuchea, everybody would have been satisfied at home, for in Loc Ninh and Tay Ninh for example, tens of thousands of Vietnamese people were getting ready to come and install themselves in Kampuchea. But now that its aggression has failed, Vietnam has become entangled in many difficulties and is in confusion at home.

But in spite of its defeats, Vietnam has still continued to aggress Kampuchea. After the whole world became aware of its aggression against Kampuchea through the statement of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea on December 31, 1977 and since its aggression has failed, Vietnam has changed its strategy. But it has entered into a new stage where it has no more possibility to launch attacks as powerfully as before. After having used 14 divisions at the end of 1977, which had been crushed in January 6, 1978, and lost 29,000 men, the Vietnamese army had used the following forces¹ to carry on their aggression against Kampuchea:

February 1978: 2 divisions
March 1978: 3 divisions
April 1978: 4 divisions
May 1978: 4 to 5 divisions
June 1978: 4 divisions
July 1978: 3 divisions
August 1978: 2 and a half divisions.

In the forthcoming dry season, from November 1978 up, Vietnam would be able to use up to 6 or 7 divisions. It will not dare to send

1. These are real forces and not nominal divisions. Indeed, owing to the difficulties in recruitment, the Vietnamese divisions do not reach their full effectiveness and often exist only in name.

many troops from North Vietnam in order not to withdraw its garrison from the Northern border with China. At the border of Svay Rieng province, in August 1978, it could send only one regiment in support. And the regiment had only 600 men whereas before, one Vietnamese regiment had from 1,800 to 2,000 men. Being composed mainly of new recruits from Saigon, these units were quickly put into pieces by the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea.

Since July 1978, the Vietnamese have used planes to bomb Kampuchea's territory along the borders, especially in the East zone and in the region of Parrot Beak. The fact that they have resorted to their aviation shows the great weakness of their infantry. From July to September 1978, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea has shot down 9 Vietnamese fighter-bombers and helicopters. The Vietnamese aviation cannot play a strategical role: Vietnam is a backward agricultural country, so the resort to aviation will only create more difficulties in the political field as well as in the economic and financial fields.

7. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

In their combat against the Vietnamese acts of aggression and annexation, the people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, under the correct and clear-sighted leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and its Secretary Pol Pot, have overcome all obstacles. They have firmly abided by the position of independence, sovereignty, self-reliance and of being masters of the destiny of their country. They have accepted many sacrifices. That is a noble national task they have to fulfill. The people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea have accepted these sacrifices for the sacred interests of their country, for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of Democratic Kampuchea and their right to dispose of their own destiny by themselves. That is undeniable. But if Kampuchea's people did not hold aloft the banner of independence, national honour and dignity, if they did not struggle with determination and crush the banner of aggression and annexation, the banner of "Indochina Federation", and the banner of hegemonism, what would have been the situation in Southeast Asia and in Asia? The expansionist big power and Vietnam annexationist and swallower of territories would have been still more arrogant and more presumptuous, and they would have carried on their expansion in Southeast Asia. Consequently, the interests of many countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and America would have suffered.

Therefore, the victory won by Kampuchea's people against the

annexation of Vietnam and the position of Democratic Kampuchea as an independent, neutral and non-aligned country with neither foreign troops nor foreign military bases in her territory, these are favourable factors for the cause of independence and peace, particularly in Southeast Asia, and for the interests of Asia and the world as a whole. Indeed, the struggle of Kampuchea's people concerns not only Kampuchea, but it is also the struggle against the strategy of the expansionist big power in Asia. That is why people the world over, especially the peoples in Asia and Southeast Asia, have expressed their sympathy with and their encouragement, and have given their active and sincere support to the present struggle of Kampuchea's people to defend their national independence.

After being defeated at Kampuchea's front, Vietnam has to face inextricable difficulties at home as well as on the international arena. Being driven into the strategy of a protracted war, the Vietnamese forces are wearing down more and more. The Vietnamese people have to face greater and greater starvation and rise up more and more strongly against the Vietnamese administration. Insecurity is developing in South Vietnam and has reached the Northern part. On the international arena, the people the world over have clearly discerned the perfidious and hypocritical face of Vietnam aggressor, an aligned country and tool of the expansionist big power.

The foreign and United Nations aids have been directly or indirectly used by Vietnam to maintain and develop its forces in order to carry on its aggression against Kampuchea and extend its expansion in Southeast Asia. More and more countries are now asking themselves as follows: "Would the cooperation and the moral, political, diplomatic, economic and financial assistances they have given to Vietnam, not indeed help Vietnam to take possession of Southeast Asia? Would they not indeed serve the strategy of the expansionist big power in Southeast Asia and in Asia?" Vietnam receives aids from various sources, this does not mean that it is independent. It is its master, the expansionist big power that has told it to receive these aids, for it does not have enough bread for itself and has no possibility to give Vietnam enough aids. The countries and international organizations which have given aids to Vietnam become more cautious and are reconsidering the problem of their aids to Vietnam.

At present, Vietnam is diluting various countries, kneeling down and begging these countries for aids in order to use them to remedy its forces and carry on its aggression against Kampuchea.

Before the defeat of its aggression in Kampuchea, Vietnam was very arrogant and presumptuous. It praised the power of its army, launched threats and insults against the Southeast Asian countries. But since their defeats on January 6, 1978 and during the first semester of 1978, the expansionist big power and Vietnam had been

forced to change by 100 per cent their stratagem, their tactics and their attitude towards the Southeast Asian countries. Previously, for them, all was bad. Now, all is good. They try to carry out in Southeast Asia diplomatic manoeuvres and like a "cat hiding its claws" they are always smiling. Their objective is to exculpate themselves from their aggression against Democratic Kampuchea and from their insults against the Southeast Asian countries, and also to isolate Kampuchea from the other countries in Southeast Asia, at surrounding her from behind so that they will launch new large-scale attacks against Kampuchea when the situation is favourable to them. The diplomatic manoeuvres of Vietnam and the expansionist big power are really too clear. They have failed even before they have been carried out thanks to the vigilance of the Southeast Asian peoples who have been fully aware of the perfidious nature of Vietnam and the expansionist big power.

The Vietnamese aggression like all other aggressions, never pays! Such is the lesson of history.

Kampuchea's people want only to live in peace in order to be able to mobilize all their time and forces to build up the country, a new and prosperous society, in national honour, dignity and independence.

Democratic Kampuchea does not put any condition on Vietnam for solving the problem. It is rather Vietnam aggressor, annexationist and swallower of territories which, in Hitler's style, has put conditions on Democratic Kampuchea. Indeed, when he threatened and aggressed the East European countries, Hitler forced these countries to negotiate, to capitulate and put their territories under his rule. Vietnam acts in the same manner. It has aggressed Kampuchea in the savage and fascist way and it says that Kampuchea has to negotiate with it. Such are the conditions of Vietnam which wants on the one hand, to force Kampuchea to capitulate and to be under its yoke, and on the other hand to hide its face of aggressor and swallower of territories, to mislead the world public opinion and legalize its acts of aggression and annexation. If the problem created by the Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea has not yet been solved, it is not because there has been no negotiation or intermediary. From 1970 to 1977, before and after liberation, negotiations between Kampuchea and Vietnam had been held for nearly 100 times, at the summit as well as at the level of Central Committee, in Kampuchea's revolutionary bases, in Hanoi or in Phnom Penh. Moreover many negotiations were held along the borders at the level of the Committee of zones, regions or districts. But the problem could not be solved. For that, we would have to eliminate the root of this problem, that is to eliminate the Vietnamese ambition of swallowing Kampuchea and the Vietnamese strategy of "Indochina Federation".

If Vietnam immediately stops its aggression against Kampuchea, the war would stop automatically. If Vietnam respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea and renounces its strategy of "Indochina Federation" and annexation of Kampuchea, through concrete acts, in conformity with the principles of non-alignment, the Pancha Sila and the United Nations Charter, then friendship between the two countries and two peoples, Kampuchea and Vietnam, would be born automatically, developed and strengthened progressively. The Government of Democratic Kampuchea has already expressed this position several times to the world.

In June 1975, during the visit of the top delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to Hanoi, the Kampuchea side officially proposed to the Vietnamese side to sign a friendship and non-aggression treaty between the two countries. But the Vietnamese side did not take into consideration and did not comply with Kampuchea's good-will. Despite that, today if Vietnam stops its aggression against Kampuchea and accepts to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea, through concrete acts, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea would propose once again to Vietnam to sign a friendship and non-aggression treaty. Democratic Kampuchea's high ranking leaders would sign this treaty whether in Phnom Penh or in Hanoi or elsewhere if Vietnam shows that it really wants to have relations of friendship with Kampuchea.

But Vietnam is bent on trying to swallow Kampuchea and extend its expansion in Southeast Asia, and the expansionist big power is trying to take possession of Southeast Asia in the framework of its global strategy. In such a situation, they are striving to carry on their aggression against Kampuchea, and that despite Vietnam has to face grave difficulties. At present, the Vietnamese army unceasingly launch their attacks of aggression against Kampuchea. At the same time, they are actively mobilizing their forces to venture in launching a new large-scale attack of invasion and aggression during this forthcoming dry season, that is from next November. The expansionist big power sends by airlift and by seaway, thousands of advisors, huge quantities of armaments aiming at regenerating Vietnam. As for several Vietnamese divisions quartered in foreign territory, they are also getting ready to attack Kampuchea at any favourable occasion. The expansionist big power uses the Vietnamese Army as its mercenary army in Asia, as it has already used another mercenary army in Africa, in conformity with the sinister doctrine of 10 years ago, and which consists of using the Asian traitors to fight against the Asian peoples. The smiling diplomacy of Vietnam and of the expansionist big power in Southeast Asia as well as their lying propaganda would not be able to hide their prep-

arations of large-scale aggression against Democratic Kampuchea during this forthcoming dry season.

In such a situation, the people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea always heighten their revolutionary vigilance. They always further develop and strengthen their traditional revolutionary heroism, consent to go on accepting sacrifices, enduring all difficulties and sufferings and overcoming all obstacles by firmly abiding by the position of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance.

Under the correct and clear-sighted leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and its Secretary Pol Pot, they resolutely carry on their struggle, holding aloft the banner of national independence, national honour and dignity in order to ever defend and safeguard Democratic Kampuchea. By doing so, Kampuchea's people fulfill at one and the same time their sacred national duty and their noble internationalist duty. The people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea grasp the situation well in hand, for they enjoy better conditions always, thanks to the victories won in their tasks of national defence and construction and also thanks to the sympathy and supports of the peoples in Southeast Asia, Asia and in the world. Before, Kampuchea's people had started their struggle from scratch and they had defeated the imperialists' chieftain that is U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. After liberation, in a situation when they had to face numerous difficulties and grave problems, they have successfully defended Democratic Kampuchea, totally safeguarded her independence and territorial integrity. In the future, they will defend her still more successfully.

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