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Volume - II

HISTORY
OF THE PARTY OF LABOR
OF ALBANIA

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HISTORY
OF THE PARTY OF LABOR
OF ALBANIA

Third, Fourth and Fifth Chapters

THE INSTITUTE OF MARXIST-LENINIST STUDIES
AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY
OF LABOR OF ALBANIA

KIBRISTA SOSYALIST
GERÇEK LONDRA BÜROSU
E - MAY 2011
SOCIALIST TRUTH JN CYPRUS

CHAPTER III

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA IN ITS STRUGGLE TO REBUILD THE COUNTRY AND PROMOTE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

(December 1944-1948)

1. THE DEFENCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC POWER

The People's State Power established in Albania and the sole leadership of the Communist Party in the State created the necessary political conditions to carry the people's anti-imperialist democratic revolution in the economic, social and cultural fields through to the end. This made it possible for the revolution to develop uninterruptedly and pass over immediately to the socialist revolution, to carrying out economic and social changes of a socialist character.

It was only by proceeding along this road that the victories achieved in the National-libe-

ration War could be safeguarded, that the destruction left from the war and the backwardness inherited from the past could be eliminated, the workers could be freed once and for all from exploitation and misery, and conditions created for the rapid development of our economy and culture.

The tasks confronting the Party for the further development of the people's revolution were determined by the internal and external situation following the Second World War.

The Radical Change of the Ratio of Forces in the World in Favor of Socialism

When Albania drove out the foreign invaders, the Second World War was still going on. It came to an end only after the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany on May 9, 1945 and of militarist Japan on September 2, 1945.

Great changes had taken place in the world. Although the Soviet Union had suffered greater human and material losses than any other country, it emerged from the war much stronger politically and militarily. Its authority and international prestige were greatly enhanced.

The capitalist system was shaken to its foundations and weakened. The second stage of the general crisis of capitalism, which had begun with the outbreak of the Second World War, assumed still larger proportions. The principal manifestation of this crisis was the victory of a series of revolutions which opened new

breaches in the imperialist front in Europe and in Asia.

As a result of these revolutions, new people's democratic regimes were established in a number of countries of Europe and of Asia. The newly set up democratic governments carried out a series of political, economic and social changes which laid the foundations for embarking on the path of socialist development. The people's revolution in China was given a fresh impulse.

The detachment of these countries from the capitalist system was one very important result of the Second World War. This made a radical change in the ratio of forces in the world in favor of socialism, and constituted the fundamental feature which defined the new international situation following the war.

The liberating character of the anti-fascist people's war, the decisive role of the Soviet Union in it, and the detachment of a series of countries from the capitalist system gave a strong impulse to the national-liberation and anti-colonial movement. The domination of the imperialist powers over the colonies and dependent countries began to crumble. The process of disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism became widespread. A series of new independent States came into being in Asia and in Africa.

Even in the remaining colonies or dependent countries the liberation movement to shake off the imperialist yoke was on the rise.

The process of disintegration of the colonial system was another important manifestation of the second stage of the general crisis of capitalism. Consequently, the importance of the National-liberation Movement of the colonial and oppressed peoples, as a direct reserve of the world socialist revolution, was greatly increased.

The new alignment of the social and political forces in the world opened a new stage to the revolutionary movement, creating more favorable conditions for the triumph of socialism on a world-wide scale.

With the end of the war the ratio of forces between the principal capitalist countries also changed. The inequality of their economic and political development was deepened still more, upsetting the balance of power within the world system of capitalism.

After the war, Germany, Japan and Italy were temporarily excluded from the world market. Their economies were heavily damaged and disorganised. France could no longer play its former role of a great imperialist power. Under the blows dealt by the liberation war of the colonial peoples, the British Empire began to break up and the power of British imperialism declined.

Only the United States of America emerged stronger from the war. It had greatly enhanced its economic and military might and became the principal center of the capitalist world.

The imperialist powers could not reconcile themselves to the growth of socialist and demo-

cratic forces in the world and the development of the anti-colonial liberation movement. A bitter struggle ensued between the imperialist and reactionary forces, on the one hand, and the socialist and democratic forces, on the other.

Thus, the contradictions in the anti-fascist coalition about the aims and the character of the war became clearer when hostilities ended and grew deeper as time passed. The antagonism between the two world social systems was becoming more and more acute. The world was split up into two camps: the anti-imperialist democratic camp and the anti-democratic imperialist camp, with aims and objectives diametrically opposed.

The democratic camp was made up of the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy. At its head stood the Soviet Union. It was supported by the entire international democratic and workers' movement, by all progressive-minded persons fighting in defense of democracy, freedom, and the independence of peoples. The aim of this camp was to secure world peace, the independence of the peoples, democracy, and progress towards socialism. This could be attained only in struggle against imperialism.

The imperialist camp had the USA as its leading force. It relied on the reactionary classes and on all the anti-democratic forces in the capitalist countries. The aim of this camp was to save the old capitalist order, to suppress the workers' revolutionary and national-libera-

tion movements, to re-establish the capitalist regime in the countries of the people's democracy. By making use of their great economic and military potential, the U.S. imperialists sought to establish their domination over the world. To achieve this aim, the imperialists headed by the USA launched a frenzied hostile campaign against the Soviet Union and against all the socialist, freedom and peace-loving forces. International reaction resorted to direct armed intervention and drowned the people's democratic movement in Greece in blood. It dealt heavy blows at the democratic workers' movement in France, Italy, and elsewhere. A tendency to fascistize political life became apparent in the imperialist states.

In order to carry out its strategic plan, the imperialist camp, and especially the United States of America, began to pursue an openly aggressive policy, to intensify the militarization of their economy and, thus, prepare for the next world war. This policy and the measures deriving from it covered all the main fields of life, including the economic and military fields and the ideological struggle. The «Truman doctrine» and the «Marshall plan» were specific expressions of this policy.

The U.S. imperialists stationed a large number of troops and set up military bases in many foreign countries with a view to using them in the aggressive war they were preparing against the USSR and the countries of the people's democracy, as well as to suppress the

liberation movement of the colonial peoples. They made use of the liberation movement of the colonial peoples. They made use of their temporary monopoly of atomic weapons as a means of intimidating the peoples.

The aggressive policy of the USA for world domination was associated with a bitter attack in the ideological field. Anti-communism was the pivot of this campaign. Alleging that the Soviet Union and Communism presented a threat to the so-called free world, the imperialist propaganda endeavored to fence off and extinguish the socialist ideas which had spread and were spreading far and wide among the working masses of the world.

Difficulties in the Administration of the Country

With the ousting of the invaders and the establishment of the People's Power, the Communist Party of Albania was charged with the burden of running the country. This task was no less difficult than that of conducting the liberation war, but our Party was firmly convinced that it would accomplish it successfully. This conviction was based on the experience it had acquired during the war for national liberation, on its determination to carry the revolution through to the end, on the firm support the masses of the people gave to its political line, and on the great revolutionary enthusiasm which had spread throughout the country.

But it had to surmount many difficulties along this course.

Liberation found our country in a lamentable condition. Albania had suffered colossal damage in the war. Its economy was shattered to its very foundations. All the bridges, big and small, had been blown up. Highways, ports and telephone networks were in ruins. Electric power was lacking, mines had fallen into disuse. Even the few factories which had escaped destruction could not work for lack of raw materials. Unemployment was widespread throughout the country.

Agriculture, too, was in a grave situation: part of the land had remained untilled; 1/3 of the cattle, especially draught animals, had been slaughtered.

Trade was at a standstill on account of shortages of goods and lack of means of communication. No funds were available. The gold reserves in the bank had been plundered by the invaders. Inflation had unheard of proportions. The people were facing winter without clothes, shoes, shelter, or food. Famine and disease threatened from all quarters.

The situation was further aggravated by the struggle the internal and foreign reaction waged against the People's Power. After liberation, a close counter-revolutionary alliance was formed between the overthrown classes and the foreign imperialist bourgeoisie.

The U.S. and British missions, which remained in Albania even after the liberation, on the pretext of preparing for the recognition of the new Government, became centres of espionage,

plots, and sabotage. They tried to unite all the forces of reaction and to launch them into struggle to overthrow the People's Power. The overthrown classes concentrated mainly on hatching up plots and preparing armed uprisings. Their main armed support came from the bands of fugitive war criminals throughout the country, especially in the northern regions. They aimed at creating insecurity, at intimidating the peasantry and at obstructing the establishment of law and order. They committed terrorist attacks against communists and propagandists of the People's Power. In January 1945, remnants of the reactionary forces mounted an assault on Koplík, but they were routed within a few hours. During the months of January-February the reactionary bands which had sought refuge in the Kelmendi highlands were completely wiped out.

Representatives of the reactionary bourgeoisie and of the land-lords set up secret groups, such as the «monarchist», «social-democrat», «demo-Christian» and other groups, which were directed by the British and U.S. missions in Tirana. The overthrown classes tried to wreck and sabotage our economy. They were also assisted by elements who had wormed their way into the ranks of the Democratic Front.

After the liberation, the Albanian people looked forward to the establishment of normal state relations between Albania and all the allies of the National-liberation War. But the leading circles of the USA and of Britain hinde-

red by all possible means the establishment of such relations, exerted pressure on the People's Power and instigated the forces of the internal reaction to fight against it.

The U.S. and the British imperialists also attempted to stage armed intervention. In January 1945, they demanded to expand their military missions in Tirana and, in May-June, to bring to Albania 1500-1700 officers and technicians of the Military Liaison (M.L.), who would be in charge, allegedly, of the distribution of their «aid». These demands were firmly rejected by the Democratic Government of Albania.

To pave the way for their armed intervention in Albania, the imperialists also made use of monarcho-fascist Greece. Immediately after liberation, directly incited by the USA and Britain, the Greek Government launched a widespread campaign in support of its timeworn claims to annex Southern Albania, organised systematic border provocations and made all-round preparations for an armed aggression to be associated with the landing of British forces on our coast. In the face of this new peril threatening the country, our people tightened their ranks around the Party, expressing their readiness to defend the independence and the territorial integrity of the Fatherland at any cost.

The Central Problem: In these circumstances, the most urgent task confronting our Party was to safeguard and to strengthen the People's Power.

«After every war and revolution», instructed the CC of the CPA, "the most important and the most difficult question is the taking and maintenance of power. For us, for our Party too, the most important question is that of the State Power: this is our central problem. Accordingly, our main objective today is to strengthen the State Power and, with it, to pass from victory to victory, from reform to reform»¹.

In order to attain this objective, the reinforcement of the political basis of the Power of the National-liberation Councils as bearers of the new State Power was of particular importance. If the councils were to become all powerful organs of self-administration of the people, it was essential that they should be invigorated, re-organise their work so as to become thoroughly capable, the «driving force in each step forward in the political, economic and social fields». The elections to the local organs of

1) Circular Letter of the CC of the CPA, December 1944. Central Archives of the Party.

power, which were held throughout the country in May 1945, served precisely this purpose.

During the electoral campaign, the Party carried out extensive political work with the masses to make clearer to them the popular character of the new power and its duties. It exposed the propaganda of reaction about the incapability of the State, and its aims to place the leadership of the councils in the hands of the «experienced» representatives of the overthrown classes.

People tested in the war, resolute, loyal to the people's interest, and who enjoyed their confidence, were elected to the local organs of power.

Besides this the Party organized the complete reconstruction of the State apparatus, new both in form and in content. Economic and social institutions, the people's courts, were set up on a new basis; the people's police was created, the State security organs were re-organized and strengthened.

The Party appointed its best cadres to the new State organs. Although they lacked experience in administrative work, nevertheless they were resolved to carry the revolution through to the end, to implement the Party line to the letter. They would master the art of governing in the course of work.

To the State organs were also appointed functionaries of the former administration, persons politically linked with the Party and with the people, although imbued with bourgeois cul-

ture, practices and mentalities. They gave their assistance to run the new State organs, but along with this they unconsciously introduced into the method and style of work of the new apparatus elements of the method and style of the old apparatus. This exercised its influence on the Party cadres working in administration and led to the spreading of organizational forms of work which were incompatible with the revolutionary character of our State Power.

The main armed force of the revolution and of the State Power was our National-Liberation Army which was considered by the overthrown classes and the foreign reactionaries as the principal obstacle to attaining their objectives to the detriment of the People's Power. The enemies aimed at eliminating it by spreading the view that Albania was not threatened by any danger, consequently, the army should be demobilized, because it was a heavy burden on our State and the whole economy of our country!

Our Party evaluated the maintaining and strengthening of the army as a vital question of our revolution, as an indispensable condition for the defence of the People's Power, of the freedom and independence of our country. So that our army could fulfil its lofty mission, the CPA demanded that it be perfected, modernized and become

«a model army endowed with all valuable qualities, and worthy of... the task of protecting the people and their

power set up at the cost of such sacrifices and bloodshed»¹.

Any sacrifice made by the people and the State for the people's army was fully justified.

In line with the instructions of the Central Committee, the army began the systematic training to master the art of modern warfare. In order to raise the military and political capability of army commanders and of commissars, schools and regular training courses were opened. Compulsory military service was introduced.

Besides strengthening and modernizing our army, the Party engaged in a wide scale, many-sided political work for the formation of a high level of consciousness among the fighters about the tasks of our army as a people's army, for the promotion of their loyalty to the cause of revolution, the preservation and the further development of the spirit of the National-liberation War. Political work in the army was the more indispensable, as, in addition to former partisan fighters, its ranks included a large number of recruits who did not possess the necessary political maturity.

Thanks to measures adopted by the Party,

1) Enver Hoxha. Our National-liberation Army. November, 1944. Documents of the General Staff and of the Supreme Command of the ANLA. Tirana, 1966, p. 339.

the army became the sure guarantee of the People's new Democratic State.

To purge the country thoroughly of any remnants of the fascists and traitors was a pressing task. The Party turned the implementation of this task into a great political action, setting all the people in motion. With the support of the peasants, the State Power organs and the military detachments wiped out the armed bands of the reactionaries. People's revolutionary tribunals imposed on the war criminals the sentences they deserved. These trials were turned into a great national indictment of the line of treachery pursued by the exploiting classes. They dealt a heavy blow not only to the internal reactionaries but also to their imperialist patrons.

The Democratic Front of Albania

The new historic tasks which confronted the Party could be carried out only if the unity of the masses of people around the Party, which was achieved during the National-liberation War, was maintained and further strengthened.

Under the new conditions, the Party advanced the slogan of national unity. Besides the broad masses of the people who had taken an active part in the war for the national liberation, this union should include also all those who had been deceived by the reactionary chieftains or had stood aloof but now could give their contribution to the building of our new society.

Life had demonstrated that this unity could be maintained and strengthened only on the basis of the Front created during the National-liberation War. The National-liberation Front had completely justified itself as revolutionary organization which had assured the fighting unity of the broad masses of the people and played a decisive role in the victory over the enemies. In this field the Party had acquired valuable experience, which enabled it to further develop the tradition of the direct unity of the masses of the people in the Front under its leadership.

The further strengthening of the National-liberation Front was the most appropriate and democratic way to deal with the attempts of internal and foreign enemies to create a reactionary «democratic» party for the purpose of splitting the people and robbing them of their victories. In August 1945, under the slogan of national unity, the CPA convened the 1st Congress of the National-liberation Front. The Congress laid down the tasks for the **Democratic Front of Albania**, as it was now called, and the measures for its further reinforcement.

The Front was to be the mainstay of the People's Power in its struggle to safeguard freedom and national independence, to reconstruct the country, to achieve its economic, social and cultural development on the road of socialism. The role of National-liberation Front was the mobilization and political education of the broad masses of the people and the streng-

thening of the political unity of the Albanian people around the CPA. Expressing the will of the people, the Congress of the National-liberation Front called for elections to the Constituent Assembly. Following the establishment of People's Democratic State at the Përmeti Congress, and now that the country had been liberated, the Assembly was to sanction the form of the political regime and adopt a new Constitution. This task had already been laid down at the 2nd Session of the ANLC in October 1944.

The Congress and the elections of new councils of the Democratic Front enlivened this organization and enhanced its role in the life of our country.

Nevertheless, the line of the Party regarding the Democratic Front was obstructed by the opportunist attitude of Sejfulla Malëshova and by the interference of the leadership of the CPY. Under the mask of «the struggle against sectarian trends» the doors of the Front were opened to hostile elements. The reaction exploited this possibility to introduce its henchmen into the Front, in order to undermine it from within and, from these positions, to carry on the struggle against the People's Power. However, the vigilance of the Party and of the broad masses of the people proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to the inimical activity of the reactionary elements within the Front.

The leading force in the Front was the working class, to which were now opened wide vistas of increasing in numbers and becoming

an industrial working class of a high socialist consciousness. As early as February 1945, it had created its own professional organizations (trade unions). The trade unions were charged by the Party with a role of importance in the communist education of workers and employees, and with becoming «the pillar of the Democratic Front and the People's Power»¹.

The laboring peasantry, which had borne the brunt of battle in the National-liberation War, remained the broadest base of the Democratic Front. With the establishment of the People's Power all the premises were created for the realization of their age-old dreams: to take over the land and to do away with misery and backwardness.

The Union of the Albanian Anti-fascist Youth and the Union of the Albanian Anti-fascist Women, which operated within the frame of the Democratic Front, were to play a special role as a powerful lever of the Party in the mobilization and political education of the masses.

Now it was up to the Albanian youth as the most vigorous and revolutionary section of the people to take the lead in new battles for the re-building and socialist construction of our country. Addressing the 1st Congress of the

1) Instructions of the CC of the CPA on the preparatory work of the 1st Congress of Syndicates, September 2, 1945. [Principal Documents of the PLA, Vol. I, p. 254.

Youth organization, Comrade Enver Hoxha, assessing the great role played by the youth, said:

«The Democratic Government, which has placed its hopes on you, is confident that you will always be in the vanguard, will throw yourselves into work just as you threw yourselves into the war; that you will learn and educate yourselves with great zeal for your own good and for the benefit of the people, strengthen and help our army, the steel-like shield of the people's interests, and defend the People's Power for which you shed so much blood. . . »¹.

Through their participation in and the contribution to the war the Albanian women had demonstrated that they were an important and essential factor for the development of the political and social life of our country. The first steps towards their emancipation, which had been taken during the war, should serve as a basis for the complete emancipation of all the masses of women so as to turn them into a great force in building the new society. The Party demanded that the equality of the woman with the man, already acknowledged by the Democratic Government at its Berat Meeting, should become a reality. To achieve this, the

1) «Bashkimi». April 17, 1945.

Central Committee instructed the Party to strive untiringly for raising the political level of women, to enable them to acquire education and culture, to eliminate sectarianism in admitting women to Party membership and hesitation in promoting them to posts of responsibility. An important role in the emancipation of women was to be played by their active participation in the economic life of the country, first of all in productive labor.

Foreign Policy

The strengthening of the People's Power in the country demanded the strengthening of its international stand also. The war they had waged and the contribution they had made to the common cause of the anti-fascist coalition entitled the Albanian people to a worthy place among the progressive peoples. Now Albania was no longer a token for barter in the exchanges of imperialist great powers. It had entered the international arena as a free and sovereign State.

Friendship with the Soviet Union and with the other countries of people's democracy was the foundation of the foreign policy of our Democratic Government. At the same time, our Government stated that it was for friendly relations and cooperation with all the countries which respected the freedom and independence of Albania and did not intervene in its internal affairs. Together with the other countries of the anti-imperialist democratic camp, Alba-

nia fought for a lasting peace, for the exposure of the aggressive warmongering policy of imperialism for friendship among the people, for their freedom and independence.

The Party considered friendship and close cooperation in all fields with the Soviet Union and the other countries of people's democracy as an external factor of very great importance for ensuring its national freedom and independence, for strengthening the international position of the new Democratic Albanian State. The political and moral support in the international field, and the economic aid of the Soviet Union were appreciated by the Party as an external factor of outstanding importance for solving the tasks confronting the People's Power. The Party also attached great importance to the establishment of relations of friendship and cooperation with the new Yugoslavia, as the peoples of Yugoslavia and Albania were bound closely together by the war and the blood shed in common against fascist aggressors.

The Communist Party of Albania followed with anxiety the development in Greece where internal and international reaction had launched a frenzied attack on the Greek National-liberation Front with which the Albanian people had been linked in their common fight against fascism. The Party and the Democratic Government of Albania took an internationalist stand, giving aid and support to the Greek progressive forces in their just struggle to resist reaction and establish democracy.

The CPA stood for the establishment of normal State relations also with capitalist countries on the basis of respect for national independence and territorial integrity, nonintervention in internal affairs and mutual economic benefit. On this basis, our Democratic Government tried to normalize its relations with the USA, Great Britain, and other countries, but encountered the aggressive policy of the USA and British imperialists.

Because of the hostile perfidious stand taken by the USA and Britain, Albania was not invited to the Conference of San Francisco for the founding of the United Nations Organization. It was not called to the London and Paris Conferences on War Reparations from Italy and Germany. Likewise, Albania was not invited to take part in the discussions on drafting the peace treaty with Italy. On all these occasions Albania should have occupied the place to which it was entitled by the sacrifices made during the war.

The USA and Britain threatened the independence and the sovereignty of the country. Through slander, they tried to present small new Albania as a country which disturbed peace and security in the Balkans. But all the intrigues of the U.S. and British imperialists to undermine the international position of the new Albanian State failed.

The Albanian people led by their Party resolutely beat back all imperialist pressures. The courageous defense of their independence

and legitimate rights, the course they had taken, their alignment with the anti-imperialist democratic camp made the Albanian people one of the inflexible fighters for democracy and peace and strengthened the international position of new Albania.

2. THE MOBILIZATION OF MASSES FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY. THE FIRST ECONOMIC-SOCIAL CHANGES

In the circumstances of the devastation left after the war, one of the most pressing problems was the reconstruction and normalization of the whole economic and cultural life of the country.

Great material and financial means were needed to solve this problem. The CPA was faced with the question of where to find these means.

Relying on Internal Forces The U.S. and British imperialists hastened to offer their «aid» with the intention of exploiting the difficult economic situation in Albania. The CPA categorically rejected this enslaving «aid» and chose the course of building the country by relying, first of all, on the internal forces as well as on the fraternal help which the Soviet Union and the countries of People's Democracy would give.

The Party made the problem of the recon-

struction and the economic and cultural development of our country a matter of concern of the whole people. The workers, peasants, intellectuals, and women set up squads, detachments, battalions and brigades for voluntary work. An unprecedented enthusiasm for work burst out throughout our country. In order to ease the sufferings of the war victims they were provided with money, food and clothing, and people shared even their last morsel with them. Thanks to the supply of Soviet wheat our Government was able to ensure the daily bread of the people.

Faced with a desperate lack of technical means and cadres, under extremely difficult conditions, our people worked self-sacrificingly, first and foremost, for the reconstruction of the demolished bridges and highways and for the speedy reestablishment of communication lines.

Through the efforts of workers, during the year 1945, some of the factories, power stations, and mines, were put into operation. The Party mobilized the peasantry to sow the ploughed land, to re-build the burned down houses with a large assistance from the State. Work began in education and cultural institutions. New schools were opened, especially in the countryside. An extensive campaign was launched to do away with illiteracy among adults, which remained a grave plague inherited from the past. Old teachers and thousands of new ones who were trained in special courses threw themselves into this campaign as a voluntary action.

In the process of reconstruction the lack of technical cadres of different branches was very acute. Accordingly, training and qualification courses for technicians and workers were opened.

The youth shouldered the heaviest burden of the reconstruction. Young men and young women from town and countryside were the first to fill the ranks of the voluntary labor brigades. They were always in the lead in the actions for rebuilding roads, reconstructing blown up bridges and burnt out houses. They were in the forefront of the campaign to spread the light of education and culture.

Through war profiteering, the capitalists had accumulated large amounts of capital, mainly in gold and merchandise. Our State deemed it reasonable and necessary that a good part of those profits should be taken over by the State and used for the needs of the people and for the reconstruction of the country. For this reason, in January 1945, the law on extraordinary taxation on war profits was passed. The taxation was progressive. The law provided also that the property of all those who did not pay these taxes was to be confiscated without compensation. This measure was directed at the same time against the economic power of capitalists.

In all districts special commissions were set up to assess the amounts of profits and taxation. Representatives of the People's Power, the Army and the mass organizations took part in

these commissions which were set up and operated under the direct guidance of the Party organizations.

The merchants, manufacturers and all those who were taxed contrived by all means to evade the payment of the taxes imposed on them. They hid their stores of merchandise and gold. They tried to depict these measures as «robbing the people» and resorted to every trick to save the riches they had accumulated at the expense of the working people. The Central Committee instructed the Party organizations not to make any concessions and to fight persistently for the strict application of this law. Any leniency on this issue would only impair the authority of the People's Power.

Backed up by the masses of the people, the commissions compelled the merchants and other capitalists to pay the taxes according to the law. In the year 1945, revenue from the extraordinary taxation on war profits accounted for more than half the State budget income.

All those capitalists who did not pay the taxes had their property confiscated. Through these measures our State amassed a big quantity of various goods which enabled it to open the first State-owned shops. This marked the birth to the socialist State sector in trade.

Besides the law on extraordinary war profits, a number of other revolutionary measures were taken also. A law was passed on requisitioning food products and other materials needed for the reconstruction of the country. Backed

up by the broad masses of people, special commissions were engaged in detecting hoarders and speculators. A system of fixed prices was enforced. Prices were supervised by the people themselves and a vigorous campaign was conducted against speculation and the black market. Private accumulation and selling of grain was prohibited. A State monopoly in the accumulation and selling of grain was established and unified prices for buying and selling were fixed. Old bank-notes were overprinted to check, to a certain extent, the inflation caused by the war and to control the circulation of old paper currency. The introduction of State-control over foreign trade, which later on was to be changed into a State monopoly, reinforced these measures.

In this manner, the financial problems were settled temporarily to facilitate the reconstruction of the country, the normalization of its economic life, while, at the same time, the economic positions of the bourgeoisie were weakened.

Creation of the Socialist Sector of the Economy The new political power of the people's revolution could not be maintained on the old social and economic basis. On this basis neither the tasks of reconstruction nor, even less, those of the further development of the revolution, could be successfully carried out.

First and foremost, foreign capital, which

had dominated the key positions in finance, in mining and industry, had to be done away with. The local exploiting classes also still held strong economic positions and the principal means of production. Both these groups tried to sabotage the reconstruction work, to disorganize economic life, and to arouse distrust towards the People's Power. Albanian and foreign merchants and entrepreneurs deliberately withheld their goods from the market, causing increased prices and encouraging the black market. They closed factories and workshops, leaving the workers unemployed, and engaged in speculation, especially in grain. This disturbed economic life and caused difficulties in the lives of the working people. In these circumstances it became even more necessary to do away with the old economic basis.

The radical solution of this problem demanded deep economic and social changes and the construction of a new socialist base of the economy.

It is true that after liberation, the most pressing social and economic tasks were to carry out changes of a democratic, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal character. This was an inevitable and logical sequel of the people's revolution carried through to the end.

However, under the new political conditions, when the People's Power had started exercising the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Party could not wait, nor did it wait, for all these democratic transformations to be carried through to the end, and only then

begin to solve questions of a socialist character. The ratio of class forces in Albania permitted that, simultaneously with rapid changes of a democratic character, changes of a socialist character also could be undertaken.

Of all these transformations, the socialization of the main means of production, through their nationalization, was the most important and decisive. State control of production and distribution was the first preparatory step towards the nationalization of the principal means of production. This was established in December 1944. State control was at the same time a form of workers' control. It included enterprises of importance for our people's economy owned by Albanian and foreign capitalists.

The control was exercised through State-appointed commissars.

Assisted by Party organs and State commissars, the workers took part vigorously in the organization of production and the management of enterprises. Thus they had the opportunity to test their forces and gain experience in managing production. Through the workers' control the production capacity of enterprises, the sources and reserves of raw materials and fuels were assessed. This prepared the ground for the working class to take over the enterprises and run them once they were nationalized.

In December 1944, the mines, and the property of political fugitives were nationalized. A month later, a law on the confiscation of the property of Italian and German subjects in Al-

bania came into force. Under this law, the National Bank and other banks, as well as the property of share-holder companies owned by foreign capitalists, were transferred to the Albanian State without compensation as common property of the people. In April 1945, all privately-owned means of transport were requisitioned with fixed compensation.

Through these important nationalization measures the key positions of economy passed into the hands of the State to be put at the service of the working masses. The elimination of the economic positions of foreign capital put an end to the economic dependence on the imperialist Powers, which further reinforced the political independence of the country.

As to their form, the nationalization measures of the year 1945 were of a generally democratic nature, but their economic and social content reflected changes that went beyond these limits. The nationalizations were carried through in the interests of the working masses and the nationalized means of production were put completely and directly at their service. Therefore these nationalization measures were in essence a socialization of the principal means of production and had a socialist character. On their basis the State socialist sector of the economy came into being.

A particular role was played by the trade unions in ensuring an ever broader participation of the working masses in the work of rebuilding the country, in its political, social and State life.

Under the guidance of the Party, they became an important factor in carrying out the tasks which confronted the People's power. In particular, they exerted great efforts to raise production and efficiency, to improve the living and working conditions of the workers, as well as to carry out their vocational and political education.

In July 1945, consumers' cooperatives for workers and employees began to be set up in the towns. They were the first economic organizations of the masses. At a time when the State sector in trade was in its initial stage of development, they played a big role in supplying the working people regularly, and in the fight against speculation and the black market. Alongside the establishment of consumers' cooperatives, the Party worked hard at convincing the artisans why they should join in cooperatives as well.

With the creation of the socialist sectors of economy, important measures were taken in favor of the workers and employees. An eight-hour working day was enforced. The principle of equal pay for equal work, irrespective of age and sex, as well as the right to 15 days paid annual holiday were put into practice. Unemployment was almost completely eliminated.

These revolutionary victories somewhat improved the living conditions of the workers and cleared the ground for new victories in the economic and social development of our country on a socialist basis.

Doing Away with Old Agrarian Relations

In the field of agriculture, the most acute and pressing problem was the elimination of former agrarian relations. This problem had to do with the radical solution of the antagonistic contradictions between the laboring peasantry and the big landowners, that is to say, with the biggest democratic change which remained to be carried out. This was now the main field for strengthening the alliance of the working class with the laboring peasantry. Therefore, in its agricultural policy, the Party devoted special attention to this problem.

In January, 1945, a law was promulgated to annul all the old land rents which were unpaid, whereas rents of the years 1944-1945 were to be reduced down to 75 per cent. But this was a half way measure which did not meet with the unanimous approval of the poor peasantry, and it was for this reason that the law in question was not put fully into execution.

At this time, the entire irrigation system, — formerly private property, — was nationalized and given to peasantry for their common use. In order to somewhat ease the living conditions of the laboring peasantry and the working masses, all interest-bearing debts incurred before liberation were cancelled.

However, the CPA was conscious of the fact that all these measures were only palliatives and did not solve the main problem — that of the land. During the war, it had promised the

peasantry that it would fight for the solution of the agrarian question and had already taken preparatory measures. Immediately after the liberation the Party launched the slogan «the land to those who till it!» Inspired by this slogan, the peasantry insisted on the application of a thorough revolutionary agrarian reform.

The law on the agrarian reform was promulgated in August 1945. According to this law, State-owned land, the estates of religious institutions, and all areas of private land exceeding defined limits were to be expropriated and alienated. These limits were laid down as follows: up to 40 hectares when the owner had an exemplary economy which he managed himself, 20 hectares when the owner tilled or managed the land himself, 7 hectares when the proprietor did not till the land himself but would do so not later than within two years' time.

Under the conditions of Albania, where the acreage of arable land was very limited, the 20-40 hectares of land left to private proprietors was too much. With this amount of land quite a number of landlords still retained their positions in the countryside; the economic power of the rich peasant (the kulak) was not affected at all, whereas many poor peasants remained without land. These shortcomings of the law on agrarian reform arose directly from the influence of the opportunist standpoint of Sejfulla Malëshova and of the representatives of the CP of Yugoslavia.

The expropriation of land exceeding the

defined limits was carried through without compensation. It was distributed without cost as private property to the landless and landpoor peasants. Up to 5 hectares of land was allotted to each head of a family. Selling, buying, or leasing of land were prohibited.

Part of the expropriated land was not distributed but was turned into State property. The State farms set up in these lands marked the birth of the socialist State sector in agriculture. Besides, the forests, springs, water supplies and all subsoil riches were proclaimed the common property of the people.

Prior to and after the issuing of the law on the agrarian reform, the Party carried out a great work, especially with the communists of villages and with the laboring peasantry, to have them understand the objectives of this reform.

It warned that the reaction would make use of all means to hinder the application of the agrarian reform, to dampen the enthusiasm of peasants, and to make the people believe that the Democratic Government was incompetent. The Central Committee instructed that the agrarian reform should be regarded as a great political action, which was not only to give the peasants the land, but also to free them once for all from the centuries of feudal oppression and exploitation, and unite the peasantry still more closely around the Party.

For the speedy and correct application of the agrarian reform the Party set up poor peasants' committees. They played an important

role in the accurate definition of the lands of the State, the big land-owners, and the enemies of the people, and in compiling lists of peasant families with little or no land. They helped in the division of the expropriated land and, especially, in mobilizing the laboring peasantry to expose and to fight the hostile activity of the landlords and other reactionary forces who rose against the land reform from its very start. The formation of the poor peasants' committees and their entire activity to carry out the land reform greatly assisted to raise the political class consciousness of the poor peasantry.

3. THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE STATE OF PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY AS A FORM OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

The demand of the Democratic Front Congress for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly was embodied in the law on the elections to the Constituent Assembly issued by the Anti-fascist National-liberation Council in September 1945.

According to the law, the elections, which would take place on December 2, 1945, were to be democratic, free, general, equal, direct and secret. All Albanian citizens, men and women, over 18 years enjoyed the right to vote. The fighters of the National-liberation Army enjoyed this right irrespective of their age. Excluded from the right to vote were ex-ministers

of the Quisling government, the war criminals, and all those who had lost their civic rights.

The Determination of the People to Proceed on the Road of the Party!

The election to the Constituent Assembly would be the most important political action of the Party, a great test of its political maturity and of its organizational capability, of the strength of its links with the masses and of the determination of the people to proceed on the road of the Party. The CPA as a whole was mobilized to win this new political battle under the slogan «For the People's Republic».

Speaking on the Party work during the electoral campaign at the 4th Plenum, which discussed the question of the elections to the Constituent Assembly, Comrade Enver Hoxha said:

«The people must see concretely that those who liberated the Fatherland from the invaders and traitors are also able to govern, are able to reconstruct and to improve the economic and social life of their country. The communists should emerge, from the electoral campaign with a great experience, it should be a school for them and equip them to solve the other major problems that lie ahead»¹.

1) Enver Hoxha. Report to the 4th Plenum of the CC of the CPA, October 17, 1945.

The Party gave the instruction that the elections to the Constituent Assembly should be turned into a great people's plebiscite with the participation of all those entitled to vote and complete victory for the Democratic Front. Accordingly, the CPA decided to present a single list of candidates of the Democratic Front. However, as a result of the opportunist deviations of Sejfulla Maleshova, this list included a number of representatives of reaction, and a coalition in the elections was proposed to the Catholic clergy.

Internal and foreign reactionary forces tried to exploit the election campaign for their own purposes. Taking advantage of the provisions of the electoral law, reaction decided at first to present its own lists of candidates as a block in opposition to the Front. When this first attempt failed, from lack of support among the people, they changed their tactics and decided to boycott the elections. The reaction called on the people to abstain, claiming that allegedly «there was no democracy», «there was the dictatorship of a single party» and that «the election law was anti-democratic», because «it did not ensure equal rights to all the citizens who desired to put forward their candidature». Gjergj Kokoshi, one of the principal spokesmen of reaction, who was a member of the ANLC, demonstratively left the Democratic Front. Especially active in the attempt to boycott the elections was the «Albanian Union», — an illegal organization directed by the reactionary

Catholic clergy. To attain its aim, this organization did not shrink from collaborating with fugitive war criminals and resorting to terrorist actions.

Other representatives of the reaction who had remained within the Democratic Front did not feel strong enough to come out in open opposition. For the time being till the elections were over they decided to remain in its ranks with the objective of being elected to the Assembly under the banner of the Front. Afterwards they would set up a group, organize a legal «opposition», or even found an independent party.

The direct instigators and organizers of the hostile activity of the internal reaction were the U.S. and British imperialists. They left no stone unturned to defeat the Democratic Front at the elections. They opened a propaganda campaign against the Front and the CPA and went to such lengths as to demand that the Democratic Government allow the officers of their military missions in Tirana unrestricted control of the electoral campaign, and so on. They employed the question of the recognition of the Democratic Government of Albania as a special means of pressure. They announced that they would recognize the Albanian government only on the condition that the USA and Britain «were convinced that the elections were conducted freely», and that «foreign correspondents would be allowed freedom to supervise the way the elections were carried out». This was just an attempt to

intervene in the internal affairs of Albania, because, in fact, all the above conditions were already met by the election law and by the entire spirit and activity of the People's Power.

The U.S. Government put forward other conditions as well. On this occasion it demanded recognition of all the agreements concluded between the USA and Albania prior to April 7, 1939.

The U.S. and British Governments announced the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with the Albanian Democratic Government. However this was only a political manoeuvre directed against the People's Power and aimed at encouraging internal reaction. In fact they did not establish diplomatic relations with Albania after the elections either.

The CPA resolutely rejected all the new attempts of the imperialists and did not permit any interference in the internal affairs of Albania. It carried out extensive propaganda work to expose the aims and the tactics of the external and internal reaction and succeeded in isolating the enemy forces and strengthening further the political unity of the people around its platform.

When the electoral campaign was in full swing an event of great importance for our country occurred. In November 1945, the Government of the Soviet Union officially recognized the Democratic Government of Albania. Following the recognition of the Albanian Government by the USSR, Yugoslavia and Poland,

It was recognized successively by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, and other countries. This strengthened the international position of the People's Power in Albania and strengthened the confidence of the masses of the people in the future of their country.

About 90 per cent of voters took part in the elections of December and 93 per cent of them cast their ballots for the candidates of the Democratic Front. These were the first democratic elections ever held in Albania. They were a great school for the political education of the people, the Democratic Front and the Party.

The CPA scored a sweeping victory while reaction was defeated. With this victory the free and sovereign Albanian people expressed their full approval of the policy of the Party and their determination to proceed undeviatingly along the road the Party indicated.

The Proclamation of the People's Republic of Albania

On the eve of the meeting of the Constituent Assembly the people instructed their elected representatives to express themselves for the proclamation of the people's republic. On January 11, 1946 the Constituent Assembly, expressing the will of the people, unanimously proclaimed Albania a People's Republic and chose the new Government with Comrade Enver Hoxha at its head.

The Party brought the draft Constitution drawn up by the Government to the judgment

of the whole people. The discussions, which lasted over two months, were very fruitful. The proposals made by the masses of the people were a valuable contribution to strengthening the revolutionary content of the Constitution. On March 14, 1946, the Constituent Assembly adopted the new Constitution. Once its task accomplished, the Constituent Assembly was turned into the People's Assembly as the highest organ of State Power in the PRA.

The new democratic Constitution sanctioned the historic victories achieved and confirmed the changes which had taken place in the political and economic order of the country after the establishment of the People's Power. It reflected the initial process of the development of the country on the road to socialism and opened wide vistas for further economic and social changes.

First of all, the Constitution laid down the fundamental principle of the structure and the activity of the People's Power: **the power derives from the people and belongs to the people.**

The Constitution proclaimed the principle that the main means of social production were common property of the people, cooperative property and private property. The private sector was subject to State control. To defend the vital interests of the people and to raise the level of the people's well-being the State was to guide the life of the country and its economic development according to a general plan. To this end the State was to rely on the direct participation of the working masses.

Social property, the socialist sector of the economy — the State and the cooperative sectors, — was to be the foundation of our social and economic order. With a view to the uninterrupted development and strengthening of the socialist economy, the Constitution defined the right of the State to restrict and to expropriate private property when the general social interest required it. On this basis entire branches of economy or single economic enterprises could be nationalized. The formation of capitalist monopolies, trusts and cartels was forbidden.

The Constitution regarded work as an honour and duty for everybody. It proclaimed the principle that each citizen was entitled to be paid according to his work and capability.

The Constitution upheld the principle of free elections by direct, general, equal, and secret ballot. Electors had the right to revoke their representatives in the various organs of State power. All citizens were guaranteed freedom of meeting, of organizing, of speech and belief and the necessary measures were provided for the preservation and implementation of these rights.

Such were some of the fundamental principles of the first Constitution of the People's Republic of Albania. With the adoption of the Constitution, the process of the political organization of the People's Democratic order as a State of the dictatorship of the proletariat was further perfected.

Besides its general content as the dictator-

ship of the proletariat, the RP of Albania had some special features of its own. These were:

The People's Power was born in the war for national liberation following the complete destruction of the State apparatus of the invaders and of reactionary classes of the country.

The People's Councils, immediate successors of the National-liberation Councils, became the political basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The alliance of the working class with the laboring peasantry, the highest principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, was embodied in the Democratic Front, which represented the political army of our revolution.

Ever since the establishment of the People's Power at its head had been only one party — the Communist Party of Albania — which was the only party in the country. It exercised the undivided leadership of the political, economic, and social life.

The dictatorship of the proletariat was the direct offspring of the people's revolution, which began during the National-liberation war as an anti-imperialist democratic revolution and was developed without interruption into a socialist revolution after the liberation of the country. While in the first stage of the revolution the strategic objective of the Party was to ensure national independence and the establishment of the order of People's Democracy, in the second stage the strategic objective was to reinforce the State of People's Democracy as a form of

the dictatorship of the proletariat, to eliminate the economic basis of capitalism and to build a socialist society.

These two stages were links of a single revolution which complemented each other. The accomplishment of the tasks of the first stage created the indispensable premises for the second stage. The second stage had its roots in the first, and grew out of it. Those democratic changes which remained uncompleted from the first stage were carried out in the second stage.

4. OUR PARTY'S ORIENTATION ON DEEPENING THE REVOLUTION AND BUILDING SOCIALISM. THE ELIMINATION OF OPPORTUNIST MANIFESTATIONS

The changes of the year 1945 had laid the first economic and social foundations for Albania to embark on the road of socialism. Now the question was to push ahead more rapidly on this road. This required the completion of the changes initiated and the definition of the main directions of socialist construction.

However, the solution of this problem was hindered by opportunist viewpoints and attitudes which had appeared in the implementation of the Party line. Their bearer was Sejfulla Malëshova, Member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the Party. Sejfulla Malëshova's opportunism was a direct expression of his capitulation to the strong pressure exerted by the over-

thrown classes and, particularly, by the U.S. and British imperialists, on the Democratic Government and on the leadership of the CPA.

His opportunistic manifestations had been criticized and severely condemned at the meeting of the Political Bureau in December 1945, but Sejfulla Malëshova, though he had found no support, stubbornly continued to defend his standpoint.

The 5th Plenum of the CC of the CPA

To solve the questions connected with the orientation of the Party on intensifying the revolution and the construction of socialism, the 5th Plenum of the CC of the CPA was convened in February 1946.

The plenum pointed out that the line of the Party had been severely damaged by the thoroughly opportunist view which Sejfulla Malëshova had maintained in the political and economic fields.

Sejfulla Malëshova upheld his opinion that the new democratic order established in Albania should be an order of bourgeois democracy. He called for slackening the class struggle, he overestimated the strength of the overthrown classes, and had no confidence in the strength of the Party and the people. He was for complete freedom of activity for the private capitalist sector, for its uncontrolled and unrestricted development and against supporting the cooperative sector in town and countryside. In essence, he was against the con-

struction of socialism and a defender of the free development of capitalism.

In the field of foreign policy, he was afraid of imperialism and knelt before its might. He made the fate of the freedom and of the independence of Albania, the fate of the people's power, dependent on the political and economic concessions to be made to the U.S. and British imperialists, and he was always ready to submit to them. He demanded that no discrimination should be made between the Soviet Union and the USA and Great Britain, that the stand towards relations with them should be the same.

With his right opportunist viewpoints Sejfulla Malëshova had become a mouthpiece and defender of the interests of the local bourgeoisie and of the imperialists within the Party, he had turned into one of their lackeys. If these viewpoints were not exposed and combatted the Party line and the construction of socialism in Albania would have been endangered and obstructed. The elimination of them was an urgent and vital question.

The 5th Plenum firmly condemned and rejected these standpoints. As Sejfulla Malëshova persisted in his mistakes, the Plenum removed him from the Political Bureau and from the Central Committee of the Party.

The exposure of the opportunism of Sejfulla Malëshova made it possible for the Central Committee to guide the Party toward the intensification of the socialist revolution in the political, economic and ideological fields. It drew

up in general lines the principal directives of the socialist construction.

First and foremost, industry, internal wholesale trade, and all foreign trade, was to pass entirely into the hands of the State. Producers' and consumers' cooperatives were to be set up in cities and villages. The State was to exercise rigorous control on the private sector and unremittingly restrict the capitalist elements.

Comrade Enver Hoxha defined the course the Party would pursue in economy as follows:

«Everything to strengthen the State sector, merciless struggle against private capital, and the greatest State aid possible to producers' and consumers' cooperatives»¹.

For the development of the productive forces and the exploitation of natural resources, a general direction was given for the setting up of heavy industry, mainly on the basis of the exploitation of minerals, and for the building of light industry.

Towards the elimination of the former relations in the countryside, which had been begun, it was decided to carry the agrarian

1) Enver Hoxha, Report submitted at the 5th Plenary Session of the CC of the CPA, February 21, 1942. Central Archives of the Party.

reform through to the end and to set about the collectivization of agriculture. Simultaneously, model State farms were to be set up. The State should assist the laboring peasantry through financial means and work implements and restrict the kulaks. The mechanization of agriculture, the elimination of its one-sided character, the spreading of new crops, the development of animal husbandry, land drainage and reclamation were designated as the general lines along which the productive forces in the countryside were to be developed.

To intensify the revolution in the fields of education and culture as a constituent part of the socialist revolution, the 5th Plenum instructed that education should be reformed on these principles: education and culture were to become the property of the broad masses of the people and not remain the privilege of a minority, the school should be stripped of the old spirit and imbued with a new revolutionary spirit. But, above all, it was necessary to wipe out illiteracy.

For the socialist construction of the country it was of decisive importance to train capable technical and professional cadres imbued with Marxist-Leninist ideology to run the State and its economy.

In the field of foreign policy, the principal task of the Party was to fight in defence of the freedom and independence of the country, to strengthen the friendship with the USSR and the other countries of people's democracy, the peace

in the world. The 5th Plenum especially emphasized that a clear-cut and resolute and principled attitude should be taken towards U.S. and British imperialism, which represented the main danger to national independence and the people's democratic order.

The People's State Power would always remain a decisive weapon to cope with the new tasks of socialist development. The 5th Plenum directed that the State Power should be democratized, not only in its content, but also in its structure and the composition of its administrative apparatus. The specialists of the old administration who worked in the State organs should be kept under constant supervision to prevent the introduction of bureaucratic methods. To strengthen the Democratic Front a radical purge from its ranks of hostile elements was ordered.

Finally, the most important task of all, the intensification of the revolution and the construction of socialism made it absolutely necessary to strengthen the Party, to raise to a higher level its leading and organizational role in the entire life of the country. For this purpose, the decision of the 4th Plenum of October 1945 to convene the 1st Congress of the Party was re-adopted. It was decided to hold the Congress on May 25, 1946. However, due to the intervention of the CPY leadership this decision was not put into execution and the Congress was postponed for an undefined period.

The Deepening of Economic and Social Transformations

The directives of the 5th Plenum of the CC were reflected at once in the Constitution of the PR of Albania, the draft of which was being discussed at that time by the people.

After the session, a new phase of nationalizations began. The power stations, the construction materials industry, the entire existing light and food-processing industries, property chiefly of the local bourgeoisie, became State property. At the end of the year 1946, the principal means of production in the cities had been turned into social property, and 87 per cent of the volume of total industrial output was contributed by the State sector. By the end of 1947 production by private capitalist industry was almost entirely eliminated.

The socialist socialization of the principal means of production put an end to the economic domination of the bourgeoisie. It laid the economic foundations of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The socialist relations in production and the socialist sector of economy in industry, trade, transport and finance were born precisely on the basis of this socialization. The nationalized enterprises became socialist enterprises. In them the exploitation of man by man was eliminated.

The nationalization of the principal means of production in Albania was done quickly and without compensation. It took place as a result

of the deep class differentiation which had taken place during the National-liberation War and after the war, and which had led to the elimination of the political domination of the bourgeoisie. This also removed the principal obstacle to the elimination of its economic basis.

The rapid rate of the socialization had its own difficulties, as well. The working class and the State took over the means of production without being fully prepared to organize and manage them efficiently. Engineers and technicians with experience and loyal to the revolution were lacking. Nevertheless, due to the good organization and to the all-round political preparation of workers and, likewise, to the State control which had been established in the capitalist enterprises, the nationalization was carried through without economic upheavals and damage.

Alongside the State socialist sector, the cooperative sector was set up and developed. During 1946 many new consumers' cooperatives in towns and trading cooperatives in villages were created. In response to the call of the Party, the individual artisans embraced the form of socialist cooperation. By the end of 1946 the handicraft cooperatives included more than half of the artisans.

To ensure the supply of the population with bread, in June 1946 the State system of purchase, procurement and sale of food grains was established. This measure did away with

any possibility of private merchants speculating with the people's bread.

In July 1946 the monetary reform was carried out, establishing the maximum limit of new banknotes which one family could exchange. Through this measure a good part of monetary means was taken from the hands of capitalist elements, and the grave consequences of inflation which affected the working masses were eliminated.

To ensure a more equitable and regular distribution of foodstuffs, in September 1946 the ration system was introduced. Under this system, a higher ration of food-stuffs was allotted to workers employed in the most important branches of economy than to the rest of the population. The weakness of this system was that no differentiation was made between the rations for the workers or employees, and for capitalist elements, who were not in work relations with the state.

The establishment of the ration system was necessary at a time when food-supplies were limited. It ensured the fulfilment of the primary needs of the working masses and blocked the road to speculation with rationed foodstuffs. The Party was conscious that the ration system was a temporary measure which would be withdrawn as soon as suitable economic conditions were created.

With the creation and the expansion of the socialist sector increased the possibilities and

the planned direction and regulation of the entire economic life of the country was made indispensable. In August 1946, the law on the general economic State plan and on the planning organs was adopted. The Planning Commission, created in 1945, was re-organized and the work for drafting the general economic plan for the year 1947 began immediately.

In May 1946 modifications were made in the agrarian reform law, which gave it a deeper revolutionary content. All lands, vineyards, olive groves, gardens, buildings and agricultural inventories owned by those who did not cultivate the land themselves were expropriated. All farmers and proprietors who cultivated the land themselves were left with no more than 5 hectares of land. The sale and purchase under any title whatsoever or the mortgaging of land were prohibited.

With these modifications the principle «the land belongs to him who cultivates it» was fully applied, big landownership was eliminated and a blow was dealt at the economic position of the kulaks (wealthy peasants). They aroused a new wave of enthusiasm among the working peasantry and secured its more lively participation in the application of the reform.

These modifications encountered the fierce opposition of the exploiting classes. Big landlords and wealthy peasants used all means to impede the execution of the agrarian reform. They warned the peasants against taking the lands allotted to them by the reform, threate-

ned them with the slogan: «The government will not be recognised by the great powers and the People's Power soon will be destroyed.» The reactionary clergy declared and preached that the land is «sacred» and that «whoever lays hands on it is punished by God». In particular, inimical activity was carried out by some of the bourgeois technicians and representatives of the overthrown classes who had wormed their way into poor peasants committees, into the State apparatus and the organs of agriculture. They attempted to leave the landlords and wealthy peasants with the best lands or more land than was due to them. Rich proprietors began to slaughter their cattle and to destroy their implements which were to be distributed to peasants. In some instances, they even passed to overt terrorist actions against the militants of the Party and the State. The U.S. and British missions in Tirana, which organized the sabotage of the reform, especially in Myzeqe, gave them direct aid.

For the full application of the agrarian reform the entire Party was set in motion, which raised the poor peasants' masses to their feet and organized a sharp struggle against the class enemies. The city workers also came to the aid of the peasants. In November 1946 the reform was completed successfully throughout Albania. The peasants became truly the masters of the soil, where they had toiled and sweated generation after generation. The Party fulfilled their age-old dream.

173,000 hectares of land, 474,000 olive trees and 6,000 draught animals were expropriated by the reform. About 90 percent of the total area of expropriated land (155,000 hectares), one half of the number of olive trees, and all of the draught animals were distributed gratuitously among 70,000 landless or landpoor peasant families.

The agrarian reform was the first revolution in the economic-social relations of the village. Its essence was the democratic change of agrarian relations in the countryside. It eliminated large-scale land ownership, it swept away for ever the remnants of feudalism and the landlord class in Albania. By the restriction of private property over the land, by the prohibition of the sale and purchase, leasing or mortgaging of land, the polarization of the peasantry was hindered and the confines of its exploitation by the kulaks were extremely restricted. Such being the case, the agrarian reform contained, at the same time, elements of an emphatically anti-capitalist character also. This occurred because the reform was applied by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In these circumstances, though it preserved small private ownership of the land by the working peasants and increased the number of middle peasants, the agrarian reform limited the terrain for the development of capitalism in the countryside.

The allocation of land to peasants and their liberation from the yoke of the landlords and

merchants aroused their desire for and interest in a better exploitation of the land, for a more speedy development of the productive forces in agriculture.

The application of the agrarian reform demonstrated that it is only the working class and its party that, after taking over the political power, are capable of carrying out radical changes in agrarian relations.

The agrarian reform further strengthened on an economic basis the alliance of the working class with the working peasantry; it also strengthened the People's Power itself, which had this same alliance at its foundation. The laboring peasants tightened their ranks around the Party and formed a more profound conviction in the correctness of its political line. All this was a support of great importance for the Party to enter the road of gradual socialist changes in the countryside. The work of the CPA for spreading the idea of collectivization among the peasants resulted in the setting up of agricultural cooperatives of production in 1946. The first cooperative was set up in Krutje of Myzeqe.

The economic-social changes created new conditions which facilitated the development of the cultural revolution, whereas the new tasks of the socialist construction required that this revolution should develop with rapid strides. The cultural revolution found its expression, first of all, in the educational reform of August 1946. According to this reform, education be-

came universal, free, equal, secular and was given in the mother tongue. The school was given a completely State and unified character. Tuition fees were abolished. Primary education became obligatory in the entire Republic. The systems of pre-school education, of vocational instruction, and of schooling for adults were created. New plans, programs and textbooks with a new content were drafted. Primary schools were opened in every village. Along with this, the campaign for the elimination of illiteracy was intensified.

A fundamental problem of the cultural revolution and of socialist revolution in general was the creation of the new intelligentsia. The solution of this problem, under the circumstances when the Albanian intellectuals comprised a very small number, was of vital importance. For this purpose, many sons of the people were sent abroad for higher studies, especially to the Soviet Union. Despite the economic difficulties, the State provided the specialists with suitable conditions for work, creative activity and living. The constructive work, the educational work and the ardent support of the Party, rendered it possible for many of the old cadres to be re-educated, to embrace the Marxist-Leninist ideology and to accept the leading role of the Party.

The new socialist changes in the economic, social and cultural domain were accompanied by a purge of enemy elements from the organs of the People's Power and from the Democra-

tic Front organizations. This purpose was served especially by the new elections to the people's councils and to leading organs of the Front.

By special laws, the rights and the duties of local organs of the power were extended and the State Control Commission was created. By its agency, the control of the working masses over the State organs and their activities was increased.

Through the new revolutionary measures, the Democratic Front improved its own social composition. The Front now represented a purely political organization of the laboring masses.

The socialist changes and the revolutionary drive of the masses made it possible for the main works destroyed by the war to be reconstructed during the year 1946. At the end of that year in industry as well as in agriculture output reached the 1938 level. Besides, relying mainly on voluntary work, new works were also undertaken. Our youth built the Kukës-Peshkopia motorvehicle road. The Maliq swamp was drained, new irrigation and drainage canals were dug, and so on. In impetuous work for the reconstruction of the country, the initiative and the creative activity of working masses were developed, socialist emulation was organized, and the shock brigade movement sprang into existence as an expression of the new stand towards work.

Theses on Reviewing the Proceedings of the Berat Plenum

The 5th Plenum of the Central Committee, which worked out the fundamental directions of socialist construction and dealt a heavy blow at opportunism, did not, however, discover and eliminate the source of this opportunism: the erroneous estimations and orientations of the 2nd Plenum of Berat. It did not condemn nor avert the Yugoslav intervention in our internal affairs, did not re-establish unity and collective leadership in the Party. Consequently, the leadership of the entire life of the Party and of the country by the Central Committee and the Political Bureau encountered great obstacles. Through their agents in the CPA, the Yugoslav revisionists exerted every effort to remove the Secretary-General from the direction of the Party work on the pretext that he should occupy himself exclusively with State affairs, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In fact, the entire direction of the Party was concentrated in the hands of Koçi Xoxe, organizational secretary of the CC. Thus a Party-State duality had been created. In reality, however, by employing the authority of the Party, Koçi Xoxe attempted to get hold of the direction of State power as well. He had managed to create such a system that orders, decrees and laws could be put into execution only after special instructions of the CC apparatus signed by him had been issued. This method of work had greatly weakened the role of State organs,

nurtured bureaucracy and impeded the speedy and correct solution of problems.

In this situation there was no guarantee that the Party could safeguard the purity of its general line or successfully accomplish its great tasks of building socialism and defending national freedom and independence.

Comrade Enver Hoxha, who had never been convinced of the correctness of the conclusions and decisions of the Plenum of Berat, had come to the conclusion that they should be reexamined and corrected. Only in this manner could the unity in the leadership be re-established, the Political Bureau and the Central Committee function normally as leading organs of the Party and the life of the country, and the implementation of the directions for the socialist construction issued by the 5th Plenum be assured.

With this intent, in June 1946 he submitted at the Political Bureau a special report on re-examining the proceedings of the 2nd Plenum of the Central Committee.

The principal theses of this report were:

— The preparations for the proceedings of the 2nd Plenum gravely violated the norms of the internal life of the Party. The problems which had been submitted to the Political Bureau for discussion prior to the plenum had not been proposed in a comradely and communist manner, but had been decided outside the Bureau, without a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis, but with passion and prejudice, with-

out submitting them to a free exchange of opinions. They were put forward in the form of a «coup d'état».

— The estimations and conclusions of the Plenum of Berat were absolutely erroneous.

— The brilliant stage of the National-liberation War was «obscured, belittled and condemned» by the Plenum of Berat.

— The independence of the CPA was seriously encroached upon.

— The principal persons responsible were Velimir Stoinich and Sejfulla Malëshova. «Velimir Stoinich trifled with our Party and our people». He «directed and encouraged the proceedings» of the Plenum.

— The orientations of the Berat Plenum had grave repercussions for our Party and, if they continued, would become a great danger to it.

Comrade Enver Hoxha knew nothing, as yet, of the behind-the-scenes dealings in Berat, of the plot which had been set up by the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party, or of all the accomplices of this plot. He considered Velimir Stoinich and Sejfulla Malëshova as principal persons responsible because it was they who had carried the banner of the anti-party assault at the 2nd Plenum of the Central Committee. The others, Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and Nako Spiru, were merely criticized for the support they had given to Velimir Stoinich and Sejfulla Malëshova. Although unaware of the behind-the-scenes dealings, Comrade Enver Ho-

xha, by analyzing the proceedings of the Berat Plenum with a Marxist eye, had formed the absolute conviction that at this Plenum the Party line had been condemned unjustly and without any reason whatsoever, that the Party had not been politically mistaken, that its line had been correct. Therefore, he demanded that the decisions of this session should be rejected, the historic truth should be re-established and the peril which menaced the independence of the Party and its Marxist-Leninist line should be averted.

These correct theses of Comrade Enver Hoxha were opposed in the Bureau and were rejected by Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo. They feared that a detailed discussion and approval of these theses would bring to light their anti-party work and the inimical intervention of the CPY in the internal affairs of the CPA.

As for Nako Spiru, he did not have the courage to disclose publicly his own activity and that of the other participants in the organization of the back stage manoeuvres. Thinking that his mistake in Berat would be covered by the lapse of time, and that he would make amends for his offence through work, after the theses of Comrade Enver Hoxha had been submitted, Nako Spiru began to uphold, on all occasions, the correct viewpoints of the Secretary-General. Thereafter, he fought with determination for the Party line on the question of the construction of socialism.

As the theses put forward in the report had not been approved and with the aim of creating

conditions for correcting the mistakes and establishing unity in the Political Bureau, Comrade Enver Hoxha proposed that the Bureau should be broadened by the admission of new members tested in battle and at work. But this proposition also was opposed by Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, and was not approved in full.

Efforts to Normalize the Internal Life of the Party

The new conditions which were created in the country after the triumph of the people's revolution, the new historic tasks which confronted the Party, required the elimination of wartime limitations in the internal democracy of the Party, the application of all Marxist-Leninist norms in its organizational life. But the intervention of the Yugoslav leadership, the copying of its Trotskyite-revisionist forms and methods by Koçi Xoxe prevented any such thing, engendered deviations and accentuated shortcomings in the organizational line. To correct these shortcomings and to normalize the situation, Comrade Enver Hoxha proposed that an analysis should be made of the organizational work of the Party and of the relations between the Party and State power. In this matter Koçi Xoxe was charged with presenting a report to the Political Bureau. However, on the instigation of the CPY leadership, he dodged this report and never presented it. This was to avoid an attack on Koçi Xoxe who was directly responsible for distortions in organizational

questions, to avert the bringing to light of the intervention of the Yugoslav leadership and the distorted line it was imposing on the CP of Albania.

On the persistent demand of Comrade Enver Hoxha and other comrades of the leadership, the Central Committee, nevertheless, took certain steps to normalize the organizational life of the Party. Lacking a Constitution, it issued detailed instructions which regulated the internal life of the Party, the admission of new members and the relations of the Party with the State and with the organizations of the masses. In these instructions, however, no mention was made of elections to Party organs. Later, in March 1947, the Central Committee decided that elections should be held only for secretaries of the cells. But even here not all the organizational regulations were observed. The secretaries were elected by open ballot. No elections took place for the Party bureaux and committees.

Of special importance to the internal life of the Party were the purge of its ranks (the audit) which was carried through during the year 1946, and the distribution of membership cards. As the result of the audit, 1,246 people, constituting 10 per cent of the total number of members and candidate-members, were excluded from the Party. Amidst them there were many who were not worthy of the proud title of a Party member. However, the audit was not carried out completely according to Marxist-

Leninist organizational regulations. Through a series of errors, there still remained in the Party persons who did not deserve to be members while others were expelled unjustly.

After this, the number of Party members began to increase rapidly. Within one year, this number increased more than three and a half times. On the one hand, this denoted the growth of the authority of the Party, on the other, it weakened its composition and militant spirit, for in admission to membership, attention was paid only to the increase in numbers, and the question of quality was largely neglected. This once again brought entirely alien and even hostile persons into the Party. While for the admission of women, especially in the countryside, a sectarian attitude was maintained.

Hand in hand with efforts to normalize the organizational life of the Party, the Central Committee took steps to raise the theoretical level of the communists, which was quite low. This became more urgent because the Party organizations did not feel that the study of Marxist-Leninist theory was absolutely necessary. For this purpose theoretical courses and circles were opened and individual study was organized. Besides, agitation and propaganda among the masses of the people was extended using new forms and methods.

The Intensification of the Class Struggle

The intensification of the revolution encountered fierce resistance from the class enemies: The imperialists and the internal reaction, despite the defeat they had suffered in Albania, could not reconcile themselves either to the existence of the People's Power, or to the revolutionary economic-social changes. After the failure of the objective they had hoped to achieve through the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the U.S. and British Governments drafted a new plan of measures against the PRA, relying on the close coordination of counter-revolutionary activity within and outside the country. This plan aimed at re-grouping and re-organizing all the remnants of the internal reactionary forces and at creating a tense situation in the country by launching these remnants into action. In such a situation events would be manipulated to furnish the imperialists with a pretext for armed intervention from abroad and to justify this intervention before international public opinion.

The imperialist propaganda launched a frenzied campaign against the order of people's democracy appealing to the Albanian people to rise against it. In Greece and Italy U.S. and British agencies assembled in special camps fugitive fascists, Zogites and Ballists, and gave them intensive military and subversive training for the coming joint attack to be undertaken from abroad and from within the country against the «communists». British warships pa-

trolled the territorial waters of the PRA in a demonstrative manner, firing shots time and again in the direction of the Albanian mainland.

Meanwhile the U.S. and British military missions to Albania set in motion the internal reaction. They organized several reactionaries, who had been elected as deputies in December 1945, in a separate group. These deputies began to declare themselves openly against socialist changes and attempted to create all sorts of obstacles to the adoption and enforcement of laws. The imperialist agency had assigned to them the task of gathering around themselves all the remnants of reaction within the country and of assuming the direction of the attack which was being prepared against the People's Power. It had established links between the treacherous deputies both with the chiefs of the «Balli Kombetar» and of the «Legality» in exile, as well as with the Greek monarcho-fascists.

The U.S. mission, in particular, had undertaken the task of disorganizing our economy by sabotage in the main branches of construction and production. Groups of saboteurs composed of corrupted bourgeois specialists operated under its direction in Maliq (where the swamp was being drained), on the construction sites of bridges, in the oil fields in Kuçova, in the copper mines at Rubik, and elsewhere.

In September 1946, counter-revolutionary bands launched an armed assault on the city of Shkodra. This attack had been calculated to serve as a starting point for military interven-

tion from abroad. However it did not work out because the reactionary bands were annihilated within the day. Two months later, the imperialists organized a provocation of an international character against Albania. When a squadron of British warships was cruising along the Albanian coast-line with the aim of open provocation, two of them struck mines in the Corfu Channel and were damaged. As was revealed later, the British command itself had purposely organized this incident. Accusing the democratic Government of Albania of allegedly placing these mines in the Corfu Channel, the U.S. and British Governments attempted to use the Corfu incident as a means to prepare public opinion to justify the landing of their military forces in Albania. Meanwhile, the Greek monarcho-fascist Government launched more frequent territorial and aerial provocations along the State boundaries with the PRA.

The intensification of the activity of the imperialists and of the internal reaction had increased the peril which threatened the people's revolution in Albania. By this time, however, the CPA and the working masses had acquired experience in the struggle with internal and external class enemies. The Party had trained the communists and workers to stand vigilant and always prepared to cope with any danger. «The group of deputies», and other enemies within the country found no support among the masses of the people.

The terrorist actions and sabotage carried

out by reactionary elements, as well as the Corfu Channel provocation, further increased the hatred of the people towards the traitors and the U.S. and British imperialists, raised the all-round preparedness of the Party, the armed forces and all the workers, to defend the order of people's democracy, the national independence and territorial integrity of the Republic. Workers of cities and of village took part vigorously together with the organs of State Security and military detachment in detecting enemies and in exterminating them. The traitors and the saboteurs were brought before people's tribunals where they gave an account of their actions and were sentenced to the punishments they deserved. They were obliged to bring to light the entire plan hatched up by the U.S. and British Governments against the PRA and to admit publicly their treason.

At the same time, the objective which the imperialists tried to reach through the Corfu Channel provocation was frustrated. Although they put into operation the international organizations, their obedient instruments, such as the Hague Tribunal etc., they did not succeed in convincing international public opinion that Albania was really to blame for the Corfu incident. The Democratic Government of the People's Republic of Albania proved before the whole world that it had no hand whatsoever in that incident, and that the whole affair was a provocation organized by the British Government for hostile aims against the PRA. On

this occasion, the entire progressive international public opinion upheld the just cause of the democratic Government of Albania and condemned the attempts of the imperialists to lay the blame on the People's Republic of Albania.

The conviction of the Albanian people that the U.S.A. and Great Britain were not acting as allies, but as their archenemies, was strengthened likewise by the persistent efforts of the U.S. and British Governments to deny the PRA its lawful place in the United Nations Organization. They made use of their veto in the Security Council against the admission of Albania to this organization.

The U.S. and British imperialists also attempted by all means to hinder the participation of Albania in the Peace Conference which was held in Paris in July 1946, but they did not achieve their aim.

In order to voice the standpoint of the Albanian Government in connection with the Peace Treaty with Italy, a delegation headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha went to Paris. The delegation demanded: Italy should be compelled to respect not only the sovereignty and independence of the Albanian State, as it was proposed in the draft-treaty, but also its territorial integrity; the gold seized by the German invaders should be returned to Albania and reparations for war-damage should be paid by Italy; the PRA should be considered as an associate power. These legitimate demands were rejected by the Conference under the pressure of British

and U.S. delegations, but through the persistence of the democratic Government, the Albanian demands were approved by the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Allied Great Powers in November, 1946.

The Anglo-U.S. delegates tried likewise to compel the Peace Conference to discuss the territorial claims of Greece against Albania and to consider the latter as a «defeated State», but the clear-cut stand of the Albanian delegation caused this attempt to fail, too.

«I solemnly declare», said Comrade Enver Hoxha before he left for home, «that neither the Paris Conference, nor the Four Power Conference, nor any other conference whatsoever, can take up for discussion the boundaries of my country, within which not even an inch of foreign land is included. Our boundaries are indisputable and nobody will dare violate them... Let the whole world know that the Albanian people have not sent their delegation to Paris to render account, but to demand that an account should be rendered to them by those who have caused them so much damage and against whom the Albanian people have fought so fiercely to the end»¹.

1) Enver Hoxha. Declaration Made to the Representatives of the Press in Paris, September 16, 1946. «Bashkimi», September 19, 1946.

An important role in bringing about the success of the People's Republic of Albania in the international arena was played by the support given by friendly States, especially by the Soviet Union.

The CPA had drawn lessons of major importance from the experience gained in the struggle against reaction during the early years after liberation. The communists were convinced in practice and, at the same time, had convinced the working masses, that the revolution can be developed and socialism can be built only through:

«a fierce and merciless struggle against internal enemies and their foreign imperialist supporters»¹.

The Party was never carried away with the successes scored by the the masses of the people under its leadership nor by the defeats suffered by the enemy. The Central Committee taught that

«the enemy's work should be taken seriously and this calls for constant revolutionary vigilance»².

1) Instructions of the CC of the CPA, June 17, 1947. Principal Documents of the Party. Vol. I, p. 362.

2) Ibidem, p. 364.

Changes in the Economic and Social Structure and the First Results of the Socialist Development of our Economy

The socialization of the principal means of production and the agrarian reform changed the economic and social structure of the country in favor of socialism. Our economy consisted now of three main forms: the socialist form, that of small-scale commodity production, and the capitalist form.

The socialist form included industry, mining, the power stations, transport and communications, the financial system, foreign trade, internal wholesale trade, the State and cooperative enterprises of retail trade, the State and cooperative agricultural economies, machine and tractor stations, the forests, waters, and subsoil resources. By the end of 1946 this form ruled the commanding positions of the economy and accounted for 95 per cent of overall industrial production.

Small-scale commodity production included the employment of most of the working people and represented about 80 per cent of the overall volume of production of the national economy. It comprised the economies of the poor and middle peasants and of the artisans who did not employ hired labor. All these people lived mainly on the income from their own toil.

The capitalist form comprised the economies of the kulaks in the countryside, the merchants and traders, and the small tradesmen

and owners in the cities who employed hired labor. They accounted for about 5 per cent of the overall volume of production in the national economy. It was concentrated principally in the field of circulation. In 1947 private trade represented about 80 per cent of the total volume of commodities handled by retail trade.

These three forms of economy corresponded also with three social classes: the working class, the working peasantry and the bourgeoisie. The working class and peasantry had become the two principal classes of society. Having lost its political power and the main means of production the bourgeoisie was turned into secondary class, but in order to safeguard its own class interests it carried on a sharp struggle against the People's Power and against the socialist construction of the country. In this struggle it had the backing of international imperialism.

Under the new economic and social conditions, for the solution of the tasks of socialist construction the Party took into consideration the fundamental circumstances which facilitated, as well as those which handicapped this construction.

The fundamental favorable circumstances were: the existence of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist Party at the head of the State Power and the direction of the country; the sound militant union of the urban and rural working masses around the Party within the framework of the Democratic Front; the revolutionary

tempering of these masses, acquired in the war against internal and external enemies; the experience of the Soviet Union in building socialism; its moral, political and economic assistance and that of the countries of People's Democracy, and the support of the anti-imperialist liberation movement.

The fundamental unfavorable circumstances were: the direct transition of Albania from semi-feudalism to socialism; the cultural and educational backwardness of the population, the lack of engineers, technicians and qualified workers; the scanty material and financial resources; the encirclement of the country by the imperialists and by those neighboring states which maintained a hostile attitude.

Under these circumstances, in order to build socialism, our Party put forward as a primary task the speedy development of productive forces, by putting into operation and by using all the internal possibilities and resources. The achievement of this task comprised at the same time a decisive condition for the restriction and elimination of the capitalist element, the construction of the material basis of socialism and the extension of socialist relations in production.

The changes in the economic and social structure of the country gave the Communist Party of Albania the opportunity to take concrete measures for the planned development of the economy and culture. The first plans, in 1947 and 1948, aimed at strengthening the socialist economy, by developing mining in the

first place and the branches of light industry. In the field of agriculture, they envisaged extension of the area under cultivation, increased production of grains, and the introduction of new industrial crops. In the field of **culture**, pre-eminence was given to the extension of education, the elimination of illiteracy and the training of specialists.

To cope with the tasks of the planned direction of the economy, the Party and the Government took a series of measures during 1947. State industrial enterprises were put on a self-supporting basis. This was a new method of planned management of the economic activity of enterprises, which required that they should cover all the expenses incurred for production with the revenues assured by the sale of their products and, at the same time, yield an amount for accumulation.

The passage of economic enterprises to this system was supplemented also by the organization of work on the basis of norms and by the new system of remunerating work done according to the socialist principle of quantity and of quality.

For the centralization of accumulation and distribution, a reorganization was carried out of the financial system, the budget, taxation, and the function of the banks. Instead of its almost administrative character, the budget was turned into the principal financial plan of the entire people's economy. Taxes, also, lost their fiscal character. The main form of budget

income was defined as taxation on the turnover of economic enterprises and their surplus profits. The bank became the only center of credit and accounting.

The rights and the duties of workers were specified in the new law on labor and on social insurance of the workers. This law also regulated the conclusion of collective contracts between the directorates of the enterprises and the workers, rates of pay hours of work and rest. It especially protected the rights of underage children, and of women as workers and as mothers. According to the new law each worker was entitled to social insurance benefits which were accorded by the State in cases of illness or of accidents at work, in old age, during pregnancy and at childbirth.

Assessing correctly the role of the cooperative sector in building the socialist economy, the Party attacked the distortions which constituted an open deviation from its economic line.

In the artisans' cooperatives an end was put to the distribution of all the profits among members without laying aside something for the expansion of production, to the trend towards speculation and the biggest possible profits, and the remuneration for work was established on a socialist basis.

The consumers' cooperatives were categorically prohibited from re-selling goods they had accumulated to private merchants, as had happened in certain cases. In order to encour-

rage the consumers' cooperatives to accumulate larger quantities of agricultural products, an entire system of economic ties was established between them and the buying and selling cooperatives in the countryside.

The buying and selling cooperatives were charged not only with supplying the countryside with industrial goods but also with accumulating agricultural products for the regular supply of cities. This measure did away with intermediaries and private speculators, encouraged the organized exchange of rural products for those of cities and rendered them materially more profitable.

The adoption of these measures in the cooperative sector was of economic and political importance. It helped to put the cooperative movement on a correct and sound basis and to stop exploitation of their shortcomings by capitalist elements who opposed the economic line of the Party in building socialism.

Without underestimating the role and significance of cooperation in the field of circulation, the Party considered it merely as a first step, as a starting point, to pass over to cooperation in the field of agricultural production. Accordingly, during the years 1947-1948 the work continued for setting up agricultural cooperatives of production on a voluntary basis.

To become modern and exemplary socialist economies, the first agricultural cooperatives were in need of an advanced material and tech-

nical basis. For this purpose the first machine and tractor stations (MTS) were set up in 1947.

From the very start the machine and tractor stations were created as State socialist enterprises in agriculture. They were employed as a special form of the great aid the State gave to the peasantry in an organized manner for the establishment and strengthening of the new cooperativist order in the countryside. The MTS's were the foundation stone of the new material-technical base of socialist agriculture. They were a powerful political and organizational medium. Through them the Party propagated and spread among the people in the countryside, the necessity for and advantages of collectivization.

A great economic and political problem for the Party and the State Power was that of providing food grain. In order to solve it People's Power had been compelled to issue special ordinances, under which peasant farmers were obliged to sell to the State all their surplus grain, after deducting the necessary amount, fixed by law, for seed and for their families food.

In this way the State succeeded in accumulating the necessary grain. The enforcement of the ordinances however encountered difficulties caused by the opposition of the peasant producers and by the endeavors of enemies to exploit this opposition to their advantage. On the other hand, this system of accumulation did not arouse in the peasant any interest or

material inducement to increase the area under cultivation and agricultural production. For this reason, in 1948, modifications were made in the system of accumulation of grain. From now on each peasant economy was obliged to deliver to the State a fixed amount of grain at a standard price. The surplus grain, the peasant could keep for himself or sell to the State at a higher price than that of the compulsory quota. This system created a certain degree of material incentive for the peasant to increase agricultural production. But it did not solve the problem completely, because it was open to abuses, which led either to the obligatory accumulation of all the surplus production, or to leaving the producers with greater quantities of grain than those prescribed by the ordinances.

The frequent modification of the procurement system during the years 1946-1948 were the consequences not only of the difficulties of providing food grains, but also of the lack of experience in finding the most appropriate forms of economic links between town and countryside.

During the years 1947-1948 the working masses exerted great efforts to fulfil the plans. During these two years new industrial works were set up, the Tirana-Durrës-Peqin railway was constructed, and the productive capacities of mines were extended. In 1948 the total industrial output was twice as much as in 1938.

At this time agricultural production also surpassed the pre-war level. With the introduction of new industrial crops, slowly but

definitely, the old structure of agriculture began to change. The first steps were taken for the reclamation of swamps and drainage and irrigation of the land.

The economic social changes of a democratic and social character which were carried out in Albania immediately after the liberation were deep, speedy, and impetuous. This was so because they were carried out by the People's Power, which represented the dictatorship of the proletariat under the direct leadership of the Communist Party. The second reason was the broad social base of the socialist revolution. The activity of the Party and of the State Power in the revolutionary change of the country was supported unwaveringly not only by the working class and the poor peasantry, but also by the middle peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie of the cities.

The thorough-going military and political defeat suffered by the landlords and the reactionary bourgeoisie in 1944 and the firm base of the People's Power among the broad masses of the population did not permit the overthrown exploiting classes to turn their class struggle into a civil war despite the repeated efforts, especially, of the U.S. and British imperialists. After the liberation these classes suffered another major defeat, in the political and economic social sphere.

5. THE COLLAPSE OF THE HOSTILE INTERVENTION OF THE YUGOSLAV REVISIONISTS. THE DENUNCIATION OF THE ANTI-PARTY ACTIVITY OF KOÇI XOXE'S GROUP

The successes achieved during the early years after the liberation would have been still greater if it had not been for the blatant interference of the CPY leadership in the internal affairs of the CPA and of the Albanian State. By its hostile activity it caused great damage to the building of socialism in Albania.

Based on the consistent internationalist policy of the CPA, which aimed at strengthening fraternal relations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of people's democracy, in July 1946, the Government of the PR of Albania concluded with the Yugoslav Government the Treaty of Cooperation and of Mutual Aid between the PR of Albania and the FR of Yugoslavia. A few months later an economic convention also was signed.

The CPA regarded with confidence the alliance between the Albanian people and the Yugoslav peoples who had fought side by side and had shed their blood in the war against the same foe and for the same objectives. The Party considered the close cooperation and the mutual assistance between the PRA and the FRY as an external factor of importance for the construction of socialism in Albania and for the protection of the national independence of the country from the enslaving intentions of

the U.S. and British imperialists and of their henchmen, the Greek monarcho-fascists.

Nevertheless, the Secretary-General and the other comrades of the Central Committee viewed with concern the interference of Yugoslav representatives in the domestic affairs of the Party and the Albanian State. But they did not suspect as yet that this interference was being actuated on the instructions and with the approval of the Central Committee of the CPY. While opposing on all occasions meddling by Yugoslav diplomats and military men in Albanian State and Party internal affairs, they tried to remove any misunderstandings or obstacles in the relations between the two countries and the two parties.

However, these endeavors clashed with the anti-Marxist, anti-Albanian stand of the Yugoslav leadership. Under the cover of this attitude, which the Yugoslav propaganda attempted to present as a policy of «disinterested fraternal aid», lay their intention to eliminate the independence of the CPA and the Albanian State.

The Resistance of the CPA against Yugoslav Intervention

The agreements concluded on the basis of the economic convention were put into effect at the beginning of 1947. The first step, foreseen by these agreements, was the parity of currency. Right from the start, the Central Committee and the Albanian Government on the initiative of Comrade Enver Hoxha,

opposed this measure in principle because there were many obstacles which hindered reaching real parity. The level of economic development between the two countries, wages and the prices of commodities were not equal. It was impossible to bring them to parity within a short period of time. However, the leadership of the CPY described this opposition as out of place and interpreted it as an expression of distrust towards the spirit of the convention. After the pressure exerted by the CPY, the *lek* was brought to parity with the *dinar*, on an altogether arbitrary basis to the advantage of the *dinar*.

The second measure which was put into effect was the unification of prices. For this measure also the Party and the Albanian Government put forward their objections based on the fact that in industry, agriculture and other branches of material production of the two countries the fundamental funds were of different structures. The productions of labor and the labor cost per unit of product were likewise different. The leadership of the CPY described these factors as unimportant. As a result of the pressure exercised, an accord was reached to the effect that similar norms of accumulation were to be determined for commodities of both countries and that these commodities should be exchanged at domestic and not at international market prices.

The third measure was the customs-union. The CPA made efforts that this union should

serve to facilitate the exchange between the two countries. Meanwhile, the CPY distorted the concept of the agreement and, after exerting pressure, succeeded in ensuring that all Yugoslav enterprises or private merchants should have the right to buy commodities, without any limitation, on the Albanian market, and that the *dinar* should be exchanged freely with the Albanian *lek*. Consequently, Yugoslav firms and private merchants took everything they found on the Albanian market. The resulting drain on the market created an extremely difficult situation for the economy and the workers of Albania. This was why the country was threatened with a new inflation and there was a general rise in prices on the free market.

A special commission was set up for the purpose of coordinating economic plans and the application of other economic agreements. The Yugoslav leadership demanded that this commission should enjoy such rights and functions which, in fact, would turn it into a super-government above the Albanian Government. These demands were rejected by the Central Committee of the CPA.

In the framework of economic agreements, joint Albanian-Yugoslav companies were set up. They covered the most important branches of our people's economy. These companies were set up allegedly on the basis of equality. However while the Albanian side, according to the agreements, paid its full quota to the fund of the joint companies, the Yugoslav side did not

invest even a penny in the original funds. So that the companies were kept running on the investments of the Albanian State alone, while the Yugoslav side appropriated half of the profits.

All these agreements infringed even the most elementary norms of relations between two sovereign states and inflicted heavy losses to the economy of the PRA.

According to the economic agreements, the Yugoslav Government had promised Albania a credit of 2 billion leks for the year 1947. Less than half this credit was made available, while those commodities, which were supplied by Yugoslavia on credit, were calculated at prices two to four times higher than international prices. The entire so-called Yugoslav aid consisted of four small, altogether out-of-date, and long written-off factories. Besides this the credit was employed as a means to exert pressure on our Party and Government, and to arouse distrust in them, as being, allegedly, incapable of directing the planned development of the economy. All this made it very difficult to fulfil the plan for 1947, which was drafted relying on the Yugoslav aid. The Yugoslav Government did not provide the PR of Albania with the credit promised for the year 1948, either.

In order to meet the needs of the plan, our Government was forced to use all the reserves it had, in raw materials, building materials and consumption goods. Since these were scarce, the

economic and financial situation of the country deteriorated.

Hand in hand with its attempts to seize important positions in the economic domain, the leadership of the CPY extended its intervention with a view to getting hold of the Albanian Army. Having secured a footing in the Political Directorate, it concentrated its attacks on the General Staff of the Army and its chief, Comrade Mehmet Shehu, who defended the correct line of the Party and the independence of the People's Army. In military matters, too, its views and demands clashed with those of the sound part of the Central Committee of the Party, led by Comrade Enver Hoxha.

In order to crush the resistance of the CC of the CPA, in June 1947, the leadership of the CPY sent it a provocative letter. In this letter, Tito, Secretary-General of the CPY, openly attacked the Central Committee of the CPA, accusing it of distorting the Party line and claiming that «a second line in anti-Yugoslav spirit was allegedly crystalizing» in Albania. By means of this accusation the Yugoslav leadership intended to strengthen its weakened positions in the CPA and to give its agent, Koçi Xoxe, a weapon to combat and attack the Secretary-General and the other sound comrades of the leadership, whom it indirectly indicated as the main source of the distortion of the Party line.

The letter of the CC of the CPY was taken up for discussion in the Political Bureau. Koçi

Xoxe and Pandi Kristo neither opposed the accusation of the Yugoslav leadership nor dared come out openly in its defence. The Bureau rejected it. It instructed Comrade Enver Hoxha to answer the Central Committee of the CPY, describing the accusation as absolutely unfounded and as an open intervention in the internal affairs of the CPA.

After this the situation became more acute. The leadership of the CPY increased its interference and pressure against the CPA. For this it created new pretexts.

At the beginning of 1947 the CC of the CPA issued directives to the State organs to begin the drafting of a two-year plan (1948-1949) of economic development. The Party took into account the actual state of affairs in Albania: the internal possibilities, the scale of studies which had been made and the experience which State organs had managed to acquire for drawing up a plan of not too long a term.

Without taking any account whatsoever of this situation, the leadership of the CPY demanded with persistence that Albania, too, should work out a prospective five-year plan, just as Yugoslavia was doing. And not only that, but it even recommended to the PRA Government the orientation for this plan, dealing with Albania as if it were a Yugoslav republic. According to this orientation, the economy of the PRA should not be developed independently, but should be integrated with the economy of Yugoslavia. Albania should not create and deve-

lop its own national industry, but should confine itself only to the production of agricultural and mineral raw materials, which would be processed in Yugoslavia. In exchange, Albania would receive from Yugoslavia the necessary industrial commodities. This orientation aimed at subjugating and exploiting the Albanian economy and at reducing it to an appendage of the Yugoslav economy.

The Central Committee of the CPA immediately rejected this orientation. It agreed to the drafting of a five-year plan, but it instructed the Government that the plan should aim at creating and developing our national industry, the electrification of the country, the development of agriculture on socialist lines, and that this plan should rely mainly on the internal resources as well as on the aid of the Soviet Union and of the countries of the people's democracy.

The Party took concrete steps to strengthen and extend the political and economic relations of the PR of Albania with the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy. But these steps encountered the opposition of the leadership of the CPY, which aimed at keeping Albania isolated from the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy.

In July 1947, a government delegation went to Moscow to confer with the Soviet Government. The delegation was headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha. As a result of these talks, the Soviet Union accorded the PR of Albania a

credit for the equipment of agriculture with tractors and other agricultural machinery and also for the construction of several important industrial works.

Using as an excuse the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid, the Yugoslav leadership attempted to hinder the conclusion of the agreement with the Soviet Union. It went so far as to have the Yugoslav representative in Moscow demand that the Albanian representative should hand to him copies of this agreement asserting in a threatening manner that nothing should be concluded without the approval of the Yugoslav Government. The Albanian Government protested against this new intrusion in its internal affairs.

The correct orientation which the CC of the Party gave the Government for the drafting of the plan, and the visit of the Albanian delegation to Moscow, were used by Tito as a pretext for formulating the second accusation against the CPA. In November 1947, he accused the Albanian Government of having allegedly drafted an autarchic, unrealistic five-year plan, which separated the economy of Albania from the economy of Yugoslavia. Indirectly he condemned the acceptance of direct material and moral assistance from the USSR and openly accused Comrade Enver Hoxha with having altered his policy towards Yugoslavia after his return from Moscow. The orientation towards the Soviet Union he described as anti-Yugoslav. The Communist Party of Albania was charged

with the crime of having allegedly allowed the creation of an anti-Yugoslav front in Albania; of wrecking the relations between the Albanian and Yugoslav peoples. Finally, comrade Nako Spiru in particular was accused of being a collaborator with the enemy.

These further accusations dealt another very hard blow at the CPA. They profoundly upset the leadership of the Party and aggravated to the extreme the tense state which had been created in the Political Bureau. These accusations placed in the hands of the Koçi Xoxe faction the dynamite with which to blow up the very foundations of the Party. And, in fact, Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and Kristo Themelko¹ became most ardent defenders of the Yugoslav theses. Koçi Xoxe did not invite a number of the members of the Bureau to the session which discussed these accusations, with the aim of depriving Comrade Enver Hoxha of all backing and support.

Besides this, instead of disclosing the reasons for the Yugoslav leadership's intervention and rejecting its false accusations, Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo supported them and put all the stress on Nako Spiru's «treason». This was a maneuver aimed at hiding the heavy blow which was being dealt at the CPA and at its

1) Kristo Themelko acknowledged his faults and made self-criticism before the Party after the treachery of the CPY had been entirely disclosed in June 1948.

Secretary-General by the Yugoslav leadership, as well as its objective.

In this acute situation and under most difficult circumstances for him, comrade Nako Spiru was unable to face up, as a communist should to any situation, but committed suicide.

In order to strengthen relations with the countries which had embarked on the road to socialism, a government delegation headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha, went to Sofia in December 1947 where the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid between the PR of Albania and the PR of Bulgaria was signed.

The leadership of the CPY attempted to obstruct the conclusion of this treaty. Through Koçi Xoxe, who was a member of the Albanian delegation, it tried to have the Treaty framed in such a way that any common action of Albania with Bulgaria should have the prior approval of Yugoslavia. This persistent demand by Koçi Xoxe was rejected. Since it was impossible to impede the conclusion of the Treaty or alter its sound spirit, the Yugoslav leadership exerted every effort to diminish its importance.

Pronouncing itself in favor of strengthening its relations with the sister communist parties on the basis of the principles of proletarian internationalism, the October 1947 Plenum of the CC of the CPA adopted in full the Declaration and the Resolution of the Warsaw Consultative meeting of a number of communist and workers' parties, which was held at the end of September 1947 and approved the

creation of the Information Bureau, which arose from the consultative meeting. The CPA expressed its readiness to exchange experiences and, in case of need, to coordinate its actions with sister communist and workers' parties. At the proper time the Central Committee would seek membership for the CPA in the Information Bureau.

Exposure of the Anti-Marxist and Anti-Albanian Schemes of the Yugoslav Leadership

Nako Spiru's suicide seriously damaged the Party and further aggravated the tense situation which had been created in the Party leadership. This gave an advantage to the Yugoslav revisionist clique to make use of this event as «a proof of the truth» of its accusations and to undertake a new assault on the line of the CPA, on its unity, and on the Secretary-General.

Under these conditions, Koçi Xoxe, with the direct help of the leadership of the CPY and masquerading as the «savior» of the Party, prepared the 8th Plenum of the CC of the CPA. The anti-Marxist, anti-Albanian theses of the CC of the CPY, which had been expressed in programmatic form in a speech delivered by Koçi Xoxe at the Party School served as the platform for this session. During preparations for the plenum, Koçi Xoxe stepped up the persecution of sound and tested cadres of the Party who defended its correct line and launched a campaign of disparagement against

communist intellectuals. Through the State Security organs, which were under his direction, he collected and trumped up data against leading Party cadres who were undesirable for him and who were to be denounced at the 8th Plenum.

Precisely at this time, the Yugoslav leadership, through Savo Zlatich, its representative in the People's Republic of Albania, submitted to the Central Committee of the CPA its plan for the «union of Albania with Yugoslavia on a federative basis». «The other peoples of the Balkans and, particularly, Bulgaria» were also to be included in the Federation. According to this plan, at first the federation would be concretized in the «economic relations» by «fusing the national economies» and by «drawing up common plans». «The union of armies in a single army» would also be carried out. Eventually «the creation of a single state» which would be allegedly the «will of peoples and parties»¹ would be examined. Koçi Xoxe's group made the theses of this scheme the basis of the preparations for the coming Plenum.

The hostile activity of the Titoites and of their agents, headed by Koçi Xoxe, reached its culmination at the 8th Plenum of the CC of the CPA, which was convened in February 1948.

1) The theses of Savo Zlatich on the union of Albania with Yugoslavia, submitted to the Central Committee of the CPA, December 5, 1947. Notes on talks.

In fact Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo charged Comrade Enver Hoxha as the principal person to blame for the allegedly mistaken road the Party had taken. Nako Spiru was declared an enemy of the Party and of the people and was stigmatized as a spy. Comrade Mehmet Shehu, who was arbitrarily prevented from taking part in the session, was accused of «inimical» anti-Yugoslav activity and was excluded from the Central Committee. Koçi Xoxe concocted the so-called faction at the head of the Party which operated «under the nose of the Secretary-General!» He even let it be understood that Comrade Enver Hoxha in person stood at the head of the faction. This was a serious blow at his position and at the unity of the Party.

The plenum agreed to such forms of economic ties between Albania and Yugoslavia which would have led to the elimination of the Albanian Government. The concept of the unification of the Albanian army with that of Yugoslavia was launched. Open attempts were made to divide Albania from the Soviet Union and anti-Soviet tendencies were manifested.

The 8th Plenum deepened still more the blunders in the structure and inner life of the Party. The organizational methods of the Party leadership were replaced to a greater degree by military-police methods.

At this plenum the resistance of the CC of the CPA in defence of the Party line was broken by the pressure of the Yugoslav leadership.

The session adopted Tito's accusations, put forward in November 1947. The correct political and economic line of the Party was seriously violated. Independence and national sovereignty were directly endangered! The 8th Plenum prepared the ground for the implementation of the Yugoslav plan for the colonization of Albania. This plenum is a black stain on the glorious history of the CPA.

Following the plenum, Koçi Xoxe's group set to work with all their might to put the Yugoslav scheme into effect. They stepped up their preparations aimed at discrediting and even at the physical elimination of those leading cadres of the Party and the State, who opposed the intervention and the pressure of the Yugoslav revisionists.

The direction and the activity of mass organizations took a distorted road. Tendencies were manifested to dismantle the youth organization. A series of functions were withdrawn from the trade unions and they were turned into an altogether bureaucratic apparatus.

Police methods were introduced in the State apparatus. The State Security organs were placed above the Party.

Thinking that they had by now fully subjugated the CPA, the Titoites intervened in the internal affairs of the Party and of the Albanian State in a more brutal and flagrant manner. The commission for the coordination of plans was changed into almost a second government. The joint Albanian-Yugoslav companies were

turning simply into Yugoslav enterprises. A special control commission came from Yugoslavia with the task of helping to integrate the Albanian economy with that of Yugoslavia, which would serve as a basis for the political union of the two countries. Meanwhile Koçi Xoxe's group launched a broad propaganda campaign for the «union and fraternization» with Yugoslavia with the aim of presenting this union as an act, allegedly, carried out by the will of the Albanian people.

The Yugoslav leadership and Koçi Xoxe's faction persistently demanded from the Party CC and the Government that the Soviet advisers be withdrawn from the army. Finally, they raised at the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPA the question of the unification of the supreme command of Albanian and Yugoslav armies with Tito at the head and demanded the approval of the plan for the union of Albania with Yugoslavia. Despite the grave situation which had been created in the Bureau and despite the extraordinary pressure from the Titoites and their supporters, after Comrade Enver Hoxha's resolute and principled resistance these anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian demands were not adopted.

The Yugoslav leadership, feeling that its intentions might soon be exposed and taking into consideration the resistance put up by the CPA, endeavored to reach these aims by means of intimidation. It fabricated as pretext the danger to Albania from an imminent attack

by Greece and sought to dispatch urgently several divisions of the Yugoslav army to Albania. In this manner the military occupation of Albania would become a 'fait accompli'. This would permit Titoites to overcome the resistance they would encounter in the annexation of Albania. Koçi Xoxe and his group supported this demand. Koçi Xoxe and Rankovich, one of Tito's closest collaborators, had even prepared a project to publicise the arrival of Yugoslav troops, after they had been established on Albanian soil, as an act carried out on the basis of the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid!

However, this Yugoslav scheme, too, fell short of materializing. Comrade Enver Hoxha raised this question in the Central Committee leadership. On his proposal it was decided not to accept the stationing of Yugoslav divisions in Albania: This historic decision saved the country from the bloodshed which would have been caused by the entry of Yugoslav troops and from a new enslavement.

Comrade Enver Hoxha informed J. V. Stalin about the demand of the Yugoslav leadership to send some division to Albania and the refusal of this demand by the Central Committee of the CPA, as he had previously informed him of the other serious interference by Tito and various Yugoslav functionaries in the internal affairs of the Communist Party of Albania and the Albanian State.

The Party and the State were passing

through exceptionally difficult moments. Precisely at this time, the CPA was informed of the letters which the CC of the CPSU(b) had sent to the Central Committee of the CPY.

In these letters the Yugoslav leadership was severely criticized for its anti-Soviet attitude, for following an opportunist line which led to the re-establishment of capitalism, for violations of the Leninist norms in the inner life of the party, and for the arrogance and conceit of the leaders of the CPY.

«Such an abnormal state within the Yugoslav Communist Party constitutes a serious danger for the life and the development of the party»¹.

The letters were of major significance to the CPA and to the Albanian people.

«At the most critical moment of the fierce conflict which existed between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania and the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, a conflict caused by the anti-Marxist Yugoslav leadership, the help of the Bolshevich Party of the Soviet Union, which was extended to our Party and to all other sister communist parties, was

1) Letter of the CC of the CPSU(b) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, May 4, 1948, Central Archives of the Party.

the great salvation of our people, of our Communist Party»¹.

In the light of these letters, the character and the aims of the Yugoslav intervention in Albania now became quite clear to the CC of our Party. A contribution of major importance to the unmasking of the revisionists and chauvinistic activity of the leaders of the CPY was made by the meeting of the Information Bureau which was held in June 1948. The Information Bureau reached the correct conclusion that the leaders of the CPY had departed from Marxism-Leninism and had taken the road of revisionism, had betrayed socialism and passed over to the positions of bourgeois nationalism. Starting from this state of affairs, it condemned the CPY leaders as traitors to the cause of socialism and proletarian internationalism.

The CC of the CPA gave full approval to the resolution of the Information Bureau «On the Situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party». In a special communiqué it condemned the treacherous, anti-Soviet and anti-Albanian course taken by the leadership of the CPY.

This stand of the Central Committee was approved by the entire Party. At their meetings all the Party organizations expressed their unshakable trust in the Central Committee and in the Secretary-General, Comrade Enver Hoxha.

1) Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, July 1, 1948. Central Archives of the Party.

The 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA. Defeat of Yugoslav Intervention and Koçi Xoxe's Hostile Activity

Following the exposure of the inimical intentions of the Yugoslav revisionists, the economic and political relations between Albania and Yugoslavia had to be purged of any spirit or content of exploitation and subjugation. For this purpose the CPA demanded that, with the exception of the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid, all the other agreements should be revised. However the Yugoslav leadership turned a deaf ear to this just demand. This being the case, the Albanian Government was obliged to abrogate the economic agreements concluded between the PR of Albania and the FR of Yugoslavia.

To completely eliminate the Yugoslav intervention and the distortions in the political and organizational line of the Party, the 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA was held in September 1948. This session was attended also by those members and candidate-members, who had been unjustly excluded from the 8th Plenum.

The plenum thoroughly analysed the political line of the Party and its activity, disclosed the causes of blunders and determined the measures to effect a turn dictated by the new historic circumstances.

The plenum considered that the political line which the Party had pursued since its foundation had been correct. The particular distor-

tions which had appeared after the liberation were consequences of the Yugoslav intervention. This intervention and Koçi Xoxe's Trotskyite activity caused the organizational line of the Party in the post-war period to take a generally incorrect course.

The principal decisions of the 2nd Plenum and all the decisions of the 8th Plenum were described as anti-Marxist, harmful and, as such, were denounced and invalidated.

The plenary session discussed in detail the relations of the Party and the Albanian State with the Yugoslav Party and State. It condemned severely the national-chauvinist and colonialist intentions of the Yugoslav revisionists towards the PR of Albania. On the other hand, the Central Committee made self-criticism for the excessive trust it had placed in the leadership of the CPY.

The plenary session regarded as incorrect that the Party remained in a semi-illegal state even after it had become the leading party in power. The fact that the Party program was hidden under the program of the Democratic Front, that Party members preserved the secrecy of their membership, and that the directions of the CPA were published as decisions of the Front, were all considered as serious errors. These forms borrowed from the CPY, weakened the leading role of the Party in the entire life of the country and led towards its elimination.

The lack of a Party constitution, which had allowed the arbitrary introduction into the

Party of the anti-Marxist forms and methods of the Yugoslav leadership, was regarded as harmful and therefore the need for the preparation of this fundamental document was stressed.

The plenum charged Koçi Xoxe with grave responsibility for the unreserved support he had given the Titoites and for the distortions in the organizational line of the Party. Holding simultaneously the functions of organizational Secretary of the Party and Minister of Internal Affairs, Koçi Xoxe employed his position to put the Party under the control of the State Security organs, to apply police methods in the Party. This had brought about the serious violation of democratic centralization and the stifling of principled criticism and self-criticism. The leading organs of the Party were not elected, but appointed from above. They did not regularly render account to the masses of communists. The membership lacked control over the leading organs. In many cases, the rights of Party members were trodden underfoot. Discipline was mechanical rather than conscious. The collective spirit in the Party leadership had been replaced with individual order and instructions.

There were serious shortcomings and errors in the practice of the cadres. Sectarianism, local attachment and personal friendship predominated. The cadres were not appreciated as the Party's invaluable treasure. The work to educate and raise their capacity was almost entirely

neglected. All the old and capable cadres of authority had been gathered in the center, whereas the local Party and State organs had been greatly weakened.

This grave situation within the Party had left pronounced traces throughout the entire life of the country. As Minister of Internal Affairs, Koçi Xoxe had allowed serious violations of socialist legality and of the democratic rights of the workers. The organs of internal affairs, especially of the State Security, were turned into all powerful organs, which were not subject to any control. Through their arbitrary and harmful actions, these organs were becoming separated from the people.

In various cases, erroneous political attitudes had been maintained by the Party and organs of State Power toward the patriotic petty-bourgeoisie and intellectuals. Drastic economic measures against small merchants which led to their premature elimination, had been taken through administrative acts. Patriots from the ranks of the middle strata of cities and villages, who had fought for the liberation under the leadership of the Party had been unjustly declared enemies. On account of the inimical activities of individual intellectual elements a broad circle of intellectuals had been arbitrarily persecuted.

All these were errors fraught with very serious repercussions which created a feeling of insecurity among the masses of the people and were weakening the bonds of the Party

with the masses and with the Democratic Front.

The 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA put an end to all these distortions and mistakes in the political and organizational line of the Party.

It rehabilitated comrade Nako Spiru as a militant of the Party and took punitive measures against Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and several other participants of the factionist group. It was decided that all those who had been promoted to leading posts in the Party or State Power in the spirit of the 8th Plenary session should return to the positions they had occupied before. Whereas, all those who had been unjustly punished were rehabilitated and returned to their former posts. Those who had been expelled contrary to Party rules, were readmitted into its ranks.

The 11th Plenum reaffirmed its unshakable stand to continue to follow the policy of friendship and close fraternal collaboration with the Soviet Union and with the Bolshevik Party led by J. V. Stalin, which stood at the head of the socialist camp and of the entire workers' revolutionary democratic and anti-imperialist movement in the world. The Party stressed that it was a duty to study the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and to apply it in a creative manner under the conditions of Albania.

The Party organizations were charged with

the task of carrying out large scale propaganda work in order to make it clear to the working masses that the chief enemies of the PRA and of all humanity were the U.S. and British imperialists, to explain to them the treachery of the Yugoslav revisionist leadership, headed by Tito, to Marxism-Leninism and the socialist camp, as well as its hostile activity against the CPA and the PR of Albania.

In order to build socialism with success, the Party was charged with the task of mobilizing the masses for the fulfilment of the State plan, for strengthening the economy of the country and for raising the standard of living of workers, for strengthening the alliance of the working class with the poor peasantry and for eliminating the exploiting classes.

To enable the Party to accomplish its historic mission, it was indispensable that political and ideological training should be organized on a more solid basis

«... to master the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, to strengthen communist consciousness... , to learn the laws of economic and social development»¹.

1) The Resolution of the 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA. Principal Documents of the PLA, Vol. I, p. 397.

The Political Bureau was charged with the task of

«organizing the scientific study of the reality of our country from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint in order to enlighten the Party better on the situation and development of the class struggle in our country, on the repositioning of the class forces and on the concrete conditions of the transition from capitalism to socialism»¹.

The plenary session decided to recommence publishing «Zëri i Popullit» («People's Voice») organ of the CC of the Party.

In order to normalize the life of the CPA it was decided to legalize it at once, to call its 1st Congress and to apply Marxist-Leninist principles in organizational matters.

The 11th Plenum marked the beginning of a sharp turn in the life of the Party and in the destiny of the country. It reestablished the unity in leadership and immeasurably raised the authority of the Party. The decisions of the plenum which, for the first time, were published in the press, aroused and put in motion all the Party organizations, stimulated the initiative and the daring of communists and enhanced their belief in their own forces.

1) The resolution of the 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA. Principal Documents of the PLA. Vol. I, p. 397.

The occasional mistakes and vascillations which became apparent as a natural sequel of the passage of the Party from a serious situation to a new situation of revolutionary upsurge, were averted by the intervention of the Central Committee.

During the discussion in the Party on the resolution of the 11th Plenum many facts and documents were disclosed, which threw new light on the inimical activity of the Yugoslav revisionists and which added to the culpability of Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and their close collaborators. On the other hand, in the self-criticism which Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo made before the Party actives in Tirana and in Korça, instead of disclosing the real origin and causes of their errors and, in this manner, helping all the Party organizations to correct the shortcomings, they attempted to deceive the Party. This showed that they were not repentent for the course they had taken and for the great damage they had done to the cause of the Party and the Albanian people. In the light of new facts, their responsibility before the Party and of the people required another evaluation.

Various measures were taken to eliminate the influence of the Yugoslav revisionists on the socialist sector of economy and on the front of the class struggle. The old law on the taxes on agricultural economies, which supported the well-to-do peasants (the kulaks) and permitted their enrichment, was amended. The

new law assisted the poor peasantry and limited the growth of capitalist elements in the countryside. Other laws to regulate and step up the economic development of the countryside along socialist lines were enacted.

A new statute for the cooperative farms was drawn up eliminating the elements of capitalist cooperation borrowed from the Yugoslav revisionists, which were embodied in the old constitution. This new constitution abolished the system of distributing incomes on the basis of the amount of acreage and introduced remuneration on the basis of work done. The number of livestock and the area of personal plots of land of the cooperative members were limited. The concern of the State for the good organization and running of cooperative farms was augmented, thus putting an end to the erroneous view that the State organs should not interfere in directing the affairs of cooperative farms which are organizations of the masses.

At this time all the attention of the Party and the workers was concentrated on the preparations for the 1st Congress of the CPA. The creative work of the masses assumed a major impulse in order to greet the Congress with the economic plan fulfilled. The revolutionary enthusiasm which had gripped all the people greatly assisted the Party to its preparations for the Congress on a high level.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUGGLE OF THE PARTY TO TURN ALBANIA FROM A BACKWARD AGRARIAN COUNTRY INTO AN AGRARIAN-INDUSTRIAL ONE

(1948-1955)

1. THE 1st CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA — AN HISTORIC TURNING POINT IN THE LIFE OF THE PARTY AND OF THE COUNTRY

The 1st Congress of the Communist Party of Albania was held in Tirana from the 8th to the 22nd of November 1948 with the participation of 563 delegates with deliberative and 299 delegates with consultative vote, representing 29,137 members and 16,245 candidate members.

The Report on the Activity of the Central Committee was delivered by the General-Secretary of the Party, Comrade Enver Hoxha. In it he analyzed the entire activity of the Party since

its founding, assessed the successes attained and the stages through which the Party and the country had passed and made a wide-ranging exposure of the circumstances and causes of the errors which had been proven in the course of the application of the Party line. The policy of the Party for the coming period was clearly laid down in this report. The Party spirit, running through it and the principled stand taken towards the fundamental problems of the Party, guided the delegates correctly and determined the success of the proceeding of the Congress.

The Fundamental Directions for the Construction of the Socialist Base. The Congress laid great stress on the need to carry through to the end the struggle against the distortions in our political line that had resulted from the hostile Yugoslav interference, and defined the main directions for the construction of the socialist base.

Its fundamental economic objective was to raise the country from its profound backwardness through a vigorous development of the forces of production.

The essence of this task was the socialist industrialization and the electrification of the country. The absolute necessity for industrialization was dictated by the need to create an entirely new material and technical basis for the people's economy, to extend production of goods within the country, to prepare the condi-

tions for the reorganization of agriculture on a socialist basis, to increase the roll-call of the working class so as to strengthen its leading position and, finally, by the need to preserve the gains of the revolution and ensure the construction of socialism.

Socialist industrialization had to be carried out at a rapid rate, within the shortest possible time, so as to overcome the backwardness inherited from the past, to ensure the independent development of economy and to achieve an appreciable rise in the material and cultural level of the working masses. The attainment of this objective rested, in the first place, on a thorough exploitation of the resources of the soil and subsoil, by improving and reorganizing the existing industry and by setting up a series of new industrial projects and branches.

Besides the socialist industrialization the Congress attached great importance to the development of agriculture and to lifting it out of its state of backwardness. The only way to attain this objective fully was the socialist reorganization of the countryside. After criticizing the errors committed on the question of collectivization, the Party was instructed to orientate itself

«towards strengthening the socialist sector of agriculture (the State farms) and towards the gradual, cautious, and voluntary collectivization of the rural areas through agricultural labor coope-

ratives, with the political, economic and the organizational support of the State»¹.

Since the conditions for extensive collectivization were not yet ripe, the Party embodied its policy in this field in the slogan «as to collectivization, neither rush it nor mark time».

The individual farms, which made up the major part of the agricultural economies, were at a low state of development; therefore it was judged necessary to give all-round aid to the individual laboring peasants so that agricultural production would be increased.

At the same time, the Congress instructed that the danger of capitalist development in the countryside in conditions of the predominance of individual farms, should not be lost sight of, even for a moment. It issued instructions that a policy of economic restriction and political isolation of the capitalist elements in the rural areas should be applied.

In carrying out this policy in the countryside, the Party was to be led by the Leninist slogan: «Reliance on the poor peasant, alliance with the medium peasant, struggle against the kulak».

The development of the country along socialist lines demanded the continuation of the struggle to eliminate its cultural backwardness, to intensify the cultural and ideological revolu-

1) Resolution of the 1st Congress of the CPA. Principal Documents of the PLA, Vol. I, p. 454. Tirana, 1960.

tion. In this connection, all possible measures were to be taken for the application and extension of compulsory education, especially of secondary vocational education, for the development of higher education and for training high-er cadres at home and abroad.

After criticizing the attempts of the Yugoslav revisionists and of the Koci Xoxe group to introduce into the sphere of education, art, and culture the spirit of negating the cultural traditions and values of the Albanian people, the Congress laid down the main directions which were to comprise the essence of the development of the cultural revolution in this field. Education and culture should belong to the people and serve the broad masses of the working people. While national values, were to be preserved and endowed with a profound socialist content. In education, art and culture the Party was to fight against the influence of bourgeois ideology and rely strongly on Marxist-Leninist science.

The directions and task laid down by the Congress put an end to the distortions observed in the practice of socialist construction; they completed, crystalized and developed the Party program for the construction of the basis of socialism. They found their concrete expression in the long-term plans for the economic and cultural development of the country.

The Congress considered and approved the directives of the two-year plan for the economic and cultural development of the country for the

period 1949-1950, during which the ground was to be prepared for passing to the stage of developing our economy with longer term plans.

Primary importance in the two-year plan was given to the development of industry. 47 per cent of all the investment funds for that period were allocated to it. Priority was given to increasing mineral production and, in particular, petroleum and bitumen. The development of light industry occupied second place. The two-year plan envisaged the construction of the «Stalin» Textile Plant, the Maliq Sugar Refinery, of the Selita Hydro-power Plant, and a series of other projects. The further development and cooperation of the handicraftsmen was to play a special role also in overcoming the difficulties of supplying the population with industrial goods.

In the sphere of agriculture the increase of agricultural products was envisaged through the extension of the sown area increasing yields, extending the irrigation and drainage network, agricultural mechanization, etc.

The Further Strengthening and Democratization of the People's State Power

For the purpose of building the basis of socialism, the Congress pointed out the imperative need to further strengthen and democratize the regime, to strengthen the People's Army and the State Security Service.

The administrative division of the State

Power into district and municipal councils, the former concerned mainly with problems of rural areas and the latter with those of towns and cities, was considered to be wrong in principle. This administrative measure, borrowed from the Yugoslav revisionists, had brought about the artificial segregation of the urban from the rural workers. In order to eliminate this weakness, instructions were issued for the immediate amalgamation of the district councils with those of the towns and cities so that the local organs of the State Power would take up all the problems of political and economic life of the district.

The dualism between the State and the Party was criticized and so was the abnormal situation created as a consequence of this dualism which had brought about the undervaluation and weakening of the role of the organs of the State Power, increased bureaucracy and delay in solving problems. The People's Councils and their executive apparatuses were to use all the prerogatives with which they were invested by the law, with the purpose of enhancing their role.

The hostile activity carried on uninterruptedly by the imperialists and their servants against the People's Republic of Albania with the aim of destroying it, obliged the Party and the Albanian people to be constantly vigilant and to unceasingly increase the defensive potential of the fatherland. This duty assumed still greater importance from the fact that Al-

bania was building socialism encircled by hostile states.

The 1st Congress directed that measures should be taken for the all-round strengthening of the People's Army, for raising its fighting capacity and readiness and for its further modernization. It instructed that the military and political training of the army proceed according to programs compiled on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the experience of the Albanian National-liberation Army, and Soviet military science, in conformity with the conditions of the country.

One of the most difficult tasks of the Party at this time was to eliminate the mistakes in the organs of the State Security Service, their re-orientation on the right path and the further strengthening of these organs which, in the years gone by, had been affected more than any other sector by the Yugoslav interference and Koçi Xoxe's Trotskyite activity. The Congress approved all the measures that the Party had taken following the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee for the liquidation of the police methods in the Security organs and for purging from them persons who had committed grave offenses. It especially emphasized that the work of the Security Forces must be carried out under the direct guidance and control of the Party and that socialist justice must be defended.

At the same time the Congress issued instructions that the analysis of the errors in the State Security Service be made in a Party

spirit. The State Security Service had rendered invaluable service in defence of the victories of the revolution. The condemnation of mistakes should in no way be turned into an attack against the vital need for the State Security Service nor take the form of a general condemnation of the security men. Those who had erred would be helped by the Party to correct their mistakes. The Congress warned that the class enemy would try to take advantage of the situation created following the exposure of the Tito clique and Koçi Xoxe's group by directing its blows mainly against the organs of the State Security Service.

«The Party should work to strengthen the State Security Force as much as possible, because this is the beloved weapon of the People's Power, directed by the Party, which protects the Party and the State from the hostile activity of foreign and internal enemies»¹.

To lay down a correct internal policy it was necessary also to pursue a correct, principled foreign policy.

The Congress condemned the actions of the Yugoslav revisionists aimed at isolating Albania completely from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, as well as the attempts

1) Resolution of the 1st Congress of the CPA. Principal Documents of the PLA. Vol. I, p. 456.

of Koçi Xoxe's anti-Party group to follow blindly the nationalist, anti-Soviet policy of the Yugoslav leadership. It mapped out a Marxist-Leninist foreign policy which emanated from the very nature of the socialist State and responded to the interests of the people and the fatherland. This policy was inspired, first and foremost, by friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, by the need to assist the struggle of the various peoples against imperialism in order to safeguard and ensure their national independence, by the efforts for the preservation of peace and the establishment of good neighborly relations.

The Constitution of the Party of Labor of Albania

A correct political line could be applied only if all the organizational distortions were done away with and a Marxist-Leninist organizational line elaborated. The reestablishment of Marxist-Leninist norms was to complete the marking of a turning point in the Party.

The Congress decided to change the name of the Party from the Communist Party of Albania to the **Party of Labor of Albania (PLA)**. This change was dictated by the social composition of the country and the Party and did not damage its character or aims. In Albania the bulk of the population (about 80 per cent) was composed of peasants. This was reflected in the Party, too, where the overwhelming majority

of its members were toilers of the soil. The PLA was to be the continuation of the Communist Party.

The norms and rules on which the inner life of the Party was constructed, were embodied in the Constitution of the Party of Labor of Albania adopted by the Congress.

The aims of the Party: the immediate aim — the construction of socialism — and the ultimate aim — the construction of communism — were formulated in general lines in the preamble of the Constitution.

The Constitution emphasized the leading role of the Party both in the People's State Power as well as in the entire political, economic, and cultural life of the country.

The structure and the whole inner life of the Party was based on democratic centralism. The application of this fundamental principle during the National-liberation War had been limited by the circumstances. After the liberation of the country, it was seriously violated through the intervention of the Yugoslav revisionists and by the activity of Koçi Xoxe's group. The Congress instructed that this principle should «be applied and preserved by us as the apple of our eye»¹.

The Constitution guaranteed the organizational and ideological unity of the Party which it described as an indispensable condition for the

1) Resolution of the 1st Congress of the CPA. Principal Documents of the PLA, vol. I, p. 459.

preservation and strengthening of the unity of the working masses around the Party enabling it to fulfil its aims.

This fundamental document formulated, for the first time, the duties of the Party member as the vanguard fighter for the socialist construction of the country, for the continuous strengthening of the unity of the people in the Democratic Front, and for the defense of the People's Republic of Albania. It especially emphasized the duty of the communist to be «exemplary in behavior and morality» as well as the duty to maintain and continuously strengthen his links with the masses; to be outstanding as a leader of the masses.

The Constitution defined the rules for admission to membership of the Party on the basis of the social conditions of the country during the period of transition to socialism. A person who exploited the labor of the others could not be admitted to membership in the Party. For the admission of working people to membership there was established a graduated scale of prerequisites according to their social origin and status, giving precedence to workers and poor peasants.

The adoption of the Constitution was a great event in the life of the Party, which, for seven years on end, had regulated its inner life solely on the basis of resolutions, circulars and instructions.

The Constitution was a sound guarantee to prevent any future violations of the Leninist

norms of the inner life of the Party. The Congress laid down the task

«of fighting against all manifestations aimed at damaging the organizational rules and principles of the Party defined in its Constitution»¹.

At the same time the Congress decided to intensify the Party's ideological work. Instructions were given and concrete measures were set out for the study of Marxism-Leninism and the History of the Party through forms of education in the Party, through various courses of the Party School, and through individual study.

The Congress expelled Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo from its ranks as Trotskyites, enemies of the Party and people, and agents of the Yugoslav revisionist leaders.

It elected the Central Committee of the Party, composed of 21 members and 10 candidates to membership. Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Shëhu, Hysni Kapo, Beqir Balluku, Gogo Nushi, Spiro Koleka etc., were elected to the Political Bureau. Enver Hoxha was reelected as Secretary-General of the Party.

The proceedings of the Congress were conducted on a high level, in a healthy spirit of criticism and self-criticism. The broad and lively participation in the discussion of the problems.

1) Resolution of the 1st Congress of the CPA. Principal Documents of PLA, vol. I. p. 463.

on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles contributed to the correct solution of the fundamental problems of the policy and inner life of the Party.

While condemning the intervention of the Yugoslav revisionists and Koçi Xoxe's Trotskyite activity the Congress did not permit itself to swing to the other extreme. The Congress described as extremely harmful and condemned the attempts made by Gjin Marku to give an entirely distorted direction to the proceedings of the Congress. Speculating on the struggle that the Party had declared on Trotskyism and revisionism, Gjin Marku attempted to have the entire political line which the Party had pursued in the past rejected, accusing all the principal leading cadres of the Party of being infected with Trotskyism and demanding that they should be placed in the same category as Koçi Xoxe and punished severely. In this way he aimed at changing the leadership of the Party, at taking up the banner of «the saviour» and emerging at the head of the Party. A few others who had committed grave offenses against the Party also behaved in the same way in order to cover up their personal responsibility and emerge free of blame. In his contribution to the discussions Comrade Enver Hoxha helped the delegates to expose the real intentions of Gjin Marku and of the other unhealthy elements, to avoid any confusion and to preserve to the end the revolutionary and principled spirit of the proceedings of the Congress.

The Congress of the CPA further deepened and formally sanctioned the change effected by the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee in the inner life of the Party and the country. It provided the Party with a correct Marxist-Leninist general line and armed the working people with a scientific program for the construction of the basis of socialism.

The Congress marked the crowning of the victory of Marxism-Leninism over opportunism and Trotskyism and armed the Party with a great experience in the struggle against modern revisionism.

It strengthened the unity of the Party and its loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and to proletarian internationalism.

The Congress foresaw also the great economic and political difficulties that the Party would encounter in the fulfilment of the tasks laid down. It prepared the Party to face these obstacles and to overcome them with success.

The materials of the Congress were taken up with the entire people. The working masses embraced the line of the Party in its entirety, they criticized courageously the errors committed in the past, expressed their loyalty towards the Party and their determination to apply its program.

A new and healthy situation was created within the Party. The country entered a new phase of development.

2. THE STRENGTHENING OF THE LINKS BETWEEN THE WORKING CLASS AND THE PEASANTRY IN BATTLE WITH DIFFICULTIES

The Central Committee of the Party immediately took a series of essential steps to put into effect the changes decided by the Congress. All the laws, ordinances etc., were reviewed. With the new administrative division of the country, which reduced the number of districts by half, the forces of the Party and of the State were concentrated in fewer places. Besides this, experienced cadres with authority were sent from the centre to the local Party and State organs. The uniting of town and regional Committees put an end to the division created between town and countryside.

The grass root organizations of the Party were based on centers of production. The Party put the mass organizations on the right road. The errors committed in connection with the Democratic Front were corrected. The organizational structure and tasks of the Front were correctly defined and this was reflected in the new Constitution of the Democratic Front of Albania. The Party acted in time against the tendency manifested after the Congress by some communists, who were of the opinion that the Front should be dissolved, because the political work with the masses was being done by the trade unions, the organizations of youth and of women. The Democratic Front was the embodiment of the unity of the Albanian people

around the Party. This form of organization, which had become a sound tradition, appeared as the most appropriate one for the uninterrupted strengthening of the political unity of the broad masses of the people in the struggle for the socialist construction of the country for the defense of the Fatherland.

On the basis of the direction given by the 1st Congress of the Communist Party of Albania, the Congress of Unification of the Youth held in Shkodra in September 1949, fused the Communist Youth Organization and the People's Youth Organization¹ into a single organization that was named the Labor Youth Union of Albania. The Party charged the LYUA as its main task with keeping alive and further developing among the broad masses of the youth the spirit of sacrifice that had characterized it during the war and during the early years after liberation. Being in the forefront of socialist construction, the youth of the country were called upon to turn their attention to education, culture and technique, in order to provide new cadres of high ideological and vocational technical training.

The PLA instructed the trade unions of Albania to play a decisive role in the communist education of the workers and employees as well as in the fulfilment of the State plan. In the struggle for the carrying out of these tasks the

1) «The People's Youth» was the name given to the Union of the Albanian Anti-fascist Youth at its 3d Congress in October 1946.

working class would be tempered in an all-around manner and thus become capable of fulfilling better its leading role in the building of socialist society and in strengthening the basis of the Party. This instruction found expression at the 2nd Congress of the Trade Unions held in October 1949.

The Party Policy for Procurement and Supply

The most urgent problem, which at that time constituted the key to the series of Party tasks was to strengthen the economic links between the working class and the peasantry and to achieve an immediate rise in the productive forces of agriculture. In a country like Albania, where small peasant economy prevailed, it was impossible to emerge from backwardness and build socialism without improving the situation in agriculture, without its further development and advancement. Industry could not be set up without ensuring supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs for the working people.

To achieve this, it was necessary, first of all, to put into effect a policy which would stimulate an increase of agricultural and livestock products.

The existing system of procurement and supply, far from solving this problem, had become an obstacle to the development of the forces of production in the countryside. The peasant did not show the proper concern about

increasing agricultural products, because his surpluses of major products, especially grain, were taken over by the State. Another adverse influence in this direction was exerted by the outmoded system of rationing on the basis of which the peasants were supplied with coupons for industrial goods. Under these conditions, the peasant did not feel obliged to hand over to the buying and selling cooperatives products that were not subject to compulsion. Such goods he did not put on the market, or else he sold them at exorbitant prices. Besides this, because of the shortage of industrial goods in the free market, the peasants hesitated to hand over their quotas to the State. Those who profited from this situation were the kulaks and speculators. While ensuring goods of primary necessity from the State through their ration cards, they developed a black market in agricultural and industrial products and thus, exploited the working masses of town and countryside.

The economic ties between town and countryside were being weakened. The worker began to view the peasant as a speculator. On their part the organs of the State, in order to collect the compulsory quotas had often been obliged to enforce administrative measures against the peasants. The alliance of the working class with the peasantry was in jeopardy.

In order to avoid this danger and to further strengthen the alliance of the working class with the peasantry, the Central Committee of the Party took a whole series of important eco-

nomic measures to aid the peasants, such as increasing agrarian credits, expanding the irrigation and drainage network, assistance from the Machine and Tractor Stations, etc. But these measures could not fully solve the problem of establishing sound economic links between the town and the countryside and of strengthening this alliance, when small private ownership predominated in the countryside. The alliance of the working class with the peasantry could be further strengthened mainly through the economic ties in the sphere of trade by the exchange of industrial goods for agricultural products. These ties were more understandable and advantageous to the peasant. The Party concretized its policy in this sphere by instituting a **new system of procurement and supply** which was approved by the Central Committee in January 1949.

According to the new system, what the peasant was obliged to hand over to the State was determined by the acreage and the quality of his land. Not all his surpluses of agricultural and livestock products were taken over, but only a portion of them, whereas the remainder he could freely dispose of himself. This system stimulated the development of the forces of production in agriculture and livestock farming. The peasant, knowing in advance the amount of produce that he was obliged to hand over to the State, would try his best to produce as much as possible in order to obtain as large a surplus as possible.

Through the new system of procurement the State ensured a good portion of the necessary quantities of grain, of agricultural and livestock products. Another portion was ensured through the new system of supply by procuring the surpluses left over to the peasant. This system regulated the exchange of industrial goods with agricultural and livestock products and the supply of the working people of the city with goods of prime necessity. This system was based on the setting up of three kinds of markets.

The state guaranteed market, on the basis of ration cards, supplied working people employed by the State and other institutions together with dependent members of their families who were incapable of working. All the private handicraftsmen who did not exploit the work of others also were provisioned by the State guaranteed market so as not to hinder the production of handicraft goods, thus helping the revitalization of trade between town and countryside.

The barter market supplied the peasants by exchanging the surpluses of their own produce with industrial commodities. The principal commercial link between the countryside and the city were the buying and selling cooperatives. They had to be converted into important economic and social organizations which would serve the strengthening of the economic links and the alliance between the urban and rural working people.

The free market aimed at satisfying the

needs of the peasants and of the city folk which were not met by the guaranteed and barter markets and provided for that category of people who were not provided with ration cards. Prices in this market were much higher than those in the first two markets. Through the free market, the State aimed at withdrawing as much as possible of the money accumulated by the peasants and capitalist elements in private trade. Besides this, the free market spurred the peasants to exchange his own products through the barter market.

The new system of supply differentiated between the working people and the parasites, stimulated a larger labor force to engage in productive work in both urban and rural regions, and saved a large quantity of grain which formerly had been distributed improperly and wasted.

The application of the new system of procurement and supply demanded the consolidation and vitalization of the State and cooperative trade, the main sphere of economic links between the town and the countryside. The reorganization of trade was effected in conformity with this system. The measures applied aimed at making the trade organizations better able to carry out the economic policy of the Party and to combat bureaucracy in their midst. The new forms of trade served directly also in revitalizing and expanding light industry.

To improve the organization of trade, a just and rapid distribution of good, the Party

devoted special care to training cadres and launched the slogan: «Communists must learn about trade».

A new stand was taken also towards the small private traders and private handicraftsmen. At a time when socialist commerce and industry were incapable of meeting all the demands of the working people, the need arose to revitalize, to a certain degree, the small private market. This was done with the aim of better meeting the needs of the working people. The development of small private trade and handicrafts was also of political importance, as it helped to strengthen the unity of the small private merchants and producers around the Democratic Front.

To permit the revitalization of small-scale trade and private handicraftsmanship meant to allow some sort of revitalization of the capitalist elements. But whatever danger there might have come to the socialist economy from the capitalist sector, was avoided by the systematic control the State exercised over it. Besides this, the capitalist sector did not have any great weight in the national economy and was in no position to engage in competition with the socialist economy.

The new system of procurement and supply was not confined to exchange alone. It was an important integral part of the economic policy of the Party that directly helped the development of all branches of the people's economy. This system resolved correctly the problem of

strengthening the alliance of the working class with the peasantry.

In Struggle with Difficulties in the Application of the New System of Procurement and Supply

The application of the new system of procurement and supply encountered major difficulties. This system embodied the policy of the Party of restricting the capitalist elements of city and countryside in favor of the working masses. The new ordinances imposed supplementary taxes on the kulak and blocked his way to speculation. This was one of the main reasons why the kulaks, from the very beginning, opposed the new system. Taking advantage of the fact that the peasant had not yet come to understand the profits accruing to him from this system and that the propaganda of the Party in this respect was still weak, they tried to distort its content and to set the peasants against the People's Regime. They resorted to such slogans as «the new system is good for the workers and employees only», «the Regime has left the peasantry without bread and clothing, therefore don't till the land», «It is the time for the poor peasants to die for lack of bread», «do not hand over the harvest». In many a village the school children were incited to demand bread ration cards. In order to hide their hostile activity, on one hand, the kulaks themselves turned in their quotas while, on the other, they incited the poor and medium peasants not to hand in their pro-

ducts. Spurred on by the kulaks, some peasants refused to harvest the planned agricultural products, thinking that in this way they would escape their grain quotas. They did not understand that these obligations were determined not on the basis of the products harvested, but on the basis of the area of land under cultivation.

The peasants offered resistance also to the application of the ordinances of the Government to hand over their quotas of other agricultural and livestock products, especially, meat. In this respect, an adverse influence was exerted also by the fact that, in clarifying the Resolution of the 1st Congress, some Party workers, while criticizing the errors committed in the past, had given the impression that there would be no obligations in the future.

Even some communists fell into the trap set by the kulaks. Because they were not aware of the importance of the new system and the perspective that it opened to the development of the economy, in general, and agriculture in particular, they suspected that this system was to the detriment of the poor peasants. There were some secretaries of grass root organizations, communists and members of the people's councils, who, under pressure from the kulaks, slipped into opportunist positions and retreated before the difficulties in the application of the ordinances for the procurement of agricultural and livestock products. Others became sceptical and «complained» to the Central Committee and

Comrade Enver Hoxha, expressing their opinion that «the ordinances of the Government on procurement were unjust», that «agriculture was being ruined» that «the peasants were discontented», etc.

Comrade Enver Hoxha's Open Letter «On Some Problems of the Countryside», published in March 1949 in «Zëri i Popullit» was of great importance in changing the existing state of affairs. This letter explained the absolute necessity for the new system, emphasizing especially the perspectives that it opened to the development of agriculture and the entire people's economy.

Comrade Enver Hoxha called the attention of the Party organizations on the hostile activity of the kulaks. The kulak was not in a position to carry on the struggle against the People's Regime with his own forces. He needed allies, people who would adopt and spread his slogans. That is why he attempted to generalize his own discontent, to make it a discontent of the entire peasantry and to raise the latter against the People's State Power. The Letter called on all communists to stand in the forefront of the struggle for the application of the new system of procurement and supply, not to yield to the difficulties encountered and, through their explanatory work, to eliminate the influence of the hostile work of the kulaks in the ranks of the peasantry.

Comrade Enver Hoxha criticized those communists who had no clear perspective of the

development of the countryside on the road towards progress and prosperity, who remained slaves to the backward mentality, saying that «all our peasant wants is some kerosine and salt which are produced in the country». He pointed out the reactionary character of this thesis which divorced the peasant from the aim and effort to improve his wellbeing, darkened the prospects of the development of agriculture and of the construction of socialism in the countryside. He explained that «the Party leads the people towards socialism, towards happiness and abundance, it does not lead them to the Middle Ages. The Party works for today as well as for tomorrow». The life of the peasant cannot be improved without the all-round mechanization of agriculture, and this cannot be attained if agriculture is not in a position to supply the city with the necessary agricultural products and industry with raw materials.

The root of the evil, Comrade Enver Hoxha explained, did not lie in the content of the ordinances on procurement and supply but in the feeble links of the communists with the peasant masses, in the absence of all sided explanatory work in the countryside.

The Letter «On Some Problems of the Countryside» intensified the struggle of the grass root organizations and the district Party committees for the complete and just application of the decisions of the Central Committee of the Party and the ordinances of the Government on the new system of procurement and supply.

Following Comrade Enver Hoxha's Open Letter, those Party committees which previously considered the overall fulfilment of the tasks of procurement impossible, shook themselves free from and rejected this attitude. All-round measures were taken to convince the peasants of the justice of the new system and to carry out an organized and more fruitful struggle against the class enemy.

The application of the new system of procurement and supply was hindered also by inadequate State reserves of industrial goods to be exchanged for agricultural products. Besides this commodities were not being properly distributed owing to shortcomings of the commercial enterprises.

The weaknesses were due to the fact that Party organizations showed little concern about economic problems. After the 1st Congress, their attention was centered on inner Party problems, which were examined and solved correctly, whereas insufficient efforts were made to tackle economic problems. On top of this, Party organizations had even less experience in the field of economic management. Thus they were lacking in initiative and looked to the central organs to solve everything. Often economic problems were regarded only from the viewpoint of immediate daily needs.

The Central Committee criticized this erroneous stand and called on the Party organizations to center their attention on an efficient organization and sound political direction of

economic questions, doing away with the idea that everything could be solved through mass meetings and manifestations. Also criticized was the mistaken idea, which had begun to spread among Party and State cadres, that the economy could be advanced by relying mainly on foreign aid.

In these circumstances, the Party had to engage in all-round work to raise the confidence of the cadres and the working people in their own forces, to convince them that the decisive factor for building socialism in Albania, were the internal forces and resources, while foreign aid constituted an important complementary factor.

In order to meet the demands of the working people for industrial commodities and agricultural products the Party took measures to strengthen the handicraft cooperatives, correcting errors that had become apparent in the past. To stimulate increased agricultural and livestock production, the Council of Ministers allocated special credits for the autumn sowing of the year 1949 and reduced procurement quotas 15 per cent through a reclassification of land.

The Party had it clear that the great tasks which it faced could be coped with successfully only by firm reliance on the masses. It told the people openly about all the difficulties the country was meeting and would have to go through and called on them to surmount them courageously. In response to this call, thousands of working people of the city and country volunteered for the construction of the «Stalin» Tex-

tile Plant in Tirana, the Maliq Sugar Refinery and other projects of the two-year plan. The determination of the people to build socialism was demonstrated also in the case of the 1st State Loan, which was turned into a great political action, demonstrating at its best the unity of the people with the Party and their loyalty to its political line.

Smashing the Plans of Internal and External Enemies

The great economic difficulties the country went through after the historic turning point of the 1st Congress were exploited in every conceivable way by the imperialists and Yugoslav revisionists. They believed that the Party of Labor of Albania could do nothing to cope with the difficult situation, and that the most favorable moment had come to carry out their sinister plans regarding Albania, which, following Tito's betrayal, found itself geographically surrounded by hostile states.

The radio and the press of the U.S.A., Great Britain, Yugoslavia, Greece, etc. launched a furious campaign of slanders and lies against the People's Republic of Albania, representing it as an «aggressor». From the air and in other ways imperialist and Yugoslav secret agents continually spread leaflets in which they called on the Albanian people to rise against their Party and Government.

Alongside their propaganda activity, the external enemies of our country assembled and

organized the fugitive reactionary Albanians. With these elements, the imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists set up new subversive organizations and held special conferences. Hundreds of political fugitives were sent to Albania as saboteurs.

By land, sea, and air, all along the State boundaries provocations were mounted uninterruptedly. All these activities were aimed at preparing the ground for direct armed intervention against the People's Republic of Albania.

Espionage activity especially increased. The U.S., British, Italian, Greek and Yugoslav agents acted against Albania on the basis of coordinated plans.

The Yugoslav revisionist leadership set in motion its agents in Albania through its diplomatic mission to Tirana. This became a center for organizing subversion and economic sabotage. Propaganda and threats were used to organize the fleeing of Albanian citizens into Yugoslavia.

The agents of foreign spy centers established contact with criminals at large within the country. With their help they committed acts of terror, assassinated militants of the Party and the State, among whom was Bardhok Biba, deputy to the People's Assembly and First Secretary of the District Party Committee of Mirdita. They set fire to storehouses in cooperative farms, Government offices and schools in the countryside.

The Titoite leaders resorted to all-round

pressure and blackmail in the diplomatic sphere and did their best to isolate the People's Republic of Albania. They cut off all air communication between Albania and the other socialist countries, unilaterally declared the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between Yugoslavia and Albania invalid and, finally, demanded the withdrawal of the Albanian Legation from Belgrade. Emboldened by the intensification of the imperialist and revisionist activity, the class enemy within the country, did their best to create an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. They spread such rumours as «war will break out soon», «there are disagreements within the Government and the Central Committee», «the situation will change very soon», etc.

The internal reaction used the campaign of the Party against the activity of the Yugoslav leadership and the Koçi Xoxe group for its own purposes. Hostile elements, exploiting the errors of the past tried to attack the Party line as a whole. Those who had been affected justly by the reforms and the laws of the People's Power began to complain that they had been treated unfairly. Pretending that they wanted to redress any evil which had occurred and that they were allegedly «concerned about the welfare of the people», they turned criticism of past mistakes into a campaign against the Party activists and the local organs of People's Power for the purpose of alienating them from the masses and inciting them against the admi-

nistration. They tried to remove the names of the communists from the lists of the candidates to the People's Councils. They attempted to replace class struggle and direct the blows of the Party and people against the State Security organs. The warning given at the 1st Congress, to the effect that the enemy would concentrate its blows against these same organs helped in the timely exposure of the tactics employed by the enemy, in the defense of the organs and employees of the State Security service, and in the correction of the errors of some communists in this respect.

It was in these circumstances that, on the 2nd of August, 1949, Greek armed forces, supported by artillery and aircraft suddenly attacked Albania and penetrated some 300-400 meters into Albanian soil. This provocation was an act of aggression calculated to establish the chauvinist claims of the Greek Government on Korça and Gjirokastra. The armed forces of the People's Republic of Albania dealt with this aggression completely smashing and eliminating the enemy.

While Greek forces were violating the boundaries of Albania, the Yugoslav Government increasing its hostile activity, also undertook threatening troop movements on the northern boundaries of Albania in the districts of Ochrida and Struga. At the same time the U. S., British and Italian secret service dropped from the air increased numbers of diversionists with the aim of provoking trouble in the rear

of the army. Reactionary elements within the country were ready to take to the mountains. The Yugoslav Government had undertaken to equip them with arms. These groups, made up of the remnants of the «Balli Kombëtar» and «Legality» organizations were wiped out by the organs of the State Security Service before they could stage their «uprising».

All these facts proved that the People's Republic of Albania was facing a coordinated, aggressive activity of the Greek monarchic-fascists, the Yugoslav revisionists and the Italian neo-fascists, under the leadership and with the support of the U.S. and British imperialists.

In those difficult moments the Albanian people rallied still more strongly around their Party. They were ready to defend the victories of the people's revolution at all costs. Thousands of people volunteered to take up arms and fight the aggressors. On a decision of the Party and Government tens of thousands of peasants were armed and participated together with the forces of the Security Service and the border guards in wiping out the bands of diversionists and criminals. The working masses demonstrated their loyalty to the Party and the people's Government by throwing themselves with all their might into the fulfilment of the economic tasks.

In strengthening the ties of the Party with the masses and deepening the people's confidence in their Party and Government an important

role was played by the visit of Comrade Enver Hoxha to the northern provinces in September 1949 and his meetings with the local people.

The struggle of the Party and the people to overcome the extraordinary difficulties and to eliminate the activity of the imperialists and revisionists was crowned by a series of important successes in the economic sphere.

The volume of procurement in the year 1949 in comparison with the year 1948 was as follows: wheat 138.8 per cent, maize 255.7 per cent. Compared with the year 1947 the turnover of goods in 1949 was 137.7 per cent. As a consequence the fund of accumulated products grew, new sources of production were ensured in the countryside, the market situation improved and the working masses were better supplied. The economic links between town and countryside and the alliance of the working class with the peasantry were strengthened.

3. PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING IDEOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL UNITY, FULFILLING THE TWO-YEAR PLAN

Under the new conditions, the Party would be able to apply its policy to cope with the difficulties, provided it preserved and strengthened its unity and ensured the fulfilment of the two-year plan.

Eliminating Distortions and Violations of the Party Line

After the turning point, some distortions and violations of the Party line, breaches of discipline and abuses of criticism and self-criticism due to the misinterpretation of the inner democracy of the Party and to imperialist and revisionist pressure became apparent.

The Central Committee took immediate measures to put an end to these manifestations, demanding the rigorous application of the constitution of the Party.

An unhealthy state of affairs in the Party organization of the Lushnja district was put right. Ambition, arrogance, career-seeking and liberalism towards the kulak had struck deep roots, a situation that the class enemy had used to its own advantage. The District Party Committee was dissolved and the main culprits were removed from the leading organs and from the Party. Cadres sent out by the Central Committee strengthened the Party leadership in this district.

The Party also condemned manifestations of opportunism apparent in the work of some employees of the organs of justice who, speculating on the fact that the organs of justice are independent institutions, underrated the Party control and did not keep in mind in their practice that these organs have a class character and cannot act outside the class struggle.

It was at this time that the anti-Party group of Abedin Shehu and Niazi Islami was exposed.

The distinguishing features of this group were: yielding under the pressure of the bourgeoisie and despondency and lack of faith in the economic line of the Party. This group considered the two-year plan to be unrealistic and spread the spirit of demobilization amongst the cadres and workers. The defeatist work of the members of this group had an influence in the failure to complete the plan in industry, in petroleum extraction and transport, where they occupied leading positions. Besides this, they did not appreciate the importance of the history of the Albanian people, they scorned the working masses, especially the Albanian working class. They had no faith in the defense capacity of the country or in the military preparedness of the People's Army.

The Plenum of the Central Committee of the PLA held in February 1950 exposed the viewpoints and activity of this anti-Party group and took all-round measures to wipe out the spirit of defeatism it had disseminated.

The vigilance of the Central Committee also exposed in good time and smashed the anti-Party activity of Gjin Marku and Nexhip Vinçani who were distorting the policy of the Party and undermining the leadership of the Party in the army.

In order to block the way to violations of the line of the Party, to preserve and strengthen its unity, it was imperative, besides other things, for the Party to rid itself of a number of unworthy members. For this purpose in Ja-

nuary 1950 the Central Committee of the PLA took the decision on the verification Party cards.

The verification of the Party cards was an important organizational measure which served to cleanse the ranks of the Party, procure complete and exact information on every communist, establishing order in questions of Party administration. It helped, at the same time, to strengthen the whole internal life of the Party and became a school for the education of the communists.

The Party did not consider this purge as the only measure to strengthen itself. Besides this, it devoted great care to the ideological and political training of its members, especially of those who had entered the ranks of the Party prematurely, who remained at a low ideological and political level, but were loyal and determined to apply its line. At the same time, the Party took important measures for raising the educational level of the communists.

The 2nd National Conference of the Party

The 2nd National Conference of the PLA held in Tirana in April 1950 was devoted to finding ways and means to overcome the difficulties impeding the fulfilment of the two-year plan and to strengthen the leading role of the Party.

The Conference made an assessment of the national and international situation since the 1st Congress of the Party.

The year 1949 witnessed important changes in the ratio of forces in the world arena in favor of peace and socialism.

The triumph of the Chinese revolution and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China on the 1st of October 1949 was a brilliant victory of the great Chinese people and the greatest historical victory of the international working class since the Great October Socialist Revolution. It inflicted a decisive blow on the colonial system and shook the capitalist world to its foundations. The ratio of forces in the world changed in favor of socialism. The Chinese revolution became a source of inspiration for the oppressed peoples and a great force of attraction for the world revolutionary movement. Another victory for socialism was the creation of the Democratic Republic of Germany.

The world socialist system now comprised more than one-fourth of the territory and more than one-third of the population of the earth. The socialist camp included: the USSR, China, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

In these circumstances and in order to avoid utter defeat, the imperialists intensified their hostile activities against the socialist countries as well as their preparations for launching aggressive wars. Under the guidance of the U. S. imperialists, the aggressive military bloc of the

«North Atlantic Treaty Organization» (NATO) was set up. It was directed primarily against the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy. The increase of the subversive activity of the imperialists against the socialist camp was directly connected also, with the all-round imperialist and revisionist offensive against Albania. The enemy thought that Albania was isolated from the socialist camp and represented its weakest link.

But geographic isolation did not prevent the socialist camp from giving the Albanian people all-round help and support. On the contrary, with the broadening and strengthening of this camp, the internal and international positions of the People's Republic of Albania were still further strengthened. In these difficult times for Albania, the Soviet Union showed itself ready to advance the credits Albania needed for the development of its socialist economy and defensive power. The other socialist countries also were ready to help the PRA.

The 2nd National Conference expressed its gratitude for this help and demanded that more be done to further strengthen the bonds of friendship with the Soviet people, the Chinese people and with the other fraternal peoples of the socialist countries.

Analyzing the internal situation, the Conference pointed out that despite the important progress achieved the plan of industrial production, especially for oil extraction for the year 1949 had not been fulfilled. This was due

to a number of factors. Prior to their departure from Albania, the Yugoslav specialists had degazified the oil fields. The defeatist activity of the anti-Party group had exercised an adverse influence. Shortcomings in the management of industry and lack of sufficient manpower were other causes.

In agriculture, too the tasks had not been completed. As a consequence of shortcomings in the work of the Ministry of Agriculture, there were irregularities in the registration of land for taxation purposes, in agricultural statistics, in registering reclaimed lands, as well in the division of the arable land between regions. This situation had hindered the planning of the planning and procurement of agricultural products.

To cope with the existing situation and to fulfil the two-year plan, the Conference instructed that the 1950 plan must be overfulfilled in all its targets to cover deficits of 1949 wherever possible.

In the sphere of agriculture the Conference set the Party as its principal task, the carrying out of a great political campaign of patient explanation and organization to convince the peasants to plant those crops of which the national economy was in need and which were included in the State plan.

At the same time, the Conference drew attention to the fact that the problem of collectivization should not be lost sight of, although it was not to be rushed. It demanded that special care should be taken

«to strengthen the cooperative farms so that they serve as an example and stimulus for the setting up of new cooperative farms in the lowlands»¹.

With a view to enhancing the leading role of the Party, the Conference instructed that the method of work and collective leadership, must be improved, bureaucracy combatted and great care shown for the political direction of economic and State problems. The Conference criticized instances when Party organizations had replaced State and economic organs and demanded that their leading role should be played not through substitution, but through sound political explanatory activity and continuous help and check up in the Party spirit.

The Conference criticized some instances of lack of concern for the organizations of the masses, and the arrogant behavior of some communists towards the people. It stressed the need for continuous work to strengthen the links of the Party with the masses, to further enliven the mass organizations and the People's Councils to increase the participation of the workers of town and countryside in solving problems of the State and the economy.

1) Resolution of the 2nd National Conference, April 14, 1950. (Principal Documents of the PLA, vol. II, p. 31.

The Fulfilment of the Two-Year Plan 1949-1950

The decisions of the 2nd National Conference went a long way to correct many shortcomings in the work of the Party as well as to further mobilizing the communists and all the working people for the fulfilment of the two-year plan.

The work for the fulfilment of the economic tasks improved. The plan for 1950 was overfulfilled. At the end of the year the volume of industrial production had been increased fourfold in comparison with 1938. Nevertheless, the deficits from the year 1949 were not entirely covered. As a consequence the two-year plan was fulfilled only 91 per cent. However, taking into account the extraordinary difficulties of this period, this was a big success.

In 1950 total agricultural output increased 30 per cent in comparison with the year 1938. Progress was made also in the collectivization of agriculture. Their number grew from 56 cooperative farms in 1948 to 90 in 1950.

The increase of industrial and agricultural production exercised a direct influence on the improvement of the standard of living of the working masses. National income in the year 1950 was 16,8 per cent higher than in 1948. In 1950 important price reductions were made for goods in the State trade network.

Along with the economic successes, important successes were achieved in the political sphere also. The May 28, 1950 elections to the

People's Assembly, with the participation of 99 per cent of the electors, of whom 98 per cent voted for the candidates of the Democratic Front, constituted a brilliant victory. This was yet another testimony to the love and devotion the people nurtured for their Party, as well as of their determination to defend the Fatherland and build socialism.

In July 1950 the People's Assembly decided to make some additions and amendments to the Constitution of the People's Republic of Albania. These were dictated by the social and economic changes that had taken place in Albania during the four-year period since the adoption of the Constitution. The following article was added to the Constitution: «The People's Republic of Albania is a State of the workers and laboring peasants». This article expressed the political and social reality of the country and the essence of the new State of people's democracy, as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Another article was added to the Constitution which recognized the leading role of the Party in the entire life of the country. It reflected the support to be given to the socialist development of agriculture, and formulated expressly for the first time the socialist principle of distribution «from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work».

The Party had remained faithful to its revolutionary foreign policy. It had taken a series of measures to ensure peace and to stop imperialist aggression. In July 1950, the People's

Assembly decided to associate itself with the Stockholm Appeal to support the world movement for peace and, at the same time, issued a declaration against the armed intervention by the U. S. imperialists in Korea. In January 1951 it approved a law condemning war-mongering and propaganda for wars of aggression, describing those as «grave crimes against humanity, against peace among the peoples and against the fatherland».

Against Manifestations of Conciliation with the Class Enemy

After the defeat which they suffered in 1949, the imperialists and Yugoslav revisionists did everything in their power to encourage the internal class enemy, prevent them losing hope and wherever possible, to incite them to actions against the people's democratic order. For this purpose they continued their unrestrained hostile propaganda, border provocations, dispatch of diversionist bands, especially espionage agents. Diversionists and spies from abroad together with local hostile elements, committed series of new acts of terror, sabotage and theft of State and cooperative property. The enemies resorted particularly to the tactics of exercising direct pressure on the communists, especially those of the countryside, and tried to compromise them. To some they would send threatening letters, others were surprised in their homes by diversionists. The kulaks used various ways and means to link themselves with the commu-

nists through marriages, material «help», etc. They addressed to the Party committees numerous provocative complaints against this or that communist, against this or that severe measure taken «unjustly» against them, asking them to annul those measures. The enemy elements would nurture in various Party members the remnants of petty bourgeois ideals and incite them to transgress communist morality, to squander and steal socialist property.

The Party, the People's Power, the working people in general, were prepared for a fierce class struggle and were determined to overcome every obstacle and difficulty on the road of socialist construction. In spite of this, the strong pressure of the external and internal enemies could not fail to live some traces. They were found even in the ranks of the Party. In the face of this pressure, a number of communists wavered, some went under. As a result some manifestations of softening, generosity and concessions, towards the kulaks and other class enemies, a trend to conciliation with them, became apparent.

Under the pressure of the class enemy, even some members of the Central Committee submitted, among them Tuk Jakova, member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee for organizational problems. His submission was not at all accidental. He has never been stripped of certain evils inherited from the period of the communist groups such as localism, ambition, petty bourgeois ma-

gnanimity towards the class enemy. His activity as a communist had always been permeated by a profound opportunism, by lack of revolutionary vigilance, failure to be rigorous in the performance of his duties and towards raising his ideological level.

At the 1st Congress of the Communist Party of Albania he took advantage of the condemnation of the activity of Koçi Xoxe to pose as one of the most persecuted communists and temporarily succeeded in hushing up his own stand in opposition to the line of the Party.

After the Congress and even before it, Tuk-Jakova broke under the pressure of the bourgeoisie and gravely damaged the activity of the Party through his opportunist stand towards the class enemy. To him, class struggle was dying down. In his opinion, the People's Republic of Albania was under no threat from the U.S. imperialists and Yugoslav revisionists. In various ways he encouraged a soft policy towards the kulaks. He intervened with the State organs to make things easier for hostile elements, to free them from prison. He completely underrated the hostile activity of the reactionary Catholic clergy and supported them in all sorts of ways.

Tuk Jakova was opposed to the economic line of the Party which gave priority to the development of heavy industry and in particular, to the development of the mineral industry, especially expressing himself against investments in the oil industry. He nurtured the idea that some branches of the economic plan were un-

realistic. With such an opportunist and defeatist stand he had obstructed the work of the Party and mass organizations of the fulfilment of the State plan.

Tuk Jakova had committed impermissible mistakes also in Party organizational matters. His concessions and failure to apply the Constitution and the decisions of the Party, his bureaucratic methods had brought about serious shortcomings in the cadres policy, in the method of work of the organs and apparatus of the Party and the organizations of the masses. This had brought about, also, breaches of the rules for admission to Party membership, violations of discipline and the weakening of criticism, self-criticism and vigilance.

He had been a supporter of the mistaken belief that the verification of the Party cards should be done outside the control of the communist masses without the direct participation of the basis Party organizations.

The 9th Plenum of the Central Committee held in February 1951 analyzing the political situation and the work of the Party, disclosed the causes of the opportunist manifestations towards the class enemy and showed the way to combat them. It condemned the anti-Marxist stand and the grave errors of Tuk Jakova, discharged him from his responsibilities as Secretary of the Central Committee and removed him from the Political Bureau.

On this occasion the Central Committee made a sound Marxist-Leninist criticism of its

own work and immediately corrected the shortcomings it had allowed to occur under the influence of the carelessness and opportunism of Tuk Jakova. Measures were taken to improve the collective leadership, to strengthen criticism and self-criticism, to call all the members of the plenum to account, to exercise a more systematic and exacting control over the application of its decisions.

The Party was mobilized with renewed vigour to bar the way to all manifestations of conciliation and all tendencies to come to terms with the class enemy and to deal him still heavier blows.

«Let it be borne in mind by the whole Party, — instructed the Central Committee, — that our victories do not diminish the class struggle. Faced with our successes and made desperate by its losses the enemy is intensifying and becoming more savage in its efforts to regain power, using ever more varied and newer forms»¹.

The Party organizations were placed on a more militant footing. The Marxist-Leninist analysis to which the Central Committee subjected the political situation and the work of the Party, the stern principled stand towards opportu-

1) Resolution of the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee on the Political Situation and the Work of the Party, February 23, 1951. Principal Documents of the PLA. Vol II, p. 55.

nism helped the communists to understand more profoundly and more concretely the objective necessity of the struggle against the class enemy, to be better protected against slipping into positions of reconciliation with it. A more rigorous rule was established for their Marxist-Leninist training. The Party explained to the working masses the new forms and manoeuvres resorted to by the enemy against the People's Republic of Albania, sharpened still further their revolutionary vigilance.

In particular, their attention was concentrated on the correct application of the Party's policy in respect to the economic restriction and political isolation of the kulaks, by drawing the middle and poor peasants into the struggle on a broader scale against them. To that end, of great help were the special instructions on how to single out the kulaks which were issued by the State organs after careful work under the direct guidance of the Central Committee and the District Party Committees. The kulaks were excluded from all the State assistance enjoyed by the peasants. They were subjected to heavier taxes in money. It was decided that when the property of the kulaks was confiscated twenty five per cent thereof would be distributed free of charge among the poor peasants.

While struggling against the conciliatory attitude towards the class enemy, the Party at the same time, attacked all sectarian manifestations causing confusion among the masses and hindering their mobilization to fulfil their poli-

tical and economic tasks and to combat the enemy more vigorously. Those Party Committees that distorted the policy of the Party and permitted the application of premature administrative measures amounting to the immediate liquidation of the kulaks as a class, or still worse that even included the medium peasants in the category of kulaks, were strongly criticized. The Party was against any measure leading to artificial sharpening of the class struggle, because only the enemy could profit from such measures.

In the struggle to overcome the difficulties caused by the imperialists, the Yugoslav revisionists and the internal class enemy as well as against opportunism, the Party preserved and strengthened its ideological and organizational unity, enriched its experience in political leadership and in the socialist construction of the country.

Efforts to Lift Agriculture out of its Backwardness

for the Party because it was a direct hindrance to the development of other branches of the economy. Despite the favorable effects of the measures taken in 1949-1950, they could not lift agriculture out of its backwardness. The development of agriculture continued to lag and the disproportion between the development of agriculture and industry was being deepened. This caused difficulties in meeting the needs of

the working masses for agricultural products and in supplying industry with raw materials. The use of only 75 per cent of the agricultural credits as well as the high prices of industrial goods in comparison with agricultural products were obstacles in this direction.

The problem of the slow development of agriculture and overcoming its backwardness was taken up at the April 1951, Plenum of the Central Committee of PLA. However, at this plenum the problem was tackled in an one-sided manner leading to the erroneous conclusion that the small peasant economies had exhausted all their possibilities for increasing agricultural production. Proceeding from the correct premise that cooperation was the principal means of lifting agriculture out of its backwardness, the plenum decided to switch to collectivization of agriculture on a mass scale. But this was a premature decision containing in itself the danger of compromising collectivization, because the conditions for the socialist reorganization of the whole of agriculture were not yet ripe. The Party rectified this hasty decision in time. The Plenum of the Central Committee met again in May. It emphasised that under the concrete conditions of Albania the main task was not the extension of collectivization in the countryside, but the strengthening of existing agricultural cooperatives and the exploitation of all the possibilities of the small peasant economy to increase production.

Making a correct assessment of all the con-

ditions, possibilities and means, the Party reached the conclusion that the best road to advance agriculture at that time was to further strengthen and perfect the economic links between town and countryside and to correct the disproportion between industry and agriculture:

«We should bear in mind», instructed the Central Committee, «that the close linking of the city and the countryside will be achieved only on an economic basis. . . We should build our economy in a harmonious way. We are interested in advancing industry, but are just as interested in advancing agriculture and let us not forget that the development of industry depends on the development of agriculture»¹.

During 1951, aid to the countryside was increased. Measures were taken to check the errors made in the registration for taxation purposes and in the classification of the land. The obligatory grain quota was lowered by 23 per cent and individual properties with small annual incomes were exempted from taxation.

As the price ratio between industrial and agricultural goods was such that it did not encourage the peasants to increase production

1) Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PLA of September 21, 1951. Principal Documents of the PLA. Vol. II, p. 110.

and on the whole did not attract them to the barter markets, the Party placed importance on the lowering of industrial prices. In 1951 a new prices cut for industrial goods was effected which reduced to some degree the disproportion in prices.

At the same time, efforts were made to further strengthen and develop State and cooperative commerce and especially the buying and selling cooperatives. This helped to convert them into powerful mass organizations for linking the town and the countryside economically and politically and for spreading the spirit of collectivization among peasants.

The economic measures aimed at lifting agriculture from its backwardness were accompanied by extensive political and organizational Party work. Importance was attached to the improvement of the social content and activity of basic organizations of the Party. The work of the people's councils and of the youth and women's organizations was also encouraged.

4. THE 2nd CONGRESS OF THE PLA. TASKS FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF ALBANIA INTO AN AGRARIAN-INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY

The 2nd Congress of PLA was held from the 31st of March to the 7th of April 1952, with the participation of 592 delegates with deliberative vote and 142 delegates with consultative vote, representing 44,418 Party members and

candidate members. Party membership at this Congress was slightly smaller than at the 1st Congress mainly due to the fact that during the verification of Party cards 8 per cent of its members were expelled.

The Directives of the First Five-year Plan

The Congress considered that the economic and cultural development of the country on the basis of a longer term plan was now entirely possible. It approved the directives of the first five-year plan for the 1951-1955 period.

Before being approved by the Congress, these directives were discussed for more than two months in the Party organizations and at open meetings of the workers of town and countryside. Many opinions and proposals came forth from these meetings and the majority of them were taken into consideration by the respective organs.

The plan relied first of all on our own forces on the internal resources, on the experience gained, and the capabilities of the cadres of our country. It was based also on the help of the other socialist countries, the Soviet Union in the first place. The help rendered by the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of Albania at that time aimed mainly at the development of the country's productive forces so that people's economy could stand on its own feet. The Party valued this aid as an important external factor in the construction of socialism.

The main tasks of the first five-year plan were: the acceleration of the rate of construction of the economic base of socialism and of the development of the productive forces so that, at the end of the first five-year period, Albania would be transformed from a backward agrarian country into an agrarian-industrial one; the strengthening of the alliance of the working class with the peasantry and the raising of the material wellbeing and cultural level of the working masses.

The Party defined the setting up of modern socialist industry as the key to the fulfilment of these tasks. In fact the industrialization of the country had already begun with the implementation of the two-year plan, but an extensive and comprehensive program to lay the foundations of a socialist industry was drawn up only at the 2nd Congress.

The Party appreciated correctly the principle that the production of the means of production plays the decisive role in the development of industry and the people's economy as a whole. In conformity with this principle, great stress was laid on the setting up and development of different branches of heavy industry, but not all branches of heavy industry were included because the economic and technical possibilities for this did not exist in the country. The necessary machinery was to be procured from the socialist countries through credit and exchanges. Albania was to develop those bran-

ches of heavy industry for which it possessed the natural resources and that were economically most advantageous. Under the concrete conditions of our country, heavy industry in the main, consisted of the mines, the engineering, electrical and building materials industries. It was envisaged that these branches would be developed as quickly as possible. The mining industry had prime importance. It would become the main basis for the development of other branches of industry and for the fulfilment of the needs of the processing industry for raw materials. At the same time, through the export of mineral products, our country would ensure the machinery and equipment necessary for its industry and agriculture.

During the first five-year plan the power industry would be equipped with hydro-electric and thermo-electric power-stations as the energy base to meet the needs of industry and the whole of the people's economy.

As the country had a great and urgent need for mass consumer goods and with the aim of reducing imports, the development of the light and food processing industry, relying mainly on the exploitation of local raw materials, was given an important place in the plan, too.

To ensure the rapid rise of industrial production set down in the plan, investments three times as big as those during the 1946-1950 five-year period were envisaged.

If the tasks set by the 2nd Congress for the development of industry were to be solved, two

main obstacles had to be overcome: first, the low rate of development of agriculture, which had by far the greatest specific weight in people's economy, and second, the lack of technical cadres and the low technical and educational level of its workers. Special care was taken to surmount these obstacles.

While total industrial output in 1951 was four times as big as that of the year 1938, agricultural production was only 30 per cent higher.

«The rapid growth of industry», instructed the Congress, «... demands that agriculture develop at a more rapid pace than thus far, so that it can cope with the needs of industry for raw materials as well as those of the State and the people for agricultural products»¹.

The only way to lift agriculture from its backwardness was the socialist transformation of the countryside. However, in the existing conditions, it was still not possible to follow the course of mass collectivization, because the bulk of the peasants were not as yet fully convinced of the superiority of the socialist system in agriculture, and besides, the necessary technical and economic basis was still lacking. The 2nd Congress underlined the fact that, under those

1) Resolution of the 2nd Congress of the PLA, April 1952. Principal Documents of the PLA. Vol. II, p. 149.

conditions, for the acceleration of the development of agriculture it was necessary to strengthen the existing agricultural cooperatives, to strengthen and extend the agricultural and livestock enterprises. It was necessary also to consolidate the economic ties between town and countryside through the extension of the Machine and Tractor Stations and the mechanization of agriculture, through the aid the State should give the laboring peasantry in the form of agricultural credits, the supply of the countryside with more industrial articles and the further regulation of the price ratio between industrial and agricultural goods.

The increase of agricultural production was to be achieved through the growth of crop yields and the expansion of the areas under cultivation.

The principal task of agriculture was to increase the production of food grains. Another feature of the development of agriculture during the first five-year plan was to expand the area sown to industrial crops. To fulfil the tasks in agriculture investment was to be doubled in comparison with the years 1946-1950.

Solution of the problem of technical cadres and qualified workers demanded the further development and acceleration of the cultural revolution. During the first five-year period, the network of schools was to be greatly expanded, the total number of pupils was to be increased by 370 per cent over that of the year 1938, the number of economists more than five-

fold and the number of engineers 18 fold. 8,500 technicians with secondary schooling and about 54 thousands qualified workers also were to be trained.

The Congress drew the attention of the Party to the backwardness of the regions of the North such as Kukës, Tropoja, Mirdita, Puka, etc. and recommended that special attention be given to their cultural advancement.

This five-year plan provided for the abolition of illiteracy.

The increase of industrial and agricultural production would help to raise the wellbeing of the working masses and would prepare the conditions for the abolition of the rationing system.

Investments for social and cultural needs were to be 3-4 times greater than those of the years 1946-1950.

The first five-year plan marked a new phase in the swift economic and cultural development of the country. Its fulfilment would create the essential conditions for commencing the final phase of the construction of the economic base of socialism.

Improve the Method of Political Leadership by the Party

The scientific analysis of the leadership by the Party following the 1st Congress and the summing up of its experience in that period made by Comrade Enver Hoxha in his report submitted to the Congress were of major importance. This analysis helped

the Congress to detect and criticize distortions in the application of the Party's line and the weak spots in the Party organizations. The Congress criticized opportunist manifestations towards the class enemy, bureaucracy, the monopolization by the Party committees of work that should be done by the State organs, the method of work by proclamation, of little real political work, the insufficient activization of all the communists and the mass organizations, etc. Comrade Enver condemned the tendency to solve problems by endless meetings and decisions in the following words

«We call meeting after meeting which go on for hours and days on end but very little comes out of them»¹

«Decisions are taken, many decisions at that, but not all of them are applied. Then nearly as many decisions are taken again to carry out the previous decisions. New decisions are adopted also on matters already decided upon, but forgotten. That is tantamount to trifling with the work and the decisions, to pretend that you are working and bringing out decisions, but in reality you are doing nothing, you are marking time and obstructing the work»².

1) Enver Hoxha — Report at the 2nd Congress of the PLA, 31st of March, 1952. Tirana 1952, p. 42.

2) Ibid., p. 41.

Proceeding from the experience gained, the Congress defined as by far the most important prerequisite for the fulfilment of the first five-year plan:

«The improvement and strengthening of the Party's guiding role in the economy, the strengthening and improvement of the work for the close linking of economic problems with political work. The exercise of continuous, systematic and rigorous check up on the application of decisions and the fulfilment of the tasks of the Party and the State. The fight for well organized work and the elimination of bureaucracy»¹.

The central and local organs and the Party organizations were instructed to review and correct their methods of work on the basis of the conclusions and decisions of the Congress. It was considered imperative that the Leninist principles of collective leadership, of the rendering of accounts by directing organs to the masses of the communists who had elected them, of criticism and self-criticism, of the role of the working masses as builders of socialism and of their organizations as powerful levers of the Party, of the systematic Marxist-Leninist train-

1) Resolution of the 2nd Congress of the PLA. Principal Documents of the PLA. Vol. II, p. 411.

ing of the Party members, should not remain only a generally accepted and propagated line but be implemented in life persistently and to the full.

At the same time, the Congress especially instructed the communists to be always vigilant, never to forget for a single moment the danger threatening the Party from the pressure of the imperialists and Titoites from without, the kulaks and other class enemies from within. From the Party's experience of the struggle against deviations and internal enemies after liberation, especially in the period between the two Congresses, the conclusion was reached that the main danger was right opportunism, the offspring of capitulation to imperialist and revisionist pressures.

«The rightist deviation, opportunism, should be considered as the greatest danger to our Party... without in any way forgetting the danger of the left-wing deviation... The pressure of the bourgeoisie on our Party should be considered as a very serious danger and combated continuously with the greatest force»¹.

1) Resolution of the 2nd Congress of the PLA. Principal Documents of the PLA. Vol. II, p. 154.

Pick in One Hand and Rifle in the Other The Congress warned Party and people that in their efforts

and struggle for the fulfilment of the first five-year plan they would encounter many difficulties, which would be surmounted only through all-round moral and material, political and military preparedness.

There were various difficulties. Those of growth were connected with the backwardness the country had inherited from the past, with the lack of experience, with the insufficient technical and cultural training of the cadres and workers in general. These were to be overcome through organization, discipline and the conviction of the masses in the correctness of the line of the Party and their mobilization.

At the same time, Party and people had to be completely prepared to cope with the difficulties the imperialists and Yugoslav revisionists would create through their all-out hostile and incessant activity against the PRA. The external enemies were framing new plans for the destruction of the people's democratic order in Albania. The Yugoslav Government together with the Greek and Turkish Government, incited and assisted by the U.S. imperialists, were preparing to rig up an aggressive Balkan pact which was directed, first and foremost, against Albania and Bulgaria.

Proceeding from this situation, the Congress laid emphasis on the slogan of the Party, which

had become also the principal motto in the activity of the masses of the people after the liberation of the country: «**Let us build socialism keeping the pick in one hand and the rifle in the other**»¹. It called for sharp vigilance and for the continuous strengthening of the unity of the people around the Party. Nothing should be spared in raising the defense capacity of the Fatherland, in further perfecting the People's Army, the Border Guards and the State Security Forces.

Condemning the aggression of the U.S. imperialists against Korea and their entire war-mongering and aggressive policy, the Congress instructed that a ceaseless campaign should be conducted to increase the hatred of the people against imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism, until its complete exposure. It described the struggle against imperialism as the main condition for the preservation and strengthening of peace.

Solidarity with the international working class and with all the peoples fighting for their liberation from the imperialist yoke was also stressed. The further strengthening of the friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries was another task set. The Congress underlined the absolute

¹) Resolution of the 2nd Congress of the PLA.
Ibid. p. 154.

necessity of exposing the Titoite clique as an agency of imperialism.

The Congress elected the Central Committee of the Party composed of 27 members and 12 candidate members. Comrade Enver Hoxha was re-elected Secretary-General of the Party.

5. FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE DISPROPORTION BETWEEN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING CONDITIONS

The fulfilment of the first five-year plan encountered difficulties which had not been properly envisaged. The plan for the development of the economy during the years 1951 and 1952 was not fulfilled. The anticipated rise of the wellbeing of the working people was not achieved. The main source of these obstacles lay in the backwardness of agriculture and its slower than expected rate of development. While the sown area was extended according to plan, productivity, especially of food grain remained below the level assigned. There was an appreciable decline in livestock farming. Thus, the disproportion between industry and agriculture, instead of being reduced, as foreseen in the plan, was intensified.

The Causes of Disproportion Between Industry and Agriculture

This state of affairs caused the Central Committee great concern. It held a special

discussion of the matter and disclosed the causes that had brought it about.

The backwardness inherited by agriculture from the past, the low level of education and culture of the peasant masses, and the small private property in the countryside impeded the extensive use of technology and the full exploitation of the possibilities the Party had created for the growth of agricultural production. The correct instruction of the 2nd Congress for a more rapid development of agriculture and for reducing the discrepancy between industry and agriculture was not kept properly in mind and did not find full reflection in the figures of the plan. The investments did not cope with the needs for the advancement of agriculture in the conditions of small private ownership. In fact they were smaller than the investments in transport and communications. This did not respond to the task laid down by the Congress to increase agricultural production by 171 per cent at the end of the five-year plan, mainly through increased productivity.

On the other hand, in the sector of industry, too, the possibilities did not permit the intended rate of progress. The construction of new industrial projects was expanded beyond the forces and availabilities at hand. The rate set for the completion of some of the big projects could not be attained. The building of these projects required a very great annual increase of labor power averaging 26,000 persons. The recruiting

of all this manpower brought about the withdrawal of a large number of peasants from agriculture. Although the figure set was never attained, it became an obstacle both for agriculture and for the fulfilment of the plan in industry, especially in the building of industrial projects.

Apart from weaknesses of planning, the economic burdens of the peasants also adversely influenced the development of agriculture. The State quotas on the peasants were high, taxes on agriculture were still heavy. The drought of the years 1950-52 made the quotas on the peasants unrealisable. During those years the peasants had to hand over to the State 40-50 per cent of the corn production instead of approximately 25 per cent as envisaged in the plan.

The drought brought heavy losses to agriculture, and also reduced the number of livestock. One third of all the farms of the Republic lacked draught oxen at a time when the areas under cultivation had increased, the variety and volume of agricultural work had been extended and agricultural mechanization was insufficient.

The yields envisaged for the production of food grains were not attained also because part of the best land was sown to industrial crops. The expansion of those areas was done in an ill-considered manner, often without taking into consideration either the wishes of the peasants or the farm hands needed for growing these crops. As a result here also the yields failed to reach the expected levels.

The disproportion in the price ratio between industrial and agricultural products, despite the measures taken by the Party, had not been completely eliminated. With his income, the peasant could hardly afford to buy farming tools because of the high prices of the tools in comparison with the prices of farming products. Apart from this, supplying the peasants with farming tools was made difficult also because neither industry nor the artisans had turned out the planned quantities of these implements.

The failure to attain the progress foreseen in agriculture directly obstructed the fulfilment of the tasks for the production of mass consumption goods. This caused difficulties in furnishing the people with supplies and prevented the improvement of the living standards of the working people of town and countryside.

Certain other circumstances also hindered the improvement of the people's well-being. Eager for profits, the consumer's cooperatives effected the accumulation and distribution of agricultural goods as well as the sale of farming tools, mainly through the free market, thus failing to ensure the necessary goods for the guaranteed and barter markets. The big increase of the number of workers from the ranks of the peasants, who descended on the cities demanded new investments to house and supply them and their families with rationed goods. Attempts to abolish the small private trade through premature administrative measures, without taking into account the direction given by the

Central Committee on this matter, had also brought about scarcity of goods in the market.

At this time the Party discovered yet another weak spot. The excessive extension of the apparatus of the State and the mass organizations was a burden on the State budget. This had happened because the experience of the cadres did not respond to the new tasks arising from the expansion of the State sector of the economy, and it was thought that the difficulties created in this direction would be solved by expanding the administrative apparatus. Such an apparatus weighed heavily on the people's economy, weakened its management and opened the road to bureaucracy.

Measures in Favor of Agriculture and of Improving the Wellbeing of the Working People The Party could not risk that the fulfilment of the first five-year plan should be jeopardised and the alliance of the working class with the peasantry thus weakened. In march 1953, the Central Committee decided to take a number of measures aimed at the liquidation of the obstacles to the advancement of agriculture and at increasing agricultural production. As a consequence, aid to the countryside was increased to some extent, the completion of the land improvement projects on schedule was ensured, work in the Machine and Tractor Stations was

improved, and the training of cadres for agriculture accelerated.

But time showed that these measures were not sufficient and could not solve the problem in its entirety, because they did not provide new sources for the expansion of the assistance that the State could offer to the countryside, as the key to the advancement of agriculture. The proportion of investments established during the first five-year period had remained unchanged; investments for agriculture had not been increased. Various quotas and taxes still weighed unduly upon the peasantry.

From this experience the Party learned the lesson that the implementation of its correct instructions for the development of agriculture demanded more profound and better studied measures, that everyone should see more clearly that the solution of the problems of the countryside was a major political problem.

Thus in the year 1953, on the initiative of the Central Committee and under its direct guidance, the Council of Ministers adopted new and important measures favorable to agriculture, in the interest of the wellbeing of the working people of town and countryside,

The distribution of investments in the first five-year plan between the main branches of the economy was re-examined. Some premature industrial projects were cancelled. The rates of constructions of some other projects were slackened. The greater part of the investments made available from industry passed over to agri-

culture, while the remainder was used to increase the supply of articles of daily consumption and to build new houses.

Cancellation of all the Peasants' arrears of quotas of food grains and other agricultural and livestock products for the years 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1952 was announced. The quotas for the peasants on all categories of land were scaled down. Any unpaid financial taxes for all the members of the cooperatives and individual farms lacking draught oxen were written off up to the end of 1952, while they were reduced 75 per cent for those that had draught oxen. A little later another general 25 per cent reduction of taxation on the peasant farms was carried out. The prices of locally made farming tools were also reduced, while the prices paid for olives, cotton, tobacco and sugar beet bought by the State were raised.

At the same time, it was decided to increase the agricultural credits to a considerable extent and to provide agriculture with a larger number of tractors.

The apparatuses of State administration and the mass organizations were scaled down 30 per cent and a number of cadres of the administration transferred to production work, many of them being sent to the countryside.

The ordinances aimed at abolishing small private trade were annulled and measures were taken for its revival to a certain degree. At the same time, measures were taken for the strengthening of the state and cooperativist

trade. Pursuing the efforts for the improvement of the living standards of the working people, the Party attached great importance to the development of light industry, without giving up the development of heavy industry, with the aim of increasing mass consumption goods. This was to be attained by relying on the full exploitation of industry, as well as by strengthening and expanding handicrafts and local industry. To best meet the needs of the village for industrial goods, the private artizan was encouraged and efforts were made to set up various trades in the villages.

All these measures were a proof of the strength of the Party, of its ability to re-examine with a critical eye and to correct its own decisions in due time and in conformity with the concrete conditions. It was evident that the Party's guiding rôle in the construction of socialism could not be conceived without reviewing the tasks time after time, without revoking decisions that had become obsolete, without filling in the gaps found along the road. In his time V. I. Lenin explained that socialism could not be built

«without very many repetitions, without retracing one's steps several times, without checking up on the work, without making individual corrections, without new methods»¹.

But despite their great importance, the

1) V. I. Lenin, Work, vol. 31. p. 572. (Alb. edition).

measures taken in 1953 by our Party and Government, were still measures from above.

To attain the advances desired in the development of the economy, especially in agriculture, it was necessary to effect an all-round mobilization of manpower and inner resources, to raise to the highest grade the revolutionary impuls and creative initiative of the masses. That could be brought about only if the instructions of the 2nd Party Congress for a radical improvement of the Party's method for political direction of our economy were put into effect.

«It should be well understood by all the cadres of the Party, the State and the economy», instructed the Central Committee of the PLA, «that the great task facing us for an increase in industrial and agricultural production, in consumer goods and improvement in the living conditions of the working people cannot be successfully attained if we do not take a radical turn for the improvement of the method of running economic and State affairs»¹.

In order to improve the methods of management, the Party centered its work, first and

1) The Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PLA. 18th of April 1954. Principal Documents of PLA. Vol. II, p. 326.

foremost, on the solution of two important contradictions.

The first contradiction was between the inadequate technical, vocational and educational training of the cadres and the ever greater demand for the direction of our people's economy. The all-round development of the people's economy, the setting up of new modern industry and the acceleration of the rate of development of agriculture demanded a raising of the level of education and culture of the cadres, the improvement of their capacities in the sectors where they worked. It became imperative to put an end to management «in general» and to manage the economy in a more concrete manner. The increased training of cadres had to respond to the demand for faultless direction of economic and State affairs.

Another contradiction existed between the high level of technology of production and the low technical and vocational level of both the workers and the engineers and technicians. Albania was witnessing the setting up of a new industry, with complex processes of production, based upon modern technique, whereas the training of the workers, technicians and engineers was not in a position to meet its requirements. This brought about incomplete exploitation of machine capacity, low productivity of labor and high production costs.

In order to solve these contradictions, the Central Committee of the Party re-examined the training and the qualification of the cadres

and workers, criticized the weak points in this respect and took measures to place them on a more sound basis.

The measures in favour of agriculture and for the raising of the wellbeing of the working people brought about the heightening of the revolutionary enthusiasm and creative initiative of the working masses. Socialist emulation involved over 90 per cent of the workers and spread to a considerable degree in the countryside, too.

It was not long before these measures gave satisfactory and visible results. In 1954 the plan of industrial production was overfulfilled to a greater degree than any other year. The area under cultivation as well as the production of food grains both followed suit. The decline of livestock farming was stopped and a considerable increase in herd numbers began. 27 per cent more living space was provided for the working people than in the year 1953. The total market turn-over increased over 13 per cent within a single year. Commercial exchanges between town and countryside were expanded.

All these factors brought about the strengthening of the alliance of the working class with the peasantry and prepared the ground for the fulfilment of the entire five-year plan.

6. STRENGTHENING IDEOLOGICAL WORK AND SMASHING ATTEMPTS TO REVISE THE MARXIST-LENINIST LINE OF THE PARTY

Following the 1st Congress of the PLA and, especially during the years of the first five-year plan, the cultural and ideological revolution spread and deepened in all directions. The level of education and culture of the working people rose. Education and culture truly came to belong to the people. The entire country was covered with a dense network of schools, theaters, cinemas, houses and hearths of culture. The first institutions of higher learning were set up. One out of every seven persons in our country was attending school. The traditional patriotism of the Albanian people had been endowed with a new socialist content. The close rallying of the working masses around the Party had been the main factor in overcoming the extraordinary difficulties that faced the country after the 1st Congress, in smashing the plans and hostile activity of the imperialists and Yugoslav revisionists towards the People's Republic of Albania. On all occasions the working people of Albania had demonstrated their sentiments of lofty internationalism. They were notable for their unsullied, militant friendship towards the Soviet people, the Chinese people and the peoples of all the countries of people's democracy, for their revolutionary solidarity with the peoples who were fighting to free themselves from the colonial and imperialist yoke, and for their soli-

darity with the working class. Profound changes had been effected in their consciousness. A new socialist stand towards work and socialist property had made its appearance, the working people had shaken off numerous backward religious, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois prejudices. Communist morality was being strengthened among them.

However, the ideological and cultural preparedness of the communists and of all the working people was still quite low. This was apparent in their work and life. Manifestations alien to communist morality, insufficient concern for ideological elevation, the low level of ideological and political work, retreating in face of the difficulties in the field of education and culture hindered the socialist construction of the country.

Raising Ideological and Political Education to a Higher Level

The change that had begun in the sphere of raising production and in the management of the economy, the defense and the uninterrupted development of the victories of the socialist revolution demanded the raising to a higher level of the active participation of the masses in the political, economic and cultural life of the country and, as a consequence, the tempering of their socialist consciousness. The need for a more sound ideological and political education of the communists and of the working people was dictated by the circumstances. Alba-

nia had embarked on the road of socialist development in the conditions of a great economic and cultural backwardness, with a working class small in number with a low educational and cultural level and a deeply entrenched petty-bourgeois world-outlook among the working people. Albania was building socialism under conditions of capitalist encirclement, when imperialism and its agents were exerting all-round, powerful pressure on the people and the Party and engaging in an extensive campaign of slander and threats with the aim of overthrowing the People's State Power.

Considering the Marxist-Leninist ideological and political education of the communists and of the working people as a fundamental task, the Central Committee of the Party carefully examined this problem and took steps to organize it better and to place it on more militant basis.

The tendency to employ administrative methods instead of the method of convincing the masses was criticized. The erroneous idea that when the Party heads the People's Power it issues commands and gives orders was condemned. Occasions when some communists in the countryside, instead of convincing the peasants to hand over their grain quota choose the shorter road of arbitrary acts like closing the mills, preventing the peasants from carrying the products home without having paid their quotas, etc., were especially attacked.

The Party committees organized a more

extensive and more concrete work to explain the political line and the importance of the decisions of the Party. The explanatory work was linked more closely with the economic problems, with the fulfilment of the plans of the enterprise, the village or the institution. Special attention was given to the education of the working people in the spirit of a socialist attitude towards work and social property. The class struggle — the principal link in the chain of problems for ideological and political education — was tackled better by the Party. It elucidated further the absolute necessity for this struggle and did not allow the anti-Marxist idea of the «dying away of the class struggle in the period of socialist construction» to strike root in the minds of the communists. This idea was being supported by the Yugoslav revisionists and various ideologists in some communist parties, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The class struggle, the Central Committee taught, will continue ceaselessly during the entire period of the construction of socialism. This occurs because the exploiting classes, even after having lost their power, never give up their attempts to re-establish their domination and because the international bourgeoisie has as its main aim the prevention of the victory of socialism on a world-wide scale, to liquidate socialist revolution wherever they have triumphed or may burst out. In this connection, the Party still further strengthened its propaganda and agitation to expose the aims

of the imperialists and their lackeys and the new forms they were using to attain these aims. It made the working people understand better the various forms of the class struggle while pointing out to them that one such form is theft, damaging or wasting of socialist property.

Measures were taken to improve the work of the press and radio as powerful mobilizing weapons in the hands of the Party. The system of Party education was reorganized. The publishing of Marxist-Leninist literature was extended. Along with the works of J. V. Stalin, the publication of which had begun in 1952, it was decided to commence publication of the complete works of V. I. Lenin. Special care was given to the raising of the ideological, educational and professional level of the functionaries of the Party apparatus and the principal cadres of the State economic organs. All the cadres and all the communists were activated better in the ideological and political education work thus doing away with the completely mistaken and harmful idea that allegedly this work was the duty only of the organs of propaganda and agitation.

To advance the cultural revolution, the Party concentrated on deepening it further, while not neglecting its further extension. Special attention was devoted to the strengthening of the scientific, ideological and political content of the school, which comprised the most important means for the educational and cultural uplifting of the masses. To speed up the development of culture in the countryside, more

funds and educational cadres than before were allotted for this purpose.

With the training of the new intelligentsia and with the setting up of scientific centers in the country, the Party now posed the task of linking science more closely with production, so that scientific research might solve the main problems of the people's economy. Special measures were taken to encourage studies in the sphere of the history of Albania, the history of Albanian literature, and the Albanian language.

Just at this time a series of new scientific, cultural and artistic institutions were set up, such as the Institute of the History of the Party, the Institute of History and Philology, the Theatre of Opera and Ballet, etc.

The Vigilance of the Party against the Penetration of Revisionism At the time when the Central Committee was examining the strengthening of ideological and cultural work in its April 1955 Plenum, Tuk Jakova attempted to exploit this occasion to attack the general line of the Party, while presenting his own revisionist points of view.

The self-criticism that he had made at the 9th Plenum and repeated at the 2nd Congress, proved to be false; he maintained his opposition to the Party line. He was still dissatisfied with and hostile to the Party leadership and its Marxist-Leninist line. He considered that the

campaign of the Party against opportunism and its measures against the class enemy were unjust. Appraising the international events of the recent years from his anti-Marxist and revisionist positions, he had started work to revise the Party's line. For this purpose he had approached elements condemned by the Party for their anti-Marxist activity.

Tuk Jakova demanded the re-examination of the whole political and organizational line of the Party, because, in his opinion, there existed big distortions that had to be set aright as soon as possible! With the explicit purpose of striking at the leadership of the Party, and in particular, at Comrade Enver Hoxha, he raised the well known hostile thesis of the Yugoslav revisionist leadership, that they had created the Communist Party of Albania and made possible all the victories attained in the National-liberation War of the Albanian people. He urged revision of all the assessments made by the Party since its founding on the work of the communist groups and insisted especially that the negative aspects of the Shkodra group, in the leadership of which he had once taken part, be minimized.

He was opposed to the Party policy regarding the class struggle. He defended the thesis of the dying out of the struggle against the class enemy and in general tried in various ways to prevent the ideological struggle and the struggle against anti-Party tendencies and manifestations, and thus make peaceful co-

existence with opportunist points of view in the ranks of the Party acceptable.

In his hostility against the Party Tuk Jakova had gone so far as to use even the reactionary slogan of dividing the Albanian people into «Gegs and Tosks» (Northerners and Southerners).

Tuk Jakova openly demanded changes in the composition of the Central Committee to place at its head people denounced for grave offenses and anti-Marxist activity. At the same time, he called for the rehabilitation of all anti-Party elements.

His aims were clear: to replace the Marxist-Leninist line of the Party of Labor of Albania with a new course like that of the Yugoslav revisionists, so that Tuk Jakova would emerge as the «saviour» and «ardent fighter» for this course, as the person who deserved to stand at the head of the Party.

Bedri Spahiu associated himself with the revisionist thesis of Tuk Jakova.

Bedri Spahiu had been criticized many a time during his life in the Party for pronounced opportunism and gross errors in his activity. But every time he had seen the danger of exposure, he had «demanded» to be removed from the leadership of the Party, with the aim of hiding his sins. He had always nurtured bourgeois nationalism and had on the quiet supported the opportunist and liquidatory trend of Sejfulla Malëshova and Ymer Dishnica.

Bedri Spahiu was also in opposition to the

policy of the Party concerning classes and the class struggle, had capitulated before the pressure of the bourgeoisie and demanded the extinguishing of the class struggle. Like Tuk Jakova, he, too, was in favour of revising the general line of the Party, for replacement of its leadership with an anti-Marxist leadership that should be headed by Tuk Jakova and be composed of other anti-Party elements.

At the 2nd Congress of the Party, Bedri Spahiu was not reelected as a Member of the Political Bureau because of his past political errors which were fully revealed during the verification of Party Cards. From that time on, his hatred towards the Party increased still further and he was awaiting the favorable moment to vomit venom against it.

The opportunist activity and views of Tuk Jakova and Bedri Spahiu were exposed and condemned without the slightest hesitation by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party that met in June 1955. Tuk Jakova was expelled from the Central Committee and later from the Party, too, whereas Bedri Spahiu, who took a profoundly hostile stand at this Plenum, was expelled at once from the Central Committee and from the Party.

In taking this decision the Central Committee instructed:

«... We must continuously increase our revolutionary vigilance and intensify our battle against opportunism and the

opportunists, nipping in the bud every act of theirs to the detriment of the Party and the people»¹.

Thus the unity of the Party was defended, its Marxist-Leninist general line preserved un-sullied. The Central Committee prepared the organizations and all the communists to fight against the views of the enemies who sought to develop in the ranks of the Party a dangerous feeling of tranquility and preached the dying out of the class struggle.

The revisionist activity of Tuk Jakova and Bedri Spahiu was not accidental. Its roots lay deep in the all-round diversionist activity of the Yugoslav revisionists against the Marxist-Leninist parties and against the unity of the socialist camp. It was closely linked with the general onslaught the modern revisionists were preparing against Marxism-Leninism and the international communist movement.

After the death of J. V. Stalin in March 1953, the revisionist elements in the communist and workers' parties, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, began to revive, to gnaw at the foundations of their parties and to undermine the unity of the international communist movement.

During the first years following Stalin's

1) The Decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PLA, June 17, 1955. Principal Documents of the PLA, vol. II, p. 419.

death, they were engaged in strengthening their positions and getting the reins of the Party into their hands by isolating and removing the sound elements from leading positions by means of slanders, intrigues and plots. To this end Khrushchev launched the campaign of combating the so-called «cult of the individual». The PLA, while condemning the cult of the individual «as an anti-Marxist and harmful practice» did not fall into the trap set by Khrushchev with the aim of having it revise its political line and thus prepare the ground for a change in its leadership. The answer given by the Party on that occasion was:

«The spirit of acting collectively and of fighting continuously for the strengthening of collective work has always existed in the Central Committee and in the other leadership bodies of our Party. The Central Committee of our Party in granite-like unity leads the Party with wisdom and courage on the glorious road to socialism and communism. There is no enemy force, either internal or external, that could destroy the steel-like unity of our Party»¹.

In the years 1954-1955 the preparations of

1) Report of the Political Bureau approved at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PLA, the 12th of July, 1954. Central Archives of the Party.

the revisionists for their general onslaught against Marxism-Leninism assumed wide proportions. Their activity was conducted primarily in these three directions: in spreading the idea of the dying out of the class struggle; in coming to terms with the Titoite clique and rehabilitating it; in substituting the struggle of the peoples in defense of peace for collaboration with the heads of imperialism.

As a consequence of this activity, in Hungary and in a number of other European countries of the people's democracy considerable concessions were made to the capitalist elements of the cities and especially of the country, while bourgeois ideology and culture were given free play. Meanwhile in the People's Republic of Albania not only were the class enemies not granted any concessions, but, on the contrary, the fight against them was intensified further.

The modern revisionists saw in the road followed by the Yugoslav leaders the model for their own common road; in the Tito clique they saw their most dependable ally in their struggle against Marxism-Leninism. At that time Khrushchev and, following him, the other leaders of the socialist countries, began to praise highly the foreign policy of Yugoslavia, as well as «its efforts to ensure peaceful coexistence and the preservation of peace». Khrushchev tried to prove that the foreign policy of Yugoslavia did not differ from that of the socialist countries. The idea that the questions which united the Marxist-Leninist parties with the Yugoslav

revisionists were more numerous and more important than those which divided them began to circulate. All-round efforts were made to prove the absolute necessity of rehabilitating the Yugoslav revisionist leadership. In May 1955, Khrushchev, without the approval of the other parties, decided to reject the decisions of the Information Bureau and the assessments of all the communist and workers' parties in regard to the betrayal of the Tito clique and to go to Belgrade at the head of a Soviet Party and Government delegation. Khrushchev tried to impose upon the other parties, too, his one-sided, unjust and arbitrary decisions. Just two days before his departure he informed the Party of Labor of Albania about this accomplished fact and demanded approval for the abrogation of the November 1949 resolution of the Information Bureau and the revision of that of June 1948 which exposed the betrayal of the Yugoslav leadership. At the same time, he asked the PLA to approve the text of a «decision» on this matter, which was drawn up by him and was to be published in the name of the Information Bureau, without its holding a meeting. Despite the great trust the Party of Labor of Albania placed in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Central Committee of the PLA viewed Khrushchev's dangerous antics with great suspicion and in a letter addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated 25th of May 1955, expressed its opposition to Khrushchev's visit to Yugosla-

via and against the rehabilitation of the Tito clique.

«We are of the opinion», the letter said «that there is a considerable difference between the content of your letter dated the 23d of May 1955 and the main thesis of the common stand we have maintained until now towards the Yugoslavs. . . The daily experience of our Party in its dealings with the Yugoslavs both before the rupture with them in 1948 and thereafter up to this day, proves in the most complete and clear manner, through many living facts, that the content of all the resolutions of the Cominform in connection with the Yugoslav problem was entirely correct, with some exceptions of tactical importance. The proposed procedure for the approval of the abrogation of the resolution of the meeting of the Cominform of November 1949 seems to us incorrect. . . In our opinion, such a hasty (and rash) decision on an important problem of principle, without first making a profound analysis jointly with all the interested parties in this matter, and even more so, its publication in the press and the comments made about it in the conversations in Belgrade would not only be premature, but would also inflict serious damage on the general orientation. . . We are

convinced that this general line of our Party in our relations with Yugoslavia is correct, with the exception of some details of minor importance»¹.

The Central Committee of the PLA demanded from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the examination of these problems in a meeting of the member parties of the Information Bureau, to which the PLA should be invited to state its opinion.

Persisting in the decision he had taken, Khrushchev went to Yugoslavia, humiliated himself before Tito confessing that «grave errors had been committed in respect to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav leadership»(!) and in reality rehabilitated him. This was unprecedented in the history of the international communist movement, an open violation of the decisions taken jointly by the fraternal parties, in complete disregard for the other parties.

In the line followed by the Tito clique Khrushchev found the embodiment of his desires and efforts to a rapprochement with U.S. imperialism. In his speech delivered in Belgrade he openly expressed this aspiration. The Yugos-

¹) Letter of the CC of PLA to the CC of the CPSU, May 25, 1955. Central Archives of the Party.

lav policy of cooperation with the Western countries, he said, «finds full acceptance with us.» In an interview with some U.S. journalists Khrushchev expressed his opinion that the struggle for peace is a political notion that stands outside the ambit of the class struggle, the safeguarding of peace being the concern of both the socialist and imperialist states. This interpretation which he put on the question of peace, in fact negated the well-known Leninist thesis, that imperialism is the source of war.

While attempting to raise this anti-Marxist viewpoint of theirs to the level of theory, the modern revisionists tried to paralyze the vigorous anti-imperialist struggle of the masses for peace and began to preach that the main fight to ensure peace was in meetings and talks with the ringleaders of imperialism. Under the influence of these efforts, during 1955 the activity of the international organizations for the preservation of peace suffered a marked decline. Instead of the fight for peace the revisionists were advocating pacifism.

Khrushchev described the conference of the four great powers, the Soviet Union, the USA, Britain and France, held in Geneva in July 1955, as «a new stage in the mutual relations between states, a turn for the better towards ensuring peace». The heads of the participating imperialist governments, he said were «reasonable people who were trying to ensure peace». He began to talk everywhere about «the spirit of Geneva». Meanwhile the leaders of the other

states participating at the Geneva Conference, first and foremost the USA, used this «spirit of Geneva» in order to demand concessions from the Soviet Union, especially unilateral disarmament.

The revisionist elements under Khrushchev's influence and instigation, became active in other countries, too. In Hungary, Imre Nagy became a great menace to the Hungarian Workers' Party and to the People's State Power. Coming out openly against the socialist development of the countryside, against the principles of democratic centralization and the leading role of the Party, Tuk Jakova and Bedri Spahiu had wanted to play a similar role in Albania.

To defend Marxism-Leninism at that time and to prevent revisionism from changing into a unified international trend meant to preserve the purity of the Marxist-Leninist line, first and foremost, in one's own party, to purge it of revisionist elements and to keep its unity tight.

The expulsion of Tuk Jakova and Bedri Spahiu from the Party ranks and the smashing of right opportunism not only barred the way to revisionism but also made our Party better prepared for the coming struggle against the appearance of right opportunism in the international communist movement.

The Fulfilment of the First Five-year Plan

The fight of the Party on the ideological front was closely linked with its struggle for the fulfilment of the first five-year plan.

The economic measures taken to lift agriculture from its backwardness were carried out through improvement of the planning of agriculture. The pronounced centralization in this branch had shrivelled the initiative of the farms and to some degree hindered the development of agriculture. Under the new method of planning, the State plan for the development of agriculture determined the volume of the obligatory quotas of agricultural and livestock products, the amount of the surplus to be bought by the State, the amounts contracted for and the volume of the payment in kind for the work of the Machine and Tractor Stations. Meanwhile the planning of agricultural production was being done directly by each State, cooperatives and individual farms in collaboration with the organs of agriculture and the Machine and Tractor Stations, having in mind the fullest possible utilization of the soil and climatic conditions in each region. The new method released many farming specialists from bureaucratic routine and increased the responsibility of the State cadres in the districts for the management of agriculture.

The year 1955 marked an important turn in industrial production, particularly, in the mining industry, an appreciable improvement in

the method and organization of work at production centers, in the management of the economy by the State and Party economic organs.

The first five-year plan was successfully fulfilled. In 1955 the total volume of industrial production was 179 per cent bigger than in 1950, and 11.5 times bigger than in the year 1938. Its average annual increase was 22 per cent. In some branches of industry, as for example in the extraction of chromium ore, in the machine making industry, the timber industry, local industry etc. the planned targets were overfulfilled. The handicraft cooperatives fulfilled the five-year plan 10 months ahead of schedule. During the first five-year plan about 150 new State or cooperative factories and enterprises of industrial production were set up and commissioned.

Important progress was achieved in agriculture. The production of food grain in the year 1955 was 53 per cent greater than in 1950.

The impetuous development of the economy and the increase of industrial and agricultural production made possible the improvement of the material wellbeing and the raising of the cultural level of the working people. The overall volume of the circulation of commodities in 1955 was 105 per cent greater than in the year 1950. The national income increased about 70 per cent, the real wages of the workers and employees 20 per cent and the income of the peasantry 35 per cent. At the end of the five-

year plan it was decided to partly abolish the rationing system.

Big successes were scored in the development of culture and education. The network of schools was expanded and the number of pupils and students increased. Illiteracy among people up to 40 years old was virtually wiped out.

The principal objective of the first five-year plan for the transformation of Albania from a backward agricultural country into an agrarian-industrial country was, in general, achieved. The basis of the new socialist industry was laid, the socialist sector of agriculture was expanded, the prerequisites for the speeding up of the collectivization of agriculture and for completing the building of the economic base of socialism in the forthcoming five-year plan were created.

During the period of the first five-year plan the Party gained invaluable experience in the leadership of the State and economy for the socialist construction of the country. It also accumulated a wealth of experience in its activity for the mobilization of the masses and in the political and ideological struggle against the class enemy within and outside the country, as well as against right opportunism.

CHAPTER V

THE PARTY OF LABOR OF ALBANIA AND ITS STRUGGLE TO COMPLETE THE BUILD- ING OF THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF SOCIALISM (1956-1960)

1. THE 3d CONGRESS OF THE PLA. THE DI- RECTIVE ON ACCELERATING THE COLLECTIVI- ZATION OF AGRICULTURE

In December 1955, the Central Committee decided to convene the 3rd Congress of the PLA which would define the new tasks for the coming five-year period. The Central Committee came before the Party and the people with a rich balance-sheet of successes, with a record of a determined principled struggle for the application of the Marxist-Leninist line, with a clear perspective of the road to the socialist construction of the country to its credit. In the preparatory period before the new Congress, the PLA found itself facing the acute problems for the international communist movement stemming

from the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as the pressure the Soviet leadership exerted on it to impose the revisionist course.

The Revisionist Course of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in February 1956, the Khrushchev group, after three years of preparation, unleashed a fierce attack against the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and against the Marxist-Leninist general line which had been followed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under the leadership of J. V. Stalin.

The report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union submitted to the Congress by N. Khrushchev presented a number of so-called «new» theses, which allegedly comprised «a creative development of the Marxist-Leninist theory in the conditions created by the changes in the ratio of world forces in favor of socialism». These theses were cloaked with Marxist-Leninist language in order to mislead public opinion inside and outside the Soviet Union, whereas in reality they represented a departure from Marxism-Leninism, a revision of it.

Khrushchev distorted the Leninist teachings on war and peace; he elevated «peaceful coexistence between the two systems» to the

general line of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and of all the socialist states. Lenin taught that the fundamental principle of the foreign policy of a socialist country and of a communist party is proletarian internationalism and not peaceful coexistence. It is

«the alliance with the revolutionaries of the advanced countries and with all the oppressed peoples against the imperialists of all hues»¹

Khrushchev imposed on the socialist states, on the international communist and workers' movement the choice: «either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third course». Thus, for the sake of peaceful coexistence with imperialism on any terms, the Soviet leadership propagated the ideas of giving up the class struggle on a world scale, of renouncing the revolutionary liberation struggle of the peoples against the imperialist yoke, and of withholding the all-out aid which should be given to the peoples by the socialist countries and the international communist and workers' movement. It made the solution of the problems of peace and freedom of the people subject to the establishment of friendly relations between the two great powers of the world, the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

1) V. I. Lenin «The Foreign Policy of the Russian Revolution». Works, Vol. 25, p. 86.

Khrushchev declared: «We want to be friends and to collaborate with the United States in the sphere of the struggle for the peace and security of the peoples as well as in the economic and cultural spheres», «our aim is to achieve a radical improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations».

Thus, on the one hand, he spread the false idea that U. S. imperialism, the biggest and fiercest enemy of peace and freedom, had given up or might give up its predatory and aggressive designs, that the socialist countries and the other independent countries would be permanently secure from imperialist aggression. But for this it was necessary to accept eternal coexistence between socialism and capitalism, since socialism would triumph on a world scale through «peaceful competition between the two systems — the capitalist system and the socialist system». On the other hand the Khrushchev group gave the U.S. imperialists to understand, that the dominating economic and military positions of the U.S.A. in the various countries would not be affected at all, that these countries should accept the division and domination of the world by the two great powers, which «would ensure peace» through their close collaboration, by using all their huge economic and military resources, all the means of propaganda, and the international organs such as UNO, etc.!

The Soviet leadership linked the problem of peaceful coexistence between States of different social systems with the forms of transition to socialism. Subordinating the transition to socia-

lism to peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev laid all the emphasis on «peaceful transition» and identified it «with the parliamentary road». «In the present day conditions», he declared, «the working class has the possibility of winning a stable majority in Parliament and of transforming it from an organ of bourgeois democracy into a weapon of the true will of the people, into an organ of true democracy, of democracy for the working people»! He described the road of the October Revolution as «correct only under those historical conditions»! These theses constituted a negation of the socialist revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union openly appraised Yugoslavia as a «socialist country», where «in the process of the building of socialism original and concrete forms of management of the economy and construction of the State apparatus were being developed». This appraisal tore up all the decisions of the Information Bureau on the betrayal of the Yugoslav revisionist leadership and supported the Yugoslav road of the liquidation of the Marxist-Leninist party and the dictatorship of the proletariat and the reestablishment of capitalism.

A still more powerful blow was dealt at the party, at the revolution and at the dictatorship of the proletariat in the «secret» report «On the cult of the individual and its consequences» that was submitted to the delegates of the 20th Congress by N. Khrushchev. This report blacke-

ned the glorious road pursued by the Bolshevik Party since the death of V. I. Lenin, calling it a road «full of errors, grave distortions and monstrous crimes». The responsibility for all this was attributed to J. V. Stalin, who for 30 years had led the Party and the Soviet State with so much wisdom and ability towards victories of historic world importance, and who had been acknowledged by the international communist movement as a great Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary. Distorting documents and using declarations made by the enemies of socialism, Khrushchev fabricated the basest slanders and lies to accuse Stalin of «arbitrary cruelty», of «isolation from life and reality» and described him as «despot», «terrorist», «ignorant». At the same time he announced the rehabilitation of enemies of the socialist order who had been condemned as agents of the imperialist States.

The attack against J. V. Stalin was a direct blow against his revolutionary work, against the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, and the socialist order. It had the definite aim of justifying the liquidation of the Marxist-Leninist line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union worked out by its former Congresses, of having a new revisionist political line adopted and of revising Marxism-Leninism. To prepare the ground for the attainment of its aims, it was essential for the Khrushchev group to denigrate Stalin, who had so resolutely defended Marxism-Leninism and had developed it further under the new conditions created in the world with the victory of

the October Socialist Revolution, with the construction of socialist society in the Soviet Union and with the creation of the socialist camp after World War II. To camouflage his own counter-revolutionary revisionist activity, Khrushchev & Co made use of the so-called «cult of the individual of Stalin», taking advantage of the fact that the cult of the individual is alien and hateful to Marxism-Leninism.

J. V. Stalin had been opposed to the cult of the individual and had often criticized it; he had correctly appreciated the role of the masses and had always upheld the principle of collective leadership of the Party and the Soviet State. But he had not taken adequate measures to restrain the excessive and entirely unnecessary praises the Soviet propaganda had lavished on him in the last years of his life. This fact was exploited by Khrushchev's group for its own anti-Marxist, anti-socialist aims, by fabricating the so-called «cult of the individual of Stalin» as its principal weapon in the struggle against Marxism-Leninism.

Khrushchev and his group declared their revisionist course to be the general line of the international communist movement and resorted to every means to make it obligatory on all the communist and worker's parties.

The conclusions of the 20th Congress became the ideological nourishment for the revisionists of all countries. They were powerful weapons placed in the hands of the imperialists and all reactionaries to fight against the socialist

countries, against communism, against the revolutionary liberation movement. Encouraged by these conclusions, the enemies of communism launched a furious campaign against Marxism-Leninism, especially against the revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. They directed their attack especially against the socialist order in the Soviet Union and in the other countries, as well as against the communist parties in capitalist countries. In this respect, the Yugoslav revisionists claim special distinction. They said that the course of the 20th Congress was in conformity with the road they had been following for quite some time. A tense situation was being created in the international communist movement.

Defeat of Attempts to Revise the Line of the PLA The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union encouraged and set

in motion the anti-Party and hostile elements in Albania, too. Great hopes were aroused among them that at last the time had come to change the Marxist-Leninist course of the PLA and for them to regain their lost positions, i.e., to start the same process as that going on in the Soviet Union and in certain countries of the people's democracy. The Tito clique directly assisted these elements, especially through the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana. Under its guidance, the organization of an underground counter-revolutionary movement was commenced, aimed at

changing the situation and seizing the reins of the Party and the People's Power. A number of Party members who had been punished for grave offenses, and some secret agents of the imperialists and Yugoslav revisionists were included in this movement. The anti-Party and hostile elements, more than anyone else publicized the 20th Congress, trying to create a favorable atmosphere for the revision of the Marxist-Leninist political line of our Party and for the rehabilitation of Koçi Xoxe, Tuk Jakova, Bedri Spahiu and many other enemies of the Party and the people. They played down the political and economic successes attained under the guidance of the Party, speaking of the existence of «cult of the individual», of violation of «Leninist norms», of «a harsh stand towards the kulaks and other class enemies», of «hesitation and procrastination in the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia». They called these «consequences of the erroneous viewpoints and practice of J. V. Stalin» and put forward the need to liquidate this line, for measures against those responsible who had permitted such things. In Tirana the anti-Party elements also took advantage of the lack of vigilance and other pronounced weaknesses within the Party Committee of the city of Tirana.

The revisionists used the Party Conference of the city of Tirana, held in April 1956, to launch their attack on the line and the leadership of the Party. Through their representatives, whom they had managed to have elected as de-

legates, they put forward their anti-Marxist platform there. At the same time they demanded the postponement of the 3rd Congress, because, allegedly, more time was needed to re-examine the line and make new preparations in the spirit of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union! As it turned out later, all this had been hatched up behind the scenes by the Yugoslav legation.

By misusing the inner democracy of the Party, the anti-Party elements created a tense situation at the Conference. The revisionist viewpoints were opposed by the majority of the delegates, but there were some among them who were swayed under the weight of this subtle demagoguery.

The Central Committee rightly appraised the situation as very serious and immediately concluded that the enemies of the Party and socialism had a finger in this. It sent Comrade Enver Hoxha to the Conference. There he unmasked the aims of the revisionists and put forward the firm line of the PLA for the preservation of the purity of its revolutionary policy and practice. The delegates fully supported this stand of the Party and condemned the attempts of the enemies to turn it from its Marxist-Leninist line. The Conference forced the anti-Party elements to admit from their own mouths the aims and character of their counterrevolutionary activity. The revisionist plot was defeated.

Drawing lessons from this event, the Central Committee instructed the whole Party:

«... In no way at all can the slightest slackening of vigilance be permitted, nor can we allow ourselves to be filled with self-complacency and thus leave a clear field for enemy activity»¹.

With their eyes opened by this event, the communists mobilized themselves to fight in a more revolutionary manner in defense of the Party line and for the fulfilment of their tasks.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev, on his part, pressed the Central Committee of the PLA to re-examine its general line in the spirit of the conclusions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to adopt a new line at the 3rd Congress. At the beginning this pressure was exerted in Moscow through Suslov, a member of the Soviet revisionist group. In the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union he demanded, through Liri Belishova, that the leadership of the PLA reexamine, in particular, its stand towards the Yugoslav revisionists and towards the sentences which had been pronounced against Koçi Xoxe, Tuk Jakova and the other anti-Party elements, because, he alleged, errors could have been committed «under the influence of Stalin's cult of the individual». This demand was repeated in the most open and per-

1) Letter of the Central Committee of the PLA to All the Party Organizations, April 21, 1956. Central Party Archives.

sistent way by the leader of the delegation of the Soviet Union who had come to Tirana to take part in the 3rd Congress.

The Plenum of the Central Committee unanimously and unhesitatingly rejected these attempts to revise the correct line of the Party and expressed its determination to continue on the road followed up till then by the PLA.

The 3rd Congress of the PLA began its proceedings on 25th May 1956, and lasted until 3rd June. It was attended by 670 delegates with deliberative vote and 121 delegates with consultative vote, representing 41,372 members and 7,272 candidates to membership of the Party.

The Congress examined the activity of the Central Committee and of the whole Party, amended the Constitution of the Party, and approved the directives for the second five-year plan.

The Determination of the Party to Continue its Marxist-Leninist course

Under the conditions of the general onslaught of international revisionism against Marxism-Leninism and the pressure exercised by Khrushchev on the PLA, the principal problem was: on which course should the Party, proceed? That of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or its own Marxist-Leninist course?

Contrary to what the revisionists demanded:

«Having heard and discussed the report on the activity of the Central Committee, delivered by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PLA, Comrade Enver Hoxha, the 3rd Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania decided to fully endorse the political line and practical activity of the Central Committee as well as the conclusions and proposals contained in the report.

The Congress noted with satisfaction that the general political, economic, and organizational line followed up to now by the Party has been correct.»¹

The Congress firmly condemned the activity of the anti-Party elements at the Party Conference of Tirana and any attempt to revise the political line of the PLA. It described as completely correct the measures taken by the Party

«against all the anti-Party and deviationist, revisionist, Trotskyite, opportunist groups and elements»²

The Congress reached the conclusion that the Party had applied the Marxist-Leninist standards punctiliously in the punishment of the anti-Party groups and elements as in its

1) Resolution of the 3rd Congress of the PLA. Principal Documents of the PLA. Vol. II, p. 452.

2) Ibid., p. 481.

entire inner life. The decisions of the Party found the full approval of all its organizations.

Dealing with the problem of the class struggle as one of the most important problems about which the fight between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism was being waged, the Congress considered it

«a mistake to think that the class struggle is dying away and that the overthrown classes would give up their struggle of their own free will»¹.

The Congress instructed the communists not to relax their vigilance even for a second, and warned them that there will be such elements who

«may think that, with the change of the situation, the discipline in the Party, the vigilance of the Party should be changed, too, and that everything should be replaced with an opportunist softness, with an easing of the class struggle, that the errors and crimes that they have committed should be hidden from the Party and the people, that «the time has come when, under the slogan of democracy, they can violate true democracy»².

1) Resolution of the 3rd Congress of the PLA. Principal Documents of the PLA. Vol. II, p. 481.

2) Ibid., p. 481.

This is how the Congress faced up to the tense situation that was being created within the international communist movement following the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Hence the duty to continue the merciless struggle against all opportunist manifestations, against the danger of rightism and to preserve, as the most precious thing, the unity and solidarity of the ranks of the Party.

The 3rd Congress decided unanimously and without the slightest hesitation to continue the Marxist-Leninist course which had been pursued by the Party since its formation.

A revolutionary Marxist-Leninist spirit — essentially opposed to the revisionist spirit that permeated the conclusions and the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union — ran through all the conclusions and decisions of the 3rd Congress of the PLA.

However, the 3rd Congress did not openly condemn the anti-Marxist theses of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. The Central Committee of the PLA had made known to the Soviet leadership its opposition and reservations over a number of their theses and actions. At the same time, the press of the People's Republic of Albania was intentionally giving various assessments practically contrary to those of the 20th Congress. But the PLA in its Congress could not express its opposition and reservations about the conclusions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union publicly

because, at that time, such an act would have been to the benefit of the enemies of communism who had unleashed a frenzied campaign against the Soviet Union and the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement. The Albanian communists have always felt it their noble internationalist duty to defend the first socialist State in the world and the whole socialist camp. Besides this, at that time, the real aim that the Khrushchev group hoped to achieve with its new theses was still not well recognised.

The main thing was that the Party of Labor of Albania did not make any concessions of principle in the face of the pressure of the Khrushchev group and did not make the revisionist course of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the basis of its line as was the case with a number of communist and workers' parties. It preserved its general Marxist-Leninist line intact.

The amendments made by the Congress to the Constitution of the Party did not affect its Marxist-Leninist principles and standards. The new Constitution defined the duties and rights of the Party members more precisely. The rich experience the Party had gained in organizational and ideological matters and in the political leadership of the socialist construction of the country found expression in this Constitution.

2nd Five-year Plan Directives

While approving the directives of the 2nd five-year plan for the years 1956-1960, the Congress defined as the main tasks: the development of industry, especially of the mining industry, mainly on the basis of the full utilization of the productive capacities in operation and by the exploitation and putting into action of the internal reserves; the rapid development of agriculture, mainly through the socialist reorganization of agricultural production; the improvement of the material situation and the raising of the living standards and of the cultural level of the people.

In conformity with these tasks it was envisaged to increase the total volume of industrial production by 92 per cent at an average annual rate of not less than 14 per cent. The production of petroleum, chromium ore, coal and electric power, as well as the production of consumer goods, would develop at an accelerated rate.

The Congress directed that there should be a marked increase of agricultural and animal products, too. But the Congress laid down that the main task for agriculture and the entire people's economy was the extension of the collectivization of agriculture, to complete the laying of the economic base of socialism throughout the country and to bring about rapid all-round development of the countryside.

The Congress considered the instruction of the December 1955 Plenum of the Central Committee for the acceleration of the collectivization

of agriculture completely correct and timely. All the political, economic and organizational conditions had been created for the transition to this new stage of the socialist reorganization of the countryside. The masses of the peasantry had become convinced of the superiority of large-scale collective agricultural production. Qualified cadres had been trained and the basis of agricultural equipment had been expanded. The Party and State were in a position to tackle the tasks arising from the extension of the collectivization of agriculture. The existence of the necessary conditions for the transition to the socialist reorganization of the countryside on a wide scale was confirmed by the fact that the task posed by the Central Committee in December 1955 of doubling the number of cooperatives within the year 1956 had been completed by the eve of the Congress.

Based on these conditions, the 3rd Congress put forward the task of completing the collectivization of agriculture, in general within the period of the 2nd five-year plan. In the first place, the collectivization would encompass the lowland areas and, partly, the hill country. In mountain areas there were to be set up mainly agricultural collectives and livestock cooperatives.

The Congress instructed that in the collectivization the Leninist principle of the free will of the peasantry must be strictly observed. It demanded that the Party organizations and the Government organs should use only the method

of persuasion by publicising the example of the cooperatives which had been set up. Any other method of work which might infringe, in the least, the principle of free will was considered alien and would be condemned by the Party.

The State would support the collectivization of agriculture by increasing mechanization, adding to the area of reclaimed land, extending land improvement projects and by giving all-round help to the agricultural cooperatives.

The objective of continuously improving the living standards and of raising the cultural level of the working people ran right through the directives of the plan. The increase of industrial and agricultural production would make it possible to abolish the rationing system during the 2nd five-year plan and to lower the prices of goods of daily use year by year. The real wages of the workers and employees would increase 25 per cent while the income of the peasants 35 per cent.

In order to achieve the best possible results in the 2nd five-year plan, the Congress called on the communists and all the working people to realise that

«the place of honour, the battle front for the construction of socialism is where the material blessings are produced, in the factory, on the construction site, or the State farm, at the machine and tractor station, or the cooperative»¹.

1) The Resolution of the 3rd Congress of the PLA. Principal Documents of the PLA. Vol. II, p. 478.

Finally, in its proceedings the Congress elected the new Central Committee composed of 43 members and 22 candidates to membership, thus increasing its numbers. Enver Hoxha was re-elected First Secretary¹.

The 3rd Congress upheld the revolutionary policy of the Party and, in the spirit of this policy, defined the new tasks for the construction of the economic base of socialism, putting first and foremost the task of completing the collectivization of agriculture.

2. THE STRUGLE OF PLA AGAINST MODERN REVISIONISM.—(THE MAIN DANGER IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT)

After its 3rd Congress the PLA found itself facing a dangerous situation in the international communist movement which had been created by the spread and enlivenment of modern revisionism.

The Revival of Revisionism in the International Communist Movement

The situation created in the second half of the year 1956 was a consequence of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the

1) The title of General Secretary of the Party was replaced by the title of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party by decision of the 12th of July, 1954 Plenum of the Central Committee of the PLA.

Soviet Union. A profound ideological confusion swept over the greater part of the communist and workers' parties. Taking advantage of the great prestige and authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Khrushchevite group exerted continuous pressure on the leadership of the other parties for the purpose of making them replace their previous Marxist-Leninist course with the revisionist course of the 20th Congress. It organized conspiracies to remove from the leadership of the parties all those who opposed the spread of revisionism. The Tito clique, on the other hand, made a great fuss about the «triumph of the Yugoslav course» and, where they could, intervened in every conceivable manner in order to accelerate the disintegration of the Marxist-Leninist parties and the socialist order. The Soviet leaders and the Yugoslav revisionists cooperated closely in the anticommunist campaign launched by international revisionism under slogans of the struggle against «Stalinism», against «dogmatism», against «the cult of the individual». Khrushchev met Tito in order to coordinate their activities in his campaign and to single out who of the leaders of this or that party was to be removed and who was to be placed at the head.

Under these circumstances, the opportunists in the ranks of the various communist and workers' parties came out in the open and, with the direct support of the Soviet leadership and the Titóites, launched an attack against Marxism-Leninism. Anti-Party elements were re-

habilitated although many of them were known world wide as counter-revolutionaries.

The Italian opportunists headed by Palmiro Togliatti were prominent among the revisionists of the capitalist countries in the campaign against Marxism-Leninism. They advanced the thesis of the degeneration of the Soviet order and that of the people's democracy and put forward the need for their replacement with «an order of unlimited democracy». At the same time they sang praises to «the Yugoslav experience». Under the guise of the «struggle against the hegemony of a single party» they attacked the unity and the common political line in the international communist movement based on Marxism-Leninism and invented the thesis of «polycentrism» — the creation of many centers in the movement. They came forward with the slogan of the «Italian road to socialism», a reformist parliamentary road which excluded any revolutionary uprising and any attempt to destroy the bourgeois State Power. Such a road was, according to the Italian revisionists, the only suitable course for all the capitalist countries of the West.

In the socialist countries, revisionism spread and deepened in Poland and Hungary more than anywhere else. With the help of the Khrushchev group, anti-Marxist elements condemned for revisionist and anti-socialist activity and viewpoints emerged at the leadership of the workers' parties of these countries. The dicta-

torship of the proletariat was paralysed. The ideology and culture of western bourgeoisie was allowed to spread far and wide. Disguised as «cultural circles» counter-revolutionary hotbeds were set up in various cities. The aim of the revisionists was to do away completely with the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist order.

This situation was exploited by the imperialists who incited, spread and organized counter-revolution in those socialist countries where the revisionists had created a favourable ground, and in direct or indirect collusion with them, set about working for the elimination of the socialist order and for the re-establishment of capitalism.

International imperialism and the revisionists together organized the counterrevolutionary revolt in the Polish city of Poznan in June 1956, as well as the counter-revolutionary uprising in Hungary in October-November 1956.

The Hungarian People's Democracy was threatened with the danger of complete liquidation. The Hungarian Workers' Party was destroyed. Betrayed by the revisionists, the Hungarian communists and working people made a desperate stand. The counter-revolution in Hungary kindled the anti-communist hysteria all over the world. The socialist system was facing a grave trial.

The peoples of the socialist countries and the revolutionary forces all over the world

were greatly concerned about the fate of socialism in Hungary. Soviet troops were stationed in the People's Republic of Hungary, but the Khrushchev group hesitated to send them into action to suppress the counter-revolution. Only in the face of the great pressure from below and, especially when it saw that Hungary was slipping out of the sphere of its influence, was it finally obliged to permit the Soviet Army to go to the aid of the defenders of the Hungarian revolution. The counter-revolution was crushed.

The Hungarian counter-revolution was the offspring of revisionism. The Yugoslav revisionists, the most ardent supporters of the Hungarian revisionists, who played a special role in the preparation of the counter-revolution, hoisted the flag at half mast when it failed. Tito termed it «an uprising of the entire people», which was brought about by «the grave errors of the Rakosi regime and the hesitation to overthrow it»! On the other hand, he described the help of the Soviet Army as «savage and impermissible intervention». Imre Nagy, the head of the counter-revolution, found refuge at the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest.

After the defeat of the counter-revolution, the Soviet leadership, which was no less responsible than the Tito clique for its preparation, tried by every means to cover the traces of its grave offense. It sacrificed Imre Nagy, whom it had itself placed at the head of the Hungarian State. Unlike the Titoites it was obliged to call

the uprising «counter-revolutionary» as it was in fact. However, it blamed the «dogmatists» and not those who really were to blame — the revisionists — for bringing about the counter-revolution.

The Hungarian counter-revolution failed, but its roots were not destroyed. Revisionism in Hungary was not eliminated, it only made a withdrawal. The close collaborators of Imre Nagy kept their key-political positions in the State and in the re-organized ruling Party.

Revolutionary Internationalist Stand of the PLA Without any reservations the PLA identified itself with the revolutionary working people of Hungary and raised the entire Albanian people on their feet to come to their aid with every means. Through the «Zëri i Popullit», it declared:

«The Albanian people denounce with contempt the bloody deeds of the imperialists and fascist counter-revolutionaries who aim at tearing Hungary away from the socialist camp, at overthrowing the regime of the workers and peasants and at establishing the savage dictatorship of capital»¹.

1) Editorial of the «Zëri i Popullit», October 30, 1956.

On its part, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, in a special declaration, made the following appeal:

«In the present circumstances the socialist victories of the Hungarian people achieved during these years must be defended with determination»¹.

The PLA and the entire Albanian people welcomed the victory of the Hungarian people as a victory of all the socialist countries, of all the freedom-loving peoples.

Analyzing these bitter events, the Party of Labor of Albania, unlike the Soviet leadership and the Hungarian leadership, who put the blame for the counter-revolution on the so-called «dogmatists», on the «previous Hungarian leadership», put its finger on the real main culprits — the revisionists — and criticized them for the «repeated and lightning changes of leadership (in Hungary — Edit.), which had left the Party and the State without a directing staff, without a strong and trustworthy leadership»².

The PLA drew important lessons from what

1) The Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, 3rd of November, 1956. «Zëri i Popullit», 4th of November, 1956.

2) Editorial of the «Zëri i Popullit», November 5, 1956.

happened in Hungary for its activity on a national and international scale.

«The tragedy of the Hungarian people», Comrade Enver Hoxha declared immediately after the defeat of the counter-revolution, «will certainly be a great lesson to all the honest people in the world, it will be a lesson to all those who rest on their laurels and who, listening to the imperialists and reaction, with their demagogical slogans slacken their vigilance and replace it with opportunism and dangerous leniency.

The Party and the people of Albania have never fallen and will never fall into the trap and will not be misled by slogans of «people's socialism», «revolutionary socialism», or catchwords of some sort of «democracy» that may smell of anything else but not of proletarian democracy....

Therefore, today more than ever, our Party is faced with the task of intensifying its principled struggle to preserve the purity of the Marxist-Leninist theory in order to strengthen its ranks ideologically and organizationally, to strengthen the international solidarity of the working people, and it considers that the struggle for the defence of the Marxist-Leninist principles, the struggle

based on these principles, is the only correct struggle»¹.

The acute international situation brought about by the counter-revolution in Hungary, was still further aggravated by the British-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt on the 29th and 30th of October 1956. This act was yet another link in the general assault of imperialism and reaction against the freedom and peace-loving forces.

Faced with such a situation, the People's Republic of Albania deemed it absolutely necessary to increase its readiness and that of the people in order to cope with the intensified imperialist-revisionist pressure. At the same time, as a detachment of the international communist movement, it considered it as its internationalist duty to make its contribution to exposing revisionism and to restricting its spread.

The situation in the international communist movement and in the world was taken up for examination at the February 1957 Plenum of the Central Committee. At this meeting Comrade Enver Hoxha made a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis of the situation and stressed once more the duties of the Party in its

1) Enver Hoxha. Speech delivered at the solemn gathering of November 8, 1956. «Zëri i Popullit», November 9, 1956.

revolutionary struggle against imperialism and revisionism.

The imperialists and the various revisionists, Yugoslav, Hungarian, Polish, Italian and others have spearheaded their activity against the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement. In order to disrupt this unity they aimed at isolating the Soviet Union by detaching all the socialist countries from it and at dismembering the world communist movement. To this end, they tried to deny the universal importance of the victories and the experience of the October Revolution and the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union. The revisionist theses and decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were likewise directed against these victories and this experience. The struggle in defense of the Soviet Union under these conditions was a struggle in defense of socialism, in defense of Marxism-Leninism. For this reason the PLA deemed it necessary

«to defend and steel the unity of the socialist countries and the fraternal communist and workers' parties around the Soviet Union»¹

1) Enver Hoxha. «Report on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Party», delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PLA, February 13, 1957. Tirana, 1957, p. 37.

In the existing circumstances, the fight against revisionism, the Central Committee taught, assumed first importance. It instructed the communists and all the working people to understand profoundly that

«under the present conditions the struggle in the ideological sphere ranks first and foremost»¹.

The PLA declared publicly that it would resolutely and persistently defend the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism from the blows of the revisionists.

First and foremost, it was necessary to expose the attempts of international revisionism to sow ideological confusion about the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the leading role of the party of the working class, on the dictatorship of the proletariat and on the class struggle.

All historical experience, Comrade Enver Hoxha pointed out, teaches us that

«The leadership of the party is a vital necessity in order to carry out socialist revolution and build socialism and communism»².

1) Enver Hoxha. «Report on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Party», delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PLA, February 13, 1957. Tirana, 1957, p. 71.

2) Ibidem, p. 58.

To deny the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party means to leave the working class without a guiding staff, to disarm it completely and to perpetuate the domination of the bourgeoisie.

Exposing the revisionists who propagated far and wide the abolition of the dictatorship of the proletariat or its «liberalization», the PLA emphasized:

«We must not abolish the dictatorship of the proletariat, but strengthen it as much as possible, not to permit it to be weakened, «liberalized», not allow confusion and disorganization in its ranks, because that is what the enemies want»¹.

It showed that those who reject the dictatorship of the proletariat reject the whole of Marxism-Leninism and go over to the side of the enemies of communism.

The Party pointed out the grave danger represented by the attempts of the revisionists to confuse the working people by spreading the «theory» of the negation of the class struggle. The class struggle, it taught,

«is an objective reality which is connected with the existence of the exploit-

1) Enver Hoxha «Report on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Party», delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PLA, February 13, 1957. Tirana, 1957, p. 50.

ing classes or their remnants, with the existence of the agents of imperialism, with the existence of the wide sector of small producers, with the existence of capitalist hang-overs in the consciousness of the people and, finally, with the existence of imperialism»¹.

Revisionism disguised its struggle against Marxism-Leninism under three main demagogical slogans: «for the creative development of Marxism-Leninism and for the struggle against dogmatism», «for the creative application of Marxism-Leninism under the specific conditions of every country» and «for the struggle against Stalinism» or «the cult of the individual».

The revisionists, the PLA pointed out, are merely speculating with the correct thesis of the creative development and application of Marxism-Leninism in the new circumstances and the specific conditions of every country. They are using these theses to negate the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and to cover up their betrayal, to impose «specific socialism» and «national communism» on others.

1) Enver Hoxha «Report on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Party», delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PLA, February 13, 1957. Tirana, 1957, p. 50.

«Marxist-Leninists», Comrade Enver Hoxha emphasized, «conceive Marxism-Leninism not as the negation of its foundations, but as an enrichment of this theory with new conclusions derived from the experience of the struggle of the working class and from the development of the sciences. . . . Marxism-Leninism is a science and the objective laws developed by it are absolute truths... They cannot grow obsolete nor be negated... The fundamental problems of the construction of socialism are common problems, the laws of the development of society have no national boundaries. Historical experience shows that such common problems are: the dictatorship of the proletariat, i. e., the establishment of the political State Power of the working class under the guidance of its Marxist-Leninist party, the strengthening, in every way, of the alliance of the working class with the peasantry and with the other working strata, the liquidation of capitalist ownership and the establishment of social ownership over the principal means of production, the socialist organization of agriculture, the planned development of the economy, the guidance by the Marxist-Leninist theory, the determined defence of the victories of the socialist revolution from the attempts of subversion by the for-

mer exploiting classes and by the imperialist states»¹.

The PLA made it clear once again that the struggle against the «cult of the individual of Stalin», «against his errors», «against Stalinism» was a struggle against Marxism-Leninism aimed at paving the way for the replacement of the revolutionary course with an opportunist and reformist course in all the communist and workers' parties in order to place the revisionists at the head of these parties.

«We do not agree with any of those who try to do away with all the positive revolutionary aspects of Stalin. . . . J. V. Stalin, as everyone knows, was a great Marxist who, next to Lenin, defended Marxism-Leninism from all the enemies and revisionists and rendered an invaluable contribution to the further development of this science»²

At that time our Party spearheaded its struggle against Yugoslav revisionism, the standard-bearer of the attack on Marxism-Le-

1) Enver Hoxha. «Report on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Party» delivered at the Plenum of the CC of the PLA, February 13, 1957. Tirana 1957, p. 40-41.

2) Ibidem, p. 43.

minism. But it was not difficult to understand that this fight was directed against revisionism in every country and in every party, that the theses of the report of Comrade Enver Hoxha were being counterposed to the revisionist theses of the 20th Congress.

Comrade Enver Hoxha's Report «On the International Situation and the Tasks of the Party», which was approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee, made still clearer the determined Marxist-Leninist stand of the PLA on the major problems of principle that had arisen in the international communist movement after the 20th Congress. It served as a powerful weapon in the hands of the communists in their struggle against modern revisionism.

The determination of the PLA not to adopt the course of the 20th Congress, but to preserve intact its own general revolutionary line, provoked uneasiness within the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This uneasiness was openly shown by the Soviet leadership in April 1957, at the time when the delegation of the PLA and of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Mehmet Shehu went to Moscow at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. During the discussions, when Comrade Enver Hoxha was expounding on the situation and the struggle of the PLA in the conditions of that time,

N. Khrushchev, dissatisfied by and very much nettled at the revolutionary stand of the PLA, cut him short saying: «You Albanians, it seems, want to turn us back to the road of Stalin!» He called the stand of the PLA towards the Yugoslav revisionists «a biased one» intending to «deepen the misunderstandings with them», and demanded that they «should not be harassed unjustly»! He did not hesitate to take a number of the enemies of the Party and of the Albanian people under his protection, demanding their rehabilitation. Angered by the rigid stand maintained by Comrade Enver Hoxha and the other members of the delegation in defense of the Marxist-Leninist viewpoints and activity of the PLA, Khrushchev threatened them saying: «You Albanians are hot-tempered and sectarians»!! «It is impossible to come to terms with you. The discussion is closed!» This incident was the first clash between the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary line of the PLA and the revisionist course of the Khrushchev group.

Despite the threats, the Soviet leadership did not dare to end the talks. The Khrushchev group still cherished the hopes that the PLA would give up its «stubbornness» and would submit to its dictate. One of the means that Khrushchev was to use in an effort to attain his objective was the economic aid of the Soviet Union without which, Khrushchev thought, Albania could not make a single step forward! One such means was the writing off of the credits amounting to 422 million old roubles that

the Soviet Union had advanced to the People's Republic of Albania from the time of liberation up to 1955. The Soviet leadership, as it was later confirmed, did not «cancel» the debts from motives of genuine friendship and the principles of proletarian internationalism. Meanwhile the PLA, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania and the entire Albanian people considered this help not as a charity, but as a fraternal aid, as internationalist assistance from the Soviet people to the fraternal people of a socialist country.

Neither threats nor «gifts» could shake the determination of the Marxist-Leninist leadership of the PLA to defend its general revolutionary line to the very end.

«The defence of the purity of Marxism-Leninism, the fight against revisionism, the strengthening of vigilance», Comrade Enver Hoxha declared in Moscow, «are among the main duties of the Party of Labor of Albania. Our Party... will march with determination along its correct road to build socialism in Albania successfully»¹.

«... We shall not give up, even for a moment, the struggle against those who seek to revise the ideas of Marxism-

1) Enver Hoxha. Speech delivered at the Albanian-Soviet Friendship Rally in Moscow. «Zëri i Popullit», April 17, 1957.

Leninism, be they Yugoslavs, Albanians or anyone else»¹.

he reiterated on his return to Tirana.

The revolutionary internationalist stand of the PLA was expressed also in the meeting of the communist and workers' parties held in Moscow in November 1957.

At this meeting, the Khrushchev group tried to have the revisionist course of the 20th Congress of the CPSU adopted as the general line of the international communist movement. These attempts were supported by a number of well-known revisionist elements from the delegations participating at this meeting.

Sharp struggle ensued over problems of principle about the transition from capitalism to socialism, about war and peace. The revisionists tried to present the Marxist-Leninist teachings about imperialist wars, armed uprising and socialist revolution, the leading role of the party of the working class in the revolution and in socialist construction, the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc., as outdated. They did not hesitate even to blacken the October Socialist revolution and the Soviet order. In the drafting of the documents of the meeting they insisted on not describing U. S. imperialism as the principal enemy of peace and of the peoples, they did not want even to mention imperialism at all. They would

1) Enver Hoxha. Speech delivered at the Tirana meeting. «Zëri i Popullit», May 14, 1957.

not agree at all to have revisionism declared as the main danger in the international communist movement, although the events of the last two years had clearly proven this fact.

The delegation of the PLA headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha rendered a valuable contribution to the exposure of these anti-Marxist viewpoints. It united its efforts with those of the delegation of the Communist Party of China and of the other delegations that defended the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism at the meeting.

Faced with the iron logic of scientific arguments, the revisionists could not maintain their stand and were forced to retreat. The declaration elaborated in common and approved by the meeting summed up the experience of the international communist movement and the universal laws of socialist revolution and socialist construction and defined the common tasks of the communist and workers' parties, as well as the norms governing the relations among them. The declaration was based on the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism.

Revisionism, right opportunism, was defined by the meeting as the principal danger to the international communist movement. It also exposed its sources, namely, the existence of bourgeois influence, as the internal source, and capitulation to imperialist pressure, as the external source.

Alongside with the revolutionary content

of the declaration, the delegation of the PLA and the delegations of the other parties defending Marxism-Leninism consented to leave unchanged the incorrect formulation on the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as being allegedly a Congress which had opened a new stage in the international communist movement. In fact, this constituted a concession, justified by the necessity to defend the Soviet Union from the frenzied attacks unleashed against it by the enemies of communism and to preserve the unity of the movement.

Despite this, in general the 1957 Moscow Declaration opposed the revisionist course of the 20th Congress. The approval of this declaration was a victory for the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist forces. It constituted a common fighting program for the communist and workers' parties in their struggle against imperialism and revisionism.

The PLA fully approved the activity of its delegation at the Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties, regarding this activity as an internationalist contribution. It identified itself with the revolutionary theses of the declaration and placed them at the basis of its struggle in defense of the purity of Marxism-Leninism.

3. THE STRUGLE OF THE PARTY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIALIST RELATIONS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND FOR THE FULFILMENT OF THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN

While placing the political and ideological struggle to the fore, the Party did not neglect the economic and social tasks set down by the 3rd Congress. On the contrary, it considered the fulfilment of these tasks, first and foremost, as a major political problem.

The Work for the Mass Collectivization of Agriculture The main attention of the PLA was directed to the collectivization of agriculture on a

mass scale. In this field work went on in two directions; in setting up new agricultural co-operatives, as the more important direction, and in persuading the individual peasants who had not yet joined to become members of the older co-operatives. Collectivization had encompassed mainly the low lands and the hilly areas. The Party organizations supported the initiative of the peasants to set up new co-operatives by all means available and did not wait for the overwhelming majority in each village to make up their minds. Cooperatives could be set up even with a minority of the peasant households.

The Central Committee of the Party specially charged all its members and many principal cadres of the Party and State to assist

the peasants and communists of the countryside in the task. The State agricultural enterprises, in the first place, as well as working people of industrial and construction enterprises, cultural institutions and party organizations of the towns were activated for the socialist transformation of agriculture.

Parallel with the expansion of collectivization, the Party conducted extensive work for the economic and organizational strengthening of new and old cooperatives. Of particular importance in this direction was the adoption of the new Statute of the agricultural cooperatives at their 3rd Congress held in September 1956. In the new Statute the fundamental rules of internal life, the right and obligations of the members and the economic activity of the cooperatives, were further improved. The limits of the personal plot of each member family of the cooperative were modified and fixed on a more equitable basis. The State assisted with mechanized implements, with cadres, agrarian credits, etc.

At the same time, the Party fought with determination against shortcomings and weaknesses observed in the work of collectivization. It combated the erroneous tendency of a number of peasants and a few communists of the countryside to agree to the setting up of cooperatives in the expectation that the State would supply them with bread and would meet all their other needs. The tendency to keep personal plots larger than provided for by the Sta-

tute was also attacked. Manifestations of misuse of administrative power in setting up cooperatives and of violating the free will of the peasants were also condemned.

The Party was mobilized, in particular, to suppress any attempt of the class enemy to impede collectivization. The kulaks, incited by the diversionists sent by the imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists, attempted to commit acts of sabotage and to cause all kinds of disorders. The class enemies came out with such slogans as: «don't hurry to set up co-operatives the time limit is 1960», «you will starve to death in the co-operatives», «collectivization is a trick to take the land from the peasants» etc. Secretly, they tried to persuade the peasants not to enter the cooperatives. When a cooperative was set up, they incited its members not to abide by the Statute, they fomented discontent and tried to provoke dissention among them. They tried to sabotage the fulfilment of the obligations to the State and to hinder the use of mechanised implements.

As a result of the work of the Party and of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses of the peasants, the attempts of the kulaks and of other enemies remained sporadic and were defeated. They were completely isolated and exposed. Collectivization went ahead in the way and at the pace determined by the Party. The battle for collectivization, especially the struggle against the class enemies, tempered still further the political consciousness of the pea-

santry and bound it still tighter to the Party. The movement for the collectivization of agriculture became a great patriotic cause.

From the very beginning of the mass collectivization of agriculture, the Party noticed a harmful manifestation in connection with livestock farming. On one hand, a considerable number of peasants, prompted by their personal interests, hesitated to sell their surplus productive livestock to the cooperatives. Often they would slaughter or sell their livestock before joining. Thus, the majority of the new cooperatives owned very limited collective herds. On the other hand, the Party committees failed to show the same interest in the collectivization of livestock as they did in that of the land. As a consequence, when the area of the cultivated land collectivized was over 30 per cent, the number of cows was only 6 per cent, and that of sheep and goats 10 per cent.

Such a state of affairs in livestock farming damaged the people's economy and the cause of the socialist organization of agriculture. To put an end to this situation, special measures were taken to speed up the collectivization of livestock parallel with that of the land and to develop and improve animal husbandry, especially of sheep and cattle.

At the same time, the Party drew other lessons, too, from the experience of the first year of extensive collectivization of agriculture. It combated manifestations of selfsatisfaction that cropped up among quite a number of commu-

nists and instructed that one should not become intoxicated with success. Measures were taken to better publicize and generalize the experience of collectivization. In particular, improvements were made in the help extended by the State to the cooperatives through the Machine and Tractor Stations, the State Agricultural Enterprises, agrarian credits, the supply of selected seeds and pedigree stock. The planting of fruit and olive trees and vineyards to strengthen the cooperative economies made big strides in the year 1957.

While examining the problem of a more rapid improvement and increase of the cadres for the entire people's economy, the Central Committee gave particular consideration to the training of cadres for socialist agriculture. Other communists and agricultural specialists who worked in State administration organs and the Party apparatus were sent to the countryside to work in the cooperatives.

1957 marked a radical turn in the collectivization of agriculture. The area collectivised reached 58 per cent of the total area of the Republic. Whole villages had been turned into cooperatives. In some districts, collectivization included 90 per cent of the land of the peasant households. In the Vlora, Bilisht, Kolonja, Cërrik, Saranda and some other districts cooperatives were set up in all the villages.

The socialist sector became the dominant sector in agriculture. In 1957 it produced nearly half the total of food grain, 3/4th of the cotton,

and 90 per cent of the sugar beet. The economic, social and cultural situation in the countryside marked further improvement. These successes constituted a firm guarantee to push on with collectivization to its final victory.

The Mobilization of the Masses for the Exploitation of the Internal Reserves 1957 marked a great advance not only in collectivization, but in the entire people's economy. In comparison

with 1956, total industrial production increased 26 per cent. The plan was overfulfilled on a big scale in all the main branches of industry. Agricultural production rose 15 per cent.

On the basis of these successes, beginning from October 1957, the rationing system was abolished entirely and the prices of goods were lowered. This was a great political and economic victory. The complete abolition of the rationing system and the transition to free trade, without limitations, at uniform State-fixed prices, became an important factor for a more equitable distribution of the social product on the basis of the socialist principle according to the amount and quality of the work done. The living conditions of the working masses were improved. The national income rose 14 per cent. The turnover of goods per head of population increased 19 per cent above that of 1956. Education and health services were further extended. The State University of Tirana, the largest edu-

cational and scientific center of the country, was set up.

The turn taken in 1957 in the development of people's economy had its origin in the revolutionary impetus that had gripped the working masses, in the better organization of work by the economic enterprises, by the cooperatives and the State organs, in the more efficient management of the economy by the Party.

Analyzing the fulfilment of the plan of the first two years of the second five-year period, the Party came to the conclusion that within the country there were powerful unexploited reserves that should be discovered and placed at the service of the speedy development of the economy and culture. This problem was laid before the broad working masses for discussion. At the same time, the State planning organs were ordered to re-examine the indices of the five-year plan with a view to raising them. The discussion of the matter by the people brought to light such inner reserves as to surpass the expectations of the State Planning Commission.

Relying mainly on the proposals of the working people, the 1958 February Plenum of the Central Committee took the decision to raise all the indices of the 2nd five-year plan. Thus, the total volume of industrial and agricultural production set by the 3rd Congress was increased about 17 per cent. Considerable increases were made especially in investments and capital construction. The index for the

improvement of the well-being and the rise of the cultural level of the people was also raised. The additions made to the 2nd five-year plan were based mainly on internal accumulation and reserves.

In order to carry on to the end the turn initiated, the Party mobilized its forces and the inexhaustible resources of the working people of town and country. The guiding, organizing, and explanatory work of the basic organizations and committees of the Party was improved appreciably. Their composition was strengthened by recruiting new members from among the workers and cooperative farmers, from among the working women, tested during the high tide of the work for the socialist construction and in the struggle against the class enemies.

The trade unions increased their efforts to educate the working people in the communist spirit and to apply the slogan: «Let us turn our attention to production». They intensified the production propaganda and improved their work for drawing workers into the management and administration of the economy.

The meetings of the workers about production were enlivened. New forms of emulation came into being and spread, and the creative initiative of the working people became bolder. The movement to prolong the life span of machinery, to economize and to fully exploit the productive capacities, spread far and wide. Many distinguished workers, disregarding their personal material interest, left their advanced

brigades and went over to other brigades to lift them out of their backwardness. The one-plus-two movement (every qualified worker undertaking to train two others) came into being.

The movement for every cooperative member to put in 300 calendar days of work spread all over the countryside. The workers in the mechanization of agriculture embraced the advanced initiative to extend the life span of the tractors and to save fuel.

The revolutionary mobilization of the working masses gave a further impetus to the economic development of our country. The over-fulfilment of the increased plan of industrial production for the year 1958 proved the correctness of the directives of the Party for the discovery and exploitation of internal reserves.

Collectivization of Agriculture Generally Completed

The collectivization of agriculture went on rapidly. By the end of 1959 the collectivized land area reached 83 per cent, whereas the entire socialist sector of agriculture included more than 86 per cent of the country's land under cultivation. Thus, on the whole, the collectivization of agriculture had been completed. Only some of the households in very mountainous areas had not yet joined cooperatives. Thus, the directive of the 3rd Party Congress was carried out a year ahead of schedule.

The completion of the collectivization of

agriculture constituted one of the most important historic victories of the socialist revolution on the economic and social front. It led to the establishment of new socialist relations in production in the countryside. The collectivization of agriculture was the second revolution, the most radical revolutionary turn in the economic and social relations in the countryside. It opened the road for a speedy development of the forces of production and for radical changes in the social and cultural life of the village.

The completion of the collectivization of agriculture proved how correct and timely was the directive that the Party had issued at its 3rd Congress for the acceleration of the rate of the socialist reorganization in the countryside.

In the collectivization of agriculture the PLA always kept in mind the conditions of the political and economic development of the country. The forms, methods and rates of the cooperation of agriculture were applied in conformity with these conditions.

The collectivization began and was carried out under the conditions of the existence of small private ownership of the land by the peasantry. It was done at a time when the new socialist industry was not as yet in a position to equip agriculture with modern means of agricultural production. The PLA was convinced that collectivization should not be delayed artificially by waiting until the industrialization was completed, just as it should not be hastened

artificially before the essential political, economic and social conditions had been created. Therefore, it was begun and carried through without waiting for the industrialization of the country to be completed.

In spite of that, from the very beginning of collectivization collective farms relied on the use of mechanized implements concentrated in the hands of the State at the Machine and Tractor Stations. Farm machinery for large scale collective production in the countryside was brought from the socialist countries through commercial exchanges and credits.

The collectivization of agriculture began and was accomplished on the basis of the agricultural cooperative of the *artel* type. Under this form of cooperation, the land, the means of production and labor were all socialized. The incomes were divided according to the work done by each member of the collective economy.

During the process of collectivization attempts were made to use such initial forms of cooperation in production as collective farms, in which, only labor was socialized. But these forms of attracting the peasants into the cooperative movement, which were to serve as intermediate links for the transition into agricultural cooperatives, were shortlived and did not spread widely in the countryside. The peasants passed over directly and immediately to the collective farms, without using other intermediary forms.

The Albanian countryside inherited no traditions of the cooperative movement from the past. Thus, the peasantry accepted that form of cooperation in production which was presented by the Party as the most suitable. The Albanian peasantry had great faith in the Party. It had been liberated from the yoke of the foreigners and the landowners and had become master of the land only under the leadership of the Party. From their own experience the peasants were convinced that the Party had always shown them the right road and that it had firmly defended their interests. That is why they accepted the collective farms of the *artel* type.

After the agrarian reform in the Albanian countryside there was no great economic differentiation between the peasants regarding the amount of land and other agricultural stocks. Therefore, when they united together in cooperatives, among the members there were no big contradictions of economic interests to make it essential to resort to intermediary forms of cooperation.

The mass collectivization of agriculture did not change the policy of the Party towards the kulaks. During this stage, too, the struggle against the kulaks went on according to the previous policy of economic restriction, political isolation and elimination of them as a class. On the whole, kulaks disappeared as a class, without it being necessary to apply mass confiscation of their property. Force and violence

against the kulaks were used only when they did not submit to the laws and ordinances of the People's State Power or committed political crimes against it.

In 1960 there were still about 1,500 kulak households, or less than one per cent of the overall number of peasant households. They had by now lost their former economic basis. Each of them owned about 3 hectares of land, 1 head of cattle and 10 sheep. The previous policy was continued against the remaining kulaks. In virtue of this policy the number of kulaks continued to diminish and their economy to weaken. Hand in hand with the policy of restriction, the Party attached importance to their re-education, especially of the sons and daughters of kulak families, without relaxing its vigilance and without hesitating to hit hard when necessary.

The completion of the collectivization of agriculture and the strengthening of socialist trade made possible a very large scale reduction of the capitalist elements in the towns. The small private merchants were organized in commercial collectives whose activity was placed under State control. The greater part of the few handicraftsmen who, hitherto, had remained private, joined the handicraft cooperatives.

At the beginning of the collectivization process separate cooperatives were formed for each village, big or small. The establishment of cooperatives, on the basis of each village was

a necessary stage at the time when they had just been set up, when their means were limited and the cadres still lacked experience in managing the collective economy.

When the collectivization of agriculture was reaching completion, the small cooperatives slowly became less and less capable of responding to the need for their economic and organizational strengthening and for a rapid development of the forces of production in the countryside. Under these circumstances, it became imperative to enlarge and strengthen the cooperatives, this being felt and demanded by the cooperative peasants themselves. Therefore, the Party laid down the task of building enlarged cooperatives by uniting small ones. But it emphasized that this unification should be cautiously carried out on the basis of the free will and full conviction of the cooperative members. This was a long term task; therefore it could not to be done urgently as a campaign.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1959, carried away by the enthusiasm of the peasantry, in some districts the unification of the cooperatives was declared the main problem of the day, the achievement of which was envisaged within a year or two. As a result, the Party's instructions were distorted. United cooperatives were being set up without a profound study of the problem and without working out the organizational forms and rules of their activity. The unification of cooperatives was being extended not only to the lowland areas but also

to the mountain regions. Some enlarged cooperatives included 10-15 villages with up to 4000 hectares of land. Some cadres thought that in this way the problem of the economic and organizational strengthening of the cooperatives would be quickly solved.

The Central Committee discovered these shortcomings and took measures to correct them in time. It emphasized the damage that could be inflicted on the cause of collectivization through the premature and hasty unification of the cooperatives. In connection with this, it instructed that the conditions of the cooperatives should be studied minutely and that the future of their unification should be determined in conformity with this.

After that, unification was conducted more prudently, it was better studied and applied only in the lowlands. In the beginning enlarged cooperatives were set up by uniting not more than 2 or 3 villages. At the same time, the State extended its economic aid to them in the form of farm machinery, agrarian credits and specialists. To strengthen the management of the united co-operatives the Party sent to the countryside many city cadres who were elected as chairmen of these co-operatives.

The unification of small cooperatives into bigger ones created new possibilities for their economic and organizational consolidation. In the enlarged cooperatives, land and mechanized implements were put to better use and the

work of the cooperative members became more fruitful. In them the various branches of agriculture were better coordinated, investments were put to a more advantageous use and the administrative expenses were kept down. The enlargement of the cooperatives offered possibilities for a better use of the advantages created by the new socialist order in agriculture.

The collectivization of agriculture created a new economic and social basis for the formation in the peasantry of the socialist world outlook. Nevertheless, this formation could not be effected by itself and at one stroke without the educational work of the Party and without other economic and organizational measures. For centuries the peasants had been accustomed to live and work on individual economies, therefore the sentiments and aspirations of private property were deeply implanted in them. This was reflected in the deficiencies and shortcomings that become apparent in the sphere of organization and in the attitude towards work and collective property.

In these circumstances, the Party strengthened its educational work with the cooperative members to have them concentrate all their efforts on the development of the collective economy, step up their participation in production and strengthen discipline at work. Besides this, special measures were taken for the organization and rewarding of labour and for the application of the Statute.

The method of management in the cooperatives began to improve. Cooperative members showed greater concern about the collective economy. They increased their efforts to open virgin lands. The economic relations between the State and the cooperative farms were strengthened still further.

The collectivization of agriculture brought in its wake changes in the material and cultural conditions of life in the countryside. In the years 1956-1960 the peasants built about 30,000 new houses. In 1959 there were more than 2,500 schools for general education, 1,300 houses and centers of culture in the countryside, employing hundreds of cadres and specialists of middle and higher training.

The 2nd Five-Year Plan Fulfilled Ahead of Schedule

Hand in hand with the work to complete the collectivization of agriculture, the Party

was fighting to ensure the fulfilment of the targets of the 2nd five-year plan in all the branches of people's economy.

Without losing sight of the fulfilment of the plan as regards quantity, it centered its attention especially on the quality of production. During the first years of socialist construction, the very low level of the forces of production, the numerous difficulties that the country was passing through, made it imperative that the main attention be directed towards the quantity of production. Now the time had come to

pay more attention to quality which was lagging behind. The Party viewed this problem not as an economic one only, but as a political and ideological problem also. The quality of production expresses the level of the economic and cultural advance of a country. Under the conditions of the socialist order, quality is an expression of the level of socialist consciousness at work and influences the raising of socialist patriotism, the strengthening of the people's belief in their own forces.

In December 1959, the Central Committee of the Party launched the slogan: «Let us turn our faces towards quality without turning our backs on quantity». At the same time, it directed that the working people should be paid not only or mainly on the basis of quantity, as before, but also on the basis of the quality of the product or service rendered. The insistent demand for the improvement of quality directly influenced the education of the working people in assuming a socialist stand towards work.

To put this directive into practice there was adopted a whole range of economic measures, aiming at perfecting the organization of labor and its rewards. The quotas of work and the classification of the workers were re-examined. In all the branches of the economy, the rates of pay were closely linked with quality. A more just connection was established between moral and material stimuli, proceeding from the principle of subjecting personal interests to the interests of society. Party organizations engaged

in extensive political activity with the working people to bring out the revolutionary importance of these measures, to explain the damage that was being done to the cause of socialism by the tendency observed in some quarters to run after money and the mistaken idea that «without money there is no emulation».

The measures to perfect the organization and the remuneration of labor were correctly grasped by the working people. They helped in raising socialist emulation to a new and higher level. The movement to set up companies and brigades of socialist labor came into being and spread throughout the country during 1960. Its motto was the slogan of the Party: «Work, learn and live in a socialist way». This movement became a major driving force to increase production, to improve quality, to advance technology and professional qualification and to strengthen the socialist consciousness of the working people. This helped to integrate work in production with learning and with the socialist way of life. The movement for invention and rationalization gained new strength, too.

The 2nd five-year plan was fulfilled and overfulfilled. Its tasks were overfulfilled to an appreciable degree, especially in industry, transport and in capital investment and construction. The overall volume of industrial production was achieved in four years and nine months, whereas the level of industrial production set for 1960 was reached in 1959. In 1960 the total volume of industrial production was

2.2 times as big as in 1955 and 25 times as big as in 1938. The highest rates of development were attained in the mining, electrical, machine-making and building materials industries. Parallel with these, the light and food processing branches of industry were also developed. As a consequence there was a pronounced improvement in the structure of the various branches of industry. In 1960 industry turned out about 40 per cent of the total volume of the national income of the country.

During the 2nd five-year plan 250 big economic and cultural projects were built. New oil fields and new iron-nickel, chromium, copper and coal mines were brought into production. The building of these projects brought about the birth of new towns.

In agriculture, the principal victory was the completion of collectivization. In 1960 the socialist sector in agriculture embraced 87 per cent of the land under cultivation. In spite of the adverse weather conditions, especially during the last two years of the five-year plan, agricultural production in 1960 was 25 per cent higher than in 1955. The area under cultivation increased 13 per cent. With the exception of wheat, yields increased in all the agricultural crops. Considerable increases were recorded in the production of tobacco, cotton and sugar-beet.

The increase of industrial and agricultural production, the increase of the productivity of labor and the lowering of the costs of produc-

tion, were the principal factors that defined an obvious increase in the well-being and the cultural level of the people. In comparison with 1955, the national income in 1960 rose 48 per cent, the real wages of the workers and employees — 29 per cent, whereas the real income of the peasantry rose 35 per cent. During the years of the 2nd five-year plan the prices of mass consumption goods were lowered 6 times, from which the people realized a gain of 7 billion and 200 million (old) leks. The volume of the circulation of goods was increased at a rate 2-3 times greater than the natural increase of the population.

Important progress was made in the development of education and culture as well as in the protection of the health of the people. In 1960, one out of every five persons of the population attended school. In comparison with 1955, the number of cadres with higher training was trebled. The average life expectancy of the population reached 62 years.

The successful fulfilment of the tasks of the 2nd five-year plan established new starting points for the further development of economy and culture on the road to the socialist construction of the country.

4. CRITICISM OF THE REVISIONIST VIEWPOINTS AND THE SPLITTING ACTIVITY OF THE SOVIET LEADERS

The meeting of the communist and workers' parties of November 1957 restrained revisionism for a time, but did not stop its extension and deeper penetration in the international communist movement.

International Revisionism Spreads further — The Yugoslav revisionists openly characterized the declaration of the meeting «as a negation of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union», «a step backwards» and «a return to Stalinism». They unleashed a fierce campaign against its revolutionary content and quickly counterposed to it their 1958 anti-Marxist «program» which was presented as an «international manifesto».

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership headed by Khrushchev disregarded the revolutionary conclusions of the joint declaration and continued to propagate and apply the revisionist conclusions of the 20th Congress. It missed no opportunity to draw ever nearer to and establish closer collaboration with the U.S. imperialists. Khrushchev described the president and the top officials of the USA as «reasonable men», who «sincerely wanted peace and collaboration with the Soviet Union». He proclaimed world

wide that under present conditions any kind of war was unjust and inhuman. He demanded that the UNO put into effect «general and complete disarmament» of every country and of all peoples, excepting only the police which were «to preserve order»(!) and the «international armed forces» that would be created by UNO, no doubt, in order to suppress the people's wars and uprisings. He began to spread the false idea that as early as 1960 there would be «a new world without weapons, without armies, without wars!»

But Khrushchev's policy had a demagogical, eclectic and contradictory character, — a feature of every kind of revisionism. On one hand, he praised the USA and demanded close collaboration with it, on the other, he attacked it as an aggressor and world gendarme. At one time he would call the U. S. president «a friend», «a great man», «reasonable» and «peaceloving», at another time «a hangman» and «a man who could not even run kindergarten». On one occasion he would praise Tito and the Yugoslav experience to the skies, on another he would call Yugoslav revisionism «the Trojan horse» and Tito a person «who is out of step with the rest of the platoon». Likewise, he felt obliged to half-hartedly condemn the anti-Marxist program of the Yugoslav League of Communists (YLC). In this way the Khrushchev group went down the road to revisionism, trying to confuse the minds of the people, jumping from opportunism to adventurism and vice-versa, while preparing the final stab in the back for the so-

cialist camp and the international communist movement.

The process of extension and deepening of revisionism was proceeding uninterrupted also among other communist and workers' parties in a number of socialist and capitalist countries.

The line and activity of the revisionists, especially of the Soviet leadership, had increased the ideological confusion in the international communist movement.

This situation was exploited in every conceivable way by the U. S. imperialists, who regarded the spread of revisionism as very favourable for imperialism and reaction. They intensified their aggressive activity in Asia, Africa and Latin America; turned West Germany into a dangerous hotbed of war; extended their military bases and increased their thermonuclear military potential. At the same time, they applied the tactics of breaking up the world socialist system by means of peaceful counter-revolution, encouraging every action and point of view of the revisionists for the liberalization of the political power and for the spread of bourgeois ideology in the socialist countries.

**Uncompromising Fight
to Expose and Destroy
Modern Revisionism**

The Party of Labor of Albania followed with concern the spread of revisionism and the great danger that it presented for the socialist camp and the international communist

movement. It considered the fight against revisionism as one of its most important duties.

The public announcement of the program of the YLC offered a suitable opportunity for dealing hard blows at international revisionism in the sphere of its activity and anti-Marxist ideology. While exposing the Yugoslav program as an accumulation of the rotten theories of Proudhon, Bernstein, Kautsky, Trozky, Bukharin etc. dressed up in a new cloak our Party advanced the slogan:

«Uncompromising struggle for the exposure and the theoretical and political destruction of modern revisionism».¹

Speaking indirectly about the opportunist stand maintained by Khrushchev and other revisionists in various communist and workers' parties, the PLA pointed out:

«Only he who deliberately shuts his eyes cannot see the role that is being played by the Yugoslav revisionists in the service of the imperialists».²

1) See the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PLA, June 20, 1958. Central Archives of the Party and «Zëri i Popullit» June 22, 1958.

2) «Modern Revisionism Must be Fought Against Mercilessly Until it is Completely Destroyed Theoretically and Politically». «Zëri i Popullit», 22nd of June, 1958.

It arranged the publication of a series of articles severely criticizing the revisionist viewpoints, bringing to light the distortions they had made in the fundamental teachings of Marxism-Leninism and defending the party of the working class and its leading role, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the revolutionary road for the transition to socialism.

While striking blows at international revisionism in the ideological and political sphere, the leadership of the PLA carefully watched the attitude and activity of N. Khrushchev and his group. It saw that they were moving further and further away from the Marxist-Leninist principles and daily coming closer and closer to the U. S. imperialists and Titoite revisionists. The process of recognising revisionism was being deepened continuously. The leadership of the PLA began to have ever more doubts and reservations about the Communist Party of the Soviet Union headed by Khrushchev. This helped a great deal in preventing the Party falling into any of the traps laid by Khrushchev to break it and drag it on to the revisionist road. The Soviet leadership nurtured vain hopes that things would change after the signing of an agreement to advance new credits to the People's Republic of Albania for the 3rd five-year plan, and especially so after the visit of Khrushchev to Albania in May 1959.

Contrary to the insistent demands of the Soviet leadership to follow its revisionist course,

the PLA firmly pursued its own Marxist-Leninist line and intensified its struggle against Yugoslav revisionism and modern revisionism in general.

At the same time, the Central Committee of the PLA protested to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over certain anti-Albanian acts of Khrushchev. One such protest was in connection with the talks held between the Soviet Prime Minister and the reactionary Greek politician Venizelos. Khrushchev had alleged that during his visit to Albania he had seen Greeks in Korça, and he had not disparaged the chauvinist demand for the «autonomy of Northern Epirus». Another protest was made when the Soviet Ambassador to Belgrade accepted the slanders and abuses of the People's Republic of Albania unleashed at a meeting by the Yugoslav revisionist leader Rankovich.

All these things showed the ever increasing opposition of the PLA to the anti-Marxist stand of the Khrushchev group.

In spite of all this, up to the first half of 1960, the ideological differences between the PLA and the Soviet leadership were not made public nor were they extended to the State relations between the two countries.

At the same time, the PLA maintained continuous vigilance to detect the plans and the hostile activity of the U.S. imperialists and those of the Titoite clique against the People's Republic of Albania. In the summer of 1960 a

clandestine anti-State organization, made up of old agents of foreign intelligence services who had managed to worm their way into the organs of the Party and State administration and the Army, was discovered and wiped out. This smashed the plot to organize a counter-revolutionary uprising coordinated with armed intervention by the U.S. 6th fleet, the Greek monarcho-fascists and the Yugoslav revisionists. At the same time, the plan of the Soviet revisionist leadership, who knew about this plot, supported it, and intended to exploit it for their own purposes, was also foiled.

The PLA's Principled Marxist-Leninist Stand at the Bucharest Meeting

The Khrushchev revisionist group attempted a decisive blow against the international communist movement with a sudden stab in the back at the meeting, held in Bucharest in June 1960, of the delegations of the communist and worker's parties that had attended the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party.

According to a previous agreement, this should have been only to discuss and decide jointly on the date and the place of a meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the world.

The delegation of the PLA, headed by Comrade Hysni Kapo, found itself unexpectedly faced with an international gathering organized by Khrushchev which had an entirely diffe-

rent character. A meeting of this nature was unexpected also for the delegation of the Communist Party of China and for the majority of the representatives of the other parties that participated in it. But still more surprising and extraordinarily disquieting was the distribution by the Soviet delegation, a few hours prior to the meeting, of a document containing slanderous attacks and accusations against the Communist Party of China. Khrushchev did his utmost to have the meeting discuss those calumnies, to have the Communist Party of China condemned and expelled from the international communist movement.

The atmosphere in the meeting was very tense. The representatives of the various parties were at a loss what to say and what stand to take. The delegation of the Chinese Communist Party rejected the slanderous accusations. The Central Committee of the PLA, having been informed immediately by its delegation, considered that the situation was very disquieting and came to the correct conclusion that the socialist camp and the internationalist movement were faced with a major conspiracy hatched by Khrushchev. Acceptance of the slanderous accusations of the Soviet leadership against the Communist Party of China would have brought catastrophic consequences. In line with the instructions of the Central Committee of our Party, Comrade Hysni Kapo took a clear-cut stand against discussing at the meeting the question of the so-called «errors» of the Chinese Commu-

nist Party and against its condemnation. He described the Bucharest meeting as insufficiently prepared and contrary to the rules of procedure of the communist and workers' parties. The delegation of the PLA pointed out that the differences between the Communist Party of Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China could not be judged properly upon the material presented by only one of the parties concerned. In order to form a judgement on them it was essential to hear what the Chinese comrades had to say. These differences should have been discussed first between the two parties. If they remained unresolved, they could be taken up at a meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries. Later the decisions of this meeting should be discussed at an international conference with the participation of all the Marxist-Leninist parties of the world which would be summoned according to the rules of procedure.

This principled stand of the delegation of the PLA was supported by a number of delegations. Meanwhile, Khrushchev called this stand an act of «rebellion» by the PLA, which he attacked sharply. Despite its persistent efforts at the Bucharest Meeting the Soviet leadership did not succeed in expelling the Communist Party of China from the international communist movement. It was decided there to summon a meeting of all the communist and workers' parties in November 1960. A special commission was charged with making prepara-

tions for it. This commission was composed of representatives from 26 parties, the Party of Labor of Albania included.

The international plot organized by the Khrushchev revisionist group failed. In Bucharest it suffered its first defeat. This was a defeat for the modern revisionism as a whole, which, from that time, began to decline.

It was now quite clear that the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union headed by Khrushchev was a clique of traitors and constituted a grave danger to Marxism-Leninism and socialism.

The Central Committee of the PLA evaluated the stand of its delegation in Bucharest as a principled Marxist-Leninist stand. It informed the entire Party of the proceedings at the Bucharest meeting and of the plot engineered by N. Khrushchev. The basic organizations of the Party unanimously supported the stand taken by the delegation of the PLA at that meeting.

The Firm Stand of the PLA towards the Attacks of the Soviet Leadership

Immediately after the Bucharest meeting, a fierce attack was launched against the PLA to force it to

its knees and compell it to support the revisionist line and splitting activities of the Soviet leadership.

The blows were struck in many directions. The Central Committee of the PLA was made their prime target. The Soviet leadership tried

to split it, to subjugate it and at all costs to have it denounce its own stand at Bucharest, and take measures against the «instigators». The Soviet leadership needed such a denunciation not only for the purpose of overturning the situation in Albania but also with the aim of attaining at the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties what it had failed to attain in Bucharest.

To this end the Khrushchev group used Liri Belishova, Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PLA who was obsessed with morbid petty bourgeois ambition and with pronounced sentiments of careerism. Worked upon in Moscow and incited by the same group, she placed herself in opposition to the line of the Party, becoming the peddler of the anti-Marxist line of the Soviet leadership. But her efforts encountered the steel-like unity of the Central Committee, its determination not to make any concession regarding the principled and the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist course of the Party. Thus, the attempt of the Khrushchev group to change or shake the positions of the Central Committee were defeated.

Taking advantage of the unbounded love of the Albanian communists for the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership tried to arouse confusion and have them rise against the Marxist-Leninist leadership of their own Party. It employed the personnel of its Embassy in Tirana, who enjoyed great freedom of action in Albania, in order to make contacts with officers and generals, cadres of the Party

and State organs and officials of the economy and culture. Khrushchev's agents expressed their «anxiety» about the «deviation from the Marxist-Leninist line» and «the betrayal» of the «Albanian-Soviet friendship» by the leadership of the PLA. Later, they would ask such provocative questions as: «Are you going to stand by the Soviet Union or will you go against it, as your leadership is doing?» The Khrushchev group pinned their hopes, especially, on the cadres who had pursued their studies in Soviet schools. But all their hopes were frustrated. The Albanian communists, their revolutionary senses tempered by the Party, knew very well how to differentiate between the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the anti-Marxist, anti-Albanian activity of the Soviet leadership, on the other. The Khrushchevite revisionists did not find nor did they manage to open a single breach in the ranks of the Party. It was precisely against this steel-like unity around the Central Committee that their plans were shattered.

Koço Tashko, the President of the Auditing Commission of the PLA, who had shown pronounced vacillations and had often been criticized for deviations and opportunism, followed Liri Belishova in yielding to Soviet pressure. Both of them were expelled from the Party as enemies.

The Soviet leadership extended its attacks to the economic and cultural spheres, too. Re-

gardless of the agreements concluded between the Governments of the People's Republic of Albania and of the USSR it delayed and, in some cases, entirely stopped the shipment of goods and industrial equipment to Albania. It rejected the request for a quantity of grain to ensure the people's daily bread of which there was a shortage caused by the extraordinary drought of 1960. The Khrushchev group exploited this occasion as a means of pressure to compel the PLA to submit, thinking that hunger would force the Albanian people to rise against their Party. Khrushchev threatened the Party and the Government of the People's Republic of Albania that he would stop sending any kind of armaments and military equipment to the People's Army of Albania, because, he declared, «You are only in the Warsaw Pact in meantime.»

In August 1960, the Soviet leadership sent a letter to the Central Committee of the PLA in which it demanded that the «Party of Labor of Albania and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should go to the forthcoming meeting in November with complete identity of views»! In other words, the PLA should give up the principled stand it upheld in Bucharest as well as its Marxist-Leninist line. Otherwise, the Khrushchev group threatened, «the spark of misunderstanding» kindled in Bucharest «will flare up»!!

Under no circumstances could the PLA accept such an «identity» which would have been nothing else but a criminal collaboration against the Communist Party of China and, consequently

against the socialist camp and the international communist movement. Therefore, it rejected the dastardly request of the Soviet leadership.

Meanwhile, the delegation of the PLA in the commission of the 26 parties that was to draft and formulate the declaration of the general meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the world was fighting with determination against the attempts of the revisionists to draw up an anti-Marxist document.

The PLA's Criticism of the Khrushchevite Revisionists at the Second Moscow Meeting The delegation of the PLA at the November 1960 Moscow Meeting of the 81 communist and workers' parties was headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha.

At this meeting, the delegation firmly carried out the instruction of the Central Committee to defend the Marxist-Leninist line. It scornfully rejected the deals proffered by Khrushchev and his collaborators to break the resistance of the PLA by promising greater economic aid and by the admission that «a mistake may have been committed by the Soviet functionaries.»

The PLA did not yield even in the face of the new threats of Khrushchev who declared that «from now on the relations between Albania and the Soviet Union would be built on a new basis»!

In his speech delivered at the Moscow meeting, Comrade Enver Hoxha put forward the principled view of the PLA on the main pro-

blems over which the differences had arisen. He dwelt especially on the problems of war and peace, of peaceful coexistence, of the roads of transition to socialism, on the question of Stalin, the question of Yugoslav revisionism and the danger of modern revisionism for the international communist movement, on the relations between the communist and workers' parties.

Directly criticizing the Soviet leadership headed by Khrushchev as well as the other revisionists who were spreading false ideas about a change in the nature of imperialism as a result of the new ratio of forces in the world in favor of socialism and of the alleged possibility of coming to terms and collaborating with U.S. imperialism for the creation of «a world without weapons, without armies and without wars», Comrade Enver Hoxha declared:

«The Party of Labor of Albania is of the opinion that imperialism, first of all U.S. imperialism, has changed neither its skin, nor its nature. It is aggressive, it will be aggressive, while even a single tooth remains in its mouth... It may plunge the world into a war. Therefore we... continue to insist that it should be made clear to the peoples that there can be no absolute guarantee that there will be no world war until after socialism has triumphed throughout

the entire world or in the greatest number of the countries of the world»¹.

«Whoever does not see this is blind, whoever sees it but covers it up, is a traitor in the service of imperialism»².

Considering the preservation and the consolidation of peace as a very important task, the delegation of the PLA expressed the conviction that this duty could not be fulfilled through useless talk with the heads of imperialism, cajoling and making concessions to the U.S. imperialists and capitulating to their pressure. It would be fulfilled only through determined political and ideological struggle to foil the aggressive imperialist plans, continuously increasing the vigilance and the revolutionary impetus of the masses and mercilessly condemning every opportunist stand, every point of view and action which aimed at lulling the peoples to sleep, every tendency towards moral disintegration and soft living. In order to make it impossible for the imperialists to launch a new world war, it was necessary to face them with all the economic, military, moral and political power of the socialist camp, the strength of the international working class, the national-liberation move-

1) Enver Hoxha. Speech at the Moscow Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties, November 1960, CPA.

2) Enver Hoxha — Ibid.

ments and all the freedom-loving countries and peoples of the world.

At a time when it was imperative for the military power and preparedness of the socialist camp to be at its highest level, the PLA deemed it entirely out of place and condemned the insistence of the Khrushchev group on keeping the secret of the atomic bomb from the socialist countries and its unwillingness to equip the armies of these countries with nuclear weapons.

«Why shouldn't China have the atomic bomb?» asked Comrade Enver Hoxha, «We are of the opinion that she should have it... We have the atomic bomb to defend ourselves. It is fear that guards the vineyards, goes a saying of our people. The imperialists should be afraid of us and terribly afraid at that»¹.

Further on he criticised the revisionists for their opportunist interpretation and application of the question of peaceful coexistence between States of different social systems. He described as anti-Marxist the stand of the Soviet leadership which presented peaceful coexistence as a general line of the Soviet Union and all the socialist countries. Comrade Enver Hoxha expressed the view of the PLA that the policy of peace-

1) Enver Hoxha. Speech at the Moscow Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties, November 1960. Central Archives of the Party.

ful coexistence between States of different systems constitutes only one of the aspects of the foreign policy of the socialist countries. The two other and more important aspects of this policy are: fraternal collaboration and mutual aid among socialist countries and unreserved support and aid to the revolutionary liberation struggle of the working masses of the oppressed peoples, against imperialism and reaction.

By following a policy of coexistence on any terms, of conciliation and collaboration with imperialism, the Khrushchev group had in fact rejected the class struggle. In practice, the revisionists extended coexistence between States with different social systems to the relations between exploiting and exploited classes within the capitalist countries and to those between the dependent and colonial countries and the imperialist powers.

«Peaceful coexistence between two opposing systems,» Comrade Enver Hoxha pointed out, «does not mean, as the modern revisionists claim, giving up the class struggle. On the contrary, the class struggle should continue; the political and ideological struggle against imperialism, against bourgeois and revisionist ideology should be further intensified. While constantly fighting to establish Leninist peaceful coexistence, making no concessions of principle to imperialism, the class struggle in the ca-

pitalist countries, as well as the national-liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries should be developed further».¹

The delegation of the Party of Labor of Albania was of the opinion that the communist and workers' parties of the capitalist countries should have as their main task to arouse the masses against imperialism and all its lackeys within their countries in order to make life impossible for them, to disrupt their economic and military bases, to undermine their rule, to destroy their State power of political oppression and to establish a new people's State power. This State power should be strengthened and developed as a dictatorship of the proletariat. Only thus can the transition to socialism be ensured.

The problem as to what road should be followed in order to establish the people's power and to pass over to socialism was clear to the Marxist-Leninists, while Khrushchev, as Comrade Enver Hoxha brought to light, distorted and confused this issue in the direction that pleased the opportunists.

«So far, no people, no proletariat, no party has seized power without bloodshed and without violence...»

1) Enver Hoxha. Speech delivered at the Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, November 1960. C&P.

Our Party thinks that on this problem we should be prepared to follow both roads, especially, that of seizing power by violence, because if we are well prepared from this point of view, the first possibility (the peaceful road — Edit.) has a better chance of success»¹.

In connection with the question of Stalin, Comrade Enver Hoxha criticized the Khrushchev group for not presenting this question correctly, in an objective and Marxist-Leninist manner, at the 20th Congress, for unjustly condemning Stalin and his work. This question concerned the entire international communist movement and not only the Soviet Union. Therefore, the condemnation of Stalin at the 20th Congress, without prior consultation with the other fraternal parties, was an arbitrary decision and grave blunder.

«The Party of Labor of Albania... was not and will never be convinced on the issue of the condemnation of Comrade Stalin in the manner and form in which it was done.

The Party of Labor of Albania is of the opinion that it is neither correct, normal, nor Marxist to wipe out the name and the great work of Stalin for the

1) Enver Hoxha. Speech delivered at the Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, November 1960. CAP.

whole of that epoch, as is being done. The fine and immortal work of Stalin should be defended by all of us. He who does not defend it is an opportunist and a coward»¹.

In order to defend Marxism-Leninism, to preserve the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement, the PLA considered it imperative to fight and expose modern revisionism to the very end. Comrade Enver Hoxha underlined that

«the three years that have passed since the Moscow Conference have fully verified that the modern revisionists are nothing but splitters of the communist movement and the socialist camp, avowed enemies of socialism and the working class»².

He criticized the Soviet leadership for failing to apply the Moscow declaration of 1957, for not condemning the Yugoslav revisionist group as it was stipulated there, for having come to terms with and rehabilitating it. The PLA expressed its firm opinion that J. V. Stalin had not been mistaken but had been completely correct in his evaluation of the Yugoslav revision-

1) Enver Hoxha. Speech delivered at the Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, November 1960. CAP.

2) Enver Hoxha. Ibid.

nists. They comprised a very dangerous agency of imperialism, therefore a merciless ideological and political struggle should be continued against them. The PLA was in a better position to confirm this evaluation, because more than anyone else it had experienced on its own back the hostile activity of the Titoites coordinated with the activity of the American imperialists.

But revisionism, Comrade Enver Hoxha pointed out, was to be found not only in Yugoslavia. It was spreading in a most disquieting way among other parties as well. For this reason the definition, which the 1957 Moscow Declaration had made of modern revisionism as the main danger, was correct and should remain in force until this danger was completely eliminated. Consequently, the demand of the Khrushchev group that modern revisionism should be considered as already exposed and defeated was absolutely mistaken and was aimed at covering up Khrushchevite revisionism which was far more dangerous than the Yugoslav brand of revisionism. After demonstrating, from facts, that the counterrevolution in Hungary was prepared by the Hungarian and Yugoslav revisionists with the knowledge and direct support of the Soviet leadership, after pointing out that the disturbing events in Poland, in other socialist countries and in quite a number of communist and workers' parties were the consequence of the spread of revisionism, Comrade Enver Hoxha addressed the participants of the meeting as follows:

«We ask why are these things happening in the international communist movement, in our camp, following the 20th Congress? Do they perhaps happen because the leadership of the Party of Labor of Albania is sectarian, dogmatic, pessimistic?

Such a thing should be of deep concern to us and we must look for the cause of the disease and cure it. Certainly the disease cannot be cured by patting the renegade Tito on the back nor by noting in the declaration that modern revisionism has been completely defeated, as the Soviet comrades claim»¹.

A source of especially great concern was the plot hatched up by the Khrushchev group in Bucharest against the Communist Party of China and the hostile activity it had begun to engage in against the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania since this meeting. Such acts constituted a direct danger to the unity of the international communist movement and the socialist camp. In connection with this, Comrade Enver Hoxha made a sharp principled criticism of the Soviet leadership.

¹) Enver Hoxha. Speech at the Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, November 1960. CAP.

«The Party of Labor of Albania is unanimously of the opinion that the Soviet comrades made a grave blunder in Bucharest, they unjustly condemned the Communist Party of China. . . The Bucharest meeting should, under no circumstances, be forgotten but must be severely condemned as a stain on the international communist movement»¹.

The delegation of the Party of Labor of Albania pointed out that later the Soviet leadership, fully conscious of what they were doing, had further deepened the grave error they had committed in Bucharest. The Albanian delegation informed the meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the ferocious fascist-type attack the group of Khrushchev had launched against the PLA to force the latter to follow the erroneous course and to support the anti-Marxist stand of the Soviet leadership against the Communist Party of China. To attain this end, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders continued their pressure on the delegation of the PLA in Moscow, acting like true blackmarketeers. At the very first meeting our delegation was faced with the alternative: «Albania must decide to go either with the 200 millions (with the USSR — Edit.) or with the 650 millions (the People's Re-

1) Enver Hoxha, Speech delivered at the Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, November 1960, CAIP.

public of China — Edit)»!!, either «it must accept peaceful coexistence, or a single atomic bomb would suffice to wipe Albania and its population right out»!! Not even a representative of imperialism had offered such alternatives and threats to the Albanian people. When they failed to attain anything out of these threats, Khrushchev declared to the Chinese delegation: «We have lost Albania and you have gained it»! Later, on the eve of the meeting of the Communist and workers' parties, the Soviet leadership distributed to all the delegations materials full of calumnies and lies against the Communist Party of China and in which the PLA also was accused of «departing from Marxism-Leninism» and of «anti-Sovietism».

Comrade Enver Hoxha, informing the meeting about these profoundly anti-Marxist acts by the Khrushchev group, addressed the latter as follows:

«What are these monstrous accusations, this 'dealers' treatment of our Party, our people and our socialist country, which, it seems, can be lost or won as in a card game? . . . You consider Albania as a trading token . . . There was a time when Albania was considered a trading token, when others thought it depended on them whether Albania would exist or not, but that time came to an end with the triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in our country. . .

You, Comrade Khrushchev, raised your hand against our small people and the Party of Labor of Albania, but we are convinced that the Soviet people, who have shed their blood for the freedom of our people, too, that the great party of Lenin, are not in accord with this activity of yours»¹.

The delegation of the PLA explained that in its severe but principled criticism against the Soviet leadership it intended only to preserve the unity of the international communist movement and socialist camp. Unity could not be preserved without laying bare errors and evil manifestations, without severely condemning them and correcting them on a Marxist-Leninist basis. To those trying to silence the Party of Labor of Albania and to force it to submit to their erroneous course, Comrade Enver Hoxha replied:

«... Let no one think that, because Albania is small and the Party of Labor is small, Albania and its Party of Labor should do what someone else says, when they are convinced that that someone else is mistaken.

1) Enver Hoxha. Speech delivered at the Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, November 1960, CAP.

Marxism-Leninism has given us the right to have our say and no one can take it right away from us, neither through political or economic pressure, nor through threats or epithets that may be hurled at us»¹.

It was at this meeting of the communist and workers' parties that the crystallization of the two opposing lines in the international communist movement — the Marxist-Leninist line and the revisionist line — became still more apparent.

The struggle between these two lines had become unavoidable although at this meeting the Soviet leadership tried to avert the strife that had broken out in the editing commission. In Khrushchev's speech and in the speeches of a number of heads of delegations there was no mention of any kind of contradictions or differences in the international communist movement, as if none existed at all. The Khrushchevite revisionists aimed thus at concealing the existence of the two opposing lines so as to prevent the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania from having their right of reply to the calumnies contained in the Soviet materials distributed on the eve of the meeting. In this way they wanted to avoid any criticism

1) Enver Hoxha. Speech delivered at the Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, November 1960. CAP.

against the revisionist viewpoints and the divisive and the destructive activity of the Khrushchev group, to put the blame for the differences on the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania. But this tactic met with complete failure. After the criticism by the Albanian and Chinese delegations, the struggle between the two lines in the international communist movement flared up very fiercely.

The representatives of all the parties were obliged to express their stand one way or the other on the problems under discussion. At this point, the revisionists attempted to distract the attention of the participants of the meeting from the problems of principle and to turn the meeting into a platform of base attacks against the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania. But this attempt failed, too. Many of the delegations of the Marxist-Leninist parties supported the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania in defence of the revolutionary line of proletarian internationalism. The revisionists were forced to retreat.

The declaration approved by the meeting of the 81 communist and workers' parties of the world, in general, embodied the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist principles. The attempt of the Khrushchevite revisionists to impose their revisionist line upon the international communist movement was foiled. The Marxist-Leninist line scored yet another victory.

The definition of the content of our epoch

made by the meeting of the 81 communist and workers' parties in 1957 as «period of transition from capitalism to socialism» was supplemented in the new declaration as follows:

«Our epoch, the principal content of which is the transition from capitalism to socialism, which began with the October Socialist Revolution, is the epoch of the struggle between the two opposing social systems, the epoch of socialist revolutions and of national-liberation revolutions, the epoch of the collapse of imperialism, of the liquidation of the colonial system, the epoch of the transition of the other peoples to the road to socialism, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world scale»¹.

Thus, the revisionists were deprived of the possibility of speculating with the incomplete definition of the content of our epoch and of presenting it as an epoch of peaceful coexistence and of economic competition without revolutions and wars of liberation.

A series of revisionist theses which were included in the draft declaration presented by the Soviet leadership and applied by them in

1) The Declaration of the Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties, November 1960.

practice were also rejected. Such theses were: «peaceful coexistence is the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries»; «the possibilities for the peaceful transition to socialism are constantly on the increase»; «in the present period it is possible to prevent all wars,» etc.

In the declaration of the meeting, against the wishes of the Khrushchevite revisionists, it was clearly defined that: — the nature of imperialism has not changed and remains the basis of aggressive wars; — the principal force of aggression and war is U.S. imperialism; — it is at the same time the citadel of world reaction and international gendarme, the enemy of the peoples of the entire world; — in order to avoid a world war it is necessary to arouse all the peoples in struggle against imperialism, dealing the main blow at U.S. imperialism and setting up a common anti-imperialist front; — the national-liberation wars constitute an important force for the prevention of a world war; — these wars should have the all-round support of the socialist countries, of the international communist and workers' movement; — all the Marxist-Leninist parties are independent, equal; — by means of consultations they work out their common views and coordinate their actions in the struggle for the same purpose, etc.

The many efforts of the Khrushchevite revisionists to put aside the definition of revisionism as the main danger, made in the 1957

declaration, were defeated. The definition remained in the new declaration. In addition:

«the communist parties unanimously condemned the Yugoslav form of international opportunism, which is a concentrated expression of the theories of modern revisionism. After having betrayed Marxism-Leninism. . . the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist League detached their country from the socialist camp, made it dependent on the so-called «aid» of the U.S. and other imperialists. . . The further exposure of the Yugoslav revisionist leaders and the active struggle to protect the communist movement as well as the workers' movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists remains an imperative task for the Marxist-Leninist parties»¹.

However, the declaration reflected some incorrect assessments, such as the evaluation of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was left as it was in the 1957 declaration, as well as some other erroneous theses. The PLA was entirely oppo-

1) The Declaration of the Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties, November 1960.

sed to such evaluations and erroneous theses and openly expressed its viewpoints at the meeting. The delegation of the PLA signed the declaration on the bases that in general its content was correct. For the sake of the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement it conceded some incorrect assessments.

The activity of the delegation of the PLA at the Meeting of the 81 communist and workers' parties was fully and unanimously approved by the plenum of the Central Committee. It assessed the stand of the delegation as «determined and principled», and the speech and the entire activity as «very positive and useful».

While reporting to the entire Party on the stand and activity of the delegation, the Central Committee also explained the reasons for and the aims of the sharp, principled and comradely criticism which it had made of the Soviet leadership at the meeting. Through such criticism the PLA aimed at putting an end once and for all to the splitting activity of Khrushchev and his followers, at preserving and strengthening the unity of the international communist movement. It aimed also at putting a stop to the intervention of the Soviet leadership in the internal affairs of the PLA, at eliminating the differences and, as a consequence, at strengthening the fraternal relations between the PLA and the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union, between the People's Republic of Albania and the USSR, at preserving and strengthening the socialist camp. If it had not acted as it did, the PLA would not have felt itself a revolutionary, internationalist Marxist-Leninist party. It has taught its members to be always correct, principled and courageous in the defense of the purity of Marxism-Leninism; to use criticism and self-criticism as a powerful weapon for the elimination of weaknesses and for advancing the cause of socialism.

The courageous, principled Marxist-Leninist stand of the Albanian delegation at Bucharest and at the second meeting in Moscow, in such complicated circumstances of the international communist movement as those created by the activity of the Khrushchevite revisionists, demonstrated the high level of revolutionary maturity of the PLA. Such a stand served as a great example for the Albanian communists in the fierce struggle that had erupted between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism. The sympathy and the support of the world revolutionary Marxist-Leninist forces for the PLA was increased even more.

While approving the stand of its own delegation at the Moscow meeting and taking an example from this stand, the PLA assessed the determined revolutionary principled struggle conducted by the Communist Party of China as a decisive contribution to the victory scored by Marxism-Leninism over revisionism at this

meeting. The common struggle and the revolutionary identity of points of view on the great problems of principle of the international communist movement strengthened the ties and the collaboration between the two parties.

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